No. L-63915. April 24, 1985.
*
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C.
TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity
as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
Mandamus; Private individuals who seek to procure the enforcement of a public
duty (e.g. the publication in the Official Gazette of Presidential Decrees, LOI,
etc.) are real parties in interest in mandamus case.—The reasons given by the
Court in recognizing a private citizen’s legal personality in the aforementioned
case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to
initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for
respondents in this case.
Same; Statutes; Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI states its date of
effectivity does not preclude their publication in the Official Gazette as they
constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present situation where
the President may on his own issue laws.—The clear object of the above-quoted
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
“ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Same; Same; Same.—Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the
Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance than
at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast
by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—
and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such
publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees
have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme
Court of Spain ruled: “Bajo la denoroinación genérica de leyes, se comprenden
también los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
potestad.”
Same; Same; C.A. 638 imposes a duty for publication of Presidential decrees
and issuances as it uses the words “shall be published.”—The very first clause
of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: “There shall be published in the
Official Gazette x x x.” The word “shall” used therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published
in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
Same; Same; But administrative and executive orders and those which affect
only a particular class of persons need not be published.—The publication of
all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
Page | 1
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Same; Same; Due Process; Publication of Presidential decrees and issuances of
general application is a matter of due process.—It is needless to add that the
publication of presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general
applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents.
implemented.—From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court,
it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published
in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive.
1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. Neither the
subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies
thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed
that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by
the government.

Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decrees and issuances of general application

which have not been published shall have no force and effect.—The Court
therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have
not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court,
quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have
on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to
whether the Court’s declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been
enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too
familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and
realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank.

Same; Same; Same; Implementation of Presidential Decrees prior to their

publication in the Official Gazette may have consequences which cannot be
ignored.—Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees
prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is “an operative fact which may
have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.”

Same; Same; Same; Only P.D. Nos. 1019 to 1030, 1278 and 1937 to 1939,
inclusive, have not been published. It is undisputed that none of them has been

Page | 2
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC.,
petitioner, vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES-PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, respondent.
G.R. No. 187654. June 5, 2013.*
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its Board of Directors, petitioner, vs. MILITARY SHRINE
SERVICES-PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondent.
Statutes; Publication; The requirement of publication is indispensable to give
effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided.—Considering
that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots),
their claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos
to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to
include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio
as disposable public land when he made a notation just below the printed
version of Proclamation No. 2476. However, it is undisputed that the
handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette. The resolution of whether the subject lots
were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of whether
the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law.
In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides: ART. 2. Laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication. Under the above provision, the
requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the
law itself has otherwise provided.
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. vs. Military Shrine Services-
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, Department of National Defense
The phrase “unless otherwise provided” refers to a different effectivity date
other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication
in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication
may be dispensed with.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was
not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note
never had any legal force and effect.—This Court cannot rely on a handwritten
note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without
publication, the note never had any legal force and effect. Furthermore, under
Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, “[t]he publication of
any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be
prima facie evidence of its authority.” Thus, whether or not President Marcos
intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative.
Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words appearing in the law. This Court cannot rule
that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain
Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, 310 SCRA 354 (1999), we ruled that “[u]nder
Article 8 of the Civil Code, ‘[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.’
This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for
interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative
of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our
courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist
or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task
of legislating.” The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial
interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law to include
petitioners’ lots in the reclassification.
Page | 3
Nos. L-27860 & L-27896. March 29, 1974.*
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc.
No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO,
respondents.
Nos. L-27936 & L-27937. March 29, 1974.*
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No.
1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, administrator-appellant, vs. LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING,
FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA,
ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
INC., movant-appellee.
Appeals; Certiorari; Certiorari available when remedy of appeal not adequate;
Case at bar.—There is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all
these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will
inevitably cause the proliferation of more or less similar or closely related
incidents and consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and
without taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense
and time which would be involved in as many individual appeals as the number
of such incidents, it is logical and proper to hold that the remedy of appeal is
not adequate in the present cases.
Same; Same; Same; Circumstances considered in determining inadequacy of
appeal.—In determining whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not enough
that the remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is indispensable that taking all
the relevant circumstances of the given case, appeal would better serve the
interests of justice. Obviously, the longer delay, augmented expense and trouble
and unnecessary repetition of the same work attendant to the present multiple
appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic issues that can be
more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action, make
the remedies of certiorari and prohibition preferable for purposes of resolving
the common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded availability
of appeal. Besides, the settling of such common fundamental issues would
naturally minimize the areas of conflict between the parties and render more
simple the determination of the secondary issues in each of them.
Special proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased persons; Where estate
settled when spouses are both deceased.—We are not unmindful of the fact that
under section 2 of Rule 73, “When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered,
and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings
of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall
be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.” Indeed, it is true
that the last sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership
of spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or
permits that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound
judicial discretion in which one it should be made. After all, the former rule
referring to the administrator of the husband’s estate in respect to such
liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which
are now embodied in the rule just cited.
Page | 4
Same; Same; When proceedings for settlement of estate deemed ready for final
closure.—The provisions of section 1 of Rule 90 cannot mean anything less
than that in order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued
already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedent
among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not
be issued until after it is shown that the “debts, funeral expenses, expenses of
administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate” have been paid,
which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually issued
upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or
parties, and not of the court.
Same; Same; Administration of estate; Factors considered in appointment of
administrator.—An administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of
any particular party and his acts are deemed to be objectively for the protection
of the rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the decedent. On the
other hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the
priority among those to whom letter of administration should be granted that
the criterion in the selection of the administrator is not his impartiality alone,
but more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so that the
one assumed to have greater interest is preferred to another who has less.
Wills and succession; Substitution of heirs; Simple or vulgar substitution;
Fideicommissary substitution; Requisites; Case at bar.—Legally speaking, Mrs.
Hodges’ will provide neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under article
859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under article 863
thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for
either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3)
incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by article 859; and
neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is
imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for
anyone else.
Same; Same; When substitution of heir occurs.—Substitution occurs only when
another heir is appointed in a will “so that he may enter into inheritance in
default of the heir originally instituted.”
Same; Institution of heirs simultaneously; Institution considered partially
resolutory; Reasons; Case at bar.—The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are
also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain
conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and
correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It
is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to
be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion
over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely
and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter rivos to anyone other than
himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his right to what might
remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that
contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the
inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would
automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in
the event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Same; Same; Same; Institution in case at bar without legal impediment but
cannot apply to legitime.—The Court sees no legal impediment to this kind of
institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine law, except that it cannot
apply to the legitime of Hodges as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half
of the estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor
descendants.
Same; Order of succession and amount of successional rights; Conflict of laws;
Question of foreign law governing matters in issue one of fact; Foreign law has
to be proven.—The question of what are the laws of Texas governing the
matters in issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is
the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be
proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with
Page | 5
the rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual
knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they
have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties
concerned do not claim otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Exception.—When, with respect to certain
aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case do not have
any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for
granted for the purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are as
such virtual agreement indicates, without the need of requiring the presentation
of what otherwise would be competent evidence on the point.
Evidence; Judicial admissions; Case at bar.—PCIB’s representations in regard
to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other
parties and the court are being made to rely and act upon. PCIB is “not permitted
to contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or
inconsistent with them.”
G.R. No. 169364. September 18, 2009.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EVANGELINE SITON
y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y MEFANIA, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Police Power; The power to define crimes and prescribe
their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the
sovereign power of the state to maintain social orders as an aspect of police
power.—The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding
penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state
to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature may even
forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that
no constitutional rights have been abridged. However, in exercising its power
to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen
with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a
certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to
avoid. This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-vagueness
doctrine which states that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential
of due process of law.”
Same; Same; Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searchers and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complaint and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.—Under the
Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
Page | 6
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. Thus, as with any other act or offense,
the requirement of probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or
executive authority that may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or
arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the
respondents, echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the
hands of the police to make an arrest or search, is therefore assuaged by the
constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is one less than certainty
or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; The requirement of probable cause cannot be
done away with arbitrarily without pain of punishment, for absent this
requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse.—The requirement
of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain of
punishment, for, absent this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty
of abuse. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the
peace officers making the arrest.
Criminal Law; Vagrancy; Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be
considered constitutionally offensive.—Article 202 (2) does not violate the
equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status,
as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such
circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension
in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification
to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct. Vagrancy must not be so
lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order
crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and
time which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable
concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community.
Constitutional Law; Vagrancy; We agree with the position of the State that first
and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and constitutional.—
We agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2)
should be presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a
constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with
grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is
presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality. The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in
the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to
sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which
enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of
the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be
in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
Criminal Law; Vagrancy; As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2)
must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.—It must not be forgotten that
police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and
pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety,
public morals, and the general welfare. As an obvious police power measure,
Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.
Page | 7
G.R. No. 173615. October 16, 2009.*
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. CAYETANO A.
TEJANO, JR., respondent.
Civil Service Commission; Public Officers; Privatization; Revised Charter of
the Philippine National Bank (E.O. No. 80); By no stretch of intelligent and
reasonable construction can the provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 be
interpreted in such a way as to divest the Civil Service Commission of
jurisdiction over pending disciplinary cases involving acts committed by an
employee of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) at the time that the bank was
still a government-owned and controlled corporation.—In a language too plain
to be mistaken, the quoted portion of the law only states no more than the
natural, logical and legal consequences of opening to private ownership the
majority of the bank’s voting equity. This is very evident in the title of the
section called Change in Ownership of the Majority of the Voting Equity of the
Bank. Certainly, the transfer of the majority of the bank’s voting equity from
public to private hands is an inevitable effect of privatization or, conversely, the
privatization of the bank would necessitate the opening of the voting equity
thereof to private ownership. And as the bank ceases to be government
depository, it would, accordingly be coming under the operation of the definite
set of laws and rules applicable to all other private corporations incorporated
under the general incorporation law. Perhaps the aspect of more importance in
the present case is that the bank, upon its privatization, would no longer be
subject to the coverage of government service-wide agencies such as the CSC
and the Commission on Audit (COA). By no stretch of intelligent and
reasonable construction can the provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 be
interpreted in such a way as to divest the CSC of jurisdiction over pending
disciplinary cases involving acts committed by an employee of the PNB at the
time that the bank was still a government-owned and controlled corporation.
Stated otherwise, no amount of reasonable inference may be derived from the
terms of the said Section to the effect that it intends to modify the jurisdiction
of the CSC in disciplinary cases involving employees of the government.
Same; Same; Same; It is binding rule, conformably with Article 4 of the Civil
Code, that, generally, laws shall have only a prospective effect and must not be
applied retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases—
the fact that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 80 states that Philippine National
Bank (PNB) would be removed from the coverage of the Civil Service
Commission must be taken to govern acts committed by the bank’s employees
after privatization.—It is binding rule, conformably with Article 4 of the Civil
Code, that, generally, laws shall have only a prospective effect and must not be
applied retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases.
This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit (the law
looks forward and not backward.) The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive: the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and, hence, is
unconstitutional. Although the rule admits of certain well-defined exceptions
such as, for instance, where the law itself expressly provides for retroactivity,
we find that not one of such exceptions that would otherwise lend credence to
petitioner’s argument obtains in this case. Hence, in other words, the fact that
Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 states that PNB would be removed from the coverage
of the CSC must be taken to govern acts committed by the bank’s employees
after privatization.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction is conferred by no other source
than law, and once acquired, it continues until the case is finally terminated.—
Jurisdiction is conferred by no other source than law. Once jurisdiction is
acquired, it continues until the case is finally terminated. The disciplinary
jurisdiction of the CSC over government officials and employees within its
coverage is well-defined in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807, otherwise
known as The Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Section 37 thereof
materially provides that the CSC shall have jurisdiction over appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of the penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days’ salary; demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. It bears to stress on this score that the CSC was able to acquire
Page | 8
jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent merely upon its filing, followed by
the submission of his memorandum on appeal. From that point, the appellate
jurisdiction of the CSC at once attached, thereby vesting it with the authority to
dispose of the case on the merits until it shall have been finally terminated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nowhere in Section 6 of Executive Order No. 80
can we find even the slightest indication that indeed it expressly authorizes the
transfer of jurisdiction from the Civil Service Commission to another tribunal
over disciplinary and administrative cases already pending with the said
Commission even prior to the enactment of the law.—Petitioner derives support
from the exceptions laid down in the cases of Latchme Motoomull and Bengzon
quoted above. Yet, as discussed above, the provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No.
80 are too clear and unambiguous to be interpreted in such a way as to abort the
continued exercise by the CSC of its appellate jurisdiction over the appeal filed
before the privatization of PNB became effective. Suffice it to say that nowhere
in the said Section can we find even the slightest indication that indeed it
expressly authorizes the transfer of jurisdiction from the CSC to another
tribunal over disciplinary and administrative cases already pending with the
said Commission even prior to the enactment of the law. Philippine National
Bank vs. Tejano, Jr., 604 SCRA 147, G.R. No. 173615 October 16, 2009
G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996.*
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996.*
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
Political Law; Citizenship; Having been declared as a non-citizen, it is
incumbent upon Frivaldo to show that he has reacquired citizenship.—
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, it is
therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in
fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A.
7160).
Same; Same; Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation.—Under Philippine law, citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 and during the oral argument in
this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but
that the bill allowing him to do so “failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives” due,
according to him, to the “maneuvers of his political rivals.” In the same case,
his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional,
substantial and procedural defects.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Memorandum dated March 27, 1987
cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning
or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725.—This memorandum dated March 27,
1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law
sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no
express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum—
Page | 9
based on the copy furnished us by Lee—did not categorically and/or impliedly
state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal
effect.
Same; Same; Same; It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored.—On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will
not be allowed “unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that
the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot
co-exist.”
Same; Same; The law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship unlike that for residence and age.—From the
above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which
must consist of at least one year’s residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Same; Same; Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
Qualifications of Elective Officials not of candidates.—So too, even from a
literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that
Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of “Qualifications” of
“ELECTIVE OFFICIALS,” not of candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the
certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications—unless
otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence—should
thus be possessed when the “elective [or elected] official” begins to govern, i.e.,
at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term—in this case, on June
30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court’s ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng
Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our
people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the
time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
Same; Same; Same; The Local Government Code requires an elective official
to be a registered voter, it does not require him to vote actually.—If the law
intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent
with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made
citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It
therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes
being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was
included as another qualification (aside from “citizenship”), not to reiterate the
need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN
THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: “a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he
intends to be elected.” It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code
requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to
vote actually. Hence, registration—not the actual voting—is the core of this
“qualification.” In other words, the law’s purpose in this second requirement is
to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks
to govern—and not anywhere else.
Same; Same; The repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of
his application on August 17, 1994.—But to remove all doubts on this important
issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date
of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
Same; Same; Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted
by his repatriation.—Being a former Filipino who has served the people
repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted
by his repatriation.
Page | 10

Same; Same; In case of doubt on the interpretation or application of laws, it is
to be presumed that the law making body intended right and justice to prevail.—
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent
prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and
the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of
applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who
may be stateless, as Frivaldo—having already renounced his American
citizenship—was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This
should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
to be presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Same; Same; Decision declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a person’s future status with finality.—Indeed, decisions declaring the
acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter
lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; The power to annul a proclamation
must be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation.—The Court
however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must “be done
within ten (10) days following the proclamation.” Inasmuch as Frivaldo’s
petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee’s proclamation, there is no question
that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the elections.
Same; Same; A decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections
is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of
time.—In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec
did not commit grave abuse of discretion because “Section 6 of R.A. 6646
authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the
elections.” In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section
78 “is merely directory,” we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to “DISMISS G.R. No. 120295.” One other point. Loong, as
quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section
78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case
however deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such
petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period
mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the
Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed
beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.

Same; Same; It is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of

R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the elections.—This claim is now moot and
academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the
subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19,
1995, affirmed en banc on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his election.
At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A.

Page | 11

G.R. No. 187521. March 14, 2012.*
F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORP.,
respondent.
Construction Contracts; Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC); Jurisdiction; Arbitration; Appeals; Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1008
vests upon the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) original
and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with,
contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines; The
arbitral award of Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) shall
be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable
to the Supreme Court.—Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1008 vests upon the CIAC
original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected
with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the
Philippines. Under Section 19 of E.O. No. 1008, the arbitral award of CIAC
“shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court.” In Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. v. Lim
Kim Steel Builders, Inc., 228 SCRA 397 (1993), we explained raison d’ etre for
the rule on finality of the CIAC’s arbitral award in this wise: Voluntary
arbitration involves the reference of a dispute to an impartial body, the members
of which are chosen by the parties themselves, which parties freely consent in
advance to abide by the arbitral award issued after proceedings where both
parties had the opportunity to be heard. The basic objective is to provide a
speedy and inexpensive method of settling disputes by allowing the parties to
avoid the formalities, delay, expense and aggravation which commonly
accompany ordinary litigation, especially litigation which goes through the
entire hierarchy of courts. Executive Order No. 1008 created an arbitration
facility to which the construction industry in the Philippines can have recourse.
The Executive Order was enacted to encourage the early and expeditious
settlement of disputes in the construction industry, a public policy the
implementation of which is necessary and important for the realization of
national development goals. Aware of the objective of voluntary arbitration in
the labor field, in the construction industry, and in any other area for that matter,
the Court will not assist one or the other or even both parties in any effort to
subvert or defeat that objective for their private purposes. The Court will not
review the factual findings of an arbitral tribunal upon the artful allegation that
such body had “misapprehended the facts” and will not pass upon issues which
are, at bottom, issues of fact, no matter how cleverly disguised they might be as
“legal questions.” The parties here had recourse to arbitration and chose the
arbitrators themselves; they must have had confidence in such arbitrators. x x
x.
Questions of Law; A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.—A question of law arises
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Waivers; Waiver is defined as “a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the
voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by
him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person
forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with
claiming it.”—In People of the Philippines v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991),
this Court explained the doctrine of waiver in this wise: Waiver is defined as “a
voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing
legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver
Page | 12
the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a Mortgage Law. The rescission referred to in this article, more appropriately
capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right referred to as resolution is on the breach of faith by the defendant which is
shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such violative of the reciprocity between the parties. The right to rescind, however,
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the may be waived, expressly or impliedly. While the right to rescind reciprocal
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.” As to what rights and obligations is implied, that is, that such right need not be expressly provided in
privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: x x x the doctrine of waiver the contract, nevertheless the contracting parties may waive the same. Contrary
extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word ‘waiver’ to the respective dispositions of the CIAC and the CA, we find that HRCC had
covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive no right to rescind the Subcontract Agreement in the guise of a work stoppage,
any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of the latter having waived such right.
which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled,
whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further
provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does
not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has
a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely
for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can
be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and
without detriment to the community at large. x x x.

Reciprocal Obligations; Rescission; While the right to rescind reciprocal

obligations is implied, that is, that such right need not be expressly provided in
the contract, nevertheless the contracting parties may waive the same.—The
right of rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal obligations. Article
1191 of the Civil Code pertinently reads: Art. 1191. The power to rescind
obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not
comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose
between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment
of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. The court shall decree the
rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who
have acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the

Page | 13

G.R. No. 79269. June 5, 1991.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PROCORO J.
DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander
Bilog, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Rebellion; Bail; Rebellion is a bailable
offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution.––We agree
with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent
for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not exceeding P20,000.00. It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Before conviction bail is either a matter of right or
of discretion; When a matter of right and a matter of discretion.––Therefore,
before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of
right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. Upon the other hand, if
the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter
of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court’s
discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.
But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also
becomes a matter of right.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.––The 1987 Constitution
strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prosecution does not have the right to present
evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right,
such is required only where the grant of bail is discretionary.––Accordingly, the
prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in
the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the
grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that
it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The guidelines for the fixing of the amount
of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not
matters left entirely to the discretion of the court; Guidelines in the fixing of a
bailbond.––We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the
respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without
hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the fixing of the amount of bail
provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left
entirely to the discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et
al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495: “Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for
the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to
refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character
and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a
fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other
case. x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent has unequivocably waived his
right to bail.––Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in
legal custody, private respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition of waiver.––Waiver is defined as
“a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for
such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or
surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent
that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its
Page | 14
benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.” third person with a right recognized by law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What rights and privileges may be waived.– Same; Same; Same; Under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer
–As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: “x x punishable by prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00.––It must,
x the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no
since the word ‘waiver’ covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule longer punishable by prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00.
that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990 and which took effect
alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or after publication in at least two newspapers of general circulation, amended,
to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalty
statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest for rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads: “Article 135. Penalty for
in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights rebellion, insurrection or coup d’etat.––Any person who promotes, maintains,
of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is perpetua. Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others
recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage in a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.”
of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in
his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large.
x x x Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute
or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a
statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it
infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals
and the public interest may be waived. While it has been stated generally that
all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be
waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect
property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to
secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rights to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived.––We hereby rule that the right to
bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to

Page | 15
G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002.*
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian
ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Maternity and Filiation; Under the new law, an action
for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime
of the alleged parent.—Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an
illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The
Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when
the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to
dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children are usually begotten
and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their
existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to
affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is
already dead.”
Same; Same; Same; The Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have
already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired.—
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already
vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
“ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.”
Same; Same; Same; The rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment
of natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such action, may
likewise be applied to spurious children.—Moreover, in the earlier case
Divinagracia v. Rovira, the Court said that the rules on voluntary and
compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive
period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children.
G.R. No. 125129. March 29, 1999.*
JOSEPH H. REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondent.
Constitutional Law; Commission on Audit; Appeals; Article IX-A, Section 7 of
the Constitution provides that decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission
on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party.—To begin with, Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that
decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party. Under Rule 64, Section 2,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment or final order of the Commission on
Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under
Rule 65.
Same; Same; Same; The mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission
on Audit to this Court is only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as
provided by the 1987 Constitution.—The petition in this case was filed on June
17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit
to this Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by
the 1987 Constitution. The judgments and final orders of the Commission on
Audit are not reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this
Court. Only when the Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme
Court under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court is not allowed
from any order, ruling or decision of the Commission on Audit.
Page | 16
Words and Phrases; A vested right is one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.—There
is no merit to petitioner’s claim that the members of the Provident Fund
acquired a vested right over the government contributions. “A vested right is
one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no
obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent
upon a contingency.” As previously stated, the government contributions were
subject to the condition that the funds would be used to augment the retirement
and other fringe benefits of TLRC employees. What is more, the Provident Fund
was dissolved due to lack of statutory basis. Thus, contributions made were
unauthorized, if not unlawful.
G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006.*
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City
and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI,
represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Forum Shopping; The certification of non-
forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party.—
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-
forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party.
Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case.
However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of
justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 673 (2000),
we ruled that while a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of
non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this
procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice. So it
is in the present controversy where the merits of the case and the absence of an
intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling
reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.
Same; Succession; Waivers; A waiver may not be attributed to a person when
its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.—As
regards Remedios’ Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private
respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a
waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt
as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains
to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not
explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. In this case, we find
that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim
does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor
daughters “by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all
claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino
Page | 17
Guy Susim.” Considering that the document did not specifically mention
private respondents’ hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be
construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Parents and guardians may not repudiate
the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval.—Even assuming that
Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver
will not bar the latter’s claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides: ART.
1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or
repudiate an inheritance. Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons
may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may
repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. The
right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons
designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the
property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis
supplied) Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of
their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to
an alienation of property which must pass the court’s scrutiny in order to protect
the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and
Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents
from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Same; Same; Same; Illegitimate Children; Where one lacks knowledge of a
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest—ignorance of a material
fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under
a mistake or misapprehension of fact; One who is yet to prove his status as
acknowledged illegitimate child of the deceased cannot possibly waive his
successional right.—It must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there
is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates
waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact. In the present case, private respondents could not have
possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their
status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself
has consistently denied that private respondents are his coheirs. It would thus
be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner
claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner’s invocation of waiver
on the part of private respondents must fail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; Illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died
during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up
to four years from attaining majority age.—We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo, 374
SCRA 180 (2002), that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time
the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their
minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years
from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away
by the passage of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Settlement of Estates; Probate Courts; Pleadings and Practice; The
court before which a petition for letters of administration is not precluded from
receiving evidence on a person’s filiation—its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir;
Two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, may be joined in one complaint.—While the original action filed
by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial court
is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents’ filiation. Its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the
determination of the status of each heir. That the two causes of action, one to
compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
Page | 18
G.R. No. 164527. August 15, 2007.*
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, R-II BUILDERS, INC., R-II HOLDINGS, INC.,
HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC., and MR. REGHIS
ROMERO II, respondents.
Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Taxpayer’s Suit; In cases where issues of
transcendental public importance are presented, there is no necessity to show
that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and
personal injury as the requisite injury is assumed; Issues averred to be in breach
of the fair diffusion of the country’s natural resources and the constitutional
right of a citizen to information are matters of transcendental public
importance.—Only a person who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or entitled to the avails of the suit can file a complaint or
petition. Respondents claim that petitioner is not a proper party-in-interest as he
was unable to show that “he has sustained or is in immediate or imminent
danger of sustaining some direct and personal injury as a result of the execution
and enforcement of the assailed contracts or agreements.” Moreover, they assert
that not all government contracts can justify a taxpayer’s suit especially when
no public funds were utilized in contravention of the Constitution or a law. We
explicated in Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 (1998), that in cases where
issues of transcendental public importance are presented, there is no necessity
to show that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct
and personal injury as the requisite injury is assumed. We find our ruling in
Chavez v. PEA, 384 SCRA 152 (2002), as conclusive authority on locus standi
in the case at bar since the issues raised in this petition are averred to be in
breach of the fair diffusion of the country’s natural resources and the
constitutional right of a citizen to information which have been declared to be
matters of transcendental public importance. Moreover, the pleadings
especially those of respondents readily reveal that public funds have been
indirectly utilized in the Project by means of Smokey Mountain Project
Participation Certificates (SMPPCs) bought by some government agencies.
Hence, petitioner, as a taxpayer, is a proper party to the instant petition before
the court.
Same; Hierarchy of Courts; While direct recourse to the Supreme Court is
generally frowned upon and discouraged, such resort may be allowed if the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction; Serious
constitutional challenges allegedly affecting the right of Filipinos to the
distribution of natural resources in the country and the right to information of a
citizen compel the Court to turn a blind eye to the judicial structure meant to
provide an orderly dispensation of justice and consider the instant petition as a
justified deviation from an established precept.—While direct recourse to this
Court is generally frowned upon and discouraged, we have however ruled in
Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993), that such resort to us may be
allowed in certain situations, wherein this Court ruled that petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, though cognizable by other courts, may
directly be filed with us if “the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [this Court’s]
primary jurisdiction.” The instant petition challenges the constitutionality and
legality of the SMDRP involving several hectares of government land and
hundreds of millions of funds of several government agencies. Moreover,
serious constitutional challenges are made on the different aspects of the Project
which allegedly affect the right of Filipinos to the distribution of natural
resources in the country and the right to information of a citizen—matters which
have been considered to be of extraordinary significance and grave consequence
to the public in general. These concerns in the instant action compel us to turn
a blind eye to the judicial structure meant to provide an orderly dispensation of
justice and consider the instant petition as a justified deviation from an
established precept.
Page | 19
Natural Resources; Judgments; Stare Decisis; Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority (PEA), 384 SCRA 152 (2002), is not a binding precedent to the
instant petition because the facts in said case are substantially different from the
facts and circumstances in the case at bar.—The Court finds that PEA is not a
binding precedent to the instant petition because the facts in said case are
substantially different from the facts and circumstances in the case at bar, thus:
(1) The reclamation project in PEA was undertaken through a JVA entered into
between PEA and AMARI. The reclamation project in the instant NHA case
was undertaken by the NHA, a national government agency in consultation with
PEA and with the approval of two Philippine Presidents; (2) In PEA, AMARI
and PEA executed a JVA to develop the Freedom Islands and reclaim
submerged areas without public bidding on April 25, 1995. In the instant NHA
case, the NHA and RBI executed a JVA after RBI was declared the winning
bidder on August 31, 1992 as the JVA partner of the NHA in the SMDRP after
compliance with the requisite public bidding. (3) In PEA, there was no law or
presidential proclamation classifying the lands to be reclaimed as alienable and
disposal lands of public domain. In this RBI case, MO 415 of former President
Aquino and Proclamation No. 39 of then President Ramos, coupled with Special
Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598, classified the reclaimed lands as alienable
and disposable; (4) In PEA, the Chavez petition was filed before the amended
JVA was executed by PEA and AMARI. In this NHA case, the JVA and
subsequent amendments were already substantially implemented.
Subsequently, the Project was terminated through a MOA signed on August 27,
2003. Almost one year later on August 5, 2004, the Chavez petition was filed;
(5) In PEA, AMARI was considered to be in bad faith as it signed the amended
JVA after the Chavez petition was filed with the Court and after Senate
Committee Report No. 560 was issued finding that the subject lands are
inalienable lands of public domain. In the instant petition, RBI and other
respondents are considered to have signed the agreements in good faith as the
Project was terminated even before the Chavez petition was filed; (6) The PEA-
AMARI JVA was executed as a result of direct negotiation between the parties
and not in accordance with the BOT Law. The NHA-RBI JVA and subsequent
amendments constitute a BOT contract governed by the BOT Law; and (7) In
PEA, the lands to be reclaimed or already reclaimed were transferred to PEA, a
government entity tasked to dispose of public lands under Executive Order No.
(EO) 525. In the NHA case, the reclaimed lands were transferred to NHA, a
government entity NOT tasked to dispose of public land and therefore said
alienable lands were converted to patrimonial lands upon their transfer to NHA.
Thus the PEA Decision cannot be considered an authority or precedent to the
instant case. The principle of stare decisis has no application to the different
factual setting of the instant case.
Reclamation Projects; Public Estates Authority (PEA); Requisites for Legal and
Valid Reclamation Projects.—EO 525 reads: Section 1. The Public Estates
Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a
proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that,
reclamation projects of any national government agency or entity authorized
under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon
approval of the President. (Emphasis supplied.) The aforequoted provision
points to three (3) requisites for a legal and valid reclamation project, viz.: (1)
approval by the President; (2) favorable recommendation of PEA; and (3)
undertaken by any of the following: a. by PEA, b. by any person or entity
pursuant to a contract it executed with PEA, and c. by the National Government
agency or entity authorized under its charter to reclaim lands subject to
consultation with PEA.
Same; Same; While Public Estates Authority (PEA) under PD 1084 has the
power to reclaim land and under EO 525 is primarily responsible for integrating,
directing and coordinating reclamation projects, such authority is not exclusive
and such power to reclaim may be granted or delegated to another government
agency or entity or may even be undertaken by the National Government itself,
Public Estates Authority (PEA) being only an agency and a part of the National
Government.—Without doubt, PEA under EO 525 was designated as the
Page | 20
agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects. Primarily means “mainly, principally, mostly, generally.”
Thus, not all reclamation projects fall under PEA’s authority of supervision,
integration, and coordination. The very charter of PEA, PD 1084, does not
mention that PEA has the exclusive and sole power and authority to reclaim
lands of public domain. EO 525 even reveals the exception—reclamation
projects by a national government agency or entity authorized by its charter to
reclaim land. One example is EO 405 which authorized the Philip-pine Ports
Authority (PPA) to reclaim and develop submerged areas for port related
purposes. Under its charter, PD 857, PPA has the power “to reclaim, excavate,
enclose or raise any of the lands” vested in it. Thus, while PEA under PD 1084
has the power to reclaim land and under EO 525 is primarily responsible for
integrating, directing and coordinating reclamation projects, such authority is
NOT exclusive and such power to reclaim may be granted or delegated to
another government agency or entity or may even be undertaken by the National
Government itself, PEA being only an agency and a part of the National
Government.
Same; National Housing Authority (NHA); Administrative Law; Basic in
administrative law is the doctrine that a government agency or office has
express and implied powers based on its charter and other pertinent statutes;
When a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is
also conferred by necessary implication—implied powers are those that can be
inferred or are implicit in the wordings of the law or conferred by necessary or
fair implication in the enabling act; The power to reclaim on the part of the
National Housing Authority (NHA) is implicit from PD 757, RA 7279, MO
415, RA 6957, and PD 3-A.—Basic in administrative law is the doctrine that a
government agency or office has express and implied powers based on its
charter and other pertinent statutes. Express powers are those powers granted,
allocated, and delegated to a government agency or office by express provisions
of law. On the other hand, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are
implicit in the wordings of the law or conferred by necessary or fair implication
in the enabling act. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936),
the Court clarified and stressed that when a general grant of power is conferred
or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary implication. It
was also explicated that when the statute does not specify the particular method
to be followed or used by a government agency in the exercise of the power
vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable
method to carry out its functions. The power to reclaim on the part of the NHA
is implicit from PD 757, RA 7279, MO 415, RA 6957, and PD 3-A.
Same; Same; Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project
(SMDRP); Even without an implied power to reclaim lands under National
Housing Authority (NHA’s) charter, we rule that the ,authority granted to
National Housing Authority (NHA), a national government agency, by the
President under PD 3-A reinforced by EO 525 is more than sufficient statutory
basis for the reclamation of lands under the Smokey Mountain Development
and Reclamation Project (SMDRP); Under PD 3-A, “national government” can
only mean the Executive Branch headed by the President—it cannot refer to
Congress as it was dissolved and abolished at the time of the issuance of PD 3-
A.—Even without an implied power to reclaim lands under NHA’s charter, we
rule that the authority granted to NHA, a national government agency, by the
President under PD 3-A reinforced by EO 525 is more than sufficient statutory
basis for the reclamation of lands under the SMDRP. PD 3-A is a law issued by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos under his martial law powers on September
23, 1972. It provided that “[t]he provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas, underwater, whether foreshore or
inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized
by it under the proper contract.” It repealed, in effect, RA 1899 which
previously delegated the right to reclaim lands to municipalities and chartered
cities and revested it to the National Government. Under PD 3-A, “national
government” can only mean the Executive Branch headed by the President. It
cannot refer to Congress as it was dissolved and abolished at the time of the
issuance of PD 3-A on September 23, 1972. Moreover, the Executive Branch is
Page | 21
the only implementing arm in the government with the equipment, manpower,
expertise, and capability by the very nature of its assigned powers and functions
to undertake reclamation projects. Thus, under PD 3-A, the Executive Branch
through the President can implement reclamation of lands through any of its
departments, agencies, or offices. Subsequently, on February 4, 1977, President
Marcos issued PD 1084 creating the PEA, which was granted, among others,
the power “to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas by
dredging, filling or other means or to acquire reclaimed lands.” The PEA’s
power to reclaim is not however exclusive as can be gleaned from its charter,
as the President retained his power under PD 3-A to designate another agency
to reclaim lands. On February 14, 1979, EO 525 was issued. It granted PEA
primary responsibility for integrating, directing, and coordinating reclamation
projects for and on behalf of the National Government although other national
government agencies can be designated by the President to reclaim lands in
coordination with the PEA. Despite the issuance of EO 525, PD 3-A remained
valid and subsisting. Thus, the National Government through the President still
retained the power and control over all reclamation projects in the country.
Same; Same; Same; President; Power of Control; Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR); The President can exercise executive power
motu proprio and can supplant the act or decision of a subordinate with the
President’s own; The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) is a department in the executive branch under the President, and it is
only an alter ego of the latter; There is nothing infirm or unconstitutional if the
President decides on the implementation of a certain project or activity and
requires said department to implement it.—Section 17, Art. VII of the
Constitution provides that “the President shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices.” The President is assigned the task of seeing
to it that all laws are faithfully executed. “Control,” in administrative law,
means “the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” As such, the President can
exercise executive power motu proprio and can supplant the act or decision of
a subordinate with the President’s own. The DENR is a department in the
executive branch under the President, and it is only an alter ego of the latter.
Ordinarily the proposed action and the staff work are initially done by a
department like the DENR and then submitted to the President for approval.
However, there is nothing infirm or unconstitutional if the President decides on
the implementation of a certain project or activity and requires said department
to implement it. Such is a presidential prerogative as long as it involves the
department or office authorized by law to supervise or execute the Project.
Thus, as in this case, when the President approved and ordered the development
of a housing project with the corresponding reclamation work, making DENR
a member of the committee tasked to implement the project, the required
authorization from the DENR to reclaim land can be deemed satisfied. It cannot
be disputed that the ultimate power over alienable and disposable public lands
is reposed in the President of the Philippines and not the DENR Secretary. To
still require a DENR authorization on the Smokey Mountain when the President
has already authorized and ordered the implementation of the Project would be
a derogation of the powers of the President as the head of the executive branch.
Otherwise, any department head can defy or oppose the implementation of a
project approved by the head of the executive branch, which is patently illegal
and unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When a statute imposes a specific duty
on the executive department, the President may act directly or order the said
department to undertake an activity.—In Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534
(2004), we stated that when a statute imposes a specific duty on the executive
department, the President may act directly or order the said department to
undertake an activity, thus: [A]t the apex of the entire executive official-dom is
the President. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution specifies [her] power
as Chief executive departments, bureaus and offices. [She] shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed. As Chief Executive, President Arroyo holds the
steering wheel that controls the course of her government. She lays down
policies in the execution of her plans and programs. Whatever policy she
chooses, she has her subordinates to implement them. In short, she has the
Page | 22
power of control. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation
to her subordinate, she may act directly or merely direct the performance of a
duty x x x. Such act is well within the prerogative of her office (emphasis
supplied).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to order the reclamation of
lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philip-pine President.—The power
to order the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the
Philippine President. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 grants
authority to the President to reserve lands of public domain for settlement for
any specific purpose, thus: Section 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public
and Private Domain of the Government.—(1) The President shall have the
power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific public purposes,
any of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise directed
by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public
purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Same; Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; The Court finds that the
conclusion that the lands to be reclaimed by National Housing Authority (NHA)
are classified as alienable and disposable is derived and implicit from the
authority given to the National Housing Authority (NHA) to transfer the
reclaimed lands to qualified beneficiaries.—It cannot be said that MO 415,
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit declarations that the lands to be
reclaimed are classified as alienable and disposable. We find however that such
conclusion is derived and implicit from the authority given to the NHA to
transfer the reclaimed lands to qualified beneficiaries.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The reclaimed lands became alienable and
disposable only after the special patents covering said areas were issued; MO
415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly taken together
with Special Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the
requirement in Public Estates Authority (PEA) that “[t]here must be a law or
presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.”—The query is,
when did the declaration take effect? It did so only after the special patents
covering the reclaimed areas were issued. It is only on such date that the
reclaimed lands became alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
This is in line with the ruling in PEA where said issue was clarified and stressed:
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino’s issuance of a land patent also
constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public
service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties. (Emphasis
supplied.) Thus, MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and
jointly taken together with Special Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than
satisfy the requirement in PEA that “[t]here must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable and open to disposition or concession (emphasis supplied).”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law
(R.A. No. 6957); RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 provides ample authority
for the classification of reclaimed land in the Smokey Mountain Development
and Reclamation Project (SMDRP) for the repayment scheme of the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) project as alienable and disposable lands of public
domain—a conclusion is necessarily implied, for how else can the land be used
as the enabling component for the Project if such classification is not deemed
made?—Apropos the requisite law categorizing reclaimed land as alienable or
disposable, we find that RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 provides ample
authority for the classification of reclaimed land in the SMDRP for the
repayment scheme of the BOT project as alienable and disposable lands of
public domain. Sec. 6 of RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 provides: For the
financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any infrastructure
projects undertaken through the build-operate-and transfer arrangement or any
Page | 23
of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the project proponent x
x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the revenue of the project
or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a
portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional
requirements with respect to the ownership of the land. (Emphasis supplied.)
While RA 6957 as modified by RA 7718 does not expressly declare that the
reclaimed lands that shall serve as payment to the project proponent have
become alienable and disposable lands and opened for disposition; nonetheless,
this conclusion is necessarily implied, for how else can the land be used as the
enabling component for the Project if such classification is not deemed made?
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Patrimonial Properties; The National
Housing Authority (NHA) is a government agency not tasked to dispose of
public lands under its charter—it is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands; The moment titles over reclaimed
lands based on the special patents are transferred to the National Housing
Authority (NHA) by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to
patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and
private corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos.—It may be argued
that the grant of authority to sell public lands, pursuant to PEA, does not convert
alienable lands of public domain into private or patrimonial lands. We ruled in
PEA that “alienable lands of public domain must be transferred to qualified
private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands,
before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands (emphasis
supplied).” To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private
person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of public
domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a private
corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold
and dispose of alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it is
transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the
other hand, the NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public
lands under its charter—The Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The NHA
is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to administer and dispose of
reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special
patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are
automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold
to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by
Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to
patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer
it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of public domain.
More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals since it can
only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and prospective buyers
to raise funds for the SMDRP. From the foregoing considerations, we find that
the 79-hectare reclaimed land has been declared alienable and disposable land
of the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been reclassified as
patrimonial property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The combined and collective
effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with Special Patents Nos. 3592 and
3598 is tantamount to and can be considered to be an official declaration that
the reclaimed lots are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.—
Petitioner’s sole reliance on Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 without taking into
consideration the special patents issued by the DENR demonstrates the inherent
weakness of his proposition. As was ruled in PEA cited by petitioner himself,
“PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom islands as alienable or disposable lands of public
domain.” In a similar vein, the combined and collective effect of Proclamations
Nos. 39 and 465 with Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and
can be considered to be an official declaration that the reclaimed lots are
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands covered
by Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598, which evidence transfer of
ownership of reclaimed lands to the NHA, are official acts of the DENR
Secretary in the exercise of his power of supervision and control over alienable
and disposable public lands and his exclusive jurisdiction over the management
and disposition of all lands of public domain under the Revised Administrative
Page | 24
Code of 1987. Special Patent No. 3592 speaks of the transfer of Lots 1 and 2,
and RI-003901-000012-D with an area of 401,485 square meters based on the
survey and technical description approved by the Bureau of Lands. Lastly,
Special Patent No. 3598 was issued in favor of the NHA transferring to said
agency a tract of land described in Plan RL-00-000013 with an area of 390,000
square meters based on the survey and technical descriptions approved by the
Bureau of Lands.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The issuance of certificates of
titles in National Housing Authority’s (NHA’s) name automatically converts
the reclaimed lands to patrimonial properties of the National Housing Authority
(NHA); The laws of the land have to be applied and interpreted depending on
the changing conditions and times—one such law that should be treated
differently is the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law (RA 6957) which
brought about a novel way of implementing government contracts by allowing
reclaimed land as part or full payment to the contractor of a government project
to satisfy the huge financial requirements of the under-taking.—Subsequently,
the special patents in the name of the NHA were submitted to the Register of
Deeds of the City of Manila for registration, and corresponding certificates of
titles over the reclaimed lots were issued based on said special patents. The
issuance of certificates of titles in NHA’s name automatically converts the
reclaimed lands to patrimonial properties of the NHA. Otherwise, the lots would
not be of use to the NHA’s housing projects or as payment to the BOT
contractor as the enabling component of the BOT contract. The laws of the land
have to be applied and interpreted depending on the changing conditions and
times. Tempora mutantur et legis mutantur in illis (time changes and laws
change with it). One such law that should be treated differently is the BOT Law
(RA 6957) which brought about a novel way of implementing mgovernment
contracts by allowing reclaimed land as part or full payment to the contractor
of a government project to satisfy the huge financial requirements of the
undertaking. The NHA holds the lands covered by Special Patents Nos. 3592
and 3598 solely for the purpose of the SMDRP undertaken by authority of the
BOT Law and for disposition in accordance with said special law. The lands
become alienable and disposable lands of public domain upon issuance of the
special patents and become patrimonial properties of the Government from the
time the titles are issued to the NHA. As early as 1999, this Court in Baguio v.
Republic, 301 SCRA 450 (1999), laid down the jurisprudence that: It is true
that, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is
issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and
becomes private property, and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent
becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance
of such patent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgments; It is a settled
precept that decisions of the Supreme Court can only be applied prospectively
as they may prejudice vested rights if applied retroactively.—The ruling in PEA
cannot even be applied retroactively to the lots covered by Special Patents Nos.
3592 (40 hectare reclaimed land) and 3598 (39-hectare reclaimed land). The
reclamation of the land under SMDRP was completed in August 1996 while the
PEA decision was rendered on July 9, 2002. In the meantime, subdivided lots
forming parts of the reclaimed land were already sold to private corporations
for value and separate titles issued to the buyers. The Project was terminated
through a Memorandum of Agreement signed on August 27, 2003. The PEA
decision became final through the November 11, 2003 Resolution. It is a settled
precept that decisions of the Supreme Court can only be applied prospectively
as they may prejudice vested rights if applied retroactively.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if it is conceded that there
was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public use or
public service, there was however an implicit executive declaration that the
reclaimed areas are not necessary anymore for public use or public service when
President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the National Housing
Authority (NHA) partly for housing project and related commercial/
industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain
beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling component to
finance the project.—Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit
Page | 25
declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public use or public service,
there was however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas R-
10 are not necessary anymore for public use or public service when President
Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the NHA partly for housing
project and related commercial/industrial development intended for disposition
to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly
as enabling component to finance the project. President Ramos, in issuing
Proclamation No. 39, declared, though indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of
the Smokey Mountain project are no longer required for public use or service,
thus: These parcels of land of public domain are hereby placed under the
administration and disposition of the National Housing Authority to develop,
subdivide and dispose to qualified beneficiaries, as well as its development for
mix land use (commercial/industrial) to provide employment opportunities to
on-site families and additional areas for port related activities. (Emphasis
supplied.) While numerical count of the persons to be benefited is not the
determinant whether the property is to be devoted to public use, the declaration
in Proclamation No. 39 undeniably identifies only particular individuals as
beneficiaries to whom the reclaimed lands can be sold, namely—the Smokey
Mountain dwellers. The rest of the Filipinos are not qualified; hence, said lands
are no longer essential for the use of the public in general.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; MO 415 and Proclamations
Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that proclaimed the non-use of the reclaimed
areas for public use or service as the Project cannot be successfully
implemented without the withdrawal of said lands from public use or service.—
MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that proclaimed
the non-use of the reclaimed areas for public use or service as the Project cannot
be successfully implemented without the withdrawal of said lands from public
use or service. Certainly, the devotion of the reclaimed land to public use or
service conflicts with the intended use of the Smokey Mountain areas for
housing and employment of the Smokey Mountain scavengers and for financing
the Project because the latter cannot be accomplished without abandoning the
public use of the subject land. Without doubt, the presidential proclamations on
SMDRP together with the issuance of the special patents had effectively
removed the reclaimed lands from public use.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reclaimed lands that are made
the enabling components of a Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) infrastructure
project are necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the
BOT Law; otherwise, absurd and illogical consequences would naturally
result.—Re-claimed lands that are made the enabling components of a BOT
infrastructure project are necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable
lands under the BOT Law; otherwise, absurd and illogical consequences would
naturally result. Undoubtedly, the BOT contract will not be accepted by the
BOT contractor since there will be no consideration for its contractual
obligations. Since reclaimed land will be conveyed to the contractor pursuant
to the BOT Law, then there is an implied declaration that such land is no longer
intended for public use or public service and, hence, considered patrimo-nial
property of the State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 60 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 applies only to “a province, municipality or branch or subdivision
of the Government”—the National Housing Authority (NHA) is not a
government unit but a government corporation performing governmental and
proprietary functions.—Petitioner relies on Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act
(CA) 141 to support his view that the NHA is not empowered by any law to sell
reclaimed land, thus: Section 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title
may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation or
association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural
purposes. The area of the land so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the
judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably
necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease if requested and shall in
no case exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That
this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, transfers, made to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government for the purposes
deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so granted
Page | 26
donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of
the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of
in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; Provided,
further, That any person, corporation, association or partnership disqualified
from purchasing public land for agricultural purposes under the provisions of
this Act, may lease land included under this title suitable for industrial or
residential purposes, but the lease granted shall only be valid while such land is
used for the purposes referred to. (Emphasis supplied.) Reliance on said
provision is incorrect as the same applies only to “a province, municipality or
branch or subdivision of the Government.” The NHA is not a government unit
but a government corporation performing governmental and proprietary
functions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The transfer of the reclaimed
lands by the National Government to the National Housing Authority (NHA)
for housing, commercial, and industrial purposes transformed them into
patrimonial lands which are of course owned by the State in its private or
proprietary capacity—perforce, the National Housing Authority (NHA) can sell
the reclaimed lands to any Filipino citizen or qualified corporation.—PD 757 is
clear that the NHA is empowered by law to transfer properties acquired by it
under the law to other parties, thus: Section 6. Powers and functions of the
Authority. The Authority shall have the follow-ing powers and functions to be
exercised by the Boards in accordance with the established national human
settlements plan prepared by the Human Settlements Commission: x x x x (k)
Enter into contracts whenever necessary under such terms and conditions as it
may deem proper and reasonable; (l) Acquire property rights and interests, and
encumber or otherwise dispose the same as it may deem appropriate (Emphasis
supplied.) Letter (l) is emphatic that the NHA can acquire property rights and
interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem
appropriate. The transfer of the reclaimed lands by the National Government to
the NHA for housing, commercial, and industrial purposes transformed them
into patrimonial lands which are of course owned by the State in its private or
proprietary capacity. Perforce, the NHA can sell the reclaimed lands to any
Filipino citizen or qualified corporation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Bids and Bidding; The lands
reclaimed by and conveyed to the National Housing Authority (NHA) are no
longer lands of public domain—these lands became proprietary lands or
patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of the titles over the reclaimed
lands to the NHA and hence outside the ambit of CA 141; The National Housing
Authority (NHA) can legally transfer patrimonial land to any interested
qualified buyer without any bidding conducted by the Director of Lands
because the National Housing Authority (NHA), unlike Public Estates
Authority (PEA), is a government agency not tasked to sell lands of public
domain.—Sections 63 and 67 of CA 141, as amended, are in point as they refer
to government sale by the Director of Lands of alienable and disposable lands
of public domain. This is not present in the case at bar. The lands reclaimed by
and conveyed to the NHA are no longer lands of public domain. These lands
became proprietary lands or patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of
the titles over the reclaimed lands to the NHA and hence outside the ambit of
CA 141. The NHA can therefore legally transfer patrimonial land to RBI or to
any other interested qualified buyer without any bidding conducted by the
Director of Lands because the NHA, unlike PEA, is a government agency not
tasked to sell lands of public domain. Hence, it can only hold patrimonial lands
and can dispose of such lands by sale without need of public bidding.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction;
Reclaimed lands cannot be considered unserviceable properties; Sec. 79 of PD
1445 cannot be applied to patrimonial properties like reclaimed lands
transferred to a government agency like the National Housing Authority (NHA)
which has entered into a Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) contract with a
private firm—if the patrimonial property will be subject to public bidding as the
only way of disposing of said property, then Sec. 6 of RA 6957 on the
repayment scheme is almost impossible or extremely difficult to implement
considering the uncertainty of a winning bid during public auction; The law
Page | 27
does not intend anything impossible (lex non intendit aliquid impossibile).—
Reclaimed lands cannot be considered unserviceable properties. The reclaimed
lands in question are very much needed by the NHA for the Smokey Mountain
Project because without it, then the projects will not be successfully
implemented. Since the reclaimed lands are not unserviceable properties and
are very much needed by NHA, then Sec. 79 of PD 1445 does not apply. More
importantly, Sec. 79 of PD 1445 cannot be applied to patrimonial properties
like reclaimed lands transferred to a government agency like the NHA which
has entered into a BOT contract with a private firm. The reason is obvious. If
the patrimonial property will be subject to public bidding as the only way of
disposing of said property, then Sec. 6 of RA 6957 on the repayment scheme is
almost impossible or extremely difficult to implement considering the
uncertainty of a winning bid during public auction. Moreover, the repayment
scheme of a BOT contract may be in the form of non-monetary payment like
the grant of a portion or percentage of reclaimed land. Even if the BOT partner
participates in the public bidding, there is no assurance that he will win the bid
and therefore the payment in kind as agreed to by the parties cannot be
performed or the winning bid prize might be below the estimated valuation of
the land. The only way to harmonize Sec. 79 of PD 1445 with Sec. 6 of RA
6957 is to consider Sec. 79 of PD 1445 as inapplicable to BOT contracts
involving patrimonial lands. The law does not intend anything impossible (lex
non intendit aliquid impossibile).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; RA 6957 as amended by RA
7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid “a portion as percentage of
the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino
citizens or corporations with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the
same.—RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can
be paid “a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the
constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporations with at
least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. It cannot be denied that RBI is
a private corporation, where Filipino citizens own at least 60% of the stocks.
Thus, the transfer to RBI is valid and constitutional.
Right to Information; The government agencies, without need of demand from
anyone, must bring into public view all the steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction and the contents of the perfected contract—
such information must pertain to “definite propositions of the government,”
meaning official recommendations or final positions reached on the different
matters subject of negotiation.—Sec. 28, Art. II compels the State and its
agencies to fully disclose “all of its transactions involving public interest.”
Thus, the government agencies, without need of demand from anyone, must
bring into public view all the steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction and the contents of the perfected contract.
Such information must pertain to “definite propositions of the government,”
meaning official recommendations or final positions reached on the different
matters subject of negotiation. The government agency, however, need not
disclose “intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications
during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the exploratory stage.” The limitation also covers
privileged communication like information on military and diplomatic secrets;
information affecting national security; information on investigations of crimes
by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused; information
on foreign relations, intelligence, and other classified information.
Same; It is unfortunate that after almost twenty (20) years from birth of the 1987
Constitution, there is still no enabling law that provides the mechanics for the
compulsory duty of government agencies to disclose information on
government transactions; In the meantime, it would suffice that government
agencies post on their bulletin boards the documents incorporating the
information on the steps and negotiations that produced the agreements and the
agreements themselves, and if finances permit, to upload said information on
their respective websites for easy access by interested parties.—It is
unfortunate, however, that after almost twenty (20) years from birth of the 1987
Constitution, there is still no enabling law that provides the mechanics for the
compulsory duty of government agencies to disclose information on
Page | 28
government transactions. Hopefully, the desired enabling law will finally see
the light of day if and when Congress decides to approve the proposed
“Freedom of Access to Information Act.” In the meantime, it would suffice that
government agencies post on their bulletin boards the documents incorporating
the information on the steps and negotiations that produced the agreements and
the agreements themselves, and if finances permit, to upload said information
on their respective websites for easy access by interested parties. Without any
law or regulation governing the right to disclose information, the NHA or any
of the respondents cannot be faulted if they were not able to disclose
information relative to the SMDRP to the public in general.
Same; The other aspect of the people’s right to know apart from the duty to
disclose is the duty to allow access to information on matters of public concern
under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution; The duty to disclose information
should be differentiated from the duty to permit access to information—there is
no need to demand from the government agency disclosure of information as
this is mandatory under the Constitution, while, on the other hand, the interested
party must first request or even demand that he be allowed access to documents
and papers in the particular agency.—The other aspect of the people’s right to
know apart from the duty to disclose is the duty to allow access to information
on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution. The
gateway to information opens to the public the following: (1) official records;
(2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions;
and (3) government research data used as a basis for policy development. Thus,
the duty to disclose information should be differentiated from the duty to permit
access to information. There is no need to demand from the government agency
disclosure of information as this is mandatory under the Constitution; failing
that, legal remedies are available. On the other hand, the interested party must
first request or even demand that he be allowed access to documents and papers
in the particular agency. A request or demand is required; otherwise, the
government office or agency will not know of the desire of the interested party
to gain access to such papers and what papers are needed. The duty to disclose
covers only transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access
has a broader scope of information which embraces not only transactions
involving public interest, but any matter contained in official communications
and public documents of the government agency.
Operative Fact Doctrine; Words and Phrases; Under the “operative fact”
doctrine a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as
unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with.—The
“operative fact” doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, 38
SCRA 429 (1971), wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior
to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be
complied with, thus: As the new Civil Code puts it: “When the courts declare a
law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution.”
It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may
not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the
declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have
been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary,
in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and
respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions.
What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to
what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior
to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is
merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or
executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity.
It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there
be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
Page | 29
Same; The existence of the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law (RA 6957)
relied upon by the parties and the executive issuances is an “operative fact” to
which legal consequences have attached—the Court is constrained to give legal
effect to the acts done in consonance with such executive and legislative acts,
since to do otherwise would work patent injustice.—In the instant case, RA
6957 was the prevailing law at the time that the joint venture agreement was
signed. RA 6957, entitled “An Act Authorizing The Financing, Construction,
Operation And Maintenance Of Infrastructure Projects By The Private Sector
And For Other Purposes,” which was passed by Congress on July 24, 1989,
allows repayment to the private contractor of reclaimed lands. Such law was
relied upon by respondents, along with the above-mentioned executive
issuances in pushing through with the Project. The existence of such law and
issuances is an “operative fact” to which legal consequences have attached. This
Court is constrained to give legal effect to the acts done in consonance with
such executive and legislative acts; to do otherwise would work patent injustice
on respondents.
Same; Vested Rights Doctrine; The Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP) agreements have produced vested rights in favor
of the slum dwellers, the buyers of reclaimed land who were issued titles over
said land, and the agencies and investors who made investments in the project
or who bought SMPPC’s—these properties and rights cannot be disturbed or
questioned after the passage of around ten (10) years from the start of the
Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP)
implementation.—When the ruling in PEA was rendered by this Court on July
9, 2002, the JVAs were all executed. Furthermore, when petitioner filed the
instant case against respondents on August 5, 2004, the JVAs were already
terminated by virtue of the MOA between the NHA and RBI. The respondents
had no reason to think that their agreements were unconstitutional or even
questionable, as in fact, the concurrent acts of the executive department lent
validity to the implementation of the Project. The SMDRP agreements have
produced vested rights in favor of the slum dwellers, the buyers of reclaimed
land who were issued titles over said land, and the agencies and investors who
made investments in the project or who bought SMPPCs. These properties and
rights cannot be disturbed or questioned after the passage of around ten (10)
years from the start of the SMDRP implementation. Evidently, the “operative
fact” principle has set in. The titles to the lands in the hands of the buyers can
no longer be invalidated.
Prohibition; Words and Phrases; A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and
specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance—
it is a duty which an officer performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed
manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to the
exercise of his/her own judgment upon the propriety of the act done.—It has
not been shown that the NHA exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
relation to the SMDRP and the agreements relative to it. Likewise, it has not
been shown what ministerial functions the NHA has with regard to the SMDRP.
A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for
the exercise of discretion in its performance. It is a duty which an officer
performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to the exercise of his/her own
judgment upon the propriety of the act done. Whatever is left to be done in
relation to the August 27, 2003 MOA, terminating the JVA and other related
agreements, certainly does not involve ministerial functions of the NHA but
instead requires exercise of judgment. In fact, Item No. 4 of the MOA
terminating the JVAs provides for validation of the developer’s (RBI’s) claims
arising from the termination of the SMDRP through the various government
agencies. Such validation requires the exercise of discretion.
Same; Prohibition does not lie to restrain an act which is already a fait
accompli.—Prohibition does not lie to restrain an act which is already a fait
accompli. The “operative fact” doctrine protecting vested rights bars the grant
of the writ of prohibition to the case at bar. It should be remembered that
petitioner was the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated and
implemented. He had the opportunity to question the SMDRP and the
Page | 30
agreements on it, but he did not. The moment to challenge the Project had
passed.
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002.*
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented
by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon.
GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN
CRESPO, respondents.]
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Motions for Reconsideration; As a
general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless
the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance
to correct the errors imputed to it; Exceptions.—As a general rule, a petition for
certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has
been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors
imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised
is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency.
As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua
non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been
squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. Aside from
being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions
of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be
dispensed with. Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special and
important reasons therefor.
International Law; Extradition; Treaties; A cardinal rule in the interpretation of
a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent.—The substantive
issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty
and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a
law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. Since PD 1069 is intended as a
guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is
a signatory, understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in
properly deciding the issues raised here.
Page | 31
Same; Same; Postulates of Extradition; Extradition is a major instrument for the
suppression of crime.—Extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of
suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a
fugitive from one state to the other. With the advent of easier and faster means
of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to
another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has
become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods
of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, “a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon
extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in the
suppression of crime.” It is the only regular system that has been devised to
return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in
accordance with municipal and international law.
Same; Same; Same; The requesting State will accord due process to the
accused.—An extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have
examined, and that both accept and trust, each other’s legal system and judicial
process. More pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s signature on an
extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of
the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited.
That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon
extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have
been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionally.
Same; Same; Same; Extradition proceedings are sui generis.—As pointed out
in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not criminal in
nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at
fore; in extradition which is sui generis—in a class by itself—they are not. “An
extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which
will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence
will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as
a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
Same; Same; Same; The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is
only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition
Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.—Given the foregoing, it
is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or
the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Such determination during
the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay.
Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through
which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction
with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the assisting
authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction.
The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine
whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and
whether the person sought is extraditable.
Same; Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; We are bound by pacta sunt seruanda
to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Extradition Treaty.—
Our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition
Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the
presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest. Fulfilling
our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the
requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder
paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure
would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly
an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. Verily, we are bound by pacta
sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty.
This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if
the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied.
In other words, “[t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the
treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on
Page | 32
the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to
make the surrender.” Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a
position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
Same; Same; Same; Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks.—
Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie
presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch:
nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the
jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the
requesting state.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition
Treaty, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the arrest of the accused, a
qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of
the arrest warrant—arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
“immediate.”—It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our
Extradition Law, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the arrest of the accused.
This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the
issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing
parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to
prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing
can no longer be considered “immediate.” The law could not have intended the
word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense
of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued.
Same; Same; Same; By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law fur ther conveys
that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage.—By using the
phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important
as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an
exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately
upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression—a
prima facie finding—sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as
regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Same; Same; Warrants of Arrest; Grave Abuse of Discretion; A judge gravely
abuses his discretion when he sets for hearing the application for the issuance
of an arrest warrant in an extradition proceeding after having already
determined from the petition itself and its supporting documents that a prima
facie finding exists.—We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause
for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already
evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after
having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist,
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for
hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The silence of the Extradition Law
and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings.—Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon
receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving
the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the
word “hearing” is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding
of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided.
It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary
in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing
every little step in the entire proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Proper Procedure in Extradition Proceedings.— Since this
is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding
whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance
with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable.
Page | 33
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further
documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the
petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the
other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who
is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not
inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the
latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our
opinion, the foregoing procedure will “best serve the ends of justice” in
extradition cases.
Same; Same; Bail; Statutory Construction; As suggested by the use of the word
“conviction” in Art. III, Section 13 of the Constitution, the constitutional
provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies
only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws—it does not apply to extradition proceedings where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.—We agree with petitioner. As
suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on
bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies
only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition
courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor
of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not
apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The provision in the Constitution stating that the
“right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended” does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right
to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.—The provision in the
Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” does not detract from the
rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.
It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.” Hence, the second sentence in
the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The detention of a potential extraditee prior
to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation
of his right to due process—while the essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard, it does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.—
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the
extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due
process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does
not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances—
such as those present in an extradition case—call for it, a subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given
full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process
and fundamental fairness.
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any provision—in the Constitution, the
law or the treaty—expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition
proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule,
would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to
hide from or evade their prosecutors.—Too, we cannot allow our country to be
Page | 34
a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the
consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be
good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through
overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited
are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any
provision—in the Constitution, the law or the treaty—expressly guaranteeing
the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting
them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from
coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
Same; Same; Same; To best serve the ends of justice, the Court holds that, after
a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law,
bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight
risk or a danger to the community, and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited
by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein.—The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of
right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to
curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate
rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that
the right to due process is broad enough to induce the grant of basic fairness to
extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the “life, liberty or
property” of every person. It is “dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every
situation calling for its application.” Accordingly and to best serve the ends of
justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested
or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as
an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted
bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2)
that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including,
as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state
when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Same; Same; Same; Since the exception to the grant of bail in extradition
proceedings has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived
essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears
the burden of proving the two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness.—Since this exception has no express or specific
statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of
justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-
tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court
realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility
arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest
concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is
not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the
exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital
international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably
impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of “the
sporting idea of fair play,” it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives
and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Same; Same; Congress; The constituents of a potential extraditee who elected
him to Congress while a foreign country was requesting his extradition were or
should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against
their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the
case—his election to public office is not, by itself, a compelling reason to grant
him bail.—While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected
as a member of the House of Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his
detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are
not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, the Court has already debunked the
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus: “When the voters of his
district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if
voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal
Page | 35
illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full
term in office. x x x It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for
and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that
the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were
or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution
of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained
to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling
reason to grant him bail.
G.R. No. 174269. August 25, 2010.*
POLO S. PANTALEON, petitioner, vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., respondent.
Credit Cards; Words and Phrases; A credit card is defined as “any card, plate,
coupon book, or other credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining money,
goods, property, labor or services or anything of value on credit”; It traces its
roots to the charge card first introduced by the Diners Club in New York City
in 1950; In the Philippines, the now defunct Pacific Bank was responsible for
bringing the first credit card into the country in the 1970s.—A credit card is
defined as “any card, plate, coupon book, or other credit device existing for the
purpose of obtaining money, goods, property, labor or services or anything of
value on credit.” It traces its roots to the charge card first introduced by the
Diners Club in New York City in 1950. American Express followed suit by
introducing its own charge card to the American market in 1958. In the
Philippines, the now defunct Pacific Bank was responsible for bringing the first
credit card into the country in the 1970s. However, it was only in the early 2000s
that credit card use gained wide acceptance in the country, as evidenced by the
surge in the number of credit card holders then.
Same; Every credit card transaction involves three contracts— the sales
contract, the loan agreement, and the promise to pay.—Simply put, every credit
card transaction involves three contracts, namely: (a) the sales contract between
the credit card holder and the merchant or the business establishment which
accepted the credit card; (b) the loan agreement between the credit card issuer
and the credit card holder; and lastly, (c) the promise to pay between the credit
card issuer and the merchant or business establishment.
Same; Contracts of Adhesion; In our jurisdiction, we generally adhere to the
rule recognizing the relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit
card holder as a contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions
found in the card membership agreement; We note that a card membership
agreement is a contractvof adhesion as its terms are prepared solely by the credit
Page | 36
card issuer, with the cardholder merely affixing his signature signifying his
adhesion to these terms.—In our jurisdiction, we generally adhere to the Gray
ruling, recognizing the relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit
card holder as a contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions
found in the card membership agreement. This contract provides the rights and
liabilities of a credit card company to its cardholders and vice versa. We note
that a card membership agreement is a contract of adhesion as its terms are
prepared solely by the credit card issuer, with the cardholder merely affixing
his signature signifying his adhesion to these terms. This circumstance,
however, does not render the agreement void; we have uniformly held that
contracts of adhesion are “as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being
that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely.” The only
effect is that the terms of the contract are construed strictly against the party
who drafted it.
Same; In more concrete terms, when cardholders use their credit cards to pay
for their purchases, they merely offer to enter into loan agreements with the
credit card company—only after the latter approves the purchase requests that
the parties enter into binding loan contracts.—Although we recognize the
existence of a relation-ship between the credit card issuer and the credit card
holder upon the acceptance by the cardholder of the terms of the card
mem-bership agreement (customarily signified by the act of the cardholder in
signing the back of the credit card), we have to distinguish this contractual
relationship from the creditor-debtor relation-ship which only arises after the
credit card issuer has approved the cardholder’s purchase request. The first
relates merely to an agreement providing for credit facility to the cardholder.
The latter involves the actual credit on loan agreement involving three contracts,
namely: the sales contract between the credit card holder and the merchant or
the business establishment which accepted the credit card; the loan agreement
between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder; and the promise to pay
between the credit card issuer and the merchant or business establishment. From
the loan agreement perspective, the contractual relationship begins to exist only
upon the meeting of the offer and acceptance of the parties involved. In more
concrete terms, when cardholders use their credit cards to pay for their
purchases, they merely offer to enter into loan agreements with the credit card
company. Only after the latter approves the purchase requests that the parties
enter into binding loan contracts, in keeping with Article 1319 of the Civil
Code.
Same; Default; Requisites; Since the credit card company has no obligation to
approve the purchase requests of its credit cardholders, the cardholder cannot
claim that the former defaulted in its obligation—without a demandable
obligation, there can be no finding of default.—Since American Express
International, Inc. (AMEX) has no obligation to approve the purchase requests
of its credit cardholders, Pantaleon cannot claim that AMEX defaulted in its
obligation. Article 1169 of the Civil Code, which provides the requisites to hold
a debtor guilty of culpable delay, states: “Article 1169. Those obliged to deliver
or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or
extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.” x x x.
The three requisites for a finding of default are: (a) that the obligation is
demandable and liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; and (c) the
creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtor’s performance. Based
on the above, the first requisite is no longer met because AMEX, by the express
terms of the credit card agreement, is not obligated to approve Pantaleon’s
purchase request. Without a demandable obligation, there can be no finding of
default.
Same; Same; A demand presupposes the existence of an obligation between the
parties.—Apart from the lack of any demandable obligation, we also find that
Pantaleon failed to make the demand required by Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
As previously established, the use of a credit card to pay for a purchase is only
an offer to the credit card company to enter a loan agreement with the credit
card holder. Before the credit card issuer accepts this offer, no obligation
relating to the loan agreement exists between them. On the other hand, a
demand is defined as the “assertion of a legal right; x x x an asking with
Page | 37
authority, claiming or challenging as due.” A demand presupposes the existence
of an obligation between the parties.
Same; The right to review a card holder’s credit history, although not
specifically set out in the card membership agreement, is a necessary
implication of the credit card company’s right to deny authorization for any
requested charge.—AMEX’s credit authorizer, Edgardo Jaurigue, explained
that having no pre-set spending limit in a credit card simply means that the
charges made by the cardholder are approved based on his ability to pay, as
demonstrated by his past spending, payment patterns, and personal resources.
Nevertheless, every time Pantaleon charges a purchase on his credit card, the
credit card company still has to determine whether it will allow this charge,
based on his past credit history. This right to review a card holder’s credit
history, although not specifically set out in the card membership agreement, is
a necessary implication of AMEX’s right to deny authorization for any
requested charge.
Same; Even if the cardholder did prove that the credit card company, as a matter
of practice or custom, acted on its customers’ purchase requests in a matter of
seconds, this would still not be enough to establish a legally demandable right—
as a general rule, a practice or custom is not a source of a legally demandable
or enforceable right.—As for Pantaleon’s previous experiences with AMEX
(i.e., that in the past 12 years, AMEX has always approved his charge requests
in three or four seconds), this record does not establish that Pantaleon had a
legally enforceable obligation to expect AMEX to act on his charge requests
within a matter of seconds. For one, Pantaleon failed to present any evidence to
support his assertion that AMEX acted on purchase requests in a matter of three
or four seconds as an established practice. More importantly, even if Pantaleon
did prove that AMEX, as a matter of practice or custom, acted on its customers’
purchase requests in a matter of seconds, this would still not be enough to
establish a legally demandable right; as a general rule, a practice or custom is
not a source of a legally demandable or enforceable right.
Same; A survey of Philippine law on credit card transactions demonstrates that
the State does not require credit card companies to act upon its cardholders’
purchase requests within a specific period of time.—Nor can Pantaleon look to
the law or government issuances as the source of AMEX’s alleged obligation
to act upon his credit card purchases within a matter of seconds. As the
following survey of Philippine law on credit card transactions demonstrates, the
State does not require credit card companies to act upon its cardholders’
purchase requests within a specific period of time. Republic Act No. 8484 (RA
8484), or the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, approved on February
11, 1998, is the controlling legislation that regulates the issuance and use of
access devices, including credit cards. The more salient portions of this law
include the imposition of the obligation on a credit card company to disclose
certain important financial information to credit card applicants, as well as a
definition of the acts that constitute access device fraud. As financial institutions
engaged in the business of providing credit, credit card companies fall under
the supervisory powers of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). BSP Circular
No. 398 dated August 21, 2003 embodies the BSP’s policy when it comes to
credit cards—“The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) shall foster the
development of consumer credit through innovative products such as credit
cards under conditions of fair and sound consumer credit practices. The BSP
likewise encourages competition and transparency to ensure more efficient
delivery of services and fair dealings with customers.” (Emphasis supplied)
Same; The Court holds that AMEX is neither contractually bound nor legally
obligated to act on its cardholders’ purchase requests within any specific period
of time, much less a period of a “matter of seconds”—the standard therefore is
implicit and, as in all contracts, must be based on fairness and reasonableness,
read in relation to the Civil Code provisions on human relations.—In light of
the foregoing, we find and so hold that AMEX is neither contractually bound
nor legally obligated to act on its cardholders’ purchase requests within any
specific period of time, much less a period of a “matter of seconds” that
Pantaleon uses as his standard. The standard therefore is implicit and, as in all
Page | 38
contracts, must be based on fairness and reasonableness, read in relation to the
Civil Code provisions on human relations, as will be discussed below.
Same; Human Relations; Abuse of Rights; Damages; In the context of a credit
card relationship, although there is neither a contractual stipulation nor a
specific law requiring the credit card issuer to act on the credit card holder’s
offer within a definite period of time, the principles set out in Article 19 of the
Civil Code provide the standard by which to judge the credit card company’s
actions.—Article 19 pervades the entire legal system and ensures that a person
suffering damage in the course of another’s exercise of right or performance of
duty, should find himself without relief. It sets the standard for the conduct of
all persons, whether artificial or natural, and requires that everyone, in the
exercise of rights and the performance of obligations, must: (a) act with justice,
(b) give everyone his due, and (c) observe honesty and good faith. It is not
because a person invokes his rights that he can do anything, even to the
prejudice and disadvantage of another. While Article 19 enumerates the
standards of conduct, Article 21 provides the remedy for the person injured by
the willful act, an action for damages. We explained how these two provisions
correlate with each other in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona 462 SCRA 466
(2005): “[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due;
and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does
not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.” In the context of a credit card
relationship, although there is neither a contractual stipulation nor a specific law
requiring the credit card issuer to act on the credit card holder’s offer within a
definite period of time, these principles provide the standard by which to judge
AMEX’s actions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is an elementary rule in our jurisdiction that good
faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party
alleging it; So long as the credit card company exercises its rights, performs its
obligations, and generally acts with good faith, with no intent to cause harm,
even if it may occasionally inconvenience others, it cannot be held liable for
damages.—It is an elementary rule in our jurisdiction that good faith is
presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging
it. Although it took AMEX some time before it approved Pantaleon’s three
charge requests, we find no evidence to suggest that it acted with deliberate
intent to cause Pantaleon any loss or injury, or acted in a manner that was
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. We give credence to
AMEX’s claim that its review procedure was done to ensure Pantaleon’s own
protection as a cardholder and to prevent the possibility that the credit card was
being fraudulently used by a third person. Pantaleon countered that this review
procedure is primarily intended to protect AMEX’s interests, to make sure that
the cardholder making the purchase has enough means to pay for the credit
extended. Even if this were the case, however, we do not find any taint of bad
faith in such motive. It is but natural for AMEX to want to ensure that it will
extend credit only to people who will have sufficient means to pay for their
purchases. AMEX, after all, is running a business, not a charity, and it would
simply be ludicrous to suggest that it would not want to earn profit for its
services. Thus, so long as AMEX exercises its rights, performs its obligations,
and generally acts with good faith, with no intent to cause harm, even if it may
occasionally inconvenience others, it cannot be held liable for damages.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person who knowingly and voluntarily exposes
himself to danger cannot claim damages for the resulting injury.—In Nikko
Page | 39
Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532 (2005), we ruled that a person
who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim
damages for the resulting injury: “The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to
which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to self-inflicted
injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by
one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he
is not negligent in doing so.” This doctrine, in our view, is wholly applicable to
this case. Pantaleon himself testified that the most basic rule when travelling in
a tour group is that you must never be a cause of any delay because the schedule
is very strict. When Pantaleon made up his mind to push through with his
purchase, he must have known that the group would become annoyed and
irritated with him. This was the natural, foreseeable consequence of his decision
to make them all wait.
may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish
that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to
the plaintiff—a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by
the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must
first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Principle of Damnum Absque Injuria; Words and
Phrases; There is a material distinction between damages and injury—injury is
the illegal invasion of a legal right while damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; There can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.—
More importantly, AMEX did not violate any legal duty to Pantaleon under the
circumstances under the principle of damnum absque injuria, or damages
without legal wrong, loss without injury. As we held in BPI Express Card v.
CA, 296 SCRA 260 (1998): “We do not dispute the findings of the lower court
that private respondent suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his
credit card. However, there is a material distinction between damages and
injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or
harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of
a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by
the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from
an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.” In other words, in order that a plaintiff

Page | 40
G.R. No. 162333. December 23, 2008.*
BIENVENIDO C. TEOCO and JUAN C. TEOCO, JR., petitioners, vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondent.
Mortgages; A mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon
which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be to the fulfillment of the
obligation for whose security it was constituted.—The mortgage directly and
immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the
possessor may be to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted. Otherwise stated, a mortgage creates a real right which is
enforceable against the whole world. Hence, even if the mortgage property is
sold or its possession transferred to another, the property remains subject to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.
Same; Agency; Special Power of Attorney; Conflict of Laws; A special power
of attorney executed in a foreign country is generally not admissible in evidence
as a public document in our courts.—Anent the CA observation that the
assignment of the right of redemption was not properly executed and/or
authenticated, Lopez v. Court of Appeals is instructive. In Lopez, this Court
ruled that a special power of attorney executed in a foreign country is generally
not admissible in evidence as a public document in our courts.
Same; Assignment of Credit; Evidence; Where there was implied admission of
the due execution and genuineness of the assignment of the right of redemption,
a private document evidencing the same is admissible in evidence.—Would the
exercise by the brothers Teoco of the right to redeem the properties in question
be precluded by the fact that the assignment of right of redemption was not
contained in a public document? We rule in the negative. Metrobank never
challenged either the content, the due execution, or the genuineness of the
assignment of the right of redemption. Consequently, Metrobank is deemed to
have admitted the same. Having impliedly admitted the content of the
assignment of the right of redemption, there is no necessity for a prima facie
evidence of the facts there stated. In the same manner, since Metrobank has
impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the assignment of the
right of redemption, a private document evidencing the same is admissible in
evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The necessity of a public document for contracts which
transmit or extinguish real rights over immovable property, as mandated by
Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is only for convenience—it is not essential for
validity or enforceability.—True it is that the Civil Code requires certain
transactions to appear in public documents. However, the necessity of a public
document for contracts which transmit or extinguish real rights over immovable
property, as mandated by Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is only for
convenience; it is not essential for validity or enforceability. Thus, in Cenido v.
Apacionado, 318 SCRA 688 (1999), this Court ruled that the only effect of
noncompliance with the provisions of Article 1358 of the Civil Code is that a
party to such a contract embodied in a private document may be compelled to
execute a public document.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase “effect as against a third person”
found in Article 1625 of the Civil Code has been interpreted to be damage or
prejudice to such third person.—Article 1625 of the Civil Code provides that
“[a]n assignment of a credit, right or action shall produce no effect as against
third person, unless it appears in a public instrument, or the instrument is
recorded in the Registry of Property in case the assignment involves real
property.” In Co v. Philippine National Bank, 114 SCRA 842 (1982), the Court
interpreted the phrase “effect as against a third person” to be damage or
prejudice to such third person, thus: x x x In Lichauco vs. Olegario, et al., 43
Phil. 540, this Court held that “whether or not x x x an execution debtor was
legally authorized to sell his right of redemption, is a question already decided
by this Court in the affirmative in numerous decisions on the precepts of
Sections 463 and 464 and other sections related thereto, of the Code of Civil
Procedure.” (The mentioned provisions are carried over in Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court.) That the transfers or conveyances in question were not
registered is of miniscule significance, there being no showing that PNB was
Page | 41
damaged or could be damaged by such omission. When CITADEL made its
tender on May 5, 1976, PNB did not question the personality of CITADEL at
all. It is now too late and purely technical to raise such innocuous failure to
comply with Article 1625 of the Civil Code. Teoco vs. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company, 575 SCRA 82, G.R. No. 162333 December 23, 2008
G.R. No. 171365. October 6, 2010.*
ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, FLORDELIZA J.
ARCILLA, LOURDES J. CATALAN, ETHELINDA J. HOLT,
BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR. and JOEL
JONGCO, petitioners, vs. ISMAEL VELOSO III, respondent.
Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases;
Jurisprudence has settled the “fresh period rule,” according to which, an
ordinary appeal from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to the Court of Appeals,
under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from
receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration.—Jurisprudence has settled the “fresh
period rule,” according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court
of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial
court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying
the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In Sumiran v. Damaso,
596 SCRA 450 (2009), we presented a survey of the cases applying the fresh
period rule: As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), that by virtue of the power of the
Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts,
the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of
appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the
appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when
the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
Same; Same; Same; The fresh period rule has retroactive application to cases
pending and undetermined upon its effectivity—procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.—Also in
Sumiran, we recognized the retroactive application of the fresh period rule to
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cases pending and undetermined upon its effectivity: The retroactivity of the
Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of
promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the
Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, stating thus: The
determinative issue is whether the “fresh period” rule announced in Neypes
could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior
to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be
answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be
given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create
new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing.
Actions; Motions to Dismiss; When the ground for dismissal is that the
complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the
facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider
other matters aliunde.—According to Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a
cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action,
such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and
from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde. The test,
therefore, is whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be
true, a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance with the prayer stated
therein.
Same; Same; Elements.—A cause of action (for damages) exists if the
following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. We find that all three
elements exist in the case at bar. Respondent may not have specifically
identified each element, but it may be sufficiently determined from the
allegations in his complaint.
Same; Human Relations; Abuse of Rights; Torts and Damages; Every man has
a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good name; A party is obliged to
respect the other party’s good name even though they are opposing parties in
the unlawful detainer case; A violation of the principle embodied in Article 19
of the Civil Code constitutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct.—First,
respondent filed the complaint to protect his good character, name, and
reputation. Every man has a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good
name. This right is protected by law with the recognition of slander and libel as
actionable wrongs, whether as criminal offenses or tortuous conduct. Second,
petitioners are obliged to respect respondent’s good name even though they are
opposing parties in the unlawful detainer case. As Article 19 of the Civil Code
requires, “[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.” A violation of such principle constitutes an abuse of
rights, a tortuous conduct.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While a prevailing party in a case is free to copy and
distribute copies of a favorable judgment to the public, he must not do so with
the intent of humiliating the other party and destroying the latter’s good name
and reputation in the community.—It is already settled that the public has a right
to see and copy judicial records and documents. However, this is not a case of
the public seeking and being denied access to judicial records and documents.
The controversy is rooted in the dissemination by petitioners of the MeTC
judgment against respondent to Horseshoe Village homeowners, who were not
involved at all in the unlawful detainer case, thus, purportedly affecting
negatively respondent’s good name and reputation among said homeowners.
The unlawful detainer case was a private dispute between petitioners and
respondent, and the MeTC decision against respondent was then still pending
appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, rendering suspect petitioners’ intentions for
Page | 43
distributing copies of said MeTC decision to non-parties in the case. While in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the case for presentation
petitioners were free to copy and distribute such copies of the MeTC judgment of evidence by the parties.
to the public, the question is whether they did so with the intent of humiliating
respondent and destroying the latter’s good name and reputation in the
community.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Bad Faith; Words and Phrases; Good faith refers to
the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned; Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to
prove the same.—The finding of the Court of Appeals of bad faith and malice
on the part of petitioners has no factual basis. Good faith is presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to the
state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It
consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not
simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature
of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It
implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.

Same; A finding that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action does not
necessarily mean that the complaint is meritorious—it shall only result in the
reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the case for presentation of
evidence by the parties.—We cannot subscribe to respondent’s argument that
there is no more need for the presentation of evidence by the parties since
petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of respondent’s complaint for damages,
hypothetically admitted respondent’s allegations. The hypothetical admission
of respondent’s allegations in the complaint only goes so far as determining
whether said complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action. A finding that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action
does not necessarily mean that the complaint is meritorious; it shall only result

Page | 44
G.R. No. 151866. September 9, 2004.*
Same; Same; Same; To be recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved
SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner, vs. LEONORA A. VALMONTE, with reasonable degree of certainty and the courts cannot rely on speculation,
respondent. conjecture or guesswork.—Owing to the rule that great weight and even finality
is given to factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of
Civil Law; Damages; Abuse of Rights; To find the existence of an abuse of the trial court, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the appellate court
right, the following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; that respondent’s claim for actual damages has not been substantiated with
(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or satisfactory evidence during the trial and must therefore be denied. To be
injuring another.—In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved with reasonable degree of
wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left certainty and the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork.
without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he
sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but
also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as
guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the principle
commonly known as “abuse of rights” under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It
provides that “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.” To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following
elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised
in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When a
right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage
to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held
accountable.

Same; Same; Same; A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good
faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.—One is not allowed to
exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to
another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right,
that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse.

Page | 45
G.R. No. 150092. September 27, 2002.*
GLOBE TELECOM, INC., DELFIN LAZARO, JR., and ROBERTO
GALANG, petitioners, vs. JOAN FLORENDO-FLORES, respondent.
Labor Law; Appeals; Equity Jurisdiction; In the review of an NLRC decision
through a special civil action for certiorari, resolution is confined only to issues
of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal;
The principles that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction
may look into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings,
and that the Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if
they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration
is necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case, are now necessarily adhered
to and are applied by the Court of Appeals in its expanded jurisdiction over
labor cases elevated through a petition for certiorari.—In the review of an
NLRC decision through a special civil action for certiorari, resolution is
confined only to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the labor tribunal. Hence, the Court refrains from reviewing factual
assessments of lower courts and agencies exercising adjudicative functions,
such as the NLRC. Occasionally, however, the Court is constrained to delve
into factual matters where, as in the instant case, the findings of the NLRC
contradict those of the Labor Arbiter. In this instance, the Court in the exercise
of its equity jurisdiction may look into the records of the case and re-examine
the questioned findings. As a corollary, this Court is clothed with ample
authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary to arrive at a just decision
of the case. The same principles are now necessarily adhered to and are applied
by the Court of Appeals in its expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated
through a petition for certiorari; thus, we see no error on its part when it made
anew a factual determination of the matters and on that basis reversed the ruling
of the NLRC.
Same; Judgments; Dispositive Portions; Where there is conflict between the
dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion
controls irrespective of what appears in the body.—Where there is conflict
between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the
dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body. While the
body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the
manner the court’s reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof
that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of
those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations. Hence, for
the Court of Appeals to have affirmed the assailed judgment is to adopt and
uphold the NLRC finding of abandonment and its award of full back wages to
respondent as an “act of grace” from petitioners. However, we believe this is
not the proper view as the records reveal that respondent was constructively
dismissed from service.
Same; Illegal Dismissals; Words and Phrases; Constructive dismissal exists
where there is cessation of work because “continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank
and a diminution in pay”; There is constructive dismissal even though an
employee may not have suffered any diminution in her basic salary but she was
deprived of all benefits due to another of her rank and position, benefits which
she apparently used to receive.—Constructive dismissal exists where there is
cessation of work because “continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a
diminution in pay.” All these are discernible in respondent’s situation. She was
singularly edged out of employment by the unbearable or undesirable treatment
she received from her immediate superior Cacholo M. Santos who
discriminated against her without reason—not preparing and submitting her
performance evaluation report that would have been the basis for her increased
salary; not forwarding her project proposals to management that would have
been the source of commendation; diminishing her supervisor stature by
assigning her to house-to-house sales or direct sales; and withholding from her
the enjoyment of bonuses, allowances and other similar benefits that were
necessary for her efficient sales performance. Although respondent continued
to have the rank of a supervisor, her functions were reduced to a mere house-
Page | 46
to-house sales agent or direct sales agent. This was tantamount to a demotion.
She might not have, suffered any diminution in her basic salary but petitioners
did not dispute her allegation that she was deprived of all benefits due to another
of her rank and position, benefits which she apparently used to receive.
Same; Same; Abandonment; Requisites; A charge of abandonment is totally
inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more
so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement.—The unauthorized absence of
respondent should not lead to the drastic conclusion that she had chosen to
abandon her work. To constitute abandonment, there must be: (a) failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and, (b) a clear
intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever the employer-employee
relationship, requisites that are negated by the immediate filing by respondent
Florendo-Flores of a complaint for constructive dismissal against petitioners. A
charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal; more so, when it includes a prayer for
reinstatement.
Same; Demotion; Reduction in an employee’s functions which were originally
supervisory in nature to a mere house-to-house sales agent or direct sales agent
constitutes a demotion in rank.—The reduction of respondent’s functions which
were originally supervisory in nature to a mere house-to-house sales agent or
direct sales agent constitutes a demotion in rank. For this act of illegal dismissal,
she deserves no less than full back wages starting from the time she had been
illegally dismissed until her actual reinstatement to her former position without
loss of seniority rights and other benefits—earned, accrued and demandable.
She shall continue to enjoy her benefits, privileges and incentives including the
use of the company car and “handyphone.”
Same; Management Prerogatives; Transfers; The managerial prerogative to
transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion—having
the right should not be confused with the manner that right is exercised.—The
managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave
abuse of discretion. It must always bear in mind the basic elements of justice
and fair play. Having the right should not be confused with the manner that right
is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid
himself of an undesirable worker.
Same; Constructive Dismissals; Burden of Proof; In constructive dismissal, the
employer has the burden of proving that the transfer and demotion of an
employee are for just and valid grounds such as genuine business necessity.—
In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the
transfer and demotion of an employee are for just and valid grounds such as
genuine business necessity. The employer must be able to show that the transfer
is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee. It must not
involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of salary and other benefits. If the
employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the employee’s demotion shall
be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.
Same; Social Justice; Proper regard for the welfare of the labor sector should
not dissuade the Court from protecting the rights of management such that an
award of back wages should be forthcoming only when valid grounds exist to
support it.—It should be noted that the award of back wages in the instant case
is justified upon the finding of illegal dismissal, and not under the principle of
“act of grace” for past services rendered. There are occasions when the Court
exercises liberality in granting financial awards to employees, but even then
they contemplate only the award of separation pay and/or financial assistance,
and only as a measure of social justice when the circumstances of the case so
warrant, such as instances of valid dismissal for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on the employees’ moral character. Proper
regard for the welfare of the labor sector should not dissuade us from protecting
the rights of management such that an award of back wages should be
forthcoming only when valid grounds exist to support it.
Same; Damages; An award of actual and moral damages is not proper where
the dismissal is not shown to be attended by bad faith, or was oppressive to
Page | 47
labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.—
An award of actual and moral damages is not proper as the dismissal is not
shown to be attended by bad faith, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary damages
are likewise not proper as these are imposed only if moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages are awarded.
G.R. No. 156109. November 18, 2004.*
KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by
ARMANDO REGINO, petitioner, vs. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A. GAMUROT and
ELISSA BALADAD, respondents.
Schools and Universities; Administrative Law; Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies; Commission on Higher Education (CHED); The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no application where a
student is not asking for the reversal of the policies of an educational institution
nor demanding that she be allowed to take the final examinations that she was
prevented from taking but is praying for damages.—Respondents anchored
their Motion to Dismiss on petitioner’s alleged failure to exhaust administrative
remedies before resorting to the RTC. According to them, the determination of
the controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCST’s
academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should have been lodged in the CHED,
the administrative body tasked under Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the
state policy to “protect, foster and promote the right of all citizens to affordable
quality education at all levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure that
education is accessible to all.” Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no
relevance to the present case since she is praying for damages, a remedy beyond
the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the courts.
Petitioner is correct. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has
no bearing on the present case. In Factoran, Jr. v. CA, the Court had occasion
to elucidate on the rationale behind this doctrine: “The doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and
convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given
the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative forum. x x x.” Petitioner is not asking for the
reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to
take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational
institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not adequately redress
Page | 48
her grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of respondents’ acts
could no longer be undone or rectified.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable
when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the
matter complained of—the CHED does not have the power to award
damages.—Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is
competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter
complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of
the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the
CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not
have commenced her case before the Commission.
Same; Same; Same; Same; One of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine is
when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court—
an action for damages inevitably calls for the application and interpretation of
the Civil Code.—The exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which
arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial
court. Petitioner’s action for damages inevitably calls for the application and
the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction
of the courts.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Motions to Dismiss; Every complaint must
sufficiently allege a cause of action, and failure to do so warrants its dismissal;
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the
truth of the alleged facts.—As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently allege
a cause of action; failure to do so warrants its dismissal. A complaint is said to
assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face
to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Assuming
the facts that are alleged to be true, the court should be able to render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the alleged
facts. In their Motion to Dismiss, respondents did not dispute any of petitioner’s
allegations, and they admitted that “x x x the crux of plaintiff’s cause of action
is the determination of whether or not the assessment of P100 per ticket is
excessive or oppressive.” They thereby premised their prayer for dismissal on
the Complaint’s alleged failure to state a cause of action. Thus, a reexamination
of the Complaint is in order.
Schools and Universities; Contracts; The school-student relationship is
contractual in nature.—In Alcuaz v. PSBA, the Court characterized the
relationship between the school and the student as a contract, in which “a
student, once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester.”
Two years later, in Non v. Dames II, the Court modified the “termination of
contract theory” in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual relationship between
the school and the student is not only semestral in duration, but for the entire
period the latter are expected to complete it.” Except for the variance in the
period during which the contractual relationship is considered to subsist, both
Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in characterizing the school-student
relationship as contractual in nature. The school-student relationship is also
reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all
contracts of such kind—it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and
obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient
to enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand,
the students agree to abide by the academic requirements of the school and to
observe its rules and regulations.
Same; Same; The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the
moment of its inception—upon enrolment of the student.—The terms of the
school-student contract are defined at the moment of its inception—upon
enrolment of the student. Standards of academic performance and the code of
behavior and discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new
students at the start of every school year. Further, schools inform prospective
enrollees amount of fees and the terms of payment. In practice, students are
normally required to make a down payment upon enrollment, with the balance
to be paid before every preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their
Page | 49
failure to pay their financial obligation is regarded as a valid ground for the
school to deny them the opportunity to take these examinations.
Same; Education is not a measurable commodity; The importance of grades
cannot be discounted in a setting where education is generally the gate pass to
employment opportunities and better life—such grades are often the means by
which a prospective employer measures whether a job applicant has acquired
the necessary tools or skills for a particular profession or trade.—Education is
not a measurable commodity. It is not possible to determine who is “better
educated” than another. Nevertheless, a student’s grades are an accepted
approximation of what would otherwise be an intangible product of countless
hours of study. The importance of grades cannot be discounted in a setting
where education is generally the gate pass to employment opportunities and
better life; such grades are often the means by which a prospective employer
measures whether a job applicant has acquired the necessary tools or skills for
a particular profession or trade.
Same; Academic Freedom; Words and Phrases; “Academic Freedom,”
Explained.—In their Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to
“academic freedom.” We are not impressed. According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an
academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be
taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study. In Garcia
v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, the Court
upheld the respondent therein when it denied a female student’s admission to
theological studies in a seminary for prospective priests. The Court defined the
freedom of an academic institution thus: “to decide for itself aims and objectives
and how best to attain them x x x free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.”

Same; A fee that was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the
start of the school year could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the
enrollees.—In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising
measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee
as a condition for the students’ taking the final examinations, and ultimately for
its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee, however, was not part
of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the school year. Hence,
it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.

Same; Quasi-Delicts; Torts; An academic institution may be held liable for tort
even if it has an existing contract with its students where the act that violated
the contract may also be a tort.— Generally, liability for tort arises only between
parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however,
may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students,
since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort.

Page | 50
G.R. No. 156168. December 14, 2004.* Same; Contracts; A contract of adhesion is “as binding as ordinary contracts,
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE T. the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it
CALDERON, respondent. entirely.”—On the same breath, however, we have equally ruled that such a
contract is “as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party who
Civil Law; Damages; In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely.” Equitable Banking
are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or Corporation vs. Calderon, 446 SCRA 271, G.R. No. 156168 December 14,
is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton 2004
disregard of his contractual obligations.—In culpa contractual or breach of
contract, as here, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to
bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. Verily, the
breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or
abusive.

Same; Same; Distinction between damages and injury.—Injury is the illegal

invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In
such cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to
a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria. In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff—a concurrence
of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual
was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some
duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be
awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the
injury.

Page | 51
G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005.*
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA,” respondent.
Actions; Human Relations; Torts and Damages; Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit
Injuria; The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury”) refers to a self-inflicted injury or to the consent to
injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.—
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated
in the process) as he was a “gate-crasher.” The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria
(“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to self-
inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of
damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger,
even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however,
this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners,
under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to
treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Where the trial court and the appellate court
reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and
evidence of the case, the Supreme Court is left without choice but to use its
latent power to review such findings of facts.—The general rule is that we are
not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors
of law. One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. The
lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave
the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on
the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly
embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the
place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in
agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges
proves.—Another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr.
Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his
witnesses—Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva—proved
only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.
Same; Same; Same; Party Gatecrashers; A person who did not abuse her right
in asking a person to leave a party to which he was not invited cannot be made
to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.—Ms. Lim, not
having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not
invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held
liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.
Same; Same; Same; Principle of Abuse of Rights; Article 19 of the Civil Code,
known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances, the object of
the article being to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.—Article
19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19
states: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. Elsewhere, we explained that when “a right is exercised
in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible.” The object of this article, therefore, is to set
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights
but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following:
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act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20
or 21 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,
and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.—Article 20 pertains to
damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as Ms.
Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the
other hand, states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus
mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and
(3) it is done with intent to injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19
and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Bad judgment which, if done with good intentions,
cannot amount to bad faith.—The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes
to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this
regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that
Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying
from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action
“predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which
calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity.” Without
proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart
cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs.
Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at
all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions,
cannot amount to bad faith. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes, 452 SCRA
532, G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

Same; Same; Same; Same; A complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and
conjectures.—As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has
not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people
did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus,
Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive
conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being “single at 44 years old,” had
a “very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by
her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen.” The lameness
of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based
on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.

Page | 53
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. THEMISTOCLES PACILAN,
JR., respondent.
Actions; Human Relations; Doctrine of Abuse of Rights; Elements; Words and
Phrases; “Good Faith,” “Bad Faith” and “Malice,” Defined.—The elements of
abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b)
which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision. The law
always presumes good faith and any person who seeks to be awarded damages
due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith
or with ill-motive. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested
by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain
from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad
faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence, dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature
of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It
implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or
bad motive.
Same; Same; Same; Banks and Banking; No malice or bad faith could be
imputed on a bank for closing the account of a depositor for frequently drawing
checks against insufficient funds.—It is observed that nowhere under its rules
and regulations is petitioner bank required to notify the respondent, or any
depositor for that matter, of the closure of the account for frequently drawing
checks against insufficient funds. No malice or bad faith could be imputed on
petitioner bank for so acting since the records bear out that the respondent had
indeed been improperly and irregularly handling his account not just a few times
but hundreds of times. Under the circumstances, petitioner bank could not be
faulted for exercising its right in accordance with the express rules and
regulations governing the current accounts of its depositors. Upon the opening
of his account, the respondent had agreed to be bound by these terms and
conditions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The act of a bank of accepting a deposit made by a
depositor the day following the closure of his account does not constitute bad
faith—the same could be characterized as simple negligence by its personnel.—
Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the deposit made by the
respondent the day following the closure of his account constitutes bad faith or
malice on the part of petitioner bank. The same could be characterized as simple
negligence by its personnel. Said act, by itself, is not constitutive of bad faith.
Same; Same; Damages; Words and Phrases; There is a material distinction
between damages and injury—injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right while
damages is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; There can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty—situations often called damnum absque
injuria.—It has not been shown that these acts were done by petitioner bank
with the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring the respondent. It is conceded
that the respondent may have suffered damages as a result of the closure of his
current account. However, there is a material distinction between damages and
injury. The Court had the occasion to explain the distinction between damages
and injury in this wise: . . . Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage
is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can
be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In other words, in order that
a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff—a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award
Page | 54
of tort damages is the premise that the individual was injured in contemplation
of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of
liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such
duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. Far East Bank and Trust
Company vs. Pacilan, Jr., 465 SCRA 372, G.R. No. 157314 July 29, 2005
G.R. No. 158805. April 16, 2009.*
VALLEY GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., petitioner, vs. ROSA O.
VDA. DE CARAM, respondent.
Corporation Law; Non-Stock Corporations; The procedure under Section 67 of
the Corporation Code for the stock corporation’s recourse on unpaid
subscriptions is inapt to a non-stock corporation vis-à-vis a member’s
outstanding dues.—To bolster its cause, Valley Golf proffers the proposition
that by virtue of the by-law provisions a lien is created on the shares of its
members to ensure payment of dues, charges and other assessments on the
members. Both the SEC and the Court of Appeals debunked the tenability or
applicability of the proposition through two common thrusts. Firstly, they
correctly noted that the procedure under Section 67 of the Corporation Code for
the stock corporation’s recourse on unpaid subscriptions is inapt to a non-stock
corporation vis-à-vis a member’s outstanding dues. The basic factual backdrops
in the two situations are disperate. In the latter, the member has fully paid for
his membership share, while in the former, the stockholder has not yet fully
paid for the share or shares of stock he subscribed to, thereby authorizing the
stock corporation to call on the unpaid subscription, declare the shares
delinquent and subject the delinquent shares to a sale at public auction.
Secondly, the two bodies below concluded that following Section 6 of the
Corporation Code, which provides: The shares of stock of stock corporation
may be divided into classes or series of shares, or both, any of which classes or
series of shares may have such rights, privileges or restrictions as may be stated
in the articles of incorporation x x x the lien on the Golf Share in favor of Valley
Golf is not valid, as the power to constitute such a lien should be provided in
the articles of incorporation, and not merely in the by-laws.
Same; Same; By-Laws; The right of a non-stock corporation to expel a member
through the forfeiture of such member’s share may be established in the by-
laws alone.—There is a specific provision under the Title XI, on Non-Stock
Corporations of the Corporation Code dealing with termination of membership.
Section 91 of the Corporation Code provides: SEC. 91. Termination of
Page | 55
membership.—Membership shall be terminated in the manner and for the
causes provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. Termination of
membership shall have the effect of extinguishing all rights of a member in the
corporation or in its property, unless otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation or the by-laws. Clearly, the right of a non-stock corporation such
as Valley Golf to expel a member through the forfeiture of the Golf Share may
be established in the by-laws alone, as is the situation in this case. Thus, both
the SEC and the appellate court are wrong in holding that the establishment of
a lien and the loss of the Golf Share consequent to the enforcement of the lien
should have been provided for in the articles of incorporation.
Same; Same; Same; Generally in theory, a non-stock corporation has the power
to effect the termination of a member without having to constitute a lien on the
membership share or to undertake the elaborate process of selling the same at
public auction.—Valley Golf has sought to accomplish the termination of
Caram’s membership through the sale of the Golf Share, justifying the sale
through the constitution of a lien on the Golf Share under Section 1, Article VIII
of its by-laws. Generally in theory, a non-stock corporation has the power to
effect the termination of a member without having to constitute a lien on the
membership share or to undertake the elaborate process of selling the same at
public auction. The articles of incorporation or the by-laws can very well simply
provide that the failure of a member to pay the dues on time is cause for the
board of directors to terminate membership. Yet Valley Golf was organized in
such a way that membership is adjunct to ownership of a share in the club; hence
the necessity to dispose of the share to terminate membership.
Same; Same; Share ownership introduces another dimension to the case—the
reality that termination of membership may also lead to the infringement of
property rights.—Share ownership introduces another dimension to the case—
the reality that termination of membership may also lead to the infringement of
property rights. Even though Valley Golf is a non-stock corporation, as evinced
by the fact that it is not authorized to distribute to the holder of its shares
dividends or allotments of the surplus profits on the basis of shares held, the
Golf Share has an assigned value reflected on the certificate of membership
itself. Termination of membership in Valley Golf does not merely lead to the
withdrawal of the rights and privileges of the member to club properties and
facilities but also to the loss of the Golf Share itself for which the member had
fully paid. The claim of Valley Golf is limited to the amount of unpaid dues
plus incremental costs. On the other hand, Caram’s loss may encompass not
only the amount he had paid for the share but also the price it would have
fetched in the market at the time his membership was terminated.
Same; Same; When the loss of membership in a non-stock corporation also
entails the loss of property rights, the manner of deprivation of such property
right should also be in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.—Does
the Corporation Code permit the termination of membership without due notice
to the member? The Code itself is silent on that matter, and the argument can
be made that if no notice is provided for in the articles of incorporation or in the
by-laws, then termination may be effected without any notice at all. Support for
such an argument can be drawn from our ruling in Long v. Basa (366 SCRA
113 [2001]), which pertains to a religious corporation that is also a non-stock
corporation. Therein, the Court upheld the expulsion of church members despite
the absence of any provision on prior notice in the by-laws, stating that the
members had “waived such notice by adhering to those by-laws[,] became
members of the church voluntarily[,] entered into its covenant and subscribed
to its rules [and by] doing so, they are bound by their consent.” However, a
distinction should be made between membership in a religious corporation,
which ordinarily does not involve the purchase of ownership shares, and
membership in a non-stock corporation such as Valley Golf, where the purchase
of an ownership share is a condition sine qua non. Membership in Valley Golf
entails the acquisition of a property right. In turn, the loss of such property right
could also involve the application of aspects of civil law, in addition to the
provisions of the Corporation Code. To put it simply, when the loss of
membership in a non-stock corporation also entails the loss of property rights,
the manner of deprivation of such property right should also be in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code.
Page | 56

Same; Same; It is unmistakably wise public policy to require that the
termination of membership in a non-stock corporation be done in accordance
with substantial justice.—It is unmistakably wise public policy to require that
the termination of membership in a non-stock corporation be done in
accordance with substantial justice. No matter how one may precisely define
such term, it is evident in this case that the termination of Caram’s membership
betrayed the dictates of substantial justice.
Same; Same; The non-stock corporation acted in clear bad faith when it sent the
final notice to a member under the pretense they believed him to be still alive,
when in fact it had very well known that he had already died.—Valley Golf did
not claim before the Court of Appeals that they had learned of Caram’s death
only after the auction sale. It also appears that Valley Golf had conceded before
the SEC that some of the notices it had sent were addressed to the estate of
Caram, and not the decedent himself. What do these facts reveal? Valley Golf
acted in clear bad faith when it sent the final notice to Caram under the pretense
they believed him to be still alive, when in fact they had very well known that
he had already died. That it was in the final notice that Valley Golf had
perpetrated the duplicity is especially blameworthy, since it was that notice that
carried the final threat that his Golf Share would be sold at public auction should
he fail to settle his account on or before 31 May 1987.
Same; Same; Human Relations; Non-stock corporations and their officers are
not exempt from the obligation imposed by Articles 19, 20, and 21 under the
Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code, which provisions enunciate a
general obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in good faith
towards one another.—Valley Golf could have very well addressed that notice
to the estate of Caram, as it had done with the third and fourth notices. That it
did not do so signifies that Valley Golf was bent on selling the Golf Share,
impervious to potential complications that would impede its intentions, such as
the need to pursue the claim before the estate proceedings of Caram. By
pretending to assume that Caram was then still alive, Valley Golf would have
been able to capitalize on his previous unresponsiveness to their notices and
proceed in feigned good faith with the sale. Whatever the reason Caram was
unable to respond to the earlier notices, the fact remains that at the time of the
final notice, Valley Golf knew that Caram, having died and gone, would not be
able to settle the obligation himself, yet they persisted in sending him notice to
provide a color of regularity to the resulting sale. That reason alone, evocative
as it is of the absence of substantial justice in the sale of the Golf Share, is
sufficient to nullify the sale and sustain the rulings of the SEC and the Court of
Appeals. Moreover, the utter and appalling bad faith exhibited by Valley Golf
in sending out the final notice to Caram on the deliberate pretense that he was
still alive could bring into operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 under the Chapter
on Human Relations of the Civil Code. These provisions enunciate a general
obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in good faith towards one
another. Non-stock corporations and its officers are not exempt from that
obligation.
Same; Same; The by-laws of Valley Golf is discomfiting enough in that it fails
to provide any formal notice and hearing procedure before a member’s share
may be seized and sold.—The by-laws of Valley Golf is discomfiting enough
in that it fails to provide any formal notice and hearing procedure before a
member’s share may be seized and sold. The Court would have been satisfied
had the by-laws or the articles of incorporation established a procedure which
assures that the member would in reality be actually notified of the pending
accounts and provide the opportunity for such member to settle such accounts
before the membership share could be seized then sold to answer for the debt.
As we have emphasized, membership in Valley Golf and many other like-
situated non-stock corporations actually involves the purchase of a membership
share, which is a substantially expensive property. As a result, termination of
membership does not only lead to loss of bragging rights, but the actual
deprivation of property.
Same; Same; The arrangement provided for in the by-laws of Valley Golf
whereby a lien is constituted on the membership share to answer for subsequent
Page | 57
obligations to the corporation finds applicable parallels under the Civil Code—
membership shares are considered as movable or personal property, and they
can be constituted as security to secure a principal obligation, such as the dues
and fees; There are at least two contractual modes under the Civil Code by
which personal property can be used to secure a principal obligation—the first
is through a contract of pledge, while the second is through a chattel
mortgage.—The arrangement provided for in the afore-quoted by-laws of
Valley Golf whereby a lien is constituted on the membership share to answer
for subsequent obligations to the corporation finds applicable parallels under
the Civil Code. Membership shares are considered as movable or personal
property, and they can be constituted as security to secure a principal obligation,
such as the dues and fees. There are at least two contractual modes under the
Civil Code by which personal property can be used to secure a principal
obligation. The first is through a contract of pledge, while the second is through
a chattel mortgage. A pledge would require the pledgor to surrender possession
of the thing pledged, i.e., the membership share, to the pledge in order that the
contract of pledge may be constituted. Is delivery of the share cannot be
effected, the suitable security transaction is the chattel mortgage. Under Article
2124 of the Civil Code, movables may be the object of a chattel mortgage. The
Chattel mortgage is governed by Act No. 1508, otherwise known The Chattel
Mortgage Law, and the Civil Code. Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc. vs. Vda.
de Caram, 585 SCRA 218, G.R. No. 158805 April 16, 2009
G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009.*
ELISEO F. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P.
LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW
AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M.
DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ,
CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M.
SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 165636. April 29, 2009.*
ELISEO F. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION
REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE,
JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO, NOEL R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL
BORLAZA, JOSE E. ROMERO IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in
their capacity as members of the Hearing and Adjudication Committee of
the MTRCB, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ,
MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO,
BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN
A. GAVINO, in their capacity as complainants before the MTRCB,
respondents.
Administrative Law; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB); Powers of an administrative agency is ascertained from the law
itself which is liberally construed. Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) has the power to issue a preventive suspension
order.—Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be
administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or
a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They
have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly
or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has certain powers,
the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the
authority given should be liberally construed. A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic
mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority,
albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And
Page | 58
this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its
power of regulation and supervision.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Administrative Agencies.—But the mere absence of
a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not
work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive
suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to
regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or
broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose
sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it
investigates. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the
IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did
the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually
done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB’s
duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a determination
of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec.
3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986
bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.
Same; Same; Same; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board’s
(MTRCB’s) power to issue a preventive suspension order includes TV
programs.—We cannot agree with petitioner’s assertion that the aforequoted
IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable only to motion pictures
and publicity materials. The scope of the MTRCB’s authority extends beyond
motion pictures. What the acronym MTRCB stands for would suggest as much.
And while the law makes specific reference to the closure of a television
network, the suspension of a television program is a far less punitive measure
that can be undertaken, with the purpose of stopping further violations of PD
1986. Again, the MTRCB would regretfully be rendered ineffective should it
be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.
Same; Same; Due Process; Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB) issued the assailed order after a hearing.—Just as untenable is
petitioner’s argument on the nullity of the preventive suspension order on the
ground of lack of hearing. As it were, the MTRCB handed out the assailed order
after petitioner, in response to a written notice, appeared before that Board for
a hearing on private respondents’ complaint. No less than petitioner admitted
that the order was issued after the adjournment of the hearing, proving that he
had already appeared before the MTRCB. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the
IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension shall issue “[a]ny time during the
pendency of the case.” In this particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly
apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986 and of
administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such violation.
Evidence; Constitutional Law; Petitioner has not been denied the equal
protection of the law as the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) ministers he criticized are
not facing any administrative charges.—Petitioner’s position does not persuade.
The equal protection clause demands that “all persons subject to legislation
should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.” It guards against undue favor and
individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot,
under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who,
for one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For
another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use
language similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCB’s
disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order
is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics,
this does not become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. The Court
need not belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang
Dating Daan, on one hand, and the INC ministers, as hosts of Ang Tamang
Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this case, simply too different to
even consider whether or not there is a prima facie indication of oppressive
inequality.
Page | 59
 Same; Same; Religious Freedom; Plain and simple insults to another person
cannot be elevated to the status of a religious speech.—There is nothing in
petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular
religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact
that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program
does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain
and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of
religious speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place his words in context show
that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any
religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers
distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV
station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech.
We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his
reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation
of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate
that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language
discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his
detractors, but opted for the low road.
Same; Same; Same; A TV program rated “G” or for general viewership reaches
adults and children alike. What may not be obscene speech to adults may be
considered obscene for children.—A cursory examination of the utterances
complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal that to an average adult,
the utterances “Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa putang babae x x x. Yung
putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!” may not constitute obscene but merely indecent
utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words.
In the context they were used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of
an adult. The problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered
in a TV program that is rated “G” or for general viewership, and in a time slot
that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases.—While adults may have understood
that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally, children could hardly be
expected to have the same discernment. Without parental guidance, the
unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a television broadcast
could corrupt impressionable young minds. The term “putang babae” means “a
female prostitute,” a term wholly inappropriate for children, who could look it
up in a dictionary and just get the literal meaning, missing the context within
which it was used. Petitioner further used the terms, “ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba,” making reference to the female sexual organ and how a female
prostitute uses it in her trade, then stating that Sandoval was worse than that by
using his mouth in a similar manner. Children could be motivated by curiosity
and ask the meaning of what petitioner said, also without placing the phrase in
context. They may be inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different from a female
prostitute and the reasons for the dissimilarity. And upon learning the meanings
of the words used, young minds, without the guidance of an adult, may, from
their end, view this kind of indecent speech as obscene, if they take these words
literally and use them in their own speech or form their own ideas on the matter.
In this particular case, where children had the opportunity to hear petitioner’s
words, when speaking of the average person in the test for obscenity, we are
speaking of the average child, not the average adult. The average child may not
have the adult’s grasp of figures of speech, and may lack the understanding that
language may be colorful, and words may convey more than the literal meaning.
Undeniably the subject speech is very suggestive of a female sexual organ and
its function as such. In this sense, we find petitioner’s utterances obscene and
not entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom of speech.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; As a standard of limitation on freedom
of speech and press, the clear and present danger test is not a magic
incantation.—It was originally designed to determine the latitude which should
be given to speech that espouses anti-government action, or to have serious and
substantial deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the
community. The clear and present danger rule has been applied to this
jurisdiction. As a standard of limitation on free speech and press, however, the
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clear and present danger test is not a magic incantation that wipes out all
problems and does away with analysis and judgment in the testing of the
legitimacy of claims to free speech and which compels a court to release a
defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of
imminent catastrophic disaster. As we observed in Eastern Broadcasting
Corporation vs. Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA 628 (1985), the clear and present danger
test “does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The State has a compelling interest to protect
minors, against offensive language in TV programs.—The State has a
compelling interest in extending social protection to minors against all forms of
neglect, exploitation, and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It has
a compelling interest in helping parents, through regulatory mechanisms,
protect their children’s minds from exposure to undesirable materials and
corrupting experiences. The Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, as
earlier indicated, to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their
role in the field of nation-building. In the same way, the State is mandated to
support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character. Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language
uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the
children. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is
unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the State’s
mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial
and compelling government interest in regulating petitioner’s utterances in TV
broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
Same; Same; Same; The assailed order penalized petitioner for past speech, not
future speeches in a TV program.—Neither can petitioner’s virtual inability to
speak in his program during the period of suspension be plausibly treated as
prior restraint on future speech. For viewed in its proper perspective, the
suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for uttering an unprotected
form of speech. It is definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible
cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. In fine, the suspension
meted was simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and
administration of the law which it is tasked to implement. Viewed in its proper
context, the suspension sought to penalize past speech made on prime-time “G”
rated TV program; it does not bar future speech of petitioner in other television
programs; it is a permissible subsequent administrative sanction; it should not
be confused with a prior restraint on speech. While not on all fours, the Court,
in MTRCB, sustained the power of the MTRCB to penalize a broadcast
company for exhibiting/airing a pre-taped TV episode without Board
authorization in violation of Sec. 7 of PD 1986.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Presidential Decree No. 1986 is
constitutional; The investiture of supervisory power would be meaningless if it
did not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised as may be
proportionate to the offense proved.—Complementing this provision is Sec.
3(k) of the decree authorizing the MTRCB “to exercise such powers and
functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purpose and
objectives of [the law].” As earlier explained, the investiture of supervisory,
regulatory, and disciplinary power would surely be a meaningless grant if it did
not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised or the regulated as may
be proportionate to the offense committed, charged, and proved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative regulation or subordinate legislation
to promote public interest is a necessity in modern life.—The grant of the rule-
making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative
powers. Administrative regulations or “subordinate legislation” calculated to
promote the public interest are necessary because of “the growing complexity
of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations,
and the increased difficulty of administering the law.” Allowing the MTRCB
some reasonable elbow-room in its operations and, in the exercise of its
statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample latitude in fixing, by way of
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an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with due regard for the
severity of the offense and attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
as the case may be, would be consistent with its mandate to effectively and
efficiently regulate the movie and television industry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB) may suspend a TV program but not its host.—But even as we
uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose sanctions for violations
of PD 1986, its decision to suspend petitioner must be modified, for nowhere in
that issuance, particularly the power-defining Sec. 3 nor in the MTRCB
Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective January 1, 1999 is the Board
empowered to suspend the program host or even to prevent certain people from
appearing in television programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, may prohibit the
broadcast of such television programs or cancel permits for exhibition, but it
may not suspend television personalities, for such would be beyond its
jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation beyond what
the law provides. Only persons, offenses, and penalties clearly falling clearly
within the letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be within the
decree’s penal or disciplinary operation. And when it exists, the reasonable
doubt must be resolved in favor of the person charged with violating the statute
and for whom the penalty is sought. Thus, the MTRCB’s decision in
Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 and the subsequent
order issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. The suspension should
cover only the television program on which petitioner appeared and uttered the
offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what the law and the facts
obtaining call for. Soriano vs. Laguardia, 587 SCRA 79, G.R. No. 164785 April
29, 2009
G.R. No. 120639. September 25, 1998.*
BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and RICARDO J. MARASIGAN, respondents.
Commercial Law; Checks; Settled is the doctrine that a check is only a
substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does
not, by itself operate as payment.—As agreed upon by the parties, on the
following day, private respondent did issue a check for P15,000. However, the
check was postdated 15 December 1989. Settled is the doctrine that a check is
only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument
does not, by itself operate as payment. This is especially true in the case of a
postdated check.
Same; Same; The issuance by the private respondent of the postdated check was
not effective payment.—The issuance by the private respondent of the
postdated check was not effective payment. It did not comply with his
obligation under the arrangement with Miss Lorenzo. Petitioner corporation
was therefore justified in suspending his credit card.
Civil Law; Damages; Elements to Find the Existence of an Abuse of Right
Under Article 19.—To find the existence of an abuse of right under Article 19
the following elements must be present: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
Same; Same; Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad faith is on
the party alleging it.—Time and again this Court has held that good faith is
presumed and the burden of proving bad faith is on the party alleging it. This,
private respondent failed to do. In fact, the action of the petitioner belies the
existence of bad faith. As early as 28 October 1989, petitioner could have
suspended private respondent’s card outright. Instead, petitioner allowed
private respondent to use his card for several weeks. Petitioner had even notified
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private respondent of the impending suspension of his credit card and made
special accommodations for him for settling his outstanding account. As such,
petitioner cannot be said to have capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the
private respondent’s credit card.
Same; Same; There can be damage without injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.—We do not
dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered damages
as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal
right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss
or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal
injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
Same; Same; There must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of
liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such
duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.—In other words, in order that
a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff—a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award
of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation
of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of
liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such
duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. BPI Express Card Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 260, G.R. No. 120639 September 25, 1998
G.R. No. 195670. December 3, 2012.*
WILLEM BEUMER, petitioner, vs. AVELINA AMORES, respondent.
Civil Law; Succession; Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.―In In Re:
Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut
Muller, 500 SCRA 65 (2006), the Court had already denied a claim for
reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted
by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena
Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement
on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought
the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine
land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
which reads: Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Same; Equity; The time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.―As also
explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must
do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus,
a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
Same; Same; Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely,
a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no
rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.―In any event,
the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to
petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties
by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a
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rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him
because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates and the plaintiff.”
the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article Same; The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of
1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon.―Precisely, it is the
him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in
The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners
the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built
unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into. thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were
properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless
Same; Principle of Unjust Enrichment; No person should unjustly enrich to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and
himself at the expense of another.―Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect. Beumer vs. Amores,
claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel 686 SCRA 770, G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for
money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment
does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit: Futile, too,
is petitioner’s reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads: Art.
22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The provision
is expressed in the maxim: “MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST” (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just
cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not
apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the
petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from
recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield
stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: “The objection that a contract is
immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times
very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which

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G.R. No. 158143. September 21, 2011.*
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs.
ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N. RAMOS, respondents.
Appeals; An exception to the rule that petitions for review on certiorari only
involve questions of law is when the findings of fact in the tribunals below are
conflicting, in which case the Supreme Court can delve into evidence and the
factual circumstance of the case, and when the exception applies, the Court is
given latitude to review the evidence on record to decide the case with
finality.—At the outset, we observe that the petition raises mainly questions of
fact whose resolution requires the re-examination of the evidence on record. As
a general rule, petitions for review on certiorari only involve questions of
law. By way of exception, however, we can delve into evidence and the factual
circumstance of the case when the findings of fact in the tribunals below (in this
case between those of the CA and of the RTC) are conflicting. When the
exception applies, we are given latitude to review the evidence on record to
decide the case with finality.
Actions; Evidence; Quantum of Proof; Words and Phrases; “Preponderance of
Evidence,” Explained; “Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight
of the credible evidence”—preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the
last analysis, means probability of the truth, evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.—In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is
more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in opposition. This Court, in
Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., 443 SCRA 293 (2004), defined
“preponderance of evidence” in the following manner: Preponderance of
evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight
of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.”
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. The party,
whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue
has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment,
subject to the overriding rule that the burden to prove his cause of action never
leaves the plaintiff. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not
merely a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but
one which, if established, will constitute an “avoidance” of the claim.
Same; Same; Same; Even if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff appears
stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot be entered in
the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain his cause of
action.—Given that PCIB failed to establish Ramos’ participation in
Balmaceda’s scheme, it was not even necessary for Ramos to provide an
explanation for the money he received from Balmaceda. Even if the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant,
a judgment cannot be entered in the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does
not suffice to sustain his cause of action; to reiterate, a preponderance of
evidence as defined must be established to achieve this result.
Banks and Banking; Negotiable Instruments Law; Checks; Crossed Checks;
Words and Phrases; A crossed check is one where two parallel lines are drawn
across its face or across its corner; The crossing of a check has the following
effects: (a) the check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank; (b)
the check may be negotiated only once—to the one who has an account with
the bank; and (c) the act of crossing the check serves as a warning to the holder
that the check has been issued for a definite purpose and he must inquire if he
received the check pursuant to this purpose; otherwise, he is not a holder in due
course.—Another telling indicator of PCIB’s negligence is the fact that it
allowed Balmaceda to encash the Manager’s checks that were plainly crossed
checks. A crossed check is one where two parallel lines are drawn across its
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face or across its corner. Based on jurisprudence, the crossing of a check has
the following effects: (a) the check may not be encashed but only deposited in
the bank; (b) the check may be negotiated only once—to the one who has an
account with the bank; and (c) the act of crossing the check serves as a warning
to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose and he must
inquire if he received the check pursuant to this purpose; otherwise, he is not a
holder in due course. In other words, the crossing of a check is a warning that
the check should be deposited only in the account of the payee. When a check
is crossed, it is the duty of the collecting bank to ascertain that the check is only
deposited to the payee’s account. In complete disregard of this duty, PCIB’s
systems allowed Balmaceda to encash 26 Manager’s checks which were all
crossed checks, or checks payable to the “payee’s account only.”
Same; Same; Same; The diligence required of banks is more than that of a
Roman pater familias or a good father of a family—the highest degree of
diligence is expected.—The General Banking Law of 2000 requires of banks
the highest standards of integrity and performance. The banking business is
impressed with public interest. Of paramount importance is the trust and
confidence of the public in general in the banking industry. Consequently, the
diligence required of banks is more than that of a Roman pater familias or a
good father of a family. The highest degree of diligence is expected.
Equity; Unjust Enrichment; To substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the
claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received
something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are
such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit.—To have a cause
of action based on unjust enrichment, we explained in University of the
Philippines v. Philab Industries, Inc., 439 SCRA 467 (2004), that: Unjust
enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts
or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly
enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must
unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received something of value
to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would
be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. Unjust enrichment is a term used to
depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or
benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable
obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer
benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a
theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the
doctrine of restitution.
Banks and Banking; Compensation; A bank does not have a unilateral right to
freeze the account of a depositor based on its mere suspicion that the funds
therein were proceeds of some shady transactions; For legal compensation to
take place, two persons, in their own right, must first be creditors and debtors
of each other.—We also find that PCIB acted illegally in freezing and debiting
Ramos’ bank account. In BPI Family Bank v. Franco, 538 SCRA 184 (2007),
we cautioned against the unilateral freezing of bank accounts by banks, noting
that: More importantly, [BPI Family Bank] does not have a unilateral right to
freeze the accounts of Franco based on its mere suspicion that the funds therein
were proceeds of the multi-million peso scam Franco was allegedly involved
in. To grant [BPI Family Bank], or any bank for that matter, the right to take
whatever action it pleases on deposits which it supposes are derived from shady
transactions, would open the floodgates of public distrust in the banking
industry. We see no legal merit in PCIB’s claim that legal compensation took
place between it and Ramos, thereby warranting the automatic deduction from
Ramos’ bank account. For legal compensation to take place, two persons, in
their own right, must first be creditors and debtors of each other. While PCIB,
as the depositary bank, is Ramos’ debtor in the amount of his deposits, Ramos
is not PCIB’s debtor under the evidence the PCIB adduced. PCIB thus had no
basis, in fact or in law, to automatically debit from Ramos’ bank account.
Same; Damages; One may err, but error alone is not a ground for granting moral
damages.—Although PCIB’s act of freezing and debiting Ramos’ account is
unlawful, we cannot hold PCIB liable for moral and exemplary damages. Since
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a contractual relationship existed between Ramos and PCIB as the depositor
and the depositary bank, respectively, the award of moral damages depends on
the applicability of Article 2220 of the Civil Code, which provides: Article
2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages
are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. [emphasis ours] Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious commission of a wrong; it partakes of the nature
of fraud. As the facts of this case bear out, PCIB did not act out of malice or
bad faith when it froze Ramos’ bank account and subsequently debited the
amount of P251,910.96 therefrom. While PCIB may have acted hastily and
without regard to its primary duty to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care and utmost fidelity, we find that its actions were propelled
more by the need to protect itself, and not out of malevolence or ill will. One
may err, but error alone is not a ground for granting moral damages.
Attorney’s Fees; Taking into consideration the time and efforts involved that
went into this case, the Court increases the award of attorney’s fees from
P20,000.00 to P75,000.00.—We deem it just and equitable, however, to uphold
the award of attorney’s fees in Ramos’ favor. Taking into consideration the time
and efforts involved that went into this case, we increase the award of attorney’s
fees from P20,000.00 to P75,000.00. Philippine Commercial International Bank
vs. Balmaceda, 658 SCRA 33, G.R. No. 158143 September 21, 2011
G.R. No. 190846. February 3, 2016.*
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., petitioner, vs. JOSE G. HOSANA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court
(SC) does not address questions of fact which require us to rule on “the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts,” Exceptions.—This Court does not address questions
of fact which require us to rule on “the truth or falsehood of alleged facts,”
except in the following cases: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.
Same; Evidence; Preponderance of Evidence; Words and Phrases;
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible
evidence.”—In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations
has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, the
parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness
of the defense offered by their opponent. Preponderance of evidence is the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or
“greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a
phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence
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that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.
Civil Law; Obligations; Payment; One who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it; the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on
the plaintiff to prove nonpayment.—It is settled in jurisprudence that one who
pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant
to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment. A mere
allegation is not evidence, and the person who alleges has the burden of proving
his or her allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence, which in civil cases
is preponderance of evidence.
Same; Contracts; Void Contracts; A void or inexistent contract has no force and
effect from the very beginning.—A void or inexistent contract has no force and
effect from the very beginning. This rule applies to contracts that are declared
void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property
without the other spouse’s written consent. A void contract is equivalent to
nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either
by ratification or prescription. When, however, any of the terms of a void
contract have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary
to allow restitution of what has been given under it. It is basic that if a void
contract has already “been performed, the restoration of what has been given is
in order.” This principle springs from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which
states that “every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same.” Hence, the
restitution of what each party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent
contract.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Deed of Sale; The deed of
sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the
truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual payment.—The deed of
sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the
truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of
introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in
the contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The
deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to determine matters that occurred in the
execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given
under the void contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.
Same; Same; It is settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which
appears to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer
policy is to be liberal and not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admit them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason
that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are
thereafter found relevant or competent.—It is also settled in jurisprudence that
with respect to evidence which appears to be of doubtful relevancy,
incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject
them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them
beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or
competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them. In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null
and void by positive provision of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal
property without the spouse’s consent. It does not, however, preclude the
possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein. The admission of
the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the court to
admit the evidence which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before the
courts.
Civil Law; Unjust Enrichment; Unjust enrichment exists “when a person
unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and
good conscience.”—Unjust enrichment exists “when a person unjustly retains
a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
Page | 68
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good
conscience.” The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy
of the State and is based on Article 22 of the Civil Code. The principle of unjust
enrichment requires Jose to return what he or Milagros received under the void
contract which presumably benefited their conjugal partnership. Tan, Jr. vs.
Hosana, 783 SCRA 87, G.R. No. 190846 February 3, 2016
G.R. No. 170479. February 18, 2008.*
ANDRE T. ALMOCERA, petitioner, vs. JOHNNY ONG, respondent.
Sales; Contracts to Sell; Words and Phrases; A contract to sell is akin to a
conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s
obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and
uncertain event, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the
parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.—It
cannot be disputed that the contract entered into by the parties was a contract to
sell. The contract was denominated as such and it contained the provision that
the unit shall be conveyed by way of an Absolute Deed of Sale, together with
the attendant documents of Ownership—the Transfer Certificate of Title and
Certificate of Occupancy—and that the balance of the contract price shall be
paid upon the completion and delivery of the unit, as well as the acceptance
thereof by respondent. All these clearly indicate that ownership of the
townhouse has not passed to respondent. In Serrano v. Caguiat, 517 SCRA 57
(2007) we explained: A contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the
efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to transfer title is
subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the
suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the
conditional obligation had never existed. The suspensive condition is
commonly full payment of the purchase price.
Same; Same; Reciprocal Obligations; Where one of the parties to a contract did
not perform the undertaking to which he was bound by the terms of the
agreement to perform, he is not entitled to insist upon the performance of the
other party.—The contract subject of this case contains reciprocal obligations
which were to be fulfilled by the parties, i.e., to complete and deliver the
townhouse within six months from the execution of the contract to sell on the
part of petitioner and FBMC, and to pay the balance of the contract price upon
completion and delivery of the townhouse on the part of the respondent. In the
case at bar, the obligation of petitioner and FBMC which is to complete and
deliver the townhouse unit within the prescribed period, is determinative of the
Page | 69
respondent’s obligation to pay the balance of the contract price. With their
failure to fulfill their obligation as stipulated in the contract, they incurred delay
and are liable for damages. They cannot insist that respondent comply with his
obligation. Where one of the parties to a contract did not perform the
undertaking to which he was bound by the terms of the agreement to perform,
he is not entitled to insist upon the performance of the other party.
Same; Same; Same; Delay; Demand would be useless where there would be
impossibility of the other party complying with its obligation due to its fault.—
Demand is not necessary in the instant case. Demand by the respondent would
be useless because the impossibility of complying with their (petitioner and
FBMC) obligation was due to their fault. If only they paid their loans with the
LBP, the mortgage on the subject townhouse would not have been foreclosed
and thereafter sold to a third person.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For failure of one party to assume and perform the
obligation imposed on him, the other party does not incur delay.—The
obligation of respondent to pay the balance of the contract price was
conditioned on petitioner and FBMC’s performance of their obligation.
Considering that the latter did not comply with their obligation to complete and
deliver the townhouse unit within the period agreed upon, respondent could not
have incurred delay. For failure of one party to assume and perform the
obligation imposed on him, the other party does not incur delay.
Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment; Elements; The fundamental doctrine of unjust
enrichment is the transfer of value without just cause or consideration.—Under
the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that respondent is justified in
refusing to pay the balance of the contract price. He was never in possession of
the townhouse unit and he can no longer be its owner since ownership thereof
has been transferred to a third person who was not a party to the proceedings
below. It would simply be the height of inequity if we are to require respondent
to pay the balance of the contract price. To allow this would result in the unjust
enrichment of petitioner and FBMC. The fundamental doctrine of unjust
enrichment is the transfer of value without just cause or consideration. The
elements of this doctrine which are present in this case are: enrichment on the
part of the defendant; impoverishment on the part of the plaintiff; and lack of
cause. The main objective is to prevent one to enrich himself at the expense of
another. It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means a person shall
not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense.
Hence, to allow petitioner and FBMC keep the down payment made by
respondent amounting to P1,060,000.00 would result in their unjust enrichment
at the expense of the respondent. Thus, said amount should be returned.
Pleadings and Practice; Due Process; Points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought
not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal—it would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no
opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory not ventilated
before the trial court.—This issue of piercing the veil of corporate fiction was
never raised before the trial court. The same was raised for the first time before
the Court of Appeals which ruled that it was too late in the day to raise the same.
The Court of Appeals declared: In the case below, the pleadings and the
evidence of the defendants are one and the same and never had it made to appear
that Almocera is a person distinct and separate from the other defendant. In fine,
we cannot treat this error for the first time on appeal. We cannot in good
conscience, let the defendant Almocera raise the issue of piercing the veil of
corporate fiction just because of the adverse decision against him. x x x. To
allow petitioner to pursue such a defense would undermine basic considerations
of due process. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. It would
be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further
evidence material to the new theory not ventilated before the trial court.
Almocera vs. Ong, 546 SCRA 164, G.R. No. 170479 February 18, 2008
Page | 70
G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002.*
JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L. CANCIO,
petitioner, vs. EMERENCIANA ISIP, respondent.
Civil Law; Damages; An act or omission causing damage to another may give
rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender.—An act or
omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such
as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony [e.g.
culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil
Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right
to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action [Article 33,
Civil Code]. Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject; however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
that the offended party “cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission” or under both causes.
Same; Same; Actions; Under the present Rules, the independent civil actions
may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any
reservation in the criminal action.—Anent the independent civil actions under
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the old rules considered them
impliedly instituted with the civil liability ex-delicto in the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute
it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Under the
present Rules, however, the independent civil actions may be filed separately
and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal
action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver
of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles
of the Civil Code.
Remedial Law; Res Judicata; The action filed by petitioner is an independent
civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution
based on the same act.—One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes
of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner
is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any
criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the
criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the
offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an
entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.
Same; Forum-shopping; There can be no forum-shopping in the instant case
because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.—The essence of forum-shopping
is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
Although the cases filed by petitioner arose from the same act or omission of
respondent, they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal
cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection
is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in
the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the criminal action. Cancio, Jr. vs.
Isip, 391 SCRA 393, G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002
Page | 71
G.R. No. 157547. February 23, 2011.*
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, petitioners, vs. ELVIN** CHAN AND
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; Civil Liability; Civil liability to
the offended party cannot be denied; the payee of the check is entitled to receive
the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued.—The
Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can
give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325 (1987),
holding: x x x Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The
payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the
worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense.
Same; Same; Same; There is no independent civil action to recover the value of
a bouncing check issued in contravention of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; The
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action; No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.—There is no independent civil action to recover
the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear
from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which
relevantly provides: x x x (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Same; Same; Same; It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable; The reason is simply that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws;
except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they
permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required
at the time of the commission of the offenses.—The aforequoted provisions of
the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case
No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that
the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.
The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or
arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to
cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an
action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases,
the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum
of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of
the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex
post facto under the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Although the court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing
check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities
arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable.—
The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez, 371 SCRA
72 (2001), to give due course to the civil action of Chan independently and
separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees,
which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which
is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the
issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of
estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil
liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-
interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve
his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action
based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, as DMPI Employees
has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has
adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil
action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check
upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation,
supra.
Page | 72
Remedial Law; Actions; Litis Pendentia; Requisites for litis pendentia to be
successfully invoked as a bar to an action.—For litis pendentia to be
successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following
requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least
such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that
may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the
possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil. Heirs of Eduardo Simon
vs. Chan, 644 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
No. 46496. February 27, 1940]
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and
proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
1.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER.—The nature of the
Court of Industrial Relations and of its power is extensively discussed in the
decision.
2.ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.—The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.
R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be
said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.—There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character.
The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate
does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence
Page | 73
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL GRANTED.—In the
light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here
that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National
Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy
the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a
conclusion of law. This result, however, does not now preclude the concession
of a new trial prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The
interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other
evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which
created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The
failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the
parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be, and the same is hereby, granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it
re-open the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth in the decision. Ang
Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc., 69 Phil. 635, No. 46496 February
27, 1940
G.R. No. 88373. May 18, 1990.*
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. HON. IGNACIO CAPULONG
and AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD., respondents.
G.R. No. 82380. May 18, 1990.
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM
PRODUCTIONS, petitioners, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 82398. May 18, 1990.
HAL McELROY, petitioner, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
134, and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Injunction; Damages; Rule that a claim for damages arising
from a wrongful injunction shall be filed in the main case with notice to the
surety firmly settled; Action must commence before judgment attains finality,
otherwise it is barred.—A rule firmly settled in this jurisdiction is that a claim
for damages arising from a wrongful injunction should be filed in the main case
within notice to the surety. If the lower court’s decision, denying injunction, is
however appealed to the Appellate Court, and the latter affirms the denial, the
application may be commenced in the Appellate Court, which may either direct
a remand of the case for reception of evidence or otherwise hear the claim itself.
So also, it must be commenced before judgment attains finality. Otherwise, it
is barred.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The procedure is mandatory and failure to observe
it deprives the aggrieved party the right to proceed against the surety bond.—It
has been held that this procedure is mandatory, and the failure to observe it
deprives the aggrieved party the right to proceed against the surety bond.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent’s claim for damages
brought about by a wrongful injunction should have been commenced prior to
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June 20, 1988 either with this Court or with the Court below.—The Court’s
ruling, therefore, is that the private respondent’s claim for damages brought
about by a wrongful injunction should have been commenced prior to June 20,
1988 (the date Ayer judgment was entered) either with this Court or with the
court below. What is plain is that it had neglected to file its claim speedily and
seasonably, and for what clearly emerges as an effort to revive a lost
opportunity, it sought a court order to raise the case long decided by this Court
as having had no leg on which to stand.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinction between the Talavera case and Ayer case
is for purposes hereof tenuous because in both cases there was a final resolution
on the merits that left nothing for the trial court to adjudicate.—The private
respondent can not deny the application of Rivera v. Talavera, where we said
that the request for damages arising from injunction may be ventilated in the
Appellate Court, because although Talavera involved an appeal, whereas Ayer
was one for certiorari (special civil action), the distinction is, for purposes
hereof, tenuous because, in both cases, there was a final resolution on the merits
that left nothing for the trial court to adjudicate. , 185 SCRA 504, G.R. No.
88373, G.R. No. 82380, G.R. No. 82398 May 18, 1990
G.R. Nos. 159017-18. March 9, 2011.*
PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and Spouses VISITACION AND CESAR C. BOMBASI,
respondents.
G.R. No. 159059. March 9, 2011.*
VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, IN
REPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO T. COMENDADOR, petitioner,
vs. VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C. BOMBASI, respondents.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.—The elements of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that the accused are public
officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public
officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official
duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury
to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) OR that such injury
is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the other
party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Same; Same; Nuisance; Causing undue injury to any party, including the
government, could only mean actual injury or damage which must be
established by evidence.—Causing undue injury to any party, including the
government, could only mean actual injury or damage which must be
established by evidence. In jurisprudence, “undue injury” is consistently
interpreted as “actual.” Undue has been defined as “more than necessary, not
proper, [or] illegal”; and injury as “any wrong or damage done to another, either
in his person, rights, reputation or property [that is, the] invasion of any legally
protected interest of another.” Actual damage, in the context of these
definitions, is akin to that in civil law. It is evident from the records, as correctly
observed by the Sandiganbayan, that Asilo and Mayor Comendador as accused
below did not deny that there was indeed damage caused the Spouses Bombasi
on account of the demolition.
Page | 75

Same; Nuisance; The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is
possible if it is nuisance per se.—The abatement of a nuisance without judicial
proceedings is possible if it is nuisance per se. Nuisance per se is that which is
nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of location and
surroundings. In this case, the market stall cannot be considered as a nuisance
per se because as found out by the Court, the buildings had not been affected
by the 1986 fire. This finding was certified to by Supervising Civil Engineer
Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer Office.
Same; Estoppel; Article 1431 of the New Civil Code provides that, through
estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.—Art. 1431 of the New Civil Code provides that, through estoppel, an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it,
and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The
representation made by the municipality that the Spouses Bombasi had the right
to continuously operate its store binds the municipality. It is utterly unjust for
the Municipality to receive the benefits of the store operation and later on claim
the illegality of the business. Asilo, Jr. vs. People, 645 SCRA 41, G.R. Nos.
159017-18 March 9, 2011
G.R. No. 108017. April 3, 1995.*
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor
children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and
NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND
SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; The filing of an independent civil action before the
prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of an express reservation.—It is well-settled
that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the
criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the
requirement of an express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this
case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground
that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting
was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the
petitioner’s cause of action.
Same; Same; Nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in
the complaint as constituting the cause of action.—The nature of a cause of
action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the
cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of
an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of
the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
Same; Same; The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient
to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts
Page | 76
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon thesame in accordance with negligence.—Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no
the prayer therein; Elements of a cause of action.—With respect to the issue of justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or
whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the general omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render which are voluntary and intentional.
a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause
of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor Same; Same; Same; The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been
of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; construed to include bodily injuries causing death.—Private respondents further
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally
such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been construed to include
recovery of damages. bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the
Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965]; Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]).
Same; Same; To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.—In attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Dulay vs. Court
determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220, G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to
establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the
outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros
Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not
be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants
(Rava Dev’t. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank &
Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the
claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated
or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA
50 [1969]).

Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; There is no justification for limiting the

scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from

Page | 77
G.R. No. 159323. July 31, 2008.*
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (PHILS.), INC. and ERIC MONTINOLA,
petitioners, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and DR. DEAN
CLIMACO, respondents.
Actions; Prejudicial Questions; Legal Research; Words and Phrases; Our
concept of prejudicial question was lifted from Spain, where civil cases are tried
exclusively by civil courts, while criminal cases are tried exclusively in criminal
courts, each kind of court being jurisdictionally distinct from and independent
of the other; The rule is that there is prejudicial question when (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed; A prejudicial
question is understood in law to be that which must precede the criminal action,
that which requires a decision with which said question is closely related.—Our
concept of prejudicial question was lifted from Spain, where civil cases are tried
exclusively by civil courts, while criminal cases are tried exclusively in criminal
courts. Each kind of court is jurisdictionally distinct from and independent of
the other. In the Philippines, however, courts are invariably tribunals of general
jurisdiction. This means that courts here exercise jurisdiction over both civil
and criminal cases. Thus, it is not impossible that the criminal case, as well as
the civil case in which a prejudicial question may rise, may be both pending in
the same court. For this reason, the elements of prejudicial question have been
modified in such a way that the phrase “pendency of the civil case in a different
tribunal” has been eliminated. The rule is that there is prejudicial question when
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action both pend and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed. This is so
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. Here, no prejudicial question exists because there is no pending
criminal case. The consolidated NLRC cases cannot be considered as
“previously instituted civil action.” In Berbari v. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 837
(1920), it was held that a prejudicial question is understood in law to be that
which must precede the criminal action, that which requires a decision with
which said question is closely related.
Same; Same; It is settled that the question claimed to be prejudicial in nature
must be determinative of the case before the court.—Neither can the doctrine
of prejudicial question be applied by analogy. The issue in the case filed by Dr.
Climaco with the SSC involves the question of whether or not he is an employee
of Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. and subject to the compulsory coverage of
the Social Security System. On the contrary, the cases filed by Dr. Climaco
before the NLRC involved different issues. In his first complaint, Dr. Climaco
sought recognition as a regular employee of the company and demanded
payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living allowance, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, Christmas bonus and all other benefits. The second
complaint was for illegal dismissal, with prayer for reinstatement to his former
position as company physician of the company’s Bacolod Plant, without loss of
seniority rights, with full payment of backwages, other unpaid benefits, and for
payment of damages. Thus, the issues in the NLRC cases are not determinative
of whether or not the SSC should proceed. It is settled that the question claimed
to be prejudicial in nature must be determinative of the case before the court.
Same; Forum Shopping; Conflict of Laws; The grave evil sought to be avoided
by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two (2) competent
tribunals of two (2) separate and contradictory decisions—unscrupulous
litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly
try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached; It is
well to note that forum shopping traces its origin in private international law on
choice of venues, which later developed to a choice of remedies.—Forum
shopping is a prohibited malpractice and condemned as trifling with the courts
and their processes. It is proscribed because it unnecessarily burdens the courts
Page | 78
with heavy caseloads. It also unduly taxes the manpower and financial resources
of the judiciary. It mocks the judicial processes, thus, affecting the efficient
administration of justice. The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against
forum shopping is the rendition by two (2) competent tribunals of two (2)
separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous litigants, taking advantage
of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several
different fora until a favorable result is reached. It is well to note that forum
shopping traces its origin in private international law on choice of venues,
which later developed to a choice of remedies.
Same; Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; There is res judicata when (1) there is a
final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment or order is on the merits; and
(4) there is between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes
of action.—There is forum shopping when one party repetitively avails of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or
already resolved adversely, by some other court. In short, forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other. There is res judicata when (1)
there is a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment or order is on the merits;
and (4) there is between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action. Measured by the foregoing yardstick, Dr. Climaco is not guilty
of forum shopping. While it is true that the parties are identical in the NLRC
and in the SSC, the reliefs sought and the causes of action are different.
Same; Same; Litis Pendentia; For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1)
identity of the parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two cases such that judgment
in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other.—For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1) identity of the parties
or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of
the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief founded on the same facts;
and (3) identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. In the case under
review, there is no litis pendentia to speak of. As previously explained, although
the parties in the cases before the NLRC and the SSC are similar, the nature of
the cases filed, the rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in each tribunal, are
different.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Action means an ordinary suit in a
court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong—every other
remedy is a special proceeding.—In Solancio v. Ramos, the issue centered on
whether the pending administrative case before the Bureau of Lands is “another
action,” which would justify the dismissal of the complaint of plaintiff against
defendants before the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Cagayan.
Ruling in the negative, the Court noted that “both parties as well as the trial
court have missed the extent or meaning of the ground of the motion to dismiss
as contemplated under the Rules of Court.” Mr. Justice Regala, who wrote the
opinion of the Court, explained the phrase “another action” in this wise: This is
not what is contemplated under the law because under Section 1(d), Rule 16
(formerly Rule 8) of the Rules of Court, [now Rule 1, Section 16(e) of the Rules
of Court, supra] one of the grounds for the dismissal of an action is that “there
is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.” Note
that the Rule uses the phrase “another action.” This phrase should be construed
in line with Section 1 of Rule 2, which defines the word action, thus—“Action
means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong. Every other remedy is a special proceeding.” Coca-Cola Bottlers
(Phils.), Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 560 SCRA 719, G.R. No. 159323
July 31, 2008
Page | 79
Nos. L-50441-42. September 18, 1980.*
ALEJANDRO RAS, petitioner, vs. HON. JAINAL D. RASUL, District
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Basilan, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Civil Law; Prejudicial question, nature and concept of.—Aprejudicial question

is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case
before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Same; Same; When is a civil case considered prejudicial to a criminal action as

to cause suspension of the criminal action pending determination of the civil
action.—For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the
civil, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

Same; Same; Criminal action for estafa (for alleged double sale of property) is
a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and
defense of the alleged vendors of forgeries of their signatures in the deed.—On
the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against
petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question,
there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering
that petitioner Alejandro Ras’ defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of
the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel
(plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witness in the criminal case) is based
on the very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner

Page | 80
Ras’ guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale
in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then there would be no double sale and
petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the
criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice
and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that
indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and spurious. Ras vs. Rasul,
100 SCRA 125, Nos. L-50441-42 September 18, 1980
G.R. No. 159186. June 5, 2009.*
JESSE Y. YAP, petitioner, vs. HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos City;
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos City; COURT
OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA
DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; It generally exists in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in
the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal case; Elements.—A prejudicial question generally exists in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question
is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
Same; Same; If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine
the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the
same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question; Neither is there a prejudicial question of the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.—If both
civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately
related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely
exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not
only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
Page | 81
prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine
the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the
same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Yap vs.
Cabales, 588 SCRA 426, G.R. No. 159186 June 5, 2009
G.R. No. 120600. September 22, 1998.*
ERNESTO C. DAWSON, LOUIS P. DAWSON, JR., BENJAMIN C.
DAWSON, JOSEPHINE DAWSON SOLIVEN, RALPH D. CUDILLA,
ELIZA C. ISIP and LARRY D. ISIP, petitioners, vs. REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY and JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 85, respondents.
Contracts; Sales; “Contract to Sell” and “Contract of Sale,” Distinguished;
Words and Phrases; In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the
vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold whereas in a contract to sell,
ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and does not pass to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price.—On May 2, 1967, Louis P.
Dawson and Siska Development Corporation executed a contract to sell, the
subject of which was the parcel of land in question. By the nature of a contract
to sell, the title over the subject property is transferred to the vendee only upon
the full payment of the stipulated consideration. Unlike in a contract of sale, the
title does not pass to the vendee upon the execution of the agreement or the
delivery of the thing sold. In Salazar v. Court of Appeals, this Court explained
the distinction between a contract to sell and a contract of sale: “In a contract of
sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing
sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor
and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.
Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the
property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until full
payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the price is a positive
suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents
the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.”
Same; Same; Succession; Civil Personality; Juridical Capacity; A seller cannot
transfer title over a lot, through a Deed of Absolute Sale, to a person who has
already died, as the deceased has no more civil personality or juridical
capacity.—It is undisputed that Louis P. Dawson died in June 1971, without
Page | 82
having completed the installments on the property. His heirs, herein petitioners, Courts; Actions; Motives; The Court cannot withhold the relief prayed for by a
then took over the contract to sell, assumed his obligations by paying the selling party merely on the basis of some speculation of improper motivation.—
price of the lot from their own funds, and completed the payment in 1978. Respondent Court questioned the filing of the petition for cancellation only in
Accordingly, the ownership of the lot had not been vested in Louis P. Dawson 1993, hinting that the remedy was “designed to evade the payment of the
during his lifetime. Indeed, on March 16, 1978, Siska Development Corporation necessary taxes to the government.” Respondent Court, however, failed to state
could not have transferred the title over the lot, through a Deed of Absolute which taxes petitioners sought to avoid. Although they are required to pay
Sale, to Louis P. Dawson who had died seven years earlier in 1971. In 1978, the capital gains tax and, thereafter, real estate tax, there is no showing that said
deceased had no more civil personality or juridical capacity. “His juridical taxes have not been paid. Thus, we cannot withhold the relief prayed for by
capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through petitioners, merely on the basis of some speculation of improper motivation.
death.” Dawson vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 295 SCRA 733, G.R. No.
120600 September 22, 1998
Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Property Registration Decree (Presidential
Decree 1529); Where the installments agreed on in a contract to sell have not
been completely paid upon the death of the original vendee and the certificate
of title was erroneously issued in his name, his heirs, who assumed his
obligations and completed the payment, can resort to the summary proceedings
under Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 to correct the manifest
mistake.—In other words, the said property did not become part of the estate of
Louis P. Dawson. Necessarily, partition is not the remedy to determine
ownership thereof and to consolidate title in herein petitioners. Hence, we agree
with the following assertion of the solicitor general: “Having stepped into the
shoes of the deceased Louis P. Dawson upon his death in June, 1971 with
respect to the said contract, and being the ones who continued the installment
payments of the selling price from their own funds until its full payment in
1978, petitioners necessarily became the lawful owners of the said lot in whose
favor the deed of absolute sale should have been executed by vendor Siska
Development Corporation.” In view of the circumstances of this case, Section
108 of PD 1529 is clearly available as a remedy to correct the erroneous
issuance of the subject TCT in the name of Louis P. Dawson. The issue is not
really novel. Faced with substantially similar facts in Cruz v. Tan, this Court
also allowed the application of Section 112 of the Public Land Act, which is
identical to Section 108 of PD 1529.

Page | 83
G.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009.*
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG
CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-
SUPER), respondents.
Civil Law; Civil Personality; Death of a Party; Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death; While the Civil Code
expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does
not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could
die—one need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.—
Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of
death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality
may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who
have acquired juridical personality could die. And third, death has been defined
as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside
the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of
the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of
the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior
to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs);
Bereavement Leave and Death Benefits; The unborn child can be considered a
dependent under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the
parties in the instant case.—The unborn child can be considered a dependent
under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who
relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the
power or aid of someone else.” Under said general definition, even an unborn
child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-
39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s
wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in
question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married
employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did
not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have
been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers.
Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general
sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legitimate Children; A legitimate
child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.—The
term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to
his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya, 469 SCRA 363 (2005) we have
expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz.: A legitimate child is a product of,
and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of
lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and
child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
“Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child attaches upon his/her conception.—It is apparent that according to the
Family Code and the aforecited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed
that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was
conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Being for the benefit of the employee,
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) provisions on bereavement leave and
other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions
thereof; It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from
the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39
weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was
born alive but died subsequently.—We emphasize that bereavement leave and
Page | 84
other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible,
lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a
loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from
the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39
weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was
born alive but died subsequently. Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA
provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted
liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code
is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law
or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the
same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor.
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation vs. Montaño, 603 SCRA 621,
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
G.R. No. 203775. August 5, 2014.*
ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS and JAIME AGUILAR
HERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALAY
BUHAY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC., and
WESLIE TING GATCHALIAN, respondents.-
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Real Party-in-Interest; Under Sections
1 and 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, which must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.—Under
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3, only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, which must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Article 44 of the Civil Code
lists the juridical persons with capacity to sue, thus: Art. 44. The following are
juridical persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2) Other
corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by
law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to
law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct
from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Capacity to Sue; Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court mandates that “[f]acts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued
or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the
legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must
be averred.—Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court mandates that “[f]acts
showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to
sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized
association of persons that is made a party, must be averred.” In their petition,
it is stated that petitioner Association of Flood Victims “is a nonprofit and
nonpartisan organization in the process of formal incorporation, the primary
purpose of which is for the benefit of the common or general interest of many
flood victims who are so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties,”
Page | 85
and that petitioner Hernandez “is a Tax Payer and the Lead Convenor of the
Association of Flood Victims.” Clearly, petitioner Association of Flood
Victims, which is still in the process of incorporation, cannot be considered a
juridical person or an entity authorized by law, which can be a party to a civil
action. Petitioner Association of Flood Victims is an unincorporated association
not endowed with a distinct personality of its own. An unincorporated
association, in the absence of an enabling law, has no juridical personality and
thus, cannot sue in the name of the association. Such unincorporated association
is not a legal entity distinct from its members. If an association, like petitioner
Association of Flood Victims, has no juridical personality, then all members of
the association must be made parties in the civil action.
Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi or legal
standing is defined as: x x x a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.—Petitioners have no locus standi or
legal standing. Locus standi or legal standing is defined as: x x x a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain a
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Association of
Flood Victims vs. Commission on Elections, 732 SCRA 100, G.R. No. 203775
August 5, 2014
G.R. No. 160869. May 11, 2007.*
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR
SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER—
HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of
Justice, respondent .
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual Allegiance; What Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who has lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country; On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance; By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizen-ship.—From the excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the
intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of
other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance
and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other
citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Same; Same; Same; Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set
specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance; Until this is done,
it would be premature for the judicial department including this Court to rule
on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.—To begin with, Section 5, Article IV
of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with
Page | 86
dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters
of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance.
Same; Same; Same; The case of Mercado did not set the parameters of what
constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual
allegiance and dual citizenship.—Neither can we subscribe to the proposition
of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set
the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado.
That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but
merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
Same; Same; Same; Court cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of
what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly
delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study
and legislation by Congress.—In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394
(2001), we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious
of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts
of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with
judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. The doctrine of
separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting
the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself
has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual
allegiance for study and legislation by Congress. Advocates and Adherents of
Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS) Member vs.
Datumanong, 523 SCRA 108, G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.*
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS
MANZANO and theCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Election Law; Parties; Certainly, petitioner had, and still has,
an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to
intervene; The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only
applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may
be declared the winner.—Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither
legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is
“a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot
be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent
be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.” The flaw in this
argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of
the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the
basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact,
however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly,
petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the
race at the time he sought to intervene.
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,reiterated in several cases,only applies to cases
in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether
one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the
winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave to
File Intervention” on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the
winner, and petitioner’s purpose was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified “from running for [an] elective local position” under §40(d) of R.A.
No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the
action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.
Page | 87
Same; Same; Same; That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6
of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of
1987.—Nor is petitioner’s interest in the matter in litigation any less because
he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private
respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes
among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at
that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent
is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms
Lawof 1987.
Same; Same; Same; Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.—Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification
even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
Same; Same; Same; Failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s
motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying
petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari.—The failure of the
COMELEC enbanc to resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant
petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC enbanc instead decided the merits of
the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of
petitioner’s motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues
respecting private respondent’s alleged disqualification on the ground of dual
citizenship.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance.—Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two
or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states.For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of
both states.
Same; Same; Instances where it is possible for certain classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship.—Considering the citizenship clause
(Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens
of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers
and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2)
Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; (3)
Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to
the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
Same; Same; The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic Act No. 7160, §40(d)
and in Republic Act No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual
allegiance.”—In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No.
7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual
allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. Mercado vs.
Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
Page | 88
G.R. No. 182701. July 23, 2008.*
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Election Law; Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003 (Republic Act No. 9225); The case of Valles v. Commission on Elections,
337 SCRA 543 (2000), has been superseded by the enactment of Republic Act
No. 9225 or the Dual Citizenship Act in 2003—R.A. No. 9225 expressly
provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship
may run for a public office in the Philippines, i.e., that they make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.—The Court’s 2000
ruling in Valles has been superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 in
2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-
acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines.
Section 5 of the said law states: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities.—Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions: x x x x (2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
Same; Same; Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election
of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.—While it
is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge
the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his
candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election
of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
G.R. No. 162224. June 7, 2007.*
2nd LT. SALVADOR represented by his daughter Myrna P. Caintic,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Commission on Audit; A money claim is “a demand for payment of a sum of
money, reimbursement or compensation arising from law or contract due from
or owing to a government agency.”— Petitioner filed his money claim before
the COA. A money claim is “a demand for payment of a sum of money,
reimbursement or compensation arising from law or contract due from or owing
to a government agency.” Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1445, money claims against the government shall be
filed before the COA.
Same; Jurisdictions; The jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA) over
money claims against the government does not include the power to rule on the
constitutionality or validity of laws.—The jurisdiction of the COA over money
claims against the government does not include the power to rule on the
constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in all Regional Trial Courts.
Petitioner’s money claim essentially involved the constitutionality of Section
27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the COA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioner’s money claim.
Armed Forces of the Philippines; Retirement; Since PD 1638, as amended, is
about the new system of retirement and separation from service of military
personnel, it should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its
approval.—We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner and the OSG
that PD 1638, as amended, should apply only to those who joined the military
after its effectivity. Since PD 1638, as amended, is about the new system of
retirement and separation from service of military personnel, it should apply to
Page | 89
those who were in the service at the time of its approval. In fact, Section 2 of
PD 1638, as amended, provides that “th[e] Decree shall apply to all military
personnel in the service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.” PD 1638, as
amended, was signed on 10 September 1979. Petitioner retired in 1982, long
after the approval of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the provisions of PD 1638,
as amended, apply to petitioner.
Same; Same; Due Process; Vested Rights; It is only upon retirement that
military personnel acquire a vested right to retirement benefits.—PD 1638, as
amended, does not impair any vested right or interest of petitioner. Where the
employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested
right to the benefits that is protected by the due process clause. At the time of
the approval of PD 1638 and at the time of its amendment, petitioner was still
in active service. Hence, petitioner’s retirement benefits were only future
benefits and did not constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement
benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must have met the stated conditions
of eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and length of
service. It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right
to retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever
they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Retirement benefits of military personnel are purely
gratuitous in nature.—The retirement benefits of military personnel are purely
gratuitous in nature. They are not similar to pension plans where employee
participation is mandatory, hence, the employees have contractual or vested
rights in the pension which forms part of the compensation.
Same; Same; Equal Protection; Requisites for Valid Classification.—The
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject
to reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification (a) must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
Same; Same; Same; Compulsory Military Service; The constitutional right of
the state to require all citizens to render personal and military service
necessarily includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have retired
from military service.—There is compliance with all these conditions. There is
a substantial difference between retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and
retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another country,
such as petitioner in the case before us. The constitutional right of the state to
require all citizens to render personal and military service necessarily includes
not only private citizens but also citizens who have retired from military service.
A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance
to the state. Thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render
compulsory military service when the need arises. Petitioner’s loss of Filipino
citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other
retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from another.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even when a retiree is no longer in the active
service, he is still a part of the Citizen Armed Forces.— Republic Act No. 7077
(RA 7077) affirmed the constitutional right of the state to a Citizen Armed
Forces. Section 11 of RA 7077 provides that citizen soldiers or reservists
include ex-servicemen and retired officers of the AFP. Hence, even when a
retiree is no longer in the active service, he is still a part of the Citizen Armed
Forces. Thus, we do not find the requirement imposed by Section 27 of PD
1638, as amended, oppressive, discriminatory, or contrary to public policy. The
state has the right to impose a reasonable condition that is necessary for national
defense. To rule otherwise would be detrimental to the interest of the state.
Same; Same; Same; Repatriation; An AFP retiree who lost his retirement
benefits as a result of his naturalization in some other country will be entitled
to receive his monthly pension should he reacquire his Filipino citizenship since
he will again be entitled to the benefits and privileges of Filipino citizenship
reckoned from the time of his reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.—Petitioner
Page | 90
has other recourse if he desires to continue receiving his monthly pension. Just
recently, in AASJS Member-Hector Gumangan Calilung v. Simeon
Datumanong, 523 SCRA 105 (2007), this Court upheld the constitutionality of
RA 9225. If petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship, he will even recover
his natural-born citizenship. In Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, 500 SCRA 9 (2006),
this Court reiterated that “[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow
him to recover his natural-born citizenship x x x.” Petitioner will be entitled to
receive his monthly pension should he reacquire his Filipino citizenship since
he will again be entitled to the benefits and privileges of Filipino citizenship
reckoned from the time of his reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. There is no
legal obstacle to the resumption of his retirement benefits from the time he
complies again with the condition of the law, that is, he can receive his
retirement benefits provided he is a Filipino citizen. Parreño vs. Commission
on Audit, 523 SCRA 390, G.R. No. 162224 June 7, 2007
G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.*
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; There are two ways of acquiring citizenship:
(1) by birth and (2) by naturalization; A person who at the time of his birth is a
citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.—There are two
ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These
ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the
natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of
his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
Same; Same; Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization generally under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.—
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.
Same; Same; Modes by Which Philippine Citizenship may be Reacquired by a
Former Citizen.—Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63
(CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and
(3) by direct act of Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality.—Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored
to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
Page | 91
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
Court’s judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the
Same; Same; Same; A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, decision. There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino; As respondent Cruz was not required by Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545,
law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.—Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent
from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2)
those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization
to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for
persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The
reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.

Remedial Law; Certiorari; The Court’s jurisdiction over the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is merely to check “whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction” on the part of the latter; There is no showing of grave abuse of
discretion in this case.—The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to
be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House. The Court’s jurisdiction over the
HRET is merely to check “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the latter.

Page | 92
G.R. No. 187567. February 15, 2012.*
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NORA FE
SAGUN, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; A direct recourse to the Supreme
Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) may be taken where only questions of law are raised or
involved.—At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this
Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken
where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question
of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dis pute as to fact, the
question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a
question of law.
Constitutional Law; Civil Law; Citizenship; The Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules
for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.—For sure, this
Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or
the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There
is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to
declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. This was our ruling in Yung
Uan Chu v. Republic, 159 SCRA 593 (1988), citing the early case of Tan v.
Republic of the Philippines, 107 Phil. 632 (1960), where we clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration
of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of
justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the
adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass
upon, and make a pronouncement relative totheir status. Otherwise, such a
pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
Same; Same; Same; If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under
the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution.—Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship
was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that “[t]hose who
elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five” are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution
which states that “[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority” are
Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be
understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a
person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to
challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been
commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the
citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental
authority of the mother and follow her nationality.—Being a legitimate child,
respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon
reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule
that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow
her nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to
confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the
Page | 93
Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of
respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Same; Same; Same; Procedure in Making a Valid Election of Philippine
Citizenship.—Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section
1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in
a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry.
The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. Based on
the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1)
a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of
election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. Furthermore, no election
of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625
unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the
requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should
first be required to register as an alien. Pertinently, the person electing
Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation
of his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election of
Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the
evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the
same is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final
determination and review.
Same; Same; Same; There is no specific statutory or procedural rule which
authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship before the courts.—It should be stressed that there is no specific
statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for
declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special
proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any
interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the
civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the
relief prayed for by the respondent. Be that as it may, even if we set aside this
procedural infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that respondent duly
elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show
that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election.
Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of
Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by
respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance,
executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that
respondent’s oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a
reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not
registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No.
625. The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election
should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by
respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil
registry.
Same; Same; Same; The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of
Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine
citizenship.—Respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and
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uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of
Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship.
Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court
to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly
elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election
of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent’s
petition before the trial court must be denied. Republic vs. Sagun, 666 SCRA
321, G.R. No. 187567 February 15, 2012
G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995.*
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
Election Law; Domicile; Residence; Words and Phrases; Residence, for the
purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.—A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC’S
Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled
concepts of “Domicile” and “Residence” in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of
election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a
tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence,
a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s
qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the
1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.—Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees
that “[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence.” In Ong vs.
Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual’s
“permanent home,” “a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent.” Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the
twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and
animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile and Residence, Distinguished.—
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and
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domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose
for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s intent be to remain,
it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to
have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a
single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As these concepts have evolved in our
election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.—For
political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; When the Constitution
speaks of “residence ” in election law, it actually means only “domicile.”—The
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually means only
“domicile.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency
qualification requirement.—It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears
to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The honest mistake in the certificate of
candidacy regarding the period of residency does not negate the fact of
residence in a congressional district if such fact is established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.—Having been forced by
private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead
of petitioner’s claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her
period of stay in her actual residence in a space which required her period of
stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7
and Item 8—the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring
domicile—coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s registration
as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for
which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An individual does not lose his domicile even
if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.—We have stated,
many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears
repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study
or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not
constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that “she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time
she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many
places” flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully
made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law
purposes.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Origin; A minor follows the domicile
of his parents.—A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once
acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact
of petitioner’s being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin
by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when she reached
the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to Leyte
contrary to private respondent’s averments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a change of domicile.—
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2.
A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing former domicile with an intent to supplant the
former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).—In
the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence
of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be
rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the
case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment
of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect
an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; Husband and Wife; The presumption
that the wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law
upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term “residence” in Article
110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts
are well delineated.—In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that
petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly
established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of “domicile” and
“residence.” The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband’s
domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of
the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is
one area where the two concepts are well delineated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A survey of jurisprudence yields
nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her
domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon
marriage.—A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts
of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields
nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her
domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is illogical to conclude that Art. 110
of the Civil Code refers to “domicile” and not to “residence.”—The duty to live
together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together.
This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as
in the case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of
their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may
“live together.” Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to
“domicile” and not to “residence.” Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or
other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What petitioner gained upon marriage
was actual residence—she did not lose her domicile of origin.—Parenthetically
when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner
was obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her
husband’s actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at
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that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San
Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places
Mr. Marcos did fix as his family’s residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had
fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The common law
concept of “matrimonial domicile” appears to have been incorporated, as a
result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code.—On the other hand, the common law concept
of “matrimonial domicile” appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the
New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the
Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been
supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly
different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision
recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women’s rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses.
Same; Same; Same; The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law.—Without as
much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law
(or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands
clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and
obligations of husband and wife-the term residence should only be interpreted
to mean “actual residence.” The inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a
new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Same; Statutory Construction; Mandatory and directory provisions; It is a
settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified
time is generally construed to be merely directory.—It is a settled doctrine that
a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory, “so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result
it would have clearly indicated it.”
Same; Same; Same; The difference between a mandatory and a directory
provision is often made on grounds of necessity.—The difference between a
mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity.
Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in
Marcelino v. Cruz held that: The difference between a mandatory and directory
provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that
less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter
of the law.
Same; Jurisdiction; Electoral Tribunals; The HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives.—As to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’S
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections return and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become
a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of
the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question.
ROMERO, J., Separate Opinion :
Husband and Wife; A widow can no longer be bound by the domicile of the
departed husband, if at all she was before—and, exercising free will, she may
opt to reestablish her domicile of origin.—I submit that a widow, like the
petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile
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of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically
revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to
reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently,
to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of
Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile
of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the
time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-
year requirement to run as Representatives of the First District of Leyte.
PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion :
Husband and Wife; It is not the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice
of a different domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife
from what it was prior to their marriage.—It is not, therefore, the mere fact of
marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that
will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The
domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred
by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during
her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change
in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not
only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because
they are contrary to law and public policy.
Same; Family Code; In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality
between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the common law, there
is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the
domicile of her dead husband.—In light of the nFamily Code which abrogated
the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the
common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife
still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code
which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article
69 of the Family Code. By its appeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are
not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as
by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of
her dead husband.
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; It can hardly be doubted
that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband’s
domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women—it cannot
survive a constitutional challenge.—Aside from reckoning with the Family
Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due
process and equal protection of law. It can hardly be doubted that the common
law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband’s domicile even
beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based
discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family
solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge.
Same; Domicile; The better stance is to rule that petitioner reac-quired her
Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989.—Prescinding from
these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that
petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in
1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner’s Batac
dictated domicile did not continue after her husband’s death; otherwise, she
would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person
can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right
of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of
the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by
the Constitution.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Statutory Construction; Political
Harassment; Equal Protection; There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos—
petitioner cannot be adjudged by a “different” Constitution, and the worst way
to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation bile and bitterness.—
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank
harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal
access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the
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Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will
allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a
controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one
Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a “different”
Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its
interpretation, bile and bitterness.
FRANCISCO, J., Concurring Opinion :
Husband and Wife; Domicile; Petitioner reverted to her original domicile upon
her husband’s death without even signifying her intention to that effect.—
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner’s domicile of origin which was involuntarily
supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954
with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of
her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and
effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another. The
question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or
moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus,
while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she
automatically loses it upon the latter’s termination, for the reason behind the
law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the
death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of
having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which
no longer serves any meaningful purpose. It is my view therefore that petitioner
reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband’s death
without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private
respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively
abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300, G.R. No.
119976 September 18, 1995
G.R. No. 191970. April 24, 2012.*
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, petitioner, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR., respondents.
Election Law; Local Government Code; Residence; Governors; The Local
Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial
governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the
election—for purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to
reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.—The Local Government
Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes
of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile,
meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but
must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention. There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s
compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is a
question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where
once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a
person can have but one domicile at a time.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is
not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or
domicile in a particular place—it is sufficient that he should live there even if
it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative.—The COMELEC
concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has
merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot
support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate
is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or
domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it
be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the
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candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification
for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual
physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile. Jalosjos vs.
Commission on Elections, 670 SCRA 572, G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012
G.R. No. 120265. September 18, 1995.*
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.
Election Law; Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate.—Petitioner
conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the
House of Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest
number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate.
Same; Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction; The electoral tribunal assumes
jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications
of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become
members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives—and, a candidate
who has not been proclaimed and has taken his oath of office cannot be said to
be a member.—Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the
House only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House
of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not
taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of
Representatives subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Commission on Elections; While the proclamation of a winning
candidate is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows
suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein—even after
the elections the COMELEC is empowered to continue to hear and decide
questions relating to qualifications of candidates.—While the proclamation of
a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with
Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances
mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner’s contention that “after the conduct of the
election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral
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exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested
of authority to pass upon the question of qualification” finds no basis in law,
because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in
relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions
relating to qualifications of candidates.
Same; Domicile; Residence; In order for a person to qualify as a candidate for
a district, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile
of choice.—We agree with COMELEC’s contention that in order that petitioner
could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
City the latter “must prove that he has established not just residence but
domicile of choice.”
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Residence, for election law purposes,
has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.—The Constitution requires that a
person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a resident of
the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (1) year
prior to the elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Clearly, the place “where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home,” i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law.—Clearly, the place “where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which
the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of
residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is “to exclude strangers or
newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community” from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain.
Same; Same; Same; While there is nothing wrong with the practice of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements,
this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through
the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the n eeds of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated
by law for him to qualify.—While there is nothing wrong with the practice of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements,
this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through
the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated
by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period
or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It
would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold
question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of
one year in the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of
Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the
same.
Same; Same; Same; The absence of clear and positive proof showing a
successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions in the instant case—
sentimental, actual or otherwise—with the area, and the suspicious
circumstances under which a lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner’s
claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution.—While property
ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be
voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences
in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident
of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac)
“indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical
residence” is not to acquire a new residence or domicile “but only to qualify as
a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.” The
absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of
domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification—
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sentimental, actual or otherwise—with the area, and the suspicious
circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie
petitioner’s claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in
the Second District of Makati.
Same; Same; Same; Domicile of origin is not easily lost—to successfully effect
a change of domicile, a person must prove an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.—Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from
Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the
case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
These requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of
petitioner’s claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District
of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
Same; Same; Same; Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed to take
advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting
themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the
process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.—Finally,
petitioner’s submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one
year residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious and
lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is
carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old
Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area
encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day
carpetbaggers cannot be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new
political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of
existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its
assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate
because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place
where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first
prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for
election law purposes for the period required by law. This he has not effectively
done.
Same; The second placer is just that, a second placer—he lost the elections, he
was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters—he could not be
proclaimed winner as he could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates.—To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the
“first” among the qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to
misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the sociological
and psychological underpinnings behind voters’ preferences. The result
suggested by private respondent would lead not only to our reversing the
doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec but also to a
massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in
favor of a candidate they believed could be validly voted for during the
elections. Had petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice,
moreover, would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony
which attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone to second
placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed.
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second
placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by
either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first
among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not
prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
Same; The Court cannot, in another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the
contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has been
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disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates
because this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a scattered
number of obscure American state and English court decisions.—This, it bears
repeating, expresses the more ogical and democratic view. We cannot, in
another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in
an election in which the winner has been disqualified is actually the winner
among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly represents a
minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state
and English court decisions. These decisions neglect the possibility that the
runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and
insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be tantamount to
rejection. Theoretically, the “second placer” could receive just one vote. In such
a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters’
“choice.”
Same; By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be
construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an
“ineligible” candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.—
Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the second placer may
not be considered numerically insignificant, voters preferences are nonetheless
so volatile and unpredictable that the result among qualified candidates, should
the equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate,
would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner
among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the
second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election
cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where
an “ineligible” candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.
Same; Constitutional Law; Republicanism; As petitioner clearly lacks one of
the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
district would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law
itself.—A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people.
Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by
the fundamental law itself.
PADILLA, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Petitioner should be declared disqualified to run as representative
in the 2nd district of Makati City because he failed altogether to prove that he
had actually and physically resided therein for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the elections.—To my mind, petitioner should be
declared disqualified to run as representative in the 2nd district of Makati City
in the 8 May 1995 elections not because he failed to prove his residence therein
as his domicile of choice, but because he failed altogether to prove that he had
actually and physically resided therein for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the 8 May 1995 elections.
Same; The candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates should be proclaimed.—At this point, what I said in
Marcos, supra, follows: “What happens then when after the elections are over,
one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him “shall not be counted”
and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer
the winner simply because a “winning candidate is disqualified,” but that the
law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of
votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being
counted or considered. As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the
matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and
consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that
“the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
Page | 104
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility” most especially when it is mandated by no less
than the Constitution.” Therefore the candidate who received the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates , should be proclaimed.
FRANCISCO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Jurisdiction; Electoral Tribunals; HRET jurisdiction applies only
to the members of the House of Representatives, and the operative acts
necessary for an electoral candidate’s rightful assumption of the office for
which he ran are his proclamation and his taking an oath of office.—Petitioner
emphatically maintains that only the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) can declare his disqualification, especially after the elections.
To bolster this stand, the cases of Co. v. HRET , 199 SCRA 692 (1991); Robles
v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780 (1990); Lazatin v. HRET , 168 SCRA 391 (1988);
and Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 (1968), have been cited as supporting
authorities. To my mind, this position is untenable. Section 17 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous that HRET jurisdiction applies
only to the members of the House of Representatives. The operative acts
necessary for an electoral candidate’s rightful assumption of the office for
which he ran are his proclamation and his taking an oath of office. Petitioner
cannot in anyway be considered as a member of the House of Representatives
for the purpose of divesting the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to
declare his disqualification and invoking instead HRET’s jurisdiction, it
indubitably appearing that he has yet to be proclaimed, much less has he taken
an oath of office. Clearly, petitioner’s reliance on the aforecited cases which
when perused involved Congressional members, is totally misplaced, if not
wholly inapplicable. That the jurisdiction conferred upon HRET extends only
to Congressional members is further established by judicial notice of HRET
Rules of Procedure, and HRET decisions consistently holding that the
proclamation of a winner in the contested election is the essential requisite
vesting jurisdiction on the HRET.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Estoppel; A party who objects to the
jurisdiction of the court and alleges at the same time any non-jurisdictional
ground for dismissing the action is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.—Clearly then, petitioner has actively participated in
the proceedings both before the COMELEC’s Second Division and the
COMELEC En Banc asking therein affirmative reliefs. The settled rule is that
a party who objects to the jurisdiction of the court and alleges at the same time
any non-jurisdictional ground for dismissing the action is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Where a party voluntarily
submits to the jurisdiction of the court and thereafter loses on the merits, he may
not thereafter be heard to say that the court had no jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative
relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape an adverse decision.—
In Jimenez v. Macaraig , the Court, citing Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals , 32
SCRA 54, 60 (1970), elaborated on the rationale for this doctrine in this wise:
“The petitioners, to borrow the language of Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo (People
vs. Archilla, G.R. No. L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 699, 700-701),
cannot adopt a posture of double-dealing without running afoul of the doctrine
of estoppel. The principle of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration
of the laws. It should deter those who are disposed to trifle with the courts by
taking inconsistent positions contrary to the elementary principles of right
dealing and good faith (People v. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534, 541, [1953]). It is not
right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape an adverse decision. Perforce, petitioner’s asseveration
that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to rule on his qualification must fail.
Same; Domicile; Residence; The argument that if a person decided to transfer
his legal residence so he can qualify for public office he is entirely free to do
so, to hold water, must be supported by clear and convincing proofs that he has
effectively abandoned his former domicile and that his intention is not
Page | 105
doubtful.—Petitioner insists that domicile is a matter of personal intention.
Thus, petitioner asserts that if he decides to transfer his legal residence so he
can qualify for public office then he is entirely free to do so. This argument to
hold water, must be supported by clear and convincing proofs that petitioner
has effectively abandoned his former domicile and that his intention is not
doubtful. Indeed, domicile once established is considered to continue and will
not be deemed lost until a new one is established (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives , 199 SCRA 692, 711 [1991]). Petitioner from
childhood until his last election as senator has consistently maintained
Concepcion, Tarlac, as his domicile. He moved to Amapola Street, Palm
Village, Makati, and thereafter claimed the same to be his new domicile. This
claim, however, is dismally unsupported by the records. The lease contract
entered into by petitioner for a period of two years on the third floor
condominium unit in Palm Village, Makati, in my view, does not prove his
intent to abandon his domicile of origin. The intention to establish domicile
must be an intention to remain indefinitely or permanently in the new place.
This element is lacking in this instance.
Same; Same; Same; The best test of intention to establish legal residence comes
from one’s acts and not by mere declarations alone.—Worse, public respondent
Commission even found that “respondent Aquino himself testified that his
intention was really for only one (1) year because he has other ‘residences’ in
Manila or in Quezon City ([citing] TSN, May 2, 1995, p. 92)”. Noting that
petitioner is already barred from running for senator due to the constitutional
consecutive two-term limit, his search for a place where he could further and
continue his political career and sudden transfer thereto make his intent suspect.
The best test of intention to establish legal residence comes from one’s acts and
not by mere declarations alone. To acquire, or effect a change of domicile, the
intention must be bona fide and unequivocal (28 C.J.S. §11). Petitioner, in my
view, miserably failed to show a bona fide and unequivocal intention to effect
the change of his domicile.
Same; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; A legislative enactment
cannot render nugatory the constitution.—Furthermore, to subscribe to
petitioner’s contention that the constitutional qualification of candidates should
be brushed aside in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 7854 will indubitably
violate the manner and procedure for the amendment or revision of the
constitution outlined under Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. A legislative
enactment, it has to be emphasized, cannot render nugatory the constitution.
The constitution is superior to a statute. It is the fundamental and organic law
of the land to which every statute must conform and harmonize.
Same; Legitimate votes cast for a qualified candidate should not be penalized
alongside a disqualified candidate—the other qualified candidate who garnered
the highest number of votes should be proclaimed duly elected; The Labo
doctrine ought to be abandoned.—Finally, it has been contended that a second
place candidate cannot be proclaimed a substitute winner. I find the proposition
quite unacceptable. A disqualified “candidate” is not a candidate and the votes
which may have been cast in his favor are nothing but stray votes of no legal
consequence. A disqualified person like the petitioner receives no vote or zero
vote. In short, no-candidate-no vote. Petitioner had therefore no right, in fact
and in law, to claim first place for he has nothing to base his right. The
legislative intent is clear as provided by R.A. 6646, Section 6, in that votes cast
for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted as they are considered stray
(Section 211, Rule 24, Omnibus Election Code). It is only from the ranks of
qualified candidates can one be chosen as first placer and not from without.
Necessarily, petitioner, a disqualified candidate, cannot be a first placer as he
claims himself to be. To count the votes for a disqualified candidate would, in
my view, disenfranchise voters who voted for a qualified candidate. Legitimate
votes cast for a qualified candidate should not be penalized alongside a
disqualified candidate. With this in mind, the other qualified candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes should be proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the district. I feel that the Labo doctrine ought to be
abandoned. Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 400, G.R. No.
120265 September 18, 1995
Page | 106
G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.*
JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS,
respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; Marriage License; The certification to be issued by the
Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist
in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite
diligent search.—The certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar
must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the
particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Presumption of Regularity of Performance of Official Duty; The presumption
of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.—Given the documentary and
testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate
the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil
Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. According to
Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions. The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by
other evidence as in the case at
bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first
and second certifications.
Marriages; The rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds;
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.—The
rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity
of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon
this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary,
the presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the policy of the
1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Same; Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested.—Our Constitution
is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State
can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-
up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is
not the concern of the family members alone.
Same; Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested; Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.—
“The basis of human society through­out the civilized world is x x x marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation,
an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. Sevilla vs. Cardenas, 497 SCRA 428, G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
Page | 107
G.R. No. 186400. October 20, 2010.*
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, petitioner, vs. DANILO T. BOLOS, respondent.
Husband and Wife; Marriages; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which the Court promulgated
on 15 March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.—Petitioner
insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule,
in fact, reads: Section 1. Scope—This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall
apply suppletorily. The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves
no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Verba Legis (Plain Meaning
Rule); A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and
free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation—there is only room for application.—The Court finds Itself
unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the
Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather
than to the word “marriages.” A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that
when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the
statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as
the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi
sermo, or “speech is the index of intention.” Furthermore, there is the maxim
verba legis non est recedendum, or “from the words of a statute there should be
no departure.”
Same; Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Time and again the
Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with
and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial
merit.—There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of
substantial justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious
nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again
the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied
with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming
substantial merit. As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific
acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable
to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; The rule is and has
been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.—
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary
period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As
pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
473 SCRA 490 (2005), the rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion
for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as
1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon, 142 SCRA 208 (1986). Since then,
the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; While the right to appeal is a statutory, not
a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and
courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
Page | 108
technicalities.—Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is
to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should,
thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal. In
the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Piñas City, Br. 254, 563 SCRA 447
(2008), the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural
right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but
rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
Same; Same; Same; Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not
a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested—
the break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their
preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.—This Court is not
unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State
finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up
of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation
is not the concern alone of the family members. Bolos vs. Bolos, 634 SCRA
429, G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
G.R. No. 158298. August 11, 2010.*
ISIDRO ABLAZA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Marriages; As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated
cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.—A valid
marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to
give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation.
The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a
marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated
cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. To
illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the
Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the
intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a
marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of
the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the
validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage
ceremony.
Same; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC); Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife; A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on 3
August 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is
confined only to proceedings commenced after 15 March 2003.—The Court has
to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.)
No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the
limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
Page | 109
be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to
distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect
on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, 574 SCRA 116 (2008), the following actions for
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation,
to wit: 1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC; and 2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the
Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Same; Same; Legal Research; The old and new Civil Codes contain no
provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and
when.—The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v.
Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), the children were allowed to file after the
death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s
marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a
marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a
voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned.
Same; Same; Parties; The right of a sibling to bring an action to declare the
nullity of a marriage contracted under the old Civil Code hinges upon a prior
determination of whether the decedent had any descendants, ascendants, or
children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether such sibling was the
decedent’s surviving heir.—The petitioner alleged himself to be the late
Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as
he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of
Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed,
a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of
succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the
conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001, should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. Article 1003, if there
are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. Pursuant to these provisions, the
presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased
excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the
deceased’s estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the
action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any
descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether
the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior
determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves
questions of fact.
Same; Same; Same; The surviving spouse must be impleaded in an action for
the declaration of nullity of a marriage since he or she is an indispensable
party—such party’s absence renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.—We note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as
the late Cresenciano’s surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the
nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not
all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required a marriage license
for their validity; hence, her participation in this action is made all the more
necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated
without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a
marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an
indispensable party who must be joined herein: x x x under any and all
conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power. It is precisely “when an indispensable party is not before the court [that]
the action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
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only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Ablaza vs. Republic, G.R. No. 103047. September 2, 1994.*
628 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.

Marriages; Absence of a marriage license renders the marriage void ab initio.—

At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local
civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence
of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.

Same; Evidence; Civil Registrars; The certification of “due search and inability
to find” issued by the civil registrar enjoys probative value and sufficiently
proves that his office did not issue a particular marriage license.—The above
Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of
public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the
date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The
certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar of
Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of “due search and inability to find”
sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to
the contracting parties.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Secret marriage” is a legally non-existent

phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting
parties.—The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in

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support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure
to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the
peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject
marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject
marriage is one of those commonly known as a “secret marriage”—a legally
non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the
contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and
Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former. Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 236 SCRA 257, G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.*
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M.
OCCIANO, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; The authority of the regional trial court judges and
judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their jurisdiction
as defined by the Supreme Court.—Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of
inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction
as defined by the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside the court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability.—“A priest who is
commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long
as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability.”
Same; Same; Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that
gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.—In People
vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render
valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided
by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority
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to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when
he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted
in gross ignorance of the law.
Same; Same; The withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the
legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.—Respondent
judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the
withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair
administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined. Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or
personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every
complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We
cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which
involves the Court’s constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that
power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office
and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.
Arañes vs. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
G.R. No. 183896. January 30, 2013.*
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS,
respondent.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Formal Requisites of Marriage.―As the
marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive
Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The
pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and
35(3), which read as follows: Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1)
Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the
cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of the
essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. Art. 35. The following marriages shall
be void from the beginning: x x x x (3) Those solemnized without a license,
except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Disputable Presumptions; Presumption of
Regularity; Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary; The presumption of regularity
of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty.―Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a
disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, “The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.” No such affirmative
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evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing
her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court.
The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and
Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent
search of the records of her office.
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2).” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt
from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the
same Code. Abbas vs. Abbas, 689 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 183896 January 30,
2013

Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Marriage License; Evidence; The

certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.―In
the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case of Republic, it was held that
the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The
case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the
parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging
a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured. Gloria has failed to discharge that burden,
and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license
was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was
presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been
issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the
alleged marriage license.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that
a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2,
Title I of the same Code.―All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not
operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family
Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or formal

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G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE
DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF
LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO,
HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA
DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN
DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and
HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO
CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO
CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA
DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-
MADARANG, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE
DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN;
HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-
SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA
CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN
RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA
RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA,
FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA,
as Intervenor, 2 respondents.3
Civil Law; Marriages; Although a marriage contract is considered a primary
evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact
took place.—Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of
marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.
Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in
support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the
marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo
Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath
of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the
titles to the properties in the name of “Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado,” more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These
are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of
the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Same; Same; Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to
be in fact married.—Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of
the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual
order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves
out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law
and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
Same; Same; Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.—
Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive
presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no
contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. On the other hand,
disputable presumptions, one of venor was identified as “intervenor-
respondent.” For clarity, we shall refer to them collectively as “respondents” in
this decision. The Court of Appeals was also impleaded as public respondent
but this was not necessary since this is a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only
in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Same; Succession; The right of representation in the collateral line takes place
only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces); It
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.—We note, however,
that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews
and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code,
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the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot
be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are
her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her
death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial
court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their
children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo
Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with
Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:
Same; Same; Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself
by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir of the estate.—
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could
not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir
to the estate.
Same; Paternity and Filiation; Under the new law, recognition may be
compulsory or voluntary; Cases of Compulsory Recognition.—Under the new
law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition is compulsory
in any of the following cases: (1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when
the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception; (2)
when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father (or mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his family; (3) when the
child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father; (4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that
the defendant is his father. On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing.
Same; Same; Dual limitation in a judicial action for compulsory
acknowledgement: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
parent.—There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an
illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo
Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by
which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.
Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual
limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. On
the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.
In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment
prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
Same; Same; An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is
understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent.—The claim of
voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An
authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a
genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia).
This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to
be his. Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and
Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of
intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact
that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight
since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses
testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of
Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10,
1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the
law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original
manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and
signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present
the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.
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Remedial Law; Settlement of Estate; Administrator; Words and Phrases; An
administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate
of the decedent; Order of preference in the appointment of an administrator
prescribes in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.—An administrator is a
person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent.
Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator.
Same; Same; Same; In the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed; Order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators specially in
cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates.—In the appointment of an
administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one
to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of
co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that
opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a
situation which obtains here. Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa vs. Heirs of Marciana
Rustia Vda. de Damian, 480 SCRA 334, G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
G.R. No. 206220. August 19, 2015.*
LUIS UY, substituted by LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ and SHIRLEY UY
MACARAIG, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA and
ROSAURA** MENDOZA, substituted by CORAZON BUENA,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; Marriages; There is a presumption
established in our Rules “that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.”—The main
issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is
anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a
presumption established in our Rules “that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.” Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.
However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by
other evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962), the
Supreme Court (SC) held that testimony by one (1) of the parties to the
marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who
officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible
to prove the fact of marriage.—Marriage may be proven by any competent and
relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962), we held that
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to
the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was
legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Article
147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together were not
incapacitated from getting married.—Since Uy failed to discharge the burden
that he was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed
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by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together
were not incapacitated from getting married.
Civil Law; Co-ownership; Properties acquired during cohabitation are
presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary.—The provision states
that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless
there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate courts
that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is
paraphernal. Uy vs. Lacsamana, 767 SCRA 672, G.R. No. 206220 August 19,
2015
G.R. No. 169766. March 30, 2011.*
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB
AHMAD A. TAMANO, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Certiorari; An application for certiorari is an independent
action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the
rendition of the judgment complained of.—Estrellita argues that the trials court
prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution
of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court.
However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ailed that the pendency of a
petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court.
“An application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a
continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment
complained of.”
Same; Answer; Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her
evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to
benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party.—Her
failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable
only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory
tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court
correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed
Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story.
Civil Law; Marriages; The Civil Code governs their personal status since this
was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage.—Even granting
that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered
as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent
between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims
whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as
we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this
was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen.
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Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him,
their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Family Code; Marriages; In a void marriage, any interested party may attack
the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.—While the Family
Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been
held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot
be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply,
Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir,
is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother
had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit. Juliano-Llave vs. Republic, 646 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 169766 March
30, 2011
G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997.*
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-
TSOI, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriage; The prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.—“If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse
to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.”
Same; Same; Same; One of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is “to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation
of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”—
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of
the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of
the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
Same; Same; Same; While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction
therefor is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife
and not any legal mandate or court order.—While the law provides that the
husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
“spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order” (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is
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useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest
act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the
mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals, 266 SCRA 324, G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
G.R. No. 150677. June 5, 2009.*
RENATO REYES SO, petitioner, vs. LORNA VALERA, respondent.
Family Code; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity;
Characterization of Psychological Incapacity; Psychological incapacity must be
confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.—The petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that “a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.” In Santos v. Court of Appeals (240 SCRA 20
[1995]), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It
should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be
confined to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity.—A later case, Marcos v. Marcos
(343 SCRA 755 [2000]), further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
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exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes
and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of
psychological incapacity.—In Molina (268 SCRA 198 [1997], we ruled that
“mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological incapacity. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.”
So vs. Valera, 588 SCRA 320, G.R. No. 150677 June 5, 2009
G.R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995.*
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Circular 28–91; Circular 28–91 requires a certification of non-
forum shopping.—The petition should be denied not only because of its non-
compliance with Circular 28–91, which requires a certification of non-forum
shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Civil Law; Family Code; Void and Void able Marriages; Psychological
Incapacity; Psychological incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity, b)
juridical antecedence, and c) incurability.—Justice Sempio-Diy cites with
approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch
I), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties, required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Same; Same; Same; Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage.—It should be obvious, looking at all the
foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of
the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
‘psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma’s “Void and Voidable Marriages
in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,” quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
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Association; Edward Hudson’s “Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases”). necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriages. psychological incapacity. Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20, G.R. No.
Thus correlated, “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a 112019 January 4, 1995
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensibility or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.—There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be “legitimate.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception
of marriage merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article
46, Family Code.—The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not

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G.R. No. 173294. February 27, 2008.*
RENNE ENRIQUE BIER, petitioner, vs. MA. LOURDES A. BIER and
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological
Incapacity; The Supreme Court has been consistent in holding that if a petition
for nullity based on psychological incapacity is to be given due course, its
gravity, root cause, incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at the time
of celebration of the marriage must always be proved; Psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incur-ability.—The trial court apparently overlooked the fact that this Court has
been consistent in holding that if a petition for nullity based on psychological
incapacity is to be given due course, its gravity, root cause, incurability and the
fact that it existed prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage must
always be proved. As early as Santos v. CA, et al., 240 SCRA 20 (1995), we
already held that: [P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. x x x This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; The granting of a petition for nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.—These must be
strictly complied with as the granting of a petition for nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This is specially so since the
Family Code does not define psychological incapacity. The determination
thereof is left solely to the discretion of the courts and must be made on a case-
to-case basis.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure or
refusal to meet one’s duties and responsibilities as a married person and
eventual abandonment of a spouse do not suffice to nullify a marriage on the
basis of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be due to some psychological
(as opposed to physical) illness.—Petitioner was able to establish that
respondent was remiss in her duties as a wife and had become a happy-go-lucky
woman who failed to attend to her husband’s needs and who eventually
abandoned him. However, the totality of her acts, as testified to by petitioner
and his brother, was not tantamount to a psychological incapacity, as petitioner
would have us believe. Habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure or refusal
to meet one’s duties and responsibilities as a married person and eventual
abandonment of a spouse do not suffice to nullify a marriage on the basis of
psychological incapacity, if not shown to be due to some psychological (as
opposed to physical) illness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although absence can indeed make the heart grow
fonder, the opposite can just as well be true—out of sight, out of mind—the
couple drifted apart and respondent obviously fell out of love with petitioner.—
The undeniable fact is that the marriage, according to petitioner’s own evidence,
was off to a good start. According to him, respondent used to be a sweet, loving
and caring wife who took good care of him and their home. She even willingly
consented to the difficult living arrangement of taking turns in going back and
forth between the Philippines and Saudi Arabia just so they could be together.
Perhaps it was this unusual arrangement which took a heavy toll on their
relationship. They barely saw and spent time with each other. Respondent could
have gotten used to petitioner’s absence. And although absence can indeed
make the heart grow fonder, the opposite can just as well be true: out of sight,
out of mind. The couple drifted apart and respondent obviously fell out of love
with petitioner.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; It was not enough that respondent, the party adverted
to as psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations, had
difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same—proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in respondent’s
personality structure that effectively incapacitated her from complying with her
essential marital obligations.—We agree with the CA that the change in
respondent’s feelings towards petitioner could hardly be described as a
psychological illness. It was not enough that respondent, the party adverted to
as psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations, had
difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor, an adverse integral element in respondent’s personality
structure that effectively incapacitated her from complying with her essential
marital obligations, had to be shown. This petitioner failed to do. Consequently,
we are unconvinced that respondent’s condition was rooted in some
incapacitating or debilitating disorder. Bier vs. Bier, 547 SCRA 123, G.R. No.
173294 February 27, 2008
G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
Family Code; Marriage; Psychological incapacity must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.—In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that “psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that “the psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.”
Same; Same; Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.—On the other
hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,”
if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
Same; Same.—The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she
and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
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incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code.—From their submissions and the Court’s own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees
marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the
state.
Same; Same; Root cause of psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.—
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
Same; Same; The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage.—The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
“the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
Same; Same; Such incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.—Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
Same; Same; Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.—Such illness must be
grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes.
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Same; Same; Non-complied marital obligation(s) must be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.—The essential
marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
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Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision. Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides: “The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.”
Same; Same; Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.—The trial court must order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, G.R. No. 108763 February 13,
1997
G.R. No. 161793. February 13, 2009.*
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, petitioner, vs. ROWENA ONG
GUTIERREZ YU-TE, respondent, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
oppositor.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Judgments; In hindsight,
it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as
the one in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity; The unintended consequences
of Molina has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions—far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.—In hindsight, it
may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of
Article 36 as the “most liberal divorce procedure in the world.” The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live
with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court,
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by
it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and
the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically,
the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders
of the said individuals.
Same; Same; In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of
families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses
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to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply
with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred
bond; To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will
simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.—The Court need not
worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there
are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention
by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between
the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed
by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic
violence and incestuous rape. In dissolving marital bonds on account of either
party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation
of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot
comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that
sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.
Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first
place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a
stillborn marriage.
Same; Same; Judgments; Legal Research; Lest it be misunderstood, the Court
is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in the instant case—it is simply
declaring that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36.—Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of
Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O.
Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 484 SCRA 353 (2006), there is need to emphasize
other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we
reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; By the very nature of
Article 36 of the Family Code, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.—The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more
or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided
expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder. By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.—Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76
(1999) emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish
the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA
755 (2000) asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that
the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
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assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion
in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, an option for the trial judge to refer the case
to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and
evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts,
who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with
the parties’ prerogative to present their own expert witnesses. Ngo Te vs. Yu-
Te, 579 SCRA 193, G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
G.R. No. 139676. March 31, 2006.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NORMA CUISON-
MELGAR and EULOGIO A. MELGAR, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Family Code; Marriages; It is the policy of our Constitution
to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.—It bears stressing that it is the
policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is
not the concern alone of the family members.
Family Code; Marriages; Only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor
or the OSG will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.—In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution
of the case at the trial level. Other than the Public Prosecutor’s Manifestation
that no collusion existed between the contending parties and the brief cross-
examination which had barely scratched the surface, no pleading, motion, or
position paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should
have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered. Truly, only the active participation of the Public
Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that the interest of the State is represented
and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.
Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240
SCRA 20 (1995), the Supreme Court declared that psychological incapacity
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must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) psychological incapacity. Norma’s omission to present one is fatal to her
incurability—it should refer to “no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity position. There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present at the inception
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the of the marriage or that they are incurable. Republic vs. Cuison-Melgar, 486
marriage.—In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that psychological SCRA 177, G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. It should refer to “no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.”
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.

Same; Same; Same; In Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000) the Supreme
Court clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity.—The Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos that there
is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such
psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.

Same; Same; Same; There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity

where there is absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present at
the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.—In order that the
allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a mere
fabrication, evidence other than Norma’s lone testimony should have been
adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is
not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert
witness would have strengthened Norma’s claim of Eulogio’s alleged

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G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993.* previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove
DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis
MOISES R. AVERA, respondents. solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Marriages; A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact Same; Actions; Declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment
under the. Family Code even for purposes other than remarriage.—Came the for the liquidation of property, custody and support of children, etc. There is no
Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the need of filing a separate civil action for such purposes.—Based on the foregoing
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly provisions, private respondent’s ultimate prayer for separation of property will
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner’s suggestion that in order for
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of
the previous marriage void. the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property
according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason
Same; Same.—In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the regarding the couple’s properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed
nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
charged with bigamy. discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J. Domingo
vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
Same; Same.—That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant
clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void
need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can
conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between
the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters’ presumptive legitimes. In such
cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has

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G.R. No. 183824. December 8, 2010.*
MYRNA P. ANTONE, petitioner, vs. LEO R. BERONILLA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; A pleading required to be
verified which lacks a proper verification shall be treated as unsigned pleading;
A pleading is required to be verified only to ensure that it was prepared in good
faith and that the allegations were true and correct and not based on mere
speculations.—The Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be
verified which lacks a proper verification shall be treated as unsigned pleading.
This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax the rule in
order that the ends of justice may be served. The defect being merely formal
and not jurisdictional, we ruled that the court may nevertheless order the
correction of the pleading, or even act on the pleading “if the attending
circumstances are such that xxx strict compliance with the rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice xxx may be served.” At any rate,
a pleading is required to be verified only to ensure that it was prepared in good
faith, and that the allegations were true and correct and not based on mere
speculations.
Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; Requisites for Jeopardy to Attach.—
Well-settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court
of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges;
and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed
or terminated without his express consent.
Same; Same; Jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of an
order sustaining a motion to quash; The granting of a motion to quash anchored
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense.—We reiterate, time and again, that
jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of an order
sustaining a motion to quash. More specifically, the granting of a motion to
quash anchored on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
is “not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.”
Same; Motion to Quash Information; Definition of a Motion to Quash an
Information; Court cannot consider allegation contrary to those appearing on
the face of the information.—We define a motion to quash an Information as
— the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for
defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. This motion is “a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information,” for which
reason, the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the
face of the information.
The Family Code; Annulment of Marriage; Under the Family Code a
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial
in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been consummated.—
The specific provision, which reads: “ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.” was exhaustively
discussed in Mercado, where this Court settled the “conflicting” jurisprudence
on “the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage.” After
establishing that Article 40 is a new provision expressly requiring a judicial
declaration of nullity of a prior marriage and examining a long line of cases,
this Court, concluded, in essence, that under the Family Code a subsequent
judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy
case because, by then, the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise
stated, this Court declared that a person, who contracts a subsequent marriage
absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous one, is guilty of
bigamy. Antone vs. Beronilla, 637 SCRA 615, G.R. No. 183824 December 8,
2010
Page | 131
G.R. No. 188775. August 24, 2011.* offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability
CENON R. TEVES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing
DANILO R. BONGALON, respondents. of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for
determining prescription. The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements.—Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The
states: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared marriage. Teves vs. People, 656 SCRA 307, G.R. No. 188775 August 24, 2011
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows: 1. That the offender has been legally
married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.

Same; Same; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Where the absolute nullity of

a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.—
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His
contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of
nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once
and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

Same; Same; Same; The finality of the judicial declaration of the nullity of
previous marriage of the accused cannot be made to retroact to the date of the
bigamous marriage.—Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the

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G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION) and ALAN B. ALEGRO,
respondents.
Civil Law; The Family Code; Declaration of Absence; The spouse present is
burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage.—The spouse present is, thus, burdened to
prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded
belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde
en motivos racionales.”
absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of
the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse
and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Court warned against collusion between the parties when
they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal
means.—Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded
belief of the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic
v. Nolasco, the Court warned against collusion between the parties when they
find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It
is also the maxim that “men readily believe what they wish to be true.” Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 477 SCRA 277, G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005

Same; Same; Same; Belief may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial

evidence which may tend even in a slight degree to elucidate the inquiry or
assist to a determination probably founded in truth.—Belief is a state of the
mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by
direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in
truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions,
attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of
men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or
characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence
evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

Same; Same; Same; Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded
belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from
a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the
absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present
spouse.—The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and
honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the

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G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000.*
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA
CALISTERIO, respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; Judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is
not necessary in the new Civil Code as long as the prescribed period of absence
is met.—A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally
noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit
mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid “until declared null and void by a
competent court.” It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases,
on the party assailing the second marriage.
Same; Same; Conditions in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid.—Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that
a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the
following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting
party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the
Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the
old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which
purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask
for that declaration. Armas vs. Calisterio, 330 SCRA 201, G.R. No. 136467
April 6, 2000
G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014.*
CELERINA J. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment; Annulment of
judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) judgment,
order, or resolution has become final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.”—Annulment of judgment is the remedy
when the Regional Trial Court’s judgment, order, or resolution has become
final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of
Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523 (1999): For fraud to become a basis for annulment of
judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts
pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting
the fraud were or could have been litigated. It is extrinsic or collateral when a
litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a
real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair
submission of the controversy.
Civil Law; Family Code; Declaration of Presumptive Death; The Family Code
provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four(4) consecutive years,
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse
is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage.—The Family Code provides that it is the proof
of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded
belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that
constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of
another marriage. The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in
danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she
reappears.
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Same; Same; Same; Affidavit of Reappearance; The filing of an affidavit of
reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her
marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared
absent or presumptively dead.—The Family Code provides the presumptively
dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere
reappearance. The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the
part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was
terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination
of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1)
the nonexistence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it
void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties
to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the
fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed
or judicially determined.
Same; Same; Same; When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial
declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is
already dead and that the second marriage is legal.—When subsequent
marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second
marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the
marital relations with the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all
marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of
the second marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent
marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there
was “no step taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by filing an
affidavit of reappearance or by court action.”—This court recognized the
conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent
marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon, 485 SCRA 376 (2006).
This court noted that mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent
marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there
was “no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent
marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]”
“Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that
the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as
legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by
law.”
Same; Same; Same; Conditions for a Bigamous Subsequent Marriage to be
Considered Valid.—A second marriage is bigamous while the first
subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid
when the following are present: 1) The prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years; 2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead; 3) There must be a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and 4) There is a
court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Bigamous Marriages; Marriages contracted prior to the
valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous
and void.—A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was
contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement
of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will
not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid
termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
Same; Same; Same; A subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing
“an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.”—The
provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the
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termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was
declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This
court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated
by filing “an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain
a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.”
Same; Same; Same; Legitimate Children; Since an undisturbed subsequent
marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the
“children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property
relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid
marriages.”—Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the
Family Code is valid until terminated, the “children of such marriage shall be
considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such
marriage will be the same as in valid marriages.” If it is terminated by mere
reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring
presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. It is true that in
most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may
nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the
status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
Santos vs. Santos, 737 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014
G.R. No. 174451. October 13, 2009.*
VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, petitioner, vs. REY C.
ALCAZAR, respondent.
Family Law; Husband and Wife; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Article
45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate; Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to
perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.—Article 45(5) of the Family
Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate denotes the
permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of
sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the
husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in
the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and
inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions.
It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or
disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of
performing the marriage act.
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is
bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural
technique.—One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can be
gleaned from the evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually seeking
the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latter’s
psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner attributes the filing of the
erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake or gross
ignorance. But even said reason cannot save petitioner’s Complaint from
dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts,
even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique. Although
this rule is not a hard and fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the
mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the
Page | 136
violation of his client’s substantive rights, petitioner failed to convince us that
such exceptional circumstances exist herein.
Same; Same; Declaration of Nullity; Psychological Incapacity; Words and
Phrases; “Psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses—it should refer, rather,
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage.—In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
240 SCRA 20 (1995) the Court declared that “psychological incapacity” under
Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
“difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations.—Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latter’s experiences during
his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said
conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the “pattern of behavior” that
showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag
likewise failed to explain how such a personality disorder made respondent
psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. We
emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent
suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder
renders him “truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in
the performance of some marital obligations.
Same; Same; Same; To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s
spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological illness, and neither can falling
out of love be so labeled; An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void
marriage.—In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence
adduced, to peek into petitioner’s marital life and, as a result, we perceive a
simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to
each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching
himself as much as possible from his wife. To be tired and give up on one’s
situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological illness;
neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy
for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways.
This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is a
limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation—a relationship
where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties; or
where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness
existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations
of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. An
unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Sexual Infidelity; Sexual infidelity, per se, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code.—As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null,
petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a
Manifestation and Motion dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner
claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the
same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-
in with another woman named “Sally.” Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does
not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondent’s
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Alcazar vs. Alcazar, 603 SCRA 604, G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
Page | 137
G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001.*
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE
BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA,
LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A.
COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE,
respondents.
Actions; Appeals; Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; Exceptions.—The general rule is that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where
there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted
by the evidence on record; and (j) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. It appearing that the
Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by both parties, the
general rule should apply.
Husband and Wife; Common-Law Relationships; Cohabitation; Words and
Phrases; Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one
of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex—at the very
least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital
relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves
out to the public as such, and secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent
together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation.—
In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term “cohabitation” or “living together as
husband and wife” means not only residing under one roof, but also having
repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual
intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer
be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by
a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and
wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or
nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute
such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this
Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the
stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence
of illegitimate children.
Same; Same; Same; Donations; Where it has been established by
preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made
by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.—
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and
Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila
is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. Arcaba vs. Vda. de Batocael, 370
SCRA 414, G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
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A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998.*
JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M.
NARAG, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Immorality; Disbarment; Good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification
for all members of the bar.—Thus, good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members
of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he
may be suspended or disbarred.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Immoral conduct is that conduct which
is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community.—Immoral conduct has been
defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.
Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.
That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses
but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.—We explained in Barrientos
vs. Daarol that, “as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses
but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.”
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Quantum of Proof; The burden of proof
rests upon the complainant, and the Supreme Court will exercise its disciplinary
power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.—Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning
his family in order to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Handwritings; Handwriting may be proved
through a comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by
the respondent as genuine.—Further, the complainant presented as evidence the
love letters that respondent had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly
manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he acknowledged as
his own. In addition, complainant also submitted as evidence the cards that she
herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be
proved through a comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or
treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence
were written by one and the same person. Besides, respondent did not present
any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he
merely denied that he wrote them.
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; While the burden of proof is upon the
complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to the court
to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar.—While the burden
of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself
but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the
bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed,
such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled,
he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of
the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in
the Roll of Attorneys. This he failed to do.
Page | 139
Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Parents have not only rights but also complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
duties—e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members
precepts and good example; and to give them love, companionship and of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, “a lawyer may be
understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance.—Respondent may have disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
provided well for his family—they enjoyed a comfortable life and his children which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
finished their education. He may have also established himself as a successful demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.” Narag vs. Narag,
lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient 291 SCRA 451, A.C. No. 3405 June 29, 1998
to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession
of law. We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties—
e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts
and good example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding,
as well as moral and spiritual guidance. As a husband, he is also obliged to live
with his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help
and support.

Same; Same; Same; Husband and Wife; A husband is not merely a man who
has contracted marriage—he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and
respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death.—Although respondent
piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove otherwise.
A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a
partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful
to her until death. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova: “The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage.” In Toledo vs. Toledo, the respondent was
disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; A lawyer may be disbarred for any

misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him
to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.—In the present case, the

Page | 140
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.*
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA
IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity
as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Actions; Rule that the crime of adultery as well as four other
crimes against chastity cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse, a jurisdictional requirement.—Under
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four
other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and
not merely a formal, requirement. While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of
the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement
for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and without which the court
cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Same; Same; Same; In prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody
else.—Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of
the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery
and concubinage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Complainant must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.—
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute
the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined
as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for adultery.—This policy was adopted out of
consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes
that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the
criminal action for adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre
of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party
had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of
the criminal case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and indubitably
exist as of the time he initiates the action.—In these cases, therefore, it is
indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would
be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status
before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or
status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did
not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the
anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without
the legal capacity to do so.
Page | 141
Same; Same; Divorce; Fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
his country is admitted and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines.—In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the matter of status of persons.
Same; Same; Same; Rule under American jurisprudence that after a divorce has
been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offender is in pari materia with ours.—American
jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the
innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted
can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion.
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Allegation that private respondent
could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge even if true is of no legal significance or consequence.—The
allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before
the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family
nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law
on adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak
of The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989

Same; Same; Same; Same; Court sees no reason why the same doctrinal rule
should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction.—We see no reason why
the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced
that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused
must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant
that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent being no longer the
husband of petitioner has no legal standing to commence the adultery case.—
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no

Page | 142
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CRASUS L. IYOY,
respondent.
Marriages; Annulment and Declaration of Nullity; Psychological Incapacity;
Guidelines; Characteristics; Words and Phrases; Psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support.—Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes
psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines
for determining its existence. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the term
psychological incapacity was defined, thus—“. . . [P]sychological incapacity”
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated… The psychological incapacity must
be characterized by—(a) Gravity—It must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage; (b) Juridical Antecedence—It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and (c) Incurability—It must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Same; Same; Same; While it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in
a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, such
psychological incapacity must be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.—A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified
that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non
for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such psychological
incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.
Same; Same; Same; Divorce; Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the material bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves—it refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage.—It is worthy to
emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article. As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases,
Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage.
It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”
Same; Same; Same; Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal
examination of a spouse by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, the totality of
evidence presented during trial by the spouse seeking the declaration of nullity
of marriage must still prove the gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability
Page | 143
of the alleged psychological incapacity.—Fely’s hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an
American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American
surname, may have hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the
family. Nonetheless, the afore-described characteristics, behavior, and acts of
Fely do not satisfactorily establish a psychological or mental defect that is
serious or grave, and which has been in existence at the time of celebration of
the marriage and is incurable. Even when the rules have been relaxed and the
personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, the totality of evidence presented during
trial by respondent Crasus, as the spouse seeking the declaration of nullity of
marriage, must still prove the gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability of
the alleged psychological incapacity; which, it failed to do so herein.
Same; Same; Divorce; Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, by its plain
and literal interpretation, cannot be applied to the case of a Filipino couple
where one spouse obtained a divorce while still a Filipino citizen.—As it is
worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
married couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its
plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the
United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.
In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living
abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize
divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus.
Same; Same; Solicitor General; That Article 48 of the Family Code does not
expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages.—That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General
does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as
the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government. His Office is
tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such,
shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. The intent of Article 48
of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State
is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the
realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Same; Same; Same; While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration
of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court, the Office of the Solicitor
General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court.—The general rule is that only the Solicitor General is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of
the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of
Appeals. While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates,
on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of
Page | 144
marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when
the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when
circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while
the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the
interests of the State.
under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with
respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless
and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem. Republic
vs. Iyoy, 470 SCRA 508, G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

Same; Same; Same; The issuance of the Supreme Court of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other
doubts as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant petition for
review on behalf of the State.—The issuance of this Court of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other
doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file
the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of
the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher
courts.

Same; Same; In the instant case, at most, the wife’s abandonment, sexual
infidelity, and bigamy, give the husband grounds to file for legal separation, but
not for declaration of nullity of marriage—while the Court commiserates with
the latter for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless
marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answer to every individual problem.—This Court arrives at
a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and
sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus
and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage

Page | 145
G.R. No. 168785. February 5, 2010.*
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, petitioner, vs. SHARON DEL MUNDO
DACASIN, respondent.
Civil Law; Contracts; Parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of
agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.—In this jurisdiction, parties to a
contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban
on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed “inexistent
and void from the beginning.” For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement,
these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters
to test the validity of the Agreement’s joint child custody stipulations.
Same; Same; The Family Code; Child Custody; Sole parental custody of a child
less than seven years old—The relevant Philippine law on child custody for
spouses separated in fact or in law is that no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother; This is mandatory grounded on sound policy of
consideration; Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years
old contravenes Philippine Law.—At the time the parties executed the
Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was
under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2)
petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United
States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child
custody for spouses separated in fact or in law (under the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: “no child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother x x x.” (This statutory awarding of
sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy
consideration, subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here.)
Clearly then, the Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years
old contravenes Philippine law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The agreement would be valid if the spouses have
not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority
when spouses live together.—The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being
contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to
allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses
have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental
authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses,
the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years
old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint
custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced
spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for
commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents
how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated
mother.
Same; Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; An alien spouse of a Filipino is bound
by a divorce decree obtained abroad.—The argument that foreigners in this
jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn
v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 (1985) settled the matter by holding that an alien
spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we
dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-
divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; It should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree
carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does
in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality irrespective of who obtained the
divorce.—We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653
(1989) to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee
(who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse
because he no longer qualified as “offended spouse” entitled to file the
complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now
that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee
in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality,
irrespective of who obtained the divorce.
Page | 146
G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.*
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO.
TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
Marriages; Family Code; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Divorce;
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages—void and
voidable marriages—and in both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage; Divorce contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.—The Family Code recognizes only two types of
defective marriages—void and voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists
before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates
the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Through the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Executive Order No. (EO) 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653
(1989).—Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise
of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted Executive
Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present
wording, as follows: “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.” Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s
holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989). In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the
spouses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Essentially, the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right
to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.—As the RTC correctly stated, the provision
was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.” The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts
created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his
or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of
the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception
to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action based on the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of
the foreign divorce decree—if the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
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likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.—An action based on the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other
than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code—the alien spouse can
claim no right under this provision.—Given the rationale and intent behind the
enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse
can claim no right under this provision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Laws; Recognition of
Foreign Judgments; The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip such aliens of legal interest
to petition the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree—direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an
action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment.—We
qualify our above conclusion—i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens—with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity
and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides
for the effect of foreign judgments. * * * To our mind, direct involvement or
being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of
the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws—the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself.—The starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.
Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; In the instant case where
the foreigner seeking recognition of the foreign divorce decree attached to his
petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving
its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the foreign law on divorce, the
Court deems it more appropriate to remand the case to the trial court to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the foreign divorce law,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s obvious
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conformity with the petition.—In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain
a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either
by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but
failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation,
we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law. We deem it more appropriate to take
this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and
the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right
by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken
to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata
effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms.—More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata
effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provides.
Same; Same; Civil Registry; While the law requires the entry of the divorce
decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration—there must
first be a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect; The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.—But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso
facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with
the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can
be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order
as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of
a court recognition, as it cited National Statistics Office (NSO) Circular No. 4,
series of 1982, and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982—
both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry,
but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to
law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
Same; Same; Same; Cancellation of Entries; The recognition that the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) may extend to a foreign divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry—a petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
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under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry; The recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
may be judicially cancelled or corrected—Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by
annotated in the civil registry.—Another point we wish to draw attention to is which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in
that the recognition that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may extend to the terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the or clear mistake of law or fact. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266, G.R.
entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not No. 186571 August 11, 2010
the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code
declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order.” The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in
the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must
be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction,
may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and
that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one
filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact.—We hasten to point out, however,
that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings
for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry—one for

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G.R. No. 149615. August 29, 2006.*
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA
BUENAVENTURA MULLER, petitioner, vs. HELMUT MULLER,
respondent.
National Patrimony; Aliens; The primary purpose of the constitutional
provision disqualifying aliens from acquiring lands of the public domain and
private lands is the conservation of the national economy.—Section 7, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution states: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is
the conservation of the national patrimony.
Same; Same; Trusts; Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, an alien’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is
absolute—not even an ownership in trust is allowed; Where the purchase is
made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision,
no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.—Respondent
was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his
knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property
titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at
subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be
sustained. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was
created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to
respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession,
respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute.
Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made
in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no
trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise
would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Equity; It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be
done directly—he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands.—Invoking the principle that a court is not
only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been
held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. He who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in
the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies
that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful
as to the controversy in issue. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
National Patrimony; Aliens; The distinction made between transfer of
ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on alien spouse’s
part—to allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the
fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.—The distinction made
between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile
exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit
respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.
Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 193 SCRA 93 (1991): Finally, the fundamental
law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution ordains that, “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.” Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge
of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in
question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over
the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or
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interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has
no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property
by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative
of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would
permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property
were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote
as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
permit him to have. Muller vs. Muller, 500 SCRA 65, G.R. No. 149615 August
29, 2006
G.R. No. 164401. June 25, 2008.*
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan,
Zamboanga Del Norte; THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHERIFF,
Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte; THE CLERK OF COURT
OF MANILA, as Ex Officio Sheriff; and LAMBERTO T. CHUA,
respondents.
Obligations and Contracts; Interests; Words and Phrases; The legal interest at
12% per annum under Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 416 shall be adjudged
only in cases involving the loan or forbearance of money, and for transactions
involving payment of indemnities in the concept of damages arising from
default in the performance of obligations in general and/or for money judgment
not involving a loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, the governing
provision is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing a yearly 6% interest; The
term “forbearance,” within the context of usury law, has been described as a
contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain, during a given period of
time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due
and payable.—In Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., 139 SCRA 260 (1985), the Court
held that the legal interest at 12% per annum under Central Bank (CB) Circular
No. 416 shall be adjudged only in cases involving the loan or forbearance of
money. And for transactions involving payment of indemnities in the concept
of damages arising from default in the performance of obligations in general
and/or for money judgment not involving a loan or forbearance of money,
goods, or credit, the governing provision is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code
prescribing a yearly 6% interest. Art. 2209 pertinently provides: Art. 2209. If
the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs
in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary,
shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. The term
“forbearance,” within the context of usury law, has been described as a
contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain, during a given period of
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time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due
and payable.
Same; Husband and Wife; Absolute Community Property Regime; Family
Code; Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community property
may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse.—The records
show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were married on February 4, 1992,
or after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Withal, their
absolute community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted
by either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code pertinently provides: Art.
94. The absolute community property shall be liable for: (1) x x x x (2) All debts
and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-
spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse
with the consent of the other. (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
been benefited. (Emphasis ours.) Absent any indication otherwise, the use and
appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of the assets of Shellite even after the
business was discontinued on May 30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to
have been used for her and her husband’s benefit. Sunga-Chan vs. Court of
Appeals, 555 SCRA 275, G.R. No. 164401 June 25, 2008
G.R. No. 153788. November 27, 2009.*
ROGER V. NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO,
Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T.
GO, doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES,
respondents.
Civil Procedure; Parties; The 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest,
i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.—The 1977 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Civil Law; Conjugal Properties; Registration of the trade name in the name of
one person—a woman—does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is married;
By law, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.—The registration of the
trade name in the name of one person—a woman—does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when
the woman is married. By law, all property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in
the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary
is proved.
Same; Same; The conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the contract
of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in
this chapter or by spouses in their marriage settlement. In other words, the
property relations of the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the spouses’ marriage settlement and by the rules on partnership
Page | 153
under the Civil Code.—Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief
partnership is governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is
not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
spouses in their marriage settlements. In other words, the property relations of
the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Civil Law; Property; Replevin; We see nothing in these provisions which
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses’ requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property
marriage settlement and by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In the before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a
absence of any evidence of a marriage settlement between the spouses Go, we condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.—We see nothing in these
look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance. provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor
of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior
Same; Partnership; In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin. Navarro
that “[a] partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership vs. Escobido, 606 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009
property.” Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used
to finance the four checks used to pay for the petitioners’ stocks subscription,
and with the presumption that the credits themselves are part of the conjugal
funds.—In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that “[a]
partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property.”
Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance
the four checks used to pay for petitioners’ stock subscriptions, and with the
presumption that the credits themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811
makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged credit.

Same; Same; Only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the
suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable partners. They are not even
necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in a suit even without
their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit
of all co-owners.—In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real
parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action,
for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned
property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not

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G.R. No. 145222. April 24, 2009.*
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO
NICOL, respondents.
Appeals; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of judgment, the proper
remedy should be appeal.—A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy
that is adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or
quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the
error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of judgment,
the proper remedy should be appeal. In addition, an independent action for
certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Actions; Third-Party Claims; Pleadings and Practice; Apart from the remedy of
terceria available to a third-party claimant or to a stranger to the foreclosure suit
against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of
his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, a third-party claimant
may also resort to an independent separate action, the object of which is the
recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as
well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property.—
Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a third-party claimant or to a
stranger to the foreclosure suit against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by
serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment
creditor, a third-party claimant may also resort to an independent separate
action, the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the
property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure
and detention of the property. If a separate action is the recourse, the third-party
claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action, distinct
and separate from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even
before or without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ.
Same; Same; Husband and Wife; Conjugal Properties; Parties; A third-party
claim must be filedby a person other than the judgment debtor or his agent—
only a stranger to the case may file a third-party claim; In determining whether
the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the property must be taken
into account.—A third-party claim must be filed by a person other than the
judgment debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may
file a third-party claim. This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was
not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account
of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a “stranger?” In
determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the
property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA
59 (1989), which was later adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, 423
SCRA 356 (2004) this Court held that the husband of the judgment debtor
cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his
wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 60
(2000), and Sy v. Discaya, 181 SCRA 378 (1990), the Court stated that a spouse
is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and
is therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of
ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlike in the system of absolute community where
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains; By no
stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from
the crime of slander committed by the spouse redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.—There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal
in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute
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community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or
quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence
or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The
conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the
liability of the debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can
it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Buado vs. Court of Appeals, 586 SCRA 397, G.R. No. 145222 April 24, 2009
G.R. No. 158040. April 14, 2008.*
SPOUSES ONESIFORO and ROSARIO ALINAS, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA ALINAS, respondents.
Land Titles; As in De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation, 452 SCRA
564 (2005), the complaint filed by herein petitioner with the RTC is also one
for recovery of possession and ownership. Verily, the present case is merely a
collateral attack on TCT No. 17394, which is not allowed by law and
jurisprudence.—Pursuant to Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the
Court ruled in De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, 452 SCRA 564
(2005), that: It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should
not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished
except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. x x x The action of the
petitioners against the respondents, based on the material allegations of the
complaint, is one for recovery of possession of the subject property and
damages. However, such action is not a direct, but a collateral attack of TCT
No. 236044. (Emphasis supplied) As in De Pedro, the complaint filed by herein
petitioners with the RTC is also one for recovery of possession and ownership.
Verily, the present case is merely a collateral attack on TCT No. T-17394,
which is not allowed by law and jurisprudence.
Appeals; Judgments; It is a basic principle that no modification of judgment or
affirmative relief can be granted to a party who did not appeal.—It is a basic
principle that no modification of judgment or affirmative relief can be granted
to a party who did not appeal. Hence, not having appealed from the RTC
Decision, petitioners can no longer seek the reversal or modification of the trial
court’s ruling that respondent spouses had acquired ownership of Lot 896-B-9-
A by virtue of the sale of the lot to them by RBO.
Family Code; Conjugal Partnership; By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other
spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be
void.—Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
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property shall belong to both spouses jointly. x x x In the event that one spouse
is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. x x x (Italics and emphasis supplied) In
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo, 453 SCRA 283 (2005), the Court
categorically stated thus: In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 372 (1998),
it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court
declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and
void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband
who contracted the sale. x x x x x x x x x By express provision of Article
124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent
of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property
shall be void.
Civil Law; Sales; As held in Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares (410
SCRA 97 [2003]), a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put
a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.—The Court
does not see how applying Article 124 of the Family Code would lead to
injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that respondent spouses were well
aware that Lot 896-B-9-B is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew
that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife,
as they knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do not bear
the signature of petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute two
documents, namely: the Absolute
Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989 and a notarized Agreement likewise dated
March 10, 1989, reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities
of the sale. As held in Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares, 410 SCRA
97 [2003], “a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.” Such being
the case, no injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as they risked
transacting with Onesiforo alone despite their knowledge that the subject
property is a conjugal property.
Same; Obligations; Interests; It was held that the interest on obligations not
constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) annually. If the
purchase price could be established with certainty at the time of filing of the
complaint, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the date the
complaint was filed until finality of the decision.—In Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes
vs. Spouses Mijares, 410 SCRA 97 [2003], the husband’s sale of conjugal
property without the consent of the wife was annulled but the spouses were
ordered to refund the purchase price to the buyers, it was ruled that an interest
of 12% per annum on the purchase price to be refunded is not proper. The Court
elucidated as follows: The trial court, however, erred in imposing 12% interest
per annum on the amount due the respondents. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994), it was held that interest on
obligations not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%)
annually. If the purchase price could be established with certainty at the time of
the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed
from the date the complaint was filed until finality of the decision. In Liu vs.
Loy, 405 SCRA 316 (2003), involving a suit for reconveyance and annulment
of title filed by the first buyer against the seller and the second buyer, the Court,
ruling in favor of the first buyer and annulling the second sale, ordered the seller
to refund to the second buyer (who was not a purchaser in good faith) the
purchase price of the lots. It was held therein that the 6% interest should be
computed from the date of the filing of the complaint by the first buyer. After
the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the
amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period being deemed
equivalent to a forbearance of credit. Accordingly, the amount of P110,000.00
due the respondent spouses which could be determined with certainty at the
time of the filing of the complaint shall earn 6% interest per annum from June
4, 1986 until the finality of this decision. If the adjudged principal and the
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interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be
twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment
becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied.
Same; Same; Compensation; Offsetting; In the absence of evidence upon which
to base the amount of rentals, no compensation or set-off can take place between
petitioners and respondent spouses.—Under paragraph 4 of the foregoing
provision, compensation or set-off is allowed only if the debts of both parties
against each other is already liquidated and demandable. To liquidate means “to
make the amount of indebtedness or an obligation clear and settled in the form
of money.” In the present case, no definite amounts for rentals nor for expenses
for repairs on subject house has been determined. Thus, in the absence of
evidence upon which to base the amount of rentals, no compensation or set-off
can take place between petitioners and respondent spouses. While the courts are
empowered to set an amount as reasonable compensation to the owners for the
use of their property, this Court cannot set such amount based on mere surmises
and conjecture. Alinas vs. Alinas, 551 SCRA 154, G.R. No. 158040 April 14,
2008
G.R. No. 160708. October 16, 2009.*
PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, petitioners, vs.
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID
D’LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D’WIGHT VILLA
ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN
DYAN VILLA ABRILLE, respondents.
Husband and Wife; Marriages; Conjugal Partnerships; The presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject
property is exclusively owned by one of the spouses.—There is no issue with
regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive property
of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann.
However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the
marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the
subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of
the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the
subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro. Petitioners’ bare assertion
would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired
during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house
built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint
efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the
house.
Same; Same; Same; Sales; A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property
concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is
governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to
be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b)
in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court.—A sale or
encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now
treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the
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husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of
the court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the
assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:
Same; Same; Same; Same; If the husband, without knowledge and consent of
the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void, and if the sale was with the
knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a
disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given
five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the
husband to institute the case.—The particular provision in the New Civil Code
giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not
carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance
of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the
wife is null and void. Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of
property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells
conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but
without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale
is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date
the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Buyer in Good Faith; For a person dealing with land
registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is
restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of
the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latter’s capacity to sell
in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.—As correctly
held by the Court of Appeals, a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or
interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time
of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property. To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith,
a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller
need only show that he relied on the face of the seller’s certificate of title. But
for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the
seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the
Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show that he inquired
into the latter’s capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value
in good faith.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of
what has been given is proper.—If a voidable contract is annulled, the
restoration of what has been given is proper. The relationship between the
parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be
characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing. Hence, in
consonance with justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment
at another’s expense, we sustain the appellate court’s order directing Pedro to
return to petitioner spouses the value of the consideration for the lot covered by
TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon. However, this court rules that
petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements they introduced
after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations on the house
and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued
introducing improvements during the pendency of the action. Thus, Article 449
of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, “(h)e who builds, plants
or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown
without right to indemnity.”
Human Relations; Damages; Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine
that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.”—The manner by which respondent and her children were removed from
the family home deserves our condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while respondent
was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in
connivance with the petitioners surreptitiously transferred all their personal
belongings to another place. The respondents then were not allowed to enter
their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas. Firmly
established in our civil law is the doctrine that: “Every person must, in the
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exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” When a right is
exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in
damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong
doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused. It is patent in
this case that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law
standards. Ravina vs. Villa Abrille, 604 SCRA 120, G.R. No. 160708 October
16, 2009
G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003.*
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when
any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain
speedy, and adequate remedy at law; Definition of Grave Abuse of
Discretion.—A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy, and
adequate remedy at law. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. As
a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper
remedy such as when an error of judgment or procedure is involved. As long as
a court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in
the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing
more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable
by a special civil action of certiorari. However, in certain exceptional cases,
where the rigid application of such rule will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical
rules may be relaxed. Certiorari has been deemed to be justified, for instance,
in order to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party where the trial judge
has capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may
be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply
be inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment
complained of.
Same; Same; Where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a
substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
the provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.—
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The issue on the validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has long
been settled in the main Decision and may no longer be the subject of review.
There were, however, incidental matters that had to be addressed regarding the
dissolution of the property relations of the parties as a result of the declaration
of nullity of their marriage. The questioned Order pertained to the division and
distribution of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, pursuant to
the court’s directive in its main decision to dissolve the conjugal partnership.
Said Order is a final Order as it finally disposes of the issues concerning the
partition of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, and as such it
may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Court of Appeals via ordinary
appeal. However, considering the merits of the case, the Court believes that a
blind adherence to the general rule will result in miscarriage of justice as it will
divest the petitioner of her just share in their common property, and thus,
deprive her of a significant source of income to support their children whom the
court had entrusted to her care. We have held that where a rigid application of
the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a manifest
failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are
technical rules may be relaxed.
Civil Law; Family Code; Elements for Article 147 to Operate.—For Article 147
to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is
without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are
present in the case at bar. Mercado-Fehr vs., 414 SCRA 288, G.R. No. 152716
October 23, 2003
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996.*
ANTONIO A.S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES,
respondents.
Civil Law; Family Code; In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.—The trial
court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may
be, of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.—Under this
property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of
the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said
party’s “efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.”
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple’s separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
Same; Same; When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment
to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other, only the property
acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions.—When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal
impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as
husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions
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and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The
share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a
valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore
expressed.
Same; Same; The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 relates only by its explicit terms,
to voidable marriages and exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of
the Code.—The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract
is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family
Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)of Article 43, relates only, by its
explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes
the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the
very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity.
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City, 260 SCRA 221, G.R.
No. 122749 July 31, 1996
G.R. No. 146294. July 31, 2006.*
JOHN ABING, petitioner, vs. JULIET WAEYAN, respondent.
Property; Ownership; Other than John’s bare allegation that he alone through
his own funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the
construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked
claim.—Other than John’s bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and
money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex
structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked claim. For sure, John even
failed to reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither did he divulge the names
of the alleged relatives from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the
amount of money he borrowed from them. All that petitioner could offer by
way of reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed money
in putting up the subject structure was the affidavit executed by a certain
Manuel Macaraeg to the effect that petitioner borrowed P30,000.00 from him.
Even then, Macaraeg stated in his affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when
John borrowed said amount from him. With the petitioner’s own admission that
the subject structure was constructed only in 1992, or two years after he
borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the amount
he allegedly borrowed from the latter went into the construction of the structure
in dispute.
Same; Same; Neither tax receipts nor declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty when not
supported by other effective proofs.—Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax
declaration covering the subject structure. We have, however, ruled time and
again that tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best an indicia of
claims of ownership. Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, any more than
indicating possession in the concept of an owner. Neither tax receipts nor
declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of
the right to possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.
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Co-ownership; In the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired
by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal
shares.—The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any
property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation
is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them
in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-
ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common “in
equal shares.” Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as
correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom. Abing vs. Waeyan,
497 SCRA 202, G.R. No. 146294 July 31, 2006
G.R. No. 165427. March 21, 2011.*
BETTY B. LACBAYAN, petitioner, vs. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.,
respondent.
Ownership; Co-Ownership; Partition; The determination as to the existence of
co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition.—Our
disquisition in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 (1989), is
definitive. There, we explained that the determination as to the existence of co-
ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus: The
first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is
proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with
a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-
ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the
other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition
is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x The second phase
commences when it appears that “the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition” directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the
parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been
accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the
real estate in question. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Same; Land Titles; Words and Phrases; What cannot be collaterally attacked is
the certificate of title and not the title itself; Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used.—Would a resolution on the
issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to
a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not. There is no dispute that a
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Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not
material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate
of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued
by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by
law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that
document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title
as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as
evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.
Same; Same; Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system
does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed—the certificate
cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.—Placing a
parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a
certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a
piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive
evidence of ownership. In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may
be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the
registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest
over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Needless
to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best
evidence thereof.
Co-Ownership; Partition; Evidence; Admissions; Requisites; Words and
Phrases; An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his
interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent
with the facts alleged by him.—As to whether respondent’s assent to the initial
partition agreement serves as an admission against interest, in that the
respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership between
him and petitioner, we rule in the negative. An admission is any statement of
fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for
which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. Admission
against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
which provides: Sec. 26. Admissions of a party.—The act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law;
(b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d)
be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and
inadmissible.
Waiver; Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law.—A careful perusal of the
contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document
involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic
of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely
divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow
petitioner’s argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against
his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully
entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by
law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed
properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Estoppel; A party does not have any right to insist on the contents of an
agreement she intentionally refused to sign.—Petitioner herself admitted that
she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the
same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the
contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
BRION, J., Separate Opinion:
Family Code; Co-Ownership; Co-ownership only arises when there is clear
proof showing the acquisition of the property during the cohabitation of the
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parties, and the actual joint contribution of the parties to acquire the same.—
Any property acquired during the cohabitation can only be considered common
property if two (2) conditions are met: first, there must be evidence showing
that the properties were acquired by the parties during their cohabitation; and
second, there must be evidence that the properties were acquired through the
parties’ actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry. Stated plainly,
co-ownership only arises when there is clear proof showing the acquisition of
the property during the cohabitation of the parties, and the actual joint
contribution of the parties to acquire the same. These two (2) conditions must
concur.
Same; Same; Mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the Family Code, without
proof of contribution, will not result in a co-ownership—proof of actual
contribution must be established by clear evidence showing that the party either
used his or her own money or that he or she actually contributed his or her own
money to purchase the property.—On the contribution aspect of these elements,
mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the Family Code, without proof of
contribution, will not result in a co-ownership; proof of actual contribution must
be established by clear evidence showing that the party either used his or her
own money or that he or she actually contributed his or her own money to
purchase the property. Jurisprudence holds that this fact may be proven by
evidence in the form of bank account statements and bank transactions as well
as testimonial evidence proving the financial capacity of the party to purchase
the property or contribute to the purchase of a property.
Same; Same; Unless there is a clear showing to the contrary, income from a
business cannot automatically be considered as personal earnings, especially in
this case where the income referred to is corporate income.—Unless there is a
clear showing to the contrary, income from a business cannot automatically be
considered as personal earnings, especially in this case where the income the
petitioner referred to is corporate income. The petitioner should have presented
evidence showing that the income she referred to actually accrued to her in the
form of salaries, bonuses, commissions and/or dividends from the manpower
business. Otherwise, the rule regarding the corporation’s distinct legal
personality from its officers, stockholders and members applies. Unless
otherwise shown, the source of the earnings would be the corporation’s, not the
petitioner’s.
Courts; Judgments; The phrase, “without prejudice to any claim his legal wife
may have filed or may file against him” in the last part of the dispositive portion
of the Decision, is objectionable—for one, no issue exists in this case between
the legitimate spouses regarding the nature of the properties they commonly or
individually hold, and, additionally, the phrase creates the impression that the
Court is giving legal advice to the wife of the respondent on what course of
action to take against her husband.—The phrase, “without prejudice to any
claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him” in the last part of
the dispositive portion of the Decision, is similarly objectionable. For one, no
issue exists in this case between the legitimate spouses regarding the nature of
the properties they commonly or individually hold. Additionally, the phrase
creates the impression that the Court is giving legal advice to the wife of the
respondent on what course of action to take against her husband. This statement
is beyond what this Court should properly state in its Decision given the facts
and issues posed, and is plainly uncalled for.
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G.R. No. 137359. September 13, 2004.*
EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Dismissal of Actions; A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16
is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a condition precedent.
Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a
condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the
action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.—A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there
is a failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect
is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent, the proper
solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under
Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It would have been
a different matter if Edwin had asserted that no efforts to arrive at a compromise
have been made at all.
Same; Habeas Corpus; In a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and
custody of a child of tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve
immediately the issue of who has the legal custody of the child. Technicalities
should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection.—
In a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of
tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who
has legal custody of the child. Technicalities should not stand in the way of
giving such child of tender age full protection. This rule has sound statutory
basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, “No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.” Tribiana vs. Tribiana, 438 SCRA 216,
G.R. No. 137359 September 13, 2004
G.R. No. 185922. January 15, 2014.*
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR., represented by their co-heirs and
Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY FAVIS-
VILLAFUERTE, petitioners, vs. JUANA GONZALES, her son
MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES
MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their parents, SPS.
MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. FAVIS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; Under the new rules, a
court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or
evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there
is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause,
or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations.—
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu
proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.
Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin, 370 SCRA 638 (2001) cited in Katon v.
Palanca, Jr., 437 SCRA 565 (2004), the Court held: x x x [T]he motu proprio
dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear
during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or
neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of
these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the
right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section
2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new
rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the
pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties
for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
statute of limitations.
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Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; No suit between members from the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had failed.—That a
condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a ground
for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between members
from the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had
failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground for a motion to dismiss. Significantly,
the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed “within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” The
time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence
of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence
of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just
noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action. Failure
to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made
but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is
deemed waived.
Same; Same; Same; Cause of Action; A failure to allege earnest but failed
efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is
not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of
action.—Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed efforts
at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a
jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action.
Versoza was cited in a later case as an instance analogous to one where the
conciliation process at the barangay level was not priorly resorted to. Both were
described as a “condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court.” In
such instances, the consequence is precisely what is stated in the present Rule.
Thus: x x x The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable
objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural
imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
G.R. No. 185920. July 20, 2010.*
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T.
RAMOS, JOSEFINA R. ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P.
MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, petitioners, vs. DANILO PANGILINAN,
RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and ROLANDO
ANTENOR, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Home; Judgments; Execution; If the family home was
constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code, or before 3 August 1988,
then it must have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially as provided
under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code; For family homes
constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need to
constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption from execution is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein.—For the family home to
be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies
based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with
by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two
sets of rules are applicable. If the family home was constructed before the
effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been
constituted either judicially or extrajudicially as provided under Articles 225,
229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home
requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of
the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is
located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to
242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which
must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with
either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from
availing of the privilege. On the other hand, for family homes constructed after
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to
constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the
time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art.
154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the
Page | 167
absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse,
its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not
exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further,
the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under
Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been
incurred after August 3, 1988. Ramos vs. Pangilinan, 625 SCRA 181, G.R. No.
185920 July 20, 2010
G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001.*
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS,
minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS,
petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON,
ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN
DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS
MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER
SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
Parent and Child; Filiation; Illegitimate Children; Actions; The due recognition
of illegitimate children in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required, but where
a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential
in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.—The filiation of illegitimate
children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved
by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact,
any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it
is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other
evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action
within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the
child’s acknowledgment.
Page | 168

Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; There is perhaps no presumption of
the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate; Upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in
proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.—There is
perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of
the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the
husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents
sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set
forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which
took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
becomes fixed and unassailable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife—it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.—
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan
G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being
children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be
aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,
or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action
the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy
of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can
be rejected.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having first been instituted to impugn their
legitimacy as being the children of some other couple born in lawful wedlock.—
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners’ alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be
validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether
petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent,
cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted
to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled
that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked
collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock
shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. De
Jesus vs. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, 366 SCRA 499, G.R. No.
142877 October 2, 2001
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