SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 1

SUCCESSION
ARTS. 818-838
Contents
DE LA CERNA v. POTOT ........................................................................................................................................................... 2
CRUZ VS VILLASOR…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3

DOMINGO CALUYA v. LUCINA DOMINGO .............................................................................................................................. 3

MOLO v MOLO ........................................................................................................................................................................ 6
NAVAL v. NAVAL...................................................................................................................................................................... 7
SPS. PASCUAL v CA .................................................................................................................................................................. 8
MANINANG v. COURT OF APPEALS ......................................................................................................................................... 8
MERCADO VS SANTOS ............................................................................................................................................................ 9
ALSUA-BETTS VS CA…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………..10

IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON .................................................................................................................................................. 11

LEVISTE VS CA…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….……..…………….………13

DOROTHEO VS CA…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….……………………..14

MALOLES VS PHILIPS…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………

NUGUID VS NUGUID…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….………………….15

PASTOR, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS and QUEMADA ............................................................................................................. 16

LIM VS CA…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….………………………………….17

CORONADO v CA ................................................................................................................................................................... 19
CAYETANO v. LEONIDAS........................................................................................................................................................ 19
SOLIVIO v CA ......................................................................................................................................................................... 21
AJERO v. COURT OF APPEALS ................................................................................................................................................ 22
VDA. DE KILAYKO v. JUDGE TENGCO..................................................................................................................................... 23
BALANAY JR VS MARTINEZ…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….………..24

CRUZ VS VILLASOR…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….25

CAMAYA v. PATULANDONG .................................................................................................................................................. 25

NATCHER VS CA…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….….27

LASAM VS UMENGAN…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………….………………….….………………28

DE LA CERNA v. POTOT
GR L-20234, 12 SCRA 576, December 23, 1964
Digest by Hannah Keziah P. Dela Cerna
DOCTRINE: Where a husband and wife executed a joint will
and upon the death of the husband said will was admitted to
probate by a final decree of the court although erroneous, and
the wife dies later, it is held that said first decree of probate
affects only the estate of the husband but cannot affect the
estate of the wife, considering that a joint will is a separate will
of each testator; and a joint will being prohibited by law, the
estate of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate
heirs and not to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid
will is shown to exist in favor of the latter or unless the
testamentary heir is the only heir of said wife.
Facts: It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe
de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and
testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that:
"our two parcels of land acquired during our marriage
together with all improvements thereon shall be given to
Manuela Rebaca, our niece, whom we have nurtured since
childhood, because God did not give us any child in our
union, Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and
that "while each of the testators is yet living, he or she will
continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands aforementioned"
Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid
will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and Manuela
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, after due
publication as required by law and there being no opposition,
heard the evidence, and, by Order of October 31, 1939; in
Special Proceedings No. 499:
"declares the Exhibit A document legalized as the testament
and last will of the late Bernabe de la Serna and his widow
Gervasia Rebaca at the same time according to Exhibit A to
enjoy the fruits of the terran described in said documents;
and there was consideration of the amount of said goods,
the summary distribution of the same is decreed in favor of
the universal company Manuela Rebaca de Potot previous
provision by the same of a deposit in the sum of P500.00 to
respond to any claims that will be filed against the property
of the late Bernabe de la Serna for the years from this date
" (Google Translate)
Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952,
another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as
Gervasia was concerned was filed on November 6, 1952, being
Special Proceedings No. 1016-R of the same Court of First
Instance of Cebu, but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R.
Potot and her attorney, Manuel Potot to appear, for the hearing
of said petition, the case was dismissed on March 30, 1954.
RTC
The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and
declared the testament null and void, for being executed
contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art.
669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
CA
On appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals
reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was
issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the
due execution of the testament.
Issue: Whether or not the final decree of the probate court has
conclusive effect. - YES, but only with respect to the husband’s
estate.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 2
Held:
Decree of Probate Court Final. - The appealed decision
correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939
by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator,
Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last
will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil
Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in
favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third
party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error thus committed by
the probate court was an error of law, that should have been
corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of
the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision,
however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for
the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world and public
policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional
errors judgment of courts should become final at some definite
date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium
Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la
Cerna, are concluded by the 1939 decree admitting his will to
probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be
validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on Whether an
act is valid or void rests with the courts, and here they have
spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On
this court, the dismissal of their action for partition was correct.
Probate Decree Could Only Affect Husband’s Share. - But
the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to
avoid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in
1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband,
Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the
share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive,
and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate
court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate
could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the
new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the
testator's lifetime.
Joint Will Considered Separate Will of Each Testator;
Trial De Novo for Wife’s Will. - It follows that the validity of
the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned,
must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo,
since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.
Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of
Cebu that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as
to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the
properties in question.
Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should
pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively
to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her
favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate
of said Gervasia.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills
should be in common usage could not make them valid when
our Civil Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are
only repealed by other subsequent laws, and no usage to the
contrary may prevail against their observance

CRUZ VS VILLASOR
G.R L-32213, November 26 1973
Digest by Francis Jeric L. Emuy
Facts:
Agapita the surviving spouse of the said decease opposed the
allowance of the will of her husband, Vicente. However, the
court still allowed the probate of the will.
There are three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely
Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco Pañares and Atty.
Angel H. Teves, Jr.
Atty. Teves was also the notary public before whom the will
was acknowledged. Under the law, the will was attested and
subscribed by at least three credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other, considering that the three
attesting witnesses must appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the same. As the third witness is the notary public
himself, Agapita argues that the result is that only two
witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge
the will.
Issue: Whether or not the Notary Public before whom the will
was acknowledged can also be a witness---NO
Ruling: The notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having
signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow; to own
as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or
preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third
witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow
assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself.
This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into
two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge
his participation in the making of the will.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others,
to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement . That
function would defeated if the notary public were one of the
attesting instrumental witnesses. For them he would be
interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly
involves him and the validity of his own act. It would place him
in inconsistent position and the very purpose of
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud .
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary
public may, in addition, act as a witness to the executive of the
document he has notarized. But these authorities do not serve
the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of
the issue herein because the notaries public and witnesses
referred to aforecited cases merely acted as instrumental,
subscribing attesting witnesses, and not as acknowledging
witnesses.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 3
DOMINGO CALUYA v. LUCINA DOMINGO
GR 7647, 27 Phil. 330, March 27, 1914
Digest by Eduardo M. Lape, Jr.
Facts: The CFI of Ilocos Norte denied the probate of a will on
the following grounds:
1. Although the testator had signed by mark, it nowhere
appeared in the will who had written the signature or
that it had been written at his request;
2. The witness Antonino Pandaraoan could not really
have signed the attestation clause because, at the
time it was executed, he was attending a session of
the municipal council of Piddig as a member thereof;
3. As to the other witness, Segundino Asis, the will
mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to him
by the testator, and he being thereby an
interested party, his testimony could not be
believed. (Relevant to our topic)
As to the third ground, the lower court held that the will,
having mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to Segundino
Asis, one of the witnesses to the will, while not rendering the
will entirely invalid, throws great doubt upon the legality of its
execution and especially the testimony of said witness relating
thereto.
Issue: WON the will must be refused probate. – NO.
Held: Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 622. If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom
or to whose wife or husband, or parent, or child, a beneficial
devise, legacy, or interest, of or affecting real or personal
estate, is given by such will, such devise, legacy, or interest
shall, so far only as concerns such person, or the wife or
husband, or parent or child of such person, or anyone claiming
under such person or such wife or husband, or parent or child,
be void, unless there are three other competent witnesses to
such will, and such person so attesting shall be admitted as a
witness as if such devise, legacy, or interest had not been made
or given.
But a mere charge on the real or personal estate of the
testator, for the payment of debts, shall not prevent his
creditors from being competent witnesses to his will
(Now in Article 824 of the New Civil Code).
As will readily be seen on reading this section, nothing in the
will before us relative to the sale of land to Segundino Asis
creates such an interest therein as falls within the provisions
thereof. Indeed, no interest of any kind was created by the will
in favor of Segundino Asis, nor did it convey or transfer of any
interest to him. It simply mentioned a fact already
consummated, a sale already made.
Even if, however, the will had conveyed an interest to
Segundino Asis, it would not have been for that reason void.
Only that clause of the will conveying an interest to him would
have been void; the remainder could have stood and would
have stood as a valid testament.
AS TO THE OTHER GROUNDS:
1st Ground: Although the testator had signed by mark, it
nowhere appeared in the will who had written the signature or
that it had been written at his request.
SC: WITHOUT MERIT. – Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides in part:

Sec. 618. No will, except as provided in the preceding section,
shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge
or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the
testator, or by the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of each other x x x.
It is nowhere required that, where the testator is unable to
write, the fact that his signature was written by some other
person, at his request and express direction, should appear in
the body of the will itself.
The section above-quoted also provides that
Sec. 618. x x x the attestation clause shall state the fact that
the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some
other person, at his express direction, in the presence of the
witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his
presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence
of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it
is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this
section provided.
Not only does the attestation clause comply with the
requirements of this section, but it appears clearly proved in
evidence that the name of the testator was signed by another
person at his request and under his direction and in his
presence and in the presence of the witnesses to the will.
Moreover, as appears from the last clause of the section, if the
attestation clause is defective, or even absent, the will is
nevertheless valid provided it is satisfactorily proved that it was
in fact signed and executed as provided by law.
2nd Ground: The witness Antonino Pandaraoan could not really
have signed the attestation clause because, at the time it was
executed, he was attending a session of the municipal council
of Piddig as a member thereof.
SC: WITHOUT MERIT. – The barrio of Piddig is only a short
distance from the house in which the will was executed and it
would have taken but a short time to cover the distance. The
witness Pandaraoan himself testified directly and positively
that, after having left the meeting of the municipal council, he
went to the house of the testator by appointment and there
signed the will as stated in the attestation clause. The other
witnesses to the will support this declaration.
Not only this, but the notary public who drew up the will and
who translated it to the testator and who was present at the
time of its execution, declared and testified that the witnesses
whose names appear upon the will were present at the time it
was executed by the testator and that they signed the same at
his request and in his presence and in the presence of each
other.
Antonino Pandaraoan testified that the municipal council began
its session about 10 o'clock; that in order to attend the
execution of the will, as he had agreed with the notary public
he would do, he was obliged to leave the session before it
terminated; that he so left the session, mounted a horse and
arrived at the house of the testator at about 12 o'clock, in
time to take part in the execution of the ill as stated in the
attestation clause.
THEREFORE: The clear and positive testimony of the witnesses
to the will and of the notary public was not overcome by the
evidence offered in opposition to the probate.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 4
TESTATE ESTATE OF ADRIANA MALOTO VS CA
GR NO. 76464, Feb. 29, 1988
Digest by Marion Lara
Facts:
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her
niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and
Constancio Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto
and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave
behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced
on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of their aunt's estate.
However, while the case was still in progress, or to be exact on
February 1, 1964, the parties — Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo,
and Felino — executed an agreement of extrajudicial
settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the
division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties.
The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement
agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did on
March 21, 1964. That should have signalled the end of the
controversy, but, unfortunately, it had not.
3 years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma,
a former associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo
Hervas, discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA
PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and
purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty.
Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy,
while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet
drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was
submitted to the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo on April 1, 1967.
Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in
the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much
bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than
what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial
settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives
devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the
petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo,
and Purificacion Miraflor.
Thus, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the
other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in Special
Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for reconsideration and
annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of
the will. Trial Court denied the motion.
The appellate court found as inconclusive the matter on
whether or not the document or papers allegedly burned by the
househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon
instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will. However, the
CA contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked.
The respondent court stated that the presence of animus
revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been
sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its finding on the
facts that the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's
residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty.
Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's
possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in
order to have a new will drawn up.
Issue: WON the will was revoked by Adriana. - NO
Held: SC did not view such facts, even considered collectively,
as sufficient bases for the conclusion that Adriana Maloto's will
had been effectively revoked.
The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can
be found in Article 830.
Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
 SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 5

… could not in any manner be construed to be final with respect

(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with
the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If
burned, torn cancelled, or obliterated by some other person,
without the express direction of the testator, the will may still
be established, and the estate distributed in accordance
therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its
unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are
established according to the Rules of Court. (Emphasis
Supplied.)
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like
burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective
revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that
the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may
be performed by another person but under theexpress
direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes
without saying that the document destroyed must be the will
itself.
to the probate of the subsequently discovered will of the
decedent. Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the action
for probate. This is understandably so because the trial court,
in the intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on
the probate of the contested will. After all, an action for
probate, as it implies, is founded on the presence of a will and
with the objective of proving its due execution and validity,
something which can not be properly done in an intestate
settlement of estate proceeding which is predicated on the
assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus, there is
likewise no Identity between the cause of action in intestate
proceeding and that in an action for probate. Hence, on these
grounds alone, the position of the private respondents on this
score can not be sustained.

In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke,

may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite
alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the
necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will
and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied
by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or
cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another
person in his presence and under his express direction. There
is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these
requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by
Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established
to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For
another, the burning was not proven to have been done under
the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not
in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were
one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place
where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in
which the papers proffered as a will were burned.

The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence

presented by the private respondents as oppositors in the trial
court, concluded that the testimony of the two witnesses who
testified in favor of the will's revocation appear "inconclusive."
We share the same view. Nowhere in the records before us
does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de
Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably
positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will.
Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she destroyed
was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her
so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the
burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so,
thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay.

At this juncture, we reiterate that "(it) is an important matter

of public interest that a purported will is not denied legalization
on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of
testamentary succession will be shaken to its very
foundations ...."

NOTE: There is no res judicata in this case as what the

petitioners argue. The intestate proceeding did not operate as
a bar to the present action for probate (pls see requisites of res
judicata). For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final
judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's
will is concerned. The decision of the trial court in the intestate
proceeding, although final, involved only the intestate
settlement of the estate of Adriana. As such, that judgment

MOLO v MOLO
GR No. L-2538, September 21, 1951
Digest by Christine Paulma
Facts:
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941 without
leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending
line. He was survived, however, by his wife, Juana Juan Vda.
de Molo (petitioner), and by his nieces and nephew
(oppositors). Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one
executed on August 17, 1918, (Exhibit A) and another
executed on June 20, 1939. (Exhibit I). The latter will contains
a clause which expressly revokes the will executed in 1918.
1941 - Juana filed a petition for the probate of the will executed
by Mariano in 1939, (Exhibit I). The will was probated but upon
opposition of the oppositors, the order of the court admitting
the will to probate was set aside. After hearing, the court
rendered a decision denying the probate of said will on the
ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was
executed in accordance with law.
1944 - In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June
20, 1939 (Exhibit I), the widow filed another petition for the
probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17,
1918 (Exhibit A). Again, the same oppositors filed an
opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that
petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will
of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the manner
required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently
revoked. Before this second petition could be heard, the battle
for liberation came and the records of the case were destroyed.
(In 2016 TSN, Ma’am said it was burned.)
Consequently, a petition for reconstitution was filed, but the
same was found to be impossible because neither petitioner
nor oppositors could produce the copies required for its
reconstitution. As a result, petitioner filed a new petition on
September 14, 1946, similar to the one destroyed, to which
the oppositors filed an opposition based on the same grounds
as those contained in their former opposition. The case was set
for trial and the court issued an order admitting the will to
probate.
Issue: Notwithstanding the disallowance of the 1939 (Exhibit
I) will, is the revocatory clause contained therein valid and thus
still has the effect of nullifying the 1918 (Exhibit A) will? – NO.
Held:
Invoking the doctrine laid down in the case of Samson v Naval:
A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will,
having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed
in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the
effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said
revocatory clause is void. (41 Phil., 838.)
Oppositors’ Contention
Counsel for oppositors contended that, regardless of said
revocatory clause, said will of 1918 cannot still be given effect
because of the presumption that it was deliberately revoked by
the testator himself. The oppositors contend that the testator,
after executing the 1939 will, and with full knowledge of the
revocatory clause contained in said will, himself deliberately
destroyed the original of the 1918 will, and for that reason the
will submitted by petitioner for probate in these proceedings is
only a duplicate of said original.
Supreme Court Decision on Contention
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the
testator deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will
because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 6
the will he executed in 1939. The only evidence is that when
the first will was executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared
it, gave the original and copies to the testator himself and
apparently they remained in his possession until he executed
his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was denied
probate on November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by
her attorney to look for another will, she found the duplicate
copy (Exhibit A) among the papers or files of the testator. She
did not find the original.
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was
voluntarily destroyed by the testator after the execution of the
second will, which revoked the first, could there be any doubt,
under this theory, that said earlier will was destroyed by the
testator in the honest belief that it was no longer necessary
because he had expressly revoked it in his will of 1939? In
other words, can we not say that the destruction of the earlier
will was but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief
that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was
valid and the latter would be given effect? If such is the case,
then it is our opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted
to probate under the principle of "dependent relative
revocation."
“This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is
usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes
an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make
a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new
disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for same reason. The
doctrine is not limited to the existence of some other document,
however, and has been applied where a will was destroyed as a
consequence of a mistake of law. . . .” (68 C.J.P. 799).
“The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected
with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that
the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy
of a new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and
if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is
inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full
force.” (Gardner, pp. 232, 233.)
“This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a
new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation
depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions,
and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent
to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render
the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is
dependent upon the valid execution of a new will.” (1 Alexander, p. 751;
Gardner, p. 253.)
We hold therefore, that even in the supposition that the
destruction of the original will by the testator could be
presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in
court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the
prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the
mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed
and would be given due effect. The theory on which this
principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die
intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he
executed two wills on two different occasion and instituted his
wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake
as to his intention of dying testate.
Editor’s note: Thus, the first will remains valid because the
assumption that the 2nd will (that revoked the first will) is valid
turned out to be erroneous.
 SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 7

NAVAL v. NAVAL
GR L-11823, February 11, 1918
Digest by Anna Sophia Tarhata Piang
Note: This case was decided before the New Civil Code took
effect.
Facts:
This case concerns two wills executed by the same testatrix on
two separate dates.
On February 13, 1915, Simeona F. Naval executed a will. The
said will was presented by attorney Perfecto Gabriel before the
CFI, Manila on September 20, 1915. The will also appointed
him as executor.
The case was recorded as No. 13386 and, after hearing the
petition for allowance filed by said executor, it was denied on
the ground that said document was not duly executed by the
deceased as her last will and testament, inasmuch as she did
not sign it in the presence of three witness and the two
witnesses did not sign it in the presence of each other.
Therefore, according to the legal provisions, in order that the
will of February 13, 1915, that is, the first document presented
as the will of the deceased Simeona F. Naval, could have the
effect of revoking that which was presented afterwards by the
petitioners as executed by the same deceased on October 31,
1914, that is, on a date previous to the execution of the first,
it was necessary and indispensable that the later will,
that is, that first presented for allowance, should be
perfect or valid, that it, executed as provided by lay in
case of wills.
It also appears from the record that the opponents themselves
maintained that said later will, that is, that of February 13,
1915, was not perfect, or executed as provided by law in case
of wills, and the Court of First Instance of Manila has so held in
disallowing said documents as the will of the deceased. So that
it very evident that the second will presented, that is, that of
October 31, 1914, was not and could not have been revoked
by the first, and the court was not in error in so holding in the
order appealed from. We deem it unnecessary to add a single
word mere or cite well-known doctrines and opinions of jurists
in support of what has already been stated.

Thereafter the nieces and legatees of the same deceased filed

in the same court for allowance as her will, another document
executed by her on October 31, 1914, and, consequently, the
case was registered under another number, which was No.
13579.
 The petition for allowance was opposed by Monica
Naval, Rosa Naval, and Cristina Naval on the ground
that the will, the allowance of which is asked, could
not be allowed, because of the existence of another
will of subsequent date, executed during her lifetime
by the same Simeona F. Naval, and because said will
has been revoked by another executed subsequently
by her during her lifetime, and further, because sail
will has not been executed with the formalities
required by existing laws.

After the trial, the lower court held that the document which
was executed on October 31, 1914 was to be admitted as the
last will and testament of the deceased.

As a result of the trial court’s decision, Rosa and Cristina Naval

appealed to the Supreme Court and raised the following error
among others:

1. That the lower court erred in ruling that the will

executed on October 31, 1914, has not been revoked
by that of February 13, 1915;

xxxx

Issue: Was the will executed on October 31, 1914 revoked by

the will subsequently executed on February 13, 1915 – No.

Held: From the evidence it appears that the trial court declared
that the first document presented by the executor of the
deceased, Simeona F. Naval could not be allowed, on the
ground that it was not executed with the requisites and
formalities prescribed by law. Article 739 of the Civil Code
provides that a former will is by operation of law revoked by
another valid subsequent will, if the testator does not state
in the later will his desire that the former should subsist wholly
or partly. In harmony with this provision of substantive law, we
find section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides
that no will shall be revoked, except by implication of law,
otherwise than by some will, codicil, or other writing executed
as provided in case of wills.

SPS. PASCUAL v CA
GR 115925, August 15, 2003
Digest by Ergel Rosal
Facts: Petitioner Consolacion Sioson (Consolacion” and
respondent Remedios Eugenio-Gino (Remedios) are the niece
and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson
(Canuto).
On September 26, 1956, Canuto and Consolation executed a
Kasulatan under which Canuto sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2
(which he co-owns with his siblings Catalina and Victoriano) in
favor of Consolacion for P2,2250. Consolacion immediately
took possession of the lot.
On October 1968, the surviving children of Canuto executed a
Joint Affidavit affirming the Kasulatan in favor of Consolacion.
Later on, Consolacion registered the Kasulatan and the Joint
Affidavit with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
On February 4, 1988, Remedios filed a complaint against
Consolacion and her spouse Ricardo Pascual for “Annulment or
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title and Damages.” She
claims to be the owner of the subject lots (Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-
E) because Catalina devised these lots to her in Catalina’s last
will and testament.
Trial Court: Remedios has no right of action against
petitioners because Catalina’s last will and testament from
which Remedios claims to derive her title has not been
admitted to probate.
Court of Appeals: Reversed the trial court. Catalina’s
unprobated last will does not preclude Remedios from seeking
reconveyance of the lots as the last will may subsequently be
admitted to probate.
Issue: W/N Remedios is a real party in interest—NO
Held: Remedios anchored her claim over the lots on the devise
of the lots to her under Catalina’s last will. However, the trial
court found that the probate court did not issue any order
admitting the last will to probate. Remedios does not contest
this.
Article 838 of the Civil Code states that “No will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.” The Court has interpreted
this provision to mean, “until admitted to probate, a will has no
effect whatsoever and no right can be claimed thereunder.”
Remedios anchors her right in filing the suit on her being a
devisee of Catalina’s last will. However, since the probate court
has not admitted Catalina’s will, remedies has not acquired any
right under the last will.
Remedios is thus without any cause of action either to seek
reconveyance of the lots or to enforce an implied trust over the
lots.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 8
MANINANG v. COURT OF APPEALS
114 SCRA 478, GR L-57848, June 19, 1982
Digest by Reginald Matt Santiago
Public policy requires probate proceeding for unless the will is
probated and notice thereof is given to the whole world, the
right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory.
Facts: Clemencia Aseneta died in Manila Sanitarium Hospital
at the age of 81 on May 1977 leaving a holographic will. In
June 1977, Soledad Maninang filed a petition for probate of the
Will of decedent with CFI Br. IV Quezon City (Testate Case).
In July 1977, Bernardo Aseneta (adopted son) claims to be the
sole heir of the decedent and institute intestate proceedings
with CFI Br. XI, Pasig, Rizal (Intestate Case). In December
1977, the cases were consolidated (CFI Rizal).
Bernardo filed MTD to the Testate Case on the ground that the
holographic will was null and void, because he, as the only
compulsory heir, was preterited and therefore intestacy should
ensue.
This is was opposed by Maninang arguing that in a case for
probate of a will, the Court’s area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the
will and that Bernardo was effectively disinherited.
The lower court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case, the
MR was denied and appointed Bernardo as administrator of the
intestate estate of the decedent.
A certiorari petition was made before the CA alleging excess of
jurisdiction of the lower court for dismissing the case but this
was denied and ruled that the order of dismissal was final in
nature and disposed of the testate case.
Issue: Was it proper to dismiss the case? – No.
Held: (1) Probate of a will, generally mandatory. – The
Court finds that court a quo acted in excess of jurisdiction when
it dismissed the Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will
is mandatory. “No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court.”
The law then enjoins the probate of the Wills and public policy
requires it because unless the Will is probated and notice
thereof is given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.
(2) Normally, probate of a will does not look into the
intrinsic validity. – The authentication of the will decides no
other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as vicious
or null even after the will has been authenticated.
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions
of the will cannot be entertained in a probate proceeding
because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has
been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law.
(3) Nuguid v. Nuguid; Balanay v. Martinez ruling are
mere exceptions to the general rule. – The Nuguid and the
Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The
intrinsic validity of the Wills in those case was passed upon
even before probate because of practical considerations so
demanded.

(4) Dismissal of testate case; determination of the
issues has not been thoroughly considered. - By virtue of
the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that
controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. We
gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its
conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited
We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will, that
conclusion is not indubitable.
(5) Correctible by Certiorari. - Coming now to the
procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding
that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari is a proper remedy. An
act done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be
corrected by Certiorari.
And even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, we
harken to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a
petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where
appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.
Fallo: The order of dismissal of CFI Rizal is annulled and the
Testate Case is reinstated for further proceedings.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 9
MERCADO VS SANTOS
G.R. No. No. 45629. September 22, 1938
Digest by Kristal Charmaine F. Alaban
Facts:
Atilano Mercado filed a petition for the probate of the will of his
deceased wife, Ines Basa. Without any opposition, and upon
the testimony of one of the attesting witnesses, the probate
court, on June 27,1931, admitted the will to probate.
On October 27, 1932 or sixteen months after the probate of
the will of Ines Basa, intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed a
complaint against the Mercado for falsification or forgery of the
will probated. The complaint was later on dismissed at the
instance of the complainant herself.
Later, the same intervenor charged Mercado for the second and
third time with the same offense and he was again arrested.
The second complaint was dismissed again at the instance of
the De Leon, while the third case was dismissed on the ground
that the will alleged to have been falsified had already been
probated and there was no evidence that Mercado had forged
the signature of the testatrix.
Dissatisfied with the result, the provincial fiscal moved for
reinvestigation of the case. The motion was granted and, for
the fourth time, the Mercado was arrested. The reinvestigation
dragged on for almost a year until the CFI ordered that the
case be tried on the merits. The case proceeded to trial, and
Mercado moved to dismiss the case claiming again that the will
alleged to have been forged had already been probated and,
further, that the order probating the will is conclusive as to the
authenticity and due execution thereof.
Before the SC, Mercado now contends that the probate of the
will of his deceased wife is a bar to his criminal prosecution for
the alleged forgery of the said will.
Issue: May the petitioner be convicted, after the will was
duly probated?
Held: NO.
The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction
thereof is usually considered as conclusive as to its due
execution and validity, and is also conclusive x x x that the will
is genuine and not a forgery.
The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in
rem. The provision of notice by publication as a prerequisite to
the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world,
and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court
is binding upon everybody, even against the State.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes
so peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by
any contrary proof however strong. The will in question having
been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any
proof to overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and
not a forgery.
Criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the
forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate
by a court of competent jurisdiction.
After a judgment allowing a will to be probated has become
final and unappealable, the law as an expression of the
legislative wisdom goes no further and the case ends there.
FROM SIGMA:
 SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 10

Q: Did the decree of the probate court become final? ALSUA-BETTS vs CA

A: Yes. The effect is that the judgment becomes res judicata.
The ruling of the probate court saying that in effect the will is
not a forgery is now res judicata with respect to that will. If you
later on prosecute a person alleging that the will was really
forged, you would in effect be disturbing an already final and
executory judgment of the court.
The last paragraph of Article 838 provides “Subject to the right
of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime
of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its
due execution”. The decree of probate court is conclusive as to
the due execution if it become final and executory.
GR L-46430-31, July 30, 1979
Digest by Pearlie Joy M. Suarez
DOCTRINE: The principle of estoppel is not applicable in
probate proceedings.
Probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application
therein of the rule of estoppel, when it will block the
ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding
the execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public
policy. Over and above the interest of private parties is that of
the state to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out
if, and only if, executed conformably to law.

Facts: On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife,
Doña Florentina Rella, both of Ligao, Albay, together with all
their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua,
Fernando Alsua, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into
a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial
(extra-judicial partition), over the then present and existing
properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Florentina. In
the provision of said extra-judicial partition, each of the four
children was allotted with the properties considered as their
share in the estate or as inheritance left by the deceased where
they will be the absolute ownerof the properties assigned in
case of death of one of the spouses.

On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doña Florentina, separately

executed their respective holographic wills the provisions of
which were in conformity and in implementation of the
extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949.

On May 21, 1956, the spouses filed before the Court of First
Instance of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of
their respective holographic wills.

On August 14, 1956, the spouses executed their mutual and

reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their
respective holographic wills. Again, the codicils similarly
acknowledged and provided that one-half of all the properties
of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been disposed
of, conveyed to and partitioned among their legitimate heirs in
the "Escritura de Particion" of November 25, 1949, but that
they reserved for themselves the other half or those not
disposed of to the said legitimate heirs under the above
agreement of partition, and that they mutually and reciprocally
bequeathed unto each other their participation therein as well
as in all properties which might be acquired subsequently.

Upon the death of Doña Florentina on October 2, 1959, Don

Jesus was named executor to serve without bond in an order
issued by the probate court on October 13, 1959.

NEW WILL: Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959,

Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will in the presence of his
bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, whom he
instructed to make a list of all his remaining properties with
their corresponding descriptions. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio
imperial Sr. was then instructed to draft a new will which was
duly signed by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses. This
notarial will had three essential features:

(a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the

provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of January 5,
1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956;
(b) it provided for the collation of all his properties
donated to his four living children by virtue of the
"Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial" of 1949, and that
such properties be taken into account in the partition of
his estate among the children; and

(c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees of
certain specific properties, and as to the rest of the
properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired
in the future, before his death, were to be given to
Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to
serve without a bond.
Petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named
in the will executed on November 14, 1959, filed a petition for
the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua.
Oppositions thereto were filed by the other siblings (private
respondents) on the grounds, among others, that Don Jesus
was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the
execution of the alleged will and that the will was executed
under duress or influence of fear or threats.
RTC: Approved and admitted the will executed by Don Jesus
on November 14, 1959 (new will).
CA: Reversed the trial court’s decision.
Issue 1: Whether or not the oppositors to the probate of the
will are in estoppel to question the competence of testator Don
Jesus Alsua.
Ruling: ESTOPPEL, not applicable.
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate
proceedings, a ruling laid down in the case of Testate Estate of
the Late Procopia Apostol Benedicta Obispo, et al vs. Remedios
Obispo penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
Finally, probate proceedings involve public interest, and
the application therein of the rule of estoppel, when it will
block the ascertainment of the truth as to the
circumstances surrounding the execution of a testament,
would seem inimical to public policy. Over and above the
interest of private parties is that of the state to see that
testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if,
executed conformably to law.
Issue 2: WON Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial
partition of November 25, 1949 which he conformed by making
a holographic will and codicil with exactly the same provisions.
Ruling: Don Jesus was not forever bound thereby for his
previous holographic will and codicil as such, would
remain revokable at his discretion.
Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A will may be revoked
by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or
restriction of this right is void."
There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute
freedom to revoke his holographic will and codicil previously
made. This would still hold true even if such previous will had
as in the case at bar already been probated. For in the first
place, probate only authenticates the will and does not pass
upon the efficacy of the dispositions therein. And secondly, the
rights to the succession are transmitted only from the moment
of the death of the decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code).
In fine, Don Jesus retained the liberty of disposing of his
property before his death to whomsoever he chose, provided
the legitime of the forced heirs are not prejudiced, which is not
herein claimed for it is undisputed that only the free portion of
the whole Alsua estate is being contested.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 11
IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON
59 Phil 156, G.R. No. L-12767, November 16, 1918
Digest by Carla Louise Bayquen
Facts: May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he was married to Rosalie
Ackeson, and. immediately thereafter embarked for the
Philippine Islands as a soldier in the Army of the United States.
As a result of relations between Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson
a daughter, named Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months
after their marriage.
In Manila city he appears to have entered into marital relations
with Alejandra Ibañez, by whom he had three children, to wit,
Mercedes, baptized May 31, 1903; Encarnacion, baptized April
29, 1906; and Victor, baptized December 9, 1907. The other
two children mentioned in the will were borne to the deceased
by Simeona Ibañez.
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and
a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of
Manila, leaving a will, dated September 9, 1915, by which he
disposed of an estate.
This document is an holographic instrument, being written in
the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and
two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore,
was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law
generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these
Islands, and hence could not have been proved under section
618.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of
this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his
death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America;
that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of
that State; and hence could properly be probated here
pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This section reads as follows:.
"Will made here by alien.—A will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country,
which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or
country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be
proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may
be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and
shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws
of these Islands."
The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and
three weeks publication of notice was ordered in the "Manila
Daily Bulletin." Due publication was made
On March 16, 1916, the document was declared to be legal and
was admitted to probate. Victor Johnson was appointed sole
administrator.
By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor
one hundred shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-
Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother in Sweden,
the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum
of P5,000.; to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75 per
month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65
per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is
left to the testator's five children—Mercedes, Encarnacion,
Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.

On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had
been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson
entered an appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to
the order admitting the will to probate. As will be discerned,
the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the petitioner is to
annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate
administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment
of the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her
father.
The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the
probate are four in number and may be stated, in the same
sequence in which they are set forth in the petition, as follows:
(1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila
and not a resident of the State of Illinois at the time
the will in question was executed;
(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and
personal property in the State of Illinois;
(3) The order admitting the will to probate was made
without notice to the petitioner; and
(4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of
the court.
Petitioner argued that at the time the court made the order of
publication, it was apprised of the fact that the petitioner lived
in the United States and that as daughter and heir she was
necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore,
insisted that the court should have appointed a date for the
probate of the will sufficiently far in the future to permit the
petitioner to be present either in person or by representation;
and it is said that the failure of the court thus to postpone the
probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that provision
of the Philippine Bill which declares that property shall not be
taken without due process of law.
Side Issue: Whether or not the publication was proper? – Yes.
On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the
probate of the will were regular and that the publication was
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the
proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
WILLS; PROBATE; PUBLICATION OF NOTICE.
Where a will is duly probated after publication pursuant to
section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order admitting
the will is, in the absence of fraud, effective against all persons.
The fact that an heir or other interested party lives so far away
as to make it impossible for such party to be present at the
date appointed for the probate of the will does not render the
order of probate void for lack of due process.
As was said in the case of In re Davis (139 Cal., 590, 596),
"the proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in
rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a
wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive
notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has
absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case
where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party
of his property without due process of law, the proceeding
being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the
ground that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute
was unreasonably short."
In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian
Islands at the time of the testator's death; and it was
impossible, in view of the distance and means of
communication then existing, for the petitioner to appear and
oppose the probate on the day set for the hearing in California.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 12
It was nevertheless held that publication in the manner
prescribed by statute constituted due process of law.
The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in force in
perhaps all of the States of the American Union, contain no
special provision, other than that allowing an appeal in the
probate proceedings, under which relief of any sort can be
obtained from an order of a court of first instance improperly
allowing or disallowing a will. We do, however, have a provision
of a general nature authorizing a court under certain
circumstances to set aside any judgment, order, or other
proceeding whatever.
Main Issue: Should the application to set probate aside be
granted? NO
APPLICATION TO SET PROBATE ASIDE.
Under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure a court
has the authority upon timely application of any interested
party to set aside the probate of a will and grant a rehearing,
where a proper case for the exercise of this power is made to
appear in the application.
In other words the utility of the provision is not limited to
actions proper but extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings.
In the second section of the Code of Civil Procedure it is
declared that the provisions of this Code shall be liberally
construed to promote its object and to assist the parties in
obtaining speedy justice. We think that the intention thus
exhibited should be applied in the interpretation of section 113;
and we hold that the word "party," used in this section, means
any person having an interest in the subject matter of the
proceeding who is in a position to be concluded by the
judgment, order, or other proceeding taken.
The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under
the section cited, at any time within six months from March 16,
1916, and upon showing that she had been precluded from
appearing in the probate proceedings by conditions over which
she had no control and that the order admitting the will to
probate had been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof
or upon a supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the
court would have been authorized to set the probate aside and
grant a rehearing. It is no doubt true that six months was,
under the circumstances, a very short period of time within
which to expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to
contest the probate with the proof which she might have
desired to collect from remote countries. Nevertheless,
although the time allowed for the making of such application
was inconveniently short, the remedy existed;the possibility of
its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on June
12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her attorneys
and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.
AMERICAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
The authority expressed in section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure for the probate of the will of a citizen of another state
or country is applicable to the case of a citizen of a State of the
American Union domiciled in the Philippine Islands.
CONCLUSIVENESS OF PROBATE; INTRINSIC VALIDITY.
While the probate of a will is conclusive as to compliance with
all formal requisites necessary to the lawful execution of the
will, such. probate does not affect the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will. With respect to the latter the will is
governed by the substantive law relative to descent and
distribution.

The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a
number of matters, such as the age and mental capacity of the
testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by
someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the
instrument by him in the presence of the required number of
witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act.
The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and
as to each and all of them the probate is conclusive.
WILL OF AMERICAN CITIZEN.
The intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will of a citizen of
one of the American States, proved under section 636 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, is governed by the laws of the State of
which he is a citizen.
CITIZENSHIP; AMERICANS RESIDENT IN PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS.
When a person who is a citizen of the United States and
therefore also a citizen of the State in which he was born or
naturalized becomes a resident of the Philippine Islands, he
cannot acquire a new citizenship here; and he must be
assumed to retain his State citizenship along with his status as
a citizen of "the United States.
Issue on citizenship. However, for the purpose of arriving at
a just conception of the case from the point of view of the
petitioner, we propose to examine the evidence submitted
upon the original hearing, in connection with the allegations of
the petition, in order to see, whether the petition contains any
matter which would justify the court in setting the judgment,
aside. In this connection we shall for a moment ignore the
circumstance that the petition was filed after the expiration of
the six months allowed by section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Issue on admissibility to probate of the will. It is insisted
in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was not
properly admissible to probate because it contains provisions
which cannot be given effect consistently with the laws of the
Philippine Islands; and it is suggested that as the petitioner is
a legitimate heir of the testator she cannot be deprived of the
legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing
testamentary successions in these Islands.
Upon this point it is sufficient to say that the probate of the will
does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree
of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution
of the will.
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the
law of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by
the general provisions here applicable in such matters; for in
the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is
declared - that "legal and testamentary successions, with
regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of
the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the
person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the
nature of the property and the country where it may be
situate."
From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the
petition submitted to the court below on October 31, 1916, was
entirely insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the order
probating the will in question.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 13
LEVISTE VS CA
GR L-29184, January 30, 1989
Digest by Cavin Jhon Cabarlo
Facts: On September 7, 1963, Benedicto Leviste, a practicing
attorney, entered into a written agreement with Rosa del Rosario
to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the
holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a
piece of real property at Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila, was
bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that Leviste’s
contigent fee would be thirty-five per cent (35%) of the property
that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will.
Subsequently, Leviste received a letter from Rosa informing him
that she was terminating his services as her counsel due to
"conflicting interest." This consisted, according to the letter, in
Leviste’s moral obligation to protect the interest of his brother-
in-law, Gaudencio M. Llanes, whom Del Rosario and the other
parties in the probate proceeding intended to eject as lessee of
the property which was bequeathed to Del Rosario under the
will.
Leviste opposed on the ground that he is entitled to fees for his
professional services.
Subsequently, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special
administratrix-legatee, filed a "Motion To Withdraw Petition for
Probate" alleging that Del Rosario waived her rights to the
devise in her favor and agreed that the De Guzman brothers and
sisters who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all the
properties left by the decedent.
The trial court denied the motion to withdraw for being contrary
to public policy. Nonetheless, it disallowed the will, holding that
the legal requirements for its validity were not satisfied as only
two witnesses testified that the will and the testatrix's signature
were in the handwriting of Maxima Reselva.
Leviste filed an appeal. However, Rosa filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal on the ground that Leviste was not a party in interest.
Issues: Whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a
contingent fee basis may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute
an appeal despite his client's refusal to appeal the decision of
the trial court? – No.
Held: The law protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Leviste
is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is
contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the
holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by
the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste
is not entitled to his fee.
Furthermore, the law presupposes that the obligor is an heir.
Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C.
Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the
decedent's will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter's
estate. There is nothing for Leviste to accept in her name.
Lastly, the contract for contingent attorney's fees neither gives,
nor purports to give, to the lawyer any right whatsoever,
personal or real to the share of the alleged heir. The amount
thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said his fees.
Relevant to Topic
While it is true that, as contended by the Leviste, public policy
favors the probate of a will, it does not necessarily follow that

every will that is presented for probate, should be allowed. The
law lays down procedures which should be observed and
requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be probated.
Those procedures and requirements were not followed in this
case resulting in the disallowance of the will. There being no
valid will, the motion to withdraw the probate petition was
inconsequential.
Leviste was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower
court. He had no direct interest in the probate of the will. His only
interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for
a prospective heir. One who is only indirectly interested in a will
may not interfere in its probate
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 14
DOROTHEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108581, December 08, 1999
J. Ynares-Santiago
Digest by Luke Morgan Codilla
FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. Aniceta Reyes died in
1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died
thereafter. In 1977, after Alejandro’s death, Petitioner
Dorotheo, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the
latter’s last will and testament.
In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro’s will to
probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order.
In 1983, Private Respondents filed a “Motion To Declare The
Will Intrinsically Void.” On January 1986, the trial court granted
the motion and issued an order declaring the provisions of the
last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically
void.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed for failure to file appellant’s brief within the extended
period granted. This dismissal became final and executory. An
Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B.
Angas setting aside the final and executory Order dated
January 30, 1986. The CA nullified the order of Judge Angas
and upheld the validity of the 1986 order.
Petitioner assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding
the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the
intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro’s will that was earlier admitted
to probate.
ISSUE: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but
declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and
executory still be given effect?
HELD: NO.
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally
with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated, particularly on three aspects: (1) whether the will
submitted is indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament;
(2) compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution
of wills; (3) the testamentary capacity of the testator and the
due execution of the last will and testament.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding
the same may still be raised even after the will has been
authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an
extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically
valid.
Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides
for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their
legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on
succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot
be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already
determined in a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void.
Such determination having attained that character of finality is
binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not
that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a
final and executory decision of which the party had the
opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand
and should no longer be reevaluated.
The only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is
left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or

through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence, which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely
interlocutory. Petitioner argues that “an order merely declaring
who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled
cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares
from one person to another particularly when no project of
partition has been filed.” But it should be noted that in the
same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late
spouses be distributed according to the laws of intestacy.
Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of
intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine
the intrinsic provisions of the same will.
Before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass
the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law
considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to
prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that
the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that
no one is presumed to give.
No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and
unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic
validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy
apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is
extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic
validity – that is whether the provisions of the will are valid
according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had
ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the
intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of
intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Alejandro’s disposition in his will of the alleged share in the
conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as
his “only beloved wife”, is not a valid reason to reverse a final
and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties
not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which
are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters
with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of
by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and
determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of
his and that of his late spouse’s estate.
MALOLES VS PHILIPS
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 15
NUGUID VS NUGUID
G.R L-23445, June 23 1996
Digest By Francis Jeric L. Emuy
Facts: Rosario single, without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and
sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,
Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11 years before
her demise. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate
and that letters of administration with the will annexed be
issued to her.
The legitimate father and mother of the deceased entered their
opposition to the probate of her will on the ground that by the
institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased,
oppositors (as compulsory heirs) were illegally preterited and
that in consequence the institution is void.
WILL
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and
memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do
hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I
may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid,
age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof,
I have signed my name this seventh day of November,
nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the
institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments4 shall be
valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...
Issue 1 : WON there was preterition --Yes
Ruling: Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line
her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga
Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus
received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived
of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This
is a clear case of preterition.
The will institutes Remedios as the sole, universal heir —
nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein
provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is
complete. There is no escaping the conclusion that the
universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance
results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification
of such institution of universal heir — without any other
testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration
that nothing at all was written
We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854
that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and
devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly
given as such in a will.

However, there is no other provision in the will before us
except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That
institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession
ensues.
Issue 2: WON there is disinheritance -NO
Contrary to the argument of Remedios, will here does not
explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It
simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be
labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said
forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition
are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition
under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the
institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will
there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of
devises or legacies. In disinheritance the nullity is limited to
that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have
been illegally deprived.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 16
PASTOR, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS and QUEMADA
GR L-56340, June 24, 1983
Digest by Eduardo M. Lape, Jr.
Parties to the Case:
- Alvaro PASTOR, SR. – Testator
- Alvaro PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA Pastor de Midgely –
Legitimate children of Pastor, Sr.
- Lewellyn Barlito QUEMADA – Illegitimate child of Pastor,
Sr.
Facts: PASTOR, SR., a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City. He
had two legitimate children, PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA, and an
illegitimate child, QUEMADA.
QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an
alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the CFI of Cebu
(Probate Court). The will contained only one testamentary
disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of
30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation
(ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.
Eventually, the Probate Court issued an Order allowing the will
to probate (Probate Order).
For two years, QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading asking
for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject
of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these
pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit
with another branch of the Cebu CFI. All pleadings remained
unacted upon by the Probate Court.
While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch
9 of the CFI of Cebu, the Probate Court issued an Order of
Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of
ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect
that the legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious. The said Order
was immediately executory.
[NOTE: The issue of ownership of the mining rights of royalties
thereon, and the intrinsic validity of the holographic will was
not previously resolved by the Probate Court.]
Upon appeal to the CA by PASTOR, JR., the CA held that the
questions of intrinsic validity of the will and of ownership over
the mining claims (not the royalties alone) had been finally
adjudicated by the final and executory Order of the Probate
Court.
Issue 1: WON the assailed Order of the Probate Court (Probate
Order) resolved with finality the questions of ownership and
intrinsic validity. – NO.
Held: Issue Restricted to Extrinsic Validity;
Determination of Ownership Provisional. – In a special
proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is
restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of
Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.)
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter
which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a certain property should
or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties,
the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
No Declaration of Ownership in Dispositive Portion. – The
rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that

decreed in the dispositive part of the decision. However, in case
of ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the decision may be
scanned for guidance in construing the judgment.
In the case at bar, the Order sought to be executed is the Order
of the Probate Court which allegedly resolved the question of
ownership of the disputed mining properties.
The Dispositive Portion of the said Order provides:
(c) There is a necessity and propriety of a special administrator
and later on an executor and/or administrator in these
proceedings x x x
xxx
The suitability and propriety of allowing petitioner to remain as
special administrator or administrator of the other properties
of the estate of the decedent, which properties are not directly
or indirectly affected by the provisions of the holographic will
(such as bank deposits, land in Mactan etc.), will be resolved
in another order as separate incident, considering that this
order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution
on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the
aforestated will.
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of
ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest
therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself
to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for
and propriety of appointing a special administrator.
Thus, it was error to conclude that the Order of the Probate
Court adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the
mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this
conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order
directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
Issue 2: WON the intrinsic validity of the will in this case has
actually been determined. – NO.
Held: Deficiencies as to the Intrinsic Validity. –
(1) When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by
his wife, two legitimate children and one illegitimate
son. There is therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal
partnership. When the disputed Probate Order was
issued, however, there had been no liquidation of
the community properties of PASTOR, SR. and
his wife.
(2) Also, there had been no prior definitive
determination of the assets of the estate of
PASTOR, SR.
(3) There was no appropriate determination, much
less payment, of the debts of the decedent and
his estate.
(4) Nor had the estate tax been determined and
paid, or at least provided for, as of the time the
Probate Order was issued.
(5) The net assets of the estate not having been
determined, the legitime of the forced heirs in
concrete figures could not be ascertained.
All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible
to determine whether the legacy of QUEMADA would produce
an impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
Finally, there actually was no determination of the
intrinsic validity of the will in other respects. It was
obviously for this reason that more than 7 years after the
Probate Order was issued, the Probate Court scheduled on a
hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 17
LIM VS CA
GR NO. 124715, Jan 24, 2000
Digest by Marion Lara
Facts:
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor
Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings.
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing
Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc.
and Action Company are corporations formed, organized and
existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties
covered under the Torrens system.
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein
petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her
nephew George Luy, filed on 17 March 1995, a joint petition
for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were
included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then
filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and motion for
exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent.
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a
probate court, granted the private respondents' twin motions
and “ordered to lift, expunge or delete the annotation of lis
pendens on Transfer Certificates of Title and to exclude those
real properties from these proceedings.”
Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition and averred
that the late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime
the respondent business entities. Although the above business
entities dealt and engaged in business with the public as
corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were however,
personally owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged
stockholders and officers appearing in the respective articles of
incorporation of the above business entities were mere
dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for
purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Rufina further claimed that real properties under the name
Auto Truck Corp. and Alliance Marketing, although registered
in the name of the above entities, were actually acquired by
Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage with her.
The Regional Trial Court acting favorably on petitioner's motion
ordered to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens in case said
annotation had already been deleted and/or cancelled said
TCTs. Furthermore, said properties covered by TCTs are
included in the instant petition.
CA nullified and set aside RTC decision. Hence, this petition
before SC.
Issue 1: WON the probate court has the power to pass upon
title to certain properties for the purpose of determining
whether the subject real property should or should not be
included in the inventory. – NO
Held 1: As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality.
Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of
estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title
thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title. (Pastor Jr vs CA)
 SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 18

Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of
land are registered in the name of private respondent
corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY
vs., ALCID is of great essence and finds applicability, thus:
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has
evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership,
for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title
in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law itself, which of course,
does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere
incident in special proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons. . . .
. . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or
exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by
Torrens title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due
weight, and in the absence of strong compelling
evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be
considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in
the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in
the persons named in the title. . . .
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling
evidence was ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare
assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the
properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The
Property Registration Decree", proscribes collateral attack on
Torrens Title.
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of
the estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of
and are registered in the name of private respondent
corporations, which under the law possess a personality
separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the
absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction,
the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of
private respondents should stand undisturbed.
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may
be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a
person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist,
where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought
to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of
legal entity should come to naught.
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine
of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows:
1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but
complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and
business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that
the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no
separate mind, will or existence of its own;
(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to
commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a
statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust
act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and
(3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately
cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the
corporate veil".
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a
corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding
the fiction of separate corporate personalities.
Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a
corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly
established. It cannot be presumed. Rufina nonetheless failed
to adduce competent evidence that would have justified the
court to impale the veil of corporate fiction.

Issue 2:
WON the respondent corporations, in its universality, be the
proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate
of Pastor Y. Lim? NO

Held 2: It is settled that a corporation is clothed with

personality separate and distinct from that of the persons
composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the
persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal
indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities
connected with it.

Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law

with a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders
or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction
and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective mantle
and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons
comprising it.

Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Piercing

the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through
the protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from
liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or
distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate one,
were it not for the existing corporate fiction.

CORONADO v CA
GR No. 78778, December 3, 1990
Digest by Christine Paulma
Facts:
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land situated in
Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters. Said parcel
of land is being contested by Juana Albovias (private
respondent) on the one hand, and Leonida-Coronado, et al
(petitioners).
Claim of respondent: Juana Albovias (JUANA) claims that the
property in question is a portion of a bigger lot referred to as
Parcel G in the last will and testament executed in 1918 by
Melecio Artiaga, grandfather of JUANA. This bigger lot was
inherited under that will by JUANA, her brother Domingo
Bueno, and two other grandchildren.
JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio
Street was created by the Municipality of Nagcarla traversing
said Parcel G and thus dividing it into two portions. Parcel G
was divided by the heirs in the following manner: the northern
portion of which was adjudicated in favor of the grandchildren
and the southern portion was given to JUANA and her brother.
Claim of petitioners: Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners
(CORONADO) claim that the property in question was
bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will executed by Dr.
Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof
even before the outbreak of World War II.
Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-
283, entitled "Testate Estate of the Deceased Monterola.”
JUANA, together with her husband, opposed the said probate.
Despite their opposition, however, the Will was allowed by the
then Court of First Instance of Laguna.
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in
question, JUANA filed an action for quieting of title, declaratory
relief and damages against CORONADO. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of JUANA.
Issue: Is the transfer of ownership to JUANA through the will
of his grandfather effectual? – YES.
Held:
Coronado’s Contention
CORONADO claims that the will under which JUANA inherited
the property in question from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga,
was never probated; hence, said transfer for ownership was
ineffectual considering that under Rule 75, Sec. 1 of the Rules
of Court (formerly Sec. 125 of Act No. 190), no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed
in the proper court.
Will is Sustained
The contention is without merit. While it is true that no will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the
questioned will, however, may be sustained on the basis of
Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at
the time said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in
1918. The said article read as follows: "Article 1056. If the
testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v.
Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986])
In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida
Coronado is entitled to legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth
of the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that
Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to
each other.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 19
CAYETANO v. LEONIDAS
GR L-54919, May 30, 1984
Digest by Anna Sophia Tarhata Piang
Facts:
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her
father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private
respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta
C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was
the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court
whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the
entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia
filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased,
Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United
States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate
of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an
American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent
resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977
while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza,
Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her
last wig and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws
of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New
Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will
and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and
registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the
administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had
declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of
the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that
therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an
administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the
properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will
was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things, that
he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a
forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and
void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as
they would work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his
counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss
Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he
"has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and
now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his
daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of
evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to
wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that
Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the
United States of America with a permanent residence at
4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that
when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and
Testament in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while
in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C.
Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving
property both in the Philippines and in the United States
of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late
Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate
by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common
 SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 20

Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of
administration were issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin
all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that
the petitioner is not suffering from any disqualification which
would render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the
Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
"usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a
settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court
to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro,
et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).

WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion

C. Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the
Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed
Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of
Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said
Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of
P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule
81 of the Rules of Court.

Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos

died and left a will, which, incidentally has been questioned by
the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face,
patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly
Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as
petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court
on September 13, 1982.

A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights

of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death
with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only
remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September
12, 1983.

Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the

respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction
when:

xxxx

5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the

fact that the Testator at the time of death was a usual resident
of Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First
Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs.
Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955).

Issue: Did the respondent judge acquire jurisdiction over the

case – No.

Held: The contention of the petition as to the issue of

jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1,
of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.

— If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which
he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province
in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos

was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila
where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that
Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a

SOLIVIO v CA
GR 83484, February 12, 1990
Digest by Ergel Rosal
Facts: This case involves the estate of the late novelist,
Esteban Javellan, Jr., who died a bachelor, without
descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces.
His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solution, the spinster half-sister of his
mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) private respondent, Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban
Javellana, Sr.
During his lifetime, Esteban expressed to Celedonia and some
close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to
honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students
obtain a college education. He died of a heart attack on
February 26, 1977 without having set up the foundation.
Celedonia and Concordia later talked about what to do with
Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's
desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his
mother. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the
deceased. Pursuant to the agreement that Celedonia would
take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the
foundation, she filed a petition for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Spl. Proc.
No. 2540). She later on filed an amended petition praying that
letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared
sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims
and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be
adjudicated to her. She was declared sole heir of Esteban.
Concordia filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order
declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, Jr., because she
too was an heir if the deceased. This was however denied by
the court. Instead of appealing the denial, she instead filed a
petition for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damaged.
Trial Court: Ruled in favor of Concordia. Ordered the execution
of judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit
an inventory and accounting of the estate.
Court of Appeals: Affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.
Issue 1: W/N the Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction
over the partition and recovery case even while the probate
proceedings were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court—
NO
Held: In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in
Branch 23, Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring
Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself declared
as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the
deceased was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her
remedy when the court denied her morion, was to elevatw the
denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However
instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than a year
later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of
the court. The Court held that the separate action was
improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive
jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
Issue 2: W/N Concordia was prevented from intervening in the
proceedings—NO
Held: She stayed away by choice. She knew that the estate
came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 21
she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as
the deceased had planned to do.
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir
of Esteban within the third degree in his mother's side was not
false. It was made in good faith and in the honest belief that
because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother,
she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's
side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-
defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she
stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her
omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Issue 3: W/N the decedent's properties were subject to
reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia—NO
Held: The estate of the deceased was not subject to reserva
troncal and it does not pertain to Celedonia as his only relative
within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva
troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891:
Art 891. The descendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor
(reservista) - the ascendant who on inherits by
operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
reservees (reservatarios) - relatives within the third
degree counted from the descendant (propositus),
and belonging to the line from which the property
came.
3. The propositus - the descendant who received by
gratuitous title and died without issue, making his
other ascendant ingerit by operation of law.
The property of the deceased is not reservable property, for
Esteban Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his
mother from whom he inherited the properties in question.
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of Celedonia, who is a relative within the
third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies
to properties ingerited by an ascendant from a descendant who
inheirtednit from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It
does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his
ascendant.
Since Esteban, Jr. died without descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his
estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code.
Hence, both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being
relatives of the decedent within the third degree in collateral
line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate
'without distinction of line or preference among them by reason
of relationship by the whole blood' and is entitled to ½ share
and share alike of the estate.
Issue 4: W/N Concordia may recover her share of the estate—
NO
Held: Since Concordia agreed to deliver the estate of the
deceased to the foundation, an agreement which she ratified
 SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 22

and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider AJERO v. COURT OF APPEALS
Order dated April 3, 1978", she is bound by such agreement. 236 SCRA 488, GR 106720, September 15, 1994
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate
to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her Digest by Reginald Matt Santiago
commitment as Celedonia honored hers.
In this case, the question of ownership was passed upon
where the decedent was not the sole owner of the property
conveyed in the will.

Facts: Annie Sand, died in 1982, left a holographic will. The

will named as devices the petitioners Spouses Ajero among
others. The Spouses Ajero instituted an action for allowance of
the decedent’s holographic will.

This was opposed thereto by private respondents alleging that

among other contentions, the disposition in the will of a house
and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte could not be conveyed
by decedent in its entirety as she was not the sole owner.

The RTC Quezon admitted the will probate holding that it can
decide only on the question of identity of the will, on its due
execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, which
if found no evidence to show sufference reason to disallow it.

The CA reversed finding that the certain disposition in the will

were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It
found erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon
had not been authenticated by decedent.

It also ruled that the decedent Annie Sand could not validly
dispose of the house and lot.

Issue 1: Can the Court of Appeals properly pass on the issue

of ownership? – Yes.

Held: As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are

limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought
to be probated.

However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to

do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon
certain provisions of the will.

In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her

holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name
of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose
Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety).
Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly
dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her
father's other heirs.

Issue 2: Can the holographic will be admitted to probate

despite the non-compliance with the requirements of
authentication of changes, and signing and dating of
dispositions (Art. 813 and 814)? – Yes.

Held: A holographic will can still be admitted to probate,

notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article
814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237-242
(1984), this Court held:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections,

and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will have not been noted under his
signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular
words erased, corrected or interlined. xxx

Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or

insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on
testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance
of such changes.

It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication
of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in
provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which
provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the
holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to
Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the
present provisions covering holographic wills are taken.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 23
VDA. DE KILAYKO v. JUDGE TENGCO
GR L-45425, March 27, 1992
Digest by Reginald Matt Santiago
There can be no valid partition among their until after the will
has been probated, this presupposes that the properties to be
partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will.
Facts: In 1962, Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a Testamento
written in Spanish. In January 1968, the decedent died leaving
the said instrument in the possession and custody of her niece
Eustaquia Lizares.
On February 1968, Eustaquia filed a petition for settlement of
the testate estate of Maria Lizares y Alunan before CFI Negros
Occidental. The probate court declared the will probated and
declared Eustaquia as executrix.
On July 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition which was
granted in 1971. The court adjudicated to them the properties
respectively assigned to each and one of them (heirs, devisees,
legatees and usufructuaries). The court ordered ROD to effect
the transfer of properties and the closure of the testate case.
However, an urgent motion to reopen testate proceedings was
filed by Eustaquia in order that some properties omitted in the
partition be adjudicated to her – this was granted and real or
personal properties which were not given by the decedent in
her last will and testament were adjudicated to Eustaquia.
In 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares executed an Agreement of
Partition and Subdivision terminating their co-ownership
over certain lots.
In 1973, Eustaquia died single without descendant.
Vda. de Kilayko et al. filed a motion to reopen once again the
testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares praying that they
be declared as heirs of certain properties.
This was opposed by two sets of intestate heirs of Eustaquia
arguing that the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the
testate estate proceedings as the order of closure was final.
The court denied the motion to reopen holding that settlement
of estate is an in rem proceeding thus binding against the whole
world. MR was denied.
With this Vda. de Kilayko et al, filed an action for Recovery of
Ownership and Possession of Real Property against the
administrator of the estate of Eustaquia (Rodolfo and Amelo
Lizares) and they filed a notice of lis pendens.
This was meted by an MTD filed by the administrators of
Eustaquia alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case barred by prior judgment. The
administrators also filed for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens and this was granted.
Upon reaching the SC, the joint administrators argue that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over the case as it involves the
interpretation of the will of Maria Lizares, its implementation
and the adjudication of her properties – they argue that this
was already settled and it had become final and unappealable
such that it was barred by res judicata.
Issue: Is the partition barred from any further litigation? –
Yes, the title over the lots in question has been
concluded by the partition which has become a closed
matter.
 SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 24

Held: (1) No valid partition until will is probated. - In BALANAY vs MARTINEZ

testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the
probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a
will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world,
the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory.
The authentication of a will decides no other question than such
as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance
with those requirements or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will.
The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute
the estate, has the power to determine the proportion or
parts to which each distributee is entitled . . .. A project
of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the
heredity estate which the court may accept or reject. It is the
court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines
the persons entitled thereto.
In this case, it was shown that a project of partition was then
submitted by Eustaquia and this was approved by the court
which in accordance thereto, an Agreement of Partition and
Subdivision was made – showing that the Lizares sisters had
recognized the decree of partition by the probate court and in
fact reaped the fruits thereof.
(2) Precluded from attacking the validity of partition. -
They are now precluded from attacking the validity of the
partition or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for
reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience
be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or
judgment and repudiate what does not suit him.
Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a partition
and there is no allegation that the inclusion was affected
through improper means or without petitioner's knowledge, the
partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated
to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the
court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the
partition.
The question of private respondents title over the lots in
question has been concluded by the partition and became a
closed matter.
GR L-39247, 64 SCRA 452, June 27, 1975
Digest by: Trisha Ann Samantha Aligato
DOCTRINE: General Rule: The probate of a will is mandatory
and it is the duty of the court to pass first upon its formal
validity.
Exception: Extreme cases where the will is on its face
intrinsically void.
Facts: Leodegaria Julian died and survived by her husband
Felix Balanay Sr and their six children. Felix Balanay Jr. filed a
petition for the probate of her mother’s will.
The testatrix disposed of a lot under their conjugal property
which she declared she owned the “southern half” of.
Issue: WON the probate court may pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the will (ownership) before ruling on its allowance or
formal validity.
Ruling: Yes. The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the
will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue.
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February
28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the
fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the
surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his
renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included
his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
General Rule: The probate of a will is mandatory and it is the
duty of the court to pass first upon its formal validity.
Exception: Extreme cases where the will is on its face
intrinsically void.
(This case falls under the exception)

(3) Final decree of distribution, effects. - A final decree of

distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title
to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is
erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once
it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in
rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and
the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the
project of partition becomes irrelevant.

[NOTE: The court also discussed here the requisites for res
judicata ruling that all requisites for the existence of res
judicata are present, making the order approving distribution
of the estate of Maria Lizares to the heirs instituted in said will
has become final and unappealable.]

CRUZ vs. VILLASOR
G.R. No. L-32213, 54 SCRA 31, November 26, 1973
Digest by Mariel D. Banosan
This case has no relation to Article 838. This is discussed under Article
805 vis a vis 806. One of the witnesses was also the same person who
acted as the notary.
Facts: The will in question is that which was executed by the
late Vicente Cruz, its allowance for probate is being opposed by
the surviving spouse, Agapita. Agapita alleged that the will was
executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue
influence; that the said instrument was execute without the
testator having been fully informed of the content thereof,
particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the
supposed last will and testament was not executed in
accordance with law. Notwithstanding such objection, the Court
allowed probate of the will.
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely
Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco Pañares and Atty.
Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the same
time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to
have been acknowledged. As the third witness is the notary
public himself, petitioner (Agapita) argues that the result is
that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public to
acknowledge the will. On the other hand, private respondent-
Manuel B. Lugay, who is the supposed executor of the will,
following the reasoning of the trial court, maintains that there
is substantial compliance with the legal requirement of having
at least three attesting witnesses even if the notary public
acted as one of them, bolstering up his stand with an American
Jurisprudence.
ISSUE: WON the will is executed in accordance with law- NO
Held: The Court is inclined to sustain that the last will and
testament in question was not executed in accordance with
law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since
he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the
will. To acknowledge before means to avow; to own as genuine,
to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding
in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were
the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or
admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot
be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that
one will appear before the other to acknowledge his
participation in the making of the will. To permit such a
situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others,
to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement and that
function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the
attesting instrumental witnesses. For them he would be
interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly
involves him and the validity of his own act. It would place him
in inconsistent position and the very purpose of
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud would be
thwarted.
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. xxx xxx xxx
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the
attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect
of having only two attesting witnesses to the will
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 25
CAMAYA v. PATULANDONG
423 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 144915, February 23, 2004
Digest by Carla Louise Bayquen
Courts; Jurisdiction Probate; Titles; A probate court cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part
of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside
parties.–It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part
of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties
is to determine whether they should or should not be included
in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot
do so.
Facts: On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix)
executed a notarized will wherein she devised, among others,
a lot to her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan (Mangulabnan).
The pertinent portion of her will reads:
IKALIMA.–Aking inihahayag at ginagawa na tagapagmana, sa
aking kusang loob, ang pinalaki kong APO na si ANSELMO P.
MANGULABNAN, may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Flora
Umagap, at naninirahan sa San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
at anak ng aking anak na si SIMPLICIA, at sa aking APO na si
ANSELMO ay aking ipinagkakaloob at ipinamamana, sa aking
pagkamatay, ang mga sumusunod kong pagaari:
LOT NO. 288-A
The testatrix’s son Bernardo Patulandong (Patulandong),
respondent herein, was in the will appointed as the executor.
During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for
the probate of her will before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Nueva Ecija where it was docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 128.
By Order of January 11, 1973, the CFI admitted the will to
probate.
On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying
above-quoted paragraph five of her will in this wise:
UNA.–Ang Lote No. 288-A na nakalagay sa barrio ng Sta. Cruz,
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, na aking ipinamana sa aking apong si
ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, sangayon sa Pangkat IKA-LIMA,
pp. 5-6, ng aking HULING HABILIN (Testamento), ay ipinasiya
kong ipagkaloob at ipamana sa aking mga anak na sina
BERNARDO, SIMPLICIA, GUILLERMA at JUAN nagaapellidong
PATULANDONG, at sa aking apong si ANSELMO P.
MANGULABNAN, sa magkakaparehong bahagi na tig-ikalimang
bahagi bawat isa sa kanila.
IKALAWA.–Na maliban sa pagbabagong ito, ang lahat ng mga
tadhana ng aking HULING HABILIN ay aking pinagtitibay na
muli.
On May 14, 1988, the testatrix died.
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor
Patulandong of the title to Lot 288-A. Patulandong refused to
heed the request, however, in view of the codicil which
modified the testator’s will.

Action for Partition
Mangulabnan thus filed an “action for partition” against
Patulandong with the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 552 (the partition case).
On June 8, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in the
partition case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court orders the partitioning of the properties
and the defendant to deliver the copy of the Transfer Certificate
of Title No. NT-47089.
However, in view of the case cited by the plaintiff himself, the
court holds that the partition is without prejudice [to] . . . the
probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of Court,
[P]alacios vs. Catimbang Palacios cited by the plaintiff:
“After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the
testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or
revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will,
it would also be allowable of his petition and if he should die
before he had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary
probate proceedings after the testator’s death would be in
order.”
The Court also orders that the right of the tenants of the
agricultural land in question should be protected meaning to
say that the tenants should not be ejected.
Petition for Probate
Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija
a petition for probate of the codicil of the testatrix, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 218. The probate court issued an Order setting
the petition for hearing and ordering the publication of said
order.
On February 7, 1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition
case, Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the
testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and TCT No. NT-2157507 was
issued in his name.
Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot No.
288-A by a Deed of Sale dated February 19, 1991.8 TCT No.
NT-215750 was thus cancelled and TCT No. NT-2164469 was
issued in the name of the Camayas.
On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision in Sp. Proc.
No. 218 admitting the codicil to probate. It declared the deed
of absolute sale between Mangulabnan and the Camayas void.
And ordered the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel
Transfer of Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446
and reissue the corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo
R. Patulandong, Filipino, married to Gorgonia Mariano residing
at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Juan R. Patulandong,
Filipino, widower and residing at San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva
Ecija; Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan of legal age,
Filipino, widow and residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, Simplicia R. Patulandong Mangulabnan, of legal age,
widow, and residing at San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija and
her grandson, Anselmo Mangulabnan with full personal
circumstances stated herein to the extent of one fifth (1/5)
each pursuant to the approved codicil (will) of Rufina Reyes
dated June 27, 1973.
Petitioners’ contention
Petitioners contend that under the law, the probate court has
no power, authority, and jurisdiction to declare null and void
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 26
the sale and titles of petitioners and that the probate court can
only resolve the following issues:
1. Whether or not the instrument which is offered for
probate is the last will and testament of the decedent; in
other words, the question is one of identity[;]
2. Whether or not the will has been executed in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law; in other words, the
question is one of due execution[; and]
3. Whether the testator had testamentary capacity at the
time of the execution of the will; in other words, the
question is one of capacity.
Issue: Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction
when it declared null and void and ordered the cancellation of
the TCTs of petitioners and the deed of sale? YES
In Cuizon v. Ramolete, this Court elucidated on the limited
jurisdiction of a probate court, to wit:
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All
that said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot
do so.
xxx
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question
was in the possession of third parties and more important,
covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of
such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the
motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the
property in question from the inventory of the property of the
estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their
possession and ownership of the property. x x x
Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its
jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of sale and
the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had the
effect of depriving them possession and ownership of
the property.
Moreover, following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree
which reads:
SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.–
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law,
Petitioners’ titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be
declared null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the partition case bared the case for
probate. NO
As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the
codicil to probate, it in effect amended the final judgment in
the partition case which is not allowed by law; and that
petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers for value and
enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful.
Petitioners’ first argument does not persuade.

Though the judgment in the partition case had become final
and executory as it was not appealed, it specifically provided
in its dispositive portion that the decision was “without
prejudice [to] . . . the probate of the codicil.” The rights of the
prevailing parties in said case were thus subject to the outcome
of the probate of the codicil.
The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the
validity of petitioners’ titles, there is no longer any necessity to
dwell on the merits of petitioners Camayas’ claim that they are
innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption
that the transfer was lawful.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2000 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 53757 affirming the January 16, 1996 Decision
of Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The decision allowing the codicil is AFFIRMED, but the 1)
declaration as null and void of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
NT-215750 issued on February 7, 1991 by the Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan,
the February 19, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him
in favor of the intervenors–herein petitioners Carolina,
Ferdinand and Edgardo Camaya, and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. NT-216446 issued on March 18, 1991 in favor of the
petitioners Camayas, and 2) the order for the Register of Deeds
of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title Nos. NT-
215750 and NT-216446 and reissue the corresponding
Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Juan R.
Patulandong, Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan, Simplicia R.
Patulandong Mangulabnan, and Anselmo Mangulabnan to the
extent of one-fifth (1/5) each pursuant to the approved codicil
are SET ASIDE, without prejudice to respondent and his co-
heirs’ ventilation of their right in an appropriate action.
SO ORDERED. Camaya vs. Patulandong, 423 SCRA 480, G.R.
No. 144915 February 23, 2004
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 27
NATCHER VS CA
GR 133000, October 2, 2001
Digest by Cavin Jhon Cabarlo
Facts: Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra
were registered owners of a parcel of land located in Manila.
Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with
his six children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Graciana's estate adjudicating and dividing among themselves
the real property. Under the agreement, Graciano received
8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share
of the said property for which TCT No. 35980 was issued in the
name of Graciano and the six children.
Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a
portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square
meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under
Graciano's name. Subsequently, another lot was further
subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land
area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No.
107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square
meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually,
Graciano sold the first lot to a third person but retained
ownership over the second lot.
Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During
their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No.
107443 (second lot) to his wife Patricia. Subsequently,
Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six
children by his first marriage, as heirs.
The six children from the first marriage filed a civil case against
Patricia Natcher for the annulment of the deed of sale on the
ground that she employed fraud, misrepresentation and
forgery in the execution of the deed.
Patricia Natcher, on the other hand, averred that she was
legally married to Graciano and she is a compulsory heir. She
alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already
distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, they
may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against
herein Natcher’s property.
When the case went on with the Court of Appeals, it ruled in
favor of the six children on the ground that the RTC acting in
its ordinary jurisdiction cannot decide on matters relating to
the legal distribution of the estate as the same is properly
cognizable by the probate court (RTC acting in its limited
jurisdiction).
Issues: Which court has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
relating to legal distribution or advancement of inheritance? –
Probate Court.
Held: Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject
to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked
distinction between an action and a special proceeding.

An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice
in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be
defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status
or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the
statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of
the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of
the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions
as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the
court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the
final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir. While it may be true that
the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the
same provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks of
the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting
in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of Natcher. The RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was
not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass
upon the question of advancement made by the decedent
Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, Natcher.
The trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to
perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is
subject to specific prescribed rules.
While the matter on whether the RTC should hear the case in
its general or limited probate jurisdiction, the same is not a
procedural issue but a mere question of procedure which may
be waived. However, in this case, there is no waiver on the part
of the heirs inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even
assailed the authority of the trial court, acting in its general
jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made
by their father to Natcher.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question
of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.
Thus, in this case, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge
the issue of advancement as well as other related matters
involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.
SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 28
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM v. VICENTA UMENGAN
G.R. No. 168156, December 06, 2006
J. Callejo, Sr.
Digest by Luke Morgan Codilla
FACTS:
Subject lot is the eastern half portion of Lot No. 5427 and Lot
No. 990. These lots are registered in the names of the original
owners, spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan.
Said spouses conveyed the ownership of Lots Nos. 990 and
5427 in favor of their two children, Irene Cuntapay and Isabel
Cuntapay. The eastern half portion of Lots Nos. 990 and 5427
shall belong to the heirs of Isabel Cuntapay.
Isabel Cuntapay had four children by her first husband,
Domingo Turingan. When Domingo Turingan passed away,
Isabel Cuntapay remarried Mariano Lasam. She had two other
children by him: Trinidad and Rosendo.
Sometime in January 2001, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam filed
with the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Vicenta Umengan, who was then occupying the subject lot.
Vicenta Umengan is the daughter of Isabel Cuntapay by her
first husband.
The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam and directed the ejectment of Vicenta Umengan. In so
ruling, the MTCC gave credence to the newly discovered last
will and testament purportedly executed by Isabel Cuntapay
where she bequeathed the subject lot to her son, Rosendo
Lasam.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC.
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in reversing the RTC and
MTCC.
HELD: YES.
As earlier stated, petitioners rely on the last will and testament
of Isabel Cuntapay that they had allegedly newly discovered.
On the basis of this instrument, the MTCC and RTC ruled that
petitioners have a better right to the possession of the subject
lot because, following the law on succession, it should be
respected and should prevail over intestate succession.
However, contrary to the ruling of the MTCC and RTC, the
purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not
properly be relied upon to establish petitioners' right to possess
the subject lot because, without having been probated, the said
last will and testament could not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:
“Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court
having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case,
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance
of wills after the testator's death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of
Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition
of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either
 SUCCESSION CASE SUMMARIES | 3-MANRESA 2018-2019 29

during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be

conclusive as to its due execution.”

Cañiza v. Court of Appeals: "A will is essentially ambulatory; at

any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law
being quite explicit: 'No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court.'”

Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, also explained

that "[b]efore any will can have force or validity it must
be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some
officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that
purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last
will and testament of the deceased person whose testamentary
act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested
and published as required by law, and that the testator was of
sound and disposing mind. It is a proceeding to establish the
validity of the will." Moreover, the presentation of the will for
probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.

Following the above truisms, the MTCC and RTC, therefore,

erroneously ruled that petitioners have a better right to
possess the subject lot on the basis of the purported last will
and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, which, to date, has not been
probated. Stated in another manner, Isabel Cuntapay's last will
and testament, which has not been probated, has no effect
whatever and petitioners cannot claim any right thereunder.