Republic V De Knecht Feb 12 1990
FACTS:
On February 20, 1979 The Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation
proceeding against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan
streets among them Cristina De Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and
some fifteen other defendants ( docketed as Civil Case No. 7001).
De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from proceeding with the
expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the lower court on the ground that the
government had already made the required deposit with the PNB of 10% of the
amount of the compensation written in the complaint.
Meanwhile, De knecht filed petition for certiorari and prohibition was granted
setting aside the order to take possession of the property, the SC reversed the lower
court decision and granted the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the
expropriation was arbitrary.
The case was remanded to the lower court. No further action was taken despite the
SC decision until two years later, in 1983, when the Government moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature has enacted BP P 340
expropriating the same properties for the same purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether an expropriation proceeding may be the subject of a subsequent
legislation for expropriation.
1. Whether or not the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 is
the proper ground for the dismissal of the expropriation case
2. Whether or not the DPWH’s "choice" of land to be
expropriated is still an issue under the circumstances, said
"choice" having been supplanted by the legislature’s choice.
3. Whether or not the law of the case theory should be applied to
the case at bar
HELD:
1. There is no question that in the decision of this Court dated October 30, 1980 in
De Knecht v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-51078, this Court held that the "choice of the
Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets as the line through which the EDSA should be
extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval."
It is based on the recommendation of the Human Settlements Commission that the
choice of Cuneta street as the line of the extension will minimize the social impact
factor as the buildings and improvement therein are mostly motels. While it is true
that said final judgment of this Court on the subject becomes the law of the case
between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take private
properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided
in the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be
undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land
owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.
2. When on February 17, 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340
expropriating the very properties subject of the present proceedings, and for the
same purpose, it appears that it was based on supervening events that occurred after
the decision of this Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the
expropriation through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets. The social impact factor
which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had
disappeared. All residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated.
Eighty percent of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been
completed. Only private respondent remains as the solitary obstacle to this project
that will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem but also minimize
the traffic bottleneck in the area. The Court finds justification in proceeding with
the said expropriation proceedings through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets from
EDSA to Roxas Boulevard due to the aforestated supervening events after the
rendition of the decision of this Court in De Knecht.
3. B.P. Blg. 340 therefore effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory
decision of this Court. And the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case pending before it on the ground of the enactment of B.P. Blg.
340. Moreover, the said decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the
Government in thereafter (over two years later in this case) making its own
independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of
undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting
the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom
and necessity of enacting B.P. Blg. 340. Thus the anterior decision of this Court
must yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.