VIZCARRA, REIDEN M.

Alliance for the Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Garin
G.R. Nos. 217872 and 221866,
April 26 2017

Statement of facts
Petitioners opposed the unilateral act of the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) on re-certifying
the contraceptive drugs named Implanon and Implanon NXT; the basis of their opposition hinges
on the fact that these drugs are abortifacients. Thus, according to them, they should have been
given notice of the certification proceedings, and a chance to present evidence that indeed
such drugs are abortifacients.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioners are not entitled to notice and hearing
because the said proceedings are done in the exercise of its regulatory power, not quasi-judicial
power; also, they alleged that the Honorable Supreme Court is incompetent to rule on the instant
controversy due to the same reason.

Issues
(a) Whether or not said controversy is outside the scope of Judicial Review;
(b) Whether or not petitioners were deprived of substantial and procedural due process of law;

Ruling
It is quite fascinating that the Supreme Court again reminded us the two fundamental powers of
an administrative body, in the words of the Honorable Court:

“The powers of an administrative body are classified into two fundamental powers: quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial. Quasi-legislative power, otherwise known as the power of
subordinate legislation, has been defined as the authority delegated by the lawmaking body to
the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of law
and implement legislative policy. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation
designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. The exercise by the
administrative body of its quasi-legislative power through the promulgation of regulations of
general application does not, as a rule, require notice and hearing. The only exception being
where the Legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain
facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.

Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is known as the power of the administrative agency to
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself. As it involves the exercise of discretion in determining the
rights and liabilities of the parties, the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power requires the
concurrence of two elements: one, jurisdiction which must be acquired by the administrative
body and two, the observance of the requirements of due process, that is, the right to notice and
hearing.”
To answer (a) above, the Supreme Court has this to say,
“On the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by the FDA in the exercise
of its “regulatory powers” and, therefore, beyond judicial review, the Court holds that it has the
power to review all acts and decisions where there is a commission of grave abuse of discretion.
No less than the Constitution decrees that the Court must exercise its duty to ensure that no grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Such is committed when there is a violation of the
constitutional mandate that “no person is deprived of life, liberty, and property without due
process of law.” The Court’s power cannot be curtailed by the FDA’s invocation of its regulatory
power.”
With regard to (b), the Supreme Court ruled that petitioners were deprived of their Right to Due
Process. Perusal of the law and rules of procedure of the instant agency reveals the need of
 VIZCARRA, REIDEN M.

an issuance of notice to all concerned MAHs and a posting of the contraceptive products for
public comments.These, respondents failed to do.
This was thoroughly explained by the Court, to wit:
“Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. In order that a particular act
may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance with
both the substantive and procedural requirements thereof. Substantive due process refers to the
intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property. Procedural due
process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods,
prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on
the part of those who are called upon to administer it. xxx
xxx To conclude that product registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of the
questioned contraceptive drugs and devices by the FDA in the exercise of its regulatory power
need not comply with the requirements of due process would render the issuance of notices to
concerned MAHs and the posting of a list of contraceptives for public comment a meaningless
exercise. Concerned MAHs and the public in general will be deprived of any significant
participation if what they will submit will not be considered.
Section 7.04, Rule 7 of the IRR of the RH Law (RH-IRR), relied upon by the respondents in support of
their claims, expressly allows the consideration of conflicting evidence, such as that supplied by
the petitioners in support of their opposition to the approval of certain contraceptive drugs and
devices. In fact, the said provision mandated that the FDA utilize the “best evidence available” to
ensure that no abortifacient is approved as family planning drug or device. It bears mentioning
that the same provision even allows an independent evidence review group (ERG) to ensure that
evidence for or against the certification of a contraceptive drug or device is duly considered.”
 VIZCARRA, REIDEN M.

Emilio A. Gonzales vs. Office of the President

G.R. No. 196231
February 26, 2014

Statement of facts
These two petitions have been raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise
of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of
independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong – the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232
Primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a
Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical
injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.)
Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private complainant, Christian M.Kalaw, before the Office of
the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the
Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of
petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for
Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding
that the material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any
evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the
Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without
prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the
complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice. However, upon the
recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his
fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza
and his colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman
Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when
P/S Insp.Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in
desperate attempt to have him reinstated in the police service. In the aftermath of the hostage-
taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight Hong Kong Chinese nationals, the injury
of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando?
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation
of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine
accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions.

Statement of the case

The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence
and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of
the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative
disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission.

The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence
the petition.
G.R. No. 196232:
 VIZCARRA, REIDEN M.

Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General
Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and
Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before
the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia’s urgent petition for bail
holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the
government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulitand sought the
Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the
accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the
PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with
nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of
his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives ‘Committee on Justice
conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the
Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,recommending to the
President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate
charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having
committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.
Hence the petition.

Issue
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created
Office of the Ombudsman.

Ruling
Yes. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor is not exclusive.
While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that
they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For,
while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of
these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No.6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that
Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary
jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section
21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the
President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of
the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a
measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that
the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law. While the removal of the
Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment
under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing
with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By
enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of
any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2,
 VIZCARRA, REIDEN M.

authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment. The Power of the
President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutors Implied from his Power to
Appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from
the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a
military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and
professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own
role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress,
therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman
for the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not diminish the
Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No.6770
granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if
not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The
independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from
political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people.
What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the
appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the
whims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the
PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason
therefor cannot, by itself, is considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would
amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request
of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the
Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people. “The factual circumstances that
the case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner’s request; that
administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private
complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately implemented;
or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months
cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack
of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the
case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any
bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable motivation. The OP's
pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him
of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of
neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the
President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as
Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind
amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively against
petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her removal from
office as provided for under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.

Doctrine
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutors Implied
from his Power to Appoint
 VIZCARRA, REIDEN M.

Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. vs. Department Of Education

G.R. No. 188720
February 23, 2016

Statement of facts
On June 1, 2009, respondent Department of Education (DepEd), through then Secretary Jesli A.
Lapus, issued Department Order No. 54, series of 2009 (DO 54), entitled the "Revised Guidelines
Governing Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School Level."
DO 54 aimed to address the "increasing reports of malpractices [of] officers or members of the
PTAs, such as but not limited to (1) [the absconding of officers] with contributions and membership
fees; (2) [the] nondisclosure of the status of funds and [the] non-submission of financial statements;
and (3) [the] misuse of funds.”

To address these issues, DO 54 required that before any PTA may be organized, the school head's
approval must first be secured. Arguing that this prerequisite undermines the independence of the
PT As, petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. (QC PTCA) directly filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court to nullify DO 54.
In ruling for the DepEd, the ponencia holds that the grant of powers to the school heads to
approve or disapprove a PTA's organization is consistent with the mandate of Batas Pambansa Blg
subordinate legislation (Delegation of powers is a rule that is widely recognized especially in the
legislative branch of government)

"With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by ‘filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide."13 On this basis, administrative agencies may promulgate supplementary regulations
which have the force and effect of law

Issue
Whether or not DepEd Order NO. 54,s 2009, an invalid exercise of the rule-making power
delegated to the secretary of education

Ruling
“Under these circumstances, I opine that the approval requirement does not deal with the evils
that DO 54 aims to address. Thus, this requirement is not only irrelevant to DO 54's policy and
purpose, but also to the mandate and policy of BP 232 and PD 603 - the statutes which DO 54
seeks to implement. As a final remark, I caution that this dissent is not intended to grant the PTAs
unrestrained powers in the exercise of their rights under the law. As the ponencia does, I am
aware that the approval requirement is part of DepEd' s efforts to recognize only those
organizations that conduct themselves in a lawful manner. I am not against DO 54' s lofty ideals.
My disagreement with the ponencia 's ruling stems from the fact that DO 54, insofar as it
mandates the school head's approval before any PTA may be organized, is invalid due to its
violation of recognized administrative law doctrines that the Court must uphold. If the DepEd
deems it best to completely overhaul the PT A system, it can study, recommend, and propose the
adoption of appropriate legislation.37 It cannot, however, shortcut procedure by the mere
issuance of a Department Order.In these lights, I vote that DO 54 should be nullified insofar as it
provides that a PT A may only be organized after the approval of the school head.”
 VIZCARRA, REIDEN M.

Carlito C. Encinas vs. PO1 Alfredo Agustin, Jr and PO1 Joel Caubang
GR No. 187317
April 11, 2013

Statement of facts
The petitioner Encinas was the Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija. He was charged
administratively with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
in violation of the Administrative Code of 1987. He was dismissed from the service. The two
respondents were holding the positions of Fire Officer I. He petitioner filed a petition for review on
certiorari under rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Civil Service Commission to dismiss the petitioner from the service.

The case arose when the petitioner allegedly required the respondents to pay him P5,000 in order
not to relieve them from their station at the Cabanatuan City and re-assign them to a far flung
area. The respondents decided to pay in fear of the re-assignment, but they manage to come up
with P2,000 only causing the petitioner to order for their re-assignment to Cuyapo and Talugtug.

Statement of the case

As a result, the respondents decided to file a complaint for illegal transfer before the Bureau of Fire
Protection and at the same time filed another complaint before the Civil Service Commission
Regional Office in Pampanga and the Civil Service Commission in Cabanatuan. Based on the
filed complaints, the petitioner alleges that the respondents are guilty of forum shopping by filing
the two identical complaints. The petitioner claims that the charges of dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to public interest that were filed before the Civil Service
Commission and the BFP are in violation of the rules against forum shopping.

Issue
Is there a violation on the rules against forum shopping?

Ruling
The court held the respondents are not guilty of forum shopping. The court enumerated what
constitutes a violation of forum shopping which include the presence of the requisites of litis
pendentia and res judicata. There is litis pendentia when: (1) identity of parties is the same with
the same interests in both actions, (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for and founded
on the same facts, (3) identity of the two preceding cases where a judgment rendered in the
pending case will amount to res judicata in the other case.

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites include (1) the
former judgment is final, (2) the court rendering the said decision has jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter, (3) judgement is based on the merits, (4) between the two actions, there
must be identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
In applying the above requisites, the court held that the dismissal of the petitioner based on the
BFP complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSC complaint. The dismissal by
the BFP is not based on the merits, but based on the recommendation of the fact finding
committee in determining whether a formal charge of an administrative offense may be filed.
There is therefore no rights and liabilities of the parties that were determined in the said action with
finality. The court thereby affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner and denied the petition.

Doctrine:
There is forum shopping when litis pendencia or res judicata is present.
 VIZCARRA, REIDEN M.

Solid Homes vs. Teresita Payawal

G.R. No. 84811
August 29, 1989

Statement of facts
On August 31, 1982 Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid Homes Inc., before the
Regional Trial Court alleging that they contracted to sell her subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9,
1975.
Subsequently Solid Homes Inc. executed a deed of sale but failed to deliver the corresponding
certificate title despite of repeated demands by Payawal because defendant had mortgaged
the property in bad faith to a financing company.
Thereafter, Solid Homes Inc moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction this being rested in the National Housing Authority under PD no. 597. The motion was
denied, hence, the petition to reverse said decision of the Court of Appeals in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court was submitted by Solid Homes Inc. to the Supreme Court.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over cases involving claims, refund and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman?

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that the applicable law is PD No. 957. The National Housing Authority has
the jurisdiction.
As amended by PD No 1344 entitled “Empowering the National Housing Authority to issue writs of
execution in the enforcement of its decisions under Presidential Decree No 957” Section 1
provides, in the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in PD No 957 that the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: a) unsound real estate
business practices, b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot owners
or condo unit buyers against project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman and, c) cases
involving specific performance of contractual statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision
lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The challenged decision of the respondent court was reversed and the decision of RTC is Set
Aside without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate complaint before the HLURB.
 VIZCARRA, REIDEN M.

Government Service Insurance System vs. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 96938 202 SCRA 799
October 15, 1991

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the order of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated June
20, 1990 which directed the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to pay the compulsory
heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal
separation up to the date of their demise. The Order dated November 22, 1990, however, denied
herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of CSC’s Order dated June 20, 1990. Deceased Elizar
Namuco and Eusebio Manuel were illegally dismissed by the GSIS for allegedly being involved in
irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials.

Issue
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has the power to execute its judgments, final orders
or resolutions?
Whether or not the writ of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is void because it varies with the
Court’s Resolution of July 4, 1988?

Ruling
The Civil Service Commission has the power to execute its judgment, final orders or resolutions. The
CSC is a constitutional commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with the
authority to administer the civil service but is also vested with quasi-judicial powers. It has the
authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought
to it on appeal. The grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power or the authority to hear
and adjudge cases, normally and logically is deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce
or execute the judgments it thus renders unless the law otherwise provides. It is quite obvious that
the authority to decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that
what has been decided is carried out.

The writ of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is valid. The Court upholds the same, simply
because there is no fair and feasible alternative in the circumstances. The binding force of
Resolution of July 4, 1988, for all intents and purposes, is that it makes exoneration in the
administrative proceedings a condition precedent to payment of said back salaries, it can not
however exact an impossible performance or decree a useless exercise such as that the
subsequent disciplinary proceedings is an empty, and inutile procedure as to the deceased
employees, they can not possibly be bound by any substantiation in the said proceedings of the
abovementioned charges.