Seminar Ekonomi Islam

Course: FN 6063
Article Review
On Money, Debt, Trust and Central Banking
Author: Claudio Borio

Bank for International Settlement (BIS)
Working Paper No. 763 (January 2019)
Prepared for:
Prof. Datuk Emeritus Mohammed Ariff
Prepared By:
Name ID
Aminath Sharahath 1400334
Siti Asbi Othman 1800109
Shahira Johan 0600021
Program: Phd, Semester: September, 2019

Article Review
Title: On Money, Debt, Trust and Central Banking
Author: Claudio Borio, Bank for International Settlement (BIS) Working Paper No. 763 (January 2019)
Article review: On Money, Debt, Trust and Central Banking by Claudio Borio
Introduction
This is a Working Paper published by Bank for International Settlements BIS on 11th
January 2019. The paper was presented as a keynote speech by the author at the Cato
Institute, 36th Annual Monetary Conference, Washington DC, 15 November 2018, and
takes the form of an essay more than a research. His main focus was to explain that
cryptocurrencies are not the answer for the current issues in monetary system. In doing so
he examines the properties of a well-functioning monetary system - defined as money plus
the mechanisms to execute payments - in both the short and long run, and looks at the whole
system from theoretical, historical and practical perspectives.
Institutional Trust and Central Bank

This paper stresses the importance of trust and of the institutions needed to secure it. Trust
is essential in the two-tier monetary system, where bank clients settle amongst themselves
with bank money (deposits) and banks settle among themselves in the interbank market with
central bank money, through bank reserves. Author is of the view that cryptocurrency will
not work as it lacks institutional trusts and is not able to stand on its own, as cryptocurrency
does not have the strength of the sovereign. From the government’s standpoint, a private
digital currency is regarded as a foreign currency as the central bank cannot control its
supply unlike conventional (government-issued) fiat money. The ability of the sovereign
state to provide a legal and governance for the institutions to work effectively is equally
important and often time, the strength of the currency depends also on the strength of the
sovereign state. Kaufman et al. (2010) define governance consists of the traditions and
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which
governments are selected, monitored and replaced: the capacity of the government to
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state
for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. Perez-
Carceles and García (2019) find that banks in countries with governments of quality and
competitive institutions are more likely to manage in an efficient way. They prove the
significant influence of goodness of governance. Calomiris et al. (2016) find that the extent
of central bank’s powers differs dramatically across countries. The central banks of some
countries (Saudi Arabia, for example) have narrowly defined powers, while others (the UK,
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Australia and New Zealand, for example) have very broad power and that these powers have
increased over time. Nonetheless, the changes are minor and often coincide with the
experience of a banking crisis, which validate the importance of this institution in
maintaining the stability of the economy.
Furthermore, cryptocurrency issuer will not operate as lender of the last resort. Calomiris
and Weltzer (2016) explain that the role of lender of the last resort is to respond to moments
when banks are unable to maintain depositor confidence. It assists in converting banks’ non-
cash assets into cash, or provides cash in the form of junior funding to banks or offers
guarantees of bank debt that puts an end to bank runs. Those actions allow banks to continue
to provide transaction services through the payments system and to provide credit to bank-
dependent borrowers, which is only unique to the central bank, IMF for member countries
or ECB for EU countries. In fact, Eichler and Hielscher (2012) find evidence that ECB did
indeed act as a lender of the last resort for vulnerable EU countries during the subrprime
crisis.
There are various studies on the implementation of capital adequacy requirement (“CAR”)
and its impact on central bank’s role. In particular, Santos and Suarez (2019) study the
impact of having CAR, which provides for higher liquidity coverage ratio, giving banks the
capability to accommodate potential debt withdrawals for some time, thus delaying
intervention by central bank in a crisis. It also allows discovery of information by central
bank, which is useful for the lender of last resort’s decision on whether to grant support.
Thus, even though the role of the lender of last resort is being compromised with the use of
capital regulation and the availability of deposit insurance, they will not necessarily remove
central bank’s role as the lender of last resort.
Another variable that will help reduce reliance on central bank as lender of last resort is
deposit insurance. Beck et al (2003) state the importance of deposit insurance as safety net
in banking system and cite Germany as a good example, where German banking system
facilitates a financial safety net with a completely private deposit insurance scheme and a
bank failure resolution scheme that relies heavily on financial and organizational support
from other banks. Nonetheless, even though deposit insurance has provided some buffer to
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the intervention need by the central banks, the system works because there is a legal
framework that supports it and this framework is absent for cryptocurrencies.
However, Arnold (2017) studies the impact of central clearing on banks’ lending discipline
and finds that under the current market regulation, central clearing undermines banks’
lending discipline. He also finds that the lending discipline channel is an important
determinant of systemic risk. Thus, the erosion of market discipline through the safety net
of insurance or bailouts, may create negative externalities that will undermine the effective
working of a free market. In this sense, cryptocurrency or any fintech business requires
higher discipline as they involved non-intermediated transactions. Bitcoin or any other
privately issued digital cryptocurrency is a money and payment system that uses
cryptographic rules in a decentralized manner (has no central authority). However, the
unexpected and rapid circulation of private digital currencies has created a great deal of
concern for the government as transactions could take place in violation of capital control
according to Rahman (2018). Thakor (2019) has reviewed emerging literature on fintech,
with a focus on the interaction between fintech and banking. He finds that fintech will have
biggest disruptive potential on the payment system and he has little doubt that digital
currencies would eventually replace cash. The open questions are when and in what form
will central banks embrace such currencies as part of the payment system.
Role of Central Bank in reducing Transaction Costs

While author does not specifically state that the central bank help reduce transaction costs,
this is a positive outcome of trust in clearing transactions. By central bank playing the
institutional role and carrying out the daily and long run functions, it provides trust to market
participants, and trust reduces transaction cost according to the theory of institutional
economics. This is aligned with North (1989)’s concept that institutions help create trust
and that the institution in this case is the central bank. Furthermore, according to North
(1987), even though trust reduces transaction costs, cost reduction also depends on the level
of development in the economy itself. This depends on the effectiveness of the specialisation
of resources in the economy as well as the role of state in providing and enforcing the
governance framework as we discussed in the earlier section. What follows is that, the
author is true in his implied argument on reducing transaction costs, since there is no legal
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and regulatory framework that can protect the transacting parties in cryptocurrency
environment.
Hasman et al. (2014) state that the main explanations for the existence of financial
intermediaries, and the central bank in this case, are that they (i) reduce transactions costs,
(ii) provide liquidity insurance, (iii) solve asymmetric information inefficiencies, and (iv)
align incentives through active monitoring. Benston and Smith (1976) argue that “the
raisond’être for the [financial intermediation] industry is the existence of transactions
costs”. They interpret transaction costs as costs of transportation, administration, search,
evaluation and monitoring, among others. Their main argument is that banks enjoy
economies of scale, scope, reputation and network. Hasman et al. (2014) associate
transaction cost as deadweight cost as agents interact. However, because the banks operate
over overlapping generations, an intermediary that offers demand deposits can internalize
the rebalancing trades and improve welfare. Thus, this works in favour of having a central
bank in a market. Even if the intermediaries incur transaction costs, the welfare attained in
the banking economy increases further, due to the increased barrier against interbank
arbitrage, which enables higher stationary investment levels. He also argues that the
transaction cost will assist in dampening the cyclical effect, thus will be beneficial to the
economy. After all, the model also shows that in the market economy transaction costs lead
to a downward sloping yield curve in the market economy based on the reason that
equilibrium investments in long-term securities come with lower per period transaction
costs.
Central Bank and Money Supply

Author holds the view that interest rate, influenced by the policy rate enforced by the central
banks determines the moneys supply and not the monetary base or money multiplier. This
is also the view of some of the Bank of England’s economists, in that in a modern economy,
the amount of money created in the economy ultimately depends on the monetary policy of
the central bank. In normal times, creation and management of money supply is carried out
by setting interest rates. The central bank can also affect the amount of money directly
through purchasing assets or ‘quantitative easing’. Thornton (2014) states that “monetary
policy” should be more aptly named “interest rate policy” because in his opinion,
policymakers pay virtually no attention to money and are pursuing unconventional
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monetary policies in an effort to enhance the effectiveness of countercyclical policy. He

offers an alternative perspective that money is essential for the central bank’s control over
the price level and that the monetary authority’s ability to control interest rates is greatly
exaggerated. His view is premised on the fact that the effect of policy actions on the total
supply of credit has been too small to have a significant effect on the level of the entire
structure of interest rates and that with more sophisticated financial markets, it is less
obvious that money is an essential as a monetary tool.
Werner (2014) finds that banks individually create money out of nothing and that the money supply
is created as ‘fairy dust’ produced by the banks individually, "out of thin air". He outlines the existing
theories of banks in creating money which (i) to the financial intermediation theory of banking,
banks are merely intermediaries collecting deposits that are then lent out, (ii) to the fractional reserve
theory of banking, individual banks are mere financial intermediaries that cannot create money, but
collectively they end up creating money through systemic interaction, and (iii) to the credit creation
theory of banking, each individual bank has the power to create money ‘out of nothing’ and does so
when it extends credit (the credit creation theory of banking).
However, one may argue for banks to create money, banks first need to consider its balance
sheet, in light of the stringent Basel II and III requirement, Xing et al (2019) study the credit
creation under multiple banking regulations. Their focus is on the liability side (money) of
the bank’s balance sheet, rather than the bank’s asset side (debt). They state that credit
creation theory of banking argues that commercial banks are able to create deposits and
loans simultaneously through balance sheet expansion. Thus, commercial banks are both
credit suppliers as well as money suppliers. They propose that bank balance sheet structure
should be considered if credit creation is to be effective. That is, if the bank is reserve-
strapped, injecting reserves is certainly an effective strategy to promote money supply.
Nevertheless, if the bank is capital-strapped, the bank should seek for additional capital
rather than reserves, and the increase in reserves would even have some adverse impacts on
money multiplier. With the aim of offering more money and credit, while still meeting the
requirements of the central bank and the banking supervisory authorities, central banks
should first look at the balance sheets of each commercial bank.
As regard to the effectiveness of central banks’ control over money supply in a digital
currency economy, Rahman (2018) finds that monetary equilibrium under a purely private
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arrangement of digital currencies will not deliver a socially efficient allocation. He also
finds that privately-issued currencies will create problems with the implementation of
monetary policy under a money-growth rule. This is because the profit-maximizing
incentive of the miners will lead to an unabated increase in money supply from the minting
of private tokens, and therefore it would be infeasible for the government to run a persistent
deflationary policy to shrink the total money supply in the economy. He also shows that a
competitive monetary equilibrium corresponds to the efficient allocation at the Friedman
rule only in a purely fiat regime with no digital currencies, thus digital currencies (on top of
the fintech credit creation) may pose challenges to the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Monetary neutrality
The author essentially demands that economists should reject the money neutrality
assumption in their analysis. The author posits that it is necessary to recognise interest rate
as the monetary anchor which affects different sectors differently, resulting in different rates
of capital accumulation and various forms of hysteresis. Originally defined by Friedrich A.
Hayek, Patinkin (1987) later describes neutrality of money as an idea that a change in the
stock of money affects only nominal variables in the economy such as prices, wages, and
exchange rates, with no effect on real variables, like employment, real GDP, and real
consumption. This is an important idea and has been a source for numerous researches since
it implies that the central bank does not affect the real economy by creating money. Results
have been mixed but later studies indicate greater support for both short and long term non-
neutrality.
One of the earliest researches was provided by Lucas’ (1972) article that relates monetary
shocks to relative and absolute prices. It shows that monetary shocks have real effects in the
short term because agents have information asymmetry and they cannot distinguish whether
the change in prices is relative or absolute but have neutral effect in the long run. Subsequent
research on the non-neutrality of money in the long-run has shown the sensitivity of the
hypothesis to the country-context used in the analysis. Noriega (2004) conducted a study to
evaluate the performances of different countries and different monetary definitions toward
the proposition using a sample period from 1975 to 2001. The analysis revealed mixed
results, whereby evidence of neutrality was found only in Brazil, Canada, Mexico’s M2 and
for Sweden but not in Argentina, Australia, Mexico’s M1, Italy and UK. Similarly, results
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were also mixed in the study by Puah et al. (2008) that inspected the relationship between
money supply and real output occurred in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand between 1970 and 2001. Rungcharoenkitkul et. al. (2019) studies the interaction
between monetary policy and macroeconomic stability and found evidence to suggest that
monetary policy may have long-lasting impact on the real economy through its influence on
the financial cycle.
The implication of non-neutrality of money is a major complicating factor in monetary

policy. As the author highlights, if monetary policy generates changes in relative prices then
it also alters the allocation of production factors and alters the goods and services produced,
resulting in income redistribution. Hence, why he claims that the debate regarding the
dichotomy between relative and absolute prices is irrelevant1. This also why the author
believes that dynamics of monetary policy may not work according to expectations
particularly in low interest rate environment. Blanchard and Summers (2017) state that low
neutral rates decrease the scope for using monetary policy and increase the scope for using
fiscal policy. The two economists are sceptical that monetary policy in the form of
movements in the policy rate is a useful tool particularly because (i) nature of asset bubbles
or unhealthy credit booms which they would like to address is difficult to address in real
time (ii) monetary policy has a lagged effect and (iii) interest rate is a very poor instrument
to decrease risk. Central banks should not continue to assume monetary neutrality less they
risk underestimating the spill over effects into other segments of the economy which a
subsequent point made by the author on financial imbalances.
Financial imbalances
Financial imbalances are a major concern for central banks as they have often been
associated with economic busts. Kindleberger (2000) states that speculative excess along
with excessive credit creation can result in financial crises. Claessens, Kose and Terrones
(2011) find that recessions associated with house price busts, tend to be longer and deeper
than other recessions. Merrouche and Nier (2017) investigates three potential drivers of the
1
The dichotomy is linked to the fact that changes in real variables cause changes in relative prices, while
changes in absolute prices are attributed to monetary causes. This dichotomy means that given the supply
of money, the velocity of money and the level of trade in goods, changes induced by a real shock in the
relative prices produce compensatory changes in other relative prices, so that the absolute level of prices
remain unchanged.
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build-up of financial imbalances: rising global imbalances (capital flows), loose monetary
policy and inadequate supervision and regulation using panel data regressions for OECD
countries from 1999 to 2007. They found that differences in the build-up of wholesale-
funded credit were driven by the strength of capital inflows and this was amplified where
the supervisory and regulatory environment was relatively weak. However, differences in
monetary policy did not significantly affect differences across countries in the build-up of
these financial imbalances ahead of the crisis.
The author believes that central banks need to be vigilant in addressing financial imbalances
since they build-up gradually with the potential destabilising effects only emerging at time
horizons that are beyond those of conventional monetary policy. Some of the immediate
measures adopted by central banks at the height of the Global Financial Crisis may have
eased the risk to financial stability and facilitated improvements in the economic outlook
but continued accommodative policies have also masked serious, underlying financial
vulnerabilities. This is evident in the legacy of high debt burdens weighing on many
countries’ balance sheets and build-up of financial imbalances in the context of rapid credit
growth, increasing asset prices, and strong and volatile capital inflows. Rungcharoenkitkul
et. al. (2019), claims that in the present “finance-based” economy, central banks can fall
into a ‘low interest rate trap’ which can lead to the build-up of financial imbalances. This
increases the vulnerability to financial busts throughout the business cycles that leads to
further cutting of rates thus creating a phenomenon “low rates can beget lower rates” and
“lower for longer” (IMF, 2019).
As the author suggests, appropriate supervision and regulation are the first line of defence
against financial imbalances. Macroprudential regulations which looks at the financial
system as a whole is of significance such as the introduction of countercyclical capital
buffers to increase banks' resilience to loan losses in a future downturn. Different
jurisdictions have also employed additional tools including sector-specific capital
requirements and limits on loan-to-income and loan-to-value ratios adopted by the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). Monetary policy and macroprudential policy also have to be
viewed in complementarity. Macroprudential regulation and monetary policy will often
work in the same direction. For example, the central bank can tighten monetary policy and
capital requirements during boom periods to mitigate expectations of higher inflation and
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the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances. Currently there is still very limited research
on understanding the nature of these imbalances and clarify the implications for the
monetary policy framework. Hence, this is an area where central banks and researchers
should put more effort to elucidate the dynamics of financial imbalances, the potential
outcomes and the impact of prudential and monetary policies on such imbalances.
Conclusions
This paper is more of an essay and did not follow scientific methodology in research papers,
as is not done in key note speeches as such. While he looked at the definition of particular
concepts such as monetary system, including definitions of its components, (i.e money and
payment system), from theoretical, historical and practical perspectives, he did not visit the
opposing views as much as his standing, most probably because the target audience to which
the paper was presented is well-informed of opposing views and issues.
His in-depth analysis of the theoretical, historical and practical perspectives of well-
functioning monetary systems, and the manner in which he articulated his justifications was
clever and leave little room for argument for the opposing views on the justification as far
as the role of central banking as an institution in providing trust in its day to day and long
run operations. However, it can be argued that this is a narrow and limited justification for
the problems that he impliedly raises in the paper, i.e. current issues with the monetary
system, and cryptocurrencies as a solution.
The author covers a wide variety of topics and related issues such as money, payments,
monetary operations, cryptocurrencies, money neutrality, free banking, inflation and the
relationship between monetary and financial stability which are typically analysed
separately in economics. By depicting a clear picture of the framework within which all
elements operate and its relationship and interdependency, the readers are able to appreciate
the broad set of issues and the importance of trust-building institutions, notably central
banks. The author not only presents his view as an opinion, but carefully draws on the
lessons of the history of money, credit, banks and central banks.
However, one lesson from history that the author does not seem to acknowledge is that
central banks can sometimes fail in carrying out their mandates of ensuring financial
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stability such as what transpired during the Global Financial Crisis. Stiglitz argues that
Federal Reserve by trying to churn the economy with policy of low interest rate and lax
regulations created a bubble, while the market is small in comparison, had enormous effect
when the housing bubble burst bringing down markets and banks across the globe.2 The
author claims central bank supervises and regulates banking system, but banking failures
and crises throughout shows the ineffectiveness of central banks doing this. Failing to
acknowledge the issues of central banks in exercising these functions, and what it can be
attributed to, will only continue to erode trust and public confidence essential to the
existence of the central banking purpose itself.
A final comment, despite his wide-ranging remarks on monetary policy and central banking,
it is odd to find that nothing was said about the central banks’ role in current debate
surrounding sustainability and climate-related issues. As these issues become more
mainstream and eminent, central banks cannot ignore the impact of environmental factors
to financial stability and more efforts in terms of research needs to be conducted to
understand the dynamics of these environmental risks and their influence on traditional
central banking tools.
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Course: FN 6063

On Money, Debt, Trust and Central Banking

Author: Claudio Borio

Program: Phd, Semester: September, 2019

Institutional Trust and Central Bank

Role of Central Bank in reducing Transaction Costs

Central Bank and Money Supply

monetary policies in an effort to enhance the effectiveness of countercyclical policy. He

The implication of non-neutrality of money is a major complicating factor in monetary

Perez-Carceles M.C., García J.G. (2019) Goodness of Governance Effect on European

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