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CHAPTER 5
Patterns of Social Control

and Resistance
New World societies based on the utilization of slave labor were notori-
ously insecure. Slaveowners were continually faced with the problem of
protecting their physical safety. The oppression of the slave which the
system engendered carried within it the seeds of violent resistance. Since
slaves outnumbered their masters in some societies, numerical inferiority
produced a new dimension to the problem of fear. These circumstances
made it imperative that rigorous measures be taken to control the servile
population, to coerce the slave into subjection. It was hoped that such
measures would act as a deterrent to rebellions. Should they occur, the
state would have the legal ammunition to crush them swiftly and deci-
sively.
The record of the Spaniards in Mexico in the area of legislation for the
control of the slaves was starkly impressive. The legislation became in-
creasingly more stringent as the slave population grew. These repressive
measures, when enforced, had an effect opposite to that intended; the
slave became so restricted, so circumscribed in his movements and
actions, that physical resistance became, if not attractive, certainly
essential.
Legislation for the control of slaves in Mexico fell into two categories.
First, there was the restrictive legislation, the kinds of measures designed
at once to intimidate the slaves and to prevent social interaction and
revolutionary plotting among them. The second type of social control
legislation involved efforts to discourage and combat the problem of the
escaped slaves (cimarrones). In neither category was any attempt made
to be systematic. Rather, such legislation responded to the particular
needs of the moment, and the authorities promulgated measures to cor-
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120 Slaves of the White God
rect individual situations. But viewed as an overall pattern, these mea-

sures constituted an attempt by an insecure master class to control a rest-
less body of slaves.
The problem of preserving the social order from the assaults of the
slaves was present from the introduction of slavery. As early as 1523 the
authorities, mindful of the dangers stemming from the presence of too
many slaves, fixed the ratio of Spaniards to slaves at three Spaniards to
one slave. 1 Although this restriction was ignored in later years in the face
of economic pressures, the spirit which initially produced it never disap-
peared. As the Spanish traveler Gomez de Cervantes complained in 1599,
"We are surrounded by enemies who outnumber us; the danger is great
because Indians, negroes, mulattoes, mestizos are present in much
greater numbers than we who have to serve Your Majesty and defend the
realm." 2
While the colonists worried over the number of slaves, the crown had
taken steps as early as 1543 to prohibit the introduction of Moorish
slaves, who were generally considered to be intractable and rebellious. In
addition, it was felt that these slaves would be the agents of Islam and, as
such, would have a contaminating effect on the new Christians, both In-
dian and African. The cedula required that all Moorish slaves then in
Mexico be expelled. 3 The number of such slaves is not known. It is un-
likely that the figure exceeded a few score, since careful attempts were
usually made at the ports of departure to prevent their transportation to
the colonies. The 1543 cedula, whether or not it was stringently enforced,
was only the first in a series designed to expel the Moors from New
Spain. As late as 1577 the crown renewed the prohibition against the
transportation of such slaves to the Indies, a tacit admission that the ear-
lier prohibition had been violated. In 1578 the local authorities in Mexico
reported to the crown that they had expelled two Moorish slaves earlier
that year and that they would shortly be expelling more. By 1597 the
number of Moorish slaves in New Spain was negligible. In that year, the
viceroy informed the king that he had concluded a survey on them and
had found that there "are very few here." 4
While the crown actively prohibited the importation of Moorish slaves
to Mexico, it also sought to provide guidelines for the proper treatment
and control of the slave population. These guidelines were contained in a
cedula issued in 1545. It ordered that all masters should take special care
in the "good treatment" of their slaves, bearing in mind that they were
Christians. In addition, all slaves should be adequately clothed and fed

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Patterns of Social Control and Resistance 121
and not be cruelly punished. No organ of the slave should be cut off as a
form of punishment, since such an act contravened both divine and
human law. If such an offense were committed, the guilty master would
lose his slave and the person who reported the incident would receive a
reward of twenty pesos.
In order to prevent violent acts by the slaves, the emperor forbade
them to bear arms, with the sole exception of a knife without a point.
Slaves would not be allowed to travel from one area to another unless
they carried a note from their masters indicating the purpose of the trip.
The cedula ordered the manager of each hacienda to check the huts of the
slaves each night to ascertain whether they harbored any slaves who did
not belong to that hacienda. Slaves were forbidden to go from one haci-
enda to another after dark. Should this restriction be contravened, the
slave was liable to receive twenty lashes from the owner of the hacienda
he visited, in addition to being arrested. 5 Through these measures the
crown attempted to restrict social intercourse between slaves as a safe-
guard against rebellions. It was clearly in the self-interest of the masters
to see that such measures were enforced.
In essence such legislation sought to protect the Spaniards from the
black slaves. But the crown attempted to protect the Indians from them
as well. As early as 1536 it was ordered that any African who maltreated
an Indian would receive 100 lashes as punishment. The slave's owner
would be held responsible for any injuries suffered by the Indian. 6 In
1551 Charles V issued a law prohibiting Indians from working for Afri-
cans, since it was claimed that the Africans mistreated the Indians, par-
ticularly the women. There were several penalties for infringement of this
regulation. For the first offense a black slave would receive 100 lashes;
for the second, his ears would be cut off. The fact that the latter punish-
ment constituted a crime against natural and divine law, as the emperor
himself pointed out in 1545, did not seem to alter the situation. In the
event that such offenses were committed by free blacks, the first offense
would incur 100 lashes, the second, banishment from the colony. 7
In 1552 the crown repeated its restrictions on the bearing of arms by
the slave population. Charles V ordered that no black person, whether
free or slave, be allowed to carry any kind of arms. For contravening
these orders a first offender would lose the arms he carried. For a second
offense the penalty would be loss of the weapons and ten days in prison;
and for a third, 100 lashes. If the slave took up arms against a Spaniard,
and even if the Spaniard were unhurt, he would receive 100 lashes in

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addition to having a nail driven through his hand. A second offense

would cost the slave the offending hand. As an interesting commentary
on Spanish racism, a similar offense committed against an Indian was
punished by loss of the ears; but when a Spaniard was the victim it meant
loss of a hand. 8 There are no records to indicate the extent to which these
measures were enforced, but they do indicate the barbarism of these
Spanish laws.
The problem of slaves carrying and using weapons was perennial for
the crown and even more for the civil authorities in Mexico. On October
10, 1537, Viceroy Mendoza prohibited all persons of "whatever status
and quality" from giving Africans, whether free or slave, any arms what-
soever. Any infringement of this order without the viceroy's dispensation
would incur the death penalty. All slaves, in turn, were forbidden to bear
arms. A similar ordinance was approved by the cabildo in Vera Cruz in
1547. 9 In 1572 the viceroy once more prohibited Africans from carrying
arms, a prohibition which was repeated in 1574, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1595,
and at various other times. 1 0 The repetition of this order suggests that the
local authorities were either inept, understaffed, or less than diligent in
enforcing these measures. Administrative concern with the bearing of
arms by the slaves grew as the slave population increased. The flood of
restrictive legislation by the Audiencia in the last decades of the sixteenth
century resulted directly from the increase in the slave population after
the epidemics of 1576-1579 and the consequent rise in the incidence of
runaway slaves. Fear of a slave rebellion also prompted the passage of
these measures.
The atmosphere of increasing control of the slave by the men on the
spot, coupled with the great demands made on his labor after the abo-
lition of Indian slavery, helped to produce an increase in the cimarron
population. Runaway slaves had always posed a great problem for the
authorities. The cimarron threat had existed as early as 1523. As Herrera
reported, "Also at this time, many negro slaves fled to the Zapotecs and
they went about rebelling throughout the country, erecting many cross-
es, making it understood that they were Christians, but they themselves,
tired of living outside of subjection, were gradually pacified and the
majority returned to their masters." 1 1 The reason Herrera advanced for
the defeat of the cimarrones might have seemed acceptable to him, but in
view of the long and sustained quest for freedom that took place in later
years, his conclusion was misleading.
Realizing the threat which the cimarrones posed to Spanish life and

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property and to the institution of slavery, the colonists responded with

unrestrained severity against offenders. As early as 1525 the cabildo of
Mexico City fixed one peso and costs as the price a master was required
to pay the captor of his runaway slave. Masters who failed to claim their
slaves and pay the costs within three days ran the risk of having their
slaves sold. In 1527 the cabildo appointed a special constable (alguacil del
campo), whose responsibilities included rounding up and returning
escaped slaves to their masters. 12 It appeared that such slaves usually had
some part of their bodies mutilated, either by their captors or their mas-
ters. In 1540 the emperor was moved to prohibit castration as a punish-
ment for cimarrones. 13
All efforts to destroy the cimarron population failed. These runaway
slaves stood as living symbols to their counterparts as to what was
achievable in terms of escape from bondage. The fact that they had
escaped and had preserved their freedom undoubtedly encouraged other
slaves to follow their example. Hence the cimarron population had to be
destroyed, and destroyed so ruthlessly as to serve as a deterrent to poten-
tial runaways. Furthermore, since the cimarrones made no distinction
between slaveowners and nonslaveowners, it was a matter of self-preser-
vation to the individual Spaniard to see that the menace was removed.
Cimarrones delighted in staging hit-and-run assaults on Spaniards on
the highways and on their own property. These clandestine attacks were
sometimes made in association with Indians, chiefly the Chichimecs.
This presented a greater danger to the Spaniards because a well-organ-
ized series of raids by the blacks and the Indians would be extremely dif-
ficult to suppress. The first official report of such collaborative raids
came from Nueva Galicia as early as 1549.14
There were raids in later years. One in 1579 occurred in Guadalajara
and was the subject of a report to the king from the dean and cabildo of
the Guadalajara cathedral. They reported that a train had been attacked,
the Spaniards defeated, all of them killed, and their property looted. As
they expressed it, "The highways are so dangerous that they cannot be
travelled except with a large guard of soldiers, and even then the fear is
great. The danger is made even greater because the mulattoes, mestizos
and vagabonds, as well as hitherto peaceful Indians, are joining with the
Chichimeca raiders." 15
The most sustained guerrilla attacks came from small groups of cimar-
rones who combined daring with the essential ingredient of surprise to
launch swiftly executed assaults in outlying areas. In 1560, for example,

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in response to highway raids on Spaniards in Guanajuato, Penjamo, and

San Miguel, Viceroy Luis de Velasco ordered a full-scale assault on this
band, which numbered some fifteen to twenty slaves. The viceroy di-
rected the local magistrate, Bartolome Palomino, to exterminate the
cimarrones with a combined force of Spaniards and Indians, who were
instructed to use whatever means were necessary to achieve the desired
goal. 16
One of the principal organizational features used by the cimarrones
was the establishment of an enclave which served simultaneously as a
base of operations and as a sanctuary. The enclave was usually a seclud-
ed and inaccessible area carefully hidden from the colonists. A cave was
sometimes an ideal location. In 1560 some slaves whose base was a cave
in Pachuca conducted raids against the Spaniards. The viceroy ordered
their arrest and imprisonment. 17 In Orizaba, Velasco initiated efforts to
suppress "the disobedient rebels" who were making life miserable for
travelers and the residents of haciendas and sugar plantations. 18
There was a report in 1576 of a group of cimarrones who had estab-
lished themselves in an area called Canada de los Negros. 19 From this
sanctuary they launched attacks on the Spaniards who had founded the
settlement of Leon. Their ravages led the authorities to undertake a
relentless campaign to crush them. To preserve their freedom, the cimar-
rones fled to the neighboring regions of Neuva Galicia, Yuriyia, Pätz-
cuaro, and Celaya.
The cimarrones were never crushed, despite the efforts of the civil
authorities. Such attempts usually took one of two forms. The first meth-
od, a series of search and destroy missions, were notoriously unsuccess-
ful. The desire to survive had perfected in the cimarrones the art of guer-
rilla warfare, which was further aided by the mountainous Mexican ter-
rain. The second strategy used by the authorities in their war against the
runaways was repressive legislation. These laws were designed both to
deter and to punish offenders. In 1571, for instance, the viceroy decreed
that any slave who was absent for four days would receive 50 lashes
while tied to a log, in which position he would remain until sunset. If a
slave were absent more than eight days, the penalty was 100 lashes and
iron fetters fastened to his feet for two months. If the slave removed the
irons, for the first offense he would receive 200 lashes, and for the sec-
ond, 200 lashes in addition to wearing the fetters for four months. The
master would be fined fifty pesos if he removed the fetters. 20
The severity of punishment depended upon the duration of the slave's

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Pattems of Social Control and Resistance 125
absence and also on whether he associated with other cimarrones during

that period. If he were absent for four months but had not associated
with cimarrones, a first offense was 200 strokes, a second, banishment
from the colony. Absence for more than six months and associating with
cimarrones incurred the death penalty. 21
As the tempo of flights increased, the viceroy adopted a policy based
on coercion but containing elements of subtle persuasion. He sought, in
effect, to make every free resident, whether white or black, a law en-
forcement officer. He decreed in 1574 that any free person who arrested a
cimarron would become his owner if the cimarron's master did not claim
him. If the cimarron were originally a freedman, he would become the
captor's slave, and if the cimarron were sentenced to death the captor
would receive fifty pesos from the authorities. Conversely, if the captor
did not want the cimarron as a slave, he would be given fifty pesos and
the cimarron would become the property of the state. 22
The viceroy also held out new options to the cimarrones. A cimarron
who brought in one of his partners would receive his freedom as a re-
ward. If he brought in several, he would receive twenty pesos for each
one. Thus, by promising freedom and financial reward, the viceroy
hoped to break the back of the movement to the hills. As a safeguard
against fraud, the viceroy stipulated that if a free mulatto or a freed black
hid a slave for four months and then brought him forward as an appre-
hended cimarron in order to claim the reward, both would be sentenced
to death. If an African or a mulatto, whether slave or free, knowingly
gave assistance to a cimarron, he would incur the same penalties imposed
on the cimarron. A Spaniard accused and convicted of the same offense
would be banished. 23 None of these measures had the desired effect.
In 1579 the viceroy ordered the suppression of cimarrones around the
city of Vera Cruz, between the city of Oaxaca and the port of Guatulco.
Other groups of cimarrones were located in the province of Pänuco and
on the ranches and large haciendas of Chichimecas, Almeria, and Tlalco-
talpa. The viceroy commanded that they be arrested and castrated. 24 The
continued presence of these cimarrones led Viceroy Don Luis de Velasco
to introduce still more severe and barbaric measures for their suppres-
sion. On June 8, 1590, the viceroy ordered that as of that date runaway
slaves who were absent more than one night would receive 30 lashes. A
second offense brought 200 lashes and the loss of both ears. A third of-
fense carried a penalty of 200 lashes and the loss of a leg. For a fourth of-
fense the slave would be hanged. Don Luis suggested keeping a register to

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inform the authorities of the number of times a slave had run away. 25
The viceroy's appointment of Don Carlos de Sämano in 1591 to crush
cimarrones in the zones of Papaloapan and Coatzacoalcos attested to the
failure of these measures and the survival of the cimarron population.
Don Carlos was no more successful than his predecessors, and he was
later replaced by other men who suffered similar defeats.
The most important military confrontations between the cimarrones
and the Spaniards occurred in the Orizaba zone around the port of Vera
Cruz during the first two decades of the seventeenth century. This zone
had for a number of years provided sanctuary for a group of runaways
who persistently attacked the Spaniards. In appointing a mission to de-
stroy them in 1606, the viceroy observed:
I have understood that the number of negros cimarrones that are

gathered in the jurisdiction of old and new Vera Cruz, Rio Blanco
and Punto de Anton is very large and their liberty and daring great,
that they have come to enter the pueblo of Tlalixcoyan to rob and
loot the houses of their masters and seizing domestic Negroes, taking
them from the houses of their masters and threatening the Spaniards
and setting fire to their houses. 26
The implications of the viceroy's observations were clear. The cimar-

rones had been doing intolerable damage to Spanish property. Equally
important, they had been serving as liberators of slaves, whom they took
with them into their sanctuaries. To the Spaniards, accordingly, another
military confrontation between the two groups had become essential.
The ensuing military activities were no more successful than the previ-
ous ones. The failure of this mission led the viceroy once again to direct
the alcalde mayor in New Vera Cruz in 1607 to stamp out "the large
number of cimarrones" in that area within fifteen days. The viceroy
charged that "each day their members keep increasing because of the
many that flee from their masters . . . and they are assaulting and killing
the Indians and the Spaniards along the highways." 27
It is not known whether this order was ever executed. But on March 9,
1608, a thoroughly frustrated Luis de Velasco expressed his doubts to the
king regarding the eventual suppression of the runaway slaves. He
pointed out that the rugged Mexican terrain posed great difficulties in
that direction and that the military exercises against the cimarrones in-
volved great risks for the Spaniards. The viceroy felt, in addition, that a

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continuation of the struggle against the cimarrones would require too

great an expenditure of money. With this background of frustration,
weariness, and doubt, the viceroy revealed that he had ordered certain
"confidential persons" to speak to the cimarrones regarding the question
of peace and that he had dispatched some priests to give them religious
instruction. 28 In effect, the viceroy hoped that gentle persuasion would
be successful where military might had failed.
The cimarrones never paid too much attention to the viceroy's efforts
to make peace with them. On June 23, 1608, an obviously frustrated
viceroy informed the king that the pacification of the cimarrones was
taking a long time, but that it was "a difficult business." He indicated that
there was a difference of opinion among the Spaniards regarding the
appropriate means for suppressing the Africans. According to the vice-
roy, one group of Spaniards favored granting the cimarrones their free-
dom with certain limitations. This apparent magnanimity was a tacit
recognition that "the war would be costly," that the outcome was doubt-
ful, and that many people would be killed in the battles. The proponents
of this view argued, in addition, that the Spaniards lacked the money to
pay the cost of suppression and that it would be expedient to make peace.
However, if the cimarrones failed to adhere to the conditions, then there
would have to be a renewed effort at suppression. 29
To explore the possibility of peace, the viceroy reported that he had
sent an emissary to the runaways. Don Luis de Velasco made it clear,
however, that the emissary would combine peacemaking efforts with
espionage. The emissary was commissioned to "examine the location of
the terrain and to find out the number of residents." In addition, the vice-
roy had sent a Franciscan to baptize the children and to minister to the
people. The friar had spent thirty days with the cimarrones but was
unable to discover their number because they were divided into several
groups. The Franciscan had informed him, however, that the leader was
"un hombre de razon." 30
No incidents of confrontations between the cimarrones and the Span-
iards were reported during the period June to December 1608. In fact, on
December 17 the viceroy informed the king that the runaways had asked
to have the friar sent to them and that this had resulted in a period of
quiet and the cessation of hostilities. As in the case of his previous visit,
the friar carried instructions to familiarize himself with the abode of the
Africans, ascertain their numbers, and discover the extent of their arms
and defenses. This, as the viceroy put it, was to enable the Spaniards to

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"understand better the means that are appropriate to suppressing them."

Once again the friar had been instructed to combine his priestly duties
with espionage. On February 13, 1609, the viceroy reported to the king
that the friar was still with the cimarrones and that all was quiet. 31
In view of the events that ensued, it was clear that the viceroy badly
misjudged the astuteness of the cimarrones. On May 24, 1609, for in-
stance, he admitted that the cimarrones were once more on the rampage
and had expelled the friars, charging them with espionage. 32 It was prob-
ably the discovery of the friars' duplicity that triggered the renewed
attacks on the Spaniards. The cimarrones once again began kidnapping
black and Indian women. According to the viceroy, in addition to the
cimarrones in and around Vera Cruz there were now about 300 in Aca-
pulco who were engaged in similar activities. Faced with this disorder,
the viceroy requested advice as to his course of action. 33 It was quite clear
what the response would be.
These incursions by the cimarrones provoked a systematic and well-
organized attack by the Spaniards. The plan was twofold: the cimarron
settlements would be destroyed, and the captives would be reenslaved.
For the task of suppression in the Orizaba region of Vera Cruz, the vice-
roy chose one Pedro Gonzalez de Herrera, who would head an amor-
phous group of Spaniards, Indians, and mestizos. Two priests, Juan
Laurencio and Juan Perez, would accompany the mission. It is unclear
when the attack actually began, but it was probably in the latter part of
1609.34 To ensure absolute secrecy, all persons of African descent were
quarantined in the city of Vera Cruz, since it was feared that they would
warn the cimarrones of the impending attack. On the morning when the
mission was due to begin, the cimarrones made a daring raid on a farm,
looting and burning it. They captured six Indian women, murdered a
Spaniard, and took another as prisoner to their camp. The Spaniards
were infuriated.
The cimarrones had no intention of killing their Spanish captive; he
was intended to convey a message to the other Spaniards. The king of the
cimarrones, Yanga, was a remarkable man who had preserved his free-
dom for some thirty years. He had come from Africa, from the nation of
Bram, and was reputed to have been a member of the royal family in the
land of his birth. A relatively old man in 1609, he delegated his military
responsibilities to Francisco, an Angolan, while he handled the adminis-
trative affairs of his kingdom.
In his letter to Pedro Gonzalez de Herrera, Yanga made an impaS-

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sioned defense of his kingdom, saying that his people had retired to that
area to escape from the "cruelty and treachery of the Spaniards who,
without any right, had become owners of their freedom." He argued that
God favored their cause, as had already been manifested in the numerous
defeats of the Spaniards. He defended the assaults on Spanish property as
one way of recovering what the Spaniards had unjustly denied the slaves.
Nevertheless, he added, he did not fear the Spaniards and was prepared
to fight in order to maintain his freedom. 35
Yanga's letter further incensed the Spaniards. Their armed force of
about 450 men prepared to attack. Locating the cimarron settlement was
not difficult, since the Spaniard who had brought the letter served as a
guide. As the raiding party approached the camp, they could hear the
shouts of the cimarrones warning one another of the advancing invaders.
Deciding not to attack that day, the invaders camped by a river and
mapped their plans for the next day.
After receiving the ministrations of the priests the following morning,
the invading forces divided into three groups and prepared for the as-
sault. An encounter was soon made with the cimarrones and a bloody
battle ensued. While the struggle raged, Yanga remained in a church with
the women, offering fervent prayers for the success of his men. But the
armed might of the Spanish party triumphed. As they advanced on the
camp, the occupants fled, leaving behind all their possessions. The Span-
iards immediately began to destroy the camp, setting fire to some seventy
houses.
Having occupied the camp and put the occupants to flight, Pedro
Gonzalez de Herrera hoisted the white flag. When it was ignored by the
cimarrones, the Spaniards took up the pursuit. Both sides suffered more
casualties. Herrera once more hoisted the white flag and announced a
general pardon for the cimarrones. This offer, however, did not immedi-
ately end the hostilities; the Spaniards continued in hot pursuit and the
cimarrones continued to fade away into the mountains. Fortifying them-
selves with frequent Masses and devotions, the Spaniards prayed for
God's guidance in their endeavors. As the chronicler of these events
expressed it, "Such Christian conduct could not but attract upon those
pious soldiers all the blessings of Heaven." 36
Although the fighting continued, it was futile and inconclusive for
both sides. Yanga eventually decided to accept the Spanish offer of peace
and dispatched a list of conditions to the viceroy. The cimarrones de-
manded that all slaves who had escaped before September 1608 remain

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free; those who had escaped after that date would be returned to their
masters. No Spaniards were to be allowed to live in the pueblo that was
to be built for the cimarrones. The cimarrones were to be allowed to have
their own cabildo and councilmen. Also, Yanga was to be made gover-
nor of the pueblo and, after him, his children and descendants. The
cimarrones offered to pay tribute to the state, "like all the other negroes
and mulattoes of the Indies," and promised to defend the realm with their
arms should it become necessary. The cimarrones also offered to return
all future runaway slaves to their masters; and finally, they asked to have
friars appointed to serve their religious needs. They added that if these
conditions were not met in one year, they would revert to hostility. 37
These demands indicated that the primary interest of the cimarrones
remained what it had always been, namely the achievement and preser-
vation of their freedom. They realized the limits of their strength and
sought not to overthrow the system of slavery but rather to withdraw
from it into their own sanctuaries. Their offer to return future runaways
was an empty gesture, impossible to enforce, and was doubtless designed
to placate the Spaniards. It was essentially an effort to win concessions.
The other demands, taken singly or together, reflected somewhat the
extent of the cimarrones' acculturation to the Spanish way of life. In
external forms, at least, these runaways had adopted Spanish religious
and governmental institutions. The viceroy was suitably impressed and
agreed to their demands. The pueblo of San Lorenzo de Negros was
created but only came into existence belatedly in 1618. This was the final
recognition of the freedom of that particular group of cimarrones. They
had become free not as a result of Spanish benevolence but through their
own daring and persistence.
The establishment of a settlement for some cimarrones did not end the
threat which others posed to the survival of the slave system in Mexico.
On March 3, 1618, the viceroy reported that some cimarrones had at-
tacked the Spaniards again, killing one and kidnapping twelve Indian
women, eight of whom were married. On May 23, 1618, the Audiencia
of Mexico observed that there were cimarrones present in the Rio Blanco
and Orizaba zone of Vera Cruz. 38 It is unclear whether these were the
same people with whom the Spaniards had made peace earlier or whether
they comprised a different group. In any case, there is no reason to
believe that all cimarrones had a common leadership or belonged to the
same group. The reverse was probably true. The interests of all these

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people were similar, but there is no evidence to suggest that they resided
in the same localities or coordinated their attacks on the Spaniards.
In October 1618 the viceroy once more returned to the subject of the
cimarrones. He said that they numbered more than 300 in the Rio Blanco
area and that they possessed about 100 houses. On January 31,1619, the
viceroy was able to report that the leader of the cimarrones, a fifty-year-
old man, had been captured along with some of "the most bellicose"
runaways. A total of thirty-six persons had been arrested and incarcer-
ated. 3 ' There is no evidence to suggest that the cimarrones were ever
contained in Mexico. In retrospect, it is quite clear that as long as the
institution of slavery existed, and as long as the topography of the coun-
try facilitated easy escape, the cimarrones would remain a phenomenon
to be reckoned with in Mexican society.
While cimarrones resisted the slave system by running away and
attacking it from the outside, other slaves dramatized their discontent by
attempted rebellions. The Spaniards in Mexico, like slaveowners every-
where, lived in morbid fear of a slave rebellion. In 1516 the famous Car-
dinal Cisneros had observed that slaves "are good for war, men without
honor and without faith and so are capable of treasons and disturbances,
and when they grow in numbers will undoubtedly rebel hoping to put on
the Spaniards the same chains which they bear." 40 In view of the date,
Cardinal Cisneros was obviously not referring to the Mexican slaves and
Mexican conditions when he made that observation, but his remarks
would have a profound applicability to Mexico in the period covered by
this study.
The reports from the viceroys and other colonial bureaucrats are con-
sistent in their expressions of fear of the black, mulatto, mestizo, and to a
lesser degree the Indian population. One bureaucrat, writing anony-
mously to the king about the year 1574, expressed concern over the fact
that the Spaniards were not well armed and were "so careless as if they
had been assured by God that nothing would happen to them." He felt
that it was necessary to remedy the situation by preventing all mestizos
and Indians from owning or riding horses. In addition, mestizos and
blacks should be forbidden to bear arms, nor should they be allowed to
possess them in their homes. Very grave penalties, he suggested, should
be imposed on those who broke this restriction. Finally, he recommended
that all Spaniards be required to own arms and swords and to be in a
state of readiness against any assaults on them. 41

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Similar views were echoed in a letter from Viceroy Martin Enriquez,

dated October 18, 1579. He believed that the Spaniards had to be very
apprehensive about the presence of blacks in the colony. Although there
had been restrictions against the possession of knives by the blacks, he
felt that this statute was not always observed, since knives could be car-
ried secretly. The result was, according to the viceroy, many homicides
involving attacks by blacks on blacks, blacks on Indians, and blacks on
Spaniards, and he promised to correct the situation. 42
An analysis of subsequent statements by colonial authorities makes it
clear that Enriquez failed to create an atmosphere of security for the
Spaniards. On April 20, 1582, Don Sanchez de Munon, a member of the
Audiencia, expressed alarm over the presence of so many mulattoes,
mestizos, freedmen, and slaves in the society. In addition, he wondered
whether the cimarrones did not harbor evil intentions against the Span-
iards. In April 1600 the members of the Audiencia fearfully took note of
"the great number of negroes and mulattoes, slaves and freedmen that
are in this kingdom." 43
The introduction of an increasing number of slaves in Mexico in the
first two decades of the seventeenth century exacerbated the problem of
fear. On June 22, 1608, Licenciado Don Francisco de Leoz, a member of
the Audiencia, declared in a letter to the king that "the number of negroes
in this kingdom is increasing so that for each Spaniard there are ten or
more of them and they are more feared than the Indians." He believed
that the blacks were fully aware of their numerical advantage and that
the remedy for this situation rested in reducing the number of new arri-
vals from Africa. Francisco de Leoz was convinced that there was already
in Mexico an adequate supply of slaves for the sugar estates and the
obrajes. He also wanted the king to note the "more than four hundred
cimarrones" who resided in inaccessible areas and were attacking Span-
ish travelers. 44
The dilemma produced by this situation was that although the Span-
iards feared the Africans they simply could not do without their services.
Francisco de Leoz was undoubtedly accurate when he stated that the
Africans were more feared than the Indians. After all, the Spaniards had
conquered the Indians and had developed a sense of superiority toward
them. Although the Indians were viewed as "gente miserable" or as a
"weak people," the African was not perceived in quite the same way and,
on the contrary, engendered fear rather than pity or paternalism. This
explains the repressive measures directed toward the African population

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as well as the efforts to curtail the number of slaves allowed to enter

Mexico. As late as 1613, for example, the Audiencia of Mexico City
noted the restlessness of the slaves and implored the king to prevent the
importation of slaves "for some time" and exclude those "from the king-
dom of Angola forever because they are a rebellious people."45
The Spaniards had good reason to fear the violent resistance of the
slaves. In fact, the first slave rebellion occurred in Mexico as early as
1537. It is not known how many slaves were in the colony at that time;
the number was probably about 10,000. The conquest of Mexico was
only in its second decade, but the demand for slave labor continually
increased, owing in part to the discovery of silver mines and the intro-
duction of sugar cultivation. Mexico City, the locus of the rebellion, had
the largest concentration of slaves, a fact which facilitated subversive
activities.
It is difficult to establish what groups of slaves comprised the leader-
ship of the rebellion. In view of the early date of the uprising it is never-
theless clear that they were not born in Mexico. Probably they came
either from one of the islands like Hispaniola where slavery was already
established, from Spain, or directly from Africa. The year 1537 was
apparently propitious for an uprising; for, as the viceroy reported, "it is
certain that what gave impetus to these negroes to create this rebellion
was first the wars and the problems which Your Majesty has, because
everyone writes of them and the news reaches the negroes and the In-
dians without hiding anything; and second, the delay in the arrival of the
ships."46
The slaves had as their first organizational problem the election of a
king. His name, unfortunately, has not survived in the records. Having
elected a leader, the slaves, allegedly acting in conjunction with the
Indians of Mexico City and Tlaltelolco, decided to murder all the Span-
iards. The rebellion was to begin at midnight on September 24,1537. The
slaves probably expected the outcome to be swift and violent.
But the plans of the slaves were destined to fail. A few hours before the
uprising was due to begin, one of the conspirators revealed the plot to the
viceroy. Using some slaves as spies, Viceroy Mendoza hastily conducted
an investigation of the allegations. The results convinced him that a
rebellion had indeed been contemplated. He had to act swiftly to protect
the territory, and he immediately ordered the arrest of the king as well as
the other ringleaders.
In order to acquaint the Spaniards and their communities with the

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news of imminent danger, Mendoza dispatched messengers. Meanwhile,

the Spaniards in Mexico City readied themselves to battle the slaves.
There was, however, no physical confrontation; the revolt was stillborn.
Those slaves who were captured admitted their guilt and were eventually
hanged. It is not known how many slaves lost their lives in this abortive
rebellion. The viceroy further enlisted the aid of some Indians in recap-
turing those slaves who fled while the bloodbath was in progress. One
group of Indians captured five slaves, four males and a female, whom
they slaughtered and salted to preserve the bodies, which they humbly
presented to the viceroy. Such was the success of the Spanish policy of
using one racial group against another.
The panic created by this unsuccessful rebellion generated a series of
suggestions to improve the defenses of the city and to prevent other up-
risings. Mendoza, for example, advised the crown to terminate the slave
trade, since the colony stood in mortal danger from the Africans. On his
part, the commander of the military fortress charged with defending the
city felt that it would be judicious to move the fort to a more defensible
position. And, on October 5,1537, the cabildo of Mexico City suggested
that a protective wall be built around the city and that the citizens have
preparatory "siege drills" at appointed times. The cabildo also proposed
that a granary be established in the city so that there would be food in the
event that rebellious slaves succeeded in cutting off supply lines.47 As
these suggestions indicate, the fearful local authorities were prepared to
adopt any measure to prevent a repetition of the events of 1537, even
measures as extreme as terminating the slave trade.
Although the viceroy had requested an end to the importation of
slaves, his proposal was impossible to implement. In fact, the demand for
slave labor increased after 1537. Though not immediately enforced, the
crown issued the New Laws of 1542, which prohibited the use of Indians
as slaves. The onslaught of the epidemic of 1545 had greatly reduced the
Indian population, thus necessitating an increased emphasis on Africa to
provide an alternative labor force. In addition, the discovery of more
silver mines and the expansion of the sugar industry produced additional
demands for slave labor.
The presence of these slaves increased the problem of preserving inter-
nal security in Mexico. Viceroy Luis de Velasco in 1551 railed against the
difficulties created by slaves who carried weapons. According to him,
such slaves accounted for "many scandals and disturbances, because
while their masters are at Mass or attending to their business, the said

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negroes go through the pueblos and with their arms molest many people
in such a way that they have killed some Spaniards and wounded some
Indians." 48 To eliminate this danger, in 1553 the viceroy created the
Santa Hermanadad, a civil militia patterned after the one established in
Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella.
The viceroy was also deeply concerned about the ever-increasing num-
ber of Africans in New Spain. In 1553 he complained to the emperor that
"this land is so full of negroes and mestizos that they outnumber the
Spaniards greatly. Your Majesty should order that they do not give so
many licenses to send negroes because there are in New Spain more than
twenty thousand and they are increasing." 49 The viceroy's recommenda-
tion was not accepted because of the important role of the slaves in Mex-
ico's economy. But the problem of security remained. Indeed, a few years
after his initial recommendation, the viceroy suggested that the crown
"order that each ship carry to New Spain fifteen or twenty soldiers" to
strengthen the defenses of the colony. 50
The threat of rebellion in New Spain continued as long as slavery
remained an institution and the number of slaves kept on increasing. The
viceroys persisted in warning against the dangers the Spaniards faced,
but such prophets of doom carried little weight when African slaves
clearly filled an economic need. The tension in the atmosphere was evi-
dent even to travelers. In 1573 one Englishman observed that "the In-
dians and the Negroes daily wait, hoping to put in practice their freedom
from the domination and the servitude in which the Spaniards keep
them. Indians and Negroes hate and abhor the Spaniards with all their
hearts." 51
The last quarter of the sixteenth century saw a series of military con-
frontations between the Spaniards and the slaves, particularly the run-
aways, which occurred in such places as Huascaltepec, Rio Blanco,
Alvarado, Zongolica, and Cuernavaca. 52 There is not much documen-
tary evidence regarding the nature and outcome of these confrontations.
Much more is known about the abortive rebellion of 1608. In that year
some Afro-Mexicans, both free and slave, met clandestinely on Christ-
mas Eve in the home of a free mulatto allegedly to organize an uprising.
There were about thirty-one conspirators present, twenty-four males and
seven females. The election of a king and a queen was the first procedural
business for the gathering. The king's crown went to Martin, a slave born
in Africa who belonged to Baltasar Reyes, reputed to be the wealthiest
man in Mexico City. The queen was Melchora, a free black woman.

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After their election, the coronation ceremony was performed by one

Francisco de Loya, a free mulatto employed by Viceroy Don Luis de
Velasco. Amid pomp and splendor, the king was seated upon a chair
under a canopy, and, as Francisco solemnly placed the crown on his head
and shouted "Long live the king," the rest of the company echoed his
words. The only dissenter was a man who preferred to shout "Long live
King Philip the Third," arousing the wrath of the others, who mauled
him and stabbed him in the face. The ceremony concluded with Francisco
on his knees saying, "May you have a long reign." This chant was
repeated by the audience.
After the coronation the plotters proceeded to elect dukes, counts,
marquises, princes and princesses, a captain of the guard, a secretary to
the king, servants, and other officers in the royal palace. The Africans
then celebrated the occasion with food and drink. The king was appro-
priately served by lesser beings on their knees. The evening ended with a
dance. But after the festivities, Francisco de Loya, who had played such a
prominent role in the affair, related the incident to his employer, the
viceroy. As a result, the Sala del crimen rounded up and arrested the
alleged conspirators.
An analysis of the slaves who participated in the gathering reveals that
of the twenty-four males present, sixteen were slaves and eight were
freedmen. Of the eight freedmen, six were mulattoes. Of the seven
women present, two were slaves. Of the freedwomen, Melchora had
been elected queen. The freedmen in the group performed a variety of
jobs in their daily lives: shoemaker, servant, butler, and textile worker. It
is noteworthy that these Afro-Mexicans were either slaves of or were
employed by some of the most important people in Mexico City, includ-
ing the viceroy, the archbishop, and the alguacil mayor.
The abortive conspiracy was important for a number of reasons. First,
it was a coalition of free blacks and mulattoes as well as slaves. It demon-
strated that both groups, slave and free, identified with each other and
shared similar interests. With the exception of Martin, the king, all of the
individuals involved were criollos. The participation of the criollo slaves
is significant because it shows that even though they were enslaved at
birth and had never known freedom they could still join forces with the
bozales to oppose the slave system. It is possible that Martin was chosen
king because, like Yanga before him, he may have been of royal lineage
in Africa. The fiscal, however, believed he was selected because he was
the slave of the richest man in the city.

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By the time the investigation ended, the authorities had compiled a list
of nineteen other persons who were considered accomplices. Of the seven
women and twelve men on the list, two of the men were identified as
Spaniards. It is not known what prompted these Spaniards to become
involved. It is likely they were individuals who opposed the institution of
slavery and wanted to aid the slaves in liberating themselves. Most of the
accomplices were given titles and offices, although they were not present
at the original meeting. There is, however, no explanation for their
absence.
Faced with the prospect of losing their slaves, if convicted, some mas-
ters began to make light of the incident. Some pointed out that the parti-
cipants had been drunk and were therefore not responsible for their
behavior; others revealed that the Afro-Mexicans had named a king on
previous occasions but had not actually performed a coronation cere-
mony. The alcalde del crimen, Dr. Luis Lopez de Azoca, was unim-
pressed by these arguments and felt that an example must be made, since
the Africans in Mexico "live in great freedom, possess great daring, and
each day they commit many offenses." He pointed out that the prepara-
tions must have been extensive in view of the various ceremonial items
used. To bolster his argument that the meeting was premeditated and had
revolutionary intentions, the alcalde cited the case of one participant, a
mulatto female, who had been seen mistreating an Indian woman. When
a Spaniard asked why she treated the Indian so badly "as if she were her
slave," the woman replied that "it was only a matter of time until the
Spaniards and everyone else would be their [the blacks'] slaves." 53
Although the evidence is inconclusive, there are some indications that
these Afro-Mexicans planned a revolt against the Spaniards. If the event
had been planned as a harmless affair, Francisco de Loya would probably
not have thought it necessary to report the proceedings to the viceroy.
Similarly, in view of the number of people present and those listed as
accomplices, it appears that this was a broadly based movement involv-
ing the participation of an even larger number of people. Evidence for
this assertion stems from the fact that the slaves present belonged to
many different masters and probably went to the Christmas Eve meeting
as the representatives of others. The list of absent accomplices also sup-
ports this conclusion that others were involved.
As in the past, the authorities took no chances and promulgated a
series of measures designed to prevent a recurrence of such events. Some
of the measures were already in existence and were merely repeated.

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Taken together, they prevented the Afro-Mexicans from congregating in

numbers exceeding four. A contravention of this order carried a penalty
of 200 lashes. Blacks and mulattoes found with knives would also be
given 200 lashes. In addition, these measures prohibited cofradias organ-
ized by Afro-Mexicans, presumably because they could serve as meeting
places conducive to plotting revolutionary activities. A fourth order pre-
vented all free blacks and mulattoes from living alone. The intention was
to keep them under Spanish surveillance. No Spaniard was to be accom-
panied on the street by more than three slaves at a time. If this order was
ignored, the Spaniard would forfeit one slave. Finally, women of African
descent were forbidden to wear silk garments and to adorn themselves
with pearls or gold. Such regalia were the prerogative of Spanish
women. 54
Although some of these ordenanzas were not new, their repetition at
this point reflected the state of mind of the Spaniards immediately after
the Christmas Eve affair. One cannot state, however, that these measures
were ever stringently enforced. It is more likely that once the memory of
the ill-fated gathering faded they were enforced sporadically or not at all.
Although the rebellion of 1608 had been nipped in the bud, the specter
of a slave rebellion in Mexico City once more appeared in 1611. The
occasion was the death of a female slave belonging to one Luis Moreno
de Monroy, a resident of Mexico City. The blacks in the city angrily
charged that maltreatment had caused her death. On the day of the
burial, 1500 Afro-Mexicans belonging to the Cofradia de Nuestra
Senora seized the corpse and marched defiantly through the streets. 55
They carried the body past the royal palace, the Holy Office of the Inqui-
sition, and other public places. Finally, returning to the home of Luis
Moreno de Monroy, they issued threats and hurled stones at the build-
ing. The distraught master was obliged to close his door and defend his
property with an armed guard of Spaniards.
This mass demonstration of black solidarity, anger, and indignation
could not fail to arouse fear and panic among the Spaniards in Mexico
City. The authorities therefore speedily responded to this latest threat to
the survival of the slave system. The alcaldes swooped down on the
leaders, arrested them, whipped them, and ordered their masters to sell
them outside the colony. The leader of the blacks was identified as a
ladino slave named Diego, an officer in the aforementioned cofradia. The
treatment meted out to these Afro-Mexicans incited rather than intimi-

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dated their peers, who decided to kill the Spaniards and loot their houses.
Accordingly, they elected two Angolan slaves, Pablo and his wife Maria,
as their king and queen. The rebellion was set for Christmas, 1611. But
fate intervened. At that time, four companies of infantry bound for the
Philippines arrived in Mexico City. Appraising the military situation
quite realistically, the conspirators decided to postpone the rebellion to a
more propitious date. Another problem arose shortly, however, for their
king soon took ill and died. 56
The arrival of the infantry and the king's death placed a temporary
brake on the slaves' plotting, but the plan was never abandoned. They
eventually decided to stage the rebellion during Holy Week of 1612,
when, as at Christmas, their masters would be engrossed in religious
observances. 57 Toward this end, each individual was required to arm
himself with appropriate weapons, including swords, machetes, and
knives. In addition, funds from the cofradias were to be used to purchase
weapons for those who were unable to procure them otherwise. In subse-
quent meetings called to organize the rebellion, the conspirators elected a
free mulatto as their king and his wife, a mulatto slave, as queen. Thus,
freedmen as well as slaves made common cause for rebellion. Events
were to begin in earnest on Holy Thursday. All Spanish males were to be
killed, but the women would be spared to serve their former slaves.
But once more the rebellion proved abortive, this time a direct result of
the conspirators' carelessness. T w o Portuguese slave traders in Mexico
City "who knew the Angolan language" heard a black woman complain
about the bad treatment meted out to a black man by a Spaniard. She
declared that all Spaniards would be killed during Holy Week and that
the city would then be under the control of the blacks. Aware of the
gravity of the situation, the two men threw an anonymous account of
their eavesdropping into the house of Dr. Antonio de Morga, senior
alcalde of the Audiencia. The letter was quickly relayed to the Sala del
crimen. Further confirmation came from Fray Juan de Tobar of the Con-
vento de la Merced. Quite likely betraying the secrets of the confessional,
the friar took his information to Don Pedro de Otalora, the senior oidor
of the Audiencia. Acting in response to the information, the Audiencia
introduced a series of protective measures. First, the members suspended
all religious processions that traditionally took place during Holy Week.
Second, they closed all churches in Mexico City and the adjacent towns
on Holy Thursday. Third, the leaders of the black cofradias were taken

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into protective custody, since they were suspected of being the leaders of
the incipient rebellion. These leaders were not told that the Spaniards
were aware of the plots.
While the leaders languished in jail, the authorities endeavored to learn
more about the rebellion. They placed spies in the prisons to report the
conversations of the detainees, while outside the investigation continued
unabated. It was not long before the Spaniards uncovered the details. An
old slave woman sent word to the alcalde denouncing an old male slave,
Sebastian, who by the use of witchcraft had threatened to kill all Span-
iards and to poison their water and food. On April 12 Beatriz Davia, a
Spanish woman, gave the alcalde an important piece of information. Her
daughter, Isabel Davia, had overheard a conversation between two
slaves in which one questioned the wisdom of the leaders' speaking about
"scepter and crown" before, rather than after, the rebellion. The slave in
question believed that tactically it would have been better to kill the
Spaniards first, and only after a successful rebellion would it be appro-
priate to discuss administrative and organizational questions. Possessed
of this information, the alcalde immediately ordered the arrest of the two
slaves and forced them to reveal the details of the plot and the names of
the leaders.
This disclosure generated an intensive search for the accused and led to
a large number of arrests. Some of the accused had already been in cus-
tody. The alcaldes ordered that the conspirators be tortured to reveal all
information relating to the rebellion. After several caches of arms were
discovered, the accused were condemned to either death or banishment.
Accordingly, on May 2, 1612, thirty-five individuals were hanged and
quartered in the central square of Mexico City. Seven women were in-
cluded in the total. Some of the cadavers remained on display until doc-
tors advised that a health hazard would be created unless they were
buried. 58
The executions and banishments did not end the state of uneasiness in
Mexico City. The viceroy immediately promulgated measures to restrict
the freedom of movement of Afro-Mexicans. He ordered that for "the
security of this realm" no slave, free black, or mulatto should be found
on the streets between eight o'clock at night and five in the morning. The
penalty for disobeying this regulation was 100 lashes.59 In addition, he
once again ordered the suppression of all cofradias organized by slaves
and freedmen. Each slave who participated in such an organization
would be given 200 lashes. No funeral of a slave or freedman could be

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attended by more than eight mourners—four men and four women—

under penalty of 200 lashes for each offender. 60 In 1613 the viceroy re-
peated the ordinance that all free blacks and mulattoes should not live
alone but should find—within thirty days—a Spaniard as master who
would keep them under surveillance. Failure to obey this measure would
mean 100 lashes and five years of forced labor in the Spanish colony of
the Philippines. If a woman were the offender, she would be required to
serve without pay in a hospital, convent, or obraje for a period of two
years. 61
For its part, the Audiencia introduced measures to prevent the sale of
"offensive and defensive" weapons to a slave or freedman. Any person
who violated this ordinance would lose his life, such was the seriousness
of the offense. No Spaniard, regardless of rank, could be accompanied
on the street by more than two black or mulatto slaves. If this number
were exceeded, the slaves would be confiscated. 62 To strengthen the
colony's military defenses, the Audiencia created two companies of sol-
diers, whose responsibility was to guard such strategic spots as the arse-
nals, the prisons, and the powder depots. 63
It must be stated again that it is impossible to determine how rigidly
these postrebellion measures were enforced. There is, on the other hand,
no evidence indicating if and when they were ever abrogated. Yet they
were restrictions imposed in a hysterical atmosphere and could have been
allowed to fall into desuetude once the situation returned to normal. In
any case, such statutes probably remained on the books to be applied
whenever necessity arose.
The records indicate that there were other instances in which slaves
created social disturbances after 1612. An uprising occurred in Durango
in 1616, but nothing is known about its nature and eventual outcome. It
is also known that, along with others, Afro-Mexicans participated in the
Mexico City riots of 1624. David Davidson notes that "countless minor
revolts and escapes occurred in the sheep ranching regions of the north in
the 1620s and 1630s."64
The problem of the social control of and the resistance of the slaves
reemerged in 1646. On September 30 of that year, the fiscal in Vera Cruz
reported that "a great disorder has arisen in this city and the pueblos of
these provinces," namely, the use of arms, swords and knives by the
blacks, both slave and free. He observed that these developments, cou-
pled with the great number of Africans and their "mala inclination," had
created serious problems which had led to a state of uneasiness among

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the Spaniards. The fiscal confessed that although the bearing of arms by
such people had been prohibited by numerous statutes, the enforcement
had been very lax, resulting in the frequent wounding and murder of
their masters and other Spaniards. 65
According to the fiscal, the most serious disturbance had only recently
occurred. From his letter, it is apparent that there were two companies of
infantry in Vera Cruz which allowed Africans to enlist. There was, how-
ever, some friction between the Africans and the Spaniards. One day,
about twenty blacks and mulattoes attacked with swords all the Span-
iards they encountered, shouting "Death to these Spaniards," as they did
so. When the melee ended, two soldiers had lost their lives and an un-
specified number were wounded. The attackers were immediately ar-
rested.
The fiscal remarked that the viceroy had responded to this latest out-
burst of black violence by ordering all the insurgents disarmed and
abolishing the two infantry companies. The penalties for violating the
ordinance against the possession of weapons were to be increased. In
addition, Spaniards who had permission to be accompanied by slaves
carrying swords should have that permission withdrawn and should
employ the services of Spaniards instead. The only exceptions were to be
the high officials of the Audiencia and the Inquisition. 66
It is apparent, then, that the slaves dramatized their opposition to the
institution of slavery in two principal ways. Withdrawal to the moun-
tains and resorting to violence, whether individual or collective, were the
most overt expressions of this opposition. It must be borne in mind that
the primary reason for the degree and extent of slave resistance in Mexico
was the brutality of the institution of slavery in that colony. This fact
alone must have justified in the eyes of the slaves a rejection of their
oppression. By resorting to physical resistance, the slaves not only reaf-
firmed their humanity but demonstrated the fact that although their
bodies were enslaved their inner being remained free. In analyzing resist-
ance among the slaves, one must not forget that the majority of them
were bozales, not criollos. Slaves coming to the various New World soci-
eties from Africa showed a greater tendency to resist than did Creole
slaves, who had been socialized into the slave systems and had known no
other type of existence. The Christmas Eve affair of 1608 had shown,
however, that criollos were not always quiescent. It must also be noted
that some masters believed that slaves of certain ethnic groups were less
tractable than others, particularly those who hailed from the kingdom of

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Angola. Mexico received a good proportion of these slaves in the early

colonial period.
The mountainous topography of Mexico facilitated easy escape from
slavery and lent itself to the creation of enclaves where the runaways
could maintain and defend their freedom. Running away was the most
widely used and demonstrably the most effective means of opposition to
Mexican slavery. The act of running away was an individual one and did
not depend on collective effort for its success, as was the case with a
rebellion.
One significant factor that contributed to the resistance of the slaves
was undoubtedly the feeling of confidence which their numerical super-
iority over the Spaniards gave them. The black population outnumbered
the whites from about as early as 1550. In 1608, as already noted, Fran-
cisco de Leoz had complained that there were ten or more slaves to every
Spaniard in the colony. This may have been an exaggeration, but it was
the product of acute concern over the safety of the Spaniards. Spaniards
were an even smaller minority in a total population consisting of Indians,
mestizos, and Africans. The endless stream of letters to the authorities in
Spain expressing alarm over such a state of affairs and forecasting doom
reflected deep and pervasive Spanish fears.
The Spanish fear of slave rebellions did not lead to a systematic and
vigilant enforcement of the extensive body of restrictive legislation that
the authorities had at their disposal. This stemmed partly from inertia
and partly from a shortage of manpower necessary to supervise not only
slaves but a large population of Indians and mestizos as well. The colo-
nial government lacked the large, salaried, bureaucratic apparatus that
would ensure regular enforcement of these measures. Masters controlled
their slaves through the exercise, sometimes excessive, of their private
power of discipline; but the public agencies were far less effective in
enforcing such ordinances as those prohibiting slaves from carrying
knives or assembling in numbers exceeding those permitted by law.
Under these conditions, the authorities tended to respond better to crises
and were never in a position to enforce the laws regularly and consist-
ently.
The slaves in early Mexico were never able to produce a successful
rebellion. The authorities always discovered the plans and quickly re-
acted to crush the conspirators. The Spaniards were always able to close
ranks whenever a rebellion threatened. It is highly doubtful whether
slaves could have emerged victorious in any military confrontation with

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the Spaniards. They stood little chance of defeating a well-armed and

united master class that could and did call upon the assistance of Indians
and mestizos. It was probably this realization that prompted slaves to use
the avenue of escape as their most dramatic and effective means of re-
sistance.
It must not be concluded that slaves resorted only to violence or the
threat of violence to make known their opposition to the system. These
were the activities which survived in the records and were the most dra-
matic, by far. Yet the slaves must have resorted to more subtle forms of
resistance, such as malingering, careless treatment of tools, cruelty to
animals, and theft. The slaves in the British West Indies and in the Amer-
ican South used these covert forms of resistance with some effectiveness,
and there is no reason to believe that Mexican slaves did not do likewise.
From the evidence, it is certain that black slaves in Mexico were never a
quiescent group. But physical resistance formed only one part of the
story. It is to the slaves' fight for spiritual survival that we now turn.

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CHAPTER 5

Patterns of Social Control

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rect individual situations. But viewed as an overall pattern, these mea-

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addition to having a nail driven through his hand. A second offense

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property and to the institution of slavery, the colonists responded with

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in response to highway raids on Spaniards in Guanajuato, Penjamo, and

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absence and also on whether he associated with other cimarrones during

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I have understood that the number of negros cimarrones that are

The implications of the viceroy's observations were clear. The cimar-

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continuation of the struggle against the cimarrones would require too

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"understand better the means that are appropriate to suppressing them."

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Similar views were echoed in a letter from Viceroy Martin Enriquez,

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as well as the efforts to curtail the number of slaves allowed to enter

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news of imminent danger, Mendoza dispatched messengers. Meanwhile,

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After their election, the coronation ceremony was performed by one

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Taken together, they prevented the Afro-Mexicans from congregating in

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attended by more than eight mourners—four men and four women—

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Angola. Mexico received a good proportion of these slaves in the early

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the Spaniards. They stood little chance of defeating a well-armed and

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