Criminal Law

PRE-WEEK AND
LAST MINUTE LECTURE

IN CRIMINAL LAW
(2019 BAR)
BY:
ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II, LL.M.
II. REVISED PENAL CODE - BOOK II
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE STATE (ARTICLES 124-133)
ARTICLE 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. (As amended by E.O. Nos. 59 and 272, Nov. 7, 1986 and July 25, 1987,
respectively).
1.Q. Article 125 of the RPC can be waived if the detainee who was validly
arrested without a warrant opts for the conduct of preliminary investigation. Can such
waiver give the State the right to detain the person indefinitely?
1.A. No. In the case of IBP Pangasinan Legal Aid vs. DOJ (832 SCRA 396, 25 July
2017)(En Banc)[Mendoza, J.], the High Court ruled in the negative. It held that the waiver of
Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the unbridled
right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and
caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of Article 125 must coincide
with the prescribed period for preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's
constitutional right to liberty.
Stated differently, the waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not a license
to detain a person ad infinitum. Waiver of a detainee's right to be delivered to proper judicial
authorities as prescribed by Article 125 of the RPC does not trump his constitutional right in
cases where probable cause was initially found wanting by reason of the dismissal of the
complaint filed before the prosecutor's office even if such dismissal is on appeal,
reconsideration, reinvestigation or on automatic review. Every person's basic right to liberty is
not to be construed as waived by mere operation of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
The fundamental law provides limits and this must be all the more followed especially so that
detention is proscribed absent probable cause.
Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be
promptly released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver
of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30-day period in cases of violation of R.A.
No. 9165) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses.
This rule also applies in cases where the investigating prosecutor resolves to
dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a
motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review. The reason is that such
dismissal automatically results in a prima facie finding of lack of probable cause to file an
information in court and to detain a person.
The Court is aware that this decision may raise discomfort to some, especially at this
time when the present administration aggressively wages its indisputably popular war on
illegal drugs.
As Justice Diosdado Peralta puts it, that the security of the public and the interest
of the State would be jeopardized is not a justification to trample upon the constitutional
rights of the detainees against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and to a speedy disposition of the case.
1
2 PRE-WEEK AND LAST MINUTE LECTURE 2019 BAR
IN CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER (ARTICLES 134-160)
2.Q. What are the elements of the crime of Rebellion?
2.A. In the case of Lagman vs. Medialdea (829 SCRA 1, 4 July 2017)(En Banc)[Del
Castillo, J.],1 the Supreme Court held that the elements of Rebellion are as follows:
(1) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government;
and
(2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the
allegiance to the Government or its laws:
(i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces;
or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
and prerogatives.
3.Q. How is the existence of rebellion determined by the President?
3.A. In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to

convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than
not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. To require him to satisfy a higher
standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers.
To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as
follows:
(1) actual rebellion or invasion;

(2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and
(3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual
rebellion or invasion.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST (ARTICLES 161-189)
4.Q. What are the elements of perjury?
4.A. In the case of Union Bank of the Philippines vs. People (667 SCRA 113, 28
February 2012)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], the Supreme Court held that elements of perjury under
Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit
upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by
law or made for a legal purpose.2
5.Q. Explain the element of materiality in perjury cases.
5.A. A material matter is the main fact which is the subject of the inquiry or any
fact or circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or corroborate or strengthen the
testimony relative to the subject of inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of any
witness who testifies.3
1
Constitutionality of the Declaration of Martial Law in Mindanao due to Marawi siege.
2
Monfort III vs. Salvatierra, 517 SCRA 447 (5 March 2007); Sy Tiong Shiou vs. Sy Chim and Chan Sy, 582 SCRA 517
(30 March 2009).
3
United States vs. Estraña, 16 Phil. 520 (1910).
2019 BAR PRE-WEEK AND LAST MINUTE LECTURE 3
IN CRIMINAL LAW
6.Q. How can a person be convicted for perjury due to his two conflicting
statements?
6.A. A conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by the prosecution by merely

showing the inconsistent or contradictory statements of the accused, even if both
statements are sworn.
The prosecution must additionally prove which of the two statements is false and
must show the statement to be false by evidence other than the contradictory statement.4
The rationale for requiring evidence other than a contradictory statement is explained thus:
Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a different time
will not be sufficient to establish the falsity of his testimony charged as perjury, for this
would leave simply one oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not appear
that the testimony charged was false rather than the testimony contradictory thereof. The
two statements will simply neutralize each other; there must be some corroboration of the
contradictory testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be furnished by evidence
aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the declarations of testimony of the
accused.5
To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed
at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time
that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed
through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is
at the place where the testimony under oath is given.
If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is

neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at
the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the
taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime
committed.
In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the
Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.
7.Q. What are the three forms of false testimonies found in the RPC?
7.A. In the case of Union Bank of the Philippines vs. People supra, the Supreme
Court said that the RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies, to wit:
1. first is false testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case
Articles 180 and 181, RPC);
2. the second is false testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and
3. the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC).
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS (ARTICLES 203-245)
8.Q. What constitute violations of Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code? Explain.
8.A. In the case of Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarment of AMA Land, Inc.
(represented by Joseph B. Usita) Against Court of Appeals Associate Justices Hon. Danton
Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario (718 SCRA 335, 11 March
2014)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.], the High Court ruled that: To commit the offense, the offender
must be a judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who
merely committed an error of judgment or taken the unpopular side of a controversial
point of law.6
4
Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice, 475 SCRA 495 (18 November 2005).
5
Id. at p. 515, citing People vs. McClintic, 160 N.W. 461 (1916).
6
Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus, First Edition (2000), National Book Store, Inc., p. 409.
IN CRIMINAL LAW
The term knowingly means sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to
do an injustice.7 Thus, the complainant must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the evidence but that it was also
made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.
Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration
are sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust
decision.8 In other words, the judge was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some other
similar motive in issuing the judgment. 9
Bad faith is, therefore, the ground for liability.10 The failure of the judge to correctly
interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render
him administratively liable.11
9.Q. Who shall determine and declare that the judgment or final order issued
was unjust? May such determination and declaration be made in administrative
investigations and proceedings like a preliminary investigation by the public prosecutor?
9.A. The answers to these queries are obvious – only a superior court acting by
virtue of either its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved
may make such determination and declaration.
Otherwise, the public prosecutor or administrative hearing officer may be usurping a

basic judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the Constitution or by law elsewhere
in the appellate court.
10.Q. What are the elements of the crime of Corruption of Public Officials under
Art. 212 of the Revised Penal Code?
10.A. In PDIC vs. Casimiro (769 SCRA 110, 2 September 2015)(First Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The elements of which are as follows:
(a) that the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a
public officer; and
(b) that the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a
public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct
bribery12 or indirect bribery.13
In Casimiro, the High Court held that: It was error on the part of the Ombudsman to
simply discredit the affidavit of the witness as inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay.
It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
7
Guevara, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, Fourth Edition (1946), Filipino Book Dealers’
Association, Manila, p. 418.
8
Basa Air Base Savings & Loan Association, Inc. vs. Pimentel, Jr., 387 SCRA 542 (22 August 2002).
9
Guerrero vs. Villamor, 296 SCRA 88 (25 September 1998).
10
Guevara, supra.
11
Sacmar vs. Reyes-Carpio, 400 SCRA 32 (28 March 2003).
12
Art. 210. Direct bribery. — Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection
with the performance of this official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such
officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of the
gift in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a
crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and
if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional, in its
medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of such gift.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from doing
something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum
period and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of such gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of
special temporary disqualification.
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators,
appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public duties. (As amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).
13
Art. 211. Indirect bribery.— The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and public
censure shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, 10 June 1985).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its
proceedings.14
In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman,15 the Court declared that hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights
and obligations of parties. Citing a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States,
it was held that probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there
is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.
11.Q. What is the distinction between Malversation of Public Funds Under Art.
217 of the RPC and Technical Malversation under Art. 220 of the RPC?
11.A. In the case of Garcia, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman (741 SCRA 172, 19
November 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that: In the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds under Art. 217 of the RPC, the offender misappropriates
public funds for his own personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds
for the latter’s personal use.
On the other hand, in Technical Malversation Under Art. 220 of the RPC, the public
officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or another’s personal use,
but to a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or
ordinance.16
Technical Malversation does not include, or is not necessarily included in the crime
of Malversation of Public Funds.
12.Q. What are the elements of malversation of public funds under Art. 217 of the
Revised Penal Code?
12.A. In the following cases of:
1. Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan (847 SCRA 552, 5 December 2017)(En Banc)

[Peralta, J.]
2. Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People (823 SCRA 370, 18 April 2017)(En Banc)

[Bersamin, J.]17
3. Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People (797 SCRA 241, 19 July 2016)(En Banc)

[Bersamin, J.],18 the High Court held that: The elements of malversation of public funds under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that the offender is a public officer;
(2) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office;
(3) that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he
was accountable; and
(4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through

abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails to have duly
forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, it shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to
personal uses.
14
See De Chavez vs. Ombudsman, 543 Phil. 600 (2007).
15
See G.R. Nos. 212140-41 (21 January 2015).
16
Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan, 274 Phil. 451 (1991).
17
Resolution which DENIED the Motion for Reconsideration of the People.
18
(Main Decision.) Petitioner initially filed a Demurrer to Evidence with the Sandiganbayan. However, it was denied.
The Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court was granted and the dismissal of the case of Plunder was ordered.
IN CRIMINAL LAW
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIEW OF THE EFFECTIVITY OF R.A. NO. 10951
In the 2017 case of Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan supra, the Supreme Court En Banc,
through Mr. Justice Peralta, made the following pronouncements as guidance for the Bench
and the Bar:
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary to reopen the
instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not
for further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the
penalty imposed by said court.
The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 19
When, however, circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en banc and give due regard to such
exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability. The same
is in line with Section 3(c),20 Rule II of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, which
provides that cases raising novel questions of law are acted upon by the Court en banc.
To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act No. 10951, entitled “An Act
Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based
and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act No.
3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code as Amended,” which accordingly reduced
the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an example of such exceptional
circumstance.
13.Q. What are the new guidelines relative to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10951?
13.A. In Rolando Elbanbuena y Marfil, In Re: Correction/Adjustment of Penalty

Pursuant to Republic Act No. 10951, In Relation to Hernan V. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No.
237721, 31 July 2018)(En Banc)[Jardeleza, J.], the High Court pronounced that: In view of the
anticipated influx of similar petitions, the Court, in the interest of justice and efficiency,
resolves to issue the following guidelines:21
I. Scope.
These guidelines shall govern the procedure for actions seeking:
(1) the modification, based on the amendments introduced by RA

No. 10951, of penalties imposed by final judgments; and,
(2) the immediate release of the petitioner-convict on account of

full service of the penalty/penalties, as modified.
II. Who may file.
The Public Attorney's Office, the concerned inmate, or his/her counsel/representative,

may file the petition.
III. Where to file.
19
Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals and Land Bank of the Philippines,
622 Phil. 215 (2009).
20
Section 3(c) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, as amended) provides:
Section 3. Court en banc matters and cases. – The Court en banc shall act on the following matters and
cases:
xxxx
(c) cases raising novel questions of law;
21
Pursuant to this Court's power under Section 5(5) of Article VIII of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 5(5). Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.
IN CRIMINAL LAW
The petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising territorial
jurisdiction over the locality where the petitioner-convict is confined. The case shall be
raffled and referred to the branch to which it is assigned within three (3) days from the filing of
the petition.
IV. Pleadings.
(A) Pleadings allowed. – The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the petition
and the comment from the OSG. No motions for extension of time, or other dilatory motions
for postponement, shall be allowed. The petition must contain a certified true copy of the
Decision sought to be modified and, where applicable, the mittimus and/or a certification
from the Bureau of Corrections as to the length of the sentence already served by
petitioner-convict.
(B) Verification. – The petition must be in writing and verified by the petitioner-
convict himself.
V. Comment by the OSG.
Within ten (10) days from notice, the OSG shall file its comment to the petition.
VI. Effect of failure to file comment.
Should the OSG fail to file the comment within the period provided, the court, motu
proprio, or upon motion of the petitioner-convict, shall render judgment as may be warranted.
VII. Judgment of the court.
To avoid any prolonged imprisonment, the court shall promulgate judgment no later
than ten (10) calendar days after the lapse of the period to file comment. The judgment shall
set forth the following:
(a) The penalty/penalties imposable in accordance with RA No. 10951;
(b) Where proper, the length of time the petitioner-convict has been in
confinement (and whether time allowance for good conduct should be allowed); and
(c) Whether the petitioner-convict is entitled to immediate release due to

complete service of his sentence/s, as modified in accordance with RA No. 10951.
The judgment of the court shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to the
filing before the Supreme Court of a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court where there is showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
VIII. Applicability of the regular rules.
The Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided in a suppletory
capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith.
14.Q. Is the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of

Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 a bailable offense?
ANSWER IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. NO. 10951:
14.A. Yes. In People vs. Valdez (776 SCRA 672, 8 December 2015)(En Banc)
[Peralta, J.], the Supreme Court held that: Even in the advent of R.A. No. 10951 above
incorporated, as long as the charged pertains to paragraphs 1-4.
However, if the charged involves paragraph 5, if the amount exceeds P8,800,000,

the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. Therefore, it becomes non-bailable.
ANSWER PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT:
14.A. Yes. In the case of People vs. Valdez supra, the Supreme Court resolved the
issue as follows: The appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of right to an accused
IN CRIMINAL LAW
who is charged with a complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00.
15.Q. What must the prosecution prove to convict the accused for malversation of
public funds under Art. 217 be proven?
15.A. In the case of People vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)(665 SCRA 89, 7
February 2012)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it was held that: To justify conviction for malversation
of public funds, the prosecution has to prove that the accused received public funds or
property that they could not account for, or was not in their possession and which they
could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of such public funds or
property.22
16.Q. Are the elements of Technical Malversation under Art. 220 and
Malversation of Public Funds under Art. 217 of the RPC the same?
16.A. No. In the case of Garcia vs. Office of the Ombudsman23 (741 SCRA 172, 19
November 2014)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: It bears stressing that
the elements of Malversation of Public Funds are distinctly different from those of Technical
Malversation.
In the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, the offender misappropriates public

funds for his own personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the
latter’s personal use.
On the other hand, in Technical Malversation (Art. 220 of the RPC) the public officer
applies public funds under his administration not for his or another’s personal use, but to
a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance.24
Technical Malversation does not include, or is not necessarily included in the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds.
Thus, in Garcia, since the acts supposedly committed by respondents constituting the
crime of Technical Malversation were not alleged in the Complaint-Affidavit and the crime
for which respondents raised their respective defenses was not Technical Malversation,
the petition must perforce be denied on this score. Otherwise, the Court would be
sanctioning a violation of respondents’ constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them, so as to deny them a reasonable opportunity
to suitably prepare their defense.25
17.Q. Can the accused for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 be
alternatively prosecuted for and tried under the same informations for two (2) counts of
technical malversation under Art. 220 of the Revised Penal Code? Explain.
17.A. No. In De la Costa vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division (709 SCRA 631, 19
September 2013) (En Banc)[Abad, J.] the Supreme Court held that: The rule of course is that
the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not by the caption of the information
or the citation of the law allegedly violated but by the actual recital of facts in that
information.26 Consequently, the issue is whether the facts alleged in the informations in
the subject criminal cases make out a case for the crime of technical malversation.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS (ARTICLES 246-266-D)
18.Q. What are the elements of the crime of murder under Art. 248 of the RPC?
18.A. In the following cases:
22
Estrella vs. Sandiganbayan, 389 Phil. 413 (2000).
23
The elements of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 are as follows: (a) the offender must be a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. [Lihaylihay vs. People, 702 SCRA 755 (31 July 2013)].
24
Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan, 274 Phil. 451 (1991).
25
Cf. Miranda vs. Sandiganbayan, 502 Phil. 423 (2005).
26
Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151 (1996).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
1. People vs. Cortez, et al. (G.R. No. 239137, 5 December 2018)(Second

Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
2. People vs. Cirbeto (G.R. No. 231359, 7 February 2018)(Second Division)

[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
3. People vs. Miguel (752 SCRA 94, 25 February 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.](The accused was convicted for Murder and Attempted Homicide by the trial
court. On appeal, the conviction for Murder was modified by the Supreme Court to Homicide
under Art. 249 of the RPC, considering that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
proven.)
4. Ramos vs. People (815 SCRA 226, 23 January 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.](Murder was committed with the use of unlicensed firearm. The consequence is,
the unlicensed firearm is considered as an aggravating circumstance.)
5. People vs. Parba (773 SCRA 83, 19 October 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.](Correlate with Art. 11 and 14 of the RPC)
6. People vs. Samuya (756 SCRA 365, 20 April 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.](Correlate with Art. 11 and 14 of the RPC)
7. People vs. Matibag (754 SCRA 529, 25 March 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.],27 the High Court pronounced that the elements of the crime of murder are:
(1) a person was killed;

(2) the accused killed him or her;
(3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned
in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and
(4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.28
19.Q. What is murder in contemplation of Art. 248 of the RPC?
19.A. Murder is the unlawful killing by the accused of a person, which is not
parricide or infanticide, committed with any of the attendant circumstances enumerated in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, one of which is treachery.29
TREACHERY
20.Q. Explain treachery in the context of Art. 248.
1. People vs. Umawid (725 SCRA 597, 9 June 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.]
2. People vs. Parba (773 SCRA 83, 19 October 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.]
3. People vs. Inciong (760 SCRA 249, 22 June 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.]
4. People vs. Samuya (756 SCRA 365, 20 April 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.],30 it was held that: It is the suddenness of the assault, without the slightest
provocation from the victim who was unarmed and with nary an opportunity to repel the
aggression or defend himself, ineluctably qualified the crime with alevosia.31
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
27
Correlate with Art. 11 and 14 of the RPC.
28
People vs. Lagman, 669 SCRA 512 (16 April 2012); People vs. Alvarez, 748 SCRA 674 (2 February 2015).
29
People vs. Jalbonian, 700 SCRA 280 (1 July 2013); People vs. Cabtalan, 666 SCRA 174 (15 February 2012); People vs.
Mamaruncas, 664 SCRA 182 (25 January 2012).
30
Correlate with Art. 11 and 14 of the RPC.
31
People vs. Pallarco, 351 Phil. 391 (1998); Vidar vs. People, 611 SCRA 216 (1 February 2010).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.
21.Q. How should the court appreciate the circumstance of the assailant
attacking the victims to death using firearms?
21.A. In the case of People vs. Oandasa, Jr. (793 SCRA 278, 14 June 2016)[Perlas-
Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: The fact that the shooting of the three victims had
occurred in quick succession fully called for a finding of the attendance of treachery in the
attacks against all the victims. Montegrico, Tamanu and Paleg were drinking together
outside their bunkhouse prior to the shooting when the accused suddenly appeared from the
rear of the dump truck, walked towards their table and shot Montegrico without any warning.
That first shot was quickly followed by more shots. In that situation, none of the three
victims was aware of the imminent deadly assault by the accused, for they were just enjoying
their drinks outside their bunkhouse. They were unarmed, and did not expect to be shot,
when the accused came and shot them.
The attack was mounted with treachery because the two conditions in order for this
circumstance to be appreciated concurred, namely:
(a) that the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or to retaliate; and
(b) that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person.32
The essence of treachery lay in the attack that came without warning, and was swift,
deliberate and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victims no
chance to resist, or retaliate, or escape, thereby ensuring the accomplishment of the deadly
design without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victims.
What was decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the
victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.
22.Q. Can treachery be appreciated in the killing of a child?
22.A. Yes. In People vs. Jugueta (788 SCRA 331, 5 April 2016)(En Banc)[Peralta,
J.],33 the High Court ruled: The killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the
manner of the assault is not shown because the weakness of the victim due to her tender
age results in the absence of any danger to the accused.34
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
23.Q. What must be proven by the prosecution for evident premeditation to be

appreciated?
23.A. In the case of People vs. Cirbeto (G.R. No. 231359, 7 February 2018)(Second
Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: For evident premeditation to be considered as
a qualifying or an aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must prove:
(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination;
and
(c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will.35
In Cirbeto, the Supreme Court concurs with the appreciation of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and affirmed the conviction of the accused for murder. However,
32
Luces vs. People, 395 SCRA 524 (20 January 2003).
33
The presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. Minor children, who by reason of
their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child,
treachery exists.
34
See People vs. Ganohon, 273 Phil. 672 (1991).
35
See People vs. Racal, G.R. No. 224886 (4 September 2017).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
the HIGH COURT is of a different view with respect to the purported presence of evident
premeditation: In this case, there is dearth of evidence to prove that accused-appellant had
previously planned the killing of Casipit. Nothing has been offered to establish when and
how he planned and prepared for the same, nor was there a showing that sufficient time
had lapsed between his determination and execution. The Court stresses the importance of
the requirement in evident premeditation with respect to the sufficiency of time between the
resolution to carry out the criminal intent and the criminal act, affording such opportunity to
coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning and the consequences of what
accused-appellant had planned to do, where the interval should be long enough for the
conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil desire and scheme.36 In the stabbing of
Casipit, this requirement is clearly wanting.
24.Q. What are the elements of Homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC?
1. Wacoy vs. People (760 SCRA 259, 22 June 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.](Conviction was modified from Death caused in a tumultuous affray to Homicide
as the accused was known as the assailant.)
2. People vs. Alejandro (820 SCRA 189, 13 March 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.],37 the High Court pronounced that: The elements of Homicide are the following:
(a) a person was killed;
(b) the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance;
(c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and
(d) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.38
25.Q. When can there be Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Art. 251 of
the RPC?
25.A. In the case of Wacoy vs. People (760 SCRA 259, 22 June 2015)(First Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes place
when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and
tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author
thereof cannot be ascertained.39
26.Q. What are the elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray?
26.A. The elements of death caused in a tumultuous affray are as follows:
(a) that there be several persons;

(b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally;
(c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a
confused and tumultuous manner;
(d) that someone was killed in the course of the affray;
(e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and
(f) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who
used violence can be identified.40
RAPE BY SEXUAL INTERCOURSE (PAR. 1, ART. 266-A, RPC)
27.Q. What are the elements of rape by sexual intercourse under paragraph 1,
Art. 266-A of the RPC to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused?
36
People vs. Dela Cruz, 551 Phil. 406 (2007).
37
Rape with Homicide. But the case was decided based on Art. 335 as the rape was committed prior to Republic Act
No. 8353, otherwise known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
38
Villanueva vs. Caparas, 689 SCRA 679 (30 January 2013).
39
Sison vs. People, 320 Phil. 112 (1995), citing United Stales vs. Tandoc, 40 Phil. 954 (1920).
40
People vs. Julianda, Jr., 422 Phil. 28 (2001).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
27.A. In Alberto vs. Court of Appeals (699 SCRA 104, 19 June 2013)(Second
Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The elements are as follows:
(1) the offender is a man;

(2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;
(3) such act was accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation. 41 (People
vs. Delfin, 744 SCRA 413, 10 December 2014.)
In Alberto, the High Court sustained the findings of probable cause for rape of the
Secretary of Justice against the respondents: Ruling on the matter, the Court finds no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary, as the elements of rape, more likely than
not, appear to be present.
The first and second elements of the crime are beyond dispute as Gil does not deny
having carnal knowledge with Iris. Anent the third element of force and intimidation, Iris’s
version of the facts, as well as Gil’s sole reliance on the sweetheart defense, leads the Court to
believe that the said element, in all reasonable likelihood, appears to be present, considering
that:
(a) mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness; 42
(b) the sweetheart theory does not, by and of itself, negate the commission of
rape;43 and
(c) the fact that Iris was a minor during the foregoing incidents casts serious
doubt on the efficacy of the consent purportedly given by her,44 especially in view of Gil’s
esteemed position of being a priest of the same congregation of which Iris belongs to.
ABSENCE OF CONSPIRACY NEGATES THE SUBSEQUENT COUNTS OF RAPE CHARGED
In the same case of Alberto, the High Court finds grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Secretary of the DOJ, in the subsequent charges of rape against respondents Gil
Anthony M. Calianga for the three (3) incidents; respondents Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyna and
Arturo S. Calianga for two (2) incidents. According to the high court, the conspiracy aspect
was not duly proven. It disposed as follows:
On the contrary, there appears to be no ample justification to support the finding of

probable cause against Atty. Reyna and Arturo, with respect to the rape incidents of
December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002, as well as against Jessebel and Grace for all three (3)
incidents.
As may be gleaned from the Amended Resolution, the DOJ Secretary indicted Atty.
Reyna, Arturo, Jessebel and Grace for these incidents only by reason of conspiracy. Yet,
other than his general imputation thereof, the DOJ Secretary never provided any rational
explanation for his finding of conspiracy against the aforementioned respondents. The rule
is that conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself. It can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. 45 In
this case, the Amended Resolution is bereft of any showing as to how the particular acts of
the foregoing respondents figured into the common design of raping Iris and as such, the
Court finds no reason to charge them for the same.
41
People vs. Alfredo, 638 SCRA 749 (15 December 2010).
42
Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness; it is self-serving negative evidence which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. As between the categorical testimony that rings of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on
the other, the former is generally held to prevail. (People vs. Serrano, 620 SCRA 327, 6 May 2010; citing People vs.
Dumlao, 562 SCRA 762, 20 August 2008).
43
It is well-settled that being sweethearts does not negate the commission of rape because such fact does not give
the accused license to have sexual intercourse against her will, and will not exonerate him from the criminal
charge of rape. Being sweethearts does not prove consent to the sexual act. (People vs. Magabanua, 553 SCRA
698, 30 April 2008).
44
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the
victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The
State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their
minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection. The harm
which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad
business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual
behavior. (Malto vs. People, 533 SCRA 643, 21 September 2007).
45
Quidet vs. People, 618 SCRA 1, 8 April 2010; citing People vs. Cadevida, 219 SCRA 218 (1 March 1993).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
Therefore, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the following respects, the Court
upholds the DOJ Secretary’s finding of probable cause for the crime of Rape against Gil for all
three (3) rape incidents and against Atty. Reyna and Arturo for the incidents of June 23 to
November 9, 2003.
In People vs. Tionloc (G.R. No. 212193, 15 February 2017), the Supreme Court
emphasized that in rape cases alleged to have been committed by force, threat or intimidation,
it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the element of voluntariness on the
part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The prosecution must prove that force or
intimidation was actually employed by accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to
do so is fatal to its cause.46
PROBLEM:
At around 6:00pm of October 10, 2001, AAA, then a 15-year old high school student,
was cleaning the chicken cage at the back of their house located in x-x-x-x when suddenly,
she saw Jose Dimas pointing a gun at her saying, "Wag kang sisigaw kung ayaw mo
madamay ang pamilya mo. Halika sumama ka kung hindi idadamay ko pamilya mo
papatayin ko sila lahat.” AAA pleaded, "Mang Jose, don't do this to me," but the latter
replied, "Do you want me to kill you? I will also kill your mother and father." Thereafter, Dimas
dragged AAA to a nearby barn, removed her shorts and underwear while he undressed and
placed himself on top of her. He covered her mouth with his right hand and used his left hand
to point the gun at her, as he inserted his penis into her vagina and made back and forth
movements. When he finished the sexual act, Jose casually walked away and warned AAA
not to tell anybody or else, he will kill her parents. Upon returning to her house, AAA hurriedly
went to the bathroom where she saw a bloody discharge from her vagina. The following day,
AAA absented herself from school and headed to the house of her aunt, CCC, who asked if she
was okay. At that point, AAA tearfully narrated the incident and requested CCC to remain
silent, to which the latter reluctantly obliged.
Due to the incident, AAA was unable to focus on her studies. She moved to the City to
start a new life. However, Jose was able to track her down. Jose made AAA as his sex slave
from 2002 to 2005. When the relationship was discovered by the wife of Jose, they were
reported to the Barangay. Thus, AAA’s mother learned what happened and AAA was made to
confess to her.
A case for rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC was filed against Jose. Jose pleaded not
guilty and maintained that he had an illicit relationship with AAA. He averred that during the
existence of their affair from 2002 to 2004, he and AAA frequently had consensual sex and the
latter even abandoned her family in order to live with him in various places in xxxx. He even
insisted that he and AAA were vocal about their choice to live together despite vehement
objections from his own wife and AAA's mother. Finally, he pointed out that when AAA was
forcibly taken from him by her mother and the police authorities, no charges were filed against
him. Thus, he was shocked and dismayed when he was charged with the crime of Rape which
purportedly happened when they were lovers.
28.Q. Is Jose criminally liable?
28.A. Yes. In People vs. Francisco Ejercito (G.R. No. 229861, 2 July 2018)(Second
Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], a case with similar factual milieu with the problem, it was held
that: Jose Dimas committed the act of sexual intercourse against and without the consent
of AAA, who was only fifteen (15) years old at that time. As such, she is considered under
the law as a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
hence, Jose’s act may as well be classified as a violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610.
29.Q. How should Jose Dimas be prosecuted in view of the minority of AAA?
Explain.
29.A. In People vs. Ejercito supra, a case with similar factual milieu with the
problem, the Supreme Court held that: Between Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA
8353, and Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the Court deems it apt to clarify that Ejercito should be
convicted under the former.
46
People vs. Amogis, 420 Phil. 278 (2001).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
Verily, penal laws are crafted by legislature to punish certain acts, and when two (2)
penal laws may both theoretically apply to the same case, then the law which is more special
in nature, regardless of the time of enactment, should prevail. In Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, it
was held that:47 It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a
subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed
way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter shall
prevail regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute. Or where two
statutes are of contrary tenor or of different dates but are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail over the other.
STATUTORY RAPE, ARTICLE 266-A (1)(D) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
30.Q. How is statutory rape committed? Explain.
1. People vs. De Guzman (G.R. No. 234190, 1 October 2018)(Second Division)

2. People vs. Cadano, Jr. (719 SCRA 234, 12 March 2014)(Second Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was ruled that: Statutory Rape under Article 266-A (1)(d) of the RPC
is committed by having sexual intercourse with a woman below twelve (12) years of age
regardless of her consent, or lack of it, to the sexual act.
Proof of force, threat, or intimidation, or consent of the offended party is

unnecessary as these are not elements of Statutory Rape, considering that the absence of
free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve (12).48
The law presumes that the offended party does not possess discernment and is
incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.
Thus, to sustain a conviction for Statutory Rape, the prosecution must establish the
following:
(a) the age of the complainant;

(b) the identity of the accused; and
(c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.49
Furthermore, these acts of Rape shall be qualified pursuant to Article 266-B (1) of the
RPC if:
(i) the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age; and

(ii) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
31.Q. What are the elements of statutory rape?
31.A. In People vs. Comboy (785 SCRA 512, 02 March 2016)(First Division)[Perlas-
Bernabe, J.],50 the High Court pronounced that: The elements of statutory rape are:
(1) The accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and

(2) The woman is below 12 years of age.51 (People vs. Lujeco, 721 SCRA 37, 7
April 2014; People vs. Santiago, 720 SCRA 516, 2 April 2014; People vs. Alfonso, 628 SCRA
431, 18 August 2010.)
32.Q. How should the accused be prosecuted if the victim of sexual abuse is
below 12 years of age? Explain.
47
488 Phil. 311 (2004).
48
People vs. Dollano, Jr., 659 SCRA 740 (19 October 2011); People vs. Sato, 741 SCRA 133 (19 November 2014).
49
People vs. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil. 576 (2014) People vs. Garcia, 681 SCRA 465 (19 September 2012), citing People vs.
Mingming, 594 Phil. 170 (2008).
50
The victim was the daughter of the accused and below 12 years of age. The conviction was modified to two (2)
counts of Qualified Rape and one (1) count of Qualified Attempted Rape, defined and penalized under Article 266-A
(1)(a) and (d), in relation to Article 266-B (1), of the Revised Penal Code.
51
People vs. Amistoso, 688 SCRA 376 (9 January 2013).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
32.A. In People vs. Matias (672 SCRA 411, 18 June 2012)(Third Division)[Perlas-
Bernabe, J.], it was held that: In the case of People vs. Pangilinan,52 which affirmed the
doctrines enunciated in the cases of People vs. Dahilig53 and People vs. Abay,54 the Court
explained:
IF THE VICTIM IS BELOW 12 YEARS OLD–OFFENDER SHOULD BE PROSECUTED

UNDER ART. 266-A(1)(D),
Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual
abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but
for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized
with reclusion perpetua.
IF THE VICTIM IS 12 YEARS OLD OR OLDER–OFFENDER SHOULD BE

PROSECUTED UNDER SECTION 5(d), R.A. NO. 7610
On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged
with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because
his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to
criminal liability for a single criminal act.
NO COMPLEX CRIME OF RAPE [ART. 266-A(1)(D)] AND R.A. NO. 7610
Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610.

Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the
Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a
special law.
33.Q. What is the proper penalty if the victim’s age is 12 years old and above but
below 18 at the time of the commission of the crime? Explain.
33.A. In the case of People vs. Matias supra, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
convicted appellant for rape under Sec. 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua, upon a finding that AAA was a minor below 12 years old at the time of
the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004.
However, a punctilious scrutiny of the records shows that AAA was born on April 23,
1991, which would make her 13 years old at the time of the commission of the offense on June
6, 2004. Thus, appellant can be prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III
of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under
paragraph 1(d).
It bears pointing out that the penalties under these two laws differ: the penalty for
sexual abuse under Sec. 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal medium to
reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is penalized with reclusion
perpetua.
ART. 266-B PENALTIES – RAPE UNDER PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE NEXT PRECEDING

ARTICLE SHALL BE PUNISHED BY RECLUSION PERPETUA
34.Q. What are the elements for Qualified Rape pursuant to Article 266-B (1) of
the RPC?
34.A. In People vs. Balcueva (761 SCRA 489, 1 July 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-
Bernabe, J.], the High Court ruled that: The elements for Qualified Rape are as follows:
(a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age;
52
G.R. No. 183090 (14 November 2011).
53
G.R. No. 187083 (13 June 2011).
54
580 SCRA 235 (24 February 2009).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
(b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by

consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim; and
(c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat
or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of
fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority. 55
35.Q. How should the court appreciate the qualifying circumstance of use of a
deadly weapon in rape cases? Explain.
35.A. In the case of People vs. Tagle (G.R. No. 229348, 19 November 2018)(Second
Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the high court held: That in order for the qualifying
circumstance of use of a deadly weapon - if the same is sufficiently alleged in the Information -
to be appreciated, it must be proven that the deadly weapon was used to make the victim
submit to the will of the offender.56 Even the act of molding a bladed instrument, by itself, is
strongly suggestive of force or, at least, intimidation, and threatening the victim with the
same is sufficient to bring her into submission.57
36.Q. What evidence is required to make the sweetheart defense credible?
36.A. In People vs. Rubillar, Jr. (837 SCRA 646, 23 August 2017)(Second Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: A sweetheart defense, to be credible, should be
substantiated by some documentary or other evidence of relationship such as notes, gifts,
pictures, mementos and the like.58 (People vs. Dumadag, 652 SCRA 535, 22 June 2011.)
In Rubillar, Jr., where the accused was acquitted by the Supreme Court, Madam
Justice Perlas-Bernabe, made the following pronouncements:
The sweetheart theory is an affirmative defense often raised to prove the non-
attendance of force or intimidation. As afore-stated, it is effectively an admission of carnal
knowledge of the victim and consequently places on accused-appellant the burden of proving
the alleged relationship by substantial evidence.59 In People vs. Patentes60 the Court
discussed the evidence required in order to support such defense, to wit:
We are mindful that appellant's bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone
stand. It must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually,
these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the
lovers.
The sweetheart theory operates to impair the victim's testimony or create doubt on her
version of the facts when the defense presents sufficient evidence of a relationship between
the accused and the victim but the latter simply denies it. Notably, a woman who was
sexually abused by a lover has no practicable reason to deny her relationship with the accused
in a rape trial because admitting such relationship would not negate her allegation of rape, as
the Court has consistently ruled that a love affair does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot
be sexually violated against her will.61 Nonetheless, if she denies the relationship but it was
found existing, she runs the risk of tainting her testimony when her version of the facts is
inconsistent with the presence of an intimate relationship between them.
37.Q. Would the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the age of the
victim, the absence of denial of the accused and their pre-trial stipulation enough for the
court to appreciate the minority of the victim?
37.A. No. In People vs. Hallarte (720 SCRA 582, 2 April 2014)(Second Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of People vs. Sori, it was explained:62 There must be
independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused. Documents such as her
55
People vs. Arcillas, 692 Phil. 40 (2012).
56
See People vs. Condes, 659 Phil. 375 (2011).
57
People vs. Arguta, 758 Phil. 594 (2015).
58
People vs. Gabelinio, 426 SCRA 608 (31 March 2004).
59
See People vs. Rivera, 717 Phil. 380 (2013).
60
726 Phil. 590 (2014).
61
People vs. Nogpo, Jr., 603 Phil. 722 (2009), citing People vs. Garces, Jr., 379 Phil. 919 (2000).
62
685 SCRA 483 (14 November 2012).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal certificate or school records would
suffice as competent evidence of her age. Here, there was nothing on record to prove the
minority of "AAA" other than her testimony, appellant’s absence of denial, and their pre-trial
stipulation. The prosecution also failed to establish that the documents referred to above
were lost, destroyed, unavailable or otherwise totally absent.
38.Q. What are the guiding principles in the review of rape cases?
38.A. In People vs. Rubillar, Jr. (837 SCRA 646, 23 August 2017)(Second Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court made the following pronouncements: The guiding
principles are as follows:
(a) An accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more
difficult to disprove;
(b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and
(c) The evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. (People vs. Estrada, 610
SCRA 222, 15 January 2010; See also People vs. Nachor, 638 SCRA 317, 14 December 2010;
People vs. Barcela, 637 SCRA 599, 8 December 2010.)
In deciding Rape cases, it is well to emphasize that such crime is a serious

transgression with grave considerations and consequences both to the accused and the
complainant.
On the one hand, the accused is presumed innocent and shall not be convicted unless
his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, in which case, he shall be meted with a severe
penalty. The Court is ever mindful that a young woman would not publicly announce that
she was raped if it were not true. No woman would want to expose herself to the process,
the trouble, and the humiliation of a rape trial unless she actually has been a victim of
abuse and her motive is but to seek atonement for her abuse. In these lights, a painstaking
review of the judgment of conviction is required.35
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY (ARTICLES 267-292)
39.Q. What are the elements of Serious Illegal Detention under Art. 267 of the
RPC?
1. People vs. Lidasan, et al. (G.R. No. 227425, 4 September 2017)(Second

Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
2. Alberto vs. CA (699 SCRA 104, 19 June 2013)(Second Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.]
3. People vs. Pepino (779 SCRA 170, 12 January 2016)(En Banc)[Brion, J.], it
was held that: The elements of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of
the RPC are as follows:
(a) that the offender is a private individual;

(b) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of
his liberty;
(c) that the act of detention is illegal, not being ordered by any competent
authority nor allowed by law; and
(d) that any of the following circumstances is present:
(1) that the detention lasts for more than five days; or
(2) that it is committed by simulating public authority; or
(3) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or threats to kill him shall have been made; or
IN CRIMINAL LAW
(4) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or

a public officer.63
The prosecution must establish the deprivation of liberty of the victim under any of the
above-mentioned circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to
effect the same. There must be a purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly
restrain the victim coupled with intent.64
40.Q. What is the essence of the crime of Kidnapping?
40.A. The crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person
in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any manner.
For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its
essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of
the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.65
CONCEPT OF SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER OR HOMICIDE
41.Q. What is the proper penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping
with ransom and homicide? Explain.
41.A. In the case of People vs. Gamboa (706 SCRA 508, 1 October 2013)(En Banc)
[Perez, J.],66 it was held that: After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December
31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article 267 of the same Code now provides:
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
42.Q. What is the imposable penalty to an accomplice in a case of violation of Art.

267?
42.A. In People vs. Kamir (838 SCRA 512, 4 September 2017)(Second Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that: As to the proper penalties to be imposed under
Art. 267 of the RPC originally prescribes the death penalty for the commission of said crime
made for the purpose of extorting ransom.
The passage of RA 934667 effectively lowered the imposable penalty to the principals,
to reclusion perpetua,68 without eligibility for parole.69
Resultantly, the imposable penalty to the accomplices must likewise be lowered to

reclusion temporal, thereby entitling them to the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.70
63
People vs. Dayon, 217 SCRA 334 (21 January 1993), citing People vs. Mercado, 216 Phil. 469 (1984).
64
People vs. Niegas, 722 Phil. 301 (2013), citing People vs. Pagalasan, 452 Phil. 341 (2003).
65
See People vs. Anticamara, 651 SCRA 489 (8 June 2011).
66
Accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole.
67
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines, Approved June 24, 2006
68
See Section 2 (a) of RA 9346, which reads:
Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the Revised Penal Code;
xxxx
69
Item II (2) of A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, entitled: Guidelines for the Proper Use of the Phrase 'Without Eligibility for
Parole' in Indivisible Penalties dated August 4, 2015, provides:
II.
In these lights, the following guidelines shall be observed in the imposition of penalties and in the use of the
phrase without eligibility for parole: x x x x
(2) When circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the death penalty, but this penalty is not
imposed because of R.A. 9346, the qualification of without eligibility for parole shall be used to qualify reclusion
perpetua in order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not
been for R.A. No. 9346.
70
Act No. 4103, entitled: An Act to Provide for an Indeterminate Sentence and Parole for All Persons Convicted of
Certain Crimes by the Courts of the Philippine Islands; To Create a Board of Indeterminate Sentence and to Provide
Funds Therefor; and for Other Purposes (December 5, 1933).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
Thus, the accomplices must be sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY (ARTICLES 293-332)
43.Q. What are the elements of special complex crime of robbery with homicide?
1. People vs. Palma (751 SCRA 233, 18 February 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.]
2. People vs. Balute (748 SCRA 172, 21 January 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.], citing the case of People vs. Ibañez,71 explained that a special complex crime of
robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the
occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution
must prove the following elements:
(1) taking of personal property belonging to another;

(2) with intent to gain;
(3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used
in its generic sense, was committed.
A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the malefactor’s main purpose and
objective, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during, or after the robbery.72
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for
instance, it was committed:
(a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit;

(b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;
(c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or
(d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.73
If conspiracy was established when a homicide takes place by reason of or on

occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is
proof that there was an endeavour to prevent the killing.
PROBLEM:
Marietta Sarifa is the Court Legal Researcher II assigned at the RTC Branch 992 in the
City of Iliyan, Province of Katbanga. In one of the criminal cases being handled by the said
court, exhibits of money were presented during the trial amounting to P45,000.00. Sarifa was
then tasked to take custody of the said money.
Before the retirement of the Presiding Judge, she instructed Sarifa to deposit the
amount to the OCC. However, the said amount, allegedly to be used in the repair of the Hall of
Justice, was later withdrawn by Sarifa.
44.Q. Was there a crime committed by Sarifa? Explain.
44.A. Yes. In the case of Office of the Court Administrator vs. Musngi (676 SCRA
525, 17 July 2012)(En Banc)[Carpio, J.], a case with similar factual milieu with the problem,
the High Court ruled: Sarifa is liable for Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. Taking monetary
evidence without proper authority constitutes theft. In Judge San Jose, Jr. vs. Camurongan,74
71
698 SCRA 161 (10 June 2013).
72
People vs. Musa, 591 SCRA 619 (3 July 2009); People vs. Dela Cruz, 575 SCRA 412 (24 December 2008); People vs.
Baron, 621 SCRA 646 (28 June 2010); Vidar vs. People, 611 SCRA 216 (1 February 2010); See also People vs.
Buenamer, 802 SCRA 37 (31 August 2016); People vs. Peralta, 792 SCRA 80 (1 June 2016); People vs. Torres, 735
SCRA 687 (22 September 2014); Crisostomo vs. People, 629 SCRA 590 (1 September 2010).
73
People vs. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701 (2009).
74
522 Phil. 80 (2006).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
the Court held that, the act of taking monetary exhibits without authority from their custodian
constitutes theft. Thievery, no matter how petty, has no place in the judiciary. This unlawful
act of taking cannot be justified by an alleged intention to safeguard the money from damage
that might be caused by the flood.
In OCA vs. Musngi supra, it was held that: Musngi’s acts of stealing the P45,000 and
saying that she used the amount for the alleged repair of the ceiling and toilet of the trial court
constitute grave misconduct and dishonesty.
45.Q. What are the elements of Qualified Theft under Art. 310 of the RPC?
1. People vs. Manlao (G.R. No. 234023, 3 September 2018)(Second Division)

2. Candelaria vs. People (744 SCRA 178, 8 December 2014)(First Division)

[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under
Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are:
(a) the taking of personal property;

(b) the said property belongs to another;
(c) the said taking be done with intent to gain;
(d) it be done without the owner’s consent;
(e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and
(f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the
RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence; 75 committed by a domestic servant.76
In the case of People vs. Manlao supra, the accused, in maintaining her innocence,
insists that as a naïve kasambahay who hailed from a rural area and only had an educational
attainment until Grade 4, she was merely tricked in a modus operandi when she complied
with the verbal instructions relayed over the phone by a person whom she thought to be
Carmel. She further points out that her non-flight manifests her lack of intent to gain;
otherwise, she would not have returned to her employers' residence and face prosecution for
the enormous value of the items taken.
The Supreme Court was not convinced. It held:
Jurisprudence provides that intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act

which can be established through the overt acts of the offender 77 and is presumed from the
proven unlawful taking.78
Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.
46.Q. What must be determined by the trial court for the proper imposition of
penalty in theft and estafa cases?
46.A. Courts dealing with theft, as well as estafa cases, would do well to be
mindful of the accused’s significance of determining the value of the goods involved, or
the amounts embezzled in said cases as they do not only entail the proper resolution of the
civil liability (if the civil aspect has been so integrated) but also delimit the proper penalty
to be imposed. These matters, through the trial court’s judicious direction, should be
sufficiently passed upon during trial and its finding thereon be amply explained in its verdict.
Although an appeal of a criminal case throws the entire case up for review, 79 the ends of
justice, both in its criminal and civil senses, demand nothing less but complete and thorough
adjudication in the judicial system’s every level. Truth be told, the peculiar nature of these
cases provides a distinctive opportunity for this ideal to be subserved.
75
Zapanta vs. People, 694 SCRA 25 (20 March 2013).
76
Candelaria vs. People, 749 Phil. 517 (2014).
77
People vs. Del Rosario, 411 Phil. 676 (2001).
78
See People vs. Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424 (19 July 2017).
79
An appeal in criminal cases throws open the entire case for review and it becomes the duty of the appellate court
to correct any error, as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not. (People vs.
Balacano, 391 Phil. 509 [2000], citing People vs. Reñola, 367 Phil. 415 [1999] and People vs. Medina, 360 Phil. 281
[1998].)
IN CRIMINAL LAW
ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315(1)(b)
47.Q. What are the elements of estafa through abuse of confidence under Art.
315(1)(b) of the RPC? Explain.
1. Rivac vs. People (G.R. No. 224673, 22 January 2018)(Second Division)

2. Benabaye vs. People (752 SCRA 26, 25 February 2015)(First Division)

[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that: The elements are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by

the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of

another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender. 80 (People vs. Go, 732
SCRA 216, 6 August 2014; D’Aigle vs. People, 675 SCRA 206, 27 June 2012.)
Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal property is
received by the offender from the offended party:
(1) in trust; or
(2) on commission; or
(3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession
and juridical possession of the thing received.
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.81
48.Q. What is the essence of estafa committed under Art. 315(1)(b)?
48.A. In Rivac vs. People supra, citing the case of Cheng vs. People,82 the Supreme
Court elucidated: The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be
made. The words convert and misappropriate connote the act of using or disposing of
another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different
from that agreed upon.
To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal
advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. In
proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, the legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to
return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.83
49.Q. What is the crime committed by an employee who misappropriated the

money of his employer in his possession?
49.A. Theft. So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not
pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or
otherwise. Hence, conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having mere
material possession of the said property constitutes theft.
80
Magtira vs. People, 667 SCRA 607 (7 March 2012).
81
Chua-Burce vs. CA, 387 Phil. 15 (2000).
82
780 SCRA 374 (13 January 2016); citing Pamintuan vs. People, 635 Phil. 514 (2010).
83
Cheng vs. People supra, citing Pamintuan vs. People, supra.
IN CRIMINAL LAW
Whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession
have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes Estafa.
A sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is considered to

be only in the material possession of the employee.84 The material possession of an
employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession
of the employer.
50.Q. What is the effect when the element of misappropriation or conversion is

absent in a case of Estafa under Art. 315(1)(b)? Explain.
50.A. In Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr. vs. Manzano (827 SCRA 253, 19 June
2017)(First Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the Supreme Court held that: In the fairly recent
case of Dy vs. People,85 the Court discussed the concept of civil liability ex delicto in Estafa
cases under paragraph 1 (b), Article 315 of the RPC stating that when the element of
misappropriation or conversion is absent, there can be no Estafa and concomitantly, the
civil liability ex delicto does not exist.
Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of pecuniary
estimation through estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit in order to
cause damage. As this Court previously held, the element of fraud or bad faith is
indispensable. Our law abhors the act of defrauding another person by abusing his trust or
deceiving him, such that, it criminalizes this kind of fraud.
51.Q. What is the act being penalized in Estafa under Art. 315(1)(b)? Explain.
51.A. In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the
act of misappropriation or conversion. When the element of misappropriation or conversion
is missing, there can be no estafa. In such case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil
liability ex delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is no act or omission from which any
civil liability may be sourced. However, when an accused is acquitted because a reasonable
doubt exists as to the existence of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability may still
be awarded. This means that, while there is evidence to prove fraud, such evidence does
not suffice to convince the court to the point of moral certainty that the act of fraud
amounts to estafa. As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without sufficient proof
justifying the imposition of any criminal penalty, civil liability exists.
The Court further clarified that whenever the elements of estafa are not established,
and that the delivery of any personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil
liability arising from the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is because the
civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the
same act or omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to
be recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.
SYNDICATED ESTAFA UNDER P.D. NO. 1689
52.Q. What is syndicated estafa? Explain.
52.A. In the following consolidated cases:
1. Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) Pag-Ibig Fund vs. Christina

Sagun (G.R. No. 205698, 31 July 2018)(En Banc)[Bersamin, J.]
2. Department of Justice, Rep. by Sec. Leila de Lima, State Prosecutor

Theodore M. Villanueva, and Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano, and the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) vs. Christina Sagun (G.R. No. 205780)(En Banc)
3. Department of Justice vs. Delfin S. Lee (G.R. No. 208744)(En Banc)
84
Matrido vs. People, 610 Phil. 203 (2009).
85
G.R. No. 189081 (10 August 2016).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
4. Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) vs. Globe Asiatique Realty

Holdings Corporation, Delfin S. Lee, In His Capacity as the President of the Corporation,
and Tessie G. Wang (G.R. No. 209424)(En Banc)
5. People of the Philippines vs. Alex M. Alvarez (G.R. No. 209446)(En Banc)
6. Home Development Mutual Fund vs. Atty. Alex M. Alvarez (G.R. No.
209489)(En Banc)
7. Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) vs. Delfin S. Lee (G.R. No.
209852)(En Banc)
8. Department of Justice vs. Delfin S. Lee (G.R. No. 210095)(En Banc)
9. People of the Philippines vs. Delfin S. Lee (G.R. No. 210143)(En Banc)
10. Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) vs. Dexter L. Lee (G.R. No.
228452)(En Banc)
11. People of the Philippines vs. Dexter L. Lee [G.R. No. 228730](En Banc)
12. Cristina Salagan vs. People of the Philippines and Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF)(G.R. No. 230680)(En Banc), the Supreme Court pronounced that: A
syndicate is defined by P.D. No. 1689 as consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
scheme.86 The Supreme Court has clarified in Remo vs. Devanadera87 that in order for any
group to be considered a syndicate under P.D. No. 1689 x x x the perpetrators of
an estafa must not only be comprised of at least five individuals but must have also used
the association that they formed or managed to defraud its own stockholders, members or
depositors.
53.Q. What does P.D. No. 1689 condemn?
53.A. P.D. No. 1689 condemns the taking by fraud or deceit of funds contributed by
members of rural banks, cooperatives, samahang nayon or farmers' associations, or of funds
solicited by corporations or associations from the general public as such taking poses a
serious threat to the general public.
54.Q. What are the elements of syndicated estafa?
54.A. In People vs. Tibayan (746 SCRA 259, 14 January 2015)(First Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The elements of syndicated estafa are:
(a) estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of
the Revised Penal Code, is committed;
(b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons;

and
(c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by the

stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, samahang nayon(s), or farmers'
associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.88
55.Q. What are the elements of estafa by means of deceit under Art. 315(2)(a) of
the RPC?
55.A. The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of

the Revised Penal Code are:
(a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his

power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions;
86
Catiis vs. Court of Appeals, 482 SCRA 71 (9 February 2006).
87
813 SCRA 610 (9 December 2016).
88
People vs. Tibayan, 746 SCRA 259 (24 January 2015).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
(b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and
(d) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
56.Q. What are the standards in considering a group of purported swindlers as a

syndicate under PD No. 1689?
56.A. The standards are as follows:
(1) They must be at least five (5) in number;
(2) They must have formed or managed a rural bank, cooperative, samahang
nayon, farmer's association or any other corporation or association that solicits funds from the
general public.
(3) They formed or managed such association with the intention of carrying out
an unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme i.e., they used the very
association that they formed or managed as the means to defraud its own stockholders,
members and depositors.
Thus, the Supreme Court in the case of Sagun, Delfin Lee, Dexter Lee, Salagan and
Alvarez concluded that None of the three abovementioned standards for determining the
existence of a syndicate was present.
Delfin Lee, Dexter, Sagun, and Salagan were, respectively, the President/Chief
Operating Officer, Executive. Vice-President, Head of the Documentation Department, and
Head of the Accounting/Finance Department of Globe Asiatique. In view of their number
being under five, the original charge brought against them was only for simple estafa.
It was only in the assailed Review Resolution of August 10, 2011 that SDSP Villanueva
recommended the filing of the charge for syndicated estafa due to the addition of Atty.
Alvarez as a co-respondent, thereby increasing the number of the respondents to at
least five.
But Atty. Alvarez was the Manager of the HDMF's Foreclosure Department whose
only connection with Globe Asiatique was by reason of his having rendered notarial
services for the latter. If Atty. Alvarez was not related to Globe Asiatique either by
employment or by ownership, he could not be considered as part of the syndicate supposedly
formed or managed to defraud its stockholders, members, depositors or the public. This alone
immediately removed the respondents' supposed association from being found and
considered as a syndicate in the context of P.D. No. 1689.
Even assuming that Atty. Alvarez was juridically connected with Globe Asiatique in
the context of P.D. No. 1689, the association of the respondents did not solicit funds from the
general public. Globe Asiatique was incorporated in 1994 as a legitimate real-estate developer
to acquire by purchase, lease, donation or otherwise, to own, use, improve, develop,
subdivide, sell, mortgage, exchange, lease, develop and hold for investment or otherwise, real
estate of all kinds, whether improve, manage, or otherwise dispose of buildings, houses,
apartments, and other structures of whatever kind, together with their appurtenances. It is
quite notable, too, that there was no allegation about Globe Asiatique having been
incorporated to defraud its stockholders or members. In fact, the HDMF, the only
complainant in the estafa charges, was not itself a stockholder or member of Globe
Asiatique.
57.Q. In the event that the circumstances does not fall under P.D. No. 1689 for
Syndicated Estafa, can the accused be prosecuted instead for Estafa under Art. 315(2(a) of
the RPC? Explain.
57.A. Yes. In Sagun, et al., the Supreme Court said: Notwithstanding the absence of
a syndicate, the respondents made false representations that gave rise to probable cause for
simple estafa against them.
IN CRIMINAL LAW
In Galvez vs. Court of Appeals,89 the Supreme Court has emphasized that swindling
may fall within the ambit of P.D. No. 1689 if it is committed through an association. On the
other hand, Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code applies regardless of the number of
the accused.
58.Q. If corporate officers committed a crime using the corporation, what is the
nature of their criminal liability? Explain.
58.A. Their criminal liability is individual. In Ching vs. Secretary of Justice,90 the
Supreme Court declared that corporate officers or employees through whose act, default or
omission the corporation commits a crime were themselves individually guilty of the
crime.
ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315(2)(d)
59.Q. What are the essential elements of Estafa under Art. 315(2)(d)?
59.A. In Rimando vs. Aldaba (738 SCRA 232, 13 October 2014)(First Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that: Deceit and damage are essential elements in
Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code.
60.Q. What are the distinctions between violation of Art. 315(2)(d) and B.P. Blg.
22?
60.A. Under Art. 315(2)(d) deceit and damage are required;
Whereas, under B.P. Blg. 22 they are not required. Under the latter law, mere
issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part
of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is
not so under the Penal Code.
Other differences between the two also include the following:
(1) A drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas

Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a preexisting
obligation.
While under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such
circumstance negates criminal liability;
(2) Specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two
offenses;
(3) Estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation

of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it
does injury to the entire banking system;
(4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in
se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.
61.Q. Can an offended party file a case for violation of Art. 315(2)(d) and for B.P.
Blg. 22?
61.A. Yes. In People vs. Reyes,91 it was held that the simultaneous filing of BP 22
and estafa cases do not amount to double jeopardy.
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may
refer to identical acts committed by the petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to
one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where
there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law
as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double
jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated,
prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same
89
691 SCRA 445 (20 February 2013).
90
481 SCRA 609 (6 February 2006).
91
228 SCRA 13 (18 November 1993).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to
double jeopardy.
Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set
of facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are
considered separate, distinct, and independent from each other. Therefore, both cases can
proceed to their final adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to the
prohibition on double recovery.92 Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the criminal and
civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil
aspects of a related estafa case, as in this instance.
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY (ARTICLES 333-346)
62.Q. What are the elements of Rape under Art. 335 93 prior to the effectivity of
the 1997 Anti-Rape Law?
1. People vs. Alejandro (820 SCRA 189, 13 March 2017)(First Division) [Perlas-
Bernabe, J.]
2. People vs. Arguta (756 SCRA 376, 20 April 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that: Under this provision, the elements of Rape are:
(a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
(b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or
intimidation; or the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the
victim was under twelve (12) years of age or demented.94
63.Q. When can there be a Qualified Rape?
63.A. If the act is committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or
more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher
penalty.95
64.Q. What are the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC?
1. Orsos vs. People (845 SCRA 150, 20 November 2017)(Second Division)

2. People vs. Ladra (831 SCRA 252, 17 July 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.]
3. People vs. Monroyo (828 SCRA 416, 28 June 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-

Bernabe, J.], it was held that: The elements are as follows:
(a) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(b) that it is done under any of the following circumstances:
(i) through force, threat, or intimidation,
(ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise

unconscious,
92
See Lim vs. Kou Co Ping, 679 SCRA 114 (23 August 2012).
93
At the time the informations were filed before the RTC, or on January 30, 1997, RA 8353, entitled "An Act
Expanding the Definition of the Crime of Rape, Reclassifying the Same as a Crime Against Persons, Amending for
the Purpose Act No. 3815, As Amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, and for Other Purposes,"
was not yet in effect as it was only passed on 30 September 1997.
94
See People vs. Viojela, 684 SCRA 241 (17 October 2012).
95
Note that the same clause is reproduced in toto in Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, otherwise
known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997" and, thus, such circumstances still qualify the rape under the new rape law.
IN CRIMINAL LAW
(iii) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority,

and
(iv) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present; and
(c) that the offended party is another person of either sex.96
65.Q. What does lewd mean?
65.A. In Amployo vs. People,97 the Supreme Court held: The term lewd is commonly
defined as something indecent or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite crude
sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a
mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such
intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence
or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the
environmental circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature,
cannot be pigeonholed into a precise definition.
66.Q. Did R.A. No. 7610 expressly repealed Art. 336 of the RPC? Explain.
66.A. No. In Quimvel vs. People (823 SCRA 192, 18 April 2017)(En Banc)[Velasco,
Jr., J.],98 the Supreme Court held that: Sec. 4 of RA 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336
of the RPC for if it were the intent of Congress, it would have expressly done so. Rather, the
phrase in Sec. 4 states: deemed amended, modified, or repealed accordingly qualifies Article
335 of Act No. 3815, as amended, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders,
administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of
RA 8353.
As can be read, repeal is not the only fate that may befall statutory provisions that are
inconsistent with RA 8353. It may be that mere amendment or modification would suffice to
reconcile the inconsistencies resulting from the latter law's enactment. In this case, Art. 335
of the RPC,99 which previously penalized rape through carnal knowledge, has been
replaced by Art. 266-A.100
Thus, the reference by Art. 336 of the RPC to any of the circumstances mentioned
on the erstwhile preceding article on how the crime is perpetrated should now refer to the
circumstances covered by Art. 266-A as introduced by the Anti-Rape Law.
The Supreme Court further held that: We are inclined to abide by the Court's long-
standing policy to disfavor repeals by implication for laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. The failure to
particularly mention the law allegedly repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal the
said law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the
new and old laws.101
Here, RA 8353 made no specific mention of any RPC provision other than Art. 335
as having been amended, modified, or repealed. And as demonstrated, the Anti Rape Law,
on the one hand, and Art. 336 of the RPC, on the other, are not irreconcilable. The only
96
See Quimvel vs. People, G.R. No. 214497 (18 April 2017); People vs. Lomaque, 697 SCRA 383 (5 June 2013).
97
G.R. No. 157718 (26 April 2005)[Chico-Nazario, J.].
98
The SC affirm the CA's Decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness as penalized under Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610.
99
Article 335. When and how rape is committed - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in
the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
100
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. (as amended by RA 8353, Sec. 2)
101
Philippine International Trading Corporation vs. Commission on Audit, 621 SCRA 461 (22 June 2010).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
construction that can be given to the phrase preceding article is that Art. 336 of the RPC now
refers to Art. 266-A in the place of the repealed Art. 335. It is, therefore, erroneous to claim
that Acts of Lasciviousness can no longer be prosecuted under the RPC.
It is likewise incorrect to claim that Art. 336 had been rendered inoperative by the
Anti-Rape Law and argue in the same breath the applicability of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. The
latter provision reads:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – x x x
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
[victim] is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; x x x
If Art. 336 then ceased to be a penal provision in view of its alleged incompleteness,
then so too would Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 be ineffective since it defines and punishes the
prohibited act by way of reference to the RPC provision.
IF THE VICTIM IS BELOW 12 YEARS-OFFENDER SHALL BE PROSECUTED UNDER ART.

336 BUT SHOULD BE PENALIZED UNDER SEC. 5(b), R.A. 7610.
67.Q. If the victim of a lascivious conduct is below 12 years of age, how should
the accused be prosecuted and penalized?
67.A. In the case of Fianza vs. People (834 SCRA 254, 2 August 2017)(First
Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that: In instances where the child
subjected to sexual abuse through lascivious conduct is below twelve (12) years of age, the
offender should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, but suffer the higher penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period in accordance with Section 5 (b), Article III of
RA 7610.
68.Q. What are the other acts referred to as punishable under Art. 339 of the
RPC? Explain.
68.A. In Dimakuta vs. People (773 SCRA 228, 20 October 2015)(En Banc)[Peralta,
J.], it was held that: Article 339 of the RPC likewise punishes acts of lasciviousness committed
with the consent of the offended party if done by the same persons and under the same
circumstances mentioned in Articles 337 and 338 of the RPC, to wit:
(1) if committed against a virgin over twelve years and under eighteen years of
age by any person in public authority, priest, home-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or
any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman; or
(2) if committed by means of deceit against a woman who is single or a widow of

good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age.
Therefore, if the victim of the lascivious acts or conduct is over 12 years of age and
under eighteen (18) years of age, the accused shall be liable for:
(1) Other acts of lasciviousness under Art. 339 of the RPC, where the victim is a
virgin and consents to the lascivious acts through abuse of confidence or when the victim is
single or a widow of good reputation and consents to the lascivious acts through deceit, or;
(2) Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 if the act of lasciviousness is not covered
by lascivious conduct as defined in R.A. No. 7610. In case the acts of lasciviousness is covered
by lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 and it is done through coercion or influence, which
establishes absence or lack of consent, then Art. 336 of the RPC is no longer applicable;
IN CRIMINAL LAW
(3) Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where there was no consent on the
part of the victim to the lascivious conduct, which was done through the employment of
coercion or influence. The offender may likewise be liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610
if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take care of herself or
protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition.102
69.Q. What are the elements of forcible abduction under Art. 342 of the RPC?
69.A. In the case of Alberto vs. CA (699 SCRA 104, 19 June 2013)(Second Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court pronounced that: The elements of Forcible Abduction
under Article 342 of the RPC are:
(a) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age or reputation;
(b) that the abduction must be against her will; and
(c) that the abduction must be with lewd designs.103
In Alberto, the Supreme Court reversed the findings of probable cause of the DOJ
Secretary. The High Court ruled that it committed grave abuse of discretion in finding
probable cause for the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape against the respondent.
Thus, it explained that:
As this crime is complexed with the crime of Rape pursuant to Article 48 of the RPC,
the elements of the latter offense must also concur. Further, owing to its nature as a
complex crime proper,104 the Forcible Abduction must be shown to be a necessary means for
committing the crime of Rape.
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR (ARTICLES 353-364)
70.Q. What are the elements of libel under Art. 353 of the RPC? Explain.
70.A. In the case of Ty-Delgado vs. HRET (782 SCRA 117, 26 January 2016)(En
Banc)[Carpio, J.], it was held that: To be liable for libel, the following elements must be
shown to exist:
(a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another;
(b) publication of the charge;
(c) identity of the person defamed; and
(d) existence of malice.105
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to
injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm.106
Malice is bad faith or bad motive and it is the essence of the crime of libel. To
determine actual malice, a libelous statement must be shown to have been written or
published with the knowledge that it is false or in reckless disregard of whether it is false
or not.
102
Sec. 3(a), R.A. No. 7610.
103
People vs. Ng, 226 Phil. 518 (1986).
104
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. There are, thus, two kinds of complex crimes. The
first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The
second is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
(People vs. Rebucan, 27 July 2011, citing People vs. Gaffud, Jr., 566 SCRA 76, 19 September 2008).
105
Brillante vs. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 568 (2004); Lopez vs. People, 642 SCRA 668 (14 February 2011); Corpuz vs.
Del Rosario, 638 SCRA 369 (15 December 2010).
106
Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 1 (1999).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
Reckless disregard of what is false or not means that the defendant entertains
serious doubt as to the truth of the publication or possesses a high degree of awareness of
its probable falsity.
71.Q. What is the effect on the accused if after filing a case of libel against him
another libelous article was published?
71.A. In Ty-Delgado vs. HRET supra, the Supreme Court held that: The fact that
another libelous article was published after the filing of the complaint can be considered as
further evidence of malice.107 Thus, Pichay (the private respondent herein) clearly acted with
actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. He committed an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which he owes his fellow men, or
society in general, and an act which is contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.
72.Q. If the accused in a libel case is not the author but the publisher of the
libelous articles and the penalty for his conviction was reduced to payment of fine, is it
correct that the circumstances of his conviction did not amount to moral turpitude?
72.A. No. The imposition of a fine does not determine whether the crime involves
moral turpitude or not.
In Villaber vs. Commission on Elections,108 the Supreme Court held that a crime still
involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed is reduced to a fine.
The Revised Penal Code provides that: Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause
the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or
business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the
author thereof.109
The provision did not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the nature or
degree of the participation of the persons involved in the crime of libel. It is basic in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
73.Q. What is oral defamation? What are the parameters to correctly classify
slander as grave or slight? Explain.
73.A. In Ramos vs. People (845 SCRA 324, 20 November 2017)(Second Division)
[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], citing the case of De Leon vs. People,110 the Supreme Court held that:
Oral defamation or slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing.
It is defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in
his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. It becomes grave when it is of a
serious and insulting nature.
Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not
only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the offended party.
The gravity depends upon:
(1) the expressions used;

(2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and
(3) the special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship
between the offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the
offender at the time.
In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with
some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony. In
Ramos the Supreme classify the uttered words of the petitioner:
107
United States vs. Montalvo, 29 Phil. 595 (1915).
108
420 Phil. 930 (2001).
109
Article 360, The Revised Penal Code.
110
779 SCRA 84 (11 January 2016).
IN CRIMINAL LAW
"ukininam, puta, awan ad-adal mo" which means "vulva of your

mother, prostitute, illiterate."
Only as slight oral defamation and imposed a fine on him.
QUASI-OFFENSES (OR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE) (ARTICLE 365)
74.Q. What is reckless imprudence? Explain.
74.A. In the case of Gonzaga vs. People (746 SCRA 551, 21 January 2015)(First
Division)[Perlas-Bernabe, J.], the High Court held that: Reckless imprudence, as defined in
Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it

must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the
injuries or damages complained of.
To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than
a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of
the consequences is required.111 Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others
within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of
a course of action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others
involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable
person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the
consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere
negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to
whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.112
75.Q. Is Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical

Injuries and Damage to Property a complex crime? Explain.
75.A. Yes. The offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with

Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to
Article 263113 of the RPC, a complex crime. Article 48 of the RPC provides that when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime, in this case, Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
76.Q. What is the proper penalty when reckless imprudence with the use of
motor vehicle resulted to the death of a person? Explain.
111
Dumayag vs. People, 686 SCRA 347 (26 November 2012).
112
Caminos, Jr. vs. People, 605 Phil. 422 (2009).
113
Art. 263. Serious physical injuries.— Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the
crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the injured person
shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum period, if in consequence of the
physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or
shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg, or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have
become incapacitated for the work in which he was theretofore habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence of the
physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his
body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in
which he as habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the
physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than
thirty days.
If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article 246, or with
attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case covered by subdivision number 1 of this
Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by
subdivision number 2 by prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period; the
case covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; and the case
covered by subdivision number 4 by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall inflict physical
injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.
IN CRIMINAL LAW
76.A. Under Article 365 of the RPC, the accused shall be punished with the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 114 the minimum of said penalty should be
taken from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period,
or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Consequently, the
Court finds a need to modify the penalty to be imposed on Rogelio and thus, sentences him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum, as
minimum, to six years of prision correccional in its maximum, as maximum.
77.Q. What proof is needed in order for the trial court to award moral damages in
a case for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide?
77.A. The award of moral damages properly speaking, is denominated as one for
the payment of civil indemnity as they were not awarded under the parameters of the Civil
Code relevant thereto,115 but was one given without need of proof other than the fact of
death as a result of the crime and proof of the accused’s responsibility for it.116
78.Q. When shall the imposed interest on its payment accrue?
78.A. In line with existing jurisprudence, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of judgment
until fully paid.117
114
Pertinently, Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides:
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense;
and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
115
See Articles 2217 to 2220 of the Civil Code.
116
People vs. Berondo, Jr., 601 Phil. 538 (2009); citing People vs. Whisenhunt, 420 Phil. 677 (2001).
117
See People of the Philippines vs. Torres, G.R. No. 189850 (22 September 2014).

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PRE-WEEK AND

LAST MINUTE LECTURE

ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II, LL.M.

II. REVISED PENAL CODE - BOOK II

CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE STATE (ARTICLES 124-133)

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER (ARTICLES 134-160)

2.Q. What are the elements of the crime of Rebellion?

(i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or

(ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces;

3.Q. How is the existence of rebellion determined by the President?

3.A. In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to

(1) actual rebellion or invasion;

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST (ARTICLES 161-189)

4.Q. What are the elements of perjury?

5.Q. Explain the element of materiality in perjury cases.

6.A. A conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by the prosecution by merely

If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is

3. the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC).

CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS (ARTICLES 203-245)

Otherwise, the public prosecutor or administrative hearing officer may be usurping a

12.A. In the following cases of:

1. Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan (847 SCRA 552, 5 December 2017)(En Banc)

2. Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People (823 SCRA 370, 18 April 2017)(En Banc)

3. Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People (797 SCRA 241, 19 July 2016)(En Banc)

(1) that the offender is a public officer;

(4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIEW OF THE EFFECTIVITY OF R.A. NO. 10951

13.A. In Rolando Elbanbuena y Marfil, In Re: Correction/Adjustment of Penalty

These guidelines shall govern the procedure for actions seeking:

(1) the modification, based on the amendments introduced by RA

(2) the immediate release of the petitioner-convict on account of

II. Who may file.

The Public Attorney's Office, the concerned inmate, or his/her counsel/representative,

III. Where to file.

V. Comment by the OSG.

VI. Effect of failure to file comment.

VII. Judgment of the court.

(a) The penalty/penalties imposable in accordance with RA No. 10951;

(c) Whether the petitioner-convict is entitled to immediate release due to

VIII. Applicability of the regular rules.

14.Q. Is the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of

ANSWER IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. NO. 10951:

However, if the charged involves paragraph 5, if the amount exceeds P8,800,000,

ANSWER PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT:

In the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, the offender misappropriates public

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS (ARTICLES 246-266-D)

18.A. In the following cases:

1. People vs. Cortez, et al. (G.R. No. 239137, 5 December 2018)(Second

2. People vs. Cirbeto (G.R. No. 231359, 7 February 2018)(Second Division)

3. People vs. Miguel (752 SCRA 94, 25 February 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

4. Ramos vs. People (815 SCRA 226, 23 January 2017)(First Division)[Perlas-

5. People vs. Parba (773 SCRA 83, 19 October 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

6. People vs. Samuya (756 SCRA 365, 20 April 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

7. People vs. Matibag (754 SCRA 529, 25 March 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

(1) a person was killed;

19.Q. What is murder in contemplation of Art. 248 of the RPC?

20.Q. Explain treachery in the context of Art. 248.

20.A. In the following cases:

1. People vs. Umawid (725 SCRA 597, 9 June 2014)(Second Division)[Perlas-

2. People vs. Parba (773 SCRA 83, 19 October 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

3. People vs. Inciong (760 SCRA 249, 22 June 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

4. People vs. Samuya (756 SCRA 365, 20 April 2015)(First Division)[Perlas-

22.Q. Can treachery be appreciated in the killing of a child?