Math 1030 - Voting Theory Project

Group 3

Part I: ​-Andrea Horrocks

When it comes to voting, Iowa differs from the rest of the nation. Rather than
voters going to the polls to cast their votes, every election they prefer a “gathering of
neighbors” of sorts. Then, they gather and discuss candidates before casting their vote.
For the Republican Party, candidates cast their ballot and whomever gets the most first
place votes (the plurality method), is given a “delegate.”
For the Democratic Party, however, the process is similar to instant runoff voting.
First, a representative for each candidate gives a campaign pitch. Then, the people in
that particular caucus divide into separate sections of the room, with one section for the
undecided folks, and candidates with less than 15% are not deemed “viable,” and then
are dropped. The people supporting that candidate then go to their second choice or
join the undecided group. The candidate with the most votes after this process wins the
“delegate.”
Before 1907, both parties originally chose candidates through the Caucus
System, before switching to the Primary System we have today. In 1916, Iowa actually
held a primary, but returned to the caucuses due to high costs and low participation.

Why Iowa? ​-Joshua Bashford

The Iowa caucus is unique in many ways, but most importantly it is the first to
cast ballots before all other states. This means that Iowa can be a very good indicator to
whether or not a presidential candidate is going to make it in the later ballot voting. Only
about half of the Iowa caucus winners will move on to be nominated.
Part II:

I. How many people voted? ​-Meagan Angus

100 people
II. Who wins by Plurality method? ​-Joshua Bashford
By plurality method we can determine that based on the first votes, ​Donald Trump​ wins
by Plurality.
III. i. Suppose we use Instant Runoff Voting. Remove the candidate with the least
1st Choice votes and show the preference schedule ​-Andrea Horrocks
19 6 36 39

1st B B C T

2nd C B B C

3rd T T T B

You would remove Marco Rubio from the preference schedule.

IV. Remove the candidate with the least 1st Choice votes and show the preference
schedule. ​-Meagan Angus
19 6 36 39

1st C C C T

2nd T T T C

V. Who wins the Instant Runoff Voting? ​Trump​ ​-Devin Whitworth

VI. Calculate a Borda Count for each candidate. ​-Devin Whitworth

B: 205 C: 272
R: 306 T: 217

VII. Who wins the Borda Count? ​Marco Rubio​ -Devin Whitworth

VIII. How many points does each candidate get using Copeland’s Method?​ -Jacob
Miller
 Jeb Bush Ted Cruz Marco Rubio Donald Trump

1 2 3 0

IX. Who wins by Copeland’s Method? ​Marco Rubio​ ​-Jacob Miller

X. Is there a Condorcet Candidate? ​- Alex Scovel

When comparing all of the candidates, you get the comparison table:

B v. C 2:2 Tie

B v. R 1:3 Rubio

B v. T 3:1 Bush

C v. R 3:1 Rubio

C v. T 3:1 Cruz

R v. T 3:1 Rubio

From this table, you can determine that there is a Condorcet Candidate.
XI. If so, who is the Condorcet Candidate? - ​Alex Scovel
​Marco Rubio

Part III: ​-Amanda Walker

One thing that has become clear to us over the course of this module and this
project is that there is no such thing as a perfect voting method. Each system violates
some attribute of a fairness criterion, and therefore choosing the most fair system to
elect a candidate can depend on the size and diversity of the voting populace, the
number of candidates, the number of open positions or options, and other factors
unique to a given situation. Even if a particular method seems to suit a situation best, it
is likely that there will still be a group of people who feel disenfranchised by it.
In our models, the plurality method gives us Donald Trump as the victor. This
means that everyone who did not vote for him (61% percent of the total votes) would be
unhappy with the result. Plurality with instant runoff gives us Trump again, and this time
it is a better representation of our voters’ preference as a whole; however, we still end
up electing a candidate who was the least favorite choice of 61% of voters. Using the
Borda count method gives us Marco Rubio. There is an argument to be made that this
method is the best, or at least the most acceptable, when the voting base is large and/or
diverse, as it produces a result that is likely to make the most amount of people the
least unhappy. However, it does violate the Majority criterion. Using Copeland’s
method again gives us Rubio as the winner, and he is in this case the Condorcet
candidate, meaning he is preferred in every one to one comparison to other candidates.
With all the data gathered, our group has chosen Marco Rubio as the winner.
Both Trump and Rubio won two of the four election methods, but Rubio is the choice
that represents the highest number of voter’s preferences. Trump wins in the plurality
methods, but the fact remains that even though he received the highest number of first
place votes compared to other candidates, 61% of voters wanted someone else. This is
supported further when we look at the preference schedule and see that, of those who
did not vote for Trump, all 61 of them listed him as their least preferred candidate.
Rubio, on the other hand, has fairly broad support across the voting populace. He was
the first choice of only 6 candidates, but the second choice of 94 others. Again, ee is
also the Condorcet Candidate, which further supports him as a choice the fewest
number of voters would object to. For these reasons, we select Marco Rubio as the
winner of the election, on the basis that he represents the largest number of voters and
angers the fewest in several ways.