Aristotle and Phytagoreans

Social justice: Aristotle versus
Pythagoreans–and implications
for modern debates
Gerhard Michael Ambrosi∗
Contents
List of Figures 2
1 Introduction 2
2 Aristotle’s taxonomy of justice 4
3 Reconstructing Aristotle’s geometry of exchange 6
4 Exchange and ‘equalization’ 9
5 Reciprocity as Pythagorean justice 14
6 Reciprocity in the Aristotelian version 23
7 An Aristotelian conception of social justice 25
8 The formal context of the ancient debate 31
9 Concluding remarks 34
10 References 37
Index 41
∗ UniversitätTrier, email: ambrosi@uni-trier.de

Revised version of a lecture manuscript for the 13th Summer Institute for the History of Economic
Thought, University of Richmond, VA, June 29-July 2, 2012. Video of the lecture under
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6g8dfZeDvCc
1
Preliminary version – January 17, 2013
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2202273
List of Figures
1 A medieval and an alternative figure of Aristotelian barter . . . . 7
(a) A medieval illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
(b) An alternative figure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Reciprocal exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(a) Equality of income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(b) Divergence of income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 The Pythagorean view of the ‘just’ satisfaction of need . . . . . . 19
(a) Extreme inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
(b) Implications of strict ‘Pythagorean reciprocation’ . . . . . 19
4 The Aristotelian variant of exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
(a) Equality of income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
(b) Divergence of income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5 Social justice as ‘golden mean’ and as an individual optimum . . 26
6 Aeginetan coins and Pythagorean exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
ABSTRACT
In his Nicomachean Ethics (BookV, ch.5) Aristotle criticized the

Pythagorean conception of justice as being too schematic. The paper
gives a geometrical interpretation of what Pythagorean justice might
have been in the eyes of Aristotle. On this basis Aristotle’s alternative
model of exchange is presented in a related, but different geometrical
version. The two models are compared, especially under the perspec-
tive of the implicit theories about a just satisfaction of need in a society
based on exchange and production. The relevance of these models for
present-day economic and social conceptions is briefly discussed.
1 Introduction
There is a persistent human impulse to associate justice with divine retribution. The
American economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen (1899, 303-4) once criti-
cized such a “barbarian conception of the divinity” but, he added, it still has “a
high aesthetic and honorific value in the popular apprehension.” Veblen substanti-
ated this with a few lines from “The Battle Hymn of the Republic”, a song which

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2202273
was written during the American Civil War but which is still popular today, e.g.
for funerals of great statesmen like Robert Kennedy and Ronald Reagan. With a
rousing “Glory, glory, hallelujah!” the song heralds “the coming of the Lord” and it
praises his terrible vengeance which will flow from the ripened “grapes of wrath”–
a term to which the title of John Steinbeck’s social critical novel of 1939 explicitly
alludes. “As ye deal with my contemners” the performers sing in the Lord’s name
“so with you my grace shall deal”. Veblen (1899, 304) deplored that such wording
“has outlived much of its usefulness for the economic exigencies of the collective
life of to-day.”
Veblen’s contempt for tradition might sound inappropriately modernistic. In fact,
his remarks–whether appropriate or not–are very near to ancient Greek debates of
similar issues. If you look at Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, written about 330
BC, you will see that Aristotle quoted there (NE V,5 §3) a–then already–ancient
proverbial “Rule of Rhadamantus”. In an English translation it proclaims (Well-
don, 1892, 150):
“As a man’s action, such his fate;

Then justice shall be true and straight”
In Greek mythology Rhadamantus is one of the judges in the underworld and in

Merriam-Webster’s dictionary you can read that in modern English language the
adjective “Rhadamanthine” still stands for ‘strict’ and ‘just’.1 This rule is a variant
of the biblical “an eye for an eye” but Aristotle comments that this is not justice
at all. He gives the example of a policeman performing his duty and who hits an
offender. Then the offender cannot claim for himself the principle of just retribution
when he hits the policeman likewise.
We learn from this example that in Aristotle’s view there must be some element
1 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rhadamanthine?show=
0&t=1339396911, accessed June 11, 2012.

of appropriateness in order that retribution can be ‘just’ in his sense. But, allegedly,
there is a school of philosophers of justice who overlook this requirement, namely
the Pythagoreans (NE V,5 §1): “they used, without qualification, to define the just
as what stands in a reciprocal relation to something else” (Rowe and Broadie,
2002, 165). This formulation is so vague, however, that it is difficult to gather what
exactly is meant. We must know more of its context before we can understand the
point of Aristotle’s criticism of the Pythagorean concept of justice.
This much can be said already, however: ‘appropriate’ justice is a controversial
philosophical issue since the time of the ancient Greeks. In this paper I propose to
look at this ancient debate more closely with the aim of relating it to some modern
views about similar matters.
2 Aristotle’s taxonomy of justice
Aristotle (384–322 BC) is one of the most interesting figures in philosophy. He

stands in the lineage of his mental master Plato (428–348 BC) whose Academy
Aristotle attended in Athens for about twenty years. Plato in turn was an ardent
follower of Socrates (469–399 BC), and–apart from having authored the most pol-
ished extant pieces of ancient philosophy–Plato tried himself as practical govern-
ment advisor in Syracuse, Sicily.
These three ‘giants’ of ancient Western thought–Socrates, Plato, Aristotle–knew
each other very well successively. They knew their mutual friends, foes and their
teachings. Aristotle in turn was teacher of the young Alexander the Great (356–323
BC) who became one of the most impressive historical figures. He conquered the
empires of his time up to the borders of China and changed the world dramatically.
Some of his booty Alexander donated to his respected teacher Aristotle so that
Aristotle could finance empirical research on a large scale.

Since Aristotle cultivated a synthetic style of thought, it is through him that we
know now much of the little that we do know about ‘the’ ancient Greek mental
setup. This includes that of the Pythagoreans. But what we read in the Nico-
machean Ethics about the Pythagorean concept of justice is rather puzzling and
incomplete–possibly because Aristotle thought that their views were known any-
how and needed only brief mentioning.
In the Nicomachean Ethics we encounter a taxonomy of justice as follows:2 there
is ‘general justice’ and ‘particular justice’. The former signifies a general respect
for the given laws and Aristotle does not debate it at length. ‘Particular justice’
concerns particular persons or maybe classes of persons. It has two subdivisions:
‘distributive justice’ and ‘corrective justice’. The former deals with the distribution
of honors and favors in the state and follows the motto: ‘To each according to
their respective merit’. The latter, the corrective justice, follows the motto: ‘To
each their respective ‘own’ ’, namely their respective lawful entitlements. The
difference between the two is that ‘distributive justice’ is concerned with situations
in which something is acquired by a person which that person does not yet have,
while ‘corrective justice’ concerns situations in which something is taken from a
person which that person rightfully had had and therefore must receive back. The
problem with Pythagorean justice is now, according to Aristotle, that it fits neither
of the two categories of particular justice.
In order to make his point, Aristotle then takes up an analysis of economic ex-
change and proclaims (Rowe and Broadie, 2002, 165)
What brings about proportional reciprocity is the coupling of diamet-

rical opposites. Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, D a
shoe: the requirement then is that the builder receive from the shoe-
2 For
a tree-like chart which structures these concept see section “Synopsis” in http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicomachean_Ethics, accessed June 20, 2012.

maker what the shoemaker has produced, and that he himself give the
shoemaker a share in his own product.
Probably ever since Aristotle uttered this statement, people have wondered what it
means that he refers to a mixture of letters A, B, C, D and of geometrical concepts
like “diametrical opposites” in order to ‘explain’ exchange. ‘Justice’ is supposed
to come into this seemingly strange mixture, but where and how that happens in
this context is not at all clear.
3 Aristotle’s geometry of exchange
We know that commentators since more than 1000 years, and in particular the Latin
scholars in the middle ages, have illustrated the passage just quoted with a graph
like fig. 1a.3 It places Aristotle’s two artisans and two products and his four let-
ters at the corners of a square and combines the corners with diagonals. But the
figure 1a clarifies nothing, except that there is a very long tradition of associat-
ing the quoted passage and some related ones with some sort of geometry. Odd
Langholm (1979, 16), a very knowledgeable scholar of the reception of Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, makes the comment:
what emerges from this obscure passage is a picture composed of
. . . the production and marketing determinants of the exchange rates
of commodities.
We agree with Langholm that Aristotle’s extant text suggests that production and
exchange was the intended topic of the extinct Aristotelian figure of exchange. In
a first move to recover that figure we propose to look at figure 1b.
This new figure 1b seems to be a more appropriate rendering of exchange than
its medieval counterpart 1a: In fig.1b the horizontal line running from corner ‘A’
3 See
the cover of Langholm (1979). Fig. 1a is a translation of a figure with Latin in Alber-
tus Magnus ([1252], 1972, 343)

(a) A medieval illustration (b) An alternative figure
Figure 1: A medieval and an alternative figure of Aristotelian barter
to the right represents the ‘own product’4 of builder A, namely the total quantity
of houses built. Likewise, the vertical line running down from corner ‘B’ of the
rectangle represents the ‘own product’ of shoemaker B, namely the total quantity
of shoes. In order to be clear that ‘houses’ C and the ‘shoes’ D are measured in
quantities–and not, say, in money values–we put symbol ‘Q’ before the respective
letters.
The “share” exchanged of the respective “own product”–terms which we have
from the quote in the last section–is then represented by QC resp. by QD as shown
at the lower right corner of fig.1b. The quantitative exchange rate between these
two products is shown by the steepness of the little diagonal line running from that
corner. In this case we have a relatively high ratio of shoes QD to houses QC , and
this is plausible–in a way, but it depends on how you measure these things. It makes
a difference whether you measure houses in bricks used or in living units supplied
etc., and we will see presently that Aristotle’s text treats this problem explicitly.
4 We use single quotes here in order to alert the reader that the ‘own’ in the present context is not
the same as the ‘own’ in the context of corrective justice mentioned above.

In modern economics this ratio has a proper name: the “barter terms of trade
(t.o.t.)”. Its corollary are the “price terms of trade (t.o.t.)”. If the symbol for a price
is p then the two hang together as shown in equ. (1a)
QD pC
a) = ; b) p × QC = pD × QD (1)
QC pD |C {z }
|{z} |{z}
barter t.o.t. price t.o.t. monetary equivalence
As then equ.(1b) further shows, the equivalence of ‘price terms of trade’ and
‘barter terms of trade’ follows from the fact that there is ‘monetary equivalence’:
what is bought in the market must be paid for by what is sold. This latter equiv-
alence we stress here, because ‘equivalence’ is mentioned often by Aristotle and
there are many commentators who have great problems with his use of terms.
The quantities which remain in the respective households are QCr and QrD . In
fig.1b they are given by the rest of the vertical and horizontal lines measuring the
respective own production. These remaining quantities together with those objects
which are obtained by trade are those goods with which the households can satisfy
their needs. Thus there is a rectangle with a corner at point A which is formed by
the remaining quantity QCr and by the traded quantity QD . Its area might be con-
sidered to be indicative of the satisfaction of needs in household A–a point which
will be related to Aristotle’s text in more detail below (see the beginning of sect.
5). There is an analogous rectangle with a corner at point B and the sides given
by this household’s retained quantity QrD and by the other traded good QC . Its
area might be likewise considered as being indicative of the satisfaction of needs,
namely in household B. But it is difficult to gather whether the builder’s house-
hold experiences a higher level of the satisfaction of needs than the shoemaker. It
seems plausible that it does since the builder’s terms of trade are better than the
shoemaker’s: in fig.1b it is easily seen that a small quantity “houses” buys a large

quantity “shoes”. But there is the problem of arbitrary units of quantity measure-
ment as just stated. There is also the problem that the terms of trade of equ.(1a)
do not show the amount which is left in each household of the respective ‘own
production’ for own consumption. These problems Aristotle does address as we
will see presently in that he demands that there must be an ‘equalization’–again an
aspect of Aristotle’s writings which seems to be rather obscure.
4 Exchange and ‘equalization’
Aristotle explains that in the analysis of exchange as quoted in section 2 there must
be “first of all equality in proportional terms, and reciprocal exchange occurs after
that” (Rowe and Broadie, 2002, 165). The wording of this passage is tortuous but
the meaning is simple. Before exchange the artisans have their ‘own production’
QC∗ resp. Q∗D which decompose as shown in equs. (2):
a) QCr + QC = QC∗ (houses) ; b) QrD + QD = Q∗D (shoes) (2)
If now the total house production is expressed in terms of total house production,
then we have the rather trivial “proportional terms” QC∗ /QC∗ = 1 and likewise for
shoe-production we get Q∗D /Q∗D = 1 . This is Aristotle’s “equality in proportional
terms”. Before exchange each producer has 100 percent of ‘own production’ and
in this sense all producers are equal, no matter what they produce. Put differently
(without resorting to the modernistic term ‘percent’), the ratio of ‘own produc-
tion’ in relation to the self-same ‘own production’ is always unity and hence it is
the same for every household. This equality among all the producers is a formal,
arithmetic, one. It has nothing to do with justice yet, of course.
Aristotle’s presentation of exchange in terms of proportions has a number of

important formal consequences. Thus, quantities exchanged and retained are now
not absolute quantities as they were in the case of our figure 1b. They are now
relative quantities as written algebraically in equs. (3)
a) qCr + qC = 1 (house-proportions) ; b) qrD + qD = 1 (shoe-proportions) (3)
where qCr ≡ QCr /QC∗ , qC ≡ QC /QC∗ for houses expressed as proportions of total
(‘own’) house production and likewise qrD ≡ QrD /Q∗D , qD ≡ QD /Q∗D for shoes ex-
pressed as proportions of total (‘own’) shoe production. Put a bit differently, we
could say: ‘if total production is split between the fraction exchanged and the frac-
tion retained, then the two fractions always add up to unity’–assuming there are
only these two uses for production.5
Since we just changed from absolute quantities to relative ones, it is clear that
the geometrical rendering of exchange is now quite different from the one of fig.1b,
namely as shown below in figs.2. The sides of the new ‘own production box’
have now always unit value, giving always a square. The ‘share’ exchanged of the
respective ‘own product’ of the above quote is now qC resp. qD , hence always a
fraction of the total unit. Parallels to the sides which intersect along the diagonal
give sub-squares as shown. As before, we have now an A-section and a B-section of
the construction, the respective little squares being indicative of the level of needs
satisfaction. If we halve the respective squares we can take the area of the shaded
triangles of figs.2 as measure of need satisfaction and the associated diagonals as
measure for the ‘worth’ of the respective artisans.
Fig.2a represents a case of identical values of own production in the sense of
identical incomes. But, as Aristotle writes:
it is not two doctors that become partners to an exchange, but rather a

5 This implies that there are no taxes and other transfers outside of the respective own households
in this setup.
10

(a) Equality of income (b) Divergence of income
Figure 2: Reciprocal exchange
doctor and a farmer, and in general people who are of different sorts
and not in a relation of equality to each other; they therefore have to
be equalized.
But the formal equalization in terms of 100% ‘own production’ as just discussed
does not mean a substantive equalization between rich (doctor) and poor (farmer).
Both aspects are important in the Aristotelian context but in interpreting Aristotle’s
text they must be clearly distinguished so that formal questions of exchange are not
confused with questions of fairness or justice.
The formal difference in income may be expressed geometrically by the relative
lengths of A resp. B as shown in fig.2(b). From that figure we can now read off the
proportions:
A qD
(relative worth) = (inverse relative sales) (4)
B qC
which follows from the intercept theorem.6 Again we must refer to Aristotle’s text
6 The full length of each of the two transversal lines inside the square is divided in sections ‘qC ’
and ‘qD ’ since the respective symbols mark legs of two isosceles triangles and can be repeated on
the respective other leg. The transversals intersect each other. They are cut by the two parallel lines
A and B. The theorem of intersecting lines then states that the sections ‘qD ’ and ‘qC ’ stand to each
11

from where we have the motivation for this exercise, since he writes:
Then as builder [A] is to shoemaker [B], so must such-and-such a num-

ber of shoes [qD ] be to a house [qC ]
The quantity measures for “shoes” and “house” must here be read in a way which
is consistent with what had been written before, namely that they are proportions
(or percentages) of each artisan’s produce, i.e. they are relative numbers–qC and
qD –, not absolute measures like the QC and QD of fig.1(b).
Translators and commentators have great problems here. It is indicative of these
problems when we read (Rothbard, 1995, 16)
Aristotle’s famous discussion of reciprocity in exchange in Book V of

his Nichomachean Ethics is a prime example of descent into gibber-
ish. . . . How can there possibly be a ratio of ‘builder’ to ‘shoemaker’?
Much less an equating of that ratio to shoes/houses? In what units can
men like builders and shoemakers be expressed?
The answer to this question is simple and was given long ago by Thomas Heath
(1949, 274) when, in his Mathematics in Aristotle, he explained:
here we may suppose A and B to represent what the builder and the
shoemaker are ‘good for’. It might be measured, say, by the value of
the work that they could respectively produce in the same time
The “value of work” is, of course, the value of the respective own production. But
the value of own net production during, say, a year is just the yearly net income in
modern parlance.
In view of some of the comical answers to the above question7 the readers should
other as A and B–as stated by equ.(4).
7 Cf. Rothbard (1995, 16) himself answers his question with: “The correct answer is that there
is no meaning, and that this particular exercise should be dismissed as an unfortunate example of
Pythagorean quantophrenia.”
12

take the time to check the formal correctness of equ.(4). It follows directly from
the accounting equation expressing ‘monetary equivalence’ as given by equ.(1b)
above. The message of this expression is timeless and it is not an anachronism to
express this message in algebra. It states: what is bought in an exchange economy
as discussed by Aristotle must be paid for by own sales.8
We resort now to a little algebraic exercise by expanding expression equ.(1b)
with the respective own production QC∗ and Q∗D . This gives the following equ.(5a)
which can be further transformed as follows.
QC QD YA qD
a) pC × QC∗ ∗ = pD × Q∗D ∗ ; b) YA × qC = YB × qD ; c) = (5)
QC QD YB qC
The q-symbols of equ.(5b) are known already. We have encountered them as

relative expressions for the exchanged quantities which were QC /QC∗ ≡ qC and
QD /Q∗D ≡ qD (see equs. (3) above). Define now the nominal income of house-
hold A as pC × QC∗ ≡ YA where Y stands for income. The reasoning here is that
the total net production of builder A is the total quantity of ‘own production’ of
the quantity of QC∗ houses. This is the unique and total real income of household
A. Evaluated at price pC the price-times-quantity magnitude YA gives A’s monetary
income. This is an accounting value and is, of course, larger than the turnover
value of A’s market sales which have the total value of pC × QC . Analogously,
pD × Q∗D ≡ YB gives the (accounting) value of B’s net money income. Using these
symbols we write equ.(5b). Re-arrangement of terms gives equ.(5c). This expres-
sion is just a variant of equ.(4), the only difference being that the A and B of the
former expression are now replaced by the corresponding symbols for A’s and B’s
income. These expressions are plausible since they mean that if builder A is poorer
than shoemaker B (in the sense of YA = pC QC∗ < YB ), then this can be due either to
8 Amazingly, Rothbard (1995, 16) writes, however: “The Aristotelian concept of equal value in
exchange is just plain wrong”.
13

a low yearly quantity of output QC∗ or to a low price pC of this product or due to
both reasons. In any case, A must then sell a large share qC of this output in order
to cater for the household needs through the market, say, by buying shoes. Thus, if
the left-hand side of equ.(5c) is small because A is relatively poor, the right-hand
side is also small because qC is relatively large.
We thus come to the conclusion that what seemed to be Aristotelian “gibberish”
is in fact a logical and plausible consequence of monetary equivalence in exchange
when we expand with ‘own production’ as shown above.
5 Reciprocity as Pythagorean justice
So far, our exposition dealt only with accounting matters–with the ‘formal equiv-
alence’ as we may say, following our above-mentioned distinction: the descrip-
tion of production and exchange, the representation of terms of trade, the change
from absolute magnitudes to relative ones–all these steps are formal ones which are
mathematically ‘true’ if we follow the rules of algebra, geometry, and arithmetics
when discussing the condition of monetary equivalence.
Even our claim that the satisfaction of need can be represented by an associ-
ated area–the shaded triangles in the specific case of figs.2–should be taken as
an accounting device. Aristotle himself introduces the concept of need–Greek:
chreia–expressly as a device for quantitative measurement when writing (Rowe
and Broadie, 2002, 166):
Everything. . . must be measured by some one thing. . . In truth this one

thing is need, which holds everything together;
This is a further passage of the Nicomachean Ethics over which there is much
dispute but we may justify our ‘quantitative’ reading of Aristotle’s treatment of
need by invoking Olof Langholm’s (1979, 49) well reasoned conclusion: “there is
14

in the end no denying that the Nicomachean Ethics at this one point states that need
is a “measure” of commutables.”9
How can Aristotle’s measure of (the satisfaction of) need be made operational?
Consider the two things of our previous examples, houses and shoes. It should be
plausible that a house-builder without shoes suffers a low level of satisfaction of
needs if the house cannot be left because of lack of shoes. Likewise a shoemaker
will suffer if it is impossible to obtain housing. From these examples it should
follow that it is a combination of things which gives that single ‘one thing-measure’
which Aristotle postulates as expressing (the satisfaction of) need. The area of a
rectangle is a possible geometrical expression of such a combination.
This reasoning stands behind the claim which was stated in section 3 above that
in the case of fig.1(b) the rectangle at the corner at point A resp. at point B express
the satisfaction of needs of the respective households. The rectangles are such a
combination of things to “one thing” because an area is calculated as length (quan-
tity of good C) times width (quantity of good D) and it gives one single measure:
area, while this measure combines components in the way just explained.
If it is agreed that in a geometrical context Aristotle’s “one thing”-measure of
the above quote can be given by some sort of area, then it is a posterior question
how we express such a measure in detail–as a square, as a half-square, as a side of
a square or by some other representation or transformation of an area. As already
stated, in the present case we decided for the associated triangles as measures of
the satisfaction of need, and in the following discussion of this measure we will use
the Greek character ‘χ’ as symbolic shorthand, this symbol coming from Aristotle’s
word “chreia”–need–which, in Greek, is written with an x-like character. In any
9 Langholm (1979, 49) goes on to expressly criticize Byzantine comments, transmitted by

Michael of Ephesus (ca. 1150), which interpret Aristotle’s ‘need’ only as cause for interchange:
“the Byzantine professor seems to have missed his ancient model’s [i.e. Aristotle’s, GMA] much
more interesting observation, where need is a measure in a sense transcending cause”.
15

case, the representation of this measure is a formal act, and, of course, not an act
of ‘justice’ in any sense.
When turning now to justice in connection with ‘reciprocation’, as we may call
the situation under review, then we must discern that there is reciprocity between
actors and reciprocity for each actor. The first of these is implicit in the very word
‘exchange’ which means to give and to take. Voluntary exchange–and Aristotle
gives no indication that he deals here with something else–means that the terms
of exchange are accepted by both partners. There is no textual indication that
Aristotle wanted to discuss questions of a philosophically determined ‘just price’ of
a specific good, the discussion of this problem being a peculiarity of the medieval
reception of Aristotelian analysis.
The second sense of ‘reciprocity’ refers to the returns which each member of the
community of exchange gets from the respective efforts. In this context questions
of justice and fairness are now indeed well imaginable. The farmer and the physi-
cian of the last section each work for one year, but the physician is rich, while the
farmer is poor. The high earners can satisfy their needs to a far greater extent than
the others. Is that fair? Here now a discussion of justice has its place. The answer
of someone advocating strict and ‘unqualified’ reciprocity could be: sure that is fair
and just, because the farmer produced cheap and homely goods while the physician
produced precious ‘goods’ or services–by saving human lives in a way few others
could have done.
This argument concerning justice corresponds to Aristotle’s characterization of
the Pythagorean doctrine as one which defines “the just as what stands in a re-
ciprocal relation to something else”, as quoted in the introduction above. The
‘reciprocity’ in this case is two-fold, namely formal and substantive. It is formal
because mathematical reciprocity holds in Aristotle’s incomprehensible-seeming
sense of equation (4) which, however, turned out to be a perfectly understandable
16

variant of monetary equivalence as was shown in connection with equation (5c).
‘Reciprocity’ may be seen as being substantive in so far as the term could stand
for a particular interpretation of justice, namely for the claim that you must receive
back what you give, and only what you give. In this sense the term substantiates
Aristotle’s ‘Rhadamanthine rule’ which was seen to amount to the biblical ‘an eye
for an eye’. Colloquially speaking, we may paraphrase our reading of Aristotle’s
presentation of Pythagorean justice with the statement: ‘If you contribute only low-
value ‘peanuts’ to the total social product, then market exchange can give back
only goods in the counter-value of those ‘peanuts’ which you gave yourself–and
this is just and fair, because as you did to the economic system, so the economic
system does to you’.10 But this sentence is maybe more of a persiflage than a
paraphrase: of course, neither Aristotle nor the Pythagoreans thought in terms of
‘peanuts’ but in terms of the satisfaction of needs. Substantive reciprocity must
then be interpreted to mean: as A to B in terms of the market value–i.e. in terms of
money value–of their own production, so the respective satisfaction of their needs.
Remembering that the satisfaction of needs may be represented by the symbol χ
we can put this maxim algebraically as
1 2
B χB B q
a) = resp. as b) = 21 D2 (6)
A χA A 2 qC
where the variant (6a) states the general principle while (6b) represents a spe-
cific solution to the problem of measuring the satisfaction of needs, namely as
the shaded half-square triangles of figs.2.
It should be clear from the above that formal reciprocity means inverse propor-
tionality: the relation of income A to income B is the inverse of the traded propor-
10 It
is interesting that Wexler (2008, 182) translates Aristotle’s antipeponthos not with the cus-
tomary ‘reciprocity’ but with “re-back-doing”, a sense which is stressed by the last part of our
paraphrase. Wexler (ibid.) explains: “I use “re-back-doing” because I think it is important that
something is being done, not just that it is being done reciprocally.”
17

tions qC resp. qD of the goods produced by households A resp. B.
But substantive reciprocity means direct proportionality as shown by equ.(6a):
you get back from the economic system a satisfaction of needs in direct proportion
to your economic contribution in terms of the money worth of your own production.
This double meaning has created endless problems.11 But if we reconstruct the
formal structure of Aristotle’s arguments in geometric or in algebraic form, then
this difference should not create great problems for the interpretation of his text in
this particular context.
In Aristotle’s representation of exchange there is not a question of either ‘direct’
or ‘indirect’ proportionality. Both types are present. In algebraic terms the former
case is covered by equs. (6), the latter case by equ. (4). In geometrical terms direct
proportionality is given when we relate the artisans’ worth A resp. B to their as-
sociated areas representing need satisfaction as may be gathered once more when
we look at fig. 3 (a). There, a large A is associated with a large area on the basis
of the A-line and a small B is associated with a small area built on the basis of the
B-line. But if, in the self-same figure, we fix our attention on the quantities traded
as expressed by qC and qD , then we know already that the intercept theorem shows
that their ratio is inverse to that of the parallel lines A and B.
But although direct as well as indirect proportionality have their place in Aris-
totle’s description of exchange, it calls for utter confusion in the minds of writers
and readers when commentators claim that when Aristotle writes about indirect
proportionality we should read the opposite. In all the passages which are on the
11 Cf. Langholm (1979, 52) who relates that “Six manuscripts of the Translatio Lincolniensis
[Grosseteste’s Latin translation of the Nicomachean Ethics of 1246-7, GMA] . . . have a marginal
note at 1133a33, [wrongly !, GMA] changing the order of the products so as to make it conform to
the order of the producers (the direct form).”
For a modern case of such a confusion see Joachim (1951, 150) who comments this passage with
“The ratio between the numbers of the units in the two commodities must be the same as the ratio
between the values of their respective producers, so that A : B :: C : xd.” But he continues (ibid.)
that his own calculation “is, I must confess, in the end unintelligible to me.”
18

´‘ Bekker-page’ 1133 Aristotle refers exclusively to the case of indirect propor-
tionality. It is therefore most unfortunate that repeatedly commentators claim the
opposite.12
(a) Extreme inequality (b) Implications of strict ‘Pythagorean reciprocation’
Figure 3: A Pythagorean view of the ‘just’ satisfaction of need (χ)
Some of the implications of this conception of justice are represented in figure

3 (b). It shows the relative income position B/A of shoemaker B to house-builder
A as drawn along the horizontal axis. Along the vertical axis it shows the level of
the satisfaction of need with the symbol χ as already explained. The rising curve is
marked as measuring household B’s need satisfaction χB when its relative income
changes.13 The U-type curve measures the total level of the satisfaction of need for
12 We quoted Joachim in this sense already in the last footnote. Likewise, Schumpeter (1954,
60f., n.1) believes that the passages in “Ethics, V (1133)” mean direct proportionality in the sense:
“ ‘As the farmer’s labor [A] compares with the shoemaker’s labor [B], so the product of the farmer
[C] compares with the product of the shoemaker [D].’ ” Schumpeter’s single quote signs suggest
that this is a paraphrase of what Aristotle does write on the ‘Bekker page’ 1133 (the single quote
signs are his signs, square brackets include my inserts, GMA). But whoever takes the trouble to
actually go through that page, say in Rackham ([1926] 2003, 285), will see that what Schumpeter
presents as a paraphrase is the opposite of Aristotle’s text on “1133”.
13 Its algebraic expression is given by the formula for the area of B’s half-square which reads
χ = 21 qC2 . In order to simplify notation, define relative income as β ≡ B/A. We know from equation
B
(4) that B/A ≡ β = qC /qD . The last symbol, qD , can be replaced since we have qC + qD = 1 whence
we can write qD = (1 − qC ). Therefore we have β = qC /qD = qC /(1 − qC ). Rearranging the last
equation gives qC = β/(1 + β). In terms of β we can therefore write
1 β 2 B d B β
a) χB = ( ) where β≡ with b) χ = >0 (7)
2 1+β A dβ (1 + β)3
Equ.(7a) is the algebraic expression for the χB -curve in figure 3 (b). Equ.(7b) is its derivative which
shows that the χB -curve is constantly rising. Further discussion could establish that the χB -curve is
19

both households A plus B.14 The vertical distance between the two curves measures
household A’s satisfaction of need. It is clear that the larger the relative income of
B, the less this distance and the less the satisfaction of need for A.
We are aware that figure 3 (b) is anachronistic because it uses ‘Cartesian co-
ordinates’–a way of rendering data which was unknown at Aristotle’s time. But
it is one thing how data are presented and quite another thing how these data are
generated. The data of figure 3 are derived from a discussion of the relevant areas
in figures 2 (a), 2 (b), and 3 (a)–and these figures are by no means anachronistic in
relation to Aristotle’s time as we will elaborate in the next sections. Thus, position
‘a’ on the B/A-axis of figure 3 (b) corresponds to the situation as depicted by the
adjacent figure 3 (a) while position ‘b’ on the B/A-axis corresponds to the above 2
(b) and the point ‘1’ represents the case of A = B along the B/A-axis as depicted
geometrically by fig. 2 (a).
In the last-mentioned case–which prevails when there is strict equality of
income–the total area covered by the two shaded triangles is a quarter of the en-
compassing square. If we compare that case with the one depicted in the adjacent
figure 3 (a) then we have a large income of A relative to B so that in this case B/A is
small as shown by position ‘a’ on the B/A-axis. The maximal value which A could
reach occurs when B is reduced to zero. A’s shaded triangle would then fill half of
the encompassing square and thus the total shaded area would then be double than
before and vice versa when A is reduced to zero. When B approaches the maximum
asymptotic to the numerical value 1/2.

14 Its algebraic expression is given by the formula for the total area of A’s plus B’s half-squares.
It reads χtotal = χA + χB = 21 q2D + 12 qC2 where again qD can be replaced since we have qD = 1 − qC
and qC in turn can be replaced by β ≡ B/A as just described in the preceding footnote. We thus
obtain
1 1 2 1 β 2 1 1 + β2 d 1−β
a) χtotal = ( ) + ( ) = ; b) χtotal = − (8)
2 1+β 2 1+β 2 (1 + β)2 dβ (1 + β)3
From the derivative (8b) it can be seen immediately that for β = 1, i.e. for B = A the expression
becomes zero – the curve (8a) has a minimum. Its numerical value is χ = 1/4 and incomes are
equal as drawn in figure 3 (b). Then we have strict equality also in the sense of qC = qD = 1/2.
20

value, then also the shaded area would approach half the square.
The significance of this discussion of geometrical figures is that the total shaded
area is supposed to measure the total satisfaction of need. Since this area is the
smallest when A = B, i.e. when incomes are equal, this means that for the case
of equality of incomes we have the lowest level of total satisfaction as shown by
the curve marked ‘χtotal ’. In this way–i.e. by discussing a number of geometrical
figures–one could generate the same type of statements as when one makes a mod-
ern discussion of functions with the help of analysis. A similar procedure could
show via geometrical discussions that the levelv of individual need satisfaction in-
creases with the relative income as shown by the curve marked χB . As shown, the
curve has decreasing marginal values except in the vicinity of its starting point.
In modern parlance this means that there are always positive marginal returns to
income, but mostly we have decreasing rates of return in terms of additional satis-
faction of needs. Every point on the curves just explained fulfills both aspects of
reciprocity: the ratio of incomes is equal to the reverse ratio of traded proportions
of own production and the ratio of the satisfaction of needs is equal to the direct
proportion of the artisan’s worth in terms of income.
If this is a picture of justice, it is the justice legitimizing a despot–a Pharaoh or
a Babylonian god-king. It shows that the concentration of income in one single
household, the household of the palace, maximizes the total satisfaction of need.
But one could think also of more modern contexts which fig. 3 could illustrate.
Thus, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan postulates that the “state of nature” where ev-
erybody has the same right would only lead to a war of “all against all”. The
installment of an absolute monarch ‘A’ is then an improvement which corresponds
to the transition from point ‘1’ of fig. 3 to the left where the entitlements of B are
greatly abolished, but total satisfaction of needs is increased.
As far as Pythagoras himself was concerned, we may note that there are an-
21

cient reports that he, the founder of this school, spent his mature formative years in
Egypt and among the Magi of Babylon. Thus, our mentioning of their respective
societal setups might indeed allude to relevant influences on Pythagoras.15 The
early Pythagoreans seem to have practiced some sort of communism in their group
and possibly in the communities which they controlled at Pythagoras’ time, in par-
ticular in the city of Croton. Minar, Jr. (1944, 45) believes that the Pythagoreans
thought that “material things” were “less important. . . than the welfare of the soul
in this life and the next.” Our model suggests that in addition they might have be-
lieved in a better satisfaction of needs–in ‘increasing returns to scale’, to express
this feature in modern terms–if their economic affairs were conducted collectively
under the rule of the wise Pythagoras whom they allegedly revered as a god-like
ruler.
But even at Pythagoras’ time the reverence for Pythagorean conceptions of soci-
ety was not general. Indeed, the rule of the Pythagoreans in the South Italian city of
Croton came to a violent end. Ancient sources claim that Pythagoras himself died
as an outcast in the wake of social unrest. It might have been due to discontentment
of large parts of the citizens who were affected by old Pythagorean conceptions of
social justice. Certainly in far away Athens where Aristotle lived and taught for
many years the social conceptions just outlined would have been totally unaccept-
able. The ancient Athenian democracy is of continuing fascination for modern
ones not least because of its cultivation of an idea of equal rights among its citi-
zens, sometimes referred to by the ancient Greek term isonomia.16 This idea seems
to be at the heart of Aristotle’s critique of the Pythagorean conception of justice.
15 For some views of the Babylonian influences on the Pythagoreans see, e.g. Miller (2011, 58)
who points out: “the “Pythagorean” theorem [concerning right triangles, GMA] was discovered by
the Babylonians a millennium or more before the birth of Pythagoras. Borrowing from the East their
knowledge of . . . mathematics, the Pythagoreans introduced into Greece . . . the geometric patterns
of orbiting stars.”
16 For a praise of “the great equalitarian movement” in ancient Athens, especially as expressed by
Pericles, see Popper (1950, 94-5) who criticizes Plato for a lack of regard for ‘isonomy’, however.
22

6 Reciprocity in the Aristotelian version
When we want to give a geometrical interpretation to the just mentioned Athenian

idea of isonomia, then, in the present economic context, we must define a value
under which no citizen must be reduced. Let us take as starting point for our con-
sideration the case of economic equality as already discussed in connection with
fig.2 (a). We reproduce this case in fig. 4 (a).
(a) Equality of income (b) Divergence of income
Figure 4: The Aristotelian variant of exchange
The difference to the previous version of this figure is that now we assume that
the status of citizen A is guaranteed even if subsequently citizen B becomes richer.
This changes the geometrical model drastically, because now the length of line
A is locked.17 Thus, when there are changes in relative income, then we cannot
simultaneously change line A and B when the intersection of the C-good line and
the D-good line changes along the diagonal as we did in the Pythagorean model.
Now the lines with segments marked qC resp. qD can only pivot around the two
endpoints of an A-line with constant length. This is due to the new assumption of
a guaranteed worth for A. This geometrical consequence is shown through the two
arched arrows of fig. 4 (a). This assumption is, of course, of no consequence when
17 Itmay be noted that from looking at the lower left corner of fig. 4 (a) it follows that line A is
the hypotenuse of a right triangle with legs of 1/2 unit length
√ each. Hence, by Pythagoras’ theorem,
we have A2 = (1/2)2 + (1/2)2 = 2(1/2)2 and A = (1/2) 2.
23

we have strict equality of A and B as in this figure. In this case the Pythagorean
and the Aristotelian models collapse into one and the quantitative measures of the
individual and of the total value of needs satisfaction is the same in both cases (1/8
resp. 1/4).
Let there be now an increase in citizen B’s income worth. In the Pythagorean
case of fig.2b above this meant a shift to the left of the intersection of the lines with
segments marked qC resp. qD . That movement implied a reduction of the length
of line A, as may be read off that figure. This in turn means that A is reduced in
economic status. If social convention is now that A’s economic status perviously
was minimal anyhow, then this calls for corrective action. This is now where the
term “corrective justice” comes in which was briefly mentioned above in section
2. Society must see to it that such a reduction is counteracted. Aristotle does not
specify how corrective action should be done in this context. But it is essential in
this case that it is done: Aristotle’s critique of the Pythagoreans is exactly that it
has no proviso for corrective action which might become necessary in the context
of reciprocation.
With A now somehow stabilized we have the case already envisaged for the
Aristotelian model: the lines with segments marked qC resp. qD have to pivot to
the respective new positions as shown in fig. 4 (b). The total length of each of
these lines is unity, hence for alternative income levels of B their endpoints de-
scribe two sections of a circle with a unit radius as drawn. Line A is unchanged
due to isonomia, but line B is now longer, since we do want to represent a case of
B being comparatively better off. The areas of the shaded triangles, the measure
of the respective satisfaction of needs, have changed. The triangle expressing A’s
satisfaction of needs is now smaller than before while the triangle associated with
B is now larger than in the case of identical income, and that is the case in spite of
isonomia. This is plausible because even if A has an unchanged income, neverthe-
24

less, the other household B can now afford a higher share of the goods, thus being
able to satisfy its needs better than household A can do.
It should be noted that lines A and B are parallel as before in the Pythagorean
case. Again they cut the intersecting lines with sections marked qC resp. qD . Again
the intercept theorem may be applied. The result is that again we have the in-
comprehensible seeming result: ‘As the–in this case relatively small–builder A to
shoemaker B, so the–in this case relatively small–length representing shoemaker’s
sold share qD to builder’s sold share qC .’ As far as proportions are concerned,
nothing has changed in the present case in comparison to the Pythagorean one.
‘Reciprocity’ has the same formal aspects in both cases.
The crucial change will become clear if the readers continue with the thought
experiment just made and if they extend the length of line B further and further,
its endpoints wandering down the curved arrows. The readers will then notice
that towards the tip of the curved arrows both shaded triangles will have become
ever more flat so that eventually the representation of B’s satisfaction of need will
have neared the value of zero. Thus there must be a point from when on it cannot
possibly be in the interest of B to extend the own income status although initially
that was attractive in terms of the satisfaction of need.
7 An Aristotelian conception of social justice
So far, we resorted to a rather pedestrian discussion of alternative geometri-

cal constellations in order to represent an Aristotelian alternative to the putative
Pythagorean version of modeling exchange, production, and the satisfaction of
needs. We return now to the “Cartesian” approach which we introduced in the
Pythagorean context above, only that now we have the modification brought about
by economic isonomia. This was exemplified by the assumption of a given (min-
25

imal) worth of household A.18 As already stated in the context of fig. 4 (a) if the
critical level of income is the one given by the case of income equality in the
Pythagorean model, then the two versions of modeling exchange and the satis-
faction of needs are the same for this particular constellation and they generate the
same numerical values for need satisfaction. The two models are otherwise very
different as will be shown now in more detail by referring to fig.5.
Figure 5: Social justice as ‘golden mean’ and as an individual optimum
The figure starts at the point of equality of income with B/A = 1. Thus its ver-
tical axis corresponds to the vertical broken line at point B/A = 1 in figure 3 (b).
Here and there equality of income implies a level of needs satisfaction of 1/8 units
for each of the two household and of 1/4 units for their aggregate. If now house-
hold B’s relative income increases, then the other household’s satisfaction of needs
decreases in both models, and here we draw the corresponding χA -curve explic-
itly.19 But as we see from the shape of the χtotal -curve, total needs satisfaction has
here a maximum at B/A = 1 whereas we saw above that in the Pythagorean case it
18 Its
√
numerical value was A = (1/2) 2, as shown in fn. 17 above.
19 The algebraic expression for curve χA follows from the definition of the quantitative measure
for needs satisfaction as triangular area which in this case is given by the area over A in fig. 4 (b).
Hence we have χA = (A/2)×hA where hA is the hight with h2A = q2D −(A/2)2 (Pythagoras’ theorem).
Take the value for A from fn.18. pReplace qD by qD = 1 − qC and qC by β/(1 + β) as shown in fn.13.
A
The curve is then given by χ = 7 − β(2 + β) ÷ (8(1 + β)) for β = 0 where β ≡ B/A as previously
defined.
26

had a minimum at this point.20
This might suggest that in the Aristotelian model an egalitarian distribution of
income will necessarily be considered as being the best solution for the satisfaction
of need for the community as a whole. But in this model one can make a distinction
between a theoretical optimum and a feasible one. If we consider the χB -curve in
more detail we see that this curve is very different from its Pythagorean analogue.
Whereas the Pythagorean curve showed ever increasing needs satisfaction from
√
increased income, the present one has a maximum at about B/A = 2, i.e. when
√
incomes B to A stand in the ratio 2 : 1, as shown in fig.5.21 Thus the χB -curve
substantiates the supposition made in the previous section that in the Aristotelian
model there must be a turning point for the privileged household B. If B behaves
rationally, then it must be aware that any further increases in its relative income
position are a reduction in previous levels of needs satisfaction, and not any more
an increase as they initially were. This result calls for further comment, especially
in view of our distinction between a ‘theoretical’ optimum for the community and
a ‘feasible’ one.
When contemplating income distribution even in a society which is egalitarian
in principle, it is clear that total equality of distribution will never be realized. The
empirical fact is that we always have social and economic differentiation. It is
just unrealistic to propagate the state of total economic and social equality as aim
for social justice. Who would be the addressee of such a propagation? There are
always privileged parts in the society and it is those who must be convinced. It
20 For the algebraic version of the χtotal -curve see the following footnote.
21 The algebraic form for the χB -curve is given in analogy to the one for χA as discussed in fn.19
above. Thus we have χB = (B/2) × hB with h2B = qC2 − (B/2)2 and B = βA. Replace A again with the
value given in fn.18. Use again qC = β/(1 + β). Eventually one reaches the value χB = β2 × χA with
the algebraic terms for χA as given in fn.19 above. Hence the equation for total needs satisfaction is
χtotal = χA + χB = (1 + β2 )χA (β = 1). The χB -curve has a maximum at β ≡ B/A = 1.382975767.
3
√
This value differs about a 100 th from 2 = 1.414213562, the position marked on the horizontal
axis of fig.5.
27

must be clear to the privileged ones that if they over-extend their privileges, then
they themselves will suffer. If the polis is in peril due to lack of internal social
cohesion, then it is all its citizens which are in danger of being exterminated or
enslaved – whether rich or poor. It is the responsibility of the privileged class in
the polis to avoid that situation. This is an old theme of Athenian tradition.
Solon of Athens (ca.640 – 560 BC) was particularly important in shaping this
line of thinking. Plato already listed him under the “seven sages” and Aristotle
mentioned him more than thirty times in his Constitution of Athens and also in
several other places.
One of Solon’s impressive passages on social justice reads (Freeman, 1926,
207):
If on our city ruin comes, it will never be by the dispensation of Zeus
. . . It is the people themselves who in their folly seek to destroy our
great city, prompted by desire for wealth ; and their leaders, unjust of
heart, for whom awaits the suffering of many woes, the fruit of their
great arrogance, since they know not how to check their greed
According to Solon as just quoted, the ingredients of the (potential) breakdown of

Athenian society were: a) human folly so great that it defeats divine benevolence,
b) folly in particular by unjust leaders, and c) the folly in question being that the
leading persons cannot “check their greed”. The leaders will over-extend their
privileges and d) eventually they will suffer “many woes” – supposedly perishing
together with the whole community. Thus it would be a great virtue for society as
a whole and for the privileged themselves if they would “check their greed”.
Here now we may mention Aristotle’s conception of virtue as a mean. There
are comments that in connection with justice this is not quite appropriate.22 The
22 See Raphael (2001, 43): Aristotle “has a general theory that each of the virtues is a mean
between excess and defect, and he tries to apply this to his account of justice, where it does not fit at
all well. He is also keen on subjecting his treatment to mathematical formulae whenever he can, and
28

present interpretation of his text makes Aristotle’s conception plausible, however,
as can be gathered from the shape of the χB -curve. As drawn, this curve has two
lateral extremes: equal distribution at the left vs the maximally possible inequality
of distribution to the right. In the former case of absolute equality that part of in-
come which surpasses the average would have to be confiscated or taken away in
some other way in the process of establishing total equality–a measure which the
formerly privileged ones would consider to be an act of injustice, namely as expro-
priation of rightful possessions. The other extreme would be an ‘unjust’ overex-
tension of income-privileges–in the sense of all-round destructiveness. The just,
according to Aristotle, is between these extremes (Rackham, [1926] 2003, 289):
it is plain that just conduct is a mean between doing and suffering

injustice, for the former is to have too much [right lateral extreme,
GMA] and the latter to have too little [left lateral extreme, GMA]. And
Justice is a mode of observing the mean
In order to make it clear that the issue is–or can be–the distribution of “things” the
passage continues with (ibid.):
Also, Justice is that quality in virtue of which a man is said to be dis-

posed to do by deliberate choice that which is just, and, when dis-
tributing things between himself and another, or between two others,
not to give too much to himself and too little to his neighbor of what is
desirable
Thus we have here another wording of the warning not to go too far towards the
right lateral extreme. There is a basis for “deliberate choice” not to do it, namely
this too turns out to be unhelpful.” See also Williams (2006, 209) who considers NE 1133b3[3]f.
as Aristotle’s “rather unhappy and perfunctory account of the application of the mean to justice”.
(The original Bekker-line is a misprint, because at 1133b3 f. Aristotle deals with exchange and not
with the “mean”.)
29

self-interest: the modeled ‘fact’ is that the privileged person’s B satisfaction of need
is highest when the privileges are not over-extended. From these passages it seems
to be quite clear that situations are envisaged as shown by curve χB .23 The basis
of “deliberate choice”, mentioned in the quote, is here self-interest because the
‘middle’ position is that which maximizes the satisfaction of need for the privileged
class B.
It might appear that with his focus on the optimal decisions of the privileged
class Aristotle showed disdain for ‘true’ social justice. After all, his own model
clearly shows that for the whole community the best satisfaction of needs will be
obtained when there is total equality of distribution as we briefly noted above. But
we should note also that through the ages all the beautiful speeches about equal
rights have done little to bring about equal economic circumstances for all the
members of society. On the other hand, the self-destructive strife of the privileged
members of society have often ruined not only the participants of that strife but the
entire society. Pericles’ beautiful speech about Athenian isonomia, highly praised
by Karl Popper,24 is a good case in point. At the end of the Periclean era Athens’
elite was in self-destructive inner strife and finally, as looser of the Peloponnesian
War in 404 BC, it was under threat of annihilation. Aristotle’s appeal to optimizing
self restraint of the privileged members of society might be taken as a formalized
lesson from that experience.25
23 We may translate Solon’s just quoted poetic implorations to the self-serving leaders of Athens
into our prosaic
√ curve χB in the following way: ‘Athenian leaders with a big ‘B’! Mind the threshold
around ‘ 2’! If you over-extend B – your share of our community’s goods and services – then you
will ruin the city, but you certainly will also ruin yourselves. So, stay somewhere in the middle
between the left and the right extremes of curve χB .’
24 Karl Popper (1950, 94) “This equalitarian principle had been admirably formulated by Pericles
a few years before Plato’s birth, in an oration which has been preserved by Thucydides.”
25 Cf. Leo Strauss (2007, 519): “What is the political philosophy of . . . Aristotle but a reflection
of the Greek political reality?. . . and Alexander’s political activity is diametrically opposed to the
principles laid down by Aristotle.” Indeed, in our reading Alexander’s eventual self-proclamation as
god-king is justifiable not with Aristotle’s conception of social justice, at most with the Pythagorean
one.
30

8 The formal context of the ancient debate
At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle states that when in the fol-
lowing he deals with “Moral Nobility and Justice” the reader should be aware that
“these conceptions involve much difference of opinion and uncertainty” and he
continues (NE I.3 §2 and §4, Rackham [1926] 2003, 7,9):
We must therefore be content if . . . we succeed in presenting a broad

outline of the truth . . . for it is the mark of an educated mind to expect
that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular
subject admits.
These words of caution, of not expecting too much precision, could well be meant
to apply here. But for drawing a specific figure, implicitly we always must assume
specific values of length and proportion, in particular a value which represents the
assumption of economic isonomia.26 But there can be much debate at what level
exactly there exists an ‘inalienable’ right to a specific minimum income. Never-
theless, it is important to have some such value in order to make the point that the
Pythagorean model of reciprocal exchange is open to the modification of including
an aspect of the “great” (cf. Karl Popper27 ) Athenian movement around the concept
of isonomia.
The appeal of the present quantitative version of introducing the idea of eco-
nomic isonomia is that with the above value of A we had as ‘golden mean’ of
√
income distribution the proportion of (approximately) 2 : 1 as shown in fig.5.28
26 It
√
will be remembered that our particular value for A was A = (1/2) 2. (See fn.18 above.)
27 See fn.16 above.
√
28 The ratio of the lengths of lines B to A as drawn in fig. 4 (b) does have the property of 2 : 1 . If
length A is so re-scaled as to have length ‘1’, then

√ the square on A has sides of unit length. Then the
diagonal in this (re-scaled) square has length 2 (Pythagoras’ theorem). This re-scaled diagonal
is the one which according to the old scale had unit length. Hence the broken line extending from
the right end-point of line
√ A to the left tip of the arrow which formerly had unit length now, after
re-scaling, has length 2. Slide this length up along two parallels, namely the right side of the
31

This is interesting because this very proportion played a great role in ancient Athe-
nian intellectual life. The art historian Jay Hambidge (1920) presented several
“root-two themes” in which he uncovered the ancient aesthetics of rectangular con-
√
structions originating from the proportion of 2 : 1.29 This proportion featured
prominently in the ancient Greek mathematical pastime of ‘doubling the square’–
with which Plato’s dialogue Meno 82b-85b deals at some length . The dialogue
describes there verbally the same geometrical structure as the one of our fig.2 (a).
The mathematics historian Benno Artmann (1990, 44) noted that long before Plato
wrote Meno this construction “seems to have been so popular that it found its way
into the decoration of coins” and he reproduced a coin from the ancient Greek is-
land state of Melos, dating from before 416 BC. The coin has the same geometrical
appearance as our fig.2 (a).
Maybe the most striking vestige of this type is to be found on coins from the
ancient island state of Aegina, probably the birthplace of Aristotle’s teacher Plato.
A specimen is reproduced here as figure 6.30
Figure 6: Aeginetan coins and Pythagorean exchange (cf. fig. 2b)
trapezoid
√ and the parallel broken line on the left of the trapezoid to form line B. Then B is to A
like 2 to 1. Alternatively, the same parallel movement can be done by using the left side of the
trapezoid and the right broken line. Thus fig. 4 (b) represents the present solution for an Aristotelian
‘golden mean’ of a ‘just’ income distribution.
29 Even for moderns this proportion has a special appeal. The nowadays widely used ISO A4
√
standard paper size has the dimension 2 : 1. (Kuhn, 1996)
30 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:BMC_193.jpg, accessed on June
19,2012.
32

It is quite clear that the geometry of the reverse side of these coins is strongly
reminiscent of figure 2b above, as we may gather in particular on the basis of our
re-tracing of that design in fig.6 after a 90°-shift of the coin.31
Coins with this geometrical construction were minted about 400 to 330 BC, thus
they were Aristotle’s contemporaries. For decades Aristotle lived in Athens with
these geometrical figures on coins from neighboring Aegina before his eyes.32 It
would have been most strange if there was no discussion in his intellectual circles
about the potential meaning of such a coin design in a commercial context. The
pervasiveness of this geometry and its implication might be the most plausible rea-
son why Aristotle was so nonchalant concerning its elaboration–everybody knew
everything interesting about these figures anyhow.
There are, of course, wide gaps in our knowledge of these matters, between
the knowledge of geometrical design on Aeginetan coins on the one hand and the
knowledge of Aristotle’s reference to the “coupling of diametrical opposites” in
exchange on the other hand–the “coupling” of the diagonally opposite A-line and
B-line through a qC -line and a qD -line. These gaps will always have to be bridged
by speculation because we have little further documental evidence. One little bit
of further evidence concerns the role traditionally assigned to geometry among
Aristotle’s intellectual forefathers. In this context it is important that in Plato’s
dialogue Gorgias 508 we have Socrates scolding his dialogue partner Callicles with
the words (Jowett, 1892, 400):
you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is

mighty, both among gods and men ; you think that you ought to culti-
31 For an in-depth analysis of the geometry of Aeginetan coin design see Ambrosi (2012).
32 Aristotle expressly mentions Aegina in a monetary context. In Metaphysics D.5 he intends to
clarify the word “necessary” with the remark that as it is “necessary” to take medicine when one
is ill, so it might be “necessary” to go to Aegina for monetary matters: “and a man’s sailing to
Aegina is necessary in order that he may get his money.” (Ross, 1928, 1015a) At Aristotle’s time
all denominations of Aegina’s money always had the reverse side with the geometrical structure of
fig. 6.
33

vate inequality or excess, and do not care about geometry.
Thus it seems clear that at least two intellectual generations before Aristotle
there was the conviction that geometry supplied guidance for appropriate behavior
“among gods and men”. In this intellectual tradition such geometrical figures as
we have them on the Aeginetan coins could well have been interpreted as template
for social philosophy. Aristotle could well have had these geometrical patterns in
mind when he criticized the ‘Pythagorean’ conceptions of justice as not admitting
for ‘qualification’ of ‘reciprocation’ in an exchange economy. But such critique is
inconsequential if the Pythagoreans are not met on their own field of argumenta-
tion. Even if Aristotle was critical of the Pythagoreans–he had to argue on the basis
of their formal template in order to show the limitations of their view of society, the
fallacy of the Pythagorean thinking being an identification between the descriptive
treatment of the economy and the normative justification for social differentiation.
This fallacy is not limited to antiquity.
9 Concluding remarks
The Pythagorean doctrine of strict reciprocation in an economic exchange commu-

nity was outlined above. It might be paraphrased as the postulate: ‘your earnings
are what you deserve’. In a way this is undeniable. If household A supplies things
of little aggregate worth to the community, it seems to be a case of justice that it
should get the same in return, namely little. This seems to be an ‘iron necessity’,
an implication of equivalent exchange which can be rendered in the form of an
algebraic equation or in the form of a geometrical model.
The main problem with the Pythagorean approach lies in its lack of regard for the
idea of economic isonomia. Since it does not have this viewpoint, the Pythagorean
model lacks provisions for corrective justice, namely for the minimum income level
34

to which a citizen is entitled. Since it considers just any application of distributive
justice as acceptable, the Pythagorean model also lacks concern for acceptable dis-
tributive justice. It is maybe in this way that we can interpret Aristotle’s dictum that
Pythagorean justice is not justice at all because it lacks both aspects of particular
justice.
The Aristotelian counter-position is: yes, indeed, exchange and income are for-
mally related as the Pythagoreans claim that they are, but a subsequent claim is not
warranted, namely that the whole gamut of relative income should be covered by
their formalism. The opposing Aristotelian principle is the maxim: ‘if citizen B be-
comes relatively rich, then citizen A must not become absolutely poor’. We covered
this maxim verbally by making the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’
equalization, the latter referring to the fixing of a minimum income.
The strength of Aristotle’s argument is that it can be expressed in a geometrical
formalism which is as stringent as the Pythagorean one. It respects and explains
the accounting principle of a ‘reverse proportionality of income and exchange’,
formulated by Aristotle as the seemingly nonsensical ‘As builder to shoemaker, so
shoes to houses’. We noted above that a prominent economist once apostrophized
Aristotle’s treatment of reciprocity in exchange as “descent into gibberish”–which
it definitely is not.
An important aspect of exchange is the motivation for its existence, namely the
satisfaction of need. This is a theme which we find several times in Plato’s writings
already. In Aristotle the treatment of “need” goes even so far that he postulates it
as the basis for an ultimate measure for comparisons in exchange situations. His
formulation suggests a belief in the existence of ‘need-values’ which are analogous
to money-values. It is a long controversy among modern commentators whether
Aristotle hereby anticipated modern utilitarianism. He certainly did not anticipate
differential calculus of extreme values, but the idea of extremes was not alien for
35

him. His doctrine of the ‘golden mean’ is based on the middle between extremes
and it is also an old theme in the literature that this mean itself is also an extreme
(Oates 1936, Kelly 2011, 158). Our interpretation of his doctrine on social justice
in an exchange economy was in terms of enlightened self-interest of the privi-
leged class. This is a utilitarian consideration but one which is quite different from
anachronistic modern utilitarianism.
What one gets out of a model depends on what one puts into it. As a model
of need satisfaction, the Pythagorean model depicts insatiable desire for additional
income and the apologetic diagnosis that this is good so, because total concentra-
tion of income maximizes total need satisfaction. There is anecdotal evidence that
these are indeed intended Pythagorean results, at least results which are in agree-
ment with the social and political background of the early Pythagoreans.
The Aristotelian model, when seen under the aspect of need satisfaction, appears
as a utilitarian rendering of Solon’s ancient wisdom that the rich should not be
made as poor as the average population but that they should reign their greed for
their own good and for the good of their community. It is in the context of the
Aristotelian version of the model of exchange that it makes sense to appeal to the
rationality of the privileged classes in the hope to get social adjustment for a stable
society.
Both conceptions of social justice can be seen as having modern counterparts.
The Pythagorean maxim of ‘you deserve what you get’ smacks of modern eco-
nomic agnosticism concerning interpersonal distribution, of the marginal produc-
tivity theory of distribution. The Aristotelian maxim of protecting the rights of the
underprivileged ones for the sake of a sustainable existence of the privileged ones
smacks of Scandinavian variants of Social Democracy.33
33 Itis interesting that under the motto “No Citizen Should be Lacking in Sustenance” (Aristotle,
Politics 1329b39 ff) Martha Nussbaum (1990) develops the conception of an “Aristotelian Social
Democracy”, albeit in an argumentative context which is quite different from the present one. She
36

There is a further difference among the ancients which we should consider as
relevant for our time. It concerns the transcendental aspects of social life. The
Pythagorean conception of society is an outer-worldly one. It is one where judges
of the underworld are invoked to judge the deeds of the once living–like the already
mentioned mythical judge Rhadamanthus. It is a social world which is ultimately
not regulated by men but by gods, by “the coming of the Lord” if we prefer to
speak in terms of monotheism.
There is an alternative tradition in ancient Greek thought. We have briefly men-
tioned it already, namely when quoting Solon’s assurance to the Athenians that the
gods want the city no harm. If the city is ruined, then that is not because of the
wrath of gods, but because of the folly of humans. Therefore, in order to avert
catastrophe in social life, we must influence humans, not gods. No doubt the mod-
ern Thorstein Veblen, whom we quoted in the introduction, totally agreed with
ancient Solon on this point.
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37

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Index
Albertus Magnus ([1252], 1972), 6, Oates (1936), 36, 39

37 Popper (1950), 22, 30, 39
Ambrosi (2012), 33, 37 Rackham ([1926] 2003), 19, 29, 31,
Artmann (1990), 32, 37 39
Freeman (1926), 28, 38 Raphael (2001), 28, 39
Hambidge (1920), 32, 38 Ross (1928), 33, 39
Heath (1949), 12, 38 Rothbard (1995), 12, 13, 39
Joachim (1951), 18, 38 Rowe and Broadie (2002), 4, 5, 9, 14,
Jowett (1892), 33, 38 39
Kelly (2011), 36, 38 Schumpeter (1954), 19, 40
Kuhn (1996), 32, 38 Strauss (2007), 30, 40
Langholm (1979), 6, 15, 18, 38 Veblen (1899), 2, 3, 40
Minar, Jr. (1944), 22, 39 Welldon (1892), 3, 40
Miller (2011), 22, 38 Wexler (2008), 17, 40
Nussbaum (1990), 36, 39 Williams (2006), 29, 40
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Social justice: Aristotle versus

2 Aristotle’s taxonomy of justice 4

3 Reconstructing Aristotle’s geometry of exchange 6

4 Exchange and ‘equalization’ 9

5 Reciprocity as Pythagorean justice 14

6 Reciprocity in the Aristotelian version 23

7 An Aristotelian conception of social justice 25

8 The formal context of the ancient debate 31

∗ UniversitätTrier, email: ambrosi@uni-trier.de

In his Nicomachean Ethics (BookV, ch.5) Aristotle criticized the

Preliminary version – January 17, 2013

“As a man’s action, such his fate;

In Greek mythology Rhadamantus is one of the judges in the underworld and in

0&t=1339396911, accessed June 11, 2012.

Preliminary version – January 17, 2013

2 Aristotle’s taxonomy of justice

Aristotle (384–322 BC) is one of the most interesting figures in philosophy. He

Preliminary version – January 17, 2013

What brings about proportional reciprocity is the coupling of diamet-

Preliminary version – January 17, 2013

3 Aristotle’s geometry of exchange

Preliminary version – January 17, 2013

Figure 1: A medieval and an alternative figure of Aristotelian barter

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4 Exchange and ‘equalization’

a) QCr + QC = QC∗ (houses) ; b) QrD + QD = Q∗D (shoes) (2)

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a) qCr + qC = 1 (house-proportions) ; b) qrD + qD = 1 (shoe-proportions) (3)

it is not two doctors that become partners to an exchange, but rather a

Preliminary version – January 17, 2013

Figure 2: Reciprocal exchange

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Then as builder [A] is to shoemaker [B], so must such-and-such a num-

Aristotle’s famous discussion of reciprocity in exchange in Book V of

Preliminary version – January 17, 2013

The q-symbols of equ.(5b) are known already. We have encountered them as

Preliminary version – January 17, 2013

5 Reciprocity as Pythagorean justice

Everything. . . must be measured by some one thing. . . In truth this one

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9 Langholm (1979, 49) goes on to expressly criticize Byzantine comments, transmitted by

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(a) Extreme inequality (b) Implications of strict ‘Pythagorean reciprocation’

Figure 3: A Pythagorean view of the ‘just’ satisfaction of need (χ)

Some of the implications of this conception of justice are represented in figure

Preliminary version – January 17, 2013

asymptotic to the numerical value 1/2.

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When we want to give a geometrical interpretation to the just mentioned Athenian

(a) Equality of income (b) Divergence of income

Figure 4: The Aristotelian variant of exchange

Preliminary version – January 17, 2013

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7 An Aristotelian conception of social justice

So far, we resorted to a rather pedestrian discussion of alternative geometri-

Preliminary version – January 17, 2013

Figure 5: Social justice as ‘golden mean’ and as an individual optimum

Preliminary version – January 17, 2013