Book Review: Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State by Mark R.

Beissinger

Summary of the Book

Mark R Beissinger’s book “Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State,” is
one of the few books that offer a holistic explanation of how, in the short span of a few years,
the collapse of the Soviet State went from “the impossible to the inevitable.” Beissinger
doesn’t just merely trace the growth of nationalism within the republics of the Soviet Union,
including Russia. He also evaluates more than six thousand public demonstrations from 1987
to 1991 through precise statistical analysis. He traces the growth, escalation and spread of the
process till the point that it became the hand that was guiding all political choices and
outcomes. He argues that the demise of the Soviet Union had never been inevitable, but the
manner in which events kept unfolding themselves within a rather short period of time forced
it to become so. By carefully reconstructing the state of affairs between 1989 and 1990, he
attempts to show how the state had been doomed much before the coup of August 1991.

Through his book, he challenges approaches that believe that the disintegration of the USSR
was completely predetermined. He also argues against the view that individual factors like
Gorbachev’s personality or Yeltsin’s policies and decisions could have played significant
roles in the collapse of the Soviet State, challenging the approach that the Soviet union would
have stayed the way it was had there been a stronger willingness to repress.

These common beliefs are challenged by Beissinger by means of a theoretical framework that
he spends the first few chapters developing. He puts forth a theory of nationalist mobilization
based on the principle of tidal forces or the idea of multiple waves of nationalism that
influence and affect each other. He believes that few key variables like structural facilitation,
institutional constraint and event-generated influences were characteristic of all nationalist
movements. With regard to the ‘tidal wave’ he then attempts to show which of the factors
played significant roles towards the early stages and which affected the same at a later stage.
Therefore, he shows how it is not possible for there to be a single definite path towards
nationalist mobilization. On the one hand there are early riser states that depend entirely upon
favourable structural conditions, and then there are late riser nations who make up for their
structural disadvantages by utilising event-generated influences. Therefore, he said that late
riser states utilise the success of other nations who were able to mobilize at the earlier stages.
Once events have been mobilized, they introduce contingencies and therefore develops the
potential to become a causal variable for other following actions. The clustering and linkage
of these events gain particular weight thereby altering expectations with regards to the
possibilities about future action. As a result, they go on to facilitate further agency, becoming
a part of their own causal framework.

Beissinger also maintains the dualism between agency and structure as an analytical
construct. If the actors are not made masters or puppets of their own destinies, sufficient
space can be created to explain through extremely detailed empirical evidence, when and
under what circumstances collective agency can initiate institutional and structural change.
The possibilities of different alternative outcomes therefore are not simply precluded from the
very beginning.

He notes that these become like waves primarily because all individuals reason by analysing.
Another reason for the same also lay in the fact that nationalist elites across various different
regions of the Soviet Union communicated with each other on a daily basis. Therefore, it’s
possible that these analogies that an individual might draw can easily get influenced by their
historical and cultural background or that communication amongst the nationalist leaders
across various regions get affected by personal networks and ethnic affinities. Beissinger tries
to address all of these problems and many other issues by means of case studies and process
tracing.

Beissinger develops a set of indicators, to predict the results of a nationalist mobilization and
the political struggle that is bound to result from it, from the data that he was able to collect
from fifteen Russian republics and a set of national minorities. The study focuses on the role
played by individual choices that are driven by complex influences in an abnormal political
period. The way things turned out is usually considered to be a result of how real people react
to real events occurring around them rather than as a result of a predetermined process of
nationalistic initiative.

Beissinger argues that institutional constraints greatly influence and affect the manner in
which individuals think about their own identities. When politics has been normalized, people
often find themselves trying to adjust to the boundaries of what is permitted and what is not.
If these boundaries get challenged, he said that the participants experienced a feeling of
‘rebirth’ (p. 153) as there is a transformation of their consciousness. The political regimes as
well as the nationalist mobilizers both compete to get the support of those who are less
committed or neutral. The process finally comes to an end, as it did with the disintegration of
the Soviet Union if these nationalist mobilizers succeed in spreading the nationalist message.

The failure of the Soviet State to adequately defend itself lay primarily in in the widespread
conception of how one must maintain order; here the boundaries of what was permissible did
not expand for the leadership. He documents how even the more order bound members of the
Politburo showed a great reluctance towards exercising state repressions. When they did
attempt to employ force, the use of the force backfired greatly leading to nationalist
mobilization and the subsequent disintegration of the state.

Critiques

According to Roger D. Peterson, Beissinger practiced a very data driven analysis studying
6000 protest events and more than 2000 violent events thus diluting the data; essentially
disregarding the importance that a singular event could have had in furthering the tidal wave
of systematic and sweeping forces that resulted in the fall of the Soviet Empire. A macro
level view of the unrest in Soviet Russia would distort the significance of individual events
that would have furthered the pace of the disintegration of the USSR. For example, the
incompetency shown by the administration to follow through on the January 1991 crackdown
in Lithuania furnished more information about the cause than a plethora of other events that
were comparatively insignificant.

The strongest critics of Beissinger would point to the fact that despite him laying a
foundation of interplay between agency and structure, he moves onto note that when tidal
forces operate, events move faster than the establishment of institutions thus drawing
criticisms from scholars stressing on the importance of both agency and institutional choice.
When events outpace institution development, the decision makers would be unable to
conceive and act on the on-going events, thus the wave would drive the outcome further
rather than the decision makers.1

Another critique by Paul Statham points out that the true shining light of the book is the
analytical and interpretative framework that Beissinger puts forward for explaining the
process of political change which puts this book as one of the primary research materials for
future theorists of Nationalism and Post- Soviet studies. With the subject of study condensed

1
Petersen, R. (2002). The Russian Review, 61(4), 657-658. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3664776
in a very small time period with a multitude of events occurring in a so called “wave of
nationalism”, Beissinger uses protest event analysis as the central plank of his study
focussing on social constraints, structural constraints and event analysis to explain the
eventual demise of the USSR.

Beissinger moves away from the traditional story telling approach often adopted by theorists
studying political and framework change instead focussing on how ideas can produce change
using a data driven approach to analyse changes in existing structural and institutional
frameworks. 2

Martha Meritt on the other hand argues that one of the primary criticisms levelled at
Beissinger is his apprehension to further delve into the works of other scholars, particularly
of David Laitin, Elie Kedourie, and Steven Solnick. Such an apprehension could arise from
the difference in findings between their works. Steven Solnick for instance was insistent in
his claim that government officials were using nationalism to further their own self-interests
or in his words “trying to steal the state”, however Beissinger’s work could offer a
contradictory view to Slonick, pointing towards escalating events that finally resulted in the
massive wave of nationalism that gripped USSR at that time. Laitin’s works on language
assimilation however was extremely supported with Beissinger providing additional subtlety
and context by referencing the difference in treatment of Belorussian and Ukrainian cases.
Ironically Beissinger quotes Kedourie’s wonderful prose despite not sharing his beliefs that
Nationalism is a disease.3

Finally, Taraz Kuzio believes that with the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 after bouts of
violence, Russia could not adopt a Chinese style approach of excessive violence and
coercion. Such an approach might have worked earlier during this time period prior to 1989
after which the political scenario had changed considerably with nationalism having seeped
even into local government institutions and even local law enforcement. Beissinger pointed to
two events of note where the use of violence backfired spectacularly for the communist party,
in Tbilisi in 1989 and Vilnius in 1992. Beissinger himself believed that the kind of violence

2
Statham, P. (2002). American Journal of Sociology, 108(2), 518-519. doi:10.1086/376333
3
Merritt, M. (2003). Perspectives on Politics, 1(2), 421-422. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688958
perpetrated by Stalin was absolutely unimaginable in today’s world and that kind of
repression was something that had since become impossible. 4

Beissinger was one of the first scholars to have referenced the link between liberal reform
and nationalism that eventually resulted in the first steps towards adoption of liberal policies
in Europe. Despite nationalism having negative connotations because of their strong links to
ethnic conflict and violence, it played a major role in the adoption of socialistic policies in
Europe and a new sense of national consciousness. Belarus is an appropriate example to
depict the correlation between national consciousness and democracy because nationalism
failed within this country in spite of having experienced the highest degree of Russianization.

The Russian movement primarily focused around Moscow and Leningrad never really
advocated secession. Kuzio goes on to mention that Beissinger absolutely neglected to
mention the fact that the only Soviet republic to not officially declare its independence was
the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (SFSR). Its independence day therefore fell
on the day that they declared their sovereignty in June 1990.

Kuzio also identifies two final problems – Beissinger claimed that the coup of August 1991
had been opposed by Leonid Kravchuk, a parliamentary leader. However, this had definitely
not been the case. Secondly, he also stated that nationalism took control of the state in
Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltic and in some Trans-Caucasian states. This was an incorrect
conclusion because unless one defined nationalists as the national Communists led by
Kravchuk, who had opposed the concept of independence from the very beginning until the
coup of August 1991.5

Robert Legvold like Peterson is of the opinion that while this book explains in great detail
how Russia’s political environment, agencies, institutions and events interacted to lead to the
creation of the tide movement, it fails to consider the wisdom and the mistakes committed by
the leaders themselves. While Beissinger makes it pretty obvious that the collapse of the
Soviet Union was unsalvageable during the period between 1989 and 1990, he fails to

4
Kuzio, T. (2003). The International History Review, 25(1), 234-235. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40110349
5
Kuzio, T. (2003). The International History Review, 25(1), 234-235. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40110349
consider what would have happened if attempts had been made to prevent the same a couple
of years earlier. 6

6
Legvold, R. (2002). Foreign Affairs, 81(6), 197-198. doi:10.2307/20033393
References

Beissinger, M. (2002). Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Legvold, R. (2002). Foreign Affairs, 81(6), 197-198. doi:10.2307/20033393

Merritt, M. (2003). Perspectives on Politics, 1(2), 421-422. Retrieved from

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688958

Statham, P. (2002). American Journal of Sociology, 108(2), 518-519. doi:10.1086/376333

Petersen, R. (2002). The Russian Review, 61(4), 657-658. Retrieved from

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3664776

Kuzio, T. (2003). The International History Review, 25(1), 234-235. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40110349