China Fill-In DA

1NCs
 1nc – China DA
a. Unique Link: China fills-in US arms reductions – that solidifies their regional
influence and undercuts US leadership.
Al Saud ‘18 (Latifa A. Al Saud; M.A. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Columbia
University, interned at the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations
where she was assigned to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly; “China’s Arms Sales
Philosophy in the Arab World”; 12/3/2018; Journal of International Affairs;
https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/chinas-arms-sales-philosophy-arab-world)//A.F. + BT

China’s role as an arms exporter to the Arab world is among the many uncertainties tainting Chinese foreign
policy, due to the secretive nature of arms deals. China is the world’s third largest exporter of arms, behind the United States
and Russia, representing around 6.2% of global trade for conventional major arms. In the Middle East, China currently ranks fifteenth on the
arms suppliers list, while the U.S. remains the largest provider. As
China continues to foster its approach of economic
diplomacy in the region, many states are becoming increasingly attracted to using China as a “Plan B” for arms
supply, filling in any blockage of arms sales from the US or Europe. Unlike the US and Russia, Chinese arms
deals have traditionally focused on commercial, rather than political purposes. Despite this, the growing influence of China
on the world stage begs the question as to what strategic role Chinese arms sales will play in one of the world’s most volatile regions. This
article analyzes China’s role as an arms exporter to the Arab world since the 1980s and argues that the Chinese approach to arms sales will
remain focused on commercial, rather than political reasons. These arms
sales have become an increasingly attractive
option to the states in the region, especially in times of need, and also represent Xi Jinping’s attempt at win-
win, cooperation-based approach to foreign policy. These sales will continue despite the slim chance that (and/or
perhaps unwillingness) by China to replace US arms sales in the region, given the former’s five-fold deficit in global annual sales
compared to the US and the more advanced military technology that the US offers. Despite the limited availability of precise numbers on
Chinese arms sales, scholars
and policymakers can look to official Chinese government documents that
illustrate its overall arms export strategy in the Middle East. These include the recent Arab Policy Paper, the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence (FPPC), and the official arms sales justifications and statements provided by the government. The Arab Policy Paper — the
first one ever to be released publicly by the government in 2016 — shows China’s new approach to Chinese-Arab relations and serves a basis to
understand its broader Middle East strategy. The
paper refers to the importance of pursuing a “new type of international
relations” in the Arab world that promotes “win-win cooperation and win-win strategy.” The document also lays out
the government’s vision to implement concrete steps to enhance Sino-Arab military cooperation and support the Arab states’
national defense and military forces. The FPPC is illustrative of China’s approach to military arms sales and President Xi Jinping’s pursuit of a
win-win foreign policy. The key principles outlined in the document, including mutual respect for sovereignty,
territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, peaceful co-existence, and benefits, speak directly to its
arms sales strategy. In 2016, in a speech to the Arab League in Cairo, Xi Jinping further reinforced the Chinese position, stating
that China will “build a cooperative partnership network for win-win outcomes. In 2014, after Saudi Arabia confirmed its purchase of DF-21
missiles from China, the Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson stated that China’s arms exports are based on three principles: “Strengthening
the defensive capabilities of the importers, not harming world or regional peace, security and stability, and not interfering in other states’
internal affairs.”[i] Upholding such principles are not only beneficial to China, but also attractive to the recipient states, which often adopt
similar rhetoric in foreign affairs. For example, Saudi and Emirati official statements have typically echoed the same principles to justify any
arms purchase, whether from the United States, Russia, China, or others. Based on this win-win outlook, China’s arms sales policy to Arab states
is conducted primarily for economic reasons. When mutually beneficial, dealing
with China may be an attractive
alternative that is perhaps less likely to involve political strings, complications, or potential repercussions that
typically accompany arms deals with the US. For example, U.S. arms sales and economic/military aid to Egypt is primarily
intended to exert influence on the Egyptian government to promote American priorities, including Egypt’s peace with
Israel. For the US, arms sales are in part an exercise of influence and reward to ensure loyalty, which can be
cut off or suspended, depending on the political dynamics and U.S. policy preference. Contrary to the U.S. approach,
Chinese arms sales are focused on “business only and business first.” China sees the Arab world and the Middle East as a whole as a new
market for its low-cost high-tech weapons and thus has an appetite to sell weapons to any state in the region, regardless of its policies. China
uses its role as a leading oil importer as leverage (for example, it threatened to decrease oil imports from Saudi Arabia over a price issue) and
has rarely used arms sales, or the threat to cut them off, as a political tool. For example, it sells weapons to both Saudi Arabia and Iran, who are
not on the same page when it comes to regional issues. There are, however, exceptions to this general rule, including China’s position against
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and current issues of national security that would naturally preclude it from arms sales (e.g., Taiwan). For
example, during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the U.S., Pakistan, and China sold arms including stingers and missiles to the Mujahedeen, who
were resisting Soviet influence. In 1975, after the Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia, China and the U.S. supplied arms to counter the
Soviet supported Vietnamese government. Compared to annual value of arms sales by the U.S., EU, and Russia, China’s operation in the Middle
East is small. The U.S. is the largest arms exporter to the Middle East and the world and will likely remain so due to its advanced technology,
hegemony of the international system, control over oil market and access, and strong ties with the Arab world, specifically the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC). Nearly half of U.S. arms exports go the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia ranking as the second largest importer of U.S. arms. China
is among the top arms exporters, but its main clients tend to be its surrounding neighbors such as Pakistan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh.
However, there has been a substantial increase in China’s military spending and arms industry and production, that may continue to spark
Chinese exports to the region. China’s arms exports increased by 74% year-over-year in 2012, as China sold $753 million in arms to the Middle
East, compared to U.S. sales of $28.5 billion. According to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Chinese
arms exports “nearly doubled over the past five years, and China’s arms imports decreased by 25 percent.” Continued technological
improvements along with successful cooperation between China and Gulf countries will promote increased arms sales in the region for decades
to come. Despite the slim chance that China threatens the United States’ status as the number one arms exporter in the region, Chinese “arms
sales will definitely surge in the years to come” due to high demand and spending by Arab states. According to SIPRI, Arab states such as Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have some of the fastest growing military budgets in the world. Over the past few years, Saudi
Arabia’s defense budget increased from $27.1 billion (2010) to $56 billion (2018), which represents 10% of its GDP. The UAE has a $22.8 billion
annual defense budget, representing 6% of its GDP. Recently, the UAE expressed interest in China’s Pterosaurs-1 UAV, which has the capability
to carry BA-7 and YZ-212 missiles, while Saudi Arabia purchased Chinese missiles and signed an agreement to build a manufacturing facility of
drones in the Kingdom. Another factor that may contribute to increased Chinese arms sales is U.S.
unwillingness to sell certain types of weaponry to certain countries in certain situations, often
depending on domestic political power and/or domestic pressure. For Arab states, China can serve as a “Plan B,”
something China can exploit to its own economic advantage. For example, China’s 1988 intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs) sale to Saudi Arabia resulted from U.S. unwillingness to do so because of Israeli opposition. This event, at least
within the GCC, set the precedent for Arab and specifically GCC states that China can play an increasingly important
role in filling a selective vacuum left by the US for arms sales in the region. In 2015, China sold armed drones
to the Kingdom after the Obama administration blocked drone sales because of the war in Yemen. The US has
sold its armed drones only to Italy and the United Kingdom, whereas China has sold them to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, and the UAE.
China has also sold weapons to non-U.S. allies, including Sudan, Syria, and Iran. China’s commercial motives do not
suggest a complete lack of interest in influencing the region and maintaining political stability. China is the world’s largest
oil importer of Saudi oil, and as such, stability in the Middle East is critical to China. Chinese arms sales to the region is arguably motivated
to maintain oil flows from friendly leaders from Arab oil exporting states and a necessary tool for China to foster and enhance
energy ties. It is no coincidence that the major oil exporting countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran, are all purchasing
weapons from China. The commercial nature of Chinese arms sales gives it short-term and long-term advantages. Commercially, arms sales
not only foster stronger economic ties with Arab states, to which China remains dependent on their oil exports, but also give
China a chance to ask for a decrease in the cost of importing energy from the region. China has the ability to use arms sales as
leverage to receive low oil prices and/or concessions, an important tool given its significant growth in oil demand and dependency
on imports. U.S. and Western policymakers and scholars view increased Chinese arms sales to the region as not merely
economically motivated, but also intended for China’s own power projection and mitigation of U.S. power in the
region. China often criticizes U.S. interference in Middle East affairs, including the strong presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf (and beyond). The
primary objectives for the US, from China’s view, are to maintain, control, and ensure access to energy resources in the region. Chinese
actions to cooperate with both U.S. and non-U.S. allies, like Iran and Syria, are intended to, at least in part, exert its own
influence. In 1991, the Chinese provided Iran with sophisticated dual use nuclear technology and natural uranium
under the umbrella of nuclear “cooperation.” This, among other factors, allowed China to build up its image as
an attractive and easy to deal with arms provider, serving an entry point to its long-term strategic presence without appearing
to have an interest in picking sides. Arms sales are part of China’s win-win cooperation and strategy-based foreign policy. Doing so is a
rather unconventional approach to international arms sales, as they have traditionally been used as a political tool, with the United States as
the top player. China’s approach can help its long-term strategic posture in the region by promoting stronger ties with the Arab states, ensuring
oil flows, and opening a door to economic expansion in the Middle East through investments and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). Although
there are no recent instances of China using arms sales to exert influence in the Middle East, this does not mean that the commercial nature of
Chinese arms sales is not also linked to national security interests. The Chinese government’s arms exports philosophy stems
from its interest to maintain strategic relations with the Arab states in order to best increase its prospects for securing its
business and energy interests in the region, regardless of the recipients’ country’s intensions. It can therefore be said that PRC
arms sales are exemplified in Xi Jinping’s overall win-win, cooperation-based foreign policy and can in turn have key implications to
understanding the global arms trade of this century.

b. Impact: Declining US leadership sends an international signal that guarantees

proliferation and war.
Mandelbaum 2019 - Christian A. Herter Professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Michael, "The New Containment," Feb 12, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-02-
12/new-containment

WILL AMERICA LEAD? The weakest link in the chain may be the most powerful country itself. There are
reasons to expect the American public to support a leading role in the containment of Russia, China, and Iran. The United
States has a long history with such a foreign policy. The approach has geopolitical logic behind it, promising to protect
American interests in crucial parts of the world at a reasonable price. But there are also reasons for skepticism.
Today’s threats appear less urgent, coping with them will be more complicated, and the country’s attitude toward foreign entanglements has
understandably soured over the last two decades. The United States was pulled into both world wars by external attacks, and Americans gave
their support to a foreign policy of global reach during the Cold War because they were persuaded it would head off yet another world war.
After the Soviet collapse, many of the Cold War arrangements persisted through inertia and gained support because they seemed to entail little
expense or risk. Now that the expenses and risks of such a policy have increased, many Americans may reconsider their support. The skepticism
has deepened because of the county’s recent misadventures abroad. The interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya turned out poorly, and
the public has little taste for more. This view has much to recommend it. But it need not threaten the prospects of a new containment, because
that course is quite different from the failed crusades of recent decades. Those involved efforts to transform the internal politics and
economies of weak states. Containment involves the opposite, checking the external conduct of strong states. If national leaders can appreciate
and explain the difference, they may be able to bring the public along. The resurgence of populism, finally, makes any such project more
difficult. The essence of populism is hostility to elites, and the design and conduct of foreign policy are elite activities. The foreign policy
establishment favors a robust American role in the world. That may be a good enough reason for antiestablishment rebels, including the
populist in chief now residing in the White House, to oppose one. So the future direction of American foreign policy is unclear.
Washington
might forgo leading coalitions to contain the three revisionist powers, in which case their strength will
increase. Emboldened by the American abdication, they may grow aggressive and try to coerce their
neighbors. Those neighbors currently rely on the American nuclear arsenal to protect them; if they come
to doubt the credibility of American security guarantees, they may follow Israel and opt to develop or
acquire their own arsenals in order to protect themselves. An American retreat would thus make the world
more dangerous and nuclear proliferation more likely. Thanks to the size, geography, and power of the United States, Americans
for many generations have been able to pay less attention to American foreign policy than have the citizens of other countries, whose lives and
fortunes that policy has more immediately and directly affected. Should
the country turn decisively away from its global
role and allow the revisionist challenges to advance unchecked, however, Americans’ happy detachment
from the world beyond their borders may disappear. And by the time they realize what they need to
protect, it may be too late to do so without great difficulty and high cost.
2NC
 2nc – Unique Link
The US is crowding out Chinese arm sales now, the plan reverses that – wrecks US
leadership & global stability.
Majumdar 2018 - defense editor for the National Interest
Dave, "The Trump Administration Has a Plan to Compete with Russia and China over Weapon Sales,"
Aug 9, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/trump-administration-has-plan-compete-russia-and-
china-over-weapon-sales-28327

The Trump Administration is

hoping to boost the export prospects for American weapons systems to allied
countries by modifying policies and streamlining the bureaucratic process. The Trump Administration
announced a revised conventional arms transfer policy in April, but that is just the first step. There are more
policy changes coming down the line. “The new policy reflects the priorities of the president’s National Security Strategy,” Ambassador Tina
Kaidanow, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, said on Aug. 8 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“Which are, namely, to preserve peace through strength by reforming regulations to facilitate the exports of U.S. military equipment; to
strengthen partners and allies; to facilitate U.S. economic security and innovation.” Under the new policy, the United States hopes to
make its export bureaucracy more proactive and cut red tape in the process. “These steps are among the first in
what we hope will be a series of efforts to streamline the arms transfer process,” Kaidanow said. “I can assure you that my colleagues and I at
the State Department, but also again more broadly in the USG, will continue exploring ways to cut red tape and give U.S. industry every
advantage in an increasingly competitive global marketplace, while continuing to ensure the responsible export of arms.” The
United
States is making these policy changes with great power competition with China and Russia in mind.
“We’re trying to improve our ability to compete with our adversaries by providing our partners with
viable alternatives to foreign products in order to maintain influence in key regions throughout the world,” Laura
Cressey, Deputy Director for Regional Security and Arms Transfers at U.S. Department of State, said. “We’re going to be working with our
partners and allies to identify critical capability requirements that they have and then trying to expedite transfers to support these essential
foreign policy and national security objectives.” However, writing the policy guidance is the easy part. Implementing the policy will be far more
challenging. “The release of the new policy was only the first step in a series of what we believe will be very practical results-focused initiatives
to transform the way that the U.S. government works to support and grow our defense industrial base,” Kaidanow said. “Through that
memorandum, the president also directed the secretary of state, in coordination with the secretaries of defense, commerce, and energy, to
submit an implementation plan within 60 days.” As part of the effort, the United States is looking at reforming export hurdles such as the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, which has been a vexing problem for the defense industry for decades. “We’ll look at streamlining the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, or ITAR, and also continuing to revise the U.S. Munitions List and the Commerce Control List,” Cressey
said. Additionally, the State Department and Defense Department will try to speed up the bureaucratic processes involved in weapons exports.
“We will also be looking at the day-to-day processes to ensure that we are as efficient, as streamlined, and as effective as possible,” Cressey
said. “So some of the things that we’re looking at, and that folks in industry and associations have asked us to look at, is: establishing
milestones and timelines for the foreign military sales process; improving and speeding up our contracting process – processes within the
Defense Department; trying to increase the competitiveness of U.S. defense items and systems by building in exportability to the design and
development; and also by expanding support for what we call non-program-of-record systems. We’re looking into potential financing options
that could make our systems more attainable for our foreign partners. And we’re also examining existing polices to ensure that they don’t
unnecessarily detract from our ability to compete in international – in the international marketplace.” Without
the changes, the
United States is increasingly in danger of losing its market share as China, in particular, increasing develops
and produces evermore-capable weapons for the export market. One example is the Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UAS) market, which the United States dominates, but which is also threatened by Chinese competition
and by Washington’s tight export regulations. “By removing some of the previous administration’s artificial barriers to the transfer of arms to
critical partners, the UAS export policy being one example, this
administration is both strengthening our hand in the
ongoing strategic competition while also stimulating economic growth at home, as well as job creation,”
Alex Gray, Special Assistant to the President for the Defense Industrial Base, said. “It should be noted that the U.S. aerospace and defense
industries contribute almost $1 trillion annually to the U.S. economy and they support about 2.5 million American jobs. Just as one point, the
international – UAS export market alone is estimated to be worth more than $50 billion a year within the next decade. Those are the stakes
we’re competing for.” Those nations that are unable to purchase American weapons could find that China or Russia are more than willing to
supply them with comparable systems. “We are witnessing China – as an example, not alone – but China filling voids the U.S. left
with a denial to a friend or ally,” Keith Webster, president of the Defense and Aerospace Export Council at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, said. “The consequence of a denial filled by China or others is as follows: The U.S. loses market share
that is not easily recaptured, and in some cases will never be recaptured. The U.S. loses control of the capability.
The U.S. loses the opportunity to train, influence, and maintain a military relationship with foreign
forces, who now are introducing into their inventory a Chinese – Korean, Israeli, et cetera – capability.”
 2nc – Impact
Hegemonic transitions escalates into a global conflict
Kroenig ’16 (Matthew; June 2016; Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International
Security at The Atlantic Council; National Bureau of Asian Research, No. 58 “Approaching Critical Mass:
Asia's Multipolar Nuclear Future,”
http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/sr58_approaching_critical_mass_june2016.pdf; RP)

The most important reason to be concerned about nuclear weapons in Asia, of course, is the threat that nuclear
weapons might be used. To be sure, the use of nuclear weapons remains remote, but the probability is not zero and the
consequences could be catastrophic . The subject, therefore, deserves careful scrutiny. Nuclear use would overturn a
70-year tradition of nonuse, could result in large-scale death and destruction, and might set a precedent that
shapes how nuclear weapons are viewed, proliferated, and postured decades hence. The dangers of escalation
may be magnified in a multipolar nuclear order in which small skirmishes present the potential to quickly draw
in multiple powers, each with a finger on the nuclear trigger. The following discussion will explore the logic of crisis
escalation and strategic stability in a multipolar nuclear order.14 First and foremost, the existence of multipolar nuclear powers
means that crises may pit multiple nuclear-armed states against one another. This may be the result of formal planning if a
state’s strategy calls for fighting multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously. A state may choose such a strategy if it
believes that a war with one of these states would inevitably mean war with both. Alternatively, in a war between state
A and state B, state A may decide to conduct a preventive strike on state C for fear that it would otherwise seek
to exploit the aftermath of the war between states A and B. Given U.S. nuclear strategy in the early Cold War, for
example, it is likely that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have also
resulted in U.S. nuclear attacks against China, even if China had not been a direct participant in the
precipitating dispute. In addition, conflicts of interest between nuclear powers may inadvertently impinge on the interests
of other nuclear-armed states, drawing them into conflict. There is always a danger that one nuclear
power could take action against a nuclear rival and that this action would unintentionally cross a red line for a
third nuclear power, triggering a tripartite nuclear crisis . Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper have dubbed this category of
phenomena the “security trilemma.”15 For example, if the United States were to engage in a show of force in an effort to
signal resolve to Russia, such as the flushing of nuclear submarines, this action could inadvertently trigger a crisis for
China. There is also the issue of “catalytic” war. This may be the first mechanism by which Cold War strategists
feared that multiple nuclear players could increase the motivations for a nuclear exchange. They worried that a
third nuclear power, such as China, might conduct a nuclear strike on one of the superpowers, leading the wounded
superpower to conclude wrongly that the other superpower was responsible and thereby retaliate against
an innocent state presumed to be the aggressor. This outcome was seen as potentially attractive to the third state as a way of destroying
the superpowers and promoting itself within the global power hierarchy. Fortunately, this scenario never came to pass during the Cold War.
With modern intelligence, reconnaissance, and early warning capabilities among the major powers, it is more difficult to imagine such a
scenario today, although this risk is still conceivable among less technologically developed states. In addition to
acting directly against one another, nuclear powers could be drawn into smaller conflicts between their allies
and brought face to face in peak crises. International relations theorists discuss the concept of “chain ganging” within
alliance relationships, the dangers of which are more severe when the possibility of nuclear escalation is
present.16 Although this was a potential problem even in a bipolar nuclear order, the more nuclear weapons states present,
the greater the likelihood of multiple nuclear powers entering a crisis. A similar logic suggests that the more
fingers on the nuclear trigger, the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will be used. Multipolar nuclear crises
are not without historical precedent .17 Several Cold War crises featured the Soviet Union against the United
States and its European nuclear-armed allies, Britain and later France. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War involved the United States, the
Soviet Union, and a nuclear-armed Israel. The United States has been an interested party in regional nuclear disputes, including the Sino-Soviet
border war of 1969 and several crises in the past two decades on the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, many of these crises stand out
as among the most dangerous of the nuclear era.
UNIQUENESS
 UQ – China Sales Down
China’s sales are low now, but new markets created by the plan help them take off
Bitzinger 2019 - Visiting Senior Fellow with the Military Transformations Program at the S Rajaratnam
School of International Studies
Richard A, "How China Weaponizes Overseas Arm Sales," Apr 16,
https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/opinion/how-china-weaponizes-overseas-arms-sales/

Weaponizing arms exports Admittedly, Chinaremains a smallish arms exporter, compared to the United States,
which dominates the global arms bazaar, typically capturing 35% to 40% of the market. Moreover, Beijing is still
overwhelmingly dependent on sales to just a few countries, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. It also still
relies on countries either too poor to buy Western armaments or who have been subjected to arms
embargoes. Few big-spending arms importers – such as the oil-rich Gulf states – have ever been interested in
Chinese arms (other than armed drones). Iran used to be a major consumer of Chinese arms, but it has not placed a new order with Beijing
in several years. Nevertheless, China’s growing, cumulative political, economic, and military rise is reshaping global as well as regional
geopolitics, including strategic alliances and balances of power – and arms exports are a critical ingredient in this remaking. While Chinese
arms exports may have had their beginnings in mostly economic rationales – such as profits and support for the
domestic arms industry – increasingly overseas arms sales are being used as a tool to advance Beijing’s
strategic interests. This is self-evident in the growing range of Chinese arms sales – especially to Africa and Latin America – and in
Beijing’s readiness to sell its most advanced weapons systems with no political strings attached and generally at prices below those of Western
competitors. As such, arms exports will also increasingly figure in the growing strategic competition with the
United States. The arms competition between these two countries – both in East Asia and increasingly globally as well – is synonymous
with their emerging great-power rivalry. In this regard, China has a growing capability to shape the direction and
character of this arms competition – not only through its military-technological development and diffusion of arms exports, but
more importantly, through its strategic choices that influence the contours of alliances and military
advantage in different geographic areas.

Chinese sales are low now – buyers prefer to buy American

SCMP 2018 - "How can China boost weapons exports in face of fierce competition, quality issues," Oct
31, News p. 4, ProQuest
The biennial Airshow China expo in Zhuhai, which starts tomorrow, will showcase many advanced, Chinese-made weapons to potential
customers in Asia and Africa. More than 900 Chinese weapons will be on display, according to the organiser of the six-day show, which will
feature more than 700 exhibitors from more than 42 countries and regions - with more than 400 exhibitors from China alone. Another
important factor is that major importers of arms lack the required political trust in China. But while
military experts say the quality
of cheaper Chinese weapons has improved, Chinese manufacturers are still struggling to build brands in
an international market dominated by competitors from the United States and Russia. At September's Africa
Aerospace and Defence air show in Pretoria, South Africa, Chinese -exhibitors struggled to find buyers even though Beijing tried hard to secure
sales of its Hongdu L-15 Falcon trainer and JF-17 fighter, Andrei Chang, the founder of military magazine Kanwa Asian -Defence, told the South
China Morning Post. He said Cameroon had -received four Harbin Z-9WE attack helicopters from China after Beijing offered a US$100 -million
loan last year, but one of them had crashed soon after being handed over. Cameroon
was still negotiating with China over
the incident and had no plans to buy any more Chinese weapons due to quality concerns, Chang said.
Professor Jonathan Holslag, head of research at the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, said financial problems were causing
many countries, -including South Africa, to be more hesitant and cautious when buying new arms. "There is also fierce competition and many
countries are willing to make offers at knockdown prices," Holslag said, adding that many of Beijing's previous clients harboured quality
concerns. "Military
sales come with important maintenance and training services and China still has a way
to go in this regard," he said. Chinese arms manufacturers may find it even more challenging to make sales
following the reported failure of Chinese-made -C-705 anti-ship missiles to hit their targets during an
Indonesian exercise in September that was watched by Indonesian President Joko Widodo. IHS Jane's reported that two -C-705 missiles failed
to hit their targets after being fired from two of the Indonesian navy's KCR-40-class missile attack craft during the large-scale Armada Jaya 2016
exercise in the Java Sea on September 14.
 AT: UQ overwhelms
Chinese sales haven’t gone to new markets, plan changes that
Béraud-Sudreau 2018 - Research Fellow for Defence Economics and Procurement at the IISS
Lucie and Meia Nouwens, "Are arms exports a tool of Chinese foreign policy?," Jul 7,
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/07/07/are-arms-exports-a-tool-of-chinese-foreign-policy/

The reform of China’s defence industry is far from complete, and the industry still faces obstacles
including the dominance of state-owned enterprise monopolies and a lack of clear legislative and
regulatory frameworks for civil–military integration. But overall, Beijing’s reform efforts have not gone without effect. A number of
Chinese firms are leading the development and export of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In 2017, the China
Electronics Technology Group Corporation and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation worked with a commercial fixed-wing
drone model by Skywalker Technology to launch in the world’s largest fixed-wing drone swarm. By 2018, China had exported heavy and armed
UAVs to more than 10 countries worldwide. The
modernisation of the Chinese defence industry, in combination with
competitive pricing, has enabled China to become a major arms exporter and not be dependent on imports.
While the volume of Chinese arms exports grew by 275 per cent between 2000 and 2017, its arms imports decreased by 56 per cent, according
to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Over the past ten years, China accounted for 5.2 per cent of total arms trade, behind
the United States (32.4 per cent), Russia (23.7 per cent), Germany (6.6 per cent) and France (6.2 per cent). But the
geographical
distribution of Chinese arms sales has not varied significantly over time. China still mainly sells to its
traditional customers Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh, which account for 63 per cent of its total
exports over the past five years. The only region to which there has been a visible increase in Chinese arms exports is Latin America,
from 0 per cent in the early 2000s to 5 per cent by 2017. This includes arms transfers to Bolivia and Venezuela in particular.
LINKS
 Yes Fill-In
China fill in only if America withdraws – status quo policies check
Caverley ’18 (Jonathan D. Caverley is Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College
and Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The views expressed are his own and do
not reflect the official policy or position of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the
Department of Defense, or any other branch or agency of the U.S. Government.
https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/

Keep China Down, Russia Out, and Friendly States In A smart arms
transfer policy would strangle both Russia, the
number two exporter, and China, which is trying to take its place. Russia in particular needs arms
exports to fund its aggressive but underfunded military modernization plans (not to mention hard
currency for its weak economy). It is in America’s interests to choke off as large a percentage of the
Russian export market as possible in favor of the products of more closely aligned countries. In terms of both
American influence and curbing proliferation, it is better for countries like Malaysia and Indonesia to buy German or South Korean submarines
than Russian. This will have the added benefit of diminishing the quality and, eventually, raising the price of the products Russia will export to
states, such as Syria, that cannot buy arms from anywhere else. In the spirit of bolstering potential partners and limiting the reach of Russian
weapons, the United States can directly compete against Russia in one important market. India accounts for a stunning 39 percent of Russia’s
recent arms exports (SIPRI). Indian orders might be big enough to provide some meaningful economic benefits to the United States, but more
importantly, U.S. sales would cut into Russia’s market share. Tying India and the United States closer, even if it means allowing most
production, jobs, and even some technology transfer to go abroad, should be a central goal of U.S. arms transfer policy. Lockheed Martin’s offer
to transfer the F-16 production line to India appears a step in this direction. America should accept that Saudi Arabia is going to buy a lot of U.S.
weapons, but avoid coddling the Kingdom. Saudi
Arabia (and its Gulf State allies) will remain an important customer
largely because the country is desperate to keep the United States involved in the region. The Saudi
military is almost entirely American equipped and trained and most of its military capability requires
continued American support to function for more than a couple of days. A few additional jobs may result from
selling more arms to the Kingdom, but this may not justify giving up the leverage over Saudi and its allies’ policies towards Yemen, Syria, and
Qatar that do not necessarily advance American interests. The United States should encourage, but steer, Europe. Since the Cold War the
United States has used its economic and political clout to systematically inhibit an independent European defense production capability. This
has certainly increased U.S. market share, but continued efforts come at the expense of more important political goals. It would be much easier
to ask NATO allies to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense if more of this money would go into indigenous industries. The United States
should recognize that European global competitiveness in the arms trade can serve American interests (and perhaps provide competition for its
own sheltered defense industry). This will relieve pressure on Europe to export to countries embargoed by the United States, which
undermines the influence of U.S. arms transfer policy. When the United States placed real restrictions on arms transfers to Egypt’s al-Sisi
regime, other states quickly attempted to fill this gap. As one French policymaker cynically noted, “Obama was the [French fighter jet] Rafale’s
best salesperson.” Overall, from 2012-2015 the export agreements of major European sellers to Egypt have gone up forty-seven-foldover the
previous four-year period. That said, Europe has by and large cooperated with successful arms embargoes against Russia and China (although
Europe does sell nearly $400 million of dual use equipment to China each year). Maintaining and even tightening these key sanctions must be
the highest priority of any defense cooperation policy with Europe. More broadly, fixation on “buying American” misses tremendous
opportunities for leading coordinated action with like-minded states in Europe and elsewhere. This is feasible given that the United States,
NATO members, South Korea, Israel, and a few other allies account for a whopping 62 percent of total global arms exports (SIPRI). To this end,
the United States should liberalize its own market. Much as when “foreign” automotive firms build their cars in the United States, acquiring
products from abroad may create more jobs than selling weapons internationally. The U.S. Air Force’s current $16 billion fighter-trainer
contract has been largely narrowed down to three candidates with foreign connections: a Lockheed Martin-Korea Aerospace Industries version
of Korea’s T-50; a new design from a Boeing-Saab team; and an entirely foreign offering from Leonardo. Winning such a contract will give one
of three like-minded states (South Korea, Sweden, or Italy, respectively) a boost in other international competitions against less scrupulous
dealers. And the United States can still shape these exports for its political interests, such as when it recently vetoed the T-50’s export to
Uzbekistan. America is Like No Other Arms Exporter and Should Act Like It The
United States — by dint of its huge military
budget, massive defense R&D, and long dominance of the global arms market — can use arms transfers
in ways beyond the dreams of its competitors. Indeed, many competitors recognize this, albeit grudgingly. I have interviewed
officials in multiple countries (both clients and competitors of the United States) claiming they will defer to U.S. wishes on arms exports if they
trust it is done for political rather than economic reasons. Many of America’s closest allies, who are also arms export competitors, look to the
United States for leadership on controversial importers such as Saudi Arabia. And, the Trump administration should be given due credit for
exercising discretion, given, for instance, its recent unilateral embargo on arms transfer to South Sudan. In fact, one administration official
stated flatly that sales “will not come at the expense of human rights.” In no small part, U.S.
domination of the global arms
trade is based on the world’s belief that the United States uses its clout to advance its political ends,
not economic gain. Destroying this reputation will do little to bring jobs to the United States, while
doing much to damage American influence abroad.

Chinese Fill-in true – they have incentive to disrupt US heg

Watson ’13 (Cynthia Watson was the Former Dean Social Sciences at Loyola University Chicago.
"China's use of the military instrument in Latin America: not yet the biggest stick." Journal of
International Affairs 66. 2. (2013): http://www.thefreelibrary.com
/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=330143510. Online. JMR)

PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy

China's defensive concerns have traditionally been continental in nature; thus, the ground forces of the PLA have
been the predominant service, while the navy or maritime concerns have been far more limited. In building a navy that is only gradually
beginning to deploy out of Asian waters, China
is developing a mechanism with which it can engage others in their
own territory. The U.S. and British navies have been global in their deployments for decades, while China has traditionally been limited to
its peripheral seas. Today, the PLAN is using Latin America as one of several experimental destinations,
where it can benefit from showing its flag while also making connections with local navies. The point of
the liaisons with Latin American navies is not merely to better relations, but to learn how to operate
successfully with navies, which operate with the U.S. Navy, and thus slowly learn more about how the
latter engages around the world. This slowly deepening confidence, cultivated over the gradual repetition of brief visits,
allows China to expand its knowledge of the U.S. military and how it interacts with partners. This is an indirect manner
of learning something of great interest to China as the PLAN also watches the United States interact with several maritime allies in the Asia-
Pacific region. This enhanced information also accompanies opportunities for the PLAN to improve its own
operational skills in deployment, similar to the experience its sailors are gaining from repeated deployments into the Gulf of Aden
for counter-piracy operations. Similarly, the deployment of Peace Ark to Latin America in September 2011 was a
classic example of using a military instrument in a nonmilitary manner. This vessel illustrates the
fundamental reassessment that the Chinese leadership has taken regarding its role around the world as
well as the selection of tools with which to interact with others. The role of any hospital ship is not only to show the flag, thus making presence
in a foreign land clear, but also to provide humanitarian assistance to places where conditions welcome outside care, which may not arrive in
any other form. In the 2011 Peace Ark voyage, the Chinese medical team offered care to those in need in Jamaica, Cuba, and Trinidad and
Tobago, as well as China's relatively new diplomatic partner, Costa Rica. (15) Since the
U.S. Navy has been the traditional
military power providing humanitarian relief in the Western Hemisphere, the Peace Ark was a deliberate message
from the Chinese to demonstrate improved capability. Beijing has learned its lesson from its notable absence from the 2004 tsunami relief
efforts in the Indian Ocean--a region some called China's backyard when the tragedy occurred. Peace Ark also signaled China's willingness to
operate in a region traditionally unwelcome to outsiders because of the Monroe Doctrine's unilateral nature. Although Chinese
arms
sales to Latin America have been relatively small, such sales are increasing. Latin American armed forces still prefer purchasing
their arms from the United States, but the staggering expense of many U.S. arms packages makes that prohibitive for the less wealthy Latin
militaries. Europe and Brazil remain at least as appealing as China as sources of arms. The focus of Beijing's arms sales to Latin American
governments has been on smaller amounts and less lethal items, such as uniforms, transports, or small arms. (16) As
China's arms
exports diversify and expand, and as U.S. systems become ever more expensive, it is likely that China's
share of sales will increase as the U.S. share decreases. The fiscal options available to militaries in the
region, along with their growing responsibilities to address transnational organized crime, may in any event force Latin
American militaries to focus on lower-tier weaponry. If China's arms sales move up the scale in cost, this
would make Latin America continue to go elsewhere for its weaponry.
China competes directly with the US for access to the arms export market – any US
arms reduction is filled-in with Chinese arms – key to China’s rising political, economic,
and military rise and international influence
Bitzinger ’19 (Richard A Bitzinger is a Visiting Senior Fellow with the Military Transformations Program
at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, “How
China weaponizes overseas arms sales”, April 16, 2019,
https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/opinion/how-china-weaponizes-overseas-arms-sales/ CS)

Now, as a paper I co-authored with Michael Raska (a colleague at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore) points out,
Chinese arms exports are increasingly being employed as an explicit tool of international relations. In
particular, overseas arms sales are being weaponized in the growing strategic competition with the
United States.Since the turn of the century, China’s defense industry has modernized to the extent that it is now
able to offer an impressive array of armaments, including fourth-generation fighter jets, trainer jets, antiship cruise missiles,
man-portable SAM systems, self-propelled and towed artillery, armored vehicles, multiple rocket launchers, large surface combatants, and
submarines. Many
of these weapons systems are competitive with their Western counterparts. Of special note,
China has quite recently but also quite significantly become a key exporter of armed drones or
unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). According to Chinese sources, Beijing sold more than US$700 million worth of UCAVs
to militaries in Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). Moreover, Chinese drones have been “bloodied in battle,” greatly boosting their reputation. The
UAE and Iraq have used Chinese drones to attack terrorist sites, while Nigeria has employed Chinese UCAVs against the Boko Haram Islamic
extremist group. Admittedly, China remains a smallish arms exporter, compared to the United States, which dominates the global arms bazaar,
typically capturing 35% to 40% of the market. Moreover, Beijing is still overwhelmingly dependent on sales to just a few
countries, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. It also still relies on countries either too poor to buy Western armaments or
who have been subjected to arms embargoes. Few big-spending arms importers – such as the oil-rich
Gulf states – have ever been interested in Chinese arms (other than armed drones). Iran used to be a major consumer of
Chinese arms, but it has not placed a new order with Beijing in several years. Nevertheless, China’s growing, cumulative political,
economic, and military rise is reshaping global as well as regional geopolitics, including strategic
alliances and balances of power – and arms exports are a critical ingredient in this remaking. While Chinese
arms exports may have had their beginnings in mostly economic rationales – such as profits and support for the domestic arms industry –
increasingly overseas arms sales are being used as a tool to advance Beijing’s strategic interests. This is self-
evident in the growing range of Chinese arms sales – especially to Africa and Latin America – and in Beijing’s readiness to sell its most
advanced weapons systems with no political strings attached and generally at prices below those of
Western competitors. As such, arms exports will also increasingly figure in the growing strategic
competition with the United States. The arms competition between these two countries – both in East Asia and increasingly
globally as well – is synonymous with their emerging great-power rivalry. In this regard, China has a growing capability to shape
the direction and character of this arms competition – not only through its military-technological development and diffusion
of arms exports, but more importantly, through its strategic choices that influence the contours of alliances and military advantage in
different geographic areas.

China fills in – economic incentives

Bowler ’18 (Tim Bowler is a reporter and business analysist for the BBC news. BBC is the British
Broadcasting Company. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43873518) //A.F.

Brutal civil wars in Syria and Yemen, coupled with the return of great
power rivalries between the US, Russia and China,
have brought the world's arms trade into sharp focus. And unsurprisingly it is a thriving global industry,
with the total international trade in arms now worth about $100bn (£74bn) per year, Pieter Wezeman, senior
researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri), tells the BBC. In its latest figures, the defence industry think tank
says that major weapons sales in the five years to 2017 were 10% higher than in 2008-12. And it is the United States that is extending its lead as
the globe's number one arms exporter, adds Sipri. It estimates that the US now accounts for 34% of all global arms sales, up from 30% five years
ago, and are now at their highest level since the late 1990s.is now the world's top importer of US arms "The US has been open to supplying
arms to a large variety of recipients, and there are a large number of countries ready to acquire weapons from the US," says Mr Wezeman. The
US's arms exports are 58% higher than those of Russia, the world's second-largest exporter. And while US arms exports grew by 25% in 2013-17
compared with 2008-12, Russia's exports fell by 7.1% over the same period. It is Middle East states that have been among the US's biggest
customers - Saudi Arabia tops the list - with the region as a whole accounting for almost half of US arms exports during 2013-17. This comes as
arms imports to the region have doubled over the past 10 years, driven by widespread conflicts across the area - most notably the civil wars in
Syria and in Yemen, which the UN has called the world's worst man-made humanitarian disaster.of Yemen's population are in need of
humanitarian assistance Since Yemen's civil war started in 2015, Saudi Arabia and eight other Arab states have carried out an air campaign in
support of forces loyal to President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. These are fighting Houthi rebels said to be backed militarily by Iran. The UN says
that as of last November, at least 5,295 civilians had been killed and 8,873 wounded, although the actual figures are likely to be much higher.
The bitter conflict in Yemen has brought the ethical issues of international arms sales into sharp relief in many western countries, which have
seen Saudi Arabia and its allies use their advanced weapons systems in the country. "Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates were
major arms importers anyway," says Sipri's Pieter Wezeman. "The major difference is that now they are using these weapons - in Yemen."
Arabia and eight other Arab states are carrying out air strikes to restore President Hadi's government The UN says that Saudi-led coalition
airstrikes continue to be the leading cause of child casualties as well as overall civilian casualties. Meanwhile, rebel forces have fired artillery
indiscriminately into cities such as Taizz and Aden, killing civilians, and also fired rockets into southern Saudi Arabia. "There is a clear risk that
arms sales contribute to human rights violations," says Oliver Feeley-Sprague, arms trade expert at Amnesty International. "There are clear
violations being committed by all sides. But in general, the more weapons get supplied, the more they risk being used." The scale of the war in
Yemen has led some countries to act: Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany among others, have all recently restricted arms sales to
the region. Across in China, its economic rise has been mirrored by a growing defence budget and its increasing importance as a global arms
supplier. The country is now the world's fifth largest seller of arms. This puts it behind the US, Russia, France, and Germany, but ahead of the
UK. fifth-largest weapons exporter China's
arms exports rose by 38% between 2008-12 and 2013-17, and the
country now has the world's second-largest defence budget after the US - $150bn compared to the latter's
$602bn in 2017. As China spends more on its defence industries, it means that it is it is also increasingly
challenging the West when it comes to the technological sophistication of its weapons systems, says Meia
Nouwens, research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). "There should be no doubt that the PLA [People's Liberation
Army] today is no longer far behind the West when it comes to certain areas of defence technology," she says. "The West's superiority in the air
is under growing threat. "China may not yet be able to produce high-performance military jet engines, but with the rate they are innovating
they are not light-years away from being able to do it." , the Liaoning: China is said to be planning to have four carrier battle groups China's
increased military spending comes as it is moving from being a land-based military to becoming a naval-based power - and has poured huge
sums into its growing navy. Since 2000 it has built more warships than Japan, South Korea and India combined - the total tonnage of new
warships and auxiliaries launched in the last four years is greater than that of the French navy. Other countries across, such as Japan and India
have responded by spending more on naval power. latest helicopter carrier Izumo, though officially a "destroyer", is its biggest warship since
World War Two "China
has grown at a staggering rate, economically, and is seeking to transform that into a
military power that is consistent with a regional hegemonic position," says Veerle Nouwens, research
analyst at Royal United Services Institute (Rusi). Part of this strategy includes China's efforts to export its
arms. It sold weapons to 48 countries during 2013-17, with Pakistan being its top customer, and it is making inroads into
some of Russia's traditional export markets. its defence imports rose 24% between 2008-12 and 2013-17 and is building six of these French-
Spanish designed submarines "They are both selling to similar customers - countries that the west won't sell arms to - like Iran, Venezuela,
Sudan and Zimbabwe," says Dr Lucie Beraud-Sudreau of the IISS. In a world where arms sales are rising, the major exception to this seems to
have been Africa. Between 2008-12 and 2013-17 arms imports by African countries fell by 22%. Yet crucially, the figures here do not tell the
whole story. Internationally, arms sales are measured by the total value of the contract - but this downplays the
significance of small arms and light weapons to continuing conflicts in Africa, most notably South Sudan's civil war.
"We are not seeing significant reductions in the fighting in South Sudan, and this is clearly being fuelled by significant purchases of
small arms and light weapons," says Amnesty International's Oliver Feeley-Sprague. "For instance, three shiploads of
machine guns, which would make a huge difference to armed groups on the ground, yet would not even
show up in the statistics." In 2014 the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) came into force, with the aim of regulating the international trade in
conventional weapons. It requires states to monitor arms exports, and ensure that their weapons sale don't break existing arms embargoes, or
end up being used for human-rights abuses, including terrorism. Yet so far its impact has been limited, say critics. "We are disappointed by the
way a number of states have decided to implement it, says Amnesty's Oliver Feeley-Sprague. "We think the UK, US and France among others,
by continuing to sell arms to Saudi Arabia and its allies in the coalition operation in Yemen, are clearly violating the ATT's provisions." of South
Sudan's population has been displaced by the conflict, which broke out in December 2013 Last July, the UK's High Court ruled that the UK
government's arms sales to Saudi Arabia are lawful. However, the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) has been given permission to
appeal against this ruling, and the case will now go to the Court of Appeal. The UK government says it has "one of the most robust export
control regimes in the world". The ATT may have had a bigger impact on curbing the flow of weapons to non-state actors, says Sipri's Pieter
Wezeman - but so far it has not had any visible impact on the overall trade in arms.
 L – Africa
China will fill any vacuum to expand their military influence over Africa
Tian 2018 - Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure Programme
Nan, "China’s Arms Trade: A Rival for Global Influence?," Sep 17,
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/09/17/chinas_arms_trade_a_rival_for_global_influen
ce__113806.html
Against the backdrop of the recent China-Africa Defence and Security Forum, numerous articles have been written questioning the rationale
behind the conference and the potential ramifications of a closer Sino-African relationship. Prime among those is the link between growing
Chinese arms exports to the region and a way of securing greater geopolitical influence. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced
in 2013, is one significant example where the economic expansion via the land (belt) and sea (silk road) has challenged the strategic interests of
many states. Couple
this with China’s growing arms industry and arms exports, the question of vital
importance is whether weapon sales have become a new foreign policy tool for China in Africa.
Development of the Chinese arms industry has enabled it to become a major arms exporter (number five in
the world) in recent years. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017, the 38%
increase in total arms exports was second only to Israel. In this time Chinese export to Africa rose by 55%, and its share of total African arms
imports increased from 8.4 to 17%. Although
Russia remains the largest supplier of major weapons to Africa (39% of
the region’s imports), some
see the rise of Chinese arms exports to the region as having a threefold rationale:
Beijing’s push to become a major arms producer. Compete against Russia to capture this growing arms market. A
foreign policy tool to gain regional influence for future economic and political interests. Although the total
volume of major arms flow from China to Africa is less than half of Russia’s, it sells to far more African countries than Russia. Between 2013–17,
Russia sold major arms to 14 Africa countries, compared to the 23 of China. This “blanket” style of selling does not typically fit with the notion
of linking targeted arms sales with foreign policy objectives. The diversity in the types of weapons and of arms recipients (e.g., from Algeria to
South Africa and Kenya to Cote d'Ivoire) suggests a more demand and supply relationship.
As China continues to develop its
arms industry, any international buyer will help expand its network, offer important developmental
feedback, and improve weapon quality and company profitability. The fall in export of Russian made weapons to Africa
corresponded with the rise in Chinese exports, potentially due to the availability of more cost-effective options. This is especially the case in
Algeria, where import of major Chinese arms increased by 46-fold between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017, while the transfer of Russian weapons
fell by 35%. Yet in-depth analysis into Chinese arms exports to Africa shows Algeria as an outlier that is biasing the recent trends. Of all major
weapons exported from China to Africa between 2013 and 2017, 46% went to Algeria, prime among them are three heavy corvettes delivered
in 2015 and 2016. Remove Algeria and major arms exports to Africa decreased by 12% between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017. Other major African
buyers of Chinese weapons are Morocco and Nigeria. It seems that suggestions linking China’s BRI project, its military base in Djibouti, and
increased military engagement in the related countries are not founded on arms transfers evidence. The main focus on of Chinese arms exports
remains to its close neighbours. Since 2008, Pakistan (40%) and Bangladesh (13%) together account for over half of all China’s major weapons
exports. Add in Myanmar, and it’s a picture where China usually sells weapons to countries that the West (the US and Western Europe) does
not. Such sales are partly due to less stringent human rights conditions linked to arms sales and more affordable weapons, but also recognising
the gaps left by the US and thus securing greater geopolitical influence as part of its foreign policy. Comparing the types of weapons sold to
African and Asia countries reinforces the argument further. Large ticket items exported to Bangladesh and Pakistan include frigates, corvettes,
submarines, and air defence systems. In addition to the transfer of the weapon, such transactions (sales and military aid) include training,
maintenance, and exchange of information on the capability of the weapons. All of which enhances country relationships and boosts future
collaborations. In contrast, weapons exports to Africa are mostly of lower value in the form of armoured personnel carriers (APCs), light training
aircraft, battle tanks and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These are akin to one-time transactions, with limited commitments to training or
maintenance. While the ability to buy expensive high-tech weapons is lower in African countries compared to neighbours close to China, China
has looked to challenge US influence in Asia with more intimate (military and economic) relations with the likes of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The
same is not evident in Africa. It has been common knowledge that China has historically linked arms sales to close neighbours with foreign
policy considerations, extending this to African countries is far less straightforward. Although this does not mean China has no future ambitions
to use arms exports as a foreign policy tool, evidence from arms exports over the past ten years presents a far less compelling case in the
present. Instead, China’s interests in Africa seem to remain mainly economic (e.g., Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) focusing on trade (China
is Africa’s largest trading partner) and investment deals with arms sale transactions in a demand and supply basis. However, looking
into
the future and to China’s growing geopolitical ambitions, the defence and security forum might become
the launch pad for China to increase its military influence in Africa and a perfect platform to integrate its
economic partnerships with a military twist.
Generic Africa link
CSIS 18 (Center for Strategic and International Studies; Founded by Georgetown University in 1962,
ranked the number one think tank in the world; “How dominant is China in the global arms trade?”;
5/29/2018; CSIS; https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/)//Garfield-Ben

For most of the 1980s and 1990s, weapons sales to Africa represented less than 15 percent of its total
arms exports. As China has worked to expand its foothold in the region, this number has grown. Since
2008, countries in Africa collectively purchased around 21 percent ($3 billion since 2008) of China’s
overall arms exports. Northern African countries are the primary destination of Chinese weapons,
constituting 42 percent of Chinese exports to the continent. An additional 29 percent flows into to
Eastern Africa, and the remaining 29 percent are divided between other African states. This relatively
wide market distribution is somewhat unusual for major arms traders. Of the $4.9 billion of US arms
exported to Africa over the last decade, roughly 87 percent were purchased by Egypt and Morocco.
Similarly, Algeria and Egypt accounted for 84 percent of Russian arms transfers in Africa over the same
period. In terms of trade value, Russia leads the pack at $12.4 billion in sales since 2008. The US tallied
less than half of that at $4.9 billion, while China sold around $3 billion.
 L – Algeria
Algeria link
CSIS 18 (Center for Strategic and International Studies; Founded by Georgetown University in 1962,
ranked the number one think tank in the world; “How dominant is China in the global arms trade?”;
5/29/2018; CSIS; https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/)//Garfield-Ben

For most of the 1980s and 1990s, weapons sales to Africa represented less than 15 percent of its total arms
exports. As China has worked to expand its foothold in the region, this number has grown. Since 2008, countries in Africa
collectively purchased around 21 percent ($3 billion since 2008) of China’s overall arms exports. Northern African countries are the
primary destination of Chinese weapons, constituting 42 percent of Chinese exports to the continent. An additional 29 percent
flows into to Eastern Africa, and the remaining 29 percent are divided between other African states. This relatively wide market distribution is
somewhat unusual for major arms traders. Of the $4.9 billion of US arms exported to Africa over the last decade, roughly 87 percent were
purchased by Egypt and Morocco. Similarly, Algeria and Egypt accounted for 84 percent of Russian arms transfers in Africa over the same
period. In terms of trade value, Russia leads the pack at $12.4 billion in sales since 2008. The US tallied less than half of that at $4.9
billion, while China sold around $3 billion. That said, Chinese weaponry is becoming increasingly attractive due in part to its
cost-effectiveness. Although Chinese arms are often less advanced than those sold by other countries, the DOD notes that “Chinese arms are
less expensive than those offered by the top international arms suppliers… [but still] have advanced capabilities.” For example, the
low-
cost K-8 jet trainer is estimated to make up 80 percent of all jet trainer aircraft in Africa. China is actively
working to strengthen its foothold in certain markets, such as Algeria. China’s exports to the North
African country totaled $483 million between 2008 and 2014, but jumped to $247 million in 2015 alone and peaked at
$499 million in 2016 as several weapon orders were fulfilled. These procurements included three C-28A frigates,
which were ordered by Algeria in 2012. Although not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, a non-proliferation
agreement targeted at missiles and systems capable of delivery weapons of mass destruction, Beijing is generally compliant with international
protocols. The 2002 Regulations on the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, for instance, outlines measures
to safeguard against proliferation. In June 2017, China published a draft of the Export Control Law, which if enacted will update existing
legislation and establish a comprehensive export control regime.
 L – Central Asia
China wants to expand into Central Asia – Nationalism, geopolitical influence, national
security, competition with Russia
Blank 17 (Stephen Blank; Professor of Russian National Security Studies and Professor of National
Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC); “New signs
of Chinese military interest in Central Asia”; 1/16/2017; The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst;
http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13421-new-signs-of-chinese-military-
interest-in-central-asia.html)//Garfield-Ben

How can we explain China’s moves and their implications? Four motives, in particular, to China’s recent military moves appear
to stand out. First, the continuing rise of Chinese power in general, and in particular the aggressively nationalist foreign policy
program of Xi Jinping’s government, underlies all of China’s activities. Second, one of the grandest designs of that policy is China’s
Go West policy. Expressed in the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) policy, now renamed the Belt Road Initiative, China has undertaken a
vast economic-political project to bind Central and South Asia, including Pakistan, to its geopolitical agenda. Because
China is investing hundreds of billions of dollars in the area, it is increasingly concerned about the safety of
its investments and geostrategic influence in Central Asia. Analysts tend to agree that these two motives are involved in shaping
Chinese policy calculations about Central Asia. Yet beyond advancing Chinese power and protecting foreign investments, at least two additional
factors are evidently at play. At home, the Chinese government remains concerned over the
continuing signs of unrest in
Xinjiang among the Uyghur population. Coinciding with the exercises in Tajikistan, Beijing has ordered all
residents of Xinjiang to surrender their passports in order “to maintain social order” and prevent people, especially young
men, from moving abroad to participate in terrorist movements like ISIS or the Taliban. This move effectively makes Xinjiang residents serfs
who are bound to the land, and bespeaks the regime’s ongoing failure to deal with its own domestic Muslim issues. It is therefore natural that
the regime resorts to ever more repressive means to prevent the insurgency in Xinjiang from further linking up with the enduring violence in
Afghanistan and Syria, which has previously seen participation of Uyghurs. The second motive may be China’s concerns about
Afghanistan and even Russia’s role there. Recent accounts in the U.S. press show that the Afghan government has made little or no
progress in reestablishing control by its own means over the country and that the Taliban is probably advancing, not retreating. Second,
on December 2, General John Nicholson, the Commander of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, publicly accused Pakistan
of supporting the Taliban; and Russia and Iran of legitimizing the movement. In particular, he accused Moscow of
competing with NATO in Afghanistan. Russia has already admitted publicly its intelligence exchanges with the Taliban, suggesting that
Russia on the one hand is pledging its support to NATO and Central Asian states against Taliban-inspired terrorism, and on the other supporting
the Taliban against allied interests. Analysts and officials in Beijing, who no doubt are seeing the same evidence, must then question Russia’s
willingness and capability to provide security in Central Asia in defense of Chinese investments there. Clearly Pakistan and Iran are also
unreliable despite whatever benefits their closeness to Beijing offers China on other issues. Under the circumstances the temptation to “do it
yourself” and have the PLA defend Chinese interests in these states rather than rely on unreliable local governments becomes much stronger.
IMPLICATIONS: The consequences of what appears to be a creeping Chinese military involvement in Central Asia are many and important. At
home it suggests that the Chinese
leadership, like many governments before it that cannot deal with internal challenges to its rule, is
looking to internationalize its domestic security problems and overcome them by projecting military and other
forms of power abroad. Yet for over thirty years it has signally failed to arrest or block the growth of Uyghur unrest and ethno-national or
religious sentiment. There is little reason to believe that a more aggressive military policy in Central Asia will offer the government in Beijing a
respite from its domestic security dilemmas. Second, one has to wonder just how much Chinese power is able to induce Iran and even more
importantly Pakistan to support China in its strategic interests. If China cannot get Pakistan to stop supporting terrorism throughout the Islamic
world despite its huge dependence on China, what does that say about the relationship between China and Pakistan? And the same question
can apply with even more force to Iran, which is much less dependent on China for support. Third, if in fact Moscow is playing a double game in
Afghanistan and Central Asia that negatively affects China’s interests, this would seriously undermine the “division of labor” between China and
Russia regarding Central Asia that analysts have hitherto discerned. China, with Russian acquiescence, had become the
leading foreign economic power in the region but has repeatedly stated its disinterest in projecting military
power into Central Asia. This supposedly fostered the global alliance of Russia and China and allowed them to cooperate on regional issues in
Central Asia without impinging on each other’s vital interests. If China has now decided, however cautiously, to upend that
division of labor, possibly because it cannot rely on Russian policy or for other reasons, can it sustain its relationship of
cooperation with Russia in Central Asia? In turn, does the manifestation of Sino-Russian rivalry and tensions in Central
Asia affect the larger Sino-Russian relationship? And if so how and where? Fourth, similar questions affect the Central Asian
states. Tajikistan, which has in the past been forced to bow to Chinese pressure for border rectification and investments, may now see its
military sovereignty compromised and it may not be the only state in the region to face greater Chinese pressures. How will these states react
to assigns of increased Sino-Russian rivalry where they may well be pressed to choose sides? And fifth, if China is going to try to eclipse Russia’s
security role in Central Asia, how will it react in Central Asia and globally? Given the visibly growing Russian dependence upon China for
economic and political support, what happens when signs of Chinese encroachment upon Russian “prerogatives” start to multiply? Does
Moscow want to undertake an “agonizing reappraisal” of its total foreign and defense polices due to events in Central Asia? And will it continue
to try and play its double game there? It is too early to discern answers to these questions, yet it is not too early to raise them. As regards
Russia, Moscow may have reacted to these developments by the announcement of new exercises recently
conducted with Tajikistan and of major new arms sales. Exercises and arms sales have been two of the principal
instruments by which Moscow has secured support from Tajikistan and its neighbors, even if the arms sales
often amount to subsidized exports of Russian weapons. Of course, it is possible that some secret arrangements exist between Beijing and
Moscow regarding exercises with Tajikistan and other Central Asian states. But in view of China’s earlier moves and the well documented signs
of friction between Russia and China in Central Asia despite their division of labor, such cooperation is not likely. CONCLUSIONS: Instead, it
seems that China, through these exercises and its earlier calls in 2016 for a security formula for Central and South Asia, is spreading its
wings and contemplating a discernible expansion of its power projection capabilities and even responsibilities. That
can only occur at the expense of Central Asian states, Russia, and probably India as well. This forces us to ask if China’s
already visible economic pull upon Central Asian states will be supplemented by their military dependence on
China, despite their desires to avoid it or at least avoid Chinese efforts to impose such dependence? To be sure, China has established itself in
Central Asia for years to come, but would a Chinese move to upgrade its powers and obligations in the region be met with equal and opposing
countermoves from other powers who also have important equities and interests there? Given the nature of contemporary international
relations, the answer to that question is almost certainly yes. In other words, a new chapter of the contemporary great game in Central Asia is
underway. And we as analysts if not participants must get ready for it.
 L – Drones
China will fill-in for the US, results in the spread of drones
Reimann 2019 - contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus
Jakob, "China is Flooding the Middle East With Cheap Drones," Feb 18, https://fpif.org/china-is-flooding-
the-middle-east-with-cheap-drones/
The last great revolution on the world’s battlefields began with the advent of the drone era. Particularly in the Middle East, the drone became
the symbol of the U.S. empire operating in a legal vacuum. In the first decade and a half of the “War on Terror,” the U.S. still had a virtual
monopoly on the risk-free execution from thousands of meters above — but once the genie is out of the bottle, every attempt to squeeze it
back in is notoriously doomed to failure. And so, quickly other countries in the region aspired after the financially — and politically — cheap
execution by drone. The number of armies with their own drone fleet is growing rapidly. A
multi-billion-dollar market with
astronomical growth rates opened up — demand that’s essentially served only by one actor: China. The
U.S. has squandered its lead The appearance of the Rainbow CH-4 — the driving force of Chinese combat drones — is almost
identical to the notorious Reaper drone of the U.S. arms manufacturer General Atomics. While the CH-4 lags behind the Reaper in most
performance parameters, it can keep up with or even outperform its competitor in some of them. Also, the CH-4’s weaponry, the AKD-10
warhead, is almost identical to the Reaper’s Hellfire missiles. The
striking similarity follows a strategy of Chinese
engineering well-known from cell phones or cars: the look of a world-famous Western branded product
is copied with an inferior but sufficiently good quality compared to that of the original — but at significantly
less cost. Chinese drones are 50 to 75 percent cheaper than the originals from the U.S. A late 2015 article published in the Asia Times suggests
that this copying of U.S. technology is likely rooted in Beijing’s data theft. According to records by world-famous NSA whistleblower Edward
Snowden, by 2010 alone “Chinese hackers had conducted more than 30,000 cyber attacks” on Pentagon computer networks and other U.S.
military agencies in order to “exfiltrate [data on] sensitive military technology.” Although there is no final proof that data on drones were
skimmed off too, Asia Times quotes then NSA director Gen. Keith Alexander, who suggests that it is highly likely that the Reaper blueprints were
part of the Chinese data hack, while military experts and analysts largely share this view. With the latest model — the
CH-7, which is
still in the development phase — China could possibly pull ahead the U.S. for the first time, military journal
Defense One explains. The CH-7 “will be the sole option for buyers wanting to field stealth combat drones,” it
predicts. “The United States had a decade-plus head start on [drone] technology,” says military expert Paul Scharre, “and has unfortunately
squandered that lead.” China captures the market For a long time, it was only the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel that had
combat drones and used them to execute alleged terrorists — something that has changed dramatically in recent years. Meanwhile, the
number of countries with combat drones has swelled to at least 29, as research organization New America identifies. And 10 countries have
demonstrably used them to kill suspected enemies; in addition to the three mentioned, there is Iran, Azerbaijan, the UAE, as well as Nigeria,
Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey (the last four countries drone-killed people on their own soil). Historically, Israel is the largest drone exporter, with a
market share of over 60 percent in the last three decades. More recently, from 2008-2017, China exported a total of 88 drones to at least 12
countries, ranking third among the world’s drone exporters behind the United States (351) and Israel (186). However, whilethe vast
majority of U.S. and Israeli exports are made up of unarmed reconnaissance drones, China’s sales focus
on armed drones. During the mentioned period, China exported 68 combat drones, putting it ahead of the U.S.
(62) and Israel (56). Foreign Policy thus recently titled rightly: “China Has Already Won the Drone Wars.” All of the armed forces of the
Chinese military have large fleets of various drones, but Beijing has used them so far only for disaster relief, surveillance of domestic critics, and
military reconnaissance — not to kill. (In 2013, Beijing considered executing by drone a Myanmar drug baron wanted in the murders of 13
Chinese sailors, but eventually caught and tried him.) Rather, Beijing appears to be establishing a norm permanently prohibiting lethal drone
strikes in East and South Asia. However, this no-shoot dogma does not prevent the Chinese arms industry from exporting their drones to states
that are patently using them for killing elsewhere. How China services U.S. clients While the Pentagon continues to this day to deliver armed
Reaper drones only to the UK, France, and Italy, purchasers of Chinese combat drones, according to Chinese manufacturers, include Algeria,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, the UAE, and Zambia. So far, the three largest buyers of
Chinese drones are Pakistan (with a share of 25 percent) as well as Egypt and Myanmar (with 23 and 13 percent, respectively). Several of
Beijing’s buyers are close strategic U.S. allies who have requested the sale of armed drones from
Washington to no avail and have thus fallen back on Chinese products. The U.S. is by far the largest arms
exporter and usually sells military equipment to almost every country in the world. According to the SIPRI
research institute, the U.S. sold $98 billion worth of weapons to as many as 112 countries in 2007-2017. Hence, on the face of it, it seems rather
counterintuitive that it would hand over the lucrative battle drone market to China. A recent report by the DIA, the Pentagon’s internal
intelligence service, deals with this contradiction. “China is a niche provider of armed [drones]” in the Middle East, the
report acknowledges, and correctly concludes that “China faces little competition” as it is not a member of international export control
regimes. In fact, unlike the U.S. and the European arms-exporting countries, China is not a contracting party to the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTRC), which strictly regulates the proliferation of combat drones and makes U.S. drone exports to the Middle East more difficult. In
addition to attempts by the Trump administration to amend the MTRC, Trump’s State Department published a new export policy in April 2018:
“We will remove barriers to the global [drone] market and avoid ceding export opportunities to competitors where such self-imposed
restrictions are unwarranted.” Since the wording does not specify when restrictions are “unwarranted,” the new policy can be understood as
blank approval for future drone exports. De facto, it was also made possible to buy combat drones directly from the manufacturer, without the
government as a broker agent. “To date, however, that hasn’t led to any reported sales to the Middle East,” Forbes reported late last year. So,
in contrast to relatively strict regulations on U.S. drone exports, China’s “no questions asked” policy allowed it to quickly gain a foothold in the
lucrative Middle East drone market and aggressively expand the course of the proliferation of cheap drones. State-of-the-art technology
perceived as revolutionary always comes with a certain adulation for its possessor. Thus, a recent report by London-based military think tank
RUSI concludes that “national prestige and status is the main reason that most states” in the Middle East increasingly acquire drones, as Middle
East Eye reports. However, in addition to their value as status symbols, in recent years they are more and more being used strategically on the
battlefields of the region, which the RUSI report attributes largely to increased Chinese exports. And so Chinese drones also recorded their first
deaths: Besides fatal deployment by the Nigerian army against Boko Haram, since the end of 2015, the Iraqi military performed more than 260
air strikes against Islamic State targets with Chinese drones. They gained particular infamy on April 22 last year, when the UAE executed the de
facto president of Yemen, Saleh Ali al-Sammad, with a Chinese drone, escalating the nearly four-year war in the country. The murdered Al-
Sammad was seen as a promoter of the UN-mediated peace process in Yemen, whereas his successor, Mahdi al-Mashat, is an implacable,
uncompromising hardliner and provocateur.

Chinese drones will get in the hands of terrorists, makes them uniquely worse than
the US
Reimann 2019 - contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus
Jakob, "China is Flooding the Middle East With Cheap Drones," Feb 18, https://fpif.org/china-is-flooding-
the-middle-east-with-cheap-drones/

Pandora’s box is open Of

particular concern is China’s drone policy in Saudi Arabia. A $ 65 billion economic
program clinched between the two countries in spring 2017 includes the construction of a Chinese
drone factory in Saudi Arabia — the first of its kind in the region. Initially, the license production of 300 drones was agreed, which
represents a massive figure given the 88 drones that China has exported in the last decade altogether. However, the license drones are not
exclusively intended for the Saudi Royal Air Force — Riyadh can explicitly market them to other countries in the region.
End-user certificates do not exist for deals with Beijing. In view of the fact that Saudi Arabia, along with supporting various jihadist groups in the
region, is a close ally of Al Qaeda in Yemen, it is within the realm of possibility to envision some of these drones end up in terrorist’s hands.
Fueled by Beijing’s export policy, the threat scenario of drone-armed jihadists has moved significantly
closer. Research by the Jamestown Foundation shows that we have already entered the era of “unmanned terrorism.” Groups
commonly labelled as “terrorists” from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan to Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen are already using mini-
drones to drop bombs, grenades, and incendiary devices onto enemy positions or civilian facilities. Further
flooding the region with cheap combat drones from China will certainly heave these tactics to the next level in the future. Since 2001,
thousands of people, most of them civilians, have been killed by drone in the so-called “War on Terror,” changing the nature of war in its
entirety and exposing civilians in all these undeclared war zones to a permanent threat on their lives. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Barack Obama
proved he could always escape punishment and international condemnation even after using drones to turn weddings and funerals into blood
baths and mass graves. And so, the desires of local actors to acquire these practical killing tools were aroused, too. The
Chinese
leadership is exploiting these developments without compromise and flooding the Middle East with
cheap drones. The consequences of this expansionary policy cannot be foreseen. Pandora’s box is
already open.

UAV empirics
CSIS 18 (Center for Strategic and International Studies; Founded by Georgetown University in 1962,
ranked the number one think tank in the world; “How dominant is China in the global arms trade?”;
5/29/2018; CSIS; https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/)//Garfield-Ben
That said, Chinese weaponry is becoming increasingly attractive due in part to its cost-effectiveness. Although Chinese
arms are often less advanced than those sold by other countries, the DOD notes that “Chinese arms are less expensive
than those offered by the top international arms suppliers… [but still] have advanced capabilities.” For
example, the low-cost K-8 jet trainer is estimated to make up 80 percent of all jet trainer aircraft in Africa. China is
actively working to strengthen its foothold in certain markets, such as Algeria. China’s exports to the North African country totaled $483 million
between 2008 and 2014, but jumped to $247 million in 2015 alone and peaked at $499 million in 2016 as several weapon orders were fulfilled.
These procurements included three C-28A frigates, which were ordered by Algeria in 2012. Although not a member of the Missile Technology
Control Regime, a non-proliferation agreement targeted at missiles and systems capable of delivery weapons of mass destruction, Beijing is
generally compliant with international protocols. The 2002 Regulations on the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related
Items and Technologies, for instance, outlines measures to safeguard against proliferation. In June 2017, China published a draft of
the Export Control Law, which if enacted will update existing legislation and establish a comprehensive
export control regime. Beijing has been quick to adapt its domestic regulations to account for emerging
technology. This has enabled it to fill the void left by other suppliers. The US, which has long been at the
forefront of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development, has purposely restricted the export of its UAVs.
Regulations that until recently characterized long-range unmanned aerial systems as cruise missiles, have also
limited overseas access of American UAVs. These factors have created a ripe market opportunity for China,
which has made its UAVs available to countries such as Nigeria and Egypt. It is worth noting that Chinese weapons have
found their way into various conflict zones. Reports indicate that Chinese arms have been used during conflicts in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, and Somalia. In July 2014, China North Industries Corporation delivered 100 guided missile systems, over 9,000
automatic rifles, and 24 million rounds of ammunition to the South Sudanese government, whose actions have been widely criticized by the
international community.
 L – High Tech Weapons
China is on the verge of selling high-tech systems
Farley 2017 Robert, "Can China Replace the United States as the World's Top Arms Dealer?" Nov 21,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/can-china-replace-the-us-as-the-worlds-top-arms-dealer/

But it may not be too long before the United States needs to worry about competition directly in its niche. China
is taking steps to
modernize the relationship between its defense industrial base and its technology sector, with the hope
of generating investment in firms that work at the juncture between the latter and the former. Leveraging
the relationship between civilian and military technology is how the United State achieved military superiority over the Soviet Union during the
Cold War. It’s also been a preoccupation of advocates of the “Third Offset,” which hopes to further harness the U.S. tech sector in the service of
maintaining American superiority in military technology. And there are indications that the Chinese are ever-more-ready to challenge the
United States in this arena. The Chinese defense industry remains far more autarkic than the United States’, and is still largely state controlled.
But allowing heavy civilian investment into military-related civilian industries, as well as focusing on building linkages
between civilian industries and the military, could accelerate Chinese innovation. If China can successfully connect
its burgeoning tech industry with its defense industrial base (a project that even the United States has struggled with),
then it can accomplish something that the Soviet Union utterly failed at. Obviously, many obstacles remain, some of
which the United States also faces. The task of integrating China’s state-owned defense giants with its private sector tech companies will be
enormously complicated, with many potential pitfalls. Not the least of these is convincing Chinese tech firms that their technologies are safe in
the hands of state-owned defense giants, a task that is probably even more difficult than getting U.S. tech firms to work with Lockheed Martin
and Raytheon. The eventual outcome might look something like the European model, where large, state-controlled defense firms have a
tolerably good relationship with the civilian sector. The difference would be that, as in the United States, the defense industrial base can count
on huge, consistent government outlays. If
China can square the circle, it can compete with the United States not
only on the air and at sea, but also in the international arms market. Chinese arms in the hands of traditional U.S.
export partners may not be quite as dangerous as those in Chinese hands, but they have the potential to undercut a dominant U.S. market
position.
 L – Latin America
Chinese SALW trade in Latin America now, but the plan causes China to dominate the trade
SIPRI ’13 (SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict,
armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and
recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested
public. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP38.pdf) //A.F

NOTE: SALW = Small Arms/ Light Weapons

In 2008 China’s first official policy paper on Latin America made reference to military exchanges and
visits.228 In recent years there has been an increase in the quantity and quality of weapons supplied by China
to Latin America.229 Identifying reasons for Chinese engagement with Latin America in this sphere is hard, although there are
suggestions that it is connected with access to markets for Chinese goods and natural resources .230 It has also

been suggested that it is a result of efforts by Latin American states to diversify their arms suppliers, as well
as serving as a counterbalance to supplies by the USA to the region. 231 According to UN Comtrade and UNROCA
data, Bolivia, Cuba, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru imported SALW from China in the period 2006–10.232 Between 1998 and 2008
China donated 10 000 rifles to the Bolivian armed forces.233 In
2003 China delivered 500 Red Arrow-8 (HJ-8) wire-guided
antitank missile systems and in December 2006 announced the supply of ‘infantry and artillery
munitions’ as part of a donation.234 Further donations to the Bolivian armed forces were announced in
2007, 2009 and 2010 but it is unclear if SALW were part of these arrangements. China also proposed to replace
Bolivia’s HN-5 stocks in 2006 but it is not know if a delivery went ahead.235 However, online images from 2011 or earlier show a Bolivian
marine with a Norinco QLZ-87/ Type-87 35-mm automatic grenade launcher.236 Prior to 2009 Ecuador had reportedly received Red Arrow-8
(HJ-8) wireguided anti-tank missile systems and 30 HN-5 MANPADS, but there is limited information on subsequent deliveries of SALW. There
have also been some suggestions that Norinco has supplied its CQ 5.56 carbine, a clone of the US M-4, to Paraguay.237 Peru reported to
UNROCA the import of 15 QW-18 MANPADS from China in 2009 and 15 QW-18s in 2010.

US containing Chinese arms sales in Latin America but China wants to expand
Tokatlian 18 (Juan Gabriel Tokatlian; Ph.D in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.; “No One’s Supplanting US
Military Influence in Latin America”; 9/5/2018; Defense One;
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/09/no-ones-supplanting-us-military-influence-latin-
america/151029/)// A.F. + B.T.

Many U.S. and Latin American experts who analyze inter-American military relations tend to repeat two inaccuracies. First,
they confuse diplomatic statements and military realities. Second, they reckon that the military policies of
China, Russia, Iran, and India towards Latin America are generating a disturbing imbalance that is
detrimental to Washington. The former tendency is exemplified by an emphasis on then-Secretary of State John Kerry’s 2013 speech
announcing the end of the Monroe Doctrine. In practice, however, the Defense Department and especially U.S. Southern
Command, have reaffirmed their supremacy in Latin America. The latter tendency requires a bit more unpacking. There
is no doubt that China’s economic growth is being accompanied by an incipient military projection beyond its regional area of influence,
including attempts to boost arms exports to Latin America. Yet Bejing’s effective military impact upon Latin America in the
region remains low — with the exception of its arms exports to Venezuela. Russia is the region’s largest foreign arms supplier: since 2013,
according to SIPRI, Moscow has supplied 27 percent of the region’s imported weapons, more than the United States (15 percent) and France
(10 percent) combined. Meanwhile, military ties between Iran and Latin America annoy Washington, but Tehran lacks the capability to ensure
its standing or hinder U.S. preeminence in the region. And as for the limited defense ties between India and Latin America, Indian specialist
Sanjay Badri-Maharaj says it is a farce to talk about them. In short, the
U.S. military preponderance in the region persists and it
is rock-solid. No extra-regional country, individually or jointly, can challenge U.S. military clout and control in
the region. mong its instruments are U.S. Southern Command, located in Miami; the U.S. Navy’s Fourth Fleet,
disestablished in 1950 and reassembled in 2008; military bases in Cuba and Honduras; cooperative security locations in El
Salvador and Aruba-Curacao; and security assistance organizations in various Latin American countries. And while
Beijing has sought to implement security cooperation programs and extend more invitations to military
courses in China, its efforts are so far dwarfed by Washington’s: according to the Washington Office on Latin America: 75
out of 107 U.S. global military assistance programs are operating in the region, while the last year alone saw 5,361 Latin American
military and security personnel trained in the United States. China and Russia are trying to increase military-
to-military contacts, but the United States has the National Guard’s State Partnership Program by which 17 states,
plus Puerto Rico and Washington, D.C., have agreements on security and defense with 23 Latin American countries.
Beijing and Moscow has been promising material assistance in the area of defense and security, but it is Washington that
earlier this year pledged $436 million in military and police aid, according to data from Security Assistance Monitor
(https://securityassistance.org/latin-america-and-caribbean) (This year, the U.S. sold $1.3 billion in arms to Mexico alone. It is true that Russia
has expanded its relationship with Venezuela, to the point that it now undertakes military exercises that seriously concern the United States.
However, SouthCom conducts regular, collective joint exercises with countries in Latin America through drills such as Panamax, UNITAS,
Tradewinds and New Horizons. And U.S. special operations there have drifted upward. Since 2006, the slice of
U.S. special operators
deployed to the region has risen from 3 percent to 4.39 percent, according to researcher Nick Turse. In fiscal 2016, the
Special Operations Command South conducted several anti-terrorist maneuvers with specialized regional units in the context of a change of
focus from Central America to the Caribbean (especially with the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago) and a growing emphasis on
South America (especially Brazil, Chile and Peru). In 2017, the Army’s Special Forces conducted various exercises with the armed forces of the
region: with naval forces from Central America targeting drug interdiction; with Colombian and Peruvian units on matters such as drug-
trafficking and terrorism, and with special forces from Chile on urban warfare. In addition, visits
to the region by U.S. military
officials are very frequent and in some years they have surpassed trips by diplomats. There are some 1,200 uniformed military and
civilians dealing with Latin America in SouthCom, more than the total of officials from various government agencies in Washington. The
political influence of the military in inter-American relations is such that before assuming their respective
presidencies in Colombia and Paraguay, Ivan Duque and Mario Abdo Benitez, visited SouthCom at Doral Florida.
To sum up, the United States remains undoubtedly, and by far, the primus inter pares on military affairs vis-à-vis Latin America. The acceptance
of the idea, both in Latin America and the United States, that military policies by China, Russia, and Iran towards the area are alarming is
questionable. The available evidence does not support such fear. U.S. military primacy in the Americas is
undeniable.
 L – Mexico
China already finding ways to get weapons to Mexican cartels
CSIS 18 (Center for Strategic and International Studies; Founded by Georgetown University in 1962,
ranked the number one think tank in the world; “How dominant is China in the global arms trade?”;
5/29/2018; CSIS; https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/)//Garfield-Ben

Over the past decade, Chinese arm sales to the Americas have grown modestly. In 2008, China exported
a meager $41 million to countries in the Western Hemisphere. This number plateaued at $178 million in
2015 before dropping to $36 million in 2016. Beijing did not sell any weapons to the region in 2017.
Chinese conventional weapons make up just 3 percent of the combined North and South American arms
import market, which is dominated by the United States (19 percent), Russia (14 percent), and Germany
(12 percent).Chinese arms exports in the Americas are concentrated in Venezuela, which attracted 87.4
percent of Beijing’s regional weapons sales over the last decade. Chinese weapon transfers to Venezuela
did not begin in earnest until after 2006 when the United States placed an arms embargo against
Venezuela for failing to cooperate in US-led anti-terrorism efforts. Since then Caracas has found a ready
partner as it has sought to upgrade its military in a cost-effective manner. Notable transactions include
the sale of 18 K-8 trainer jets in 2010, 121 VN-4 armored vehicles in 2012, and an undisclosed number of
C-802 anti-ship missiles in 2017. China is now Venezuela’s number two supplier of conventional
weapons at 12 percent of the market share; a position well behind Russia’s dominant role as the
supplier for 74 percent of Caracas’ arms imports. While China’s major conventional weapons sales in the
region are limited, China is a provider of small arms to North America. Prior to 2009, most of these
procurements flowed into Canada, but in recent years Mexico has become a more significant market. All
told, however, China only supplies a fraction of both country’s foreign small arms acquisitions. According
to some reports, Chinese weapons are increasingly finding their way into the hands of Mexican cartels.
 L – Middle East
China will fill the gap in the region, expanding their geopolitical leverage and
diminishing the US
Al Saud 2018 - graduate student in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University
Latifa A, "China's Arms Sales Philosophy in the Arab World," Dec 3, https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-
articles/chinas-arms-sales-philosophy-arab-world
China’s commercial motives do not suggest a complete lack of interest in influencing the region and maintaining political stability. China is the
world’s largest oil importer of Saudi oil, and as such, stability in the Middle East is critical to China. Chinese
arms sales to the region is arguably motivated to maintain oil flows from friendly leaders from Arab oil exporting states
and a necessary tool for China to foster and enhance energy ties. It is no coincidence that the major oil exporting
countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran, are all purchasing weapons from China. The commercial nature
of Chinese arms sales gives it short-term and long-term advantages. Commercially, arms sales not only foster stronger
economic ties with Arab states, to which China remains dependent on their oil exports, but also give
China a chance to ask for a decrease in the cost of importing energy from the region. China has the
ability to use arms sales as leverage to receive low oil prices and/or concessions, an important tool given its significant
growth in oil demand and dependency on imports. U.S. and Western policymakers and scholars view increased Chinese arms sales to the region
as not merely economically motivated, but also intended for China’s own power projection and mitigation of U.S. power in the region. China
often criticizes U.S. interference in Middle East affairs, including the strong presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf (and beyond). The primary
objectives for the US, from China’s view, are to maintain, control, and ensure access to energy resources in the region. Chinese
actions to
cooperate with both U.S. and non-U.S. allies, like Iran and Syria, are intended to, at least in part, exert its own
influence. In 1991, the Chinese provided Iran with sophisticated dual use nuclear technology and natural uranium under the umbrella of
nuclear “cooperation.” This, among other factors, allowed China to build up its image as an attractive and easy to deal with arms provider,
serving an entry point to its long-term strategic presence without appearing to have an interest in picking sides. Arms sales are part of
China’s win-win cooperation and strategy-based foreign policy. Doing so is a rather unconventional approach to
international arms sales, as they have traditionally been used as a political tool, with the United States as the top player. China’s
approach can help its long-term strategic posture in the region by promoting stronger ties with the Arab
states, ensuring oil flows, and opening a door to economic expansion in the Middle East through
investments and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). Although there are no recent instances of China using arms sales to exert influence in the
Middle East, this does not mean that the commercial nature of Chinese arms sales is not also linked to national security interests. The
Chinese government’s arms exports philosophy stems from its interest to maintain strategic relations
with the Arab states in order to best increase its prospects for securing its business and energy interests
in the region, regardless of the recipients’ country’s intensions. It can therefore be said that PRC arms sales are
exemplified in Xi Jinping’s overall win-win, cooperation-based foreign policy and can in turn have key
implications to understanding the global arms trade of this century.
 L – Philippines
China Fills in – They did it with the Philippines before.
Mogato ’18 (Manuel Mogato reports for Reuters; Thomson Reuters is dedicated to upholding the Trust
Principles and to preserving its independence, integrity, and freedom from bias in the gathering and
dissemination of information and news. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-china-
arms/china-donates-four-small-boats-and-grenade-launchers-to-philippines-idUSKBN1KJ0AU) // A.F.

MANILA (Reuters) - China has donated four 12-meter-long boats and 30 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG)
launchers to the Philippines, continuing the closer relations between the two countries under President
Rodrigo Duterte. The donation, which follows the provision last year of about 6,000 assault rifles and
hundreds of sniper rifles, also included small arms and ammunition, said Navy spokesman Commander Jonathan Zata.
“They are brand new equipment,” he told reporters, adding the military was assessing how to integrate the material and provide
long term logistical support. The Chinese rifles went to the Philippine National Police (PNP), helping to fill a

shortfall after U.S. legislators blocked the sale of about 26,000 M4 rifles to the police in 2016. The
freeze on the sale came amid concerns about the United States arming a police force accused of
widespread human rights abuses during Duterte’s fierce war on drugs, which has killed thousands of
Filipinos. Duterte, who has been critical of the Philippines alliance with the United States, is eager to develop closer trade and political ties
with old foe China. China’s donation is part of a new wave of diplomacy to engage a country with which
Beijing has a bitter history of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Beijing’s donations so far remain small
compared with arms transfers from the United States, a defense treaty ally with the Philippines since the 1950s. Washington has in the past five
years provided 15 billion peso ($282 million) of military aid, including drones, ships, surveillance planes and assault rifles. Washington and
Manila have for decades held joint exercises, as many as 300 a year, and the programs remain intact despite repeated threats last year by
Duterte to cancel them and abrogate bilateral defense pacts.
 L – Saudi Arabia
US sales to Riyadh are necessary to pressure them, otherwise China will fill in and
green light MBS’s adventurism
Caverley 2018 - Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research
Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Jonathan D, "AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME," Apr 6,
https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/

A smart arms transfer policy would strangle both Russia, the number two exporter, and China, which is trying to take
its place. Russia in particular needs arms exports to fund its aggressive but underfunded military modernization plans (not to mention hard
currency for its weak economy). It is in America’s interests to choke off as large a percentage of the Russian export market as possible in favor
of the products of more closely aligned countries. In terms of both American influence and curbing proliferation, it is better for countries like
Malaysia and Indonesia to buy German or South Korean submarines than Russian. This will have the added benefit of diminishing the quality
and, eventually, raising the price of the products Russia will export to states, such as Syria, that cannot buy arms from anywhere else. In the
spirit of bolstering potential partners and limiting the reach of Russian weapons, the United States can directly compete against Russia in one
important market. India accounts for a stunning 39 percent of Russia’s recent arms exports (SIPRI). Indian orders might be big enough to
provide some meaningful economic benefits to the United States, but more importantly, U.S. sales would cut into Russia’s market share. Tying
India and the United States closer, even if it means allowing most production, jobs, and even some technology transfer to go abroad, should be
a central goal of U.S. arms transfer policy. Lockheed Martin’s offer to transfer the F-16 production line to India appears a step in this direction.
America should accept that Saudi Arabia is going to buy a lot of U.S. weapons, but avoid coddling the
Kingdom. Saudi Arabia (and its Gulf State allies) will remain an important customer largely because the country
is desperate to keep the United States involved in the region. The Saudi military is almost entirely American equipped
and trained and most of its military capability requires continued American support to function for more than a couple of days. A few
additional jobs may result from selling more arms to the Kingdom, but this may not justify giving up the
leverage over Saudi and its allies’ policies towards Yemen, Syria, and Qatar that do not necessarily
advance American interests. The United States should encourage, but steer, Europe. Since the Cold War the United States has used
its economic and political clout to systematically inhibit an independent European defense production capability. This has certainly increased
U.S. market share, but continued efforts come at the expense of more important political goals. It would be much easier to ask NATO allies to
spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense if more of this money would go into indigenous industries. The United States should recognize that
European global competitiveness in the arms trade can serve American interests (and perhaps provide competition for its own sheltered
defense industry). This will relieve pressure on Europe to export to countries embargoed by the United States, which undermines the influence
of U.S. arms transfer policy. When the United States placed real restrictions on arms transfers to Egypt’s al-Sisi regime, other states quickly
attempted to fill this gap. As one French policymaker cynically noted, “Obama was the [French fighter jet] Rafale’s best salesperson.” Overall,
from 2012-2015 the export agreements of major European sellers to Egypt have gone up forty-seven-fold over the previous four-year period.
That said, Europe has by and large cooperated with successful arms embargoes against Russia and China (although Europe does sell nearly $400
million of dual use equipment to China each year). Maintaining and even tightening these key sanctions must be the highest priority of any
defense cooperation policy with Europe. More broadly, fixation on “buying American” misses tremendous opportunities for leading
coordinated action with like-minded states in Europe and elsewhere. This is feasible given that the United States, NATO members, South Korea,
Israel, and a few other allies account for a whopping 62 percent of total global arms exports (SIPRI). To this end, the United States should
liberalize its own market. Much as when “foreign” automotive firms build their cars in the United States, acquiring products from abroad may
create more jobs than selling weapons internationally. The U.S. Air Force’s current $16 billion fighter-trainer contract has been largely
narrowed down to three candidates with foreign connections: a Lockheed Martin-Korea Aerospace Industries version of Korea’s T-50; a new
design from a Boeing-Saab team; and an entirely foreign offering from Leonardo. Winning such a contract will give one of three like-minded
states (South Korea, Sweden, or Italy, respectively) a boost in other international competitions against less scrupulous dealers. And the United
States can still shape these exports for its political interests, such as when it recently vetoed the T-50’s export to Uzbekistan. America is Like No
Other Arms Exporter and Should Act Like It The United States — by dint of its huge military budget, massive defense R&D, and long dominance
of the global arms market — can use arms transfers in ways beyond the dreams of its competitors. Indeed, many competitors recognize this,
albeit grudgingly. I have interviewed officials in multiple countries (both clients and competitors of the United States) claiming they will defer to
U.S. wishes on arms exports if they trust it is done for political rather than economic reasons. Many
of America’s closest allies,
who are also arms export competitors, look to the United States for leadership on controversial
importers such as Saudi Arabia. And, the Trump administration should be given due credit for exercising discretion, given, for
instance, its recent unilateral embargo on arms transfer to South Sudan. In fact, one administration official stated flatly that sales “will not
come at the expense of human rights.” In no small part, U.S.
domination of the global arms trade is based on the
world’s belief that the United States uses its clout to advance its political ends, not economic gain.
Destroying this reputation will do little to bring jobs to the United States, while doing much to damage
American influence abroad.
 L – Small Arms
China fill-in leads to increased black-market trade
SIPRI ’13 (SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict,
armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and
recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested
public. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP38.pdf) //A.F

NOTE: SALW = Small Arms/ Light Weapons

The current Chinese Government position is that SALW should not be transferred to unauthorized non-state actors (see chapter 3). However,
there is significant amount of open source data showing that armed non-state actors in South and South
East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Middle East are using SALW produced in China.
These SALW may have been stolen from government stocks or seized from government forces on the
battlefield. However, in many cases it appears that states have imported weapons from China and then
re-transferred them to armed non-state actors. This raises questions about whether improvements could be made to China’s
export licensing risk assessment mechanisms and post-export controls. Cambodia, Myanmar and Pakistan have been
highlighted as potential diversion points for Chinese SALW to armed non-state actors in Asia.245 The LTTE in
Sri Lanka is alleged to have sourced part of its arsenal of Chinese SALW from Cambodia.246 The United
Wa State Army (UWSA) in Myanmar is alleged to have acquired weapons from former PLA officers acting
without the formal approval of Chinese authorities.247 The UWSA is regarded as a potential source of arms for various
armed non-state actors in South Asia.248 According to Indian officials and researchers, Maoist forces in northern India have acquired Chinese
SALW from China’s Yunnan province via Myanmar and Bangladesh in recent years.249 An
article in the Indian media in 2011
claimed that senior Indian intelligence officials believe that China is providing SALW to the Isak-Muivah
faction of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) in north-eastern India.250 In 2009 Yemen
provided Chinese authorities with a public blacklist of arms importers that were not authorized to import arms in order to prevent the diversion
of arms.259 Yemen also requested that only documents approved by the Yemeni Ministry of Defence or the Yemeni embassy in Beijing be
treated as genuine

China fill-in is destabilizing and escalates tensions in EVERY hotspot

Earl Conteh-Morgan ’17 (Earl Conteh-Morgan is Professor of International Studies in the School of
Interdisciplinary Global Studies at the University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida. He is currently
working on a book-length manuscript on Sino-African relations from a Political Economy Approach.
https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/chinas-arms-sales-in-africa) //A.F.

NOTE: SALW = Small Arms/ Light Weapons

One of the negative aspects of China’s increasing engagement with African states is the spread of small arms and/or light weapons especially in
conflict zones and [where] opposition is violently suppressed. These weapons have undoubtably contributed to the enhancement of
closer ties between China and authoritarian regimes and served as an instrument for consolidating its
presence in the continent. China has developed an extensive presence in Africa through infrastructure such as airports, roads, hospitals,
convention centers, media investment, agricultural and health education, among many other activities that seemingly put China in a good light.
At the same time many of China’s seemingly worthwhile activities by have not consolidated its ties to the African political elite and incumbent
regimes as much as its arms sales to authoritarian regimes have. Its positive contributions in the continent have been offset by the lure of the
benefits that are associated with arms sales to African states despite their negative consequences in growing African states. Chinese
small
arms have been implicated in ethnic violence and war crimes in Sudan, South Sudan and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) among others. They have also been instrumental in the suppression of democratic
progress in Zimbabwe, and at the same time expanding its influence and political economic ties with the authoritarian regime of
President Robert Mugabe. China’s worldview which puts social and economic rights over individual liberties and political rights is often quick
to supply weapons to authoritarian African states because it does not make human rights observance a condition
for arms sales to any country. Incumbent African regimes that face severe threats to their survival are therefore quick to turn to China as a
source of arms supply in the struggle to preserve their power. Apart from the lure of profits for China’s arms sales to Africa, there is also the
added benefit of China finding employment opportunities for its skilled Chinese citizens. This contributes to spreading its technical and
personnel influence in the continent. At times, an arms supply relationship also involves establishing an arms factory in a recipient state that
requires the expertise of skilled Chinese scientists, engineers, and industrial managers. Such a relationship for China leads to a long term
business and security relationship with the African country. This is one reason why China’s influence in Sudan is so strong. However, what
happens is that weapons that are sold by China or produced by China in Africa end up fueling and feeding the conflicts in countries such as the
DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, among others. Regime survival or incumbent regime power consolidation efforts
fuel arms transfers in South Sudan and Burundi. Chinese arms are often implicated in these conflicts because of China’s aggressive arms sales
strategy w is based on the following: A “catch all” customers strategy that has established an arms transfer or military relationship with several
large African states such as Egypt, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, as well as smaller states like the Republic of Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Burundi, and Sierra Leone, among others; A favorable financing strategy especially for African countries that cannot afford to
buy sophisticated weapons and afford to pay the market price for small or light weapons; and China’s use of frequent and aggressive small arms
marketing of its and more sophisticated military hardware at annual arms exhibits in various states within the continent. The wide array of
Chinese arms enables China to sell weapons to both rich authoritarian African states as well as poorer smaller ones. The Chinese policy of
placing no human rights or democracy conditions on arms sales as well its overall policy of non-interference in the politics of African states
translates into the availability and affordability of Chinese arms in many African states. The bloody footprints of China’s arm sales in Africa It is
not therefore surprising that arms from China have been implicated in the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict in which China is known to have supplied
arms to both sides in the conflict. It is also well documented that Chinese weapons were used in Sudan’s suppression of rebels in Darfur
following a revolt in 2003 which led to a genocide against the region’s people. It is alleged that the light weapons used in the massacres in
eastern DRC were of Chinese origin. There, children as young as 11 years old were given weapons by warlord Thomas Lubanga, and forced to
participate in interethnic killings in the early 2000s. Furthermore, Chinese trained Congolese troops have been implicated on several occasions
in ethnic killings of innocent civilians in the eastern DRC. Similarly, in 2009 Chinese-trained Guinean Commando units were responsible for the
killings of about 150 people during a protest against authoritarian and undemocratic rule in the country. According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute ( SIPRI) report of 2010, China was found to be the foremost exporter of arms to Africa. The Chinese Type
56 which is China’s version of the Russian Kalashnikov (AK47) assault rifle is much easier to use as a light weapon. The argument could be made
that in spite of China’s claim that it does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, the fact that it supplies weapons to warring
factions within a sovereign nation is itself inherently interventionist by nature. Such interference produces consequences such as gross human
rights violations, murder, rapes, tortures, and extra-judicial killings. China’s arms sales to Africa attract negative attention especially because
they are made available to states like Sudan and Zimbabwe and the DRC, known for blatant human rights violations in Africa. This often means
that China is reaping the profits of selling weapons to both incumbent regimes and rebel groups. The general outcome is the consolidation and
expansion of its ties and presence in the continent. Looking forward: an unsustainable arrangement China’s propensity to spread small arms
and light weapons (SALW) among African states will end up undermining whatever positive perception it has generated in the continent as well
as taint its goals to support sustainable development and contribute to the national development goals of individual African states. In
particular, it will cast doubt on its willingness to support Millenium Development Goals, and other specific development goals in the continent
such as the Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa and similar such programs. So far, China’s military to military ties with African
states has been a source of frustration for the United Nations. While it China contributes to peacekeeping efforts in the continent, the United
Nations does not know details of its military engagement, or specific military ties, with the countries in which its peacekeepers are deployed
such has the DRC, South Sudan, Liberia, Mali, among others. In other words, the expanding military ties with African states, and perhaps the
access by rebels to Chinese arms are factors that are likely to undermine UN peacekeeping functions of disarmament of ex-combatants. It is
difficult to know whether Chinese arms complement or undermine the efforts to enhance security in fragile African states. It is a question of
whether China is willing to ensure that its military ties with countries of concern such as the DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe,
complement peacekeeping activities there or help to promote peace, stability, democracy and development. Human rights organizations have
often called attention to the destabilizing role that Chinese arms play in conflict zones in Africa. China so far seems determined to support and
forge closer ties with authoritarian regimes in their goals of power consolidation, oppression of the opposition. China on the other hand is
preoccupied with spreading its influence, consolidating its ties and deepening its engagement with every African state regardless of whether it
is democratic or authoritarian. Accordingly, Chinese SALWs are supplied to both national armies in Africa as well as to rebel groups in the DRC,
Chad and Uganda, and now the warring factions in South Sudan. China’s supply of arms to both rebels and national armies is often a violation of
embargoes as well as a blatant case of economic self-interested behavior. The glimmer of hope in all this is that China has at times bowed to
international pressure to cease supplying weapons in areas of gross human rights violations such as was the case with Darfur. But overall China
still gives priority to concern over sovereignty and often defers to incumbent regimes such that human rights observance and non-proliferation
of SALWs are relegated a secondary role in China’s foreign policy rights towards Africa states.

China fills in small arms

SIPRI ’13 (SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments,
arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations,
based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP38.pdf) //A.F

NOTE: SALW = Small Arms/ Light Weapons

At least 46 states imported military SALW from China during 2006–10 . African states account for the
largest share of reported imports of military SALW. A number of exports of Chinese SALW to Africa that
have involved European arms brokers have caused concern with regard to their potential impacts on
peace, stability and security in the importing state. Several states in Asia have reported importing SALW from China, with
Pakistan and Bangladesh the most prominent recipients, both of direct deliveries as well as licensed production arrangements and technology
transfers. There has been an increase in the quantity and quality of weapons supplied by China to Latin
America in recent years. In the Middle East, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Qatar imported SALW from
China in the period 2006–10. Iran has been a major recipient of Chinese arms, including SALW, since the
1980–88 Iran–Iraq War. But in response to concerns that Iran is an important point of diversion of arms and technology to armed non-
state actors and the illicit market, China is reported to have wound down arms sales to Iran. There is significant evidence to indicate that
armed non-state actors in South and South East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Middle
East are using SALW produced in China. These SALW may have been stolen from government stocks or
seized from government forces on the battlefield. However, in many cases it appears that states have
imported weapons from China and then re-transferred them to armed non-state actors. There is potential for
greater sharing with China of other states’ experiences, policies and practices with regards to assessments of the risk of diversion, including
unauthorized re-exports. Building on Chinese interest in developing and implementing robust controls on SALW exports, and given that there
have been a number of cases of Chinese SALW exports being re-exported without authorization, it could be desirable for states participating in
the Wassenaar Arrangement to consider conducting outreach to China on its Best Practice Guidelines on Subsequent Transfer (Re-export)
Controls for Conventional Weapons Systems. States could also share their own experiences and practices in dealing with cases of unauthorized
re-export and in strengthening risk assessment and post-shipment and delivery measures in this area.
 Arms Sales Key
China’s sales aren’t economic but geopolitical – the plan gives them a unique
opportunity to expand their SOI
Matthews 2017 - Chair of Defence Economics at the Centre for Defence Management and Leadership,
Cranfield University and the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
Ron and Xiaojuan Ping, "Why the World Should Fear China's Military (Exports)," Sep 27,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-world-should-fear-chinas-military-exports-22494

Is there something different, something special, that distinguishes China’s arms export strategy from its Western
counterparts? The answer is a resounding yes. First and foremost, Western strategists should not be under any illusion that export
revenue is the primary goal. Rather, Beijing’s end-game is longer-term geo-political and strategic influence. The
search for regional and global influence is the critical aim of Chinese economic diplomacy. It reflects a more
narrowly focused aspect of Beijing’s soft power framework, embracing foreign aid, foreign direct investment, overseas educational programs
and, importantly, arms sales. China’s arms export model operates according to a carefully-crafted strategy based on three principles: promoting
the legitimate self-defence capability of the recipient country; strengthening the peace, security and stability of that country and region; and
non-interference in its internal affairs. Beijing’s long-standing approach of linking non-interference to arms sales rests on the view that a
customer’s political, military and human rights record lies outside the contractual arrangements. The ‘no questions asked’ policy
attracts the opprobrium of Western states, but there is no disputing its effectiveness in selling guns and securing influence.
The policy particularly appeals to second- and third-tier military states suffering excessive dependence
on US or Russian weaponry. Chinese arms offer poorer states the opportunity to diversify arms sources,
regain a degree of sovereignty over military capability and reduce strategic vulnerability to arms embargoes. The Chinese arms export model
has several other significant features. From a Chinese strategic perspective, it
leverages strong client-state relationships and
in the process bolsters Beijing’s influence, particularly among neighbouring states. It is no accident that China’s
arms sales to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar indirectly act to contain the potential threat of Asia’s other mega-power, India.
Chinese arms are also competitively packaged. Pricing is low compared to Western models. Chinese drones, for example, reportedly cost 10–20
per cent of the near-equivalent US version. Finally, China
is amenable to technology transfer through defence offset,
supporting client states to indigenise maintenance, repair and overhaul activities and even produce
components. While it may not yet be the dominant player, China’s arms export strategy has proved effective in
taking market share from competitor nations. China has also begun to encroach into higher income
markets, especially where technological sophistication is not required. There is a long-term strategy at
work here, driven by diplomatic and geostrategic objectives, not commercial gain.

China will fill-in for the US and crush American leadership

Benard 2018 - visiting fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, is managing partner of an American
private equity firm focused on Asia and Africa
Alexander, "US needs to sell more weapons as Russia and China fill the breach," Jul 4, The Australian

WORLD COMMENTARY National security is hurt by excessive restrictions America’s

arms-sales policies are too restrictive,
leading even some pro-US countries to buy weapons from Russia and China. This year’s National Defence Authorisation Act
would give Defence Secretary Jim Mattis authority to waive certain new restrictions for specific countries enacted by congress last year. But the
problem is more fundamental:
The US arms-sale regime needs to be recalibrated to protect American influence
in a highly competitive geopolitical environment. The US government blocks weapons sales to foreign countries for various
reasons. Congress is often wary of selling arms to countries that could use them to undermine civil liberties. The Defence Department often
worries the purchasing country could allow sensitive US technology to fall into the wrong hands. The State Department arms-control bureau
has a general aversion to any weapons proliferation on grounds that it could trigger an arms race. These are valid concerns. But
as Russia
and China actively pursue weapons sales as part of an aggressive strategy to expand their spheres of
influence, US strategic interests must be given more weight. Over the past decade, Russia has easily maintained its
position as the world’s second-largest weapons supplier, comprising 22 per cent of global sales from 2013-17. Chinese arms exports
increased by nearly 40 per cent from 2013-17 compared with the previous four years, the largest increase for
any large exporter country except Israel, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Neither Russia nor China
has qualms about selling weapons to even brazen human-rights violators. In fact they often provide the
technologies authoritarian governments use to surveil and repress their citizens. And they are especially eager to
peel off countries the US has declined to arm. Russia sells aircraft, submarines, anti-aircraft systems and missiles. China has made strides in
advanced missile systems as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. The sale of these sophisticated weapons poses a direct threat to US security
interests. It also creates challenges around interoperability. Technologies developed by the Russians and Chinese — such as advanced radars,
sonars, sensors and communications platforms — cannot integrate effectively with US technologies. The
more a country purchases
from Russia or China, the less able it is to purchase from the US in the future, pushing a country further
out of America’s security orbit. The lack of interoperability would also present major obstacles if the US
needed to fight a war alongside an ally whose advanced military equipment had been sourced from
Russia or China.

Arms sales are used to gain financial leverage, military power, and influence domestic
politics which independently risks war in SCS and ECS – empirics flow neg
Lind 18 (Jennifer Lind; Professor of Government at Dartmouth; “Life in China’s Asia: What Regional
Hegemony Would Look Like”; April 2018; Foreign Policy;
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/life-chinas-asia)//CS + BT

For now, the United States remains the dominant power in East Asia, but China is quickly closing the gap.
Although an economic crisis or domestic political turmoil could derail China’s rise, if current trends continue, China will before long supplant the
United States as the region’s economic, military, and political hegemon. As that day approaches, U.S. allies and partners in the region, such as
Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, will start to face some difficult questions. Namely, should they step up their individual
defense efforts and increase their cooperation with other countries in the region, or can they safely decide to accept Chinese dominance,
looking to Beijing as they have looked to Washington for the past half century? It may be tempting to believe that China will
be a relatively benign regional hegemon. Economic interdependence, one argument goes, should restrain Chinese aggression: because
the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rests on economic growth, which depends on trade, Beijing would maintain peaceful
relations with its neighbors. Moreover, China claims to be a different sort of great power. Chinese officials and scholars regularly decry
interventionism and reject the notion of “spheres of influence” as a Cold War relic. Chinese President Xi Jinping has said that his country has
“never engaged in colonialism or aggression” thanks to its “peace-loving cultural tradition.” In this view, life in China’s Asia would not be so
different from what it is today. But
this is not how regional hegemons behave. Great powers typically dominate their
regions in their quest for security. They develop and wield tremendous economic power. They build massive
militaries, expel external rivals, and use regional institutions and cultural programs to entrench their influence. Because
hegemons fear that neighboring countries will allow external rivals to establish a military foothold, they develop a profound interest
in the domestic politics of their neighborhood, and even seek to spread their culture to draw other countries closer. China
is already following the strategies of previous regional hegemons. It is using economic coercion to bend
other countries to its will. It is building up its military to ward off challengers. It is intervening in other
countries’ domestic politics to get friendlier policies. And it is investing massively in educational and cultural programs to enhance its soft
power. As Chinese power and ambition grow, such efforts will only increase. China’s neighbors must start debating how comfortable they are
with this future, and what costs they are willing to pay to shape or forestall it. ECONOMIC CENTRALITY Over the past few decades, China
has
become the number one trading partner and principal export destination for most countries in East Asia. Beijing has
struck a number of regional economic deals, including free-trade agreements with Australia, Singapore, South Korea, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and others. Through such arrangements, which exclude the United States, Beijing seeks to
create a Chinese-dominated East Asian community. Beijing is also building an institutional infrastructure to increase its
influence at the expense of U.S.-led institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and
Japanese-led ones, such as the Asian Development Bank. In 2014, China, along with Brazil, Russia, and India, set up the $100 billion New
Development Bank, which is headquartered in Shanghai. In 2015, China founded the $100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which
80 countries have now joined. Furthermore, Xi’s much-heralded Belt and Road initiative will promote Chinese trade
and financial cooperation throughout the region and provide massive Chinese investment in regional infrastructure and
natural resources. The China Development Bank has already committed $250 billion in loans to the project. Such policies mimic the
economic strategies of previous regional hegemons. China was the predominant economic and military power in East Asia
until the nineteenth century. It granted or withheld trade privileges according to an elaborate system of tribute, in which other countries had to
send diplomatic missions, bestow gifts, and kowtow to the Chinese emperor. The Chinese then determined the prices and quantities of all
goods traded. Imperial China consolidated its economic power by investing in agriculture and railroads, extracting minerals, and encouraging
close commercial integration throughout the region. In Latin America, the United States followed the same playbook to
establish itself as the region’s central economic player. In the nineteenth century, American firms flocked to the region in search of fruit,
minerals, sugar, and tobacco. The U.S. company United Fruit managed to gain control of the entire fruit export trade in Central America.
Finance was another powerful tool; as the Uruguayan journalist Eduardo Galeano has argued, a U.S. “banking invasion”
diverted local capital to U.S. firms. Washington encouraged American banks to assume the debts of European creditors to minimize the
influence of European rivals. For almost 100 years, Washington used diplomacy to advance its economic interests through initiatives promoting
U.S. regional trade and investment, such as the Big Brother policy in the 1880s, “dollar diplomacy” in the early 1900s, and the Alliance for
Progress in the 1960s. The United States
also built a regional institutional architecture to advance its agenda. In 1948, it
created the Organization of American States (headquartered in Washington, D.C.) to promote regional security and
cooperation. American influence ensured that the OAS remained silent on, or even legitimized, various U.S. military and political
interventions in Latin America. Other development institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the
U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Export-Import Bank of the United States, also advanced U.S. interests. Through “tied aid,”
such organizations required sponsored projects to hire U.S. vendors. The IMF, as Galeano has argued, was “born in the United States,
headquartered in the United States, and at the service of the United States.” Another regional hegemon, Japan, pursued similar
strategies in its empire that dominated the region in the early twentieth century. Vowing to eject the Western colonial powers, Tokyo
declared itself the head of a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” To feed its industrial economy and military, Tokyo extracted raw
materials from countries it conquered. To promote Japan’s centrality, and to prevent economic activities by rival countries, it
reformed and managed local economies in a regional network, standardizing the region’s currency in a “yen bloc” and
dispatching Japanese banks throughout the area so that they controlled the majority of the region’s bank deposits. Tokyo also
created the Southern Development Bank, which provided financial services and printed currency in occupied territories. Economic dominance
lets regional hegemons use economic coercion to advance their agendas. Similarly, in Eastern Europe after World War II, the Soviet Union relied
on economic and financial statecraft to dominate the region. Moscow blocked all trade with Western Europe and forbade Eastern European
states from accepting aid under the 1948 Marshall Plan. Instead, it created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to manage and
integrate the regional economy. Soviet investment, trade agreements, and trade credits made Eastern European countries economically
dependent on Moscow, both as their primary export market and as their supplier of raw materials and energy. And by selling raw materials at
below-market prices, Moscow
encouraged local political leaders to become dependent on its subsidies.
Economic dominance lets regional hegemons use economic coercion to advance their agendas. In Latin
America, the United States has long sought to coerce countries through sanctions. In addition to the long-standing (and failed) U.S. embargo of
Cuba, Washington used financial pressure to weaken President Salvador Allende in Chile in the 1970s and embargoed Nicaragua to undermine
the Sandinista government in 1985. Similarly, in Eastern Europe, Moscow sought to control independent-minded leaders, imposing sanctions
against Yugoslavia in 1948, Albania in 1961, and Romania in 1964. Beijing has already begun to employ such economic
coercion. In 2017, China punished South Korea and the Japanese–South Korean business conglomerate Lotte for cooperating with the U.S.-
built THAAD missile defense program. (Lotte had sold the land on which THAAD was deployed to the South Korean government.) Beijing
banned Chinese tour groups from visiting South Korea, Chinese regulators closed 80 percent of Lotte supermarkets and other Korean-owned
businesses (ostensibly for fire-code violations), and state-run media urged boycotts of Korean products. Beijing has also used economic
coercion against Japan (banning the export of Chinese rare-earth metals to the country after a 2009 ship collision) and Norway (embargoing
Norwegian fish exports after the Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010). And in 2016, when Mongolia hosted the
Dalai Lama, Beijing imposed extra fees on commodities moving through the country and froze all diplomatic activity—including negotiations
about a $4 billion Chinese loan. “We hope that Mongolia has taken this lesson to heart,” the Chinese foreign ministry said in a statement.
Apparently it has: the Mongolian government has announced that the spiritual leader will not be invited back. Such coercion will be less
necessary in the future as leaders preemptively adjust their policies with Beijing in mind. Consider
the Philippines: in the past, the
country has stood up to China—for example, filing a complaint about Chinese territorial assertiveness with an international tribunal
at The Hague in 2013. But more recently, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who has received $24 billion in investment
pledges from Beijing, has warmed relations with China and distanced his country from the United States. Following the
example of previous hegemons, China is also expanding its regional military reach. Since the 1990s,
Chinese military spending has soared, and the CCP is modernizing weaponry and reforming its military
organizations and doctrine. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has adopted the doctrine of “anti-access,
area denial” to push the U.S. military away from its shores and airspace. China has also built the region’s largest
coast guard and controls a vast militia of civilian fishing vessels. In 2017, the PLA opened its first overseas military base in
Djibouti; it will likely build more bases along the African east coast and the Indian Ocean in coming years. Meanwhile, in the South
China Sea, China has built six large islands that house air force bases, missile shelters, and radar and
communications facilities. Already, the U.S. military finds itself constrained by the expanding bubble of Chinese air
defenses, by China’s growing ability to find and strike U.S. naval vessels, and by an increased missile threat to U.S. air bases and ports.
Beijing is using these capabilities to more forcefully assert its territorial claims. By transiting disputed
waters and massing ships there, Beijing is pressuring Japan militarily over a cluster of small islands called the Diaoyu by China
and the Senkaku by Japan. Elsewhere, to deny access to disputed areas, the PLA swarms fishing and coast guard vessels, and
fires water cannons at other countries’ ships. Last summer, after asserting ownership of an oil-rich area in
Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, Beijing threatened to use military force if Vietnam did not stop drilling.
Vietnam stopped drilling. Contemporary China’s quest for regional military dominance follows the behavior of previous regional
hegemons, including China itself. As the historian Peter Perdue has argued, modern China is a product of invasions that
subdued all of modern Xinjiang and Mongolia, and reached Tibet, as well. Chinese dynasties, he has written, “never shrank from
the use of force,” including the “righteous extermination” of rival states and rebels. Throughout Asia, Chinese military garrisons subdued
invaders and pirates. Subsequent hegemons dominated their regions through military force, too. Starting in the late
nineteenth century, the United States began to build what would become the Western Hemisphere’s preeminent military. In that period, the
United States acquired territory through numerous wars against Mexico and Spain. Over the next few decades (often to
advance the United States’ commercial interests), U.S. forces invaded Latin American countries more than 20 times,
most often the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, and Nicaragua. During the Cold War, the United States repeatedly used
military force to counter leftist movements in Latin America: it blockaded Cuba in 1962, sent troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965, mined
Nicaraguan harbors in the 1980s, and invaded Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. Japan also built and maintained its empire
through military force. Its nineteenth-century military modernization yielded stunning victories over China and Russia. Through these
and other military campaigns, Japan seized territories such as Korea and Taiwan and wrested colonial possessions from France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. The Japanese military then administered the empire, fighting counterinsurgencies and suppressing
independence movements. In Europe after World War II, the Soviet Union dominated its sphere of influence with the
region’s most powerful army. It stationed troops in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. To shape the region to its
liking, the Kremlin was willing to use force. It dispatched Soviet troops to quell uprisings in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. These
hegemons did not tolerate the presence of rival great powers in their regions. Likewise, China today is
chafing against the U.S. presence in Asia and actively working to undermine it. Chinese officials and defense white papers
criticize U.S. alliances as outdated and destabilizing. Xi himself, calling for a new “Asian security architecture,” has argued that these
relationships fail to address the region’s complex security needs. Meanwhile, by cultivating close ties with Seoul and
encouraging the Philippines’ tilt toward China, Beijing has sought to draw U.S allies away. NOSY NEIGHBOR Beijing is also interfering
in the domestic politics of other countries. Citing China specifically, Canadian intelligence officials have warned of foreign
agents who might be serving as provincial cabinet ministers and government employees. And in 2016, a scandal
erupted in Australia after it was revealed that Sam Dastyari, a senator who had defended Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea,
had financial ties to a Chinese firm, prompting new laws banning foreign political donations. Historically, regional hegemons have
intervened extensively in domestic politics to support friendly governments and undermine parties and leaders perceived as hostile. Within
China’s tribute system, the emperor delegated the administration of subservient states to local leaders, an approach known as “using
barbarians to govern barbarians.” But local independence went only so far. As the sixteenth-century statesman Chang Chu-cheng said of such
vassals, “Just like dogs, if they wag their tails, bones will be thrown to them; if they bark wildly, they will be beaten with sticks; after the
beating, if they submit again, bones will be thrown to them again; after the bones, if they bark again, then more beating.” Japan
similarly
intervened in domestic politics during its imperial heyday. In the Philippines, for example, it abolished all political
parties except for the pro-Japanese one. Elsewhere, it delegated control to friendly local leaders and police, and trained such
leaders at institutes in Japan. If officials in China, Korea, and Manchuria did not cooperate, Tokyo relied on a Japanese paramilitary organization
that intimidated, blackmailed, and assassinated local leaders. For its part, the
United States meddled in Latin American
politics countless times. Through the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, Washington claimed the right to intervene in its
neighbors’ affairs. It relied on covert and overt, violent and nonviolent methods to support anticommunist leaders and
to undermine or depose leftist ones. The U.S. diplomat Robert Olds explained the approach in blunt terms in 1927: “Central America has always
understood that governments which we recognize and support stay in power, while those which we do not recognize and support fall.” During
the Cold War, the U.S. military and the CIA funded, armed, and trained anticommunist forces throughout Latin America at institutions such as
the U.S. Army School of the Americas in Panama. U.S.-trained forces sought to depose leftist governments in Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, and
Nicaragua. Washington also supported coups in Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973. Moscow was similarly busy in Eastern
Europe. After World War II, the Soviet Union installed communist parties in its neighbors’ governments, in which advancement depended on
loyalty to Moscow. Under Stalin, Soviet secret police harassed, tortured, and murdered opposition leaders. After Stalin, the Soviets relied on
subtler tactics, such as bringing foreign elites to train in communist party schools and to build networks with Soviet and regional politicians.
Through the Brezhnev Doctrine, Moscow claimed the authority to intervene in its neighbors’ politics in order to defend socialism from hostile
forces.
 Zero-Sum
US and China use arms sales to compete for influence, it’s 0 sum – exhaustive study of
sales between 2008 and 2017
Huang 18 (Kristen Huang; Journalist at SCMP citing SIPRI; “China’s arms sales rise as it vies with US for
influence on the world stage”; 3/12/2018; South China Morning Post, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute; https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2136877/chinas-
arms-sales-rise-it-vies-us-influence-world-stage)//Garfield-Ben

The rivalry between America and China has seen both sides step up international arms sales and transfers as they seek to
strengthen military ties with key allies, according to a report published on Monday. The study by the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which examined the volume of international transfers of major weapons between 2008
and 2017, showed China’s arms exports represented 5.7 per cent of the world’s share of arms exports between 2013-17 – up by more than
a third from the 4.6 per cent recorded between 2008-12. The report was published a week after China unveiled an 8.1 per cent increase in
military spending over a three-year period, although China’s state media defended the rise as proportionate and low, adding that it would not
lead to an arms race with the United States. The administration of US President Donald Trump has dubbed China as a “rival”, and the latest
SIPRI report shows how the
US has used arms transfers as a foreign policy tool to offset Beijing’s growing influence.
For example, US arms deliveries to India grew by 557 per cent between 2008 and 2017, the year China and India
became embroiled in a protracted border dispute over the Doklam region in the Himalayas. “This development is part of the
growing strategic partnership between the two countries under which the USA has begun to supply India with advanced military equipment,”
the report said. The US has also started to increase its security cooperation with Vietnam, which is embroiled in
a dispute with Beijing over the South China Sea. In 2017 it delivered one patrol ship, the USS Morgenthau, to
Vietnam – the first major US arms transfer to that country. Tensions between China and Japan in the East China
Sea also saw Japan moving closer to the US, the report said. It said Tokyo turned to the US for several types of
advanced weapons between 2013 and 2017, including the first batches of a total of 42 combat aircraft. Japan also ordered advanced air
and missile defence systems from the US in the same period. But in cases where US relations with other countries had
deteriorated the result was a fall in arms transfers. For example, the report said that Venezuela, which once relied
on the US as its main arms supplier, had rebuilt its armed forces with weapons from China and Russia after
ties with Washington soured following the Hugo Chavez’s election as president in 1999. As China became increasingly
capable of producing its own advanced weapons, its arms exports increased by 38 per cent and its arms imports
decreased by 19 per cent in 2013-2017 compared with 2008-2012. The report showed China delivered major arms to 48 countries
in the past five years, with Pakistan topping the list, followed by Bangladesh and Algeria. “China was the largest arms supplier to
Pakistan in 2008–12 and 2013–17. Although the volume of China’s arms exports to Pakistan remained roughly the same in both periods, its
share of Pakistan’s arms imports rose from 45 per cent in 2008–12 to 70 per cent in 2013–17 due to the overall decrease in Pakistan’s arms
imports between those periods,” the report stated. The report also said China’s arms exports to Africa rose by 55 per cent over the period.
Military expert Collin Koh, from the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said higher
value military items like warships and fighter jets were the major reason for the rise in China’s arms exports. “This is most notable in naval
sales. For example, submarines to Pakistan and Thailand, and corvettes to Bangladesh and Algeria. Even with land-based systems, China has
also made inroads in higher value sales, such as its long-range rocket artillery,” he said.

Interoperability issues guarantee that the weapons distribution is zero-sum

Benard 2018 - visiting fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, is managing partner of an American
private equity firm focused on Asia and Africa
Alexander, "US needs to sell more weapons as Russia and China fill the breach," Jul 4, The Australian

WORLD COMMENTARY National security is hurt by excessive restrictions America’s

arms-sales policies are too restrictive,
leading even some pro-US countries to buy weapons from Russia and China. This year’s National Defence Authorisation Act
would give Defence Secretary Jim Mattis authority to waive certain new restrictions for specific countries enacted by congress last year. But the
problem is more fundamental:
The US arms-sale regime needs to be recalibrated to protect American influence
in a highly competitive geopolitical environment. The US government blocks weapons sales to foreign countries for various
reasons. Congress is often wary of selling arms to countries that could use them to undermine civil liberties. The Defence Department often
worries the purchasing country could allow sensitive US technology to fall into the wrong hands. The State Department arms-control bureau
has a general aversion to any weapons proliferation on grounds that it could trigger an arms race. These are valid concerns. But
as Russia
and China actively pursue weapons sales as part of an aggressive strategy to expand their spheres of
influence, US strategic interests must be given more weight. Over the past decade, Russia has easily maintained its
position as the world’s second-largest weapons supplier, comprising 22 per cent of global sales from 2013-17. Chinese arms exports
increased by nearly 40 per cent from 2013-17 compared with the previous four years, the largest increase for
any large exporter country except Israel, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Neither Russia nor China
has qualms about selling weapons to even brazen human-rights violators. In fact they often provide the
technologies authoritarian governments use to surveil and repress their citizens. And they are especially eager to
peel off countries the US has declined to arm. Russia sells aircraft, submarines, anti-aircraft systems and missiles. China has made strides in
advanced missile systems as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. The sale of these sophisticated weapons poses a direct threat to US security
interests. It also creates challenges around interoperability. Technologies developed by the Russians and Chinese — such as advanced radars,
sonars, sensors and communications platforms — cannot integrate effectively with US technologies. The
more a country purchases
from Russia or China, the less able it is to purchase from the US in the future, pushing a country further
out of America’s security orbit. The lack of interoperability would also present major obstacles if the US
needed to fight a war alongside an ally whose advanced military equipment had been sourced from
Russia or China. Countries cut off by the US will still be able to purchase advanced systems. Worse, they
will be able to do so without depending on the US for maintenance, ammunition or spare parts. This
eliminates a key lever for US influence in the event that human-rights abuses occur, for instance.
 AT: China Tech Sucks
Chinese capabilities are on par with the US, maybe better
Wolf 2019 - Citing a report from former deputy defense secretary Robert Work
Andy, "China willing to do whatever it can to surpass the U.S. military," Jun 9,
https://warisboring.com/china-willing-to-do-whatever-it-can-to-surpass-the-u-s-military/

The Chinese military is reportedly close to achieving technological parity with the United States, just one
step in China’s plan to achieve global dominance. According to a report by former deputy defense
secretary Robert Work, the Chinese are looking to surpass the United States and keep them trailing behind
at all costs. “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has been patiently stalking the US military for two decades,” the report read. “It has
studied the preferred American way of war and devised a strategy to exploit its weaknesses and offset its strengths- particularly its military-
technological strengths.” Work added that China “appears increasingly close to achieving technological parity with
U.S. operational systems and has a plan to achieve technological superiority.” China’s plan to push the U.S. off of its
pedestal began in the late 1990s and early 2000s, though actual catching up took longer than expected. According to Newsweek, China has
largely relied upon industrial and technical espionage to establish some form of equal footing with the
US, though some innovation has been home-grown. China’s military budget is the world’s second largest, trailing behind the
USA but with more focus on materials. “Every day we wait, we fall farther and farther behind,” Work said.
 AT: Interoperability
Chinese weapons are cheap – easy to fill-in.
CSIS 18 (Center for Strategic and International Studies; Founded by Georgetown University in 1962,
ranked the number one think tank in the world; “How dominant is China in the global arms trade?”;
5/29/2018; CSIS; https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/)//Garfield-Ben
For most of the 1980s and 1990s, weapons sales to Africa represented less than 15 percent of its total arms exports. As China has worked to
expand its foothold in the region, this number has grown. Since 2008, countries in Africa collectively purchased around 21 percent ($3 billion
since 2008) of China’s overall arms exports. Northern African countries are the primary destination of Chinese weapons, constituting 42 percent
of Chinese exports to the continent. An additional 29 percent flows into to Eastern Africa, and the remaining 29 percent are divided between
other African states. This relatively wide market distribution is somewhat unusual for major arms traders. Of the $4.9 billion of US arms
exported to Africa over the last decade, roughly 87 percent were purchased by Egypt and Morocco. Similarly, Algeria and Egypt accounted for
84 percent of Russian arms transfers in Africa over the same period. In terms of trade value, Russia leads the pack at $12.4 billion in sales since
2008. The US tallied less than half of that at $4.9 billion, while China sold around $3 billion. That said, Chinese weaponry is becoming
increasingly attractivedue in part to its cost-effectiveness. Although Chinese arms are often less advanced than those sold by
other countries, the
DOD notes that “Chinese arms are less expensive than those offered by the top
international arms suppliers… [but still] have advanced capabilities.” For example, the low-cost K-8 jet trainer
is estimated to make up 80 percent of all jet trainer aircraft in Africa. China is actively working to strengthen its
foothold in certain markets, such as Algeria. China’s exports to the North African country totaled $483 million between 2008 and
2014, but jumped to $247 million in 2015 alone and peaked at $499 million in 2016 as several weapon orders were fulfilled. These
procurements included three C-28A frigates, which were ordered by Algeria in 2012.

They’ll just reverse engineer the tech anyways

CSIS 18 (Center for Strategic and International Studies; Founded by Georgetown University in 1962,
ranked the number one think tank in the world; “How dominant is China in the global arms trade?”;
5/29/2018; CSIS; https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/)//Garfield-Ben

Unlike most other regions where China is a net exporter of arms, Europe presents a different story. More than 99 percent of China’s
total arms imports ($12.8 billion) come from Europe, while it exports a paltry $16 million of its own weapons to the continent. This
trend is driven by and large by Russia, which supplies China with 67 percent of foreign arms. France and Ukraine collectively supply an
additional 23 percent of these imports. Historically Russian arms have poured over the border to China, but this trend is
shifting. Russian arms sales to China averaged $2.5 billion through the 2000s until 2006, but this figure dropped to around 900
million in recent years. This downturn has reduced the market share of Russian arms exports obtained by China from 47.7 percent of total
sales in 2006 to 8.7 percent in 2012. Historically Russian arms have poured over the border to China, but this trend is shifting. Russian arms
sales to China averaged $2.5 billion through the 2000s until 2006, but this figure dropped to around 900 million in recent years. This downturn
has reduced the market share of Russian arms exports obtained by China from 47.7 percent of total sales in 2006 to 8.7 percent in 2012. This
trend reflects China’s growing capability to domestically produce weapons, which in many cases has
been supported by the successful reverse engineering of existing technology. For instance, the
Shenyang J-11 fighter was adopted from the Russia Su-27k that Beijing first purchased in 1992. It has
been suggested that China’s HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles were inspired by Russia’s S-300 platform.
China’s economic growth has also contributed to this shift. China spends more on research and development than any
other country except the United States. The nature of Chinese arms imports is also changing. Whereas in the past China procured entire
weapons systems, it is increasingly purchasing specific components that can be outfitted on platforms designed and built at home. Of particular
note is China’s longstanding need to acquire foreign engines to counterbalance its struggles to indigenously produce them. Between 2012 and
2016, China purchased over 420 aircraft engines from Russia, along with four Sukhoi Su-35s. This represents a reversal from 1997 to 2001 when
China bought only four engines but 79 finished aircraft from Russia.
 AT: China Violates Law
China follows norms – their weapons are compatible.
CSIS 18 (Center for Strategic and International Studies; Founded by Georgetown University in 1962,
ranked the number one think tank in the world; “How dominant is China in the global arms trade?”;
5/29/2018; CSIS; https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/)//Garfield-Ben
China is actively working to strengthen its foothold in certain markets, such as Algeria. China’s exports to the North African country totaled
$483 million between 2008 and 2014, but jumped to $247 million in 2015 alone and peaked at $499 million in 2016 as several weapon orders
were fulfilled. These procurements included three C-28A frigates, which were ordered by Algeria in 2012. Although not a member of
the Missile Technology Control Regime, a non-proliferation agreement targeted at missiles and systems capable of delivery
weapons of mass destruction, Beijing is generally compliant with international protocols. The 2002 Regulations on
the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, for instance, outlines measures to
safeguard against proliferation. In June 2017, China published a draft of the Export Control Law, which if
enacted will update existing legislation and establish a comprehensive export control regime. Beijing has
been quick to adapt its domestic regulations to account for emerging technology. This has enabled it to fill the void left
by other suppliers. The US, which has long been at the forefront of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development, has purposely restricted the
export of its UAVs. Regulations that until recently characterized long-range unmanned aerial systems as cruise missiles, have also limited
overseas access of American UAVs. These factors have created a ripe market opportunity for China, which has made its UAVs available to
countries such as Nigeria and Egypt.
 AT: Arms Control
China won’t follow international arms control norms – Chinese Foreign Ministry
O’Connor 19 (Tom O’Connor; Staff Writer specializing in the Middle East, North Korea and other
foreign conflicts; “China ‘will never’ join arms control deal with the US and Russia, says Donald Trump
has not even followed past agreements”; 5/20/2029 Newsweek; https://www.newsweek.com/china-
arms-deal-us-russia-1431025//Garfield-Ben

China dismissed the possibility of entering into negotiations for a trilateral arms control deal alongside
the United States and Russia, highlighting that the U.S. had failed to uphold its international commitments. At a news briefing
Monday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang warned of "growing instabilities and
uncertainties in the field of international strategic security," specifically pointing out how a "certain major country has
withdrawn from one international treaty and mechanism after another while building up its own nuclear
and missile power." The remarks came as President Donald Trump attempted to get Beijing to join new non-proliferation agreements as
Washington had abandoned previous agreements with Moscow. Lu argued that such moves "impacted global stability, eroded
strategic mutual trust between major countries and weakened international arms control mechanism."
He said that "China and Russia both believe that they need to strengthen the planning of strategic
cooperation, adhere to multilateralism, firmly check the negative tendency and resist the harm of
unilateralism." "As to the trilateral negotiations on arms control, China's position is clear-cut," Lu added.
"The premise and basis for trilateral arms control negotiations do not exist at all, and China will never
participate in them." In February, the White House withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a measure
that banned the U.S. and Russia from deploying land-based missiles with ranges between 310 and 3,420 miles. Washington argued that
Moscow's Novator 9M729 missile violated the agreement's restrictions, while Russian officials rejected this and counterclaimed that the
Pentagon's own Aegis Ashore defense system in Eastern Europe could be used offensively, thus violating the treaty. Though China was not a
party to the agreement, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang called the U.S. move "regrettable" at the time and warned it could "trigger
a series of adverse consequences." Asked if China would join a new INF, Geng said such a move "involves a series of complex issues covering
political, military and legal fields, which draws concerns from many countries" and "what is imperative at the moment is to uphold and
implement the existing treaty instead of creating a new one." Since then, the Trump
administration suggested it might also
consider letting the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) expire and instead seek a three-way arrangement
with Moscow and Beijing. The New START is itself a sequel to the original START treaty signed in 1991 by the U.S. and Soviet Union, and
expanded on restrictions to both countries' nuclear arsenals.
IMPACTS
 ! – China Rise
China’s aspirations will spark a war with the US
Pickrell 2015 - Master’s in IR, currently pursuing a PhD in IR and Diplomacy at Central China Normal
University. Ryan, "The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?,"
Oct 26, nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-
14168?page=3
Conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable as most realist scholars suggest. However, in every relationship,
there is a tipping point or a point of no return, and China and the United States are rapidly approaching this point. As
traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to resolve the more challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these
two great powers have been increasingly relying on their military capabilities and hard power tactics. That’s especially true in the South
China Sea, which is one of the single greatest points of contention between China and the United States. While there is a
realization on both sides of the Pacific that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the
United States remain unwilling to compromise and make the kind of meaningful concessions required to
move the relationship further from confrontation and conflict and closer to cooperation and rapprochement. Instead, these
two countries are drawing lines in the sand and preparing for the worst. Failed pursuit of strategic stability China’s proposed solution to the
Sino-American strategic stability issue is the “new model of major-country relations,” which encourages the United States and China to avoid
confrontation and conflict, respect one another’s political systems and national interests—specifically China’s core interests—and pursue win-
win cooperation. China is exceptionally enthusiastic about this proposal and brings it up at every high-level Sino-American meeting. Chinese
enthusiasm for the “new model of major-country relations” can be explained in a number of different ways. American acceptance
of
China’s proposal would facilitate Beijing’s rise, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a leader for
national strength and revival and reduce the likelihood of American containment. As acceptance of the “new
model of major-country relations” would create an international environment conducive to China’s rise, it would essentially allow China to
become the preeminent power in Asia without great power competition or conflict. This proposal also has the potential to put China on par
with the United States, to elevate it to an equal status, one acknowledged by the United States. Not
only would American
recognition of China’s strength and power have effects abroad, but it would also stoke Chinese
nationalism and strengthen CCP leadership at home. Furthermore, this new model is a means of establishing a new code
of conduct for the Sino-American relationship that is more in line with Chinese national interests, opening the door for the creation of a Chinese
sphere of influence in Asia and, potentially, a Sino-centric regional order. Prior to the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi
announced that China’s proposed “new model of major-country-relations” would be an important discussion point for the meeting, but, while
this proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear progress was made. Because U.S. leaders believe that the “new model of major-
country relations” is not in America’s best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed China’s proposal. As the hegemonic power, the
United States maintains its power by dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework alternative proposed by a strategic rival
requires sacrificing a certain amount of power and influence. Along those same lines, acceptance
of China’s proposal might give
other states in the international system the impression that the United States is in decline and on the losing
end of the classic “Thucydides trap.” Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United States to respect China’s “core
interests”— as many Chinese and foreign scholars have noted—is a loaded statement. While the United States is not opposed to respecting a
state’s national interests, it tends to be unwilling to respect national interests which are highly contested, which is the situation for the majority
of China’s “core interests.” In addition to traditional Chinese national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang,
China’s “core interests” also cover most of its territorial claims in Asia. The United States is concerned that
China’s “new model of major-country relations” is a ploy designed to trick the United States into
acknowledging China’s extensive territorial claims and undercutting the interests of American allies and long-
time strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region, which would likely result in the weakening of the American-led “hub-and-
spoke” security structure, a security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security Concept. There are also suspicions
in the United States that China’s proposal is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to which the Obama administration has
been consistently opposed. America’s approach to Sino-American strategic stability is to have China and the United States focus on cooperation
and agree to avoid letting competition in one area affect cooperation and collaboration in others. In many ways, this resembles China’s old
“shelving disputes and pursuing joint development” strategy for Asia. As this kind of strategy is the geopolitical equivalent of sweeping dirt
under the rug, it is only effective to a point. Eventually, the dirt spills out. Sooner or later, unaddressed problems surface. At best, this approach
is only a temporary stop on the road to functional strategic stability. At worst, this approach has already outlived its usefulness. China views this
strategy as an attempt by the United States to avoid addressing China’s demands that the United States acknowledge China’s rise to great
power status and redefine the relationship accordingly, which only encourages the already strong Chinese desire to push forward the “new
model of major-country relations.” China and the United States are at an impasse regarding strategic stability. While
both states have
made commitments and promises to prevent great power conflict, neither China nor the United States has
developed a reasonable or implementable solution for Sino-American strategic stability. Thus, competition
continues unmanaged, unchecked and confrontation is steadily evolving into conflict. Drawing Lines in the “Sea” The problems pushing the
Sino-American relationship towards conflict are numerous and diverse, but if you are looking for the issue most likely to cause conflict, you
need look no further than the South China Sea. China perceives the territorial disputes in this area as issues in which aggressive foreign state
actors led by the United States are threatening China’s territorial sovereignty. For China, because of its history, territorial sovereignty issues
implicate regime survival in a way that transcends all other quarrels and disagreements. The
United States, on the other hand, views
China’s territorial claims and actions to bolster those claims as Chinese expansionism, aggression against
American allies and strategic partners, and a threat to the guiding principles of the liberal world order—which the United States
views as crucial for the preservation of America’s global hegemonic power. The situation in the South China Sea has been steadily escalating for
several years now. In April, 2014, American defense secretary Chuck Hagel met with Chinese defense minister Chang Wanquan. During the
meeting, Hagel said, “All parties should refrain from provocative actions and the use of intimidation, coercion, or aggression to advance their
claims. Such disputes must be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law.” Chang replied, “I’d like to reiterate that the
territorial sovereignty issue is a Chinese core interest. On this issue, we will make no compromises, no concessions. Not even a tiny bit of
violation will be allowed.” The inability to discuss openly or compromise on this issue has made it impossible to resolve and has led to
escalation and increased tension. In the aftermath of this meeting, China began investing heavily in island construction and land reclamation
activities in disputed waters. As these activities have stirred up a lot of dust in the region, the United States has demanded that China abandon
its present course of action, insisting that it is provocative and negatively impacting regional peace and stability. Not
only has China
dismissed America’s demands, it has also increased its military presence in contested areas in order to
establish anti-access zones. While China claims that its actions are within the scope of international law, the United States asserts
that Chinese actions are in violation of the law of the sea and laws for the regulation of the international commons. China argues that the South
China Sea issue is a territorial sovereignty issue, yet the United States regards this issue as a freedom of navigation dispute, as well as a fight for
the preservation of the international legal system—a cornerstone for the American-led liberal world order. In August of this year, the United
States launched its new Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, which aims “to safeguard the freedom of the seas, deter conflict and escalation,
and promote adherence to international law and standards.” The Asia-Pacific region is now at the heart of the American naval security agenda.
In response, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said that China “opposes any country’s attempt to challenge China’s territorial
sovereignty and security under the pretext of safeguarding navigation freedom.” Responding to Chinese criticisms of America’s new regional
maritime security strategy, American Defense Secretary Ashton Carter stated, “Make no mistake, we will fly, sail, and operate wherever
international law permits…We will do that at times and places of our choosing.” In 2014, the United States carried out “freedom of navigation”
exercises in various parts of the world and challenged the territorial claims of 18 different countries; however, the United States has yet to
officially challenge China’s claims in the South China Sea. But, that may soon change, as the United States is currently considering sending
American naval vessels within 12 nautical miles of China’s artificial islands in order to force China to end its land reclamation activities. Such
plans are considered aggressive, dangerous and extremely provocative by the Chinese. A recent Global Times editorial read, “China mustn’t
tolerate rampant US violations of China’s adjacent waters and the skies over these expanding islands. The Chinese military should be ready to
launch countermeasures according to Washington’s level of provocation.” The article further stated, “If the US encroaches on China’s core
interests, the Chinese military will stand up and use force to stop it.” The article stated plainly, “If the US adopts an aggressive approach, it will
breach China’s bottom line, and China will not sit idly by.” Other reports from this newspaper, a state-sponsored Chinese media outlet, have
made it clear that if
the bottom line for the United States is that China must end all of its land reclamation
activities in the South China Sea, then war is inevitable, which suggests that this issue may be the tipping
point for the Sino-American relationship. How the United States and China choose to move forward on this issue will
permanently redefine the relationship between these two great powers. Granted, this may just be saber rattling, but even if that is the case,
this issue is still decidedly zero-sum—which increases the likelihood of conflict. For China, political
preservation and a potential Chinese sphere of influence are on the line, and for the United States, the
liberal world order and American hegemony are at stake. Sooner or later, this trying issue will need to be resolved, and
regardless of whether it is resolved through diplomacy or military force, it will take a toll on the geopolitical influence of either one or both
countries. Were the international institutions for collective security strong enough to handle situations like this when they arise—and if China
and the United States were willing to establish a new relationship model which addresses each country’s respective security concerns and
encourages effective collaboration—it might actually be possible to resolve this issue peacefully. But given current circumstances, this is little
more than idealism and wishful thinking. As there is currently
no clear solution to this problem that would allow
both countries to walk out of this situation with their heads held high, these two states are pondering
the unthinkable. Depending on each country’s level of commitment and resolve, this situation may have already passed the tipping point.
The outcome of the geopolitical power struggle between China and the United States will almost
certainly be decided in the South China Sea. Some have suggested that the South China Sea issue is not a Sino-American issue.
On the contrary, it is the most pressing Sino-American issue. One side will either choose to back down or be forced to
back down. No matter how everything plays out in the South China Sea, geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific
region will never be the same again.

Containment is the only way to prevent bandwagoing and arms races, impact
outweighs the entire aff
Haddick 2014 -an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command
Robert, Fire on the Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 39-40
Whether a Sinocentric structure in Asia is a subconscious Chinese goal or not, there are enough lingering fears elsewhere in the region about
this prospect to create active resistance to the concept. Simply put, we should expect Japan, India, Vietnam, the
Philippines, and many others to resist the establishment of a new Middle Kingdom. Should the United
States scale back its security role in the region, that resistance would also occur, only in more unstable and
dangerous forms. It is important to discuss why China's neighbors tolerate-indeed, even welcome-U.S. security hegemony
in the region and why, by contrast, these same countries would strongly resist Chinese hegemony. There is a
structural reason why this is so, and it relates to geography and is therefore enduring: China is a large neighbor in the region
and the United States is not. Because the United States has to project its presence across a vast ocean, it
requires the permission of most countries in the region to continue its role as the security hegemon. The
United States requires bases, access rights, and negotiated agreements with local governments to fulfill its security guarantees. If these
governments withdrew their permission due, say, to bad American behavior, the United States would find it
difficult and costly to sustain its presence across the ocean in the face of broad resistance. China, by contrast, is a
permanent presence in the region that the neighbors can never dislodge. Should China engage in the
same bad behavior, these countries cannot make China go away. They can only fight or accept China's
treatment. It is therefore easier for the countries in the region to enter into a security contract with an outside power, knowing they have
some bargaining leverage and an escape clause. When dealing with a powerful neighbor like China that isn't going
anywhere, the only way to achieve the same bargaining leverage is to match that neighbor's power,
especially its military power. And that implies arms races and spiraling security dilemmas.10 Thus, hegemons are
not all created equal. It is easier to strike a bargain with an outside hegemon than with a local one-an
immutable reason why the U.S. security presence will be welcome in the region. Even more crucially, U.S. service as the region's
security hegemon is much more likely to result in stability than if the region were left alone to find its
own stable structure (more on this below}. Adding to America's attractiveness as an outsider are the United States' seven-decade
record of keeping the region's commons open for all and its not having territorial disputes with
countries in the region. The logic behind why most countries in the region welcome the United States as the
security hegemon, and why most would resist China attempting to play the same role, is a strong
argument for maintaining this arrangement. Which brings us to Global Trends' second pathway, the Hobbesian scramble for
security, as the most likely outcome should the United States opt to reduce its costs by withdrawing from the region. As this chapter will later
explore, this outcome would very likely trigger multisided missile and nuclear arms races across the
region, with unpredictable and unstable consequences. The risk of military disaster inside the most important economic
region in the world would rise abruptly. The U.S. economy and standard of living would not escape the risks and
costs of these developments. It is easy to see how the absence of the United States as an outside
security provider could result in a dangerously unstable security competition in East Asia. The rapid rise
of China's military power would create the logic for an offsetting alliance by most of its neighbors. Some
however (perhaps, e.g., a future unified Korea) may choose to bandwagon with China instead, especially if historical grievances make allying
with some of China's adversaries politically unacceptable. Bandwagoning by some would increase the security anxiety
of the remainder that don't. Finally, some significant powers (e.g., Russia) might choose to remain unaligned, which would
compound the region's uncertainty because the players would have to ponder how these neutrals would eventually act during a regional crisis.
Should one or more countries conclude that stability was unachievable and conflict inevitable, the
calculation would then turn to the logic of security trends and time pressure and the possible advantage
gained by striking first rather than waiting for adversaries to grow even stronger in the future.
 T/ Every Impact
Chinese hegemonic leadership is destabilizing and counterproductive – makes every
impact more likely and turns the aff.
Friedberg 18 [Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University,
PhD in Government from Harvard, deputy assistant for national-security affairs and director of policy
planning in the office of the Vice President from 2003-2005. “Competing with China,” Survival: Global
Politics and Strategy, Vol. 60, No. 3, June-July 2018, pages 7-64, Taylor & Francis Online]

If there is a single theme that unifies much of what follows, it is the often underestimated importance of
political beliefs and ideology . America's post-Cold War strategy for dealing with China was rooted in prevailing liberal ideas about
the linkages between trade, economic growth and democracy, and a faith in the presumed universality and irresistible power of the human
desire for freedom. The strategy pursued by China's leaders, on the other hand, was, and still is, motivated first and
foremost by their commitment to preserving the C hinese C ommunist P arty's monopoly on domestic political
power. The CCP's use of militant nationalism , its cultivation of historic claims and grievances against foreign powers, and its
rejection of the idea that there are, in fact, universal human values are essential pieces of its programme for
mobilising popular support and bolstering regime legitimacy . It is impossible to make sense of the
ambitions, fears, strategy and tactics of China's present regime without reference to its authoritarian,
illiberal character and distinctive, Leninist roots. The intensifying competition between the U nited S tates and
China is thus driven not only by the traditional dynamics of power politics – that is, by the narrowing gap between a
preponderant hegemon and a fast-rising challenger – but also by a wide and deep divergence in values between their respective
regimes. The resulting rivalry is more intense , the stakes are higher , and the likelihood of a lasting
entente is lower than would otherwise be the case. The two powers are separated not only by divergent
interests, some of which could conceivably be reconciled, but by incompatible visions for the future of Asia
and the world . China's current rulers may not be trying actively to spread their own unique blend of repressive politics and
semimarket economics, but as they have become richer and stronger they have begun to act in ways that inspire and
strengthen other authoritarian regimes , while potentially weakening the institutions of young and developing
democracies. Beijing is also using its new-found clout to reach out into the world, including into the societies, economies
and political systems of the advanced industrial democracies, to try to influence the perceptions and policies of their people and
governments, and to suppress information and discourage the expression of opinions seen as threatening
to the CCP. If they wish to respond effectively to these new realities, American and allied policymakers cannot afford to downplay the
ideological dimension in their own strategy. Beijing's obsessive desire to squelch dissent, block the inward flow of

unfavourable news and discredit ‘so-called universal values’ bespeaks an insecurity that is, in itself, a form of
strategic vulnerability . China's rulers clearly believe the ideological realm to be a crucially important domain of competition, one that
they would be only too happy to see the United States and the other Western nations ignore or abandon.
 T/ Human Rights
If the US doesn’t sell weapons, it becomes impossible to pressure them over human
rights concerns
Benard 2018 - visiting fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, is managing partner of an American
private equity firm focused on Asia and Africa
Alexander, "US needs to sell more weapons as Russia and China fill the breach," Jul 4, The Australian

Countries cut off by the US will still be able to purchase advanced systems. Worse, they will be able to do
so without depending on the US for maintenance, ammunition or spare parts. This eliminates a key lever
for US influence in the event that human-rights abuses occur, for instance. Take Turkey. In 2016 and 2017 it had
been attempting to purchase helicopters and other technology from US manufacturers, but was turned down due to
concerns around deteriorating governance. Then late last year it acquired a sophisticated missile-
defence system from Russia for $US2.5 billion, an unprecedented move for a member of NATO. Vietnam’s relations with the US have
been pleasantly thawing, partly because of a common concern around China’s aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The US lifted its
arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, but residual concerns about human rights have largely limited sales
to sonars and radars. In addition the US has not provided meaningful military assistance to Vietnam to help offset costs. As a result,
Vietnam continues to purchase much of its military equipment from Russia, which often subsidises the
transactions. Or consider Thailand, traditionally one of America’s closest security partners in Asia. A 2014 coup caused concern about the
country’s trajectory and led the US to limit some weapons sales. China took immediate advantage, signing a deal to sell over $US1bn of
submarines to the Thai navy. Late last year Bangkok announced plans to establish a joint naval centre with Beijing to service those submarines,
as well as a joint arms factory to produce and maintain other military equipment. There are more examples around the world. As
the US
moves into a phase of more intense competition with Russia and especially China, its approach to arms
transfers must change.

Chinese sales will be worse for human rights

Aftergood 2019 - directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Steven, "Rising China Sells More Weapons," May 3, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2019/05/china-
weapons/
“In 2018, China’s arms sales increased, continuing a trend that enabled China to become the world’s fastest-growing arms supplier during the
past 15 years,” according to the 2019 China Military Power report published by the Department of Defense. “From 2013 through 2017, China
was the world’s fourth-largest arms supplier, completing more than $25 billion worth of arms sales.” “Arms transfers also are a
component of China’s foreign policy, used in conjunction with other types of military, economic aid, and development assistance
to support broader foreign policy goals,” the Pentagon report said. “These include securing access to natural resources
and export markets, promoting political influence among host country elites, and building support in international
forums.” Needless to say, the United States and other countries have long done the same thing, using arms
exports as an instrument of foreign policy and political influence. Up to a point, however, US arms sales are
regulated by laws that include human rights and other considerations. See U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights:
Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions, CRS In Focus, May 2, 2019. To assist soldiers in identifying Chinese weapons in the field, the
US Army has produced a deck of “playing cards” featuring various weapons systems. “The Worldwide Equipment Identification Playing Cards
enable Soldiers to be able to readily identify enemy equipment and distinguish the equipment from friendly forces. Cards can be used at every
level and across all services.” See Worldwide Equipment Identification Cards: China Edition, US Army TRADOC, April 2019.
 Petro-Yuan Scenario (v Saudi Arabia)
The plan causes Riyadh to rely on China, resulting in a petro-yuan and the death of
dollar heg
Ramani 2018 - PhD Candidate in IR @ Oxford
Samuel, "The Risks of the China-Saudi Arabia Partnership," Feb 17,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/the-risks-of-the-china-saudi-arabia-partnership/

Saudi Arabia’s Balancing Act Between China and the United States Even though Washington did not react strongly to
China’s emergence as Saudi Arabia’s largest trade partner in 2010, many U.S. policymakers are concerned that China will
make Saudi Arabia an unwitting pawn in its efforts to erode U.S. hegemony over global financial
markets. These concerns have risen sharply since Saudi Arabia’s Vice Minister of Economy and Planning Mohammed al-Tuwaijri announced
on August 24 that Saudi Arabia planned to partially cover its budget deficit in Chinese yuan to reduce its financial dependency on the U.S.
dollar. Many American economists have expressed alarm at Saudi Arabia’s willingness to borrow in Chinese yuan, as
Riyadh’s decision
could cause other oil-exporting countries to abandon the U.S. dollar in favor of the “petro-yuan.” A marked
decline in the use of the U.S. dollar as the preferred credit-issuing currency by oil-producing countries would greatly weaken the U.S. dollar’s
long-term viability as a global reserve currency. Asthe United States views its alliance with Saudi Arabia as the
lynchpin of its Middle East strategy, Washington will likely react strongly if Riyadh uses its influence
within OPEC to strengthen the Chinese yuan. As Saudi Arabia remains dependent on U.S. arms sales to
pursue its geopolitical objectives in the Middle East and counter Iran, intense U.S. pressure would likely
cause Riyadh to distance itself from Beijing, limiting economic integration between the two countries. In addition to setting
informal limits on the scope and nature of Saudi Arabia’s economic partnership with China, Riyadh’s dependence on U.S. military
equipment restricts its ability to purchase large quantities of Chinese arms. Historically, Saudi Arabia has
only purchased arms from China to pressure the United States into selling Riyadh highly sophisticated
weaponry. Saudi Arabia’s purchases of DF-3 missiles from China in 1987, and current procurements of Chinese stealth weaponry for military
use in Yemen, exemplify its tactical approach to arms deals with Beijing. As U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations have improved
considerably under Donald Trump, the need for Saudi Arabia to purchase arms from China will likely
decrease in the years to come. As Qatar has been able to covertly purchase Chinese SY-400 missiles with little U.S. scrutiny, and China has a
long-standing defense partnership with Iran, the Chinese government is likely to forge stronger defense links with Saudi Arabia’s chief rivals,
straining the Beijing-Riyadh partnership.

That puts the whole international order in jeopardy

Cao 2016 Lan, Fowler School of Law @ Chapman University, "Currency Wars and the Erosion of Dollar
Hegemony," Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol 38 Iss 1)
As George Soros succinctly described, “in the financial sphere the Bretton Woods institutions—the IMF and the World Bank—have lost their
monopoly position. Under Chinese leadership, a parallel set of institutions is emerging.”404 Soros noted that against this
context of
“rival camps” with China and Russia on one side and the United States on the other, “China has begun to
build a parallel set of financial institutions, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); the Asian Bond Fund
Initiative; the New Development Bank (formerly the BRICS Bank); and the Chiang Mai Initiative, which is an Asian regional multilateral
arrangement to swap currencies.”405 I have focused on the New Development Bank and on a myriad of other actions, from the various
ChinaRussia bilateral agreements, the historic gas deal, to demonstrate that the hegemony of the dollar is being eroded as more and more
countries seek to price oil and gas in a currency other than the dollar, such as the yuan. Since the closure of the gold window, the
dollar’s
unique status has been maintained partly by its linkage to oil. Breaking the dollar-oil link will be a
significant step toward bringing the world closer to a non-dollar-based regime. Hence, it is interesting to note that
whereas Saddam Hussein moved to price oil in a currency other than the U.S. dollar,406 Iraq post-Saddam Hussein is now committed to selling
oil in dollars.407 The search for hard assets such as oil, gas, gold and other natural resources has also
intensified. Gold in particular remains relevant to the international economy, despite vociferous claims to the contrary. It remains relevant
despite prior efforts to demote it. Take as an example the move by the IMF in January 1976 to convert the SDR “from a gold-backed reserve
asset to one referencing a basket of paper currencies.”408 Take as another example the deliberate effort by the United States during the Carter
administration to lower the price of gold by dumping 300 tons of it onto the international market.409 to show that dollars, rather than gold,
should be the global reserve currency. China’s
quest to internationalize the yuan and its recent inclusion in the
IMF’s SDR basket reflect not only Chinese desire “to use financial liberalization as an engine of growth”
but also its “ultimate ambition of replacing the US dollar as the dominant currency in the world.”410 It is
not only China but Russia as well that has stepped up efforts to increase its own gold reserves. From 2004 to 2013, Russian reserves increased
from 390 tons to over 1,000 tons.411 Through QE, massive printing of dollars has upset the complex relationship between the dollar and other
currencies tied to it, such as the yuan. Dollar devaluation has resulted in inflation in other countries, contributing to economic stress and
political revolutions in many parts of the world. Moreover, the
drive to repatriate gold in the post-2008-financial crisis
world must be seen in this context–of growing mistrust in the global financial system, in the same way that
mistrust during the Cold War drove Germany and other European countries to keep its gold stored in New York rather than risk confiscation by
the Soviets on the other side of the Iron Curtain. “If the United States or the U.K. suddenly deemed it necessary to confiscate foreign gold to
defend its paper currency in a crisis, that gold would be conveyed from the original owners to the possession of the United States or the
U.K.”412 As
there is mistrust in paper money such as the dollar, there is an increasing demand to
accumulate gold as a reserve asset. As Mario Draghi, head of the European Central Bank declared in 2013, “I never thought it wise
to sell [gold] because for central banks this is a reserve of safety. It’s viewed by the country as such. In the case of non-dollar countries, it gives
you a fairly good protection against fluctuations of the dollar.”413 This Article has connected seemingly disparate dots in the
international economic system to warn about the dangers that lie beneath the dollar’s apparent
strength. Before any serious efforts to defend the system can be mustered,414 the first task is to realize
that positive snapshots, a rallying stock market, a strong dollar, a robust economic recovery, or a
slowdown in China’s economy415 may in fact be deceiving because what lies beneath are fault lines that
pose fundamental danger to the postWorld War II international economic regime.
 Latin America Scenarios (v Small Arms)
Hemispheric leadership is key to global heg
**Maybe written by an undergrad.

Ciccarillo 16 [Simon Gaetano Ciccarillo, Dickinson College. 2016. "The Russia-Latin America Nexus:
Realism in the 21st Century."
https://scholar.dickinson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=student_work]

At this point, the long-term national interests of Russia and Latin America remain united in a desire for
economic prosperity, and the faster arrival of a multipolar world where both have relative influence over regions of
the world. To achieve this, Latin American nations and Russia seek to balance out power with the US in Latin
America for this purpose (as Latin America is not and will not likely be able to successfully enact policy in a united manner in any other area
of the world). Conclusions In an interview in 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that, “We are interested in strong, economically
stable and politically independent, united Latin America that is becoming an important part of the emerging polycentric world order.”30 Given
the past 15 years of Latin American movement toward a Russian-led sphere, it would seem as though the region wants to pursue the same
policy goals. The historical ties between the two regions create a basis from which current cooperation is not only easily facilitated but also
almost natural. If the realist school of thought is assumed to be true, then it would make sense that naturally, Latin America and Russia, both of
which have potential to exude more influence in their respective regions, would wish to see that expand onto the international stage, to a more
favorable context—a multipolar world. As Russia has begun a more aggressive foreign policy to display its
reinvigorated military and economy , it is in the position to pursue such goals further abroad, in Latin
America, which is yet unable to coherently influence the world outside its own region. Therefore, Russian leaders, with
experiences from the Cold War, will use realist, geopolitical strategy to confront perceived challenges to the nationalism that pervades its
policies – specifically the US. One of the best ways it has found, is to engage a region nearly devoid of US attention given current events, and
that has enough history with the US to have built up a resentment and desire for autonomy that would make an aligning of interests mutually
beneficial. For the US, the past historical grievances perceived by Latin America, combined with a lack of interest today, as well as a liberalist
foreign policy to date has not allowed it to sufficiently maintain its grip to the south of its borders. That said, the
inevitability of a
Russia-Latin America sphere , or the faster transition into multipolarism is not necessarily evident either.
However, there are measures the U nited S tates can take that would allow for a refocus on Latin America to
counter Russian intervention there. Those policies, which should theoretically take place within the next decade, would be
best to mimic Russian activity today. By pursuing economic and political dialogue with the region with
the mutually beneficial policies between equal partners, the US government can show Latin American
leaders that the era of the Monroe Doctrine has truly ended , as Secretary of State John Kerry announced at the end of
2013.31 This action alone is a significant step in the direction of mutual respect and moderation that could benefit the US. Fortunately, it also
shares a positive history with Latin America, and can use this to justify further involvement in supporting organizations like MERCOSUR, the
OAS, or others. Opening up political relations with Cuba by beginning dialogue between both governments
has also been a step noticed across Latin America as one in a positive direction. Unless the US is able to pursue
a moderate d approach to governments (particularly contrarian, anti-American governments) in the region, Latin America will
continue to drift toward Russia , creating an unfavorable world order in the future. In this case, moderation
includes countering Russian involvement in Latin American trade and political organizations, normalizing relations with “security threats” such
as Venezuela or Cuba that begins a more active and apologetic role in developing Latin America to their mutual benefit. The projection for
National Intelligence Council (NIC) 2030 in the Stalled Engines World, where the US draws inward and allows competitors to fill vacuums to
pursue their interests is not inevitable.32 At the moment, Russia has
illustrated the trend by successfully making inroads
into Latin America in an effort to create a balance against US hegemony as a unipolar state in the
international system today. Without action within the near future , this cooperation between Latin
America and Russia could create an unfavorable world order for the US as multipolarism comes to the
fore of the international system, but will certainly benefit Russia and Latin America to the extent of the investment in their
reinvigorated relationship.

New Latin American partnership staves off Chinese encroachment – that’s the litmus test for
hegemony
Cerna 11 [Michael, China Research Center, China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for
U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region, 4/15/11, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-
presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/]
With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with

Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the U nited S tates, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The
U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls from
Brazil and diversifies its investments, there
is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region.
These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences – primarily,
providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin
America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative

to U.S. influence presents a major problem. The third BRICS summit in April provided more insight into the potential consequences of
China’s growing place in Latin America via its relations with Brazil. One proposal to emerge from the summit of the five nations (Brazil, India, China, Russia and
South Africa) was a broad-based international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. The idea was to set up a new exchange rate mechanism that
would bypass the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of the world. In addition, banks of the five BRICS nations agreed to establish mutual credit lines in their local
currencies, not in U.S. currency. While the chances of such a proposal gaining support are debatable, it
sets a clear example of a possible
shift in power away from the U.S . and toward a more global organization, one that is arguably anchored by
China. If China becomes a preferred partner in Latin America, it will show that U.S. dominance around
the globe also is at risk . So what does China’s growing place in the region mean for the future? Depending on whom this question is posed to, there
are two probable answers. The first is that China’s intensifying relations with Latin America offer a clear sign of the end

of U.S. dominance in the region, and in a greater sense, the entire world . There is enough evidence to
show that the tides have changed in favor of China. The other answer is that it means nothing. The U.S. is obviously still the more
dominant power in the region, and Chinese presence will eventually subside, again leaving the United States as the region’s premier partner. The real answer

probably falls somewhere in the middle. Is China the preferred partner for Latin America? At this point, the definitive answer is no. However, the U nited
S tates should not take its place in the region for granted . There is clear evidence of an increasingly symbiotic relationship with
China throughout Latin America. While the U.S. is the most dominant trade partner to the region as a whole, it is losing ground in key countries, namely Brazil,
which is blossoming on the world stage and is emerging as the clear leader in the region. Increasing trade and investment can be beneficial for all, but the power
that China can derive from its growing economic influence could bring increased political and ideological influence that the U.S. might find unnerving. China already
has replaced the U.S. as the largest trading partner for Brazil and Chile, and is on pace to do the same in Peru and Venezuela. At the very least, this
should
cause the U.S. to pay more attention to its southern neighbors and take steps to make sure that China
only benefits economically and not politically at the expense of the U.S. The world will be watching . As it
stands, the Chinese are not broadening their relations with the region in a way that directly competes with the United States. China is strictly concerned with
commodities, including oil. U.S. President Barack Obama recently signed an agreement with Brazil’s Petrobras that will allow the oil company to drill in the Gulf of
Mexico. This symbolic move could cause tensions to increase as the world’s two largest oil consumers
battle over rights to Brazilian oil. In that regard, the competition may go beyond a race to Latin commodities and
move into the realm of fighting for political influence . It is odd to think that the United States would need to compete for
hemispheric dominance with a country on the other side of the globe, but China’s actions and increasing integration into the region

tell us that such a scenario may one day arise. Given the proximity and importance of Latin America to
the United States, this region could be the symbolic battle that best measures the continued
hegemony of the U.S. versus China.

Chinese leadership in Latin America collapses naval power and emboldens Chinese strikes on
Taiwan
Cropsey 18 [Seth Cropsey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and director of Hudson’s Center for
American Seapower. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the
Reagan and George H. W. Bush Administrations. 4/9. "China Sets Its Sights on South America."
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/04/09/china-sets-sights-south-america/]

China’s attempts to expand its influence in Latin America represent a critical , if understated, portion of this
policy of hedging against the U.S. threat. Indeed, Latin America represents a glowing opportunity for
Chinese planners to undermine U.S. power and reduce their own vulnerabilities . Latin American farms
produce 11 percent of global food and agriculture production value. Moreover, Latin America retains immense
resource wealth : The region’s mines extract significant portions of the world’s copper, silver, molybdenum, zinc, and lithium supplies.
Additionally, Latin America can serve as an alternative energy supplier for China, given Venezuela’s sustained oil
reserves and the increasing discovery of harder-to-extract resources like shale and oil sands. Not only does Latin America provide an effective
resource hedge—its markets will
also become increasingly important as Chinese leaders attempt to change
the country’s internal economic profile. Newly confirmed President-for-Life Xi Jinping has indicated that the next step in China’s
development will be an attempt to change its economy from a low-skill, labor-intensive export juggernaut to a more balanced system, in which
medium and high-skill exports are coupled with growing material imports, especially in China’s megacities. China’s
departure from
the ranks of producer-exporter nations will leave a significant gap in the global economy’s structure, as
Chinese firms increasingly seek to compete with American refined goods producers rather than support
the high-skill U.S. economy. Latin America is poised to fill China’s void . Its high levels of income inequality and
nearly 600-million population can support increasing economic industrialization, thus enabling China’s economic transition by serving as a base
for Beijing’s increasingly sophisticated economy. Moreover, Latin America’s markets will become increasingly attractive to Chinese producers.
Not only will Chinese medium-skill refined goods find their way to Latin America, but Chinese companies will also rely on the Latin American
upper class to consume an expanding set of high-skill products. The CCP has already begun working toward these long-term
objectives. Chinese firms have purchased Chilean and Peruvian copper mines and obtained major stakes in Venezuelan oil fields. Between 2015
and 2019, China’s leaders plan to invest $250 billion in the region and reach trade levels of $500 billion. China’s investment is aided by its lax
environmental and ethical standards, and the willingness of Chinese companies to accept higher levels of risk and extend more secure lines of
credit. The willingness to accept higher risk offers China a great deal of leverage. Sri Lanka’s experience serves as an example—the island nation
had to surrender the major port of Hambantota to China on a 99-year lease in order to repay its debts to Chinese firms. Additionally, it is
easy to envision the CCP supporting the small, elite classes of Latin American states to increase its
regional influence, at the detriment of democratic governance throughout the continent . Colombia ,
Bolivia , Brazil , and Panama are particularly vulnerable to these actions, due to present income disparities
within each country. By slowly decreasing its export relationship with the United States, China’s leaders can steadily
strengthen its political position and nullify the diplomatic and economic instruments that the U nited
S tates possesses to counter China. Given Chinese naval expansion projections over the next two decades, it is
essential to consider the possibility that Chinese aircraft carrier battle groups will project naval power
across the Pacific to Latin American coastlines, forcing the U.S. government to accept the loss of global
sea control, and by extension, the elimination of the international system it has cultivated for the past 70 years.
Growing Chinese influence in Latin America poses not only economic and security threats to U.S. interests, but an equally dangerous political
one. China lacks the ideological commitments of the Soviet Union, as shown by its willingness to support North Korea’s totalitarian system,
former President Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwean military dictatorship, and the explicitly Muslim Pakistan and Iran. Authoritarian

regimes are more pliable than democratic ones, especially when it comes to Chinese economic interests . They
lack the ethical scruples that limit representative governments, allowing fundamentally predatory economic practices that benefit the ruling
elite but harm all others. Over time, absent a counterbalancing force , Chinese pressure could progressively
reverse Latin American democratization , creating states hostile to America in its geopolitical
backyard . During the first years of the 20th century, the U.S. government gained control of the Panama Canal. In his characteristic manner,
President Theodore Roosevelt combined targeted displays of American power with inducements to local authorities to obtain a prize arguably
unparalleled in U.S. history. Much like its cousin in Egypt, the Panama Canal greatly shortened transit times between hemispheres. This
facilitated international trade, and more important, enabled U.S. warships to travel between the Pacific and Atlantic fleets, giving America
undisputed sea control over the Western Atlantic and Eastern Pacific. This forced Britain to accept America’s growing power, however
begrudgingly, setting the stage for the steady rise of the United States to global preeminence. China has abandoned its attempts to construct a
Nicaraguan Canal to compete with its Panamanian counterpart. Nevertheless, the episode, combined with growing Chinese investment in Latin
America, is illustrative. Equally revealing is China’s $65 billion investment plan in Latin America and the Caribbean states called the “Forum of
China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States,” an important Chinese vehicle for controlling the region’s natural resources
and raw materials. Surrendering control of these valuable commodities will diminish the independence of participating nations and prove
antithetical to their interests, but the allure of Chinese investments may be too strong. For the moment, Chinese
political pressure is
most apparent in the CCP’s attempts to shrink the pool of states that diplomatically recognize
Taiwan . Out of the 20 states that maintain full diplomatic relations with Taiwan, 11 of them are in the
Caribbean , Central America , or South America . There is a clear link between Chinese investment in
Panama over the past decade and Panama’s recent decision to recognize Beijing rather than Taipei .
China is a major trading partner for Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, four of the five Central
American states that recognize Taiwan. Several states, including the United States and the majority of its allies, maintain
unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, by chipping away at Taiwan’s official pool of partners, China

seeks to isolate Taiwan further . In the event of a military confrontation , Taiwan’s strategic partners,
particularly the U nited S tates, will need to justify defending a state that lacks UN recognition and is
only recognized by fewer than 5 percent of states . China’s involvement in Latin America will thus prove extremely useful,
for its long- and short-term goals, and in both its own region and America’s. Washington policymakers, whether elected or appointed, political
or military, have safely assumed that the United States is secure from foreign powers’ adventures to its south. International communism posed
an intermittent challenge to this proposition throughout the Cold War. Nevertheless, the Western Hemisphere has been viewed as a secondary,
or even tertiary, theater of great-power competition. Aside from infrequent applications of military force, law enforcement agencies have been
the major implements of American power in Latin America since 1945. This demonstrates the security of America’s regional position. Or at
least, it did up until now. China’s moves threaten to transform Latin American nations into strategic liabilities
for Washington. The United States has not faced a serious threat in its own hemisphere since the 19th century. Beijing’s diplomacy
and expanding economic influence in Latin America also seek to isolate Taiwan further , thus extending the
threat of Chinese power at strategic junctures on both sides of the Pacific .
 AT: China Peaceful
No peaceful rise
Mulgan 2016- prof of Japanese politics, U of New South Wales
Aurelia George, "China’s Rise as a Predator State," thediplomat.com/2016/03/chinas-rise-as-a-predator-
state/

China’s land grab and subsequent militarization of “islands” in the South China Sea have finally dispelled the myth
that its rise will be peaceful. Indeed, these developments point to an unwelcome fact – that China has become a predator
state. Rand’s Michael Mazarr wrote about predator states in the late 1990s. He argues that what distinguishes a predator state above all is
“territorial aggression” – the predisposition to grab territory and resources. China is one of two contemporary examples; the other is Russia in
Europe. The best historical examples are Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and more recently Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
These examples teach us that predator states cause wars. Predator states are buoyed by an expansionist ideology – the active promotion of the
idea that neighbouring territories (both land and maritime) belong by rights to the predator. Such states often possess a sense of historical
grievance or victimization that can only be “righted” by territorial grabs. Indeed, a Mazarr contends, the “politics of memory operates
powerfully…causing [predator states] to react by forming aggressive, predatory instincts.” Besides territorial aggression, predator states exhibit
several other distinguishing features. First, national
policy demonstrates very high levels of militarization. Predator
states divert large quantities of national resources into military expansion for purposes of power
projection. The emphasis in military planning and weapons acquisitions is inherently offensive rather than defensive and is geared to
intimidating potential adversaries and winning offensive wars. The flipside domestically is, as Mazarr writes, that “military, nationalistic, and
territorial issues continue to play a large role in domestic politics and in the states’ approach to the world.” In China’s case, nationalism has
overtaken Marxism and more recently developmentalism as state ideology. Second, predator states
adopt a strongly strategic
perspective on national advancement and display an associated willingness to use all the institutions
and instruments of the state over which they maintain control – economic, cultural, military, technological, resource,
trade, legal, media – in the pursuit of this overwhelming important strategic objective. China, for example, deployed a broad range of
retaliatory instruments against Japan over the Senkaku Islands affair in 2010, including restricting the export of rare earth metals. The use of
such “strategic” instruments extends beyond such punitive acts of state retaliation to a whole range of long-term, so-called “market-based”
investments. These include foreign acquisitions in strategically important and sensitive areas such as land, resource and water assets and
critical infrastructure as well as in private-sector developments and industries. The “strategic” element cannot be discounted in these
acquisitions because the line between private enterprise and state-owned enterprises in the Chinese case is imprecise given the complex
interweaving of business and state actors. In the end, everything becomes “strategic” in the sense of supporting national advancement and
security. Third, predator states are not democracies where there exist checks and balances and other moderating influences that negate the
potential for predation against other states. Predator states have authoritarian governments with low levels of accountability. Political leaders
are only answerable to other power cliques and display a willingness to engage in political repression, including imprisonment and even murder
of their opponents. In such states, there is no real separation of the executive from the judiciary and, in that sense, no rule of law. Levels of
domestic lawlessness are matched by international lawlessness. Predator states do not respond to appeals to international laws or norms
because they are inherently lawless themselves – they understand and respect only power in international affairs. China’s actions in the
South China Sea clearly demonstrate that it does not support a rules-based regional or global order; nor
does it believe that you can fight power with rules as other states are attempting to do in dealing with
this issue. Finally, predator states show a predisposition to act unilaterally rather than multilaterally.
Multilateral cooperation is entertained only where it fits with the long-term strategic interests of the
state. Moreover, there is little willingness to trade off state interests for larger collective interests in the international community. In that
sense, predator states are not interested in providing international public goods and should not be considered as potentially benign hegemons.

China is territorial and hegemonic.

Lind 18 (Jennifer Lind, April 2018, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, “Life in
China’s Asia”, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/life-chinas-asia/ ) CS

Following the example of previous hegemons, China is also expanding its regional military reach. Since the 1990s, Chinese military
spending has soared, and the CCP is modernizing weaponry and reforming its military organizations and doctrine. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has adopted
the doctrine of “anti-access, area denial” to push the U.S. military away from its shores and airspace. China has also built the region’s largest coast guard and
controls a vast militia of civilian fishing vessels. In 2017, the PLA opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti; it will
likely build more bases along the African east coast and the Indian Ocean in coming years. Meanwhile, in
the South China Sea, China has built six large islands that house air force bases, missile shelters, and
radar and communications facilities. Already, the U.S. military finds itself constrained by the expanding bubble of Chinese air defenses, by
China’s growing ability to find and strike U.S. naval vessels, and by an increased missile threat to U.S. air bases and ports. Beijing is using these

capabilities to more forcefully assert its territorial claims. By transiting disputed waters and massing
ships there, Beijing is pressuring Japan militarily over a cluster of small islands called the Diaoyu by China
and the Senkaku by Japan. Elsewhere, to deny access to disputed areas, the PLA swarms fishing and
coast guard vessels, and fires water cannons at other countries’ ships. Last summer, after asserting
ownership of an oil-rich area in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, Beijing threatened to use military
force if Vietnam did not stop drilling. Vietnam stopped drilling. Contemporary China’s quest for regional military dominance follows the
behavior of previous regional hegemons, including China itself. As the historian Peter Perdue has argued, modern China is a product of invasions that subdued all of
modern Xinjiang and Mongolia, and reached Tibet, as well. Chinese dynasties, he has written, “never shrank from the use of force,” including the “righteous
extermination” of rival states and rebels. Throughout Asia, Chinese military garrisons subdued invaders and pirates.

China majorly interfere with other countries.

Lind 18 (Jennifer Lind, April 2018, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, “Life in
China’s Asia”, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/life-chinas-asia) CS

Beijing is also interfering in the domestic politics of other countries. Citing China specifically, Canadian
intelligence officials have warned of foreign agents who might be serving as provincial cabinet ministers
and government employees. And in 2016, a scandal erupted in Australia after it was revealed that Sam
Dastyari, a senator who had defended Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, had financial ties
to a Chinese firm, prompting new laws banning foreign political donations. Historically, regional hegemons have
intervened extensively in domestic politics to support friendly governments and undermine parties and leaders
perceived as hostile. Within China’s tribute system, the emperor delegated the administration of subservient
states to local leaders, an approach known as “using barbarians to govern barbarians.” But local
independence went only so far. As the sixteenth-century statesman Chang Chu-cheng said of such vassals, “Just like dogs, if they
wag their tails, bones will be thrown to them; if they bark wildly, they will be beaten with sticks; after the beating, if
they submit again, bones will be thrown to them again; after the bones, if they bark again, then more
beating.” Japan similarly intervened in domestic politics during its imperial heyday. In the Philippines, for example, it abolished all political
parties except for the pro-Japanese one. Elsewhere, it delegated control to friendly local leaders and police, and trained such leaders at
institutes in Japan. If officials in China, Korea, and Manchuria did not cooperate, Tokyo relied on a Japanese paramilitary organization that
intimidated, blackmailed, and assassinated local leaders.

Historical resentment and militarization of surrounding countries proves.

Lind 18 (Jennifer Lind, April 2018, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, “Life in
China’s Asia”, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/life-chinas-asia) CS

When examining China’s current behavior in the context of previous regional hegemonies, some common themes stand out. First,
economic interdependence has a dark side. Although interdependence raises the cost of conflict, it also creates leverage. China’s
centrality in regional trade and finance increases its coercive power, which Beijing has already begun to
exercise. Second, history shows that regional hegemons meddle extensively in their neighbors’ domestic politics.
Indeed, Beijing has already begun to reverse its much-touted policy of nonintervention. As China grows stronger,
its neighbors can expect Beijing to increasingly interfere in their domestic politics. East Asian countries need to decide whether this is
something they are willing to accept. In particular, Japan,
the only country with the potential power to balance China,
faces an important choice. Since World War II, Japan has adhered to a highly restrained national security
policy, spending just one percent of its GDP on defense. For obvious historical reasons, the Japanese people are suspicious
of military statecraft, and they worry about a lagging economy and the expense of caring for an aging population. They may decide to continue
devoting their wealth to butter rather than guns. This would be a perfectly valid choice, but before making it, the Japanese people should
contemplate their life in China’s Asia. Beijing and Tokyo are already embroiled in a bitter territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. To
gain control of the islands, weaken the U.S.-Japanese relationship, and advance other interests, Beijing can be expected to use greater military
and economic coercion and to meddle in Japanese politics. Beyond a hegemon’s normal reasons to intervene, China harbors deep
historical resentment toward Japan. Imagine if the United States had actually hated Cuba. If Japan
decided that Chinese hegemony would be unacceptable, its national security policy would need to
change. The United States’ global interests and commitments allow Washington to devote only some of its resources to Asia. It would not
have the capability, let alone the will, to balance Beijing alone. Japan would need to become more like West Germany: a U.S. ally that, although
outgunned and directly threatened by a hostile great power, mobilized substantial military might and was a true partner with the United States
in securing its national defense.

Containment is the only way to prevent bandwagoing and arms races, impact
outweighs the entire aff
Haddick 2014 -an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command
Robert, Fire on the Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 39-40
Whether a Sinocentric structure in Asia is a subconscious Chinese goal or not, there are enough lingering fears elsewhere in the region about
this prospect to create active resistance to the concept. Simply put, we should expect Japan, India, Vietnam, the
Philippines, and many others to resist the establishment of a new Middle Kingdom. Should the United
States scale back its security role in the region, that resistance would also occur, only in more unstable and
dangerous forms. It is important to discuss why China's neighbors tolerate-indeed, even welcome-U.S. security hegemony
in the region and why, by contrast, these same countries would strongly resist Chinese hegemony. There is a
structural reason why this is so, and it relates to geography and is therefore enduring: China is a large neighbor in the region
and the United States is not. Because the United States has to project its presence across a vast ocean, it
requires the permission of most countries in the region to continue its role as the security hegemon. The
United States requires bases, access rights, and negotiated agreements with local governments to fulfill its security guarantees. If these
governments withdrew their permission due, say, to bad American behavior, the United States would find it
difficult and costly to sustain its presence across the ocean in the face of broad resistance. China, by contrast, is a
permanent presence in the region that the neighbors can never dislodge. Should China engage in the
same bad behavior, these countries cannot make China go away. They can only fight or accept China's
treatment. It is therefore easier for the countries in the region to enter into a security contract with an outside power, knowing they have
some bargaining leverage and an escape clause. When dealing with a powerful neighbor like China that isn't going
anywhere, the only way to achieve the same bargaining leverage is to match that neighbor's power,
especially its military power. And that implies arms races and spiraling security dilemmas.10 Thus, hegemons are
not all created equal. It is easier to strike a bargain with an outside hegemon than with a local one-an
immutable reason why the U.S. security presence will be welcome in the region. Even more crucially, U.S. service as the region's
security hegemon is much more likely to result in stability than if the region were left alone to find its
own stable structure (more on this below}. Adding to America's attractiveness as an outsider are the United States' seven-decade
record of keeping the region's commons open for all and its not having territorial disputes with
countries in the region. The logic behind why most countries in the region welcome the United States as the
security hegemon, and why most would resist China attempting to play the same role, is a strong
argument for maintaining this arrangement. Which brings us to Global Trends' second pathway, the Hobbesian scramble for
security, as the most likely outcome should the United States opt to reduce its costs by withdrawing from the region. As this chapter will later
explore, this outcome would very likely trigger multisided missile and nuclear arms races across the
region, with unpredictable and unstable consequences. The risk of military disaster inside the most important economic
region in the world would rise abruptly. The U.S. economy and standard of living would not escape the risks and
costs of these developments. It is easy to see how the absence of the United States as an outside
security provider could result in a dangerously unstable security competition in East Asia. The rapid rise
of China's military power would create the logic for an offsetting alliance by most of its neighbors. Some
however (perhaps, e.g., a future unified Korea) may choose to bandwagon with China instead, especially if historical grievances make allying
with some of China's adversaries politically unacceptable. Bandwagoningby some would increase the security anxiety
of the remainder that don't. Finally, some significant powers (e.g., Russia) might choose to remain unaligned, which would
compound the region's uncertainty because the players would have to ponder how these neutrals would eventually act during a regional crisis.
Should one or more countries conclude that stability was unachievable and conflict inevitable, the
calculation would then turn to the logic of security trends and time pressure and the possible advantage
gained by striking first rather than waiting for adversaries to grow even stronger in the future.
 AT: Interdependence Checks
Interdependence won’t check Beijing – they are revisionist
Lind 2018 - Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College
Jennifer, "Life in China's Asia: What Regional Hegemony Would Look Like," Mar/Apr,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/life-chinas-asia

It may be tempting to believe that China will be a relatively benign regional hegemon. Economic
interdependence, one argument goes, should restrain Chinese aggression: because the legitimacy of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) rests on economic growth, which depends on trade, Beijing would maintain peaceful relations with its neighbors.
Moreover, China claims to be a different sort of great power. Chinese officials and scholars regularly decry interventionism and reject the
notion of “spheres of influence” as a Cold War relic. Chinese President Xi Jinping has said that his country has “never engaged in colonialism or
aggression” thanks to its “peace-loving cultural tradition.” In this view, life in China’s Asia would not be so different from what it is today. But
this is not how regional hegemons behave. Great powers typically dominate their regions in their quest
for security. They develop and wield tremendous economic power. They build massive militaries, expel
external rivals, and use regional institutions and cultural programs to entrench their influence. Because
hegemons fear that neighboring countries will allow external rivals to establish a military foothold, they develop a profound
interest in the domestic politics of their neighborhood, and even seek to spread their culture to draw
other countries closer. China is already following the strategies of previous regional hegemons. It is
using economic coercion to bend other countries to its will. It is building up its military to ward off challengers. It is intervening
in other countries’ domestic politics to get friendlier policies. And it is investing massively in educational
and cultural programs to enhance its soft power. As Chinese power and ambition grow, such efforts will
only increase. China’s neighbors must start debating how comfortable they are with this future, and what costs they are willing to pay to
shape or forestall it.
 AT: China War Limited
There’s no limited US-China war – Beijing mixes conventional and nuclear capabilities
and US military strategy focuses on disabling crucial infrastructure, that forces Beijing
into use it or lose it and makes them fear the US plans a nuclear first strike
Talmadge 18 (Caitlin Talmadge; Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, article adapted from version published in
International Security; “Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control”;
December 2018; Foreign Policy, International Security;
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option, https://cpb-us-
e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/b/1590/files/2018/07/Talmadge-IS-2017-y16c9h.pdf)//Garfield-
Ben

The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional
forces can threaten nuclear forces in
ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable
U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If
U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that
Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s
nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that
limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to
defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing’s long-term objective of
reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It
is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control
over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S.
law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any
effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security
of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole
superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the
course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some
Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States
engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but
guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese
harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly
undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-
armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-
armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these
transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from
contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic
missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble
fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that
protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S.
forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese
attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports
and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of
undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in
a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack
submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later.
Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just
two such incidents
would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would
likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return
to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is
similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile
force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once
again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it
would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese
conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that
they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they
share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the
conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s
ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually
indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some
nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases
would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening
Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave
much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even
intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers
have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that
mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm
U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese
intercontinental ballistic missiles are
larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States
is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq
nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war.
China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean
attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the
handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign
might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously
undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state
of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the
favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory would likely endanger much of China’s nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land.
Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be
incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened.
AFF
UNIQUENESS ANSWERS
 China Sales Up
Chinese arms sales are already up
Aftergood, 2019 (Steven Aftergood directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy. The Project works
to reduce the scope of national security secrecy and to promote public access to government
information, 5/3/2019, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2019/05/china-weapons/, SHD)

“In 2018, China’s arms sales increased, continuing a trend that enabled China to become the world’s
fastest-growing arms supplier during the past 15 years,” according to the 2019 China Military Power report published by
the Department of Defense. “From 2013 through 2017, China was the world’s fourth-largest arms supplier, completing
more than $25 billion worth of arms sales.”∂ “Arms transfers also are a component of China’s foreign
policy, used in conjunction with other types of military, economic aid, and development assistance to
support broader foreign policy goals,” the Pentagon report said. “These include securing access to natural
resources and export markets, promoting political influence among host country elites, and building
support in international forums.”∂ Needless to say, the United States and other countries have long done the
same thing, using arms exports as an instrument of foreign policy and political influence. Up to a point,
however, US arms sales are regulated by laws that include human rights and other considerations. See U.S.
Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions, CRS In Focus, May 2, 2019.∂ To assist soldiers in identifying
Chinese weapons in the field, the US Army has produced a deck of “playing cards” featuring various weapons systems.∂ “The Worldwide
Equipment Identification Playing Cards enable Soldiers to be able to readily identify enemy equipment and distinguish the equipment from
friendly forces. Cards can be used at every level and across all services.”

Sales up now
CSIS 18 (Center for Strategic and International Studies; Founded by Georgetown University in 1962,
ranked the number one think tank in the world; “How dominant is China in the global arms trade?”;
5/29/2018; CSIS; https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/)//Garfield-Ben

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China’s

conventional arms sales surged from $650
million in 2008 to $1.13 billion in 2017.1 The lion’s share of these exports, around 74 percent, went to Asia. An
additional 21 percent flowed into Africa. Although China has established itself as an arms export leader, the overall value of
its trade still pales in comparison to the United States, whose exports averaged $9 billion annually over the last
ten years. Most of Beijing’s arms exports are sold to countries close to home. Despite low levels of arms exports throughout the mid-1990s and
into the mid-2000s, most of what China did export (82.8 percent) were shipped to countries across Asia. This trend has continued as China has
emerged as a leader in the global arms trade. A combined 62.4 percent of China’s conventional weapons sales since 2008 have
found their way to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Other Asian countries have purchased an additional 11.8 percent
of Chinese arms. Over the past decade, Chinese arms sales across South and Southeast Asia grew from $386 million
in 2008 to $1.5 billion in 2016 before falling to $948 million in 2017. Notwithstanding this growth, China lags other traditional arms
exporters to the region. Since 2008, the US has exported $27.2 billion worth of conventional weapons across Asia (not including the Middle
East).2 Close military ties have paved the way for China to supply Pakistan with more arms than any other
country. These exchanges are often tied to political objectives. Due in large part to growing cooperation between
Beijing and Islamabad on counter-terrorism initiatives, sales surged from $250 million in 2008 to over $750 million in 2009.
In March 2018, Beijing announced the sale of sophisticated optical tracking systems that could be used for nuclear
missiles with multiple warheads. This announcement came just weeks after India successfully tested the Agni-V long-range ballistic missile in
mid-January. Other purchases highlight close levels of collaboration between China and Pakistan, such as the co-developed JF-17
aircraft. Bangladesh is also a strong buyer of Chinese weapons. Between 2008 and 2017, China provided $1.86 billion of
weapons to Bangladesh. This constitutes 71.9 percent of Bangladesh’s military acquisitions over this period, making
China far and away the biggest supplier of arms to Dhaka. China supports these procurements by offering generous
loans and providing its wares at competitive prices. Discounted acquisitions include the 2013 transfer of two
used Type-035G Ming-class submarines for Bangladesh for just over $100 million each. Since 2006, China has also supplied Bangladesh
with the majority of its small arms, totaling over 16,000 rifles and 4,100 pistols. Myanmar is the third largest market for Chinese
arms exports in Asia. Since the easing of sanctions against Myanmar in the early 2010s, it has ramped up its acquisition of foreign arms. This
buying spree has enabled China to make considerable inroads. Over the last six years, Myanmar
has imported $954 million in
conventional weapons from China. Higher ticket items include 17 JF-17 aircraft, 12 Chinese Rainbow UAVs, 2
Type-43 Frigates, and 76 Type-92 armored vehicles.

Chinese sales increasing now

Huang 2018 - Kristin, "China's arms sales rise as it vies with US for influence on the world stage," Mar
12, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2136877/chinas-arms-sales-rise-it-
vies-us-influence-world-stage

The rivalry between America and China has seen both sides step up international arms sales and
transfers as they seek to strengthen military ties with key allies, according to a report published on Monday. The study
by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which examined the volume of international transfers of major weapons
between 2008 and 2017, showed China’s arms exports represented 5.7 per cent of the world’s share of arms
exports between 2013-17 – up by more than a third from the 4.6 per cent recorded between 2008-12.
The report was published a week after China unveiled an 8.1 per cent increase in military spending over
a three-year period, although China’s state media defended the rise as proportionate and low, adding that it would not lead to an arms
race with the United States. The administration of US President Donald Trump has dubbed China as a “rival”, and the latest SIPRI

China is on the verge of selling high-tech systems

Farley 2017 Robert, "Can China Replace the United States as the World's Top Arms Dealer?" Nov 21,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/can-china-replace-the-us-as-the-worlds-top-arms-dealer/

But it may not be too long before the United States needs to worry about competition directly in its niche. China
is taking steps to
modernize the relationship between its defense industrial base and its technology sector, with the hope
of generating investment in firms that work at the juncture between the latter and the former. Leveraging
the relationship between civilian and military technology is how the United State achieved military superiority over the Soviet Union during the
Cold War. It’s also been a preoccupation of advocates of the “Third Offset,” which hopes to further harness the U.S. tech sector in the service of
maintaining American superiority in military technology. And there are indications that the Chinese are ever-more-ready to challenge the
United States in this arena. The Chinese defense industry remains far more autarkic than the United States’, and is still largely state controlled.
But allowing heavy civilian investment into military-related civilian industries, as well as focusing on building linkages
between civilian industries and the military, could
accelerate Chinese innovation. If China can successfully connect
its burgeoning tech industry with its defense industrial base (a project that even the United States has struggled with),
then it can accomplish something that the Soviet Union utterly failed at. Obviously, many obstacles remain, some of
which the United States also faces. The task of integrating China’s state-owned defense giants with its private sector tech companies will be
enormously complicated, with many potential pitfalls. Not the least of these is convincing Chinese tech firms that their technologies are safe in
the hands of state-owned defense giants, a task that is probably even more difficult than getting U.S. tech firms to work with Lockheed Martin
and Raytheon. The eventual outcome might look something like the European model, where large, state-controlled defense firms have a
tolerably good relationship with the civilian sector. The difference would be that, as in the United States, the defense industrial base can count
on huge, consistent government outlays. If
China can square the circle, it can compete with the United States not
only on the air and at sea, but also in the international arms market. Chinese arms in the hands of traditional U.S.
export partners may not be quite as dangerous as those in Chinese hands, but they have the potential to undercut a dominant U.S. market
position.
 Uniqueness Overwhelms the Link
US limits to Chinese expansion fail – they’ve still expanded globally
Lu, 2019 (Zhenhua Lu joined the Post in 2017 as US correspondent covering US-China relations on
diplomacy, security and trade, 3/12/2019,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2189604/china-sells-weapons-more-countries-and-
biggest-exporter-armed, SHD)

China is selling arms to more countries and is now the world’s leading exporter of armed drones, according
to a report released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on Monday.∂ But the latest data from the Swedish think
tank shows Chinese arms exports increased by a relatively low 2.7 per cent in the period from 2014 to 2018,
compared to the previous five years.∂ Weapons exports from the United States, however, jumped 29 per cent in the 2014-18
period from 2009-13.∂ Meanwhile, China expanded its customer base to 53 countries in 2014-18, up from 41 in
the previous five years.∂ The researchers also found that China is the world leader in sales of armed
drones, or unmanned combat aerial vehicles – supplying 153 of them to 13 countries in the past five years.∂ By contrast, the
US – the world’s biggest arms exporter – only sold five armed drones, to Britain, over the 10 years from
2009.∂ The main buyers of the Chinese drones are Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.∂ Nan Tian, a researcher with SIPRI’s arms transfers and military
expenditure programme, said China’s military technology advances – with more emphasis on developing its own
weapons – were a key reason for the slower growth in arms exports, along with its defence budget.∂ “Previously,
China relied on foreign countries such as Russia, Ukraine and France in developing its own armament industry,” Nan said. “Now, it has
increasingly turned to domestic manufacturers such as AVIC and Norinco in arms exports.”∂ He added that
armed drones had been “one of the most visible technological developments” made by Chinese arms producers.∂ As export growth has slowed,
China’s military spending has been increasing at a more modest pace. Last week, Beijing
said the defence budget would rise
7.5 per cent for 2019, the fourth consecutive year of single-digit spending growth for the People’s
Liberation Army.∂ SIPRI, which monitors the international arms trade, said the slower growth in China’s weapons
exports in recent years contrasted sharply with the 195 per cent rise in arms sales in the 2009-13 period,
from the previous five years.∂ Pakistan, China’s key ally in South Asia, remained Beijing’s top arms buyer in the last five years – a
position it has maintained since 1991 – followed by Bangladesh and Algeria.∂ The US, Russia, France, Germany and China are the world’s top
five arms exporters, accounting for three quarters of the total volume of weapons sales from 2014 to 2018.∂ Of China’s arms exports, 70 per
cent went to Asia and Oceania in the last five years, followed by 20 per cent going to Africa and 6.1 per cent to the Middle East.∂ Meanwhile,
the top three buyers of American weapons were all US allies – Saudi Arabia, Australia and the UAE.∂ The SIPRI report noted that almost all of
the biggest arms importing countries were not on China’s top buyers list.∂ “China’s
arms exports are limited by the fact that
many countries – including four of the top 10 arms importers in 2014-18 (India, Australia, South Korea
and Vietnam) – will not procure Chinese arms for political reasons,” the report said.
 Thumpers
Pakistan deal thumps
Meng and Chan, 2015 (Angela, reporter for the South China Morning Post, Minnie Chan is an award-
winning journalist, specialising in reporting on defence and diplomacy in China,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1776522/beijing-eyes-bigger-arms-
exports-experts-say, SHD)

Vows by China and Pakistan to deepen security and defence ties will reinforce Beijing's ambitions to
increase its arms exports, which could create unease among some countries in the region, especially India, security experts say.∂
President Xi Jinping made his first state visit to Pakistan last week and met Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, with the sides agreeing to boost their
partnership to "all-weather levels".∂ The two nations also decided to step up dialogue between their armed
forces, and expand cooperation in defence technology and production.∂ Three weeks before Xi departed for the trip,
Sharif approved a US$5 billion deal to buy eight submarines from China, Reuters reported, quoting an unnamed
Pakistani government official as saying, but added the deal had not been finalised. It would be China's largest single sale of
submarines, experts say.∂ The deal would likely encourage Beijing to expand arms exports, said Mathieu Duchatel,
head of the China and Global Security Project at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which tracks global military spending
and arms sales.∂ "With
progress in its defence industry and strong government support for research and
development, China has become a major player in weapons system," Duchatel said. "The success in the
deals with Pakistan will make it easier for China to secure markets in the countries in which China has
strong defence relationship, as it means that the weapon systems are already tested. " China was the third-
largest arms exporter in 2012-13 but has since fallen to fifth place, behind Britain, France, Russia and the United States, according to the
institute's research. But it remains the main supplier for Pakistan, delivering half of the country's arms from 2010-14.∂ Li Jie, a researcher at the
PLA Navy's Military Academy, said the submarine deal likely involved the Type 039-class, a diesel-electric vessel that first went into operation in
the 1990s. China had sold submarines overseas before, but the deal with Pakistan was the biggest, he said.∂ "The Type 039-class submarine is
equipped with an advanced air-independent propulsion system, which would allow the warship to stay and operate underwater much longer
and make it more difficult to be detected by its enemies," Li said.∂ "The Pakistan Navy will gain a competitive advantage in their underwater
fighting capability." China is pushing for deeper ties with Pakistan amid concerns over Islamabad's ability to maintain security
within its own borders. Beijing wants a planned network of roads, railways and energy projects linking Pakistan's deepwater Gwadar port with
the Xinjiang region on the mainland.∂ The corridor would shorten the route for energy imports, bypassing the Strait of Malacca, a bottleneck at
risk of blockade in wartime.∂ Beijing has also expressed concerns about terrorists from Pakistan and Afghanistan entering Xinjiang, and has
pledged to help broker talks between political factions in Afghanistan. Pakistan, for its part, is seeking a reliable supplier of advanced weapons
amid tensions with India.∂ "This is a big step forward," said Imtiaz Gul, founder and political analyst for the Centre for Research and Security
Studies in Islamabad. "Pakistan
does not attract much foreign investment, or much defence and military
cooperation from Western countries. Anything that comes Pakistan's way in terms of finance and
military hardware helps end Pakistan's international isolation."∂ But the deal could stoke an already heated arms race in
the region. "The proposed sale of eight Type 039 submarines by China to Pakistan is bound to result in India's need to retaliate," said D.S. Rajan,
a former director of India's Chennai Centre for China Studies, adding Pakistan would likely equip the submarines with nuclear-tipped missiles.∂
"India still has no such subs with nuclear-tipped missiles," he said. "India may therefore feel more and more anxious to fill this gap."∂ Dr
Rajeswari Rajagopalan, a defence analyst at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation think tank, agreed the deal would have serious
consequences for the region but said it was unlikely to result in increased arms spending on both sides.∂ "Nevertheless, India has been paying
adequate attention in recent years to the acquisition of naval capabilities, including submarines. This is something India has to do irrespective
of the China-Pakistan deal," he said.∂ "If India does not replenish the dwindling submarine force, it will end up having the same number of
submarines as Pakistan. And now if this deal goes through, that number will be heavily skewed in favour of Pakistan."
LINK ANSWERS
 Arms Sales Not Key
Arms sales not key to China influence – it’s only economic interests.
Al Saud ‘18 (Latifa A. Al Saud; M.A. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Columbia
University, interned at the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations
where she was assigned to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly; “China’s Arms Sales
Philosophy in the Arab World”; 12/3/2018; Journal of International Affairs;
https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/chinas-arms-sales-philosophy-arab-world)//A.F. + BT
Based on this win-win outlook, China’s arms sales policy to Arab states is conducted primarily for economic reasons. When mutually beneficial,
dealing with China may be an attractive alternative that is perhaps less likely to involve political strings,
complications, or potential repercussions that typically accompany arms deals with the US. For example, U.S. arms
sales and economic/military aid to Egypt is primarily intended to exert influence on the Egyptian government to promote
American priorities, including Egypt’s peace with Israel. For the US, arms sales are in part an exercise of influence
and reward to ensure loyalty, which can be cut off or suspended, depending on the political dynamics and U.S.
policy preference. Contrary to the U.S. approach, Chinese arms sales are focused on “business only and
business first.” China sees the Arab world and the Middle East as a whole as a new market for its low-cost high-tech weapons and thus
has an appetite to sell weapons to any state in the region, regardless of its policies. China uses its role as a leading oil
importer as leverage (for example, it threatened to decrease oil imports from Saudi Arabia over a price issue) and has rarely used arms
sales, or the threat to cut them off, as a political tool. For example, it sells weapons to both Saudi Arabia
and Iran, who are not on the same page when it comes to regional issues.
 No Link – Generic
Nobody wants Chinese arms – malfunctioning systems, defective weapons, empirical
failures
Knodel 16 (Kevin Knodell; Reporter at National Interest, spent time on field team in Iraw; “The Simple
Reason the World Isn't Buying All of China's Fancy Weapons (At Least Not Yet)”; 12/25/2016; National
Interest; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-simple-reason-the-world-isnt-buying-all-chinas-
fancy-18857)//Garfield-Ben

In November 2016, China held its major biennial air show in Zhuhai. The event brought in 700 exhibitors as potential customers from
Africa and Asia flocked to see Beijing’s military wares. The main focus of interest was, of course, China’s
new J-20 stealth fighter —
 the country’s next-generation warplane — as the air show was the site of the plane’s first public demonstration. But the Chinese
arms industry is also having trouble, according to the December 2016 edition of O.E. Watch, the newsletter for the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military
Studies Office. “Despite this attention, China still faces a number of hurdles in the defense trade industry,” the
newsletter noted. “The global perception of the Chinese defense industry is less than adequate. Some of the
perceptions are due to malfunctioning systems or defective weapon designs. Additionally, China lacks extra services,
such as training and the maintenance of equipment and arms. Some countries also lack political trust in
China.” To be sure, China has made serious inroads around the world by selling weapons. Two thirds of African countries now use Chinese
arms. Over the last few years Chinese weapons exports reached record highs. But lately, arms deals have slowed — and Russia and
America still dominate the global market. In September, Chinese exhibitors apparently struggled to find buyers at an air
show in South Africa even as officials in Beijing aggressively tried to secure deals for the JF-17 fighter — a Chinese-Pakistani equivalent to
the U.S.-made F-16. Several African countries are more heavily scrutinizing their budgets with consequences for arms sales. Nigeria is
currently the only African country with JF-17s on order. When Cameroon purchased four brand new Chinese
attack helicopters, one of them crashed shortly after delivery, causing an apparent freeze in new acquisitions. There have
been concerns among some buyers about the quality of Chinese weapons. Compared to battle-tested American and Russian weapons, many
Chinese systems have yet to prove themselves to new military customers. During
an Indonesian Navy exercise on Sept. 14, 2016,
two Chinese made C-705 missiles failed to hit their targets after launching from two KCR-40 attack ships. This was a
particularly embarrassing setback in no small part because Indonesian Pres. Joko Widodo personally witnessed it.
 No Link – Saudi Arabia

China won’t fill-in for the US

Turak 2018 - Natasha, "Threats of US sanctions could accelerate a Saudi shift eastward," Oct 23,
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/23/threats-of-us-sanctions-could-accelerate-a-saudi-shift-
eastward.html

Saudi Arabia has already been increasing business with the Russians and the Chinese. In June, Vladimir Putin
hosted Saudi Crown Prince at the Kremlin, where the two agreed to “expand cooperation in oil and gas matters” after working together on
output deals to stabilize markets amid fluctuating global crude prices. And October of last year saw the first-ever visit of a Saudi monarch —
King Salman — to Russia, during which a $1 billion joint investment fund was created and 15 cooperation agreements were signed in the areas
of technology, defense and agriculture, including Moscow’s readiness to sell Riyadh its S-400 missile defense system. China,meanwhile,
is the kingdom’s largest trading partner, with $42 billion in bilateral trade in 2017. Last March, the two signed a raft of
deals worth a reported $65 billion in sectors ranging from energy to space technology. Some in Riyadh have
also talked of trading oil in yuan instead of dollars as retaliation for potential U.S. sanctions. But as trade tensions with the U.S.
continue to put strain on China’s economy, it is likely to lay low at this stage to avoid further conflict
with the U.S. administration. Additionally, China is far from able to match U.S. weapons production in terms
of sophistication and capabilities, defense experts say. Beijing sold just $20 million in arms to the Saudis last
year, compared to $3.4 billion in exports from the U.S., according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
 No Link – Taiwan
1. Duh
2. Any other country filling in still solves our impacts.
Thrall 2018 - senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department
A Trevor and Caroline Dorminey, "Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy," Mar 13,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#full

Forgoing arms sales is likely to be a superior strategy even in cases where the United States has an
entrenched interest. In the case of Taiwan, for example, though it is clear that Taiwan needs to purchase weapons from other
countries to provide for its defense, those weapons do not have to be made in the United States. Having Taiwan
buy from other suppliers would help defuse U.S.-China tensions. Even if Taiwan’s defenses remained robust, China
would clearly prefer a situation in which American arms no longer signal an implicit promise to fight on
Taiwan’s behalf. This could also promote more productive U.S.-China diplomacy in general, as well as greater stability in the Pacific region.
Most important, breaking off arms sales would also reduce the likelihood of the United States becoming
entangled in a future conflict between Taiwan and China.
INTERNAL ANSWERS
 Arms not key to Influence
The disad is just wrong – China sells to a litany of countries in Africa but its sale
strategy does not provide geopolitical benefits to advance a revisionist agenda. It only
uses sales in Asia to challenge US influence – not the same elsewhere because they are
defensive realists.
Tian 18 [Dr. Nan Tian is a Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure
Programme. “China’s Arms Trade: A Rival for Global Influence?”. September 17th, 2018. RealClear
Defense.
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/09/17/chinas_arms_trade_a_rival_for_global_influen
ce__113806.html. Lowell-KY]

Although the total volume of major arms flow from China to Africa is less than half of Russia’s, it sells to far
more African countries than Russia. Between 2013–17, Russia sold major arms to 14 Africa countries,
compared to the 23 of China. This “blanket” style of selling does not typically fit with the notion of linking
targeted arms sales with foreign policy objectives. The diversity in the types of weapons and of arms
recipients (e.g., from Algeria to South Africa and Kenya to Cote d'Ivoire) suggests a more demand and supply
relationship. As China continues to develop its arms industry, any international buyer will help expand its network,
offer important developmental feedback, and improve weapon quality and company profitability. The fall in export of Russian made
weapons to Africa corresponded with the rise in Chinese exports, potentially due to the availability of more cost-
effective options. This is especially the case in Algeria, where import of major Chinese arms increased by 46-fold between
2008-2012 and 2013-2017, while the transfer of Russian weapons fell by 35%. Yet in-depth analysis into Chinese arms exports to Africa shows
Algeria as an outlier that is biasing the recent trends. Of all major weapons exported from China to Africa between 2013 and 2017, 46% went to
Algeria, prime among them are three heavy corvettes delivered in 2015 and 2016. Remove Algeria and major arms exports to Africa decreased
by 12% between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017. Other major African buyers of Chinese weapons are Morocco and Nigeria.
It seems that suggestions linking China’s BRI project, its military base in Djibouti, and increased military
engagement in the related countries are not founded on arms transfers evidence. The main focus on of Chinese
arms exports remains to its close neighbours. Since 2008, Pakistan (40%) and Bangladesh (13%) together account for over
half of all China’s major weapons exports. Add in Myanmar, and it’s a picture where China usually sells weapons to countries
that the West (the US and Western Europe) does not. Such sales are partly due to less stringent human rights conditions linked to
arms sales and more affordable weapons, but also recognising the gaps left by the US and thus securing greater geopolitical influence as part of
its foreign policy. Comparing the types of weapons sold to African and Asia countries reinforces the argument further. Large
ticket items exported to Bangladesh and Pakistan include frigates, corvettes, submarines, and air defence systems. In
addition to the transfer of the weapon, such transactions (sales and military aid) include training, maintenance, and exchange of
information on the capability of the weapons. All of which enhances country relationships and boosts future
collaborations. In contrast, weapons exports to Africa are mostly of lower value in the form of armoured personnel
carriers (APCs), light training aircraft, battle tanks and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These are akin to one-time
transactions, with limited commitments to training or maintenance. While the ability to buy expensive high-tech
weapons is lower in African countries compared to neighbours close to China, China has looked to challenge US influence in
Asia with more intimate (military and economic) relations with the likes of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The same is not evident in
Africa. It has been common knowledge that China has historically linked arms sales to close neighbours with
foreign policy considerations, extending this to African countries is far less straightforward. Although this does not
mean China has no future ambitions to use arms exports as a foreign policy tool, evidence from arms exports over the past ten years presents a
far less compelling case in the present. Instead, China’s interests in Africa seem to remain mainly economic (e.g., Forum
on China-Africa Cooperation) focusing on trade (China is Africa’s largest trading partner) and investment deals with arms sale transactions in a
demand and supply basis.
Arms sales don’t produce the leverage China wants
Roggeveen 18 (Interview with Sam Roggeveen, a senior fellow at the Lowy Institute in Australia and an
expert on the Chinese military, discusses the growth of China’s arms industry and the wider implications
for Asia. “What Role Do Arms Sales Play in China’s Geopolitical Ambitions?”. January 23rd, 2018. World
Politics Review. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/24044/what-role-do-arms-sales-play-
in-china-s-geopolitical-ambitions. Lowell-KY)

Roggeveen: It is safe to assume that the answer is both, though we should be careful not to confuse commercial with economic. All arms
spending is, in purely economic terms, wasteful, since military arms either go unused or are used in massively
expensive wars. Exporting arms can only defray that cost. Nor should we assume that arms sales necessarily
produce political leverage or even closer political ties. Sweden is one of the most successful arms exporters in the
world, yet it is not obvious that this has had political payoffs. Australia, which tends to buy American, has also closed
huge arms contracts with European manufacturers, but its relations with Europe are slowly becoming more
distant as Australia embraces its geography and takes in more Asian immigrants. One last skeptical note: Arms importers have
leverage of their own, which they regularly exploit for political purposes. The recent sale of Chinese JF-17
fighters to Myanmar, for example, was followed just this week by news that Myanmar is buying six SU-30 fighters from
Russia. The message to Beijing ought to be clear: Myanmar is not a Chinese client state, and if you push
us too hard we can take our money elsewhere.

Arms sales are not key to China’s agenda – pursues more enduring ties through
infrastructure projects
Roggeveen 18 (Interview with Sam Roggeveen, a senior fellow at the Lowy Institute in Australia and an
expert on the Chinese military, discusses the growth of China’s arms industry and the wider implications
for Asia. “What Role Do Arms Sales Play in China’s Geopolitical Ambitions?”. January 23rd, 2018. World
Politics Review. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/24044/what-role-do-arms-sales-play-
in-china-s-geopolitical-ambitions. Lowell-KY)

Roggeveen: In strategic terms, the

most significant arms export to Asia that China has ever conducted is still its
transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan. Next to that, everything else pales for two reasons. First, the
scale of Chinese conventional weapons exports to the rest of Asia remains relatively modest—though, as the SIPRI
figures show, it is clearly growing. But second, if China were not exporting weapons to Asia, countries would simply be purchasing them from
elsewhere. Granted, China’s presence in the market creates competition, presumably driving down prices and improving overall quality. But the
conventional weapons Beijing is offering to the market are in ready supply, whereas nuclear weapons technology is much harder to come by.
For those reasons, I doubtChinese arms sales make a huge contribution to Beijing’s ambitions for greater regional
influence, particularly in contrast to its signature initiative, known as One Belt, One Road. China is offering fast, large-
scale infrastructure support, which other players such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and bilateral
donors do not provide. The connections these projects create with China are physical and can generate
economic markets that are painful to disturb, so they are much more durable than the ties created by arms
sales.
IMPACT ANSWERS
 China Peaceful
China won’t risk war with the US
Yan 2018 - Distinguished Professor and Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua
University
Xuetong, "The Age of Uneasy Peace," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-12-11/age-
uneasy-peace

Given this enthusiasm for the global economy, the

image of a revisionist China that has gained traction in many Western
capitals is misleading. Beijing relies on a global network of trade ties, so it is loath to court direct
confrontation with the United States. Chinese leaders fear—not without reason—that such a confrontation might cut off its
access to U.S. markets and lead U.S. allies to band together against China rather than stay neutral, stripping it of important economic
partnerships and valuable diplomatic connections. As a result,
caution, not assertiveness or aggressiveness, will be the
order of the day in Beijing’s foreign policy in the coming years. Even as it continues to modernize and
expand its military, China will carefully avoid pressing issues that might lead to war with the United States,
such as those related to the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and the weaponization of space.

China only cares about regional hegemony – won’t replace US heg

Oğuzlu, 2019 (Tarik Oğuzlu, Professor at the Department of Political Science and International
Relations at Antalya Bilim University, 7/23/2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/op-
ed/2019/07/23/understanding-chinas-challenge-to-the-international-order, SHD)
The liberal world order, which came into being at the end of World War II under American leadership, has been going through a radical
transformation in recent years mostly owing to China's spectacular rise. In parallel to its increasing material power capability, China is also
posing fundamental challenges to the normative fabric of the liberal world order.∂ What are the key
characteristics of China's challenge to the liberal world order and whether the growing confrontation between the established hegemon, the
United States, and the aspiring hegemon, China, will result in the global Armageddon requires serious attention.∂ For long, U.S.-led
international organizations have not only enabled Western actors to materialize their interests across
the globe but also perpetuate the core liberal assumption that there is only one route to modernity and
development, i.e., the Western way.∂ Acting as the gatekeepers to the Western international community, such international
organizations have long played key roles in the socialization of erstwhile non-Western states into constitutive norms, rules and values of the
Western world.∂ The hope for transformation∂ Since its opening up to the world economy in the late 1970s, Western powers hoped that China
would gradually transform into a responsible stakeholder of the liberal international order and adopt its core values, such as consolidation and
promotion of the principles of individual entrepreneurship, democratic way of government, minimum state involvement in the economy, rule
of law, free trade, the secularization of societal relations and respect for multiculturalism. The main reason of such optimism was that China
benefited from becoming a part of the capitalist world economy and its double-digit economic development was long made possible by its
economic interaction with the U.S.∂ However, it
is now the case that China's adoption of capitalist practices has not
paved the way for its liberal democratic transformation and the U.S., under the Obama and Trump
administrations, have begun defining China as a strategic rival that needs to be contained. Looking from
the American perspective, the "strategy of engagement" has now given way to a "strategy of
containment."∂ At stake now is whether China's evolving approach to liberal international order justifies a radical change in the American
approach toward China, away from engagement to containment. At closer inspection, it seems that the maintenance of regional
and global stability is still in China's national interests. As of today, particularly given the protectionist trade war that
President Trump has waged on China and China's galloping internal challenges, Beijing is not in a position to risk the gains of its ongoing
development process by adopting a hardline approach toward the United States and its neighbors.∂ China has the largest reserves in U.S.
dollars and its access to the American market, technology and foreign direct investment is still important for its economic modernization. China
does not have the luxury of postponing its transformation into an economy in which Chinese companies produce mainly technology-intensive
high value-added goods and domestic consumption increases to such an extent that China's economic development is not negatively affected
by recessions and contractions in developed Western economies.∂ The Chinese economy cannot survive long on the principles of export-led
growth and high domestic savings. Besides, an aggressive stance against its neighbors will likely push them further
closer to the arms of the United States, thereby tarnishing Chinese attempts at manufacturing soft
power.∂ How to gain a role∂ China owes its meteoric rise in global politics to its efforts to become a part of the
capitalist world economy. Its influence in global politics arises from the intense economic relationships it has developed with many
other countries.∂ China has now become the number one trading-partner of not only its neighbors to the south and east but also many
developed countries in the West. China is still the global factory of merchandise goods and it needs to import many raw materials from abroad
because it is a resource-poor country.∂ If China
wants to benefit from its growing economic relations with other
countries, such as through the Belt and Road Imitative (BRI), the message that Chinese leaders have long
been giving should continue to resonate: China's rise also means the rise of others. For China's "no-strings-
attached" development aid policy not to be seen imperial, China's economic rise should continue benefiting others as well. The improvement of
infrastructural capacities of the countries on which China is dependent on for raw materials and to which China exports goods are in the final
analysis in China's national economic interests.∂ An important characteristic of China's rise also relates to its continental size and huge
population. Because size matters in international politics, every small increase in Chinese per capita income will lift many Chinese people out of
poverty and increase China's share in the global economy.∂ Despite the fact the per capita income in China is still less than $10,000, China will
likely overtake the United States as the largest economy by no later than the mid-century. Any war with the United States will certainly
postpone this to much later.∂ Challenge to liberal order∂ China's
challenge to the liberal world order closely varies with
its civilizational state identity and core values of Chinese society, such as a father-like status of the state in the eyes of
people, unitary state identity, territorial integrity, realpolitik security culture, societal cohesion, primacy of family bonds over individuality,
primacy of state sovereignty over popular sovereignty, state's unquestioned involvement in economics and social life, primacy of responsible
and ethical statesmanship over electoral legitimacy, resolving conflicts through societal mechanisms and trust relationships rather than legal
instruments, primacy of hierarchical relations within the society over egalitarianism and primacy of shame culture over guilt culture.∂
Another key characteristic of China's rise is that despite all counter allegations that Chinese foreign
policy has turned out to become more assertive and aggressive over the last decade Chinese leaders
seem to have been following a low key foreign policy orientation by avoiding rigid positions on global
issues unless core national interests are at stake, such as the status of Taiwan, Tibet, the Uighur region, the South China Sea
and the East China Sea. Chinese leaders also avoid taking global responsibilities. This is a challenge mainly because the costs of
maintaining global stability and providing global commons will dramatically increase absent the Chinese
contribution. On the other hand, such a reluctant approach to global governance might suggest that China is not resolved to
replace the United States as the global hegemon.∂ China is not openly questioning the established
Western liberal order by either forming anti-Western coalitions of states or doing its best to make sure
that Western-led international organizations do not operate smoothly.∂ It is for sure that China, along with
many other rising powers, wants to see that its growing ascendance in global politics be accommodated
institutionally and peacefully. However, should Western powers decline to accommodate China, the latter will not hesitate to help
establish alternative institutional platforms under its guidance, such as the Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership. China values external democratization of global politics rather than internal democratization of national
politics.∂ The project goal∂ Today's China is not pursuing a strategy of global hegemony . Defining their empire-state as
the Middle Kingdom, Chinese rulers have never adopted an imperial mission whose essential logic was to help transform others in China's
image. Despite that they believed in the superiority of their civilization, Chinese rulers have never engaged in an empire-building project whose
goal was to bring civilization to barbarians.∂ The expectation was that others would at some time in the future accept and respect the
legitimacy of China's primacy and pay their tributes to Beijing in return for Chinese benevolence and rewarding economic relations. Embracing a
benign imperial mindset, today's rulers of China want to make sure that a decentralized imperial order take place, first in East and Southeast
Asia, in which China sits at the center and other states respect the superiority of Chinese values as well as China's centrality in their
development.∂ China is against the idea of a universal civilization as well as the practices of setting global
standards of human rights. From the Chinese perspective, rules, values and norms are relative and
products of different time and space configurations. Similar to other great powers, China hopes that its values
and norms are shared by others. However, it does not construct its foreign relations on the basis of a
normative understating in that it is China's historical and civilizational mission to project its values
abroad.∂ On the contrary, Chinese leaders appear to believe that the main features of Chinese civilizations have already shaped the
dynamics of interstate and transnational relations in East and Southeast Asia and that the more interdependent economic and strategic
relations China builds with its neighbors, within the framework of realist Westphalian order, the more leverage Beijing will have over other
capitals.∂ It is probable that its historical, civilizational and cultural characteristics on one hand and developmentalist economic philosophy on
the other will likely affect China's contemporary foreign and security policies in a more reconciliatory, benign and cooperative fashion.
However, this in no way suggests that the process of its climbing up the ladder of power will never cause geopolitical rivalries and conflicts in
the years ahead.

Chinese rise is peaceful

Ting, 2019 (Kacee Ting is a practising barrister in Hong Kong and vice-chairman of the Hong Kong Legal
Exchange Foundation, 7/17/2019,
https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/24/187/99/1563340339875.html, SHD)
The rise of the United States from a former British colony to become the world supreme power was propelled by its profiteering from both
warring sides in world wars, joining the Allies in the later period of World War II, and orchestrating the downfall and disintegration of the
former Soviet Union. In those decades, China was too poor to warrant any attention until earlier this century. The US no longer saw China as a
useful source of cheap labor for American multinationals but a potential threat to future US hegemony. Since about 2005, the US
developed a covert China containment policy which had two aspects: multi-frontal containment and
internal transformation.∂ One of the subscribers to this China containment policy, University of Chicago International Relations
Professor John Mearsheimer, told a recent seminar on Power Politics in the Indo-pacific Region in Poland that, “…China is more likely to
become a counter-weight to the US, who will not allow a new rival to emerge. Hence, it is trying every means to contain China’s rise. ∂ “The US
has defeated its rivals time and time again in the past. This time it is China’s turn. China will also be defeated by the US.”∂ But at
the end of
the day it boils down to one central question: “Is it necessary to contain China?” Unlike European
powers often rising on the ruins of another, the Chinese nation has stayed away from hegemony despite
its economic preponderance for milleniums.∂ In traditional Chinese culture, the quest for harmony – or at times only a simple
appearance of harmony – is constant: it refers to a balanced relationship between Men and Society, between Mankind and Nature and among
Men. A Chinese person will consequently feel embarrassed to refuse something bluntly, because he/she does not want to risk losing face with
vis-à-vis or breaking a “harmonious” ambience, albeit the latter is only a thin surface. ∂ The
Western world uses a number of
ways to resolve problems, but most of them are bipolar and allow for confrontation, differing interests
or points of view.∂ Westerners are not necessarily aware of what they have in common because there are degrees of nuance between a
“cards on the table” confrontation, close to physical assault and a well-conducted negotiation.∂ The Chinese race, by the great majority, is the
Han ethnic group. Han ancestors are the agricultural tribes emerging from central and eastern Asia and enjoyed the abundance of land and rich
resources. Because of this self-sufficiency and availability of unlimited resource, the Han ethnics were very contended and never needed to
invade or conquer. ∂ On the contrary, nomads often invaded the Hans from all other directions greedy for their richness, forcing the ancient
Han ethnics into self-defense battles against invasion. ∂ Ever since 1840, China was the victim of foreign invasion by Western
powers and Japan (the First opium War, the Second Opium War, the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in World War II)
rather than being a belligerent hegemon. ∂ In fact, China has always been a peace-loving nation. The best
proof may be the invention and use of gunpowder. As early as in the Tang Dynasty (AD 618-907), there was written gunpowder formula
recorded in the book "Tai Shang Sheng Zu Jin Dan Secret" 《太上聖祖金丹秘訣》. Chinese ancients invented gunpowder by chance in the pursuit
for immortality.∂ Ironically, it is the West that used gunpowder as weapon against the Chinese who discovered that thousands of years ago but
had never thought to use it to hurt people. The East used gunpowder to further develop fireworks whereas the West used gunpowder to make
weapons.∂ Fromthe outset of the trade dispute with the US, China has taken a passive and defensive
attitude throughout.∂ According to the white paper entitled “China’s Peaceful Development” issued by the Information Office of the
State Council of China in September 2011, China regards itself as a member of the international community and aims at building of a
harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity and work with other countries on international relations and foreign policies. For
instance,
China respects the right of the people of other countries to independently choose their own
social system and path of development, and does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs. In 2015,
President Xi Jinping reiterated the message that “No matter how strong its economy grows, China will never seek hegemony, expansion or
sphere of influence.” The message has been emphasized time and again since then.∂ The
so-called theory of “China Threat”
has bedraggled the world long but only to no avail. China has been taking a path of peaceful
development upholding national sovereignty and territorial integrity while avoiding the enhancement
of national interests through aggression.∂ Skeptics like Mearsheimer works on suspicion and not facts; they relied on
speculation rather than analysis; they had no understanding of the Han ethnic culture but based his conclusion upon belligerent and
confrontational Western way of thought.
Chinese transition is peaceful --
Harris 14 (Peter, contributor to the National Interest and newsletter editor for the International History
and Politics section of the American Political Science Association, 2014, “Problems with Power-
Transition Theory: Beyond the Vanishing Disparities Thesis”, Asian Security, p. 253-254)//EAW

It should be noted that power-transition theorists tend to argue that rising states will be the ones to initiate
hegemonic war with a declining state rather than the other way around. There are actually several assumptions
embedded in this claim that a vanishing disparity in power will cause a rising state to initiate war with a declining state. First,
Organski assumes that there are distributional consequences to how the international order is
organized, which create material incentives for states to compete over its form. Second, because dominant states are
presumed to have had a hand in constructing the extant international order, such states always benefit
disproportionately from their dealings with others in the international system, receiving “the greatest share of the benefits that flow from the
existence of the international order,” and thus have a rational self-interest in maintaining the status quo. Third, Organskiassumes that
rising states invariably stand to gain from changing the status quo because a new international order
would serve them better than the extant one. Fourth, Organski implies that international order can be
remade by rising states—that is, world order is sufficiently malleable such that a newly dominant state could have significant
influence over its shape if that rising state is able to displace or unseat the established hegemon. Fifth, war against the preexisting
hegemon is cost-effective for the rising state or group of states—that is, the benefits of usurping a dominant state via
force outweigh the costs of waging hegemonic war.∂ Viewed through the lens that Organski has bequeathed, then, Thucydides’s trap is a lethal
contraption indeed. Consider, for example, its application to the contemporary and anticipated rise of China. China is the third largest country
in the world by area and the first biggest by population. Its economy has grown rapidly for decades and is forecast to overtake that of the
United States at some point during this century. China
is already the world’s largest trading nation, its biggest
producer of steel, and the second biggest consumer of oil. Its voracious appetite for raw materials spurs economic growth
in countries on its periphery and farther afield. Beijing’s economic policy is geared towards the urbanization and industrialization of what has
historically been a primarily agrarian society. While its GDP per capita is still quite low relative to other industrialized economies, this only
portends the distance that China still has to go and foretells the enormous latent potential that the country still has at its future disposal. In
short, China
already surpasses the United States on some of Organski’s key measures of national power
and is almost certain to eclipse its rival along his other dimensions in due course. What is more, neither the
United States nor any other world power seems capable of doing much to halt China’s rise. At some point—namely, the point at which Chinese
power comes close to eclipsing that of the United States—Organski’s formulation of power-transition theory would clearly predict that conflict
between the United States, China, and their respective allies will ensue. China is destined to want to change the extant world order, which
unambiguously is the product of the United States and its liberal, maritime-capitalist, Anglo-Saxon predecessor as world hegemon, the British
Empire. The scene is set for a Great Power showdown of epic proportions. ∂ It would be remiss not to mention, however, that Organski
acknowledges in World Politics that his theory of power transitions does not explain all historical cases of interest. In particular, Organski
highlights the Anglo-American power transition of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the “one major exception that bears
examination.” As noted in the introduction, the United States surpassed the British Empire in financial, industrial, and military terms in a mostly
peaceful fashion. Organski speculates that this peaceful power transition occurred because of several unique circumstances: unlike other rising
states, the United States did not seek world leadership; the United States’ growth in power was due to the development of its internal
provinces and was thus non-threatening to external powers; the United States was accepting of the extant Anglo-French international order;
and, in any case, London was powerless to prevent the inevitable. Each of these conjectures could have been modeled by Organski as
intervening variables—general conditions that might hold in other power-transitional dyads and not just the Anglo-American case, factors that
might blunt the causal predictions of the vanishing disparities thesis. As it is, however, Organski in World Politics and his subsequent work does
little more than discuss these factors as anomalies to explain the Anglo-American outlier. In general terms, peaceful power transitions should
not be expected; Organski’s power-transition theory does not—indeed, cannot—explain their occurrence.
 AT: Heg I/L
China’s rise is inevitable and weapon systems aren’t key
Roggeveen 2018 - senior fellow at the Lowy Institute in Australia
Sam, "What Role Do Arms Sales Play in China’s Geopolitical Ambitions?" Jan 23,
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/24044/what-role-do-arms-sales-play-in-china-s-
geopolitical-ambitions

But beyond China’s relationships with its customers, I think there is a strategic agenda. China wants be a world power, and this
ambition is being advanced largely through technological means. China clearly wants to compete with Boeing and
Airbus as a maker of civilian airliners, and it has an equally ambitious space program. It is also focused on leading the way in
artificial intelligence and computer technology. China wants to be a world-class manufacturer of weapons, too, and if it is
going to make these weapons for its own armed forces, it might as well export them. WPR: What are the implications of Chinese arms sales in
its immediate spheres of influence? Roggeveen: In strategic terms, the most significant arms export to Asia that China has ever conducted is still
its transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan. Next to that, everything else pales for two reasons. First, the
scale of Chinese
conventional weapons exports to the rest of Asia remains relatively modest—though, as the SIPRI figures show, it is
clearly growing. But second, if China were not exporting weapons to Asia, countries would simply be purchasing
them from elsewhere. Granted, China’s presence in the market creates competition, presumably driving down prices and improving
overall quality. But the conventional weapons Beijing is offering to the market are in ready supply, whereas
nuclear weapons technology is much harder to come by. For those reasons, I doubt Chinese arms sales make a huge
contribution to Beijing’s ambitions for greater regional influence, particularly in contrast to its signature
initiative, known as One Belt, One Road. China is offering fast, large-scale infrastructure support, which other players such as the World
Bank, Asian Development Bank and bilateral donors do not provide. The connections these projects create with China are physical and can
generate economic markets that are painful to disturb, so they are much more durable than the ties created by arms
sales.
 AT: Heg decline bad
Hegemonic decline will be peaceful
Fettweis 2017 - Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University
Christopher, "Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace," Security Studies, 26:3, 423-451, DOI:
10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394

Why has armed conflict declined to historically low levels? What accounts for the post-Cold War peace, and how long is it
likely to last? Surely no questions are more important for either the theory or practice of international relations, and few are harder to answer.
Only by understanding the causes of the New Peace can we extrapolate its likely future, however, and plan accordingly. Of the many possible
independent variables, none
is more controversial than the suggestion that hegemonic stability is at work. The
possibility that the United States, wittingly or not, has essentially established a global Pax Americana is
generally overlooked by the major scholarly works on the subject. This stands in stark contrast to the policy world,
where the many positive aspects of unipolarity and/or US hegemony are articles of faith, rarely discussed
and never seriously questioned. Scholar and public intellectual Michael Lind spoke for many when he wrote, “in my experience,
most members of the U.S. foreign policy elite sincerely believe that the alternative to perpetual U.S. world domination is chaos and war.” 4 One
of those is certainly Robert Kagan, who noted, “Pinker traces the beginning of a long-term decline in deaths from war to 1945, which just
happens to be birthdate of the American world order. The coincidence eludes him, but it need not elude us.”5 This paper examines the
theoretical, empirical, and psychological foundations of that widespread belief. The first section discusses the New Peace and its potential
explanations; the second explains the difference between unipolarity and hegemony, and examines the logic of the hegemonic-stability
argument; the third turns to the evidence, comparing both US power and grand strategy to conflict levels; the fourth examines the political
psychology of hegemony and reviews some major findings that provide insight into how international order can be misperceived. Insights from
that field are crucial in any discussion of the relationship between US power and global stability, which is built far more on belief and
perception than evidence. The
New Peace does not appear to be the result of unipolarity or US hegemony.
While that conclusion might not sit well with many US analysts, the news is not all bad, for if the current
generation of declinists is right and unipolarity’s days are numbered, the odds are good that the world
will not descend into the atavistic chaos that haunts the neoconservative imagination. The United States
can adjust its grand strategy without fear in the Trump years, perhaps even letting the “unipolar
moment” expire, because the New Peace may well be unrelated to its dominance.6
 AT: Petro-Yuan Impact
Petro-yuan impact is bunk
Bulloch 2018 – Former prof of International Relations Theory and International Politics at the London
School of Economics
Douglas, "Why the Petro-Dollar is a Myth, and the Petro-Yuan Mere Fantasy," Apr 26,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/douglasbulloch/2018/04/26/the-petro-dollar-is-a-myth-the-petro-yuan-
mere-fantasy/#6cb3e3a56a14
China's recent introduction of yuan-denominated oil futures has attracted some fairly extensive press commentary. Partly this is down to a
habit of over-interpreting everything happening in China as just more evidence of their unstoppable rise to global superpower status, but it is
also due to some profound misconceptions about the importance of oil as a commodity. It is widely thought, for example, that
oil somehow underwrites the global financial system and guarantees the U.S. dollar's hegemonic status.
Inevitably, stories about the toppling of the "Petro-dollar" and the long yearned for rise of an alternative reserve currency,
one not dependent on the whims of a capricious political elite in Washington, have proliferated across the alter-net and on the state-
backed media platforms of Russia and China. But we should be clear: the Petro-dollar does not exist, and really hasn't
done in any meaningful way since the 1970s, therefore the "Petro-yuan" has no future. This is not to say that oil will
never be traded in yuan, that is likely, but it is to say that trading oil in yuan will not suddenly transform the
currency into the global reserve many claim is inevitable. Origins Of The Petro-Dollar The myth of the Petro-dollar comes
from efforts in the 1970s to prevent the U.S. suffering severe negative effects in its balance of payments from rising oil prices. Until the late
1960s the U.S. had been an oil-exporter, but by also being an oil consumer they had never sought to maximize the rent from oil production by
driving prices upwards. OPEC countries, however, never had such qualms and when the opportunity arose as the U.S. became an importer,
happily restrained supply to drive prices, and their own national incomes, higher. The U.S. was worried about the resultant trade deficit caused
by suddenly having to pay vast amounts for necessary imports, and so secured the agreement of Saudi Arabia to only trade oil in U.S. dollars,
meaning the U.S. could pay for oil in their own currency. Saudi Arabia, for their part, accumulated huge reserves of U.S. dollars, investing some
of them back into the U.S. economy. The enormous lake of U.S. dollars this created augmented the role of the dollar as the global reserve
currency, being a highly liquid, easily-exchanged claim on the products, services and investment potential generated by the U.S. economy. But
this was merely one step in the rise of the greenback as the global reserve. The next step came when other economies–East Asia in particular–
followed the lead of the oil producers and also built up huge reserves of U.S. dollars, all of which was made possible by the abandonment of the
Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s. This practice helped to keep exchange rates for exporters low, and kept a lid on
inflation in the U.S., which suited everyone up to a point. Future Petro-Yuan? Bringing this up to date, it was a long time ago when the link
between oil and the dollar mattered much at all beyond the financial returns of non-dollar based oil companies. Since the 1980s, the dollar has
been consolidated as the global reserve currency because of the strength and dynamism of the U.S. economy, and oil exporters have
demanded to be paid in U.S. dollars because that's the currency they prefer to hold on to. To do otherwise is to take on exchange risk.
Exporters can, and routinely do, accept payment in whatever exchange medium they wish -- tanks, planes and construction services -- but their
central banks demand dollars for reasons entirely unconnected to oil. Because the U.S. dollar is a hard currency, easily exchangeable,
underwritten by the U.S. taxpayer, and founded upon decades of broadly consistent macro-economic policy management. Those who believe
that oil being traded in U.S. dollars gives the U.S. economy a unique advantage in the global economy have it exactly the wrong way around.
The U.S. economy is the central economy in the global system because it is the most open, innovative, and productive economy in the world,
and because of this, the U.S. dollar is the most convenient, liquid and reliable medium of exchange. One can imagine another currency
challenging it at some point in the future, but only on the basis of the openness of its underlying economy, and the depth of the capital markets
denominated in it. And if the euro can't do it yet, why does anyone imagine the yuan is up to the job? Furthermore, the U.S. dollar's position as
the global reserve currency has been underwritten by Chinese economic policy. China has deliberately built up a huge pile of U.S. dollar-
denominated reserves which, contrary to much press coverage and occasional threats of a big selloff from China, confirms rather than
undermines the dollar's status. Yuan-Denominated Oil Futures? When China, like any other economy, allows the trading of oil futures in yuan,
the contract merely promises dated delivery of oil in exchange for yuan. The contract does not supply the oil, it does not forward the yuan to an
oil producer, it is merely a transaction that allows a buyer guaranteed delivery of oil by paying for it in yuan. The counter-party has to supply
the oil in exchange for the yuan. Somewhere along the supply-chain someone will be paying in U.S. dollars, unless the ultimate supplier wishes
to hold yuan. And despite the fanfare over the last few years, the
yuan still comprises a tiny share of foreign exchange
reserves held globally. Indeed, at 1.1% of the total, the yuan is significantly behind both the Australian and
Canadian dollars, meaning that–with pound sterling–Queen Elizabeth II's head appears on 7.5 times more foreign currency reserves than
Mao's. If China wants to change that, it will need to open up its economy, liberate its capital account and
start living up to, rather than repudiating, its reform promises. Shanghai-traded oil futures in themselves have nothing to
do with it.