Managing Underground Risks in Singapore Through
Geotechnical Interpretative Baseline Reports
J Rozek1 and L N Loganathan2
ABSTRACT
Risk exposure in tunnel projects is extremely high due to various factors
such as variability of subsurface conditions, selection of inappropriate
design and tunnelling methods, improper risk assessment on adjacent
surface and subsurface structures and utilities, and inadequate
contractual practices. The risks in tunnelling must be borne by the
contractor, designer and the owner of a tunnelling project. There have
been a number of improvements in the last ten to 15 years in the manner
in which tunnel projects are developed and implemented in terms of
their design, construction, financing and operations. One significant
improvement has been the manner in which underground conditions and
their risks are being managed. Owners are less willing to transfer the
full responsibility to the contractor for managing the underground
conditions, although this is a familiar manner in which underground
major urban projects have been previously contracted and managed.
The owners of tunnel projects in Singapore have advanced the risk
management process for their projects through geotechnical
interpretative baseline reports (GIBRs), geotechnical data reports
(GDRs) and project specifications (PSs). This paper discusses industry
practice and its development as well as the application during the
preparation and use in Singapore on the Deep Tunnel Sewerage System
(DTSS) and the Marina Coastal Expressway (MCE) project in
Singapore. The DTSS trunk sewer is 48 km and ranges from 3.3 m to
6 m finished diameter up to 50 m below the ground. The underground
conditions ranged from Old Alluvium, strengths of about 1 MPa to
competent Bukit Tima granite, with strengths of over 230 MPa. The
total route length of the MCE is about 5 km. About 3.6 km will be
constructed underground, consisting of dual five-lane carriageways. The
underground construction will be cut and cover, and 2.6 km will be
constructed about 13 m underground, and 1 km of tunnel will range
from 13 m to 24 m as the tunnel passes under a 420 m wide reach of
Marina Bay, whose crossing will be constructed as a two-phase
cofferdam.
INTRODUCTION
Tunnelling has become a familiar manner of providing
transportation facilities in today’s urban areas. There have been a
number of improvements in the last ten to 15 years in the manner
in which these projects are developed and implemented in
terms of their design, construction, financing and operations.
One significant improvement has been the manner in which
underground conditions and their risks are being managed.
Underground urban infrastructure projects present many risks,
and they must be allocated to the owner or to the contractor. The
greatest risks are associated with the materials encountered and
their behaviour during excavation, and installation of temporary
and permanent support. Extensive and comprehensive soil
investigation and the proper interpretation and usage of the
results is the most important factor in developing appropriate
construction techniques and minimising risks associated with
deep excavation and tunnelling works and to adjacent structures
and buildings.
1. Senior Vice President, PB Australia, Level 27, Ernst and Young
Centre, 680 George Street, Sydney NSW 2000.
Email: rozekj@pbworld.com
2. Principal Tunnel Engineer, PB Australia, Level 27, Ernst and Young
Centre, 680 George Street, Sydney NSW 2000.
Email: nloganathan@pb.com.au
13th Australian Tunnelling Conference Melbourne, VIC, 4 - 7 May 2008
The objective of this paper is three-fold; namely to describe:
1. traditional practice in contracting and risk allocation
practices in tunnelling industry,
2. currently evolving risk management procedures between
various parties involved in the project, and
3. lessons learnt from the Deep Tunnel Sewerage System
(DTSS) and the Marina Coastal Expressway (MCE) project
advance consultancy work.
TRADITIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN
TUNNELLING
For many years, geotechnical information gathered during the
preliminary and final design phases of projects was made
available to bidders, but the construction documents typically
disclaimed any responsibility for the risk of interpreting the data.
Bidders didn’t have time to undertake further geotechnical site
investigation and testing. Bidders, in a competitive market,
frequently made optimistic interpretation of data, which resulted
in significant claims when conditions were adversely different to
the interpretation they made at the time of their bid. Over time,
owners have recognised the need and value in presenting a
designer’s interpretation of underground conditions and make it
part of the contract documents.
Practice in the United States
Since the early 1970s, there have been several forms of
geotechnical reports that have been incorporated in contract
documents. In 1972 the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority (WMATA) transit project in Washington recognised
the importance of communicating underground conditions
to bidders and initiated the ‘geotechnical report’. In 1974,
the Committee on Tunnelling Technology published Better
Contracting for Underground Construction, which said:
Contracting practices in the United States are
inadequate for even past methods and constitute
a serious barrier to new technology and to the
most economical tunnelling.
It made some 17 recommendations, including importantly
disclosing all information; it recommended eliminating
disclaimers, it recognised differing site conditions and
distinguished responsibilities for tunnel ground support.
In 1975, the first geotechnical design summary report (GDSR)
was utilised, and in 1984, the US National Committee on
Tunnelling Technology (USNCTT) published its Geotechnical
Site Investigation for Underground Structures, which suggested
that more exploration and site investigation would result in lower
cost. It provided an outline for interpretive geotechnical reports
and a checklist of items to be addressed.
Further, in the 1980s and 1990s the American Society of Civil
Engineers (ASCE) and the Underground Technology Research
Council (UTRC) encouraged the use of dispute review boards,
escrow bid documents, GDSRs, and differing site condition
clauses in the contract documents, the 1989 UTRC Avoiding and
Resolving Disputes in Underground Conditions and 1991 update
of the document. In the 1990s, there was the first suggestion to
1
J ROZEK and L N LOGANATHAN
rename the GDSR to GBR (geotechnical baseline report). The
UTRC published its 1997 follow-on booklet Geotechnical
Baseline Reports for Underground Construction (Yellow Book),
and recommended that GBRs be made part of the contract
documentation. UTRC’s technical committee has issued the
Geotechnical Baseline Reports for Construction (suggested
guidelines) in 2007. ASCE (2007) has published guidelines for
geotechnical baseline reports for construction.
Practice in Singapore
Most of the tunnels in Singapore have been built along heavily
developed corridor through mixed and highly variable soil
conditions. Right from the concept stage, risk associated with
each stage of the project as it affects safety, program, quality and
cost were identified and measures are put in place in managing
the project so as to minimise or mitigate risk.
Singapore provides an interesting and important study in the
manner in which they have contracted the sharing of information
relative to underground projects. The Public Utility Board’s
(PUB) Deep Tunnel Sewerage System (DTSS) utilised GDRs,
and the contractor provided geotechnical interpretive reports
included in the contract documents, in 1999 and 2000, and a
number of Land Transport Authority (LTA) projects are now
employing GIBRs.
EVOLVING RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURE
The International Tunnelling Association (ITA) has recognised
the importance of risk management procedure in tunnelling and
developed guidelines for risk management at various stages of
the project including early design phase, tendering and contract
negotiation phase and construction phase. These guidelines are
based on current international practices including US and
Singapore.
Risk assessment
Risk is the potential occurrence of a hazardous event that harms
the public and the infrastructure. The degree of risk is measured
by the potential damage to the public with respect to the
occurrence of the hazardous event. Risk exposure in tunnel
projects is extremely high due to various factors:
• Unforeseen ground conditions – ground conditions vary
inevitably depends on its deposition parent, history and the
stress changes during construction. Geotechnical conditions
are in general, interpolated or extrapolated in between two
boreholes. Tunnelling methods are chosen based on the
assumed ground conditions. When the ground conditions
deviate from the assumed conditions, there are possibilities
of excess ground movements and delay in tunnel excavation
rates. It is not appropriate to force the contractor to accept
the entire risk associated with the unforseen ground
conditions. The GIBR is a tool to manage the risk between
the owner and the contractor effectively.
• Tunnelling methods – tunnelling methods are chosen by the
contractor based on the geotechnical information provided
with the contract document. Contractors often choose a
method that paves the way to the early completion of the
project. In this process, contractors can overlook
geotechnical conditions and it may lead to a major risk. The
geotechnical design reports (GDR) and GIBR provided by
the owner outline the risk sharing between the contractor and
the owner.
• Inadequate design – due to the increased competitive nature
of the engineering industry, design engineers tender for job
with competitive design fees. This can lead to design practice
which minimises the risks of the potential adverse ground
2 Melbourne, VIC, 4 - 7 May 2008
behaviour. The project specification is a tool to set minimum
standards for the designers who can provide a safe product to
the public and the owner of the project. In Singapore,
temporary works are now subjected to the same rigors of the
permanent works and have requirements for jurisdictional
authorities to approve these designs as well as the owner.
Risk assessment must also consider major hazard events, in
spite of their low probability, which could affect the public, in
addition to the risk to individuals at work. Identifying risks can
be communicated to others by preparing and making available
the risk register. The risk register is a ‘live’ document that is best
used if continuously reviewed and revised as appropriate and
available for scrutiny at any time. Risk registers identify hazards,
consequent risks, mitigation and contingency measures, proposed
actions and responsibilities, and provide an auditable trail though
the life of the project to demonstrate compliance.
The process of risk assessment and the subsequent preparation
of a risk register are required to identify and clarify ownership of
risks and concisely how risks are to be allocated, controlled,
mitigated and managed. The system used to track risk must
enable the management and mitigation of risks through
contingency measures and controls to be monitored through all
stages of project.
The International Tunnelling Insurance Group published A
Code of Practice for Risk Management of Tunnel Works (ITIG,
2006). Similarly, Eskesen et al (2004) has published Guidelines
for tunnelling Risk Management as part of the working group for
International Tunnelling Association (ITA).
Risk management
Major accident hazards can happen in events that have a low
probability of occurring. But when they do, they have
considerable consequences for those affected. The accidents
must be prevented through effective risk management. The
owner, contractor and operators must honour and respect their
own risk analysis, assessment and reports. Singapore’s Ministry
of Manpower (MOM) have said the risk management principle to
be applied is based on the saying that ‘those who create the risk
will be held responsible for reducing it’, following the collapse
of the Nicole Highway deep excavation.
The potential for major accidents, whether due to construction
process or deficiencies in design, must be recognised and
expeditiously controlled. It is inappropriate to leave the control
of risk wholly to the contractor. In terms of practical risk
management, this duty means reducing the risk to a level which
is as low as is reasonably practicable. It cannot be determined by
the contract value of the project.
The risk control principle requires that health and safety is
given due prominence. Such decisions should be made using a
structural approach to risk identification, avoidance, elimination,
mitigation and control. A positive and consistent safety culture is
a must. Adequate staffing, good teamwork and interface,
adequate supervision and clear instructions are critical features in
risk management.
In terms of practical risk management, the risk should be
reduced to a level which is as low as is reasonably practicable. In
a design and build contract, it is essential that the owner sets out
its expectation of risk management by the contractor. However,
in current practice the risk sharing is carried out effectively by
adopting meaningful risk management processes.
The assessment and evaluation of project options must be
carried out during project development by the owner (or their
appointed representative) that takes account of the following:
• the geology,
• tunnelling methodologies,
• temporary and permanent ground support systems,
13th Australian Tunnelling Conference

• ground movements and impact on adjacent properties,
• environmental considerations, and
• appropriate contracting methods.
The construction risk must be assessed and reviewed at each
stage of the project and updated during the development of the
project.
The geotechnical baseline is set for a given project based on an
aggregation of geotechnical data. Where the baseline is set
determines the respective levels of risk allocated to the owner
and contractor. During the preparation of the GIBR, meetings
must be conducted with the owner to discuss the baseline
principles and the owner must be advised of the consequences of
an adverse presentation of the anticipated surface conditions and
need for staying within a reasonable limit.
The interpretations and baseline statements contained in the
GIBR should reflect the risk allocation attitude and preferences
of the owner. The rationale and potential consequences of
establishing conservative baseline should be clearly explained.
The geotechnical baseline report should be the soul
geotechnical interpretive document upon which the contractor
can rely. The GIBR should be limited to interpretive discussions
and baseline statements, and should make reference to
information contained in the GDR, drawings or specifications.
Geotechnical data report
A GDR presents all factual data that has been collected. It
provides the results of field and laboratory tests, and becomes
part of the contract document. GDRs were utilised in Singapore
in the delivery of 48 km of large diameter tunnel as part of the
DTSS. The 48 km of tunnelling was broken into six contracts
based on the size of the finished diameter (3.3 m to 6 m) of
tunnel, the function of the system, and the ground through which
the TBM excavate (Rozek, 2002). The ground varied and the
strengths ranged from about 1 MPa in the Old Alluvium in the
east, to over 230 MPa in the interior in the Bukit Tima granite.
Risk management was an important aspect of the contracting
as all six design-build contracts were out for tender
simultaneously, because of the ambitious program. As part of the
risk management, the government undertook an extensive site
investigation program, as well as laboratory testing. An
important identification of the material properties, the high
abrasive qualities of the Old Alluvium, was made in the GDRs.
Bidders for any of the six DTSS design-build contracts were
required to interpret the factual information provided, and
provide a PGIR (preliminary geotechnical interpretive report) as
part of their bid. A comprehensive tender evaluation was made of
the bids submitted. The evaluation was based on best value. The
PIGR was important in the tender evaluation to determine how
well the bidders understood the ground conditions in the
corridor, as well as what equipment the contractor selected and
his means and methods, which he was required to provide with
his bid. The tunnel-boring machines (TBMs) were one of the
most important considerations as there would be up to eight
TBMs operating simultaneously on the project, as well as the
length of the runs, up to 12.6 km and the required advance rates,
which represented substantial risks to timely completions. The
PGIR was a key document in assessing whether actual
encountered ground conditions differed from those anticipated
by the successful contractor (Marshal et al, 2007).
The successful contractors were also required to perform
additional site investigation and provide a final geotechnical
interpretive report, which also proved valuable as the contractors
were better able to manage the excavation with the benefit of the
additional information, analysis and interpretation. The
contractor was allocated all the risks within his control.
13th Australian Tunnelling Conference Melbourne, VIC, 4 - 7 May 2008
MANAGING UNDERGROUND RISKS IN SINGAPORE
The particular conditions of contract recognised unforeseen
ground conditions (UGC) and made allowances for additional cost
and time. However, the contractor was required to demonstrate the
actual conditions encountered were ‘unforeseeable’.
The range of bid prices received as well as the content of the
PGIR demonstrated that many of the bidders put significant
effort into the development of the PGIR for their bid, and this
resulted in more competitive prices.
Advances in Singapore practice
The collapse of the Nicole Highway in April 2004 has resulted in
much greater concerns and requirements in the design and
construction of temporary works in Singapore. In recent years,
the LTA of Singapore has utilised GIBRs, with an owner-
provided geotechnical baseline utilised in the contracting process
of major infrastructures projects. On the soon to be bid Marina
Coastal Expressway, GIBRs will be utilised in all six major
design-build civil structure contracts, to provide geotechnical
information, design parameters and other information on the
existing underground conditions.
MARINA COASTAL EXPRESSWAY PROJECT
The entire alignment will be constructed in reclaimed land
constructed between 1975 and 1984, underlain by thick lenses of
marine clay or the Kalang Formation, up to 30 m thick. This will
make the construction of the Marina Coastal Expressway (MCE)
one of the largest tunnels ever constructed in some of the most
difficult ground. Singapore’s LTA will go out for tender in
December 2007, for six design-construct civil contracts to
perform the excavation, provide the temporary earth retaining
system (TERS) and construct the structural concrete tunnel
boxes.
Extensive site investigation, in situ and laboratory testing have
been performed, including over 160 boreholes. One important
element of the project is the geotechnical interpretive baseline
report (GIBR). The report is an evaluation and interpretation of
the geological conditions along the MCE, and represents the
available knowledge of the geotechnical, geological and
hydrogeological conditions.
This GIBR will be utilised throughout the project in managing
risks, including the influence of the notional temporary earth
retaining system, the tendering process and during execution of
the work and administration of contracts.
Geotechnical interpretative baseline report
(GIBR)
In the very recent past, Singapore is utilising a GIBR in its road
and rail projects, including the 3.6 km cut and cover ten lane
expressway for the 5 km Marina Coastal Expressway (MCE),
which is being tendered under six major civil structural
design-build contracts. This GIBR presents an evaluation and
interpretation of the geological conditions along the proposed
MCE. From 2005 to 2007, the LTA conducted site investigations
and laboratory testing along various preliminary alignments for
the project. The MCE project will be one of the world’s largest
tunnels (ten lanes) in some of the most challenging ground
conditions, as its entire length will be constructed in reclaimed
land, some 13 m thick, over some 30 to 40 m under consolidated
marine clay. The project is further complicated by the presence
of a number of existing structures that require consideration in
the geotechnical design, including old sea walls, and a ‘detached
mole’, a form of sea wall comprised of stones of 1 to 2 m in
diameter, placed some 60 m wide.
A GIBR was prepared for each of the six contracts, and is
developed to present the knowledge of the geotechnical,
geological and hydrogeological conditions of that specific
3
J ROZEK and L N LOGANATHAN
segment of the MCE. The GIBR includes statements with respect
to subsurface and site conditions that are expected during the
performance of the works. It includes discussion of geologic and
man-made features of engineering and construction significance
along the alignment. The subsurface and site conditions to be
encountered during the performance of the works are derived
from geotechnical information and data gathered from site
investigations.
To manage risks, the GIBR presents the minimum requirement
of geotechnical design parameters for temporary works design.
The GIBR preparation was directly influenced by the notional
temporary earth retaining systems (TERS) developed as part of
the design and reflected in the drawings and particular
specification in the tender documents. The contractor was
advised not rely upon the GIBR in isolation for the planning or
performance of any aspects of his work, without limitation as to
the means, methods, techniques, sequences and procedures of
construction and safety precautions to be employed by the
contractor. The bidders were instructed to undertake their own
independent review of the entire set of contract documents to
arrive at decisions concerning the planning of the works and the
means, methods, techniques, sequences and procedures of
construction to be used. The tender documents require that the
final design process must incorporate additional exploration and
geotechnical evaluation as required by the contractor to further
delineate subsurface conditions for preparation of his final
design.
While the descriptions of the subsurface conditions provided
in the GIBR were based on substantial investigations and
analyses, bidders were instructed that they should not be
interpreted as a guarantee or warranty that the conditions
encountered during construction will be exactly as described, as
no amount of investigation or analysis can precisely predict the
characteristics, quality or quantity of anticipated subsurface and
site conditions and/or the behaviour of such conditions during
construction. Such behaviour will vary and will also significantly
depend upon and be influenced by the construction means and
methods selected and used by the contractor.
The main objectives of the MCE GIBR was to share available
information with the tenderers, reduce uncertainty in the bidding
process, establish a baseline with the successful tenderer prior to
award of this contract and enable contract risk allocation and
administration of contractual disputes (if any) to be more
equitable.
4 Melbourne, VIC, 4 - 7 May 2008
All bidders are required to submit their own geotechnical
interpretation and submit their own GIBR at the time of tender
submission. The tenderers are instructed to highlight any
significant geotechnical interpretation of the ground conditions
that they consider differ from or are not included in this GIBR.
The successful bidder’s soil profile is to be agreed with the
owner and the LTA prior to the award of this contract.
The GIBR will be made part of the contract document and will
be legally binding upon both the LTA and the successful
contractors. In the event of apparent conflicts, discrepancies, or
inconsistencies with any other geotechnical data made available
to the contractor, the GIBR takes precedence in reconciliation of
the conflict.
CONCLUSIONS
Tunnel constructions are inevitably associated with risks,
especially due to the variability of the ground conditions.
Providing a baseline for geotechnical design and the
performance to accommodate the ground variability associated
with risk sharing is an appropriate mechanism between the
owner and the contractor. The role of GIBRs is important in
allocating risk associated with subsurface conditions. Where the
baseline is set determines risk allocation and has a great
influence in risk acceptance, bid price and quality of change
orders and the final cost of the project. Owners must participate
in setting up the baseline and should have the clear
understanding of the risk level associated with the level at which
the baseline is set. Owners and the engineers who prepare
baselines must set realistic baselines. To effectively identify and
allocate risks, the baseline reports must be prepared by capable
and experienced geotechnical engineers with geotechnical
design knowledge and appropriate experience in geotechnical
constructions.
REFERENCES
ASCE, 2007. Geotechnical Baseline Reports for Construction, Suggested
Guidelines (ed: R Essex) (American Society of Civil Engineers).
ITIG, 2006. A Code of Practice for Risk Management of Tunnel Works
(The International Tunnelling Insurance Group).
Eskesen et al, 2004. Guidelines for Tunnelling Risk Management,
Working Group No 2 (International Tunnelling Association).
Marshal et al, 2007. Lessons Learned on Singapore’s DTSS, Tunnels and
Tunnelling International, October.
Rozek, J, 2002. Singapore’s deep tunnel sewerage system: risk
management from concept design to construction, PB Network).
13th Australian Tunnelling Conference