The war of 1812

Table of Contents
Topic Page
Introduction 02
Maritime causes 03
Sophistication of war rhetoric 04
Unrest among the first nations 07
Land hunger 09
Slavery and the war 11
Gender dynamics—Women in the war 14
Statecraft of America in the war 16
France during the war 17
Opposition of the federalists 19
Consequences of the war 20
Sources and References 21

Introduction:
On the 4th of July, 1776, thirteen British colonies on the east coast of
North America declared their independence. In September, 1783, the
Treaty of Paris agreed to and confirmed the independence of the
thirteen states, acknowledging the United States as a sovereign country.
Loss of colonies and continual wars with the French (1793—1812)
further compelled the English to ascertain supremacy over the Trans-
 The scope of this paper is limited to discussing the causes of the war, the social,
economic, and political trends and diplomacies during the war, and the
consequences of the war. Military strategies, and/or military history have not been
discussed, except when necessary.
 -2-

Atlantic trade. The countermeasures taken up by England like

impressments, issue of numerous Letters of Marque, and the popular
Continental system against Napoleon were perceived by the Americans
as attack on the integrity of the fledgling United States of America. A
war was declared on the 18th of June, 1812, by the President of United
States, Mr. Madison, against the United Kingdom of Britain and
Ireland.
The war was fought for almost three years from the 18th of June, 1812
to the 18th of February, 1815. Status quo ante bellum was established
after the peace Treaty of Ghent was signed, annulling territorial
concessions. Native Indians lost the claim to the American mainland to
a fair degree of certainty.
But before beginning the analysis of the consequences of the war of
1812, or even the war rhetoric, a closer examination of the causes of the
war produces the following problematic,
What were the diplomatic postures of the protagonist nations prior to
1812? Why did they fail? Why was the war declared in 1812?
Republican ideology was intensely sceptical of the concept of a national
standing army. What was the Republican view on the modern Fiscal-
military state burdened by debt? What political decisions were made in
this regard?
Why did United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland agree to peace on
terms of antebellum despite its military and naval superiority?
What was the role of Indians, in the war? How important were the
French or any other European nation in the war?
What was the aftermath? How different was it from planned outcome?
Hypothesis:
The two principal, immediate causes of war are---
 -3-

1. The impressment of seamen from American merchant ships to

serve the British navy, and
2. The interference with the carrying trade of the United States by
the naval power of Britain.
As the war with Napoleon increased in intensity, the British Cabinet
formulated and enforced a restriction of trade against neutrals, justified
only as a necessary retaliation against the French. These Orders of
Council by their enormity, dominated over all prior complaints. Along
with the impressment question, the Orders of Council forged a vital,
irreconcilable resistance to it, thereby dragging the two nations into
armed conflict.
Maritime causes:

When sailors were on open seas, their rights were regulated by the
municipal law of the country to which the ship belonged, regardless of
their individual allegiances. Great Britain, to man her fleet during war
with France, maintained an inalienable right to the service of all English
sailors, including those aboard neutral vessels, like the American. Since
impressment or acquiescence to infringement of personal liberty was
dishonourable to the country to which the ship belonged, the actions of
England hurt both commerce and the national pride of the States.
Attempts at diplomacy were made continually to forestall the military
confrontation. In 1794-95, John Jay negotiated a treaty through which
America was granted “the most favoured nation” status, despite
restriction of commercial access to the British West Indies. It lapsed in
1805 due to opposition of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. An
official statement of the Secretary of State of America, made in 1812,
declared that five hundred and twenty-eight American merchantmen
had been taken by British men-of-war prior to 1807, and three hundred
and eighty-nine after that period including seizure of cargo worth nearly
thirty million dollars.
Sophistication of War rhetoric:
 -4-

America faced similar maritime issues before Madison, during the

offices of both John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. The Republicans of
the American Enlightenment movement were against war. The
federalists opposed conflict since the Embargo act, 1807. In this
situation, declaration of war realized as the pro-war rhetoric shifted
majorly from just maritime issues.

 Cluster Bloc analysis: A technique in which the researcher uses pair wise voting scores to
form groups of legislators who voted similarly-and the index of cohesion, a numerical
measure of group unity.
Statistics point to considerable consistency in party unity, signifying
uniqueness of the situation of 1812 compared to 1798 or 1808, where
partisan behaviour masked the real differences of opinion, but by itself
could not have produced a declaration of war in 1812. Close
observation of congressional voting patterns reveals the possibility of
war much before Madison, in Adam’s or Jefferson’s administration.
 -5-

Consistency in the cohesion indices, a pointer of the relation of each of

the three president’s relation with congress, renders Madison’s war
message equally ineffective as party unity in the war declaration.
 -6-

What distinguished 1812 from 1798 or 1808 is the way the vocabularies
of motive shifted. There was a gradual conversion of Republicans from
Jeffersonian pacifism to a vigorous defence of America’s neutral rights,
believing that the only alternative was submission and national disgrace.
Although the quasi-war was justified on narrow commercial grounds
prior to 1807, Republicans in 1807-08, following Chesapeake affair,
subsumed commercial interests within national honour. By 1812, war
proposition was thoroughly articulated as the determination of Britain
to “re-colonize” America, with three major themes—
1. Identification of damages
2. Lawlessness of conduct
3. Universalization of effects
 -7-

War justification themes for Republican war rhetoric:

Unrest among the First Nations:

A large portion of the United States was unsettled in 1812. The

agricultural practises followed were primitive, and wasteful. Repeated
cultivation without crop cycle rotation turned lands barren, increasing
the demand for virgin soil. Foraying through forests and expansion into
territory controlled by Native Americans, due to an imperative demand
for more territory into which western immigrants might go and still be
within the jurisdiction of the United States caused frequent Indian
attacks.
 -8-

Prior to the declaration of war of 1812, tribes for the great lake regions
(Michigan, Ontario, Quebec, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin and Minnesota)
face continual threat from the Whites. Frequent attacks from Americans
forcefully displaced several tribal communities like the Shawnee,
Delaware, Iroquois, Miami, Odawa, Wyandot and Mingo, who finally
prepared to go to war against the United States. Alliances formed
among the various tribes of the Gitchi Gamik (Great Lakes), and
leaders emerged. One such leader was Tecumseh, a Shawnee Indian,
and brother of Tenskawata, a self proclaimed prophet. Tecumseh
succeeded in converting the Prophet’s religious following into a political
activism inspiring resistance to the American expansion into the Indian
lands.
The British in Canada retained the trade relations with the Natives of
the First Nations. Also, the old British-Indian military alliances had
been maintained post the American Revolution through activities of
military garrisons and quasi-military Indian agents. These fraternizations
aroused deep mistrust and suspicion among the Americans. The West
believed that the unrest among Indians resulted from operations of the
British.
The Battle of Tippercanoe, 1811, in which United States attacked,
fought, and defeated the Prophet thereby forcing the Indians to recede
further, had two major effects—It aggravated the Indians as they readily
joined British, and Canadians during the war as the Aboriginal/Indian
Confederacy; the American pro-war spirit was fuelled by the loss of life
on the battlefront, providing an acceptable vocabulary of motive for
war declaration, “The British are to be warred upon because the Indians
stood in the way of advancing frontier and the British stood behind the
Indians; not because the British themselves possessed the coveted
lands.”
 -9-

Land Hunger:

President Madison did bring a declaration of war to Congress, but his

leadership in planning for war was mostly absent. The declaration was
adopted by the House of Representatives by a sharply sectional vote.
New York, New Jersey, and New England cast only seventeen votes in
favour of the war and thirty five against it; the rest of the country
mustered sixty two votes for the war and only 14 for peace.

New England: the six states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.

Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, and South Carolina voted

unanimously for war while Connecticut and Rhode Island voted
unanimously against it, further complicating the voting patterns towards
the east coast.
 - 10 -

The maritime rights thesis fails to explain why the West and South
should be eager for war while the seaboard East denied the war, fearing
such hostilities meant their economic ruin. This bellicose attitude of the
West, when attributed to Britain’s lawlessness of conduct, or to the
growing national pride, posed the same question—why not in 1807, or
1808? Or why was the declaration not against France?
The logical conclusion is that the war of 1812 was meant to be a land
war, advocated by an agricultural section of the country for the
acquisition of the great reserves of agricultural lands of Canada.
The division in the House of Representatives is as follows:
(1) The division in Massachusetts was only 8 to 6 against a declaration
of war and 5 of the 6 affirmative votes came from representatives of
coastal areas.
(2) New Hampshire cast 3 of its 5 votes in favour of war, and Vermont
3 of its 4. In the latter state the lone vote for peace was cast by the
member from the north-westernmost part of the state.
(3) Pennsylvania, only half of which could be included in the West (as
of 1812), cast 16 of its 18 votes for war.
(4) Maryland, hardly to be classed as a Western state, favoured the war 6
to 3.
(5) All the representatives from coastal Virginia and North Carolina
voted for war. All the opposition to the measure in those states came
from the central portion.
This distortion works uniformly to emphasize the significance of the
West, where constituencies were much larger in area than those in the
East and South, and thereby cast greater representation in terms of
votes.
The South also contributed majorly to the declaration of the war, but
for its own agenda. The conquest of Canada was widely discussed and
 - 11 -

openly advocated in the South as early as the summer of 1807 as

opposed to 1811 in the West. But a region of greater interest to the
South was the Floridas. The South supported the conquest of Canada
hoping to obviate some Northern opposition to the acquisition of this
slave territory (Florida).
The rise of Tecumseh, backed, by the British, produced an urgent
demand in the Northwest that the British be expelled from Canada. The
South was almost unanimous in its demand for the Floridas, for
agrarian, commercial, and strategic reasons. In a way, before the
declaration of war, northern and southern Republicans came to a
definite understanding that the acquisition of Canada on the north was
to be balanced by the annexation of the Floridas on the south.
The expansionist theories are colligated to the maritime causes to arrive
at a more realistic approach consisting of all the monologues discussed.
Slavery and the War:

The Haitian Revolution of 1791-1804 resulted in the formation of a

second independent state in the Americas, the Republic of Haiti; it
inspired a number of slave rebellions in the United States. Between
1789 and 1812, there were at least sixty-two registered slave revolts and
conspiracies across the greater-Caribbean. These mutinies aimed to
attain freedom, rights, and end of slavery. On the eve of the war of
1812, a gradual
extinction of slavery
from the North due to
growing anti-slavery
movements made is
look more of a
Southern institution.
By 1812, the slave
population of Virginia alone was about three million five hundred
thousand, of which at least one-seventh were capable of combat.
- 12 -
 - 13 -

Britain, after its catastrophic losses in St. Domingue in 1793-98, and

repeated slave rebellions in Jamaica, Grenada, and St. Vincent in 1795-
96, established the West India Regiments in the British Caribbean. This
military experience of Britain proved helpful in the war of 1812, as it
entered the war in North America with not only a profound knowledge
of the military usefulness of slaves, but also the consequences of slave
resistances.
The “Sambo” image of slaves of them being docile, irresponsible, loyal,
dependent, and attached to their masters was cast into doubt during the
war. As the war progressed, escaping slaves turned into spies, guides,
messengers, and labourers for the British military. British naval units did
not begin operations in the Chesapeake until the spring of 1813 under
orders to divert American attention from the Canadian frontier. The
officers-in-charge, Admiral John Borlase Warren and Colonel Sir
Thomas Sydney Beckwith had strict orders against inciting any
uprisings. The slaves, instead, were to be transported to British
possessions or given an opportunity to join the special black regiments
in West Indies.
In the July and August of 1813, the rate of slave abandonments to the
British increased. Nine-tenths of the slaves decamped from the United
States. These black refugees, as they crowded the invading vessels, often
returned along with the troops, attacking their former masters. In 1814,
as the Chesapeake Bay was under repeated attacks, a small group of two
hundred slaves an even donned British uniform and fought against
American militia, forcing them to contend with two enemies.
Sustaining arduous losses to Economy and property, the state
governments of Maryland and Virginia took to counter-measures. It was
important that Americans retain the slaves, not only for economy, but
also as a vital military necessity, for most slaves returned as guides,
leading the British troops during invasions. Realizing the importance of
 - 14 -

preventing intercourse between the incoming British vessels and the

slaves, the Americans focussed on scouring the heavily wooded
Chesapeake coast regions and hunting the slaves who lay in wait there
for a passing English cruiser down. These expeditions resulted in a
bloody massacre of the blacks; both on land and sea, for several ‘artful’
ambushes were laid.
American slave population served as an undeniable asset to the British
in the course of the war. At negligible cost, the British succeeded in
hugely impairing the American war efforts. As the mere presence of the
British encouraged black uprisings, Americans were compelled to split
their resources at two fronts.
Gender dynamics—Women in the war:

The war of 1812 happened when the “cult of true womanhood” as a

concept and its complexity in society was still being explored. In the
Middle and Upper class Whites of America, men were supposed to
prevail in public domain, control politics, religion, and paid work, while
women were delegated to the domestic realm—a place of retreat and
nurture. These emerging gender roles downplayed the contribution of
women to the war.
While most women stayed back and managed household and farm
work, a few were allowed in the army, to minister to the sick and
injured. Female informants were used by both British and American to
an extent that spread of information by females required regulations
that forbade passing of women into the military camps. There were also
rare instances of disguise, and even fewer opportunities for women to
participate openly in the war.
There was a marked economic and social contrast between the women
of the army and the “ladies” of the regiment. While women of the
common classes cooked and washed, elite women sometimes
accompanied their husbands looking for leisure pleasures. When Great
Britain’s Continental Army traveled to America, the Baroness Frederika
 - 15 -

Charlotte Riedesel, whose husband was General Friedrich Adolf

Riedesel of Brunswick, and a party of other women went with them
because they wanted an opportunity to vacation in New York.
Neutrality was hard to maintain for both protagonist states forced
women not only to pick a side, but also to actively support it. This made
them not just targets but essentially combatants, regardless of their
civilian status or gender.
The newly developed gender ideals didn’t quite work out with lower-
working class white women who were forced to take up men’s work
alongside their domestic duties. Native American women and slaves
faced wholesale exclusion, which reinforce the “uncivilized” image of
these women for the American society; this made them more
threatening when put into situations of inelastic gender roles like war.
Many native societies offered women positions of considerable political,
and economic influence which was perceived as “backwardness of
culture” by the Americans. By not conforming to the gender roles of
European-American societies, the natives posed a threat by killing
White women and children alongside men. This also spewed enormous
hate between the natives and the Whites, further straining their
relations.
During the War of 1812 many white men in Canada and the United
States believed that war posed gender-based dangers to women and
obligations to men. These perceived dangers and obligations had a
profound impact, as they were used as justification for many of the
decisions white military leaders made leading up to and during the war.
Women’s safety was cited in military decision-making as a reason for
fighting and for deciding not to fight.
Fear mongering was at large especially with media sensationalizing
brutal details of Indian attacks against women, children, the old, and the
invalid; it helped turn the visceral fears into rhetorical weapons. It was
understood that Native people were perfidious, with loyalties that
 - 16 -

changed on whim rather than reason. The threat of butchery was used
throughout the war to remind men why they had to fight and what they
had to fight for.
Statecraft of America in the war:

In the build up to war with Great Britain, the administrations of

Thomas Jefferson and James Madison enacted policies of economic
restriction, mainly embargoes, as diplomatic tools to compel Britain and
France to respect American trading rights. Both presidents believed that
economic sanctions were capable of producing diplomatic results.
However, embargoes proved inadequate for long-term resolutions in
Anglo-American relations.
Shippers of New England, engaged in an extensive wartime carrying
trade, were able, in spite of the restrictions, to make a considerable
profit. The case was much different in the West and South. These areas
harboured the producers not the carriers. They were not concerned
with the vast profits of the carrying trade but with the more marginal
question of selling their produce, which was adversely affected.
In 1800, Thomas Jefferson, with the help of Albert Gallatin, the
Secretary of treasury, sought to modify the fiscal policies of the United
States with four main goals—
1. Reduction in Government expenditure,
2. Balanced budget,
3. Decrease in size of national debt, and
4. Alleviation of tax budget.
To achieve the seemingly opposing goals, he moved towards the
abrogation of Hamilton’s funded debt plan, and retire all state
obligations as judiciously as possible and further to abolish all internal
taxes like excise tax. By 1808, the debt came down by $23 million.
 - 17 -

By 1808, the treasury reserves also increased from $3 million in1801 to

$14 million. The treasury, assured by the surplus generation from the
customs duties, was confident of funding the war strictly through
government borrowing. The non-importation acts, and the Embargo
enacted in 1807 prohibited export of raw materials or consumer goods
to Europe, attempting to force the recognition of their neutral rights
from England and France. Enforcing it, however, proved costly, as
tariff slipped sharply due to interrupted trade. Gallatin could no longer
rely on the tariff alone, noting that "in time of peace it is almost
sufficient to defray the expenses of a war; in time of war, it is hardly
competent to support the expenses of a peace establishment."
Upon the appeal to declare war in 1812, the congressional debate that
followed revealed deep political divisions, as already discussed earlier.
The congress, in the course of debate remained reluctant to approve of
radical fiscal policies, but settled for doubling of the tariff schedule. As
the war began, the customs revenues fell by 50 %. After fighting for one
full year, congress re-approved internal taxes, explicitly designated as
war measures, providing for automatic appeal within a year of war
termination. By 1815, Alexander Dallas, the Secretary of State, proposed
the remodelling of income tax structure based on that of Britain during
Napoleonic wars, to raise $3 million for the war effort. The war ended
before any modification was ratified.
France during the war:

Despite every account of war considering France among the casual

factors, it skips scrutiny post the commencement of war. Federalists
throughout the war raised persistent allegations against the Republican
government for having been tricked into war by France; the
administration, however, rebuked these allegations, writing them off on
the misconduct of Napoleon. But the France’s impact on war with
Britain was definitely considered in the war calculations of America.
 - 18 -

On the eve of war, Madison consciously linked the French invasion of

Russia, assuming Britain wouldn’t supply its forces in Canada. Madison
was banking on the French co-belligerence to allow US to exploit
maritime warfare against Britain. Expressions of anger over France's
continuing disregard for American property in Europe and of
annoyance over French unwillingness to recognize the existence of a
contribution against the common enemy were wide spread. America
also hoped that the declaration of war in 1812 would burden the British
war with France, who then in goodwill would help them obtain the
Floridas from Spain.
The government's posture towards France was guileful. It was also
unsuccessful, since France failed to perform even the minimal functions
assigned to it. The seizure and destruction of American ships bound for
Lisbon continued, American sailors remained in French prisons,
indemnities for past depredations went without discussion, and new
damages were committed under colour of the repealed Berlin and Milan
Decrees. Neither threats nor blandishments of American ministers to
France served in 1812 and in 1813 changed the treatment of American
commerce. Even worse, the role of France as the great antagonist of
England collapsed, as Napoleon in 1813 reeled from a succession of
reverses, and then in 1814 toppled to defeat, leaving the United States
exposed to the full wrath of a powerful and revengeful England.
Throughout 1812 to 1814, the French policy remained unchanged—
that the United States would seek an accommodation with England at
the first opportunity; the only hopes for concession were through
optimism about a prospective commercial treaty. Napoleon envisaged a
powerful America emerging in future challenging the commercial
hegemony of England in trans-Atlantic European trade; but it was too
weak at that moment. Moreover, even in areas requiring no sacrifice of
French interests, the American war made little impact on France. At the
declaration of war, France focussed more on Russia, than on the war.
 - 19 -

And towards the end, after decline of Napoleon, it faced adversities of

its own and was too weak to be impactful.
Opposition of federalists:

Federalists, especially of New England have always been against the

war, for they saw it as a party war designed to further Republican
interests. They also feared playing directly into the hands of Napoleon.
The initial protests against the war, particularly in New England, often
expressed greater fear of a French alliance than of the war itself. “The
horrors of war, compared with it, are mere amusement,” said Timothy
Dwight, “The touch of France is pollution. Her embrace is death.”
Even after the danger of a French alliance had receded, Federalists
continued to oppose the war because they considered it an “offensive”
war aimed at Canada. Although willing to support a war to protect
American commerce or to defend the nation’s frontiers, they refused to
sanction the conquest of Canada. They saw the war as a costly, futile,
and partisan venture that was likely to produce little good and much
evil. The best way to bring the conflict to an end, most Federalists
agreed, was to oppose it.
Once the war began, that opposition took new forms. In the Federalist
stronghold of Massachusetts, resistance was greatest. Boston's town
meeting passed a resolution condemning the war; the Massachusetts
House of Representatives passed a resolution urging outright resistance.
Governor Caleb Strong, claiming that the state's militia could only be
asked to serve for defensive purposes within the state's borders, refused
President Madison's order to prepare it for federal service.
Other New England states also followed the lead, and in return were
granted safe naval passage through the blockade by the British troops.
This way, when trade and commerce came to standstill everywhere else,
the six states to the North-East continued with their commercial
engagements. By 1814, New England's opposition had become, in the
view of many, treasonous. New England goods flowed not only
 - 20 -

eastward, but northward into Canada for export—and many of these

goods were sold directly to the British army. Brazenly deriding the
national policy, the state of Massachusetts refused to allow their militia
of seventy thousand men into the war.
By the end of 1814, New England Federalists called for a conference at
Hartford to discuss further direction of opposition. The Republicans,
including the President Madison feared secession or separate peace
proposal with England. During this time, Andrew Jackson’s forces
moved to New Orleans, Louisiana to defend the city against the British
led by Major-General Sir Edward Pakenham. Also, on December 24,
1814, diplomats from the two countries, meeting in Ghent, Belgium,
signed the Treaty of Ghent. Before any conference could be convened,
the new of Andrew Jackson’s booming victory at New Orleans against
the British forces arrived, followed by the news of the peace treaty that
had been signed at Ghent reached the Hartford, concluding the war.
Consequences of the war:

Ironically, the victory at New Orleans had been won after the peace
Treaty of Ghent was signed, but it led the Americans to view the whole
war as a triumph, although the situation returned to post war
conditions, and the treaty didn’t actually resolve any major concern that
supposedly caused the war.
United States, as a nation succeeded in ending impressment and
privateering practices on the Atlantic waters. Free trade was restored in
the country. More than everything, the war of 1812 granted to the
United States of America complete freedom and sovereignty. The fact
that England negotiated peace, and accepted to status quo antebellum,
reinforced the sense of complete colonial freedom. The relative
moderation of the Federalists' demands was largely lost on triumphal
Republicans, and they were cast out as unpatriotic, selfish, and poor
judges of events. Federalist Party, at most could retain its influence in
 - 21 -

New England for a few years longer, but clearly reached the end of its
time as a national political party.
Canadians also developed nationalistic sentiments and a national history
after their successful defence against the American invasion. The belief
that their civilian soldiers had won the war helped germinate seeds of
national pride in Canadians.
The war of 1812 was heavily over-shadowed by the Napoleonic wars, in
Britain. However, England remained acutely conscious of the naval
potential of the United States Navy, for it had won most single-ship
duels. Also, Britain suffered huge losses as numerous British ships were
captured and raided by American privateers; this sent the insurance
rates skyrocketing and caused a great deal of embarrassment to the
Admiralty.
As an aftermath of the war, the Indians suffered immense losses. The
death of Tecumseh ensured the dissolution of the Indian confederacy.
The American national policy changed against Indians. Immediately,
after his election, President Jackson was able to have a devastating law
enacted—the Indian Removal Act of 1830. The Indian Removal policy
stated that Indians living east of the Mississippi River were to be
removed to lands west of the Mississippi River. These lands in the west,
which were designated as “Indian Territory,” were primarily the states
of Oklahoma and Kansas. A multitude of tribes were forced west, never
to stand another chance at reoccupying their native lands.
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 - 22 -

1812, and concluded by a ratification and exchange of a treaty of peace, at the city of
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 - 23 -

20. Federalist Opposition To The War Of 1812 - Archiving Early America

21. http://www.earlyamerica.com/early-america-review/volume-4/federalist-opposition-to-
the-war-of-1812/

22. Channing, History of the United States, IV, 456.

23. Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1812 (New York, 1925), 12-13.

24. http://www.ushistory.org/us/18b.asp

25. https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/embargo-
1807#Embargo_of_1807

26. https://www.boundless.com/u-s-history/textbooks/boundless-u-s-history-
textbook/securing-the-republic-1800-1815-11/the-war-in-europe-98/the-embargo-act-
of-1807-527-10387/

27. http://classroom.synonym.com/embargo-act-1807-effects-us-11926.html

28. http://www.learnnc.org/lp/media/uploads/2010/07/embargo_graphic_org_tchr_note
s.pdf

29. http://www.libertylawsite.org/book-review/republican-ideology-and-its-failure-in-the-
war-of-1812/

30. https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=39006

31. http://www.shmoop.com/war-1812/politics.html

32. http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/00165897ch14.pdf

33. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/haitian-rev

34. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ksands/War.html

35. http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/98201/frontmatter/9780521898201_frontmatte
r.pdf

36. http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/early-republic-and-
antebellum-history/war-1812-conflict-continent

37. https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/imh/article/view/8462/10637

38. http://i.infopls.com/images/states_imgmap.gif

39. http://www.allmendeberlin.de/What-is-Enlightenment.pdf

--The End--