CHAPTER XI

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

OF THE CONSTITUTION

The commentaries and jurisprudence diJCUsscd herein below is

more in accord with the construction and interpretation of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. This is to enlighten and guide prcsent-<lay law
students and even lawyers for purposes of academic discussion.
" A constitution is a system of fundarnenta1 law for the
governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority
from which it emanates. It has been defined as the funda-
mental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes lhe
permanent framework of a system of government. a.-;signs
to the different departments their respective powers and du-
ties. and establishes certain fixed principles on which gov-
ernment is founded. The fundamental conception in other
word,; is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights
must be determined and all public authority administered.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violate.1t any nonn of the constitution~ that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the ex-
ecutive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental , paramount
and supreme Jaw of the nation. it is deemed written in every
statute and contract."
Thus says the Supreme Court through Justice Josue N. BeUosiUo
in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service In·
surance System (G.R. No, 122156, February 3, J997) when it directed
the respondents G.S.I.S., et al., to cease and desist from selling the 51 %

327
tr
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign entity and accept

the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel Corporation under the Filipino
First policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
Like a statute, the primordial rule in the construction and inter-
pretation of the constitution is the intention of the framers of the writ-
ten constitution. But this intention is readily available in the instrument
itself. Thus, the natural meaning of the words used in every provision
should be taken as it is. Technical words should be given their techni-
cal meaning, unless it appears that terms were used in a more popular
sense.
Our statutes and jurisprudence gives us more of the guiding prin-
ciples in the construction and interpretation of the constitution.

ALL PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE SELF-EX-

ECUTING; EXCEPTIONS
In Manila Prince Hotel vs. G.S.l.S., supra, the Supreme Court de-
clared that:
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of poli-
cies. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry
out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of gov-
ernment providing for the different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of
citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-execut-
ing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision
is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is
no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have
been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often be-

328
 CONSTRUCTION AND lNTERPRETATION OF THE CON
STITUTION

come in eff~ct extensive codes of laws .

the ~ople m a manner similar to that mtended to operate directly upon
st
function of constitutional conv ti of atutory enactments, and th
that of a legislative body H en ons has evolved into one more
.1 . . ence, unless it is
rn/
e
a eg1s auve act is necessary t ,. expressly provided that
1 . o en,orce a con u·t •
presumption
. now is that all prov1s1ons
.. of the cs ullonal
. . mandate • the
ecutmg. If the constitutional p . . onslltullon are self-ex-
. . rov1s1ons are treated .. .
110n mstead of self-executing th 1 . 1 as reqwnng Ieg1sla-
tl1
ignore and practically nullify e eg~ ature would have the power to
can be cataclysmic. That is wh e man ate_~fthe_fundamental law. This
been, that - y the prevailing view is, as it has always

"d edx x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be con-

SI er self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x
Unles~ th~ contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
ConSt1tutlon shoul~ be considered self-executing, as a con-
trary rule, would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
wo~ld be subordinated to the will of the law-making body,
which could make them entirely meaningless by simply re-
fusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Cruz, Isa-
gani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10).
NOTE: Section 10, second paragraph of Article XII provides:
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the na-
tional economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to quali-
fied Filipinos.
PROHIBITORY PROVISIONS GIVEN LITERAL AND STRICT
INTERPRETATION
In Civil Liberties Union vs. The Exe1,utive Secretary (G.R. No.
83896, February 2, 1991), Executive Order No. 284 issued on July 25,
J987 which in effect, allows members of the Cabjnet, their under-secre-
taries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or posi-
tions, although subject to the limitation therein .imposed, was declared
null and void as it runs counter to the provisions of Section 13, Article
vn of the I 987 Constitution, which provides as follows:

329
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

"Sec. 13. The President, Vice President, the Members

of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not, un-
less otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially in-
terested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office."
In declaring Executive Order 284 null and void, the Supreme
Court said:
"Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987
Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the Presi-
dent, Vice President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or em-
ployment in the government during their tenure, the excep-
tion to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On
its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibi-
tory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive
and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding mul-
tiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever
the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to
be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation. The phrase 'unless otherwise provided in this Con-
stitution' must be given a literal interpretation to refer only
to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself
to wit: the Vice President being appointed as a member of
the <?abin~t under ~ection 3, par. (2), Article VII or acting as
President 10 tho_se mstances provides under Section 7, pars.
(2) and _(3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being
ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtu
of Section 8(1 ), Article VIII." e
 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

The prohibition against holding dual .

ployment under Section 13 • Art"ice or multiple
1 V lloftheC .. offices or em-
however, e construed as applyin t onstltutJon must not
.al b . fi g o posts occupied b th E •
o. c1 s spec1 ed therein without additional _Y _e xecutive
cw
ffi capacity as provided by law and . compensau~n man ex-offi-
of said official offices. (Varney vs J as;equ~~ed by5 the pnmary function
vs. State, 22 Tex. App. 396, S.W. Ky 96; 6 S.W. 457; Hunt
3
the ab?ve en ban~ decision, the following guidelines in con-
struct1on and mterpretatmn of the const't1 ut'10n are stressed:
. I. A fo?lproof yardSt ick in constitutional construction is the in-
tention underlymg the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been
held t~at the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind
the obJeCt sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if
any, s_ough_t to be _prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
exammed m the hght of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is
to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution
to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accom;
plished thereby, in order to constrUe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. (Maxwell
vs. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 44 L. Ed. 597).
II. It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction
that not one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon
a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be interpreted as
to effectuate the great purposes of the instrUment. Sections bearing on
a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable constru9tion, the
two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable,
and must Jean in favor of a constrUction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nuga-
tory. (People vs. Wright, 6 Col. 92; Thomas M. Colley, A Treatise on
the Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1, p. 128, citing Attomey General

331
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

vs. Detroit and Erin Plank Road Co., 2 Mich. 114; People vs. Burns,
5 Mich. 114; District Township vs. Dubuque, 7 Iowa 262; Grants vs.
Grauman [Ky], 320 SW 2d 364; Runyon vs. Smith).
ID. While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the de-
bates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are power-
less to vary the ,terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention are of value as showing the
view of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face. The
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood
by' the people adopting ·it than the framer's understanding thereof. (16
Corpus Juris Secundum, 2.31, p. 105; Commonwealth vs. Ralph, III Pa.
365, 3 At!. 220; Household Finance Corporation vs. Shaffner, 203, S.W.
2d 734, 356 Mo. 808).
N.B. Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Philip Ella Juico, et
al., G.R. No. 83815, February 22, 1991 is consolidated in this case.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON NATURAL-BORN

CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EF-
FECT
In upholding the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal de-
claring the winning candidate as a natural born-citizen and resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes, the Supreme Court inter-
prets the pertinent portion of the Constitution found in Article IV which
reads:

SECTION I. The following are citizens of the Philippines: ·

I. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

332
 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRET/\::rION OFTIIB CONSTITUTION
1
Those born before January 17 1973 of Fili .
3. elect
and Philippine citizenship upon
' reaching
' . thepmoagemothers, who
of majority;
\

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION
T · fr2. Natural-born
• , who" are c1t1zens
citizens are those ·· of
the P: 1pp:e~ birth without having to perfonn any act to acquire
or pe ect e~ c1t1zenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citi-

zens."
The Court interprets Section l, Paragraph 3 above as applying not
only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987
but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. '
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair
position which discriminates against Filipino women.
As extrinsic aid, the records of the deliberation of the Constitu- \
tional Commission were look into viz.:
"MR. RODRIGO: But these provisions become very important \
because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not
only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen en-
titling him to run for Congress.
FR. BERNAS: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that
reason we will leave it to the,body to approve that provisions

of Section 4.
MR. RODRIGO: I think there is a good basis for the provision
because it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who
was bom a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filip_ino
citizen or a natural born-citizen." (Records of the Consutu-
tional Commissioner, Vol. I, p. 231 ).
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and J973 when we were
under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers

333
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

but alien mothers Were natural-born Filipinos. However,

those born of Filipin0 mothers but alien fathers would have
to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of ma-
jority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but
not natural-born Filipino citizens." (Records of the Constitu-
tional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356). ·
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To
make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a nar-
row interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be
retroactive.

It should be noted that in constrµing the law, the Courts are not
always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit
and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where
adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela
vs. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970]).

A constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it ef-

fective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence,
it is the spirit of the provision which should prevai I over the letter there-
of. (Jarrolt vs. Mabberly, !03 U.S. 580).

In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason vs. LTA (31
SCRA413 [1970]):

"To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated.

Our constitution or any constitution is not to be construed
narrowly or pedantically, for the prescriptions therein con-
tained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical
~or:mul_as ~av!ng their essence in their form but are organic
bvmg mst1tutions, the significance of which is vital not for-
mal. .. " (p. 427). '

The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous

situatio~ where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one b
of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Ph"~~
. .. h" If I lip
pme c1t1zens 1p. one so e ected, he was not under earlier laws
ferred the status of a natural-born. • con-
 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF TIIE CONSTITlITION

Under th~ _I ~73 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and

thos~ born of F1lipmo mothe~ with an alien father were placed on equal
footmg. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
N.B. The constitutional provision is curative in nature. (Co vs. Elec-
toral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92,
July 30, 1991, and Balanguit, Jr. vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92202-03, July 30, 1991).

THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE CONSTRUED IN

ITS ENTIRETY AS ONE, SINGLE DOCUMENT
In the Matter of Appointment dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Ma•
teo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City
(Adm. Mat. No. 98-5--01-SC), the Supreme Court en bane resolved to
declare VOID, the appointments of said judges signed by His Excel·
!ency, The President under date March 30, 1998.
The issue posed by this Administrative Matter is whether, during
the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill va-
cancies in the Judiciary in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article vm. A
corollary question is whether he can make appointments to the judiciary
during the period of the ban in the interest of public service.
The provisions of the constitution material to the inquiry at bar
read as follows:
Section 15, Article VII:
"Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacan-
cies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety."
Section 4(1 ), Article Vlll:

liiif""\.~ice
• "The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Jus-
and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en bane or, in

arc 335
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

·ts discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members.

~y vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the oc-
currence thereof."
Section 9, Article VIII:
"The members of the Supreme Court and judges in
lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list
of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no con-
firmation.

"For the lower courts, the President shall issue the ap-
pointments within ninety days from the submission of the
list."

The Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution - "two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term" - the Presi-
dent is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed
to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that
the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time
frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII.
It is noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect
only once every six years.

Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two
types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes; and (2) those
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments
made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are
similar to those which are declared election offenses in the Omnibus
Election Code. (Sec. 261, pars. [a] and [g], Omnibus Election Code).
The second type of appointment prohibited by Section 15, Article
VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments. In A,ytona vs.
Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal
as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated
in his bid for re-election, became no more than a "caretaker" adminis-
trator whose duty was to "prepare for the orderly transfer of authority
to the incoming President."

336
 7
r
CONSTRUCTION AN DINTERPRET:O.TIONOFTHEC
ONSTITUTION

Section 15, Article VII h

It may not unreasonably be d as a broader scope th th
appointments - those m deem~ to contemplate~ot e:y~?n~ ru_ling.
by their number
d d and the / imee oofbv1ously for partisan reoasons
their makin y lilldmght"
as shown
pres~me m~ e for the purpose of infl . g - but also appointments
o e Pres1-
dent1al election. uencmg the outcome f th .

On the other hand, the exception i

VII -:- allowing appointments to be n the s~e Section 15 of Article
therem provided - is much made dunng the period of the ban
The exception allows only ;arro= than that recognized in Aytona.
executive positions when cont~ m d g of _temp_orary appointments to
vice or endanger public saf ;uib v_acancies will ~rejudice public ser-
the appointing power of the;res1
. 'dent
v10usl~,
dunngthe
thearticle
periodgreatly restricts
of the ban.

C?ns~dering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling
vac~c1es m t~e _coui:ts and the restriction on the President's power of
appomtment; it is this Court's view that, as a general proposition, in
c_ase of conflict, 1;11e forme~ s~ould yield to the latter. Surely, the preven-
tion of _vote-~uymg and surular ev~ls outweighs the need for avoiding
delays m filhng up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases.
Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, inciden-
\
tally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six
years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled tem-
porarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are long lasting
and permanent in their effects. Tuey may, as earlier pointed out in fact
influence the results of elections and, for that reason, their making is

considered an election offense.

To the contention that may perhaps be asserted, that Sections 4( 1)
and 9 of Article Vill should prevail over Section 15 of Article VU, be-
cause they may be considered later expressions of the people when they
,dopted the Constitution, ii suffi"" to point out that the Comtitoti<>"
must be constrUed in its entirety as one, single instroment.

LIBERAL coNSTRUCTION OF ONE TITLE

ONE SUBJECT RULE
A liberal constrUction was applied by the Supreme Court in inter-
p,etiog Artide VI, Se<- 26( I) of the Constitution on the "ooe title o"'

337
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

subject" rule. (Robert Tobias, et al. vs. Hon. City Mayor Benjamin S.
Abalos, et al., G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994).
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluy-
ong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of
Mandaluyong."

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No.
7675, specifically Article vm, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional
for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article vm, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
"As a highly urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong
shall have its own legislative district with the first repre-
sentative to be elected in the next national election after the
passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative
district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new leg-
islative district of San Juan with its first representative to be
elected at the same election."

Petitioners' first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A.

No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enun-
ciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
"Section 26(1 ). Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.

Petitioner allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in

the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects,
namely: (I) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Man-
daluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not ger-

mane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats
of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as ex-
pressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 9 treats of a sub-

338
r CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

ject"distinct from that stated . the title

. of th J
ru1e h as not been complimed with.
. e aw, the '>onesub'~ect-one
bill
In dismissing the petition th S
tratY to petitioners' assertion the e u~reme Court declared that con-
· t ",or Mandaluyong is not
stnc • a creation
b' of a separate congressional
b' t f . su Ject separat d d' .
di
su JeC o its conversion into a h. hi . e an 1st1nct from the
and logical consequence of its c ig Y_ur~amzed city but is a natural
1
Verily, the title of R.A. No. ~n~: :/nto a hig~ly urbanized city.
767
!
ity of Mandaluyong Into a Highl U b Conv~rtmg the Municipal-
necessarily includes and contem y r anize~ City of Mandaluyong"
49 regarding the creation of plates the subJect treated under Section
daluyong. a separate congressional district for Man-

Mo~eove~, a liberal constrUction of the "one title-one subject" rule

has_bee~ mvanably adopted by the court so as not to cripple or impede
legislation. Thus,~ S~mulong vs. COMELEC (83 Phil. 288 [1941]), we
rule~ that the consutut1onal requirement as now expressed in Article VI,
Section 26( I) "should be given a practical rather than a technical con-
strUction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane

to the general subject."

RESIGNATION OF THE pRESIDENT UNDER THE 1987 CON-
STITUTION IS NOT GOVERNED BY ANY FORMAL REQUIRE·
MENT AS TO FORM- IT CAN BE ORAL· IT CAN BE WRITTEN.
IT CAN BE ExPRESS. IT CAN BE IMPLIED.
After monstrous demonstration calling for his resignation, Presi-
dent Joseph E. Estrada, in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 departed
Malacaiiang Palace, the seat of presidency of the Philippine Republic

with the following press statement:

At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria
MacapagaJ-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Re-
public of the Philippines. While along with mai_iY other le-
gal minds of our countrY, I have strong and senous dou~ts
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamauon
as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the
restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
339
 STATIITORY CONSTRUCTION

It is for this reas0n that I now leave Malacafiang Pal-

ace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.
I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the oppor-
tunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk
from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same
seryice of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in
the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconcilia-
tion and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved peo-
pie.
MABUHAY!
In his petition for quo warranto, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Es-
trada attacks the legitimacy of the presidency ·of respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and seeks a declaration that petitioner is the lawful
President,of the Philippines.
The issue is whether or not petitioner Joseph E. Estrada resigned
as president.

The Supreme Court en bane through Hon. Justice Reynato S. Puno

declared:

The issue brings under the microsc?pe the meaning of section 8,

Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office or resignation of the President, the Vice Presi-
dent shalJ become the President to serve the unexpired tenn.
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office,
or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the
President of the Senate or, in.case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, shalJ then act as President
until the President or Vice President shall have been elected
and qualified.
XXX XXX xxx

340
 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATJON OF THE CONSTITUTION

The issue then is whether th ..

,
should be considered resigned as ~ itltioner resigned as President or
0 20
took her oath as the 14th President f: u i , !001 when respondent
high level legal abstraction. It is a ~actu~ epub~ic. Resi_gnation is not a
beyond quibble: there must be . que~tlon and its elements are
an mtent to resign and the • t
coupled by acts of relinquishment Th l'd' _m ent must be
governed by any formal • · e va I ity of a resignation is not
requirement as to form It can be ral I be
written. It can be express. It can be im lied A~ lo o . _t can_
is clear, it must be given legal effect. P · ng as the resignation

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any
formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaiiang Palace in
the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arro~o. Conseq~ently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be de-
termined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January
20, 2~ 1 or by t~e totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
and c1rcumstant1al evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using the totality test, which culminated in the president's depar-
ture from Malacafiang and the press statement above-quoted, it held
that petitioner Estrada resigned as President.
Continuing, the Supreme Court added:
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaiiang. In the press re-
lease containing his final statement: (1) he acknowledged the oath-tak-
ing of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation
about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat
of t'1e presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to
any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency
as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the
people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was refer-
ring to the past oppor-.unity given him to serve the people as President;
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may
come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is
to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which
· ·-- .. ~ - ~nrl ('i) he called on his supporters to join him in the
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidar-

ity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release
was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is
now in the past tense.
In his concurring opinion, Hon. Justice Jose C. Vitug articulated
the departure of petitioner, Estrada, from Malacaiiang and his "valedic-
tory" message as resignation in this wise: "Abandonment of office"
is a specie of resignation, and it connotes the giving up of the office
although not attended by the formalities normally obser:ved in resigna-
tion. Abandonment may be effected by a positive act or can be the result
of an omission, whether deliberate or not. (Joseph E. Estrada vs. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 02, 2001).

SPECIAL PROVISION PREVAILS OVER A GENERAL ONE

In the exercise by the Senate of its constitutional power to concur
with the Visiting Forces Agreement between the Republic of the Philip-
pines and the United States of America, Section 25 of Article XVIIl was
considered as special and controlling provision over Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution. Said the Supreme Court:
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requir-
ing the concurrence of the Senate on'treaties or international agreements.
Section 21 , Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:
"No treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at leave two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate."
Section 25, Article xvm, provides:

"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement be-

tween the Republic of the Philippines and the United States
of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bas-
es, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and
when the Congress so require, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for

342
i coNSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

that purpose, and recognized

tracting State." as a treaty by the other con-

Section
· 21,
al Article
· 1 treaties
. VII deals w"th . or · .
ments 1n gener , m which case the mternatlonal agree
(113) of all. the Membera
. of the 'Sen,~-~
e is requrredof" two-drink
'""'th
to mak
treaty, or mtemat1onal agreement valid d b" . e art
e subject

a:
. Th" , an mding on the f
P ppmes. 1s provision Jays down th P o the
hili
international agreements and applies to ~eneral rule on ~ties or
variety· of subject
th matter, such
. . as, but not ~trmd
limi~
e of to,treaty ~~th aorwide
extraditton tax
treattes or ose econorruc m nature All treat" . .
ments entered. into by the. Philippine~ , regardle1esss orf
o sumtbe~attonal
1ect matter,agree-
cov-
. , ..,, e concurrence
erage, or particular designation or appellation req";~es th
of the Senate to be valid and effective.
. In contra~t, Section 25, Article XVlli is a special provision that
applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases
troop• « facilities in tho Philippines- Uod" mis pnwSion, mo~
currence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compli-
ance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement
binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires
that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the
Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for
that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the

other contracting state.

It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far
from contradicting each other, actually share some co~on grou?d.
These constitutional provisions both embody phrases 1n the nega~ve
and thus, are.deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In P'."°"cu-
la<, S,Ctirn> 21 opoo• with mo cl- "No _ , ' ' ,," ""·" "'oo ."
contains the phrase "shall not be allowed-" Additionally, ID both m-
•=•• m, oonc,moo« of m, sen•"' is indi""",blo '° "'""°' ""
treaty or international agreement valid and effective.
1o our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to ~e
""'"" """" s,ction 21. Artie!< .VIL
concurrence under the same prov1s1on, JS 1nu-.
""'•hO ""'"' " -••
. . ,-n1aten·al for JD either case,
,nd
• . XVIII th
whether under Section 21 , Article Vll or Secuon 25, AfUcle ' e
343
 ..'l l f-\ 1 U J UK I L U I''! .'.:> J K U \... l l U l'II

fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is

mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treat-
ment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel,
and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel
and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and
supplies.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIIl, which specifically deals

with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities,
should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited
sense, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find ap-
plicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determin-
ing the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.

It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that

a special provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis
derogant generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular
enactment and also a general one which, in its most comprehensive
sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular en-
actment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to
affect only such cases within its general language which are not within
the provision of the particular enactment. (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan] vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000).

SUPREMALEX

It is time-honored that the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the

land. It is the law of all laws. Hence, if there is conflict between a statute
and the Constitution, the statute shall yield to the Constitution.
Our civil code is explicit on this matter. Thus, when the Courts
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern. It further adds that administrative or
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Art. 7, NCC).

344
 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF TIIE CONSTITUTION

In fact, it is a basic
ute should be interpreted _precept in statutory con .
petition for recall a pun m harmony with the Consstrut_tuct~on that a stat-
. ' ong bara • 1 t1on Th •
Government
1 Code which solos
t ngay
that mvoked Sec ' 74(b) 0.f tireus,Loc,t
l1JlI«all ma
( ) y~ar froi:11 the date of the officia1' sh~! take place within o
c"
be m h,nnony with Section J of ;::.:/"~,t
Y"" unmed,mely preceding , re 1 ' ••rnmpllon to offi" "'""'
elecll<m was i,"""'ted
a local government code wh"1ch shoulde of.dthe Constitution to "enact
an accountable local govern prov1 e for a more respons1·ve
. ment structur · ·
o d ecentrabzation with eff t" e msututed through a system
& ec 1ve mecha · Of
fd
re,,«,odum x x x " (P" C msm r,gj!, initiati.e ,od
mns). · ""· oMELEC, 264 SCRA 49, eroptra,O

STARE DECISIS
. _Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Jaws or the Con-
st1tut1on
NCC) Thshall fonnhpart d of
. .the legal system of the ph'Ji ·
I ppmes. (Art. 8,
· ese are t e ec1s1ons pronounced by the Supreme Court and
Im>_ no reference to the dedsioos of "" ]owe< oo,rts. (Miranda "· Im·
penal, 77 Phil. 1066).
In ou, jurisdictioo, "" doctriae of ,we dee•• o< tf,e role of P"'·
eden" ,s followed m that ooce • " " "'" beeO decided io °"'
way, ""'
another case, involving the same issue should be decided in the same

manner.
•"]'he pdnciple of"'"' J,c;,;, applies wi<h spedID fo,ce to t1re
,onsouctio, of ,o,stitoti""'• ,od " in""""tatio• "'"deli_,,,,
put upun <h• p•wisio" of '""' ,n
-
in""'"""'
,hoold ,ot be depmted
withOUt g<a'° _,,,.. Th• .,i,ilitY of m"Y of th< - t imPo'·
tant io>titotion• of sod<IY dep<"ds ,pu, the penn•"'""' " well " tl<
.,,uiotY, of tb< '°"uuction pt_,,d by <he jodid'"' op<" me fuad>·
"'""" 1,w." (Bt,ck, c,,.,,,,ction omJ /me,pn,to#M of IA"'• p. 44,
Whil' the p,i,dple of """ d,c;,o is • ro"'d doctrioo fo, Po'·
2nd ed.)-
puses of stability, <hi• s1t0Wd oot be fot]ow<tl wheO - 0 P'""t "'°'
i j,dgme0t- soch P"''dent sboold be
O
'""'"°""' ,od di,C-·

345
 sTA'ftJTORY coNSTRUCflUN

coNCLUSION
The framers of the Constitution could not have anticipated all con-
'"""'" <h" OUght ,rise in m, ,fto,roaili of "'"is. A coo,t;iution doe•
oo< do< io d<,Wl•, bfil "'"°""'' m, genonol teo<is d,at ,n, mtend<d
"' apply"' all facis drat may coro< ,t,oul bUI whidt ,an be i,,ougbl
,;<hio ;,. ,tirectious. B,h;od ;is ,ondsen<" ;, ;is ,ndus;venoss and ;is
apertures ovenidingly lie, not fragmented but integrated and encom-
,,...,. Its ,p;rit and ;ts ;,1eot 1bo ,onstitutioo c,umot be pennitted «>
deteriorate into just a petrified code of legal maxims and hand-tied to its
restrictive letters and wordings, rather than be the pulsating Jaw that it
is. Designed to be an enduring instrument, its interpretation is not to be
confined to the conditions and outlook which prevails at the time of its
adoption; instead, it must be given flexibility to bring it in accord with
~e vicissitudes of changing and advancing affairs of men. Technicali-
ues and pla~ of words cannot frustrate the inevitable because there is an
unmense difference between legalism and justice. If only to secure our
democracy and keep the social order - technicalities must give way
It h,s bo,o s,id dratm, real~=" of i"'';" does not ,m,oate
qm~~Imgs over patchwork legal technicalities but proceeds from the
1
spmt s gut consciousness of the dynamic role as a b . k . th .
development of social edifice. An thin e nc ~ . e ultimate
of tho Coostlt,tio• ro, which ;, 0 ionn::..::"'""" tho •~mt and httenl
rrrelevance and obscurity. (Separate _and re_d~ces Its mandate to
C. Vitug, in Joseph E. Estrada vs Gl~::~·mg op1mon of Justice Jose
146738, March 2, 2001). . acapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.

In fine, there is no hard and fast I .

terpretation of the Constitution J . ru e m the construction and in-
literal and liberal construction ~:in;prudence will show that the strict
study. on each and every prov1s1on
. . JO
_epend
qu fafter a careful and th oroug h'
specuve application will likewise d des wn. Prospectivepace
and retro-
ma
controversy. epen on each provision I d .

. "The fundamental princi le o .

give effect to the intent of the f; f constitutional constru . .
pie adopting it. The intenti ame_rs of the organic la ct1on IS to
is embodied and ex re o~ to which force is to _w and of the peo-
The Court will thu; c:~:~ne t~e t e constitutional ptJ?':'en
applicable constit is_1onsisthemselves.
that which
utmnal provisions
346 '
 CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

•n accordance with how the executive or the legislative department

1
not want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and
maY 'de" (Sarmiento III vs. Mison, No. L-79974, December 17, 1987,
provt ·
J56 scRA 549).

347