Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
net/publication/333681946
CITATIONS READS
0 20
2 authors:
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
CRM 2018 – Conceptual Frameworks, Reasoning & Modelling in the History and Epistemology of Science & Teaching Sciences/Nature of Sciences View project
Analogy in Islamic Law, Constructive Type Theory and Mathematics View project
All content following this page was uploaded by Shahid Rahman on 11 June 2019.
MUHAMMAD IQBAL
Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 8163 - STL- Savoirs Textes Langage, F-59000 Lille, France; and
Islamic University Antasari, Banjarmasin, Indonesia
iqbal.ego@gmail.com
SHAHID RAHMAN
Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 8163 - STL- Savoirs Textes Langage, F-59000 Lille, France
shahid.rahman@univ-lille3.fr
Abstract:
Despite the fact that the spread of Islam in Indonesia can perhaps be traced
back to the 9th century, it had to wait until the 17th and 18th centuries to reach
its full cultural, scientific and institutional outcomes. One crucial challenge was
one that nowadays rises up in our modern society, namely finding out ways of
cultural integration.
The paper will also provide the first translation from the Indonesian of the
Relevant texts and a study of the dialectical structure of the qiyās involved.
Introduction
Despite the fact that the spread of Islam in Indonesia can perhaps be traced
back to the 9th century, it had to wait until the 17th and 18th centuries to reach
its full cultural, scientific and institutional outcomes. One crucial challenge was
one that nowadays rises up in our modern society, namely finding out ways of
cultural integration.
Al-Banjari learned the theory and practice of qiyās from the Shāfi‘ī-school
of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) including the work of one the most important
masters of that school, namely, Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (393H/1003-
476CE/1083CE); but he also integrated some further developments of the qiyās
as the ones of al-Ghazālī. 3
1
The Banjarese represent one of the largest tribe in Indonesia. Nowadays they are more than 4
million, mostly living in South Kalimantan.
2
That is, the principle that “the original state of things is permissibility except for what the Law
proscribes” (al-aṣl fi’l-ashyā’ al-ibāḥa illā mā ḥaẓarahu al-Sharʿ). See Ibn Ḥazm (1928-1933),
vol. 1, p. 177. See Rahman/Zidani/Young (2019, section V.
3
Whereas al-Ghazālī defended vehemently the use of qiyās, he did not share the opinion that the
occasioning factor can be identified by pure epistemological means. Epistemological methods
must be coupled with insights coming from revelation. Cf. al-Ghazālī (1324H, pp. 307-308) and
Hallaq (1987b, pp. 61-62).This seems to be the interpretation of al-Ghazālī' followed by al-
Banjari. Perhaps, one way to put al-Ghazālī's point is as stressing the fact that the epistemological
means provided by qiyās pave the way for understanding the intention of the norms by the
Lawgiver. Once the way has been opened by epistemological means, revelation can bring the
deeper insight required for approaching certainty. Keeping in mind the due differences, we might
3
In this context, one cannot overestimate the work of al-Banjari, who sets a
paradigm on how to apply a dialectical constitution of qiyās in order to
integrate new cultural contexts into the scope of Islamic Law.
the argument for the allowance of consuming the traditional drink called
Lahang (even when fermented) made of the juice of sugar-palm.
Whereas the debate on the former takes the form of qiyās al-shabah
(argument by analogy), the second one is shaped by qiyās al-‘illa –
argumentation-schemes based on establishing the occasioning factor (or ratio
legis) that grounds the juridical decision at stake.
The paper will also provide the first translation from the Indonesian of the
Relevant texts and a study of the dialectical structure of the qiyās involved.
In the next section we will briefly recall the main notions involving the
objectives and feature of the dialectical constitution of qiyās,
parallel al-Ghazālī's point with Freg'es view that though concepts are ontological independent of
the logical analysis that makes them explicit and therefore publically accessible to human
understanding, this analysis clears the way to the grasping of those concepts. Nevertheless,
different to al-Ghazālī, Frege thinks that logical analysis is the only way.
4
2 Basics on Qiyās,
Let us recall that one of the finest outcomes of the argumentative approach
to legal reasoning within fiqh (Islamic Law) is the notion of qiyās, known as
correlational inference. 4
4
Cf. Young (2017, p. 10). The term has quite often a broader meaning encompassing legal
reasoning in general. However, Young’s choice for its translation renders a narrower sense that
stems from approach of the Shafi‘ī’s.
5
Let us now display the dialogues based on the arguments of the texts and
shaped by the structure of the Islamic argumentation form.
Arsyad al-Banjari’s own presentation takes the form of text with the
headings question, response, instead of Proponent and Oppoent, usually
deployed within the framework of Jadal. This makes al-Banjari’s texts more
difficult to follow, particulary so when counter-attacks trigger a change of roles
between respondent and challenger.
In order to facilitate the reading, before providing the text, we will first
sketch very briefly the argumentation pattern and then we will proceed by
displaying the argument in a dialogical form. After presenting the dialogue we
5
See Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2019, Preface).
6
will provide a detailed analysis commenting the main moves from the point of
view of Islamic Argumentation theory.
Banjarese believed that if these rituals are not carried out the evil or the
hidden family will do harm such as bringing in disaster or disease. See
Mujiburrahman (2014).
The complexity of the argument does not only stem from its argumentative
structure but it is also generated by important philosophical matters. Indeed, the
strongest passages of the argument set up analogies involving epistemological and
theological issues concerning causation.
The argument starts by grounding its thesis (the interdiction) in the resemblance of the
branch-case, the rituals of manyanggar and mambuang pasilih, and the root-case, acts of
wasting based on idolatry and practicing heretical innovation, which amounts to
following the steps of Satan.
This is contested by another analogy brought forward by the clever Opponent who
compares the resemblance of the belief on the healing and preventing powers of the
contested rituals with the (established) belief that the power of fire to burn dry objects and
the power of food to satiate is in fact due to Allah's power to enact those effects. In other
words the Opponent is asserting the similarity of the branch-case with some other
alternative root-case in relation to the general property of believing that it is Allah the
only one who has the power to enact effects. Thus, carrying out the contested rituals is
not idolatry. The ones carrying out those rituals endorse after all the Islamic theory of
causation which establishes Allah as the true agent of efficiency (see remark below).
This allows the Opponent to force his antagonist to concede that, under these conditions,
practicing the rituals under consideration does not entail idolatry. Morever, since
7
deploying fire and food is not forbidden, so must manyanggar and mambuang pasilih be
integrated into Law as permissible acts.
The Proponent, accepts that under these conditions the practice of manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih do not entail idolatry. However he refuses that this should lead to their
permissibility. The Opponent's argument on the permissibility of manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih, is based on an irrelevant similarity between the belief entailed by
deploying fire and food and the belief entailed by the practice of those ritual. The grounds
for refusing the proposed similarity are subtle and deeply entrenched in the Islamic theory
of causation endorsed by al-Banjari just mentioned. In a nutshell, while burning and
satiation are enacted by Allah through the natural beings food and fire (in that derivative
send we can speak of them of being natural causes), the contested rituals are not present
in nature and cannot be said to be in that sense natural causes of healing and prevention
of danger enacted by Allah. Therefore food and fire are different to manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih and hence, the deployment of food and fire in order to attain their
effects (by the enacting of Allah) is also different to carrying out those rituals.
At this point of the debate, the argumentation seems to get stuck. On one
hand the Opponent managed to convince the Proponent that there is no idolatry
behind the practices in question; on the other the Proponent forces the Opponent
to concede that the analogies brought so far into the debate do not justify its
permissibility. Nevertheless, the Proponent, who has the burden of the proof, did
not prove yet his thesis on the interdiction of manyanggar and mambuang pasilih.
Accordingly, the Proponent, starts developing another angle of attack. Actually,
the moves of both Opponent and Proponent, that follow this attack, seem to be
grounded in less convincing analogies.
The Proponent claims now that manyanggar and mambuang pasilih entail wasting and
those who waste are likened to devils and therefore likened to those who follow the steps
of Satan.
The Opponent refuses to accept these rituals entail wasting by comparing feeding his own
family or friends with feeding the hidden family.
The response of the Proponent is the expected one. What is the evidence for the hidden
family profiting of the offers? Opponent's reference to the story of Elders and of a
possessed person, do not provide evidence that the offers have not been wasted.
The Opponent ends up accepting that practicing manyanggar and mambuang pasilih
entail wasting and following the footsteps of Satan.
However, surprisingly, the Opponent claims that though the practices entail following
Satan, this does not make those practices forbidden acts. The reason he brings in is that,
the objective of the practice is still a permissible one, namely being healed. Moreover, the
Opponent proposes the following: while feeding Satan with the aim of healing we can do
as if we were feeding a dog. Feeding a dog is permissible after all and so is the aim of
practicing these rituals, namely, being healed.
The expected response, is that engaging in a despicable act even in order to attain not
forbidden objectives, does not make the act less forbidden. This is indeed one of three
counterarguments brought forward by the Proponent. However, al-Banjari adds a twist to
his response. Not only engaging in a despicable act in order to attain some permissible
objective, does not change the interdiction, by doing as if the being addressed by the act
(Satan) is something else (the dog), does not help in erasing despicability of the act (and
corresponding interdiction). The Proponent's counter-examples are almost shocking:
8
Killing a person with the belief that this killing will bring relief to his heartache, makes it
not less despicable if while during the killing the murderer does as if he is killing a
mouse. He adds a second example of the same kind: committing adultery with the belief
that the intercourse will heal his rheumatism, does not become deontically acceptable,
even if during the intercourse the man does as if he is with his wife.
The Proponent, adds two more arguments, both of them amount to pinpointing out at the
dissimilarity between feeding a dog and feeding Satan and between Medicine as
acknowledged healing practice, and the rituals at stake. According to the Proponent, the
fact that feeding a dog and feeding Satan are different is made patent by the ways the
offering are carried out, leftovers for the dog, and the finest food for Satan. The third
dissimilarity seems to be more convincing to the modern reader: Medicine is practiced by
treating the body of the sick person by inducing ingestion or by semearing or spraying it.
This treatment impacts the body in such a way that it can be felt to be either cold or
warm. Clearly, this does not liken the purported healing practice of manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih. These practices are not acknowledged medical practices
Remark. In order to follow the argument it is necessary to take into consideration that al-
Banjari follows here the notion of causation of al-Ghazālī, according to whom; Allah is
the only agent of effects. In other words, the burning of cotton is neither inherent to fire
(it is not in the nature of fire by itself, to put in the terminology of al-Banjari), nor did
Allah constituted fire in such a way that once it contacts cotton it burns. Cotton burns
when in contact with fire because Allah constituted fire in such a way that when in
contact with cotton it is he himself who enacts the burning. 6 In the dialogue both,
Opponent and Proponent share this view on causation.
O P
Manyanggar and mambuang pasilih 0
are forbidden
1 Why ? 0? According to the sources, tabdhīr 7 or 2
wasting is forbidden, isn’t it?
6
See Marmura (1965). Peter Adamson (1998), who has a slightly less occasionalist reading as the
one of Marmura expresses the point as follows;
his [Al-Ghazālī] critique here imputes a very strong notion of causality to the
philosophers: namely that given the existence of a cause, the existence of its effect is
necessary. Al-Ghazālī holds that, on such a notion of causality, only God is a cause. This
is because, given the existence of miracles, and accepting the proposition that God can
do anything, no cause other than God can necessitate its effect. It is always possible that
God might will the expected effect not to proceed, or will an entirely different effect to
proceed. Al-Ghazālī defends this view against both philosophers who claim that a natural
cause, such as the fire which causes the burning of cotton, is the sole and sufficient cause
for its effect.
7
Literally, tabdhīr means wasting or squandering.
8
Literally, shirk means ascribing a partner for God in lordship and worship.
9
O students! You should know that some �ﻫﻨﺪﻗ� اڠﻜﻮﻛﳤﻮى ﱔ ﻃﺎﻟﺐ ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠﺘ
deeds that have become a custom in
some “lands below the wind” (Malay:
�ﺮ�ﺎدت ﻓﺪ ﺳ�ﺘڠﻪ نڬﺮى �وﻩ ا�ﲔ )ﺳﻔﺮة( ﳑﺒﻮاڠ
13
negeri bawah angin) 9 such as ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� دان ﻣڽڠڬﺮ دان �ﺮڠي�ﻎ ﺳأٔﳁﺎڽ )�ﺋﺖ( ﺑﺪ�ﻪ
mambuang pasilih, manyanggar and the
like are innovations (bid‘a) which are in
ﻫﻦ دڠﻦ ﻗﺮآٓن دان۲ﻓﺪ ﻓﺮ ﺑﻮا�ﻦ ﳘﺐ ﯾڠﱪﺳﻼ
opposition to the quran, the hadith, �ﺪﯾﺚ دان ﻗﻮل ﲱﺎﺑﺔ دان اﺟﲈع ﺳﳫﲔ �ﻠﲈء )ﻣﻚ
companion’s opinion (qawl ṣaḥāba) and �ﺋﺖ( ﺑﺪ�ﻪ ﺿﻼ� ﯾڠ أٔﻣﺖ كﺠﻰ واﺟﺐ ٔأ�ﺲ
consensus of jurists (ijmā‘). Thus, they
are heretical innovations (bid‘at al- ٔأورڠﯿﻎ ﻣڠﺮ�ﺎﻛﻨﺪي ﺳڬﺮا ﺗﻮﺑﺔ درﻓﺪاڽ )دان( واﺟﺐ
ḍalāla), so that it is obligatory for those دان اوراڠ �ﴪ ﻣڠﻬﯿﻠڠ�ﻜنﺪى۲ ا�ﺲ ﺳڬﻞ راج
who carried them out to repent. It is
also obligatory for kings and leaders to
درﰷرن ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ درﻓﺪﻓﻜﺮ �أٔن ﻣﻌﺼﯿﺔ ﯾڠ
abolish them since they are immoral ۲ ﻣڠن�ﺪوڠ ﺑﱪاف �ڬﻲ درﻓﺪ ﯾڠ ﻣنﻜﺮ )دان( ﺗﯿﻒ
acts in which some evils are present; ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠ ﻣنﻜﺮ اﯾﺖ واﺟﺐ ﻣنڬﻬﻜنﺪى دان
and every evil act must be interdicted
and eliminated as [we find in] the ﻣڠﻬﯿﻠڠ�ﻜنﺪى دڠﻦ ﺳﻮرﻩ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱄ دان رﺳﻮﻟڽ دداﱂ
command of Allah and His messanger .ﺑﱪاف ﻧﺺ ﻗﺮآٓن دان �ﺪﯾﺚ
in some verses of quran and hadith.
Question : how much evil is present in )ﺳﺆال( �ﺮاف �ڬﻲ ﻣنﻜﺮ ﺑڠﱰﻛﻨﺪوڠ دداﱂ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن
the act of mambuang pasilih and �ﺮﺑﻮاڠ ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� دان ﻣڽڠڬﺮ اﯾﺖ )ﺟﻮاب( ادﻓﻮن �ڬﻰ
manyanggar? Response: well, there are
many evils contained in that act. One of ﻣنﻜﺮ ﺑڠﱰﻛﻨﺪوڠ دداﱂ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن اﯾﺖ اﻣﺖ �ﭘﻖ
them is called tabdhīr that means )ﺳ�ﺘڠﻪ( درﻓﺪڽ ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ ﳕﺎڽ ٔأرﺗ� ﳑﺒﻮاڠ ارت دڠﻦ
wasting by spending money/resources;
and a person that wastes and spends
ﳑﺒﻠﻨ�ﺎﻛﻨﺪى ﻓﺪ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠﺪﺣﺮاﻣﻜﻦ )اﻧﯿ�( ارت
money/resources is called mubadhdhir. ارت دان ﯾڠ ﳑﺒﻠﻨ�ﺎ�ﻦ۲ ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ )دان( اورڠﯿڠ ﳑﺒﻮاڠ
This is the evil that Allah and His دى ﻓﺪ ﻓﻜﺮ �أٔن ﯾڠﺪ ﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ دﳕﺎى ﻣبﺬر )ﻣﻚ
Prophet prohibit in certain verses of
quran and hadith as Allah’s word: “wa ادا�( اﯾﺖ ﺳﺴــﻮات ﻣنﻜﺮ ﯾڠﺪ�ڬﻬﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ دان
lā tubadhdhir tabdhīrā. inna al- (رﺳﻮﻟڽ دداﱂ ﺑﱪاف ﻧﺺ آٓﯾﺔ ﻗﺮآٓن دان �ﺪﯾﺚ )ﺳﻔﺮة
mubadhdhirīna kānū ikhwān al-
shayāṭīn”. It means: “Do not spend ا �ن اﻟْ ُﻤ َﺒ ِّﺬ ِر َ�ﻦ َﰷﻧُﻮا. ًﻓﺮﻣﺎن ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ َ)و َﻻ ﺗُ َﺒ ِّﺬ ْر ﺗَ ْﺒ ِﺬ�ﺮا
�
wastefully. Surely, the wasteful اﺧ َْﻮ َان اﻟ �ﺸ� َﯿﺎ ِﻃﲔِ ( ٔأرﺗ� �ﺎڠﻨ� اڠﻜﻮ ﻣبﺬر درﰷرن
[people] are brothers of the devils”. �
That is to say, do not spend your
ﺳڬﻞ ﻣﺮﯾﻚ ﯾڠ ﻣبﺬر اﯾﺖ ادا� ﻣﺮ�ﻜئﯿﺖ ﺳﻮدار
money/resources for forbidden acts, ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮا )ﯾﻌﲎ( �ﺎڠﻦ اڠﻜﻮ ﺑﻠﻨ�ﺎ�ﻦ ار�م ﻓﺪ
because those who spend their ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠ ﺣﺮام )در ﰷرن( ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﺳڬﻞ ﻣﺮﯾﻚ ﯾڠ
money/resources for a forbidden act
become nothing but brothers of the ﳑﺒﻠﻨ�ﺎ�ﻦ ار�ڽ ﻓﺪ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠ ﺣﺮام اﯾﺖ �ﺪى
devils by the fact that they are deceived ﺳﻮدار ﺳڬﻞ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮا ﻓﺪ ﻓﳱﻖ �ﺮﻓﺮداي دڠﻦ
and together with devils they do what is
prohibited by Allah and His Messenger.
دڠﻨﺪي ﻣڠﺮ�ﺎ�ﻦ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠﺪ۲ ﻓﺮدا�ڽ )دان( �ﺮﺳﺎم
O intelligent brothers, listen to the �ڬﻬﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ دان رﺳﻮﻟڽ )ﱔ ﺳﳫﲔ( ﺳﻮدار ﯾڠ
prohibition of Allah to do tabdhīr; and �ﺎﻗﻞ دڠﺮ� نڬﻪ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ درﻓﺪ ﻣڠﺮ�ﺎ�ﻦ ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ ا�ﻦ
[recall that] Allah strongly condemns
9
It is the ancient name of Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce. See
Reid (1988).
14
those who do it so [tabdhīr] that they اورڠﯿڠ ﻣبﺬر )دان( �ﻼ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ا�ﻦ اورڠﯿڠ ﻣبﺬر
are likened to devils that are the most
evil creatures. Should we appreciate the
دﺳﲈ�ﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ اﻛﻨﺪي دڠﻦ ﺳڬﻞ۲ ﺳﻜﱪ
tabdhīr, but Allah prohibit and ﳐﻠﻮق ادﻛﻪ ﻓﺎﺗﺖ ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ اﯾﺖ۲ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﯾڠ ﲭﺎﻫﺖ
condemn it? دﻓﺮﻣﻠﯿﺎ�ﻦ دان د�ﴪ�ﻦ ﻓﺪ �ﺎل ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻣنڬﻪ دان
ﻣن�ﻼدي
One of the evils present in the act of )دان ﺳ�ﺘڠﻪ( درﻓﺪ �ڬﻰ ﻣنﻜﺮ ﯾڠﱰﻛﻨﺪوڠ دداﱂ
mambuang pasilih and manyanggar is ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن �ﺮﺑﻮاڠ ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� دان ﻣڽڠڬﺮ اﯾﺖ اﺗﺒﺎع
ittibā‘ al-shayāṭīn wa ghurūrihim that
means following the footsteps of Satans اﻟﺸ�ﯿﺎﻃﲔ و ﻏﺮورﱒ ٔأرﺗ� ﻣڠﯿﻜﻮت ﺳڬﻞ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن
by doing what they [the devils] ask and ۲ دڠﻦ ﻣڠ�ﺎﺻﻠﻜﻦ �رڠ ﻓﺮﻣنﺘأٔنڽ )دان( ﻣڠﻬﺎرف
expecting what they promised. That is a
heinous evil act that Allah and His
ﯾڠﺪﺟنﺠﯿﻜ� اﯾﺖ ﺳﻮات ﻣنﻜﺮ ﯾڠ اﻣﺖ كﺠﻰ
Messanger prohibits it in certain verses (ﯾڠﺪ�ڬﻬﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ دان رﺳﻮﻟڽ دداﱂ ﺑﱪاف )آٓﯾﺔ
of quran and hadith as Allah’s word: ﻗﺮآٓن دان �ﺪﯾﺚ )ﺳﻔﺮة( ﻓﺮﻣﺎن ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ َ)و َﻻ ﺗَت � ِب ُﻌﻮا
“wa lā tattabi‘ū khuṭuwāt al-shayṭān
innahu lakum ‘aduwwun mubīn. اﻧ � َﻤﺎ ﯾَأ� ُﻣ ُﺮُﰼ. ﺧ ُُﻄ َﻮ ِات اﻟ �ﺸ� ْﯿ َﻄ ِﺎن اﻧ � ُﻪ ﻟَ ُ ْﲂ �َﺪُ �و �ﻣب ٌِﲔ
� �
Innamā ya’murukum bi-l-sū’ wa al- ِ� �ﻟﺴﻮ ِء َواﻟْ َﻔ ْﺤﺸَ ﺎء( ٔأرﺗ� دان �ﺎڠﻦ ﰷم ا�ﻜﻮت ا�ﻦ
faḥshā’ ”. That means, do not follow
the footsteps of devil, namely his deceit ﺳڬﻞ �ﺎﻟﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن )ﯾﻌﲏ( ﻓﺮﻫﯿﺎﺳ� دان ﻓﺮدا�ڽ
because he is to you a clear enemy. He در ﰷرن ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ ﺑڬ ﰷم ﺳﱰو ﯾڠ اﻣﺖ
only orders you to evil acts and ﭘﺎت ﻫﺎڽ ﺳڽ ﺗﯿﺎد ﻣڽﻮرﻫﻜﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ اﻛﻨﲀم
immorality. As well, Allah’s word: “wa
man yattakhidhu al-shayṭāna waliyyan ﻣﻠﯿﻨﻜﻦ دڠﻦ �ﺮﺑﻮاة كﺠﻬﺎ�ﻦ دان ﺳڬﻞ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن
min dūnillāh faqad khasira khusrānan ﺟﻮا دان ﻻڬﻲ ﻓﺮﻣﺎنڽ ) َو َﻣﻦ ﯾَﺘ� ِ� ِﺬ۲ﯾڠﻜﺠﻲ
mubīnā”. That means, whoever takes
devil as an ally that he/she follow ُﴪا�ً �ﻣبِﯿﻨًﺎ َ ِ ا� ﻓَﻘَﺪْ ﺧ
َ ْ َﴪ ﺧ ِ � ُون ِ اﻟ �ﺸ� ْﯿ َﻄ َﺎن َو ِﻟﯿ�ﺎ ِّﻣﻦ د
instead Allah has certainly sustained a � ﯾ َ ِﻌﺪُ ُ ْﱒ َوﯾُ َﻤ ِﻨّ ِﳱ ْﻢ َو َﻣﺎ ﯾ َ ِﻌﺪُ ُ ُﱒ اﻟ �ﺸ� ْﯿ َﻄ ُﺎن ا �ﻻ ُﻏ ُﺮ ًورا ( ٔأرﺗ.
clear loss. Devil promises humans and �
arouses desire in them. But devil does
��رڠ ﺳ�ﯿﺎف ﻣن�ﺪ�ﻜﻦ اي ا�ﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ وﻟ
not promise them except delusion. (ﯾڠﺪ ا�ﻜﻮ�ڽ اﻛﻨﺪي ﻻ�ﻦ درﻓﺪ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ )ﻣﻚ ﺳڽ
�ﺮاو� �ﺮوڬﯿﻨ� اي دڠﻦ روڬﻲ ﯾڠ اﻣﺖ ﭘﺎت
ﻣنﺠﻨﺠﯿﻜﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ ا�ﻦ ﺳڬﻞ ﻣﺎ�ﴘ دان
اي ا�ﻦ ﻣﺮ�ﻜئﯿﺖ دڠﻦ ﯾڠﺪﺟنﺤﯿﻜ� دان۲ ﻣڠﻬﺎرف
ﺗﯿﺎد ﻣنﺠﻨﺠﯿﻜﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ ا�ﻦ ﻣﺮ�ﻜئﯿﺖ ﻣﻠﯿﻨﻜﻦ
...ا�ﻦ ﻓﺮد� ﺟﻮا
The other evils in the act of mambuang )دان ﺳ�ﺘڠﻪ( درﻓﺪ �ڬﻰ ﻣنﻜﺮ ﯾڠﱰﻛﻨﺪوڠ دداﱂ
pasilih and manyanggar are shirk and
bid‘a sayyi’a (heretical innovations).
ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن �ﺮﺑﻮاڠ ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� دان ﻣڽڠڬﺮ اﯾﺖ �ﺋﺖ ﴍك
Those are the biggest and the very دان ﺑﺪ�ﻪ ﺳيئﺔ اﻧﯿ� ﻣنﻜﺮ ﯾڠﱰﻟﺒﻪ �ﴪ دان ﯾڠ ﺳﺎ�ﺔ
heinous evils. If it is believed that sick كﺠﻲ )درﰷرن( �ﻚ داﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻛ� ﲠﻮ ﺗﯿﺎد ﲰﺒﻪ ﯾڠ
people cannot be cured or danger
15
cannot be avoided except only by ﺳﺎ�ﺖ درﻓﺪ ﻓڽﺎ�ﯿﺖ )اﺗﻮ( ﺗﯿﺎد �ﺮﺗﻮﻟﻖ درﻓﺪ ﲠﺎي
carrying out manyanggar or mambuang
pasilih, in the sense that those acts have
�ﻣﻠﯿﻨﻜﻦ دڠﻦ ﻣڽڠڬﺮ اﺗﻮ �ﺮﺑﻮاڠ ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� )ﻣﻚ( دﺗﯿ
the power (to cure or to avoid danger) �ﻚ داﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻛ� ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ دڠﻦ
in their own nature, so the one who has ﻃﺒﯿﻌ� ﻣﻚ اورڠ اﯾﺖ �ﺎدي ﰷﻓﺮ )دڠﻦ( ﺗﯿﺎد
such belief is heathen (kāfir). There is
no disagreement of jurists on that case �ﺮﺳﻼﻫﻦ ﺳﳫﲔ �ﻠﲈء )ﰷرن( ﺗﯿﺎد �ڬ� ﺗﻮﺣيﺪ ﻓﺪ
because that is going against oneness of ٔأﻓﻌﺎل ﷲ )دان �ﻚ( ﺗﯿﺎد داﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻛ� ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ
Allah’s deeds (tauhīd af‘āl). If it is
believed that they [those acts] have no
ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ دڠﻦ ﻃﺒﯿﻌ� ﻫﺎڽ داﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻛ� اﻛﻨﺪي
power in their nature, but it is believed ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ دڠﻦ ﻗﻮاة ﯾڠﺪ�ﺎد�ﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ دداﳌڽ
that they have the power [to cure or to )ﻣﻚ( اورڠ اﯾﺖ �ﺪي ﺑﺪ�ﻪ ﻓﺎﺳﻖ ﺗﯿﺎد �ﺮﺳﻼﻫﻦ
avoid danger] given by Allah to their
nature, then the jurists agree that the ﺳﳫﲔ �ﻠﲈء دان ﻛﻔﺮڽ �ﺮﺳﻼﻫﻦ ﻣﺮ�ﻜئﯿﺖ )ﰷت
one who believes so is the impious (�ﻠﲈء( ﻣﺎ وراء ا�ﳯﺮ أٔورڠ اﯾﺖ �ﺎدي ﰷﻓﺮ ﺟﻮ )دان
heretic (bid‘a fāsiq); and jurists
disagree on his/her heathenism (kufr). �ﻚ ﺗﯿﺎد داﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻛ� ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ دڠﻦ
According to the jurists of [the region] ﻃﺒﯿﻌ� دان ﺗﯿﺎد ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ اي دڠﻦ ﻗﻮاة
“what lies beyond the river” (arabic: mā
warā’ al-nahr) 10 he/she is also heathen
ﯾڠﺪ�ﺎد�ﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ دداﳌڽ ﻫﺎڽ داﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻛ� ﲠﻮﺳڽ
(kāfir). If it is believed that they have ﯾڠ ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ ﻓﺪ ﻣڽﻤﳢﻜﻦ دان ﻣنﻮﻟﻘﻜﻦ ﲠﺎي اﯾﺖ
no power [to cure or to avoid danger] ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺟﻮا دڠﻦ د�ﺎد�ﻜ� اﻓبﯿﻞ د�ﺮ�ﺎ�ﻦ ﺳڠڬﺮ
either in their own nature or given by
Allah to their nature, but it is believed اﺗﻮ ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� اﯾﺖ )ﻣﻚ( د�ﺪ�ﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﲰﺒﻪ درﻓﺪ
that only Allah who has the power to ﻓڽﺎ�ﯿﺖ )دان( دﺗﻮﻟﻘﻜ� ﺳڬﻞ ﲠﺎي ﻓﺪ ﻛﺘﯿﻚ اﯾﺖ
cure and avoid danger by enacting that
if those acts are carried out then Allah
)ﻛﺘﺎڽ( اد� ﻗيﺎس دان ﺑﻨﺪﯾڠ ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﺳﻔﺮة اﰲ
cures and avoids the danger in that time. دان ﻣﲀنﻦ ﺗﯿﺎد ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ اي دڠﻦ ﻃﺒﯿﻌ� ﻓﺪ
It is said that analogy and comparison ﻣڠﻬﺎڠﺴﻜﻦ دان ﻣڠﭙڠﻲ دان ﺗﯿﺎد ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ اي
for that is like [the deployment of] fire
and food. They do not have the power دڠﻦ ﻗﻮاة ﯾڠﺪ�ﺪ�ﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ دداﳌڽ ﻫﺎڽ ﯾڠ ﳑﱪي
in their own nature to burn or to satiate, �ﻜﺲ ﻓﺪ ﻣڠﻬﺎڠﺴﻜﻦ دان ﻣڠﭙڠﻲ اﯾﺖ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺟﻮا
as well they do have neither the power
[to burn or to satiate] given by Allah. It
دڠﻨﺪ�ﺎد�ﻜ� ﻣن�ﺪ�ﻜﻦ ﻫﺎڠﺲ )ﺗﺘﲀل( �ﺮﺳنتﻪ اﰲ
is only Allah who burns and satiates دڠﻦ ﺳﻮات ﯾڠﻜﺮڠ )دان( د�ﺎد�ﻜ� ﻛﻨﭙڠ ﺗﺘﲀل
enacting that when fire touches ﳑﺎ�ﻦ ا�ﻦ ﻣﳫﲍ )ﻛﺘﺎڽ( دﻣﻜيﻨ� ﻗيﺎس دان ﺑﻨﺪڠ
something dry, then it becomes burned,
and enacting that when we eat food then ﺳڠڬﺮ دان ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� )ﻣﻚ( اورڠﯿڠ �ﺮاﻋﺘﻘﺪ دﻣﻜﲔ
we are satisfied. It is said that this is the (اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد �ﺪي ﰷﻓﺮ دڠﻦ ﳎﺮد اﻋﺘﻘﺎد اﯾﺖ )ﻫﺎڽ
analogy and the comparison of
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih. �ﺎدي ﺑﺪ�ﻪ ﺟﻮا )ﺗﺘﺎﰲ( �ﺪي ﰷﻓﺮ اي �ﻚ
10
It is the arabic name of Transoxania, historical region of Turkistan in Central Asia east of
the Amu Darya (Oxus River) and west of the Syr Darya (Jaxartes River), roughly corresponding to
present-day Uzbekistan and parts of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. See "Transoxania
(historical region, Asia)". Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed 05-10-2018. See also Svat Soucek
(2000, p. 25).
16
So, someone who believes so does not د�ﻼﻟﻜ� ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﺳڠڬﺮ دان ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� دڠﻦ اﻋﺘﻘﺎد
become heathen by merely such a
belief, but they are still heretics.
(ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ دڠﻦ ﺗﯿﺎد �ﻼف ﺳڬﻞ �ﻠﲈء )ادﻓﻮن
However, had he/she pronounced the ﻗيﺎس دان ﺑﻨﺪڠ ﯾڠﱰﺳبﺖ اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد ﰠ ا�ﻦ �ﺎدي
permissibility of manyanggar and ﻣڠ�ﻼﻟﻜﻦ اﻋﺘﻘﺎد ﯾڠﱰﺳبﺖ اﯾﺖ )ﺳبﺐ( �ﺮ ٔ��ﻦ ﻟﯿﲍ
mambuang pasilih, he/she would have
been heathen (kāfir) with such belief; ﺣﲂ در ﰷرن اﰲ دان ﻣﲀنﻦ اﯾﺖ ﺳ�ﺒﲊﭘﺎ� اي درﻓﺪ
and there is no disagreement of jurists (ﺳڬﻞ ﺳبﺐ ﯾڠﱪ�ﺎدة دڠﻦ ﺗﯿﺎد �ﻼف )ادﻓﻮن
on that case.
Concerning the analogy and the
۲ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﺳڠڬﺮ دان ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� اﯾﺖ ﻣﻚ �ﺋﺖ ﺳﲀل
comparison, it is not legally valid to ﺗﯿﺎد درﻓﺪ ﺳڬﻞ ﺳبﺐ ﯾڠﱪ�ﺎدة )دان( �ﻚ ﺗﻘﺪ�ﺮ
pronounce the permissibility of ��ﻦ �ﺮﻻ�ﻮ ﻓﺪاڽ ﻛﻨﻼ�ﻮان ﺳبﺐ ﯾڠﱪ�ﺎدة دڠﻦ ﺳ�ﺒ
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih
based on that analogy because they ( ﻓﺮداي ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮا )ﻣﻚ۲ )ﻣﻚ( �ﺋﺖ ﺳﲈت
have a different nature. Indeed, fire and ﺑﺘﺎف ﻛﲑاڽ ﰠ ﻗيﺎس دان ﺑﻨﺪڠ ﯾڠﱰﺳبﺖ اﯾﺖ ﱔ
food are natural causes [in the sense
that Allah enacts being burned and )ﺳﳫﲔ( إﺧﻮان ﯾڠ �ﺎﻗﻞ ﻓيﻜﺮ�ﻦ اوﳍﻢ دڠﻦ اﻧﺼﺎف
being satisfied by means of the natural ادﻛﻪ ﲠﺎي ﯾڠﱰﻟﺒﻪ �ﴪ درﻓﺪ ﲠﺎي ﻛﻔﺮ دان ﺑﺪ�ﻪ
beings fire and food], whereas
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih
ﺳيئﺔ ﯾڠﱪﻫﺎدف ٔأ�ﺲ ﯾڠﱪﺑﻮاة دي ﻟﻌﻨﺔ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ
certainly are not the natural cause [of )ﺳﻔﺮة( ﺳ�ﺒﺪا ﻧﱯ ﺻﲆ ﷲ �ﻠﯿﻪ و ﺳﲅ )ﻣﻦ ٔأ�ﺪث
being cured and being prevented from �ﺪ� ﻓﻌﻠﯿﻪ ﻟﻌﻨﺔ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ( ٔأرﺗ� �رڠﺴ�ﯿﺎف ﻣڠﺪا�ﻦ
danger. In other words since
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih are ﺳﻮات ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠ ﺗﯿﺎد اي در ﻓﺪ اڬﺎم )ﻣﻚ( ٔأ�ﺴڽ
not present in nature– we cannot say ﻟﻌﻨﺔ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ )ﻛﳤﻮي اوﳍﻢ( ﱔ ﻃﺎﻟﺐ ﲠﻮﺳڽ
therefore that these rituals are the
natural causes of the effects of healing
ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﺳڠڬﺮ دان ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد اي در ﻓﺪ اڬﺎم
and prevention enacted by Allah]. If, اﺳﻼم )ﻫﺎڽ( ٔأد� درﻓﺪ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﺑﺪ�ﻪ ﺳيئﺔ
saying, when they are carried out, then ﯾڠﺪ�ڬﻬﻜﻦ درﻓﺪڽ )ﻣﻚ( �رڠﺴ�ﯿﺎف ﻣڠﺮ�ﺎﻛﻨﺪي
being cured or being avoided from
danger happens, it is nothing but the ٔأ�ﺴڽ ﻟﻌﻨﺔ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ )ﺳﻔﺮة( ﯾڠ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم دداﱂ ﻧﺺ
deceit of Satan. So, this analogy and .�ﺪﯾﺚ اﯾﺖ
comparison could not be legally valid.
O intelligent brothers, you should be
aware: is there any danger bigger than
the danger of heathenism (kufr) and
blameworthy innovation (bid‘a sayyi’a)
so that those who perform them are
cursed by Allah as [the] Prophet said:
man ’aḥdatha hadathan fa‘alaihi
la‘natullāh ta‘ālā. That means, whoever
commits innovation which opposes to
religion, so the curse of Allah to him. O
student! You should know that
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih are
not part of religion (Islam), but they are
17
the food are the invisible men: first, the ﺗﻮرن ﲤﻮرن ﴎة اد۲ )ﻓﺮ�م( ݘﺮ�ﺮا ٔأورڠ ﺗﻮﻫﺎ
elders tell us about that story from
generations to generations; second, the
ﻛﺘﺎڽ ﺟﲀﯾ� )ﻛﺪوا( ﻓﺮﰷر ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔنڽ ﺗﺘﲀل اي ﻣڽﺎروڠ
words of a possessed person who at the ﻛﻔﺪ ﺳﺆرڠ ﻣﺎ�ﴘ ﻛﺘﺎڽ ﱔ اﻧﻖ ݘݘﻮ�ﻮ �ﺮي ٔأوﳍﻢ
moment of possession said: “O my اﻛﻨﺪا�ﻮ ﻣﲀنﻦ ﺳﻔﺎي ﻛﺘﻮﻟﻮڠ اﻛﻨﲀم ﻓﺪ �رڠ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن
descendants give me food so that I will
help you to relieve your difficulties and ﯾڠ ﺳﻮ�ﺮ ٔأﺗﻮ ﺳﻔﺎي ﲰﺒﻪ ﯾڠ ﺳﺎ�ﯿﺖ درﻓﺪ اﻧﯿ� اﳁﺎ
to cure your illness”. Response: the دان ﻛﺘﺎڽ۲ ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔنڽ )ﺟﻮاب( ﲠﻮ ݘﺮ�ﺮا ٔأورڠ ﺗﻮﻫﺎ
story that the elders tell about is not a
legally valid justification of the
ﺣﲀﯾﺔ أٔﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد ﰠ �ﺎدى دﻟﯿﻞ ﺑڠﺪ ٔأ�ﺲ اﯾﺖ
permissibility of manyanggar and ﺳڠﲀ دان وﱒ دان ﺟﻮا ﺗﯿﺎد اد۲ درﰷرن ٔأي ﺳﲈت
mambuang pasilih because it is merely (ﴎ�ڽ دﻟﯿﻞ ﯾڠ ﻣنﻨﺠﻘﻜﻦ �ﺒﲊ انڽ )دان دﻣﻜيﻨﻼڬﻲ
prejudice and delusion without evidence
(dalīl) confirming its truth. Moreover, اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد ﰠ۲ ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔنڽ ٔأورڠﯿﻊ �ﴪوڠﻦ اﺑﺖ ﺳﲀل
the words of a possessed person are not �ﺎدى دﻟﯿﻞ ﯾڠ ﻣنﻨﺠﻘﻜﻦ ٔأ�ﺲ ﲠﻮ ﯾڠ ﻣڽﺎروڠ اﯾﺖ
a legally valid evidence for justifying
that who possesses the possessed person ﻣﺎ�ﴘ ﻫﺎڽ ٔأد� ﺑڠﺪ ﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﰠ �ﺎدى دﻟﯿﻞ
is a man, but that is proof that who ﻣنﻨﺠﻘﻜﻦ ٔأ�ﺲ ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﯾڠ ﻣڽﺎروڠ اﯾﺖ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮا
possesses the possessed person is Satan
because some verses of Quran and
ﰷرن ﺑﱪاف ﻧﺺ ﻗﺮآٓن دان �ﺪﯾﺚ دان ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔن ﺳڬﻞ
Hadith, and what jurists say prove that �ﻠﲈء ﯾڠ ﻣنﻨﺠﻘﻜﻦ ٔأ�ﺲ ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﯾڠ ﺑﻮ� ﻣڽﺎروڠ دان
only angels and Satans can enter into ﻣﺎﺳﻖ ﻛﻔﺪ �دن اﯾﺖ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﻜﺔ دان ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮا درﰷن
the body of a human because they are
created by Allah with ability to do hard ﻣﺎﻟﯿﻜﺔ دان ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ د�ﺪ�ﻜﻦ ﷲ �ﻮاس ٔأ�ﺲ
things so that they can enter into the ﻣڠﺮ�ﺎ �ﻦ ﯾڠ ﺳﻮ �ﺮ ﻫڠڬ داﻓﺖ ٔأي ﻣﺎﺳﻖ ﻛﺪاﱂ
body of a human. However, the
difference between them is that angels
ﺗﻮﺑﻪ ﻣﺎ�ﴗ )ﺗﺘﺎﰲ( ﻓﺮ ﺑﺬ ٔأ�ڽ ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﻣﻼ�ﻜﺔ اﯾﺖ
only suggest (God’s) guidance and ﺗﯿﺎد ﻣڽﺮواي )ﻣﻠﯿﻨﻜﻦ( ﻛﻔﺪ �ﺎﻟﻦ ﻓتﻨﺠﻮق دان
goodness while Satans only suggest the (�ﺒﺠﯿﻜﻦ دان ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد ﻣڽﺮواي )ﻣﻠﯿﻨﻜﻦ
wrong path and evil. It is mentioned
further in the hadith that an angel called ﻛﻔﺪ �ﺎﻟﻦ ﺳﺴﺖ دان كﺠﻬﺎ�ﻦ )ﺷﻬﺪان( �ﺮﺳبﺖ
mulhim stays in the right side of دداﱂ �ﺪﯾﺚ ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﺳﺆرڠ ﻣﻼ�ﻜﺔ �ﺮ�م ﻣﻠﻬﻢ
human’s heart, by Allah’s command,
suggesting goodness; and a Satan called
�ﺮد�ﺮي ﻓﺪ ﻫﺎت اﻧﻖ آٓدم ﯾڠ ﻓﺪ ﻓﳱﻖ ﰷنﻦ دڠﻦ ﺗيتﻪ
waswās stays in the left side of human’s (ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻓﺪ �ﺎل ﻣڽﺮو اي ﻛﻔﺪ �ﺒﺠﯿﻜﻦ )دان
heart, by Allah’s command, suggesting ﺳﺆرڠ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن �ﺮ�م وﺳﻮاس �ﺮد�ﺮي ﻓﺪ ﻫﺎت اﻧﻖ
evil. So, all good tendencies come from
the suggestion of mulhim so his آٓدم ﯾڠ ﻓﺪ ﻓﳱﻖ ﻛﲑي دڠﻦ ﺗيتﻪ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻓﺪ �ﺎل
suggestion is called ilhām (inspiration); ﻣڽﺮو اي ﻛﻔﺪ كﺠﻬﺎ�ﻦ )ﻣﻚ( ﺳڬﻞ ﺧﻮاﻃﺮ �ﺒﺠﯿﻜﻦ
and all evil tendencies come from the
suggestion of waswās so his suggestion اﯾﺖ داﺗڠ درﻓﺪ ﻓﳱﻖ ﴎو ﻣﻠﻬﻢ )دان( دﳕﺎى ﴎوڽ
is called waswās (evil thoughts). اﯾﺖ اﻟﻬﺎم )دان( ﺳڬﻞ ﺧﻮاﻃﺮ كﺠﻬﺎ�ﻦ اﯾﺖ داﺗڠ
Therefore, if someone recites dhikr
(remembrance) of Allah then the Satan
ﻓﳱﻖ ﴎو وﺳﻮاس دان دﳕﺎى ﴎوڽ اﯾﺖ وﺳﻮاس
will go far away and disappear from his )ﻣﻚ( ٔأﻓبﯿﻞ ﻣڽﺒﻮت ﺳﺆرڠ ﻣﺎ�ﴘ ا�ﻦ ذ�ﺮ ﷲ
heart, but if he neglects reciting dhikr of
19
Allah the Satan will go back to his �ﺮ�نﺴ�ﯿ� ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ )ﯾﻌﲏ( اﻧﺪور دان ڽﳱ� اي
heart. This is the understanding of
Allah’s words: min sharri al-waswās
درﻓﺪ ﻫﺘ� دان ٔأﻓبﯿﻞ ﻻﱄ اي درﻓﺪ ﻣڽﺒﻮﺗﺪي داﺗڠ
al-khannaās, alladhī yuwaswisu fī ﴍِ ّ َ ﻓﻮل اي )�ﺋﺘ�( ﻣﻔﻬﻢ ﻓﺮﻣﺎن ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ) ِﻣﻦ
ṣudūr al-nās. That is, I seek refuge with ( � ِا�ي ﯾُ َﻮ ْﺳ ِﻮ ُس ِﰲ ُﺻﺪُ و ِر اﻟﻨ� ِﺎس.اﻟْ َﻮ ْﺳ َﻮ ِاس اﻟْ َﺨﻨ�ﺎس
Him from the evil of Satan named
waswās. He will go far away and ﯾﻌﲏ �ﺮﻟﻨﺪڠ ا�ﻮ دﻋﻨﺪي درﻓﺪ كﺠﻬﺎ�ﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن
disappear if dhikr of Allah is recited. He ﯾڠﱪ�م وﺳﻮاس اﻧﺪور دان ﭘﯿﻪ اي ) ٔأﻓبﯿﻞ( دﺳبﺖ
is the one who gives the evil thoughts in
the hearts of people. Such is what al-
ذ�ﺮ ﷲ اﭘﺎ� ﯾڠ ﳑﱪي وﺳﻮاس دداﱂ ﻫﺎت ﺳڬﻞ
Ghazālī said in the Minhāj al-‘Ābidīn ﻣﺎ�ﴘ )دﻣﻜيﻨ�( ﯾڠﺪﺳبتﻜﻦ ٔأو� اﻣﺎم ﻏﺰاﱄ دداﱂ
and the others. .�ﻛﺘﺎب ﻣﳯﺎج اﻟﻌﺎﺑﺪ�ﻦ دان ﻻﯾ
Question: if someone says that whom )ﺳﺆال( �ﻚ �ﺮﰷت ﺳﺆرڠ ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﯾڠﲀم ﺳڠڬﺮ دان
we give the food in manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih is indeed Satan, but
ﺑﲊڽ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮا۲ﯾڠ ﰷم �ﺮي ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� اﯾﺖ ﺳ�ﺒﲊ
our intention of carrying them out is )ﺗﺘﺎﰲ( ﻧﯿﺔ ﰷم ﻓﺪ ﻣڠﺮ�ﺎ�ﻦ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن اﯾﺖ ﰷرن ا�ﻦ
only to cure. Otherwise, we suppose اوﺑﺔ ﺟﻮا ) ٔأﺗﻮ( ﰷم ﻧيتﻜﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ ﺳﻔﺮة اﳒﯿڠ
Satan similar to a dog, so we give the
food to Satan as if we feed a dog. It was (ﻣﻚ ﰷم �ﺮي اﻛﻨﺪي ﻣﲀنﻦ ﺳﻔﺮة ﳑﱪي اﳒﯿڠ )دان
known that feeding a dog is permissible ﺗ� �ﺮﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﲠﻮﺳڽ �ﺮاوﺑﺖ دان ﳑﱪي ﻣﺎ�ﻦ اﳒﯿڠ اﯾﺖ
and there is no prohibition of such act.
That is manyanggar and mambuang
�ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﻫﺎرس ﺗﯿﺎد ﺣﺮام داﳌڽ دان دﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺘ
pasilih if we put them with such ﺳڠڬﺮ دان ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� ٔأﻓبﯿﻞ دﻧيتﻜﻦ دڠﻦ ﻧﯿﺔ ﯾڠﱰﺳبﺖ
supposition and intention. Response: ﺗﯿﺎد۲ اﯾﺖ )ﺟﻮاب( ﲠﻮ ﻧﯿﺔ ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﺳﲀل
such supposition and intention are
simply not helpful because they do not ﳑﱪي ﻓﺎﺋﺪة )ﰷرن( ﺗﯿﺎد ﻣڠﻬﯿﻠڠﻜﻦ ﺟﺮام ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ دان
eliminate the prohibition of tabdhīr, ﻣڠﻜﻮت ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن داﳓﺮام ﯾﺪ�ﻪ )ﻣﻚ( ﺑﻨﺪڠ ﯾڠ دﻣﻜﲔ
following Satan and heretical
innovation. That comparison is similar اﯾﺖ ﺳﻔﺮة ٔأورڠﯿڠ ﳑﺒﻮﻧﻪ أٔور�ﺪڠﻦ ﺗﯿﺎد ﺳ�ﺒﲊڽ
to someone who kills someone else with دﻧيتﻜ� ﳑﺒﻮﻧﻪ ﺗﯿﻜﻮس اﺗﻮ دﻧيتﻜ� ا�ﻦ �ﺎدي اوﺑﺔ
the intention to cure heartache and �ﺳﺎ�ﯿﺖ ﻫﺎت اﳁﺎڽ )دان( ﺳﻔﺆة اورڠﯿڠ ز� دﻧيتﻜ
while killing he does as if the victim is
a mouse. It is also similar to someone ﺟﲈع دڠﻦ اﺳﱰ�ڽ اﺗﻮ ا�ﻦ �ﺪي اوﺑﺔ ﺳﺎ�ﯿﺖ ﻓڠڬڠ
who commits adultery with the ﺗﯿﺎد۲اﳁﺎڽ )ﻣﻚ( ﻧﯿﺔ ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﺳﲀل
intention to cure rheumatism and during
the intercourse he does as if he is with (ﻣڠﻬﯿﻠڠﻜﻦ ﺣﺮام ﳑﺒﻮﻧﻪ دان ز� )ﺳ�ﺒﺎڬﻲ ﻻڬﻲ
his wife. So, those suppositions and ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔنڽ ﰷم �ﺮي ﻣﲀنﻦ ا�ﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ ﺳﻔﺮة ﳑﱪي
intentions do not eliminate the
prohibition of killing and adultery.
دﺳﺖ ﺟﻮا ﺗﯿﺎد �ﺮﲰأٔن ﯾڠﺪداﱂ۲اﳓﯿڠ �ﺋﺖ ﺳﲈت
Furthermore, concerning what they said ﻫﺘ� دڠﻦ ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔن ﻟﯿﺪﻫڽ ٔأدا� ﻫﺎﺗ� ﻣڠﺤﺮﻣﺎﰐ دان
that giving the food to Satan is like ﳑﻠﯿﺎ�ﻦ ا�ﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن دڠﻦ دﻟﯿﻞ ﻓﺮﺑﻮاﺗ� ﺑڬ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن
feeding a dog, in fact what they said is
different from what is in their heart. دان ﺗﯿﺎد۲ اﯾﺖ ﺑﱪاف �ڬﻲ ﻣﺎ�ﻦ ﻣﺎﻛﲍ ﯾڠ اﻧﺪﻩ
Their hearts venerate Satan, this is �د�ﺮ�ﻜ� دﺳيﺴﺎى دان دﻟﻔﺲ ﴎة داﻧﱰﻛ� ﻛﻔﺪ ﲤﻔ
indicated by the fact that they do not
20
give Satan leftovers, but they provide دڠﻦ ﺑﱪاف ﳇڠﲀﻓﻦ دان ﻓﺮﻫﯿﺎﺳﻦ دان ﺑﱪاف
beautiful foods, and they server them in
decorated trays and by doing so they
ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠ ﻣنﻨﺠﻘﻜﻦ ا�ﺲ ﻣڠﺤﺮﻣﺎﰐ دان ﳑﻠﯿﺎ�ﻦ
indicate their respect for Satan. O ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮاداڽ )ﻓيﻜﺮ�ﻦ( اوﳍﻢ ﱔ ﺳﳫﲔ اﺧﻮان ﯾڠ
intelligent brothers, is it similar to �ﺎﻗﻞ ادﻛﻪ ﺳﻔﺮة دﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﳑﱪي ﻣﺎ�ﻦ اﳒﯿڠ ﺗﯿﺎد
feeding a dog? Mostly, you do not give
a dog food but despicable and leftovers ﺟﻮا ﻣﲀنﻦ ﯾڠﺪ�ﺮ�ﻜﻦ ﻛﻔﺪ اﳒﯿڠ ﻓﺪ �ﺎﻟﺐ ﻣﻠﯿﻨﻜﻦ
that are put haphazardly in any place. ﻣﲀنﻦ ﯾڠ ﻫﯿﻨﺎ ﻻڬﻲ ﺳيﺴﺎ دان د�ﺮ�ﻜﻦ ﻓﺪ ﲰﺒﺎرڠ
Finally, manyanggar and mambuang
pasilih should not be called Medicine
(ﲤﻔﺖ ا�ﺲ ��ﻮان ﯾڠ ﺗﯿﺎد ﳑﻠﯿﺎ�ﻦ )ﺳ�ﺒﺎڬﻲ ﻻڬﻲ
neither by the practice involved in these ﺗﯿﺎد ﻓﺎﺗﺖ دﳕﺎى۲ﺳڠڬﺮ دان ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� اﯾﺖ ﺳﲀل
rituals nor by juridical indication [there اوﺑﺖ ﻓﺪ �ﺎدة اﺳ�ﳣﯿﻮا ﻓﻮل ﻓﺪ ﴍع ﻫﺎڽ ﯾڠﺪﳕﺎى
is no evidence from the sources at all
indicating that these practices should be اوﺑﺖ ﻓﺪ �ﺎدة �ﺋﺖ �ﺮڠﯿڠ دﻛﻨﺎ�ﻦ ﻓﺪ ﺑﺪان اورڠﯿڠ
called Medicine]. Medicine is practiced داوﺑﺔ دل دﻣﺎﻛ� اﺗﻮ دﻣيﳮڽ اﺗﻮ دﺑﺪﻗﻜﻦ اﺗﻮ
by treating the body of the sick person
by inducing ingestion or by semearing دﲰﺒﻮر�ﻦ اﺗﻮ �رڠﺴ�ﺒﺎڬ� ﴎة ﳑﻠﳱﺎر�ﻦ ﯾڠ ﻓﺎﺗﺖ ﻓﺪ
or spraying it. This treatment impacts .��ﻃﺒﯿﻌﺔ ﺑﺪان اورڠﯿڠ داو�ﰐ ﻓﺪ دﯾڠ� اﺗﻮ ﻫﺎ
the body in such a way that it can be felt
to be either cold or warm [But the
contested rituals do not treat the body in
that way]
Al-Banjari's Jadal
for a qiyās al-‘illa on Lahang
Let us recall the classical example: Date liquor intoxicates, just as (grape)
wine does, so that it is prohibited like wine. The canonical analysis identifies four
elements in such an argument: the branch-case, date liquor; the source-wine; the
character they have in common their power to intoxicate; and their common legal
qualification, prohibition. The crucial step that underlies this form of
argumentation is the identification of the occasioning factor, the ‘illa, that lies
11
More precisely lahang is made from the juice of Arenga pinnata.
21
behind its prohibition. The point here is that applying the general principle that
drinks that have the power to induce intoxication should be forbidden, to the case
of date liquor occasions its interdiction.
O P
0
The consumption of lahang is
allowed, even if fermented.
Furthermore, whatever pure
substance is added to it before the
lahang becomes vinegar rests pure
and thus the resulting vinegar is
pure and hence it's consumption is
not forbidden either.
1 Why ? 0? According to the sources the 2
consumption of wine made of
fermented grape-juice is
12
In relation to the contamination of wine-vinegar al-Benjari refers to Tuḥfat al-Muḥtāj fī Sharḥ
al-Minhāj by Ibn Hajar al-Haytamī (909-974H/1504-1567), re-printed 1983 and Nihāyat al-
Muḥtāj ilā Sharḥ al-Minhāj by al-Ramlī (919-1004H/1513-1596), re-printed 1984. Both of these
jurists were Shāfi’īs.
22
forbidden. Right
3 Indeed !2 ?3 In a previous debate we 4
established that the occasioning
factor for its interdiction is its
intoxicating nature. Right?
5 We came to that conclusion !4 ?5 Isn't it the case that whatever pure 6
before substance is added to wine (made
of grape juice) before it becomes
vinegar, becomes contaminated by
the impurity of the wine?
Moreover, isn't it the case that this
contamination (mutanajjis) makes
thus the resulting vinegar to
become impure and that it
therefore also makes its
consumption forbidden?.
7 Yes, this follows from our !6 ?7 Now, it has been verified by 8
previous discussions on the repeated observations that if
interdiction of wine lahang is left over night and
ferments, it has no intoxicating
nature. So it has intoxicating
nature neither before nor after it
ferments. Even when it is drunk in
a large amount.
9 This can be indeed verified !8 ?9 Therefore, its vinegar is 10
intoxicating neither. Furthermore,
the vinegar cannot be
contaminated by any pure
substance added to the lahang that
vinegar is made of. Recall that the
lahang is not intoxicating before
becoming vinegar even if
fermented.
11 Yes, I see. !10 ?11 So, clearly, lahang has not the 12
factor occasioning the interdiction
of wine. Right?
13 Yes, I concede. ?13 Thus, its consumption in any form, 14
before fermentation, after
fermentation; after becoming
vinegar is to be allowed
15 Yes. I concede. !14 ?15 So my case has been closed and it 16
provides the justification for the
thesis you asked for with your first
move
It is understood from what has been )ﺷﻬﺪان( دﻛﳤﻮي درﻓﺪ ﺳﳫﲔ ﯾڠ �ﺮﺳبﺖ اﯾﺖ
explained above that vinegar made from
lahang or the like is pure on the whole �ﲠﻮﺳڽ ݘﻮك ﯾڠ �ﺪي درﻓﺪ ﻻﻫڠ اﻧﻮ اﺗﻮ �ﺮڠﺴ�ﺒﺎڬ
either it becomes vinegar automatically ﺳﻮݘ اي ا�ﺲ اﻃﻼق ﯾﻌﲏ ﺳﲈ ادا اي �ﺪي ݘﻮك
or because of being added with another
substance which is pure because lahang دڠﻦ ﺳ�ﻨﺪ�ﺮ�ڽ ٔأﺗﻮ دڠﻦ دﺑﻮﺑﻪ ﺳﻮات �ﲔ ﯾڠ ﺳﻮݘ
does not turn into wine even if it is left
for one night or more. So, it is different ﻛﺪاﳌڽ درﰷرن ﻻﻫڠ اﻧﻮ اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد �ﺪي ﲬﺮ دڠﻦ
from grape juice and the like because دﻓﺮﻣﺎﳌﻜﻦ ﺳﲈﱂ اﺗﻮ ﻟﺒﻪ �ﺮﺳﻼﻫﻦ دڠﻦ ا�ﺮ ﺑﻮﻩ اڠڬﻮر
lahang that is left overnight is not
intoxicating. This [the fact that it is not دان �ﺮڠﯿڠ ﺳﺆﳁﺎڽ ﰷرن ﻻﻫڠ ﯾڠ ﺗ� دﻓﺮﻣﺎﳌﻜﻦ اﯾﺖ
intoxication] has been observed several
times even when it is drunk in a large
ﺗﯿﺎد اي ﳑﺎﺑﻮﻗﲄ دڠﻦ ﺳﻮدﻩ �ﺮݘﻮ� دﻣيﲌ ﺑﱪاف ﰷل
amount. If wine is drunk in smaller ﻫڠڬ ﺟﳫﻮ دﻣيﲌ اي دڠﻦ ﻗﺪر ﯾڠ �ﭘﻖ ﺳﳫﯿﻔﻮن
amount than that, then it normally
intoxicates. In the previous discussion, �ﻚ دﻣيﲌ ﲪﺮ دڠﻦ ﻗﺪر ﯾڠ �ﺮ�ﻮرڠ درﻓﺪ۲ﺳﻜﲑا
it was explained that the ‘illa of the اﯾﺖ �ﺴ�ﺎي ﳑﺎﺑﻮﻗﻜي� اي )دان ﺳڽ( ﺗ� �ﺮدﻫﻮل
impurity and the unlawfulness of wine
lies in its intoxicating nature. Hence, if ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔن ﲠﻮﺳڽ �� ﳒﺲ ﲪﺮ دان �� ﺣﺮﻣڽ �ﺋﺖ
such ‘illa does not exist like in the case
of lahang which is left overnight, then ٔ�د ٔأنڽ ﳑﺎﺑﻮﻗﲄ ﻣﻚ ٔأﻓبﯿﻞ ﺗﯿﺎد� دﻓﺮاوﻟﻬﺮ�� ﯾڠ
it is not impure and not unlawful. �ﺮﺳبﺖ اﯾﺖ ﻓﺪ ﻻﻫڠ اﻧﻮ ﯾڠ ﺗ� دﻓﺮﻣﺎﳌﻜﻦ ﺗﯿﺪ� ﳒﺲ
Likewise, vinegar made from it is pure
and permissible to drink. Even though اي دان ﺗﯿﺎد ﺣﺮام )دان دﻣﻜيﻨﻼڬ( ݘﻮك ﯾڠ �ﺪي
another substance is added within it,
that does not change the ruling.
درﻓﺪاڽ ﻫﺎڽ ادا� اي ﺳﻮݘ ﻫﺎرس ﳑﯿﳮﺪي دان �ﻚ
دﺑﻮﺑﻪ ﺳﻮات �ﲔ ﯾڠ ﻻ�ﻦ ﻛﺪاﳌڽ ﻣﻚ �ﺋﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد ﳑﱪي
ﻣﴬة
In the present paper we did not provide all the details of the dialogical-
framework underlying our reconstruction of the qiyās deployed by al-Banjari. We
present nevertheless the main elements necessary for following our study of the
dialogues. The reader interested in reading more about our take on qiyās can
consult the book Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2019) and Rahman/Iqbal (2018), though
the latter is restricted to the case of qiyās al-‘illa.
Conclusion
24
Indicative Bibliography
P. Adamson (1998)
“Al-Ghazālī, Causality, and Knowledge”. Boston: 20 WCP. Online
https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Medi/MediAdam.htm.
A. al-Banjarī, Muḥammad (1983).
Tuḥfat al-Rāghibīn. Banjarmasin: Toko Buku Murni.
A. al-Banjarī, Muḥammad (1957).
Sabīl al-Muhtadīn.Riyadh: King Saud University.
Al-Ghazālī, Abū Hāmid. (1324 H). Al-Mustaṣfā min ‘Ilm al-Uṣūl, 2 vols. Būlāq:
al-Maṭba’a al-Amīrīyya.
Al-Ramlī, Shams al-Dīn b. Aḥmad (1984).
Nihāyat al-Muḥtāj ilā Sharḥ al-Minhāj, Beyrut: Dār al-Fikr
P. F. A. Bartha (2010). By Parallel Reasoning. The Construction and Evaluation
of Analogical Arguments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
R. Brandom (1994). Making it Explicit. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
J. Granström (2011). Treatise on Intuitionistic Type Theory. Dordrecht: Springer.
13
Clearly, we indulge here in the anachronism of deploying Brandom’s (1994) terminology in the
context of a dialectical practice far in time and space from the one discussed by Brandom. Perhaps,
this also suggests that the emergence of the dialectic stance on the rational assessment of notions
and beliefs implicit in social practices has quite of a long and rich history behind.
25