G.R. No.

173614 September 28, 2007 because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required
by said provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner, was dissolved only upon the latter’s death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely
vs. three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore,
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI- petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for
MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents. at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional
ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogio’s serious illness which
DECISION
made its performance impossible.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as
husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union
Procedure assails the Order,1 dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28
(RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting
October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended that
reconsideration of its Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating
the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo,
respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense,

On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the

(Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity

for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. of marriage.

Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the dismissal of the
married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3 They begot seven children,
Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7
herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel,
March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC
Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26 August
elucidated on its position in the following manner:
2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo,
Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.7
The Complaint should be dismissed.

In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the

1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court
same was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued
which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a
8
that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who
petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed
have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment
solely by the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple
from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio
which states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the
petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of
this Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and this right solely
belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot
substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null
12
and void. (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the
answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the
13
[respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by
petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an
Order14 dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the
RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order
ignored the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog,15 which was on the authority for holding
that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage
even after the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where
both parties to a void marriage are still living.16 Where one or both parties are
deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the
marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA
122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the
heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his
marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration
held that the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the
Rule) because the Supreme Court has rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog
by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held that
it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an
action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely
personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Niñal vs.
Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to
reconcile the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court
will have to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the
legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced
particularly with respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the
parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over the property of the said
parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it
should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare
his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have
already a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested
right should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules
of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then,
have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their
parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it
will give premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever
at all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given
a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after
the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both parties
to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty
party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic)
marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband
or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be
applicable.17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated
October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order;
however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that
no new matter was raised therein.19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
on the sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Niñal, or the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme
Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court,
countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable
within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or
certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this
Court.20 Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower
courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the
task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of
21
courts. However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary
power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature
and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction.22 Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant
Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this
Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question
of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A
contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal which is applicable, whereby the
heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to
file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein
respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling
for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable
law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil
Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.23 What we
have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be
declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As
can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio was celebrated
in 2004.1âwphi1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its
scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.
The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
24
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion
of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC with the ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope and application. As has
been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of
petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls
within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget.
When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the
wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of
voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or
by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by
the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to
file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior
to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of
the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage
and not to seek its dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo.
Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory
or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules
on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not
in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED
DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of
Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the latter. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO
and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of
subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to
the protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17,
2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its
subsequent Resolution2 dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89
declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen.
Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice –
initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3
and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at
Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen.
Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and
in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed
a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31,
1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been
celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based
on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by
deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he
contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still
subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal
basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his
lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because divorce is not allowed
under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant
Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the
deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually,
to have been one contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2)
of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register
their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then
asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be
counted from January 4, 1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until February
18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to
Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as had
been averred in the latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.12
Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues
involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
shari’a courts.
The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the
case for declaration of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a
certiorari petition with this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to
Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA14 which
was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the
case since there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage
even if the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to
participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their evidence.
When it was Estrellita’s turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such
purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March
22, 1996, suspended the proceedings16 in view of the CA’s temporary
restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the
case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its
Decision dated September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate
court’s judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita
to present her evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on
that day, the hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.21 The day before this
scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib
moved to submit the case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long
been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet
filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25
stating as one of the reasons that as shari’a courts are not vested with original
and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil
Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded
from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated August
24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered
the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano
as void ab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never
severed, declared Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab
initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines
and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the
second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during
the subsistence of his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the
subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late
Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the
void character of the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce
obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the
effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was
solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the
Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC
should have required her to file her answer after the denial of her motion to
dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his
marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim
Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal standing to question the
validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the CA held
that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given
ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous
postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60
days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that
Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts
since, as an independent and original action, it does not interrupt the
proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s
marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that
the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code,
which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial
celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was
only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to
file the action as she is Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence, the injured party in
the senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked
the additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the
public prosecutor’s report on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule
9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code35
will not invalidate the trial court’s judgment as the proceedings between the
parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming
that the issues have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable
to Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellita’s
allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to
our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No.
126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to
the issue of the validity of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that
the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely
issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and to present her
evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her marriage. She
claims that Judge Macias v. Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a
motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer
and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved
with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC hearings
because of the trial court’s assurance that the proceedings will be without
prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning
the RTC’s jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered
an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R.
No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also
questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of
whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further
proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator
is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time
he married her. She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage
of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their consent to be
covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized
under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives
under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the
deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file
suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s
reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be
heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari does not stay the
proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is
collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the
vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack of
collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents’ legal standing to
challenge the validity of Estrellita’s purported marriage with Sen. Tamano,
reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a
void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as they
are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even though
the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered
without waiting for the Supreme Court’s final resolution of her certiorari petition,
i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied
due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an
investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s
marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to
answer; and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning
the denial of the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all
suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of Quezon
City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due
process. She was never declared in default, and she even actively participated
in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the
period to file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition
for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has
been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following reasoning
of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of
filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the
period for her to file her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved
by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to
suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on
April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the
Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now
Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11
of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service
on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her
Answer to the complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that
the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to
dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial
court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or
impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts. In
Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the
proceeding of the case because after it denied the wife’s motion to dismiss, it
immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex parte and
resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure,
the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no
time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the
extended period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for
extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it
should have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the
CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the
CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not
suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is
an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which
resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CA’s
temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the
RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we
never issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the
principal action. With her numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita
remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence
when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for
our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal
to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not
be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other
party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and
rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to
present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the
decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait
for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves
strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of
marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules
of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the
participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It
specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to
determine whether there is collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month after
receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the
public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties
are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis
thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the
finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The
court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in
collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set
the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for
the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to
submit the required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied
with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation
dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there could be no collusion
between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not
the spouse of any of the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming
that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public
prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of
participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and
legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated.
Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation
by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the
parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-
intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the
contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial
court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano;
their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent
marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike
was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage
can exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No.
39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has
been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim
personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1)
thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part
of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of
PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both
in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law
cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain
rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly
provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise
provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the effectivity
of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their
execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall
affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or
liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of
doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186
aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of
a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil acts
that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2)
which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in
accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under
Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to
be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of
mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as
both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their
personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time
Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the
CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the
declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only
the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in
application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground
is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,55 Estrellita relies
on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that
under Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of
others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she
and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the
petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of
voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or
by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by
the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to
file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior
to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of
the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is
employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely,
this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had
only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous,
and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus,
in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy
is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be
a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage
which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from
impugning the subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both
Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the
Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family
Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003.58

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage
in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper
party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage
has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may
attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who
has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in
interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be
interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include
striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly
rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent
Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013
YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER,
vs.
FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO,
AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the September 4, 2012 Decision2
and October 16, 2012 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, of
Manila in Civil Case No. 11-126203. The RTC denied the petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa with private
respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan due to insufficient evidence.
The antecedents follow:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in
one of his visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as
"single" and "has never married before." Since then, the two became close to
each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and married
private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding,
the couple resided in Japan.4
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that
something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife
about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received
news that her previous husband passed away.5
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and discovered
that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that
their marriage took place on June 20, 1994.6 This prompted petitioner to file a
petition7 for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and
void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article
35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following
pieces of documentary evidence issued by the National Statistics Office
(NSO):
(1)
Certificate of Marriage8 between petitioner and private respondent marked as
Exhibit "A" to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on November 28,
2002;
(2)
Certificate of Marriage9 between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo
Arambulo marked as Exhibit "B" to prove the fact of marriage between the
parties on June 20, 1994;
(3)
Certificate of Death10 of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibits
"C" and "C-1" to prove the fact of the latter’s death on July 14, 2009; and
(4)
Certification11 from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage
recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent marked as Exhibit "D"
to prove that private respondent in fact contracted two marriages, the first one
was to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June 20, 1994, and second, to
petitioner on November 28, 2002.
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) admitted the authenticity and due execution of the above documentary
exhibits during pre-trial.12
On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that
there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent’s prior existing
valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner offered the
certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner
who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioner’s testimony is
unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private respondent’s prior
marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger to the
marriage certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s
death certificate. It further ruled that petitioner’s testimony about the NSO
certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of
said document.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the
RTC in an Order dated October 16, 2012.
Hence this petition raising the sole legal issue of whether the testimony of the
NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of the
public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be
accorded evidentiary weight.
Petitioner argues that the documentary evidence he presented are public
documents which are considered self-authenticating and thus it was
unnecessary to call the NSO Records Custodian as witness. He cites Article
410 of the Civil Code which provides that books making up the civil register
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Moreover, the trial
prosecutor himself also admitted the authenticity of said documents.
The OSG, in its Comment,13 submits that the findings of the RTC are not in
accord with law and established jurisprudence. It contends that both Republic
Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Law on Registry of Civil Status, and the
Civil Code elaborated on the character of documents arising from records and
entries made by the civil registrar and categorically declared them as public
documents. Being public documents, said documents are admissible in
evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness
and consequently, there was no need for the court to require petitioner to
present the records custodian or officer from the NSO to testify on them. The
OSG further contends that public documents have probative value since they
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein as provided in the above-
quoted provision of the Civil Code. Thus, the OSG submits that the public
documents presented by petitioner, considered together, completely establish
the facts in issue.
In her letter14 dated March 19, 2013 to this Court, private respondent indicated
that she is not against her husband’s petition to have their marriage declared
null and void. She likewise admitted therein that she contracted marriage with
Arambulo on June 20, 1994 and contracted a second marriage with petitioner
on November 28, 2002. She further admitted that it was due to poverty and
joblessness that she married petitioner without telling the latter that she was
previously married. Private respondent also confirmed that it was when she
found out that Arambulo passed away on July 14, 2009 that she had the guts
to confess to petitioner about her previous marriage. Thereafter, she and
petitioner have separated.
We grant the petition.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner
are all public documents.1âwphi1 As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further
proof of their due execution and genuineness.15 Thus, the RTC erred when it
disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not
present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their
authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution
was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents
admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant
case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private
respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires
is a bigamous marriage,16 which is void from the beginning as provided in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what transpired
in the instant case.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together
concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private
respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly
prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent married Arambulo on
June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a
second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City;
(3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private
respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo
died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private
respondent’s marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved;
and (4) that the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is
bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and
subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
September 4, 2012 Decision and October 16, 2012 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 11-126203 are hereby SET
ASIDE. The marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and private respondent
Felisa Custodio Gangan is declared NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and the National Statistics Office are
hereby ORDERED to make proper entries into the records of the
abovementioned parties in accordance with this Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227
dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos
("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him.
Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2
Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his
marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"),
declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in
the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful
day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows
before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's
parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia
gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a
number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a
nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of
her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit
the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he
desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his
efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the
regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of
marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No.
9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed
the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the
petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their
marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report
to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit
unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that
she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the
trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with
Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its
lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly
show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his
own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner.
A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a
period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of
the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.)
Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice
(Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the
other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not
lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added
that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient
use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and
the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be
modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to
defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there
is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for
voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to
the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word
"mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-)
Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting
the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice
Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the
Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is
precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be
cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for
void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is
curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack
or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of
consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages,
and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a
ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really
understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make
excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing
for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by
reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a
defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that
psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to
do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do
not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are
really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that
it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and
the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each
other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of
age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not
be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it
should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as
long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the
marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the
action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the
issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer
true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a
defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children
and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been
cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser
degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological
incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in
insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of
the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that
the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was
contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of
marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among
the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some
instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only
temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that
they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term
"incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated
that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to
show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the
essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa
explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after
the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of
marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and
later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after
the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he
is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this
case is to allow him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On
the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may
encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the
basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities,
which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or
mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity
to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity"
refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because
there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they
classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments
of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not
reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and
in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the
effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of
psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or
prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer
to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under
the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were
concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee
approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years
within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed
in court. The Committee approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately
deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact,
so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by
Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429,
13 June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear
that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge
to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for
having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law
prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation
or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how
the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a
grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are
unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf.
SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the
term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to
draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to
assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise
definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by
Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself
to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other
disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here
described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real
inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he
cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring;
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere
difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal
effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due
(cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage
is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that
the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact
deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume
the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being
bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr.
Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot
be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue
to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and
even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of
our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold
on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close
to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and
understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its
journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time,
much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who
created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring
husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed
the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration
in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract.
(Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa,
Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night
of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City.
But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew.
They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio
City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during
siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22,
1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of
sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.
Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January
20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and
still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up
to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment
was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but
he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he
did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using
an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall
be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect
on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two
of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention
of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them.
But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but
he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed
this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be
forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband,
the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are
still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he
is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical
Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency
(Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether
or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2)
inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one
(1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of
further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having
sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the
marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at
the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy
of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let
another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion
with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally
absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the
lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between
them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private
respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that
since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus
between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion
except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended
to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that
the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of
the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it
could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said
provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined
by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party,
she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence
was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He
admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the
petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall
be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts.
88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without
trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their
marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between
the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent)
have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling
the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial
lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based
on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on
record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife
after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within
the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the
alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as
error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the
alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders"
because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such
as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not
want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made
a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have
sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never
been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage
void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated,
the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that
any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also
claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for
private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as
stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with
private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and
avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never
did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out
or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the
reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the
wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he
was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during
the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the
same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves
to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked
(Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact
that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens
his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of
her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the
innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would
expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her
marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is
the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not
phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom
he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable
resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and
of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to
discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family
Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the
sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say
"I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private

respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must
be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely
not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with
love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated
marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the

Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162049 April 13, 2007
NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the Decision1 dated January 8, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 65677, reversing the Regional Trial Court’s declaration of
nullity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent. Likewise assailed is the
Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated February 4, 2004 denying reconsideration.
In Civil Case No. 94-70727, filed by petitioner Narciso Navarro, Jr. with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, he sought the declaration of nullity
of his marriage to respondent.
As culled from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent were college sweethearts. At the time they got
married, both in civil and church ceremonies, they were awaiting their first
child. Since petitioner was still a medical student, while respondent was a
student of pharmacy, they lived with petitioner’s parents, on whom they were
financially dependent. Eventually, their union bore four children.
Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he didn’t have
time for her; and that she constantly quarreled with him even before marriage
when he could not give her the things she wanted. He added that she was not
supportive of his career. Even marriage counseling did not work. Petitioner
stated that when they quarreled, she refused to have sex with him and even
told him to look for other women. He filed the petition for nullification of their
marriage when he found out their eldest daughter had been made pregnant by
a man whom respondent hired to follow him.
Abdona T. de Castro, a marriage counselor duly accredited by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development, testified that when petitioner saw her on
April 6, 1994, he was distraught, harassed, and unhappy. She concluded from
meetings with the petitioner that the marriage was dysfunctional, destructive,
and reconciliation was out of the question since he claims he would go insane
if he were to go back to his wife. Relying on the view of another expert, one
Dr. Gerardo Velasco, witness de Castro opined that professionals are per se
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage because they
spend a lot of time in the pursuit of their profession and have very little time to
spend with their family. She concluded that respondent was also
psychologically incapacitated to perform the marital obligations because she
knew, from the start, that her husband was going to be a doctor, yet she did
not give him the support and understanding that was expected of a doctor’s
wife.
Lilia Tayco, the housemaid of petitioner’s parents also testified that petitioner
and respondent were always quarreling because respondent was always
jealous of petitioner’s classmates.
A psychologist, Dr. Natividad Dayan, who conducted a psychiatric test on
petitioner, testified that tests showed that petitioner was a perfectionist, short-
tempered, critical, argumentative and irritable when people do not meet his
expectations. He married Cynthia only after he got her pregnant. He had
depressions and tended to escapism when beset with problems. He was vocal
about his marital problems. He believed that the lack of communication,
absence of quality time, inadequacy in problem-solving, and many problems
caused the failure of the marriage.
For her part, respondent refused to submit to the psychiatric examination
asked by the petitioner, but said she would do so only when her defense
requires it. She averred that she had no marital problems, not until petitioner
had an illicit affair with a certain Dr. Lucila Posadas. Petitioner denied the affair.
Respondent narrated that early 1984, she caught petitioner and Lucila inside
the Harana Motel in Sta. Mesa where a confrontation ensued. After the
incident, petitioner seldom went home until he permanently left his family
sometime in 1986. Respondent claimed petitioner and Lucila continued to see
each other and had gone abroad together several times. She explained that
she uttered she would not make love with her husband and dared him to look
for other women only out of frustration and anger upon discovery of the affair.
She admitted hiring someone to spy on petitioner, but added that she still loved
her husband.
Cynthia’s friend since high school, Miraflor Respicio testified that Cynthia was
a good, stable, and mature person; that she was a loving and caring mother
who gave up her career to take care of her children; and that petitioner and
respondent were happy during the early days of the marriage.
On August 21, 1998, the trial court held that petitioner and respondent were
both psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations. The
dispositive portion of the court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage between the parties is (sic) dated June 2, 1973
is hereby declared null and void with the following effects:
1. The Plaintiff is hereby directed to support his children with the Defendant in
the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) a month, which sum shall be
payable on or before the 5th day of each month, effective September, 1998;
2. The parties are hereby disqualified from inheriting from each other by way
of testate or intestate succession;
3. Either of the parties may revoke the designation of the other as beneficiary
in a life insurance policy;
4. The parties’ children are hereby declared legitimate, and the custody of the
parties’ minor children is hereby awarded to the Defendant with the Plaintiff
exercising his right to visit them at least once a week;
5. The properties in the name of the parties consisting of a house and lot
located at 15 Bronze Street, Filinvest, Quezon City are hereby deemed as their
advance legitime to their children.
SO ORDERED.2
Respondent appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. She averred that the
trial court erred when it annulled their marriage instead of decreeing their legal
separation, with the ruling that petitioner was the guilty spouse.
In a Decision dated January 8, 2003, the Court of Appeals held that the
constant arguments, bickerings and conflicts between the spouses did not
constitute psychological incapacity. It ruled that petitioner failed to show that
any psychological incapacity in either of the two parties existed at the time of
the celebration of marriage. The appellate court reversed the decision of the
trial court and declared that the marriage still subsists.
Petitioner now comes before us raising the following as issues:
(1) Are the decision and resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals proper
subject for review by the Honorable Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure?
(2) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals – that the lower court
(RTC) erred in finding the parties (petitioner and respondent) both
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of The Family Code – correct or
not?
(3) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals – that the evidence
failed to show that the parties (petitioner and respondent) were completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage – correct or not? and
(4) Which is more in accord with existing law and settled jurisprudence, the
decision of the Court of Appeals or the decision of the trial court?3
Simply stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is void on the
ground of the parties’ psychological incapacity.
Petitioner contends that the decision of the trial court was well-founded, based
on the evidence indicating that the marriage was beyond reconciliation, and
allowing the marriage to subsist would only prolong the spouses’ agony.
Respondent counters that petitioner failed to prove psychological incapacity,
and that their psychological incapacities existed as early as the time of the
celebration of their marriage.
We shall now resolve the issue.1a\^/phi1.net
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
In addition, as early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,4 we categorically
said that psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
These include the obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.5
We likewise have repeatedly reminded that the intention of the law is to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.6 In Republic v. Court of
Appeals,7 the Court gave the guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 which are as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity...
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision...
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable...
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage...
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts...
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition...8
In the present case, the spouses’ frequent squabbles and respondent’s refusal
to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute
psychological incapacity. The records show that petitioner and respondent
were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them
four children. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations,9 it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness10 existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
It will be noted that respondent did not undergo psychological tests. Witness
de Castro’s diagnosis was based solely on petitioner’s avowals and not on
personal knowledge of the spouses’ relationship. Hence, de Castro’s diagnosis
is based on hearsay and has no probative value.11
Further, de Castro’s statement that professionals are per se incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage because their profession allows
them little time for family life is highly debatable.
Lastly, petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity, on the part
of both spouses, existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Their
bickerings and arguments even before their marriage and respondent’s
scandalous outbursts in public, at most, show their immaturity, and immaturity
does not constitute psychological incapacity.12 Thus so far, both petitioner and
respondent have not shown proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor,
an adverse integral element in their personality structure that effectively
incapacitates them from accepting and complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.13
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
January 8, 2003 and the Resolution dated February 4, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 65677 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011
ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner,
vs.
MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution2 dated
July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which
reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated January 4, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302. The
RTC had granted petitioner’s prayer that his marriage to respondent be
declared null and void on the ground that he is psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University.
They were classmates but initially, petitioner was not interested in respondent.
He only became attracted to her after they happened to sit beside each other
in a passenger bus. Petitioner courted respondent and they eventually became
sweethearts even though petitioner already had a girl friend. Later, respondent
discovered petitioner’s other relationship and demanded more time and
attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he appreciated this gesture like
a child longing for love, time and attention.
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married
in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church
wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa
Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five children.
As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical
quarrels became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner
became unhappy because of it. The frequency of their quarrels increased
when their eldest daughter transferred from one school to another due to
juvenile misconduct. It became worse still when their daughter had an
unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious attention petitioner
gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled
some of them, but it also became another cause for the incessant quarrelling
between him and respondent.
Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with
another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly
terminated it. But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their quarrels
aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of respect
remaining between them was further eroded by their frequent arguments and
verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was unloved,
unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards
respondent. When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family
home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties
which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of
respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several
women.
On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said
date, he filed a petition4 for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent
on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
responsibilities of marital life.
In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was
already exposed to the hardships of farm life at an early age. His father,
although responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and
womanizer. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom
he had seven other children. This caused petitioner’s mother and siblings to
suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became obsessed with attention and
worked hard to excel so he would be noticed.
Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and
worked hard for the company he joined. He rose from the ranks at Advertising
and Marketing Associates, Inc., and became Senior Executive Vice President
and Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite his success at work, he alleged
that his misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in
his relationship with his own family.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report5 of Dr.
Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental
Health. Dr. Tayag’s report stated that petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial
Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy,
rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of
remorse. The report also revealed that petitioner’s personality disorder is
rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that
his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was
Dr. Tayag’s conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner’s marriage to
respondent on the ground of petitioner’s psychological incapacity.
Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the
RTC decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
marriage between the parties is declared valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to
establish the existence of petitioner’s psychological incapacity. The CA noted
that Dr. Tayag did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she
give a concrete explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its
gravity or permanence. The appellate court emphasized that the root cause of
petitioner’s psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. In addition,
the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It
must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this appeal.
Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in
reversing the trial court’s decision.
Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential
marital obligations was clearly proven and correctly appreciated by the trial
court. Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation conducted by
Dr. Tayag and quotes the latter’s findings:
Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his
family to the present affairs that he [has]. This need had afforded him to find
avenues straight or not, just to fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit, lies,
violence, [and] authority just so to accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally,
he is using religions to support his claim for a much better personal and
married life which is really out of context. Rebellious and impulsive as he is,
emotional instability is apparent that it would be difficult for him to harmonize
with life in general and changes. Changes must come from within, it is not
purely external.
Clinically, petitioner’s self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and
incurable nature of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Such disorder is
characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness,
impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse.
The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional
antecedence as it existed even before the said marital union. It is also
profoundly rooted, grave and incurable. The root cause of which is deep
feelings of rejection starting from family to peers. This insecure feelings had
made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. Carrying it until his marital
life. Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and
severed the relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void
by reason of the psychological incapacity.7
According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag
declared that his psychological incapacity is profoundly rooted and has the
characteristics of juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. Moreover,
petitioner asserts that his psychological incapacity has been medically
identified and sufficiently proven. The State, on the other hand, never
presented another psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayag’s findings. Also, petitioner
maintains that the psychological evaluation would show that the marriage
failed not solely because of irreconcilable differences between the spouses,
but due to petitioner’s personality disorder which rendered him unable to
comply with his marital obligations. To the mind of petitioner, the assailed
decision compelled the parties to continue to live under a "non-existent
marriage."
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment8 maintaining that petitioner
failed to prove his psychological incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag
failed to explain specifically how she arrived at the conclusion that petitioner
suffers from an anti-social personality disorder and that it is grave and
incurable. In fact, contrary to his claim, it even appears that petitioner acted
responsibly throughout their marriage. Despite financial difficulties, he and
respondent had blissful moments together. He was a good father and provider
to his children. Thus, the OSG argues that there was no reason to describe
petitioner as a self-centered, remorseless, rebellious, impulsive and socially
deviant person.
Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner
to establish his psychological incapacity, the State is not required to present
an expert witness where the testimony of petitioner’s psychologist was
insufficient and inconclusive. The OSG adds that petitioner was not able to
substantiate his claim that his infidelity was due to some psychological
disorder, as the real cause of petitioner’s alleged incapacity appears to be his
general dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most he was able to prove
infidelity on his part and the existence of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities." These, however, do not constitute psychological
incapacity.
Respondent also filed her Comment9 and Memorandum10 stressing that
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage should
contemplate downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the essential marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
The appeal has no merit.
The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of
the RTC for lack of legal and factual bases.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.11 These are the
disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to
give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has contracted.12
Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage.13
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court held,
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.1avvphi1
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition.
In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological
examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological
incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag
however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In
cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist
from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled
that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of petitioner’s
alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a
general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality
Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is
a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.
As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,15 the presentation of expert proof in
cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr.
Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to
declare as void petitioner’s marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by
Dr. Tayag’s evaluation which became the trial court’s basis for concluding that
petitioner was psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly
specify the actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged
psychological incapacity. More importantly, there was no established link
between petitioner’s acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is
indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself.16
For sure, the spouses’ frequent marital squabbles17 and differences in
handling finances and managing their business affairs, as well as their conflicts
on how to raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological
incapacity which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. Petitioner
even admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they had happy moments
together. Also, the records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly
during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his
family, most especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a
personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer
for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs
during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful
as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a
psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. His tendency to
womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be due to
causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In
fact, the records show that when respondent learned of his affair, he
immediately terminated it. In short, petitioner’s marital infidelity does not
appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered
him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various
cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is
suffering from psychological incapacity.18 It must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage.19 That not being the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological
incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be
more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the intention
of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.21
All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner
and respondent as valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented
is insufficient to establish petitioner’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his
essential marital obligations.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution
dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in
addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a
marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our
courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of
psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still
many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in
specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled —
exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article
36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in
addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the
January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858
affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel
Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent
Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo
were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a
son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been
the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in
March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their
child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that
he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual
who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the
couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel
could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church
of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was
born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that
of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth
G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an
erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity'
(as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision
tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily
on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up
because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal
and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a
broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long
haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason
to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of
Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that
such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than
a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of
a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of
the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder
but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings
that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit
for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits
were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness
to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the
facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty
of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae,
namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge)
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code
Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of
the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code
are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"
by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically
ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on
evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant
the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the
foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo
Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166738 August 14, 2009
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, Petitioner,
vs.
EDWARD RUMBAUA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through her
petition for review on certiorari,1 the decision dated June 25, 20042 and the
resolution dated January 18, 20053 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 75095. The challenged decision reversed the decision4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent
Edward Rumbaua (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied
the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage against the respondent before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that the respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of
marriage as shown by the following circumstances: the respondent reneged
on his promise to live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to
extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his mother’s death; he
represented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be
working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman in
Novaliches, Quezon City.
Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as
personal service proved futile.5 The RTC ordered the provincial prosecutor to
investigate if collusion existed between the parties and to ensure that no
fabrication or suppression of evidence would take place.6 Prosecutor Melvin
P. Tiongson’s report negated the presence of collusion between the parties.7
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the petition.8 The OSG entered its appearance and
deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya to assist in all hearings
of the case.9
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
substantiate her charges.
The petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood neighbors
in Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they met again and
became sweethearts but the respondent’s family did not approve of their
relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, the respondent promised
to marry the petitioner as soon as he found a job. The job came in 1993, when
the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted the respondent as a computer
engineer. The respondent proposed to the petitioner that they first have a
"secret marriage" in order not to antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed;
they were married in Manila on February 23, 1993. The petitioner and the
respondent, however, never lived together; the petitioner stayed with her sister
in Fairview, Quezon City, while the respondent lived with his parents in
Novaliches.
The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the first six
months of their marriage. At that point, the respondent refused to live with the
petitioner for fear that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his
application for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their marriage, the
couple’s daily meetings became occasional visits to the petitioner’s house in
Fairview; they would have sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, the
respondent enrolled at FEATI University after he lost his employment with
PAL.10
In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret marriage. The
respondent’s mother tried to convince him to go to the United States, but he
refused. To appease his mother, he continued living separately from the
petitioner. The respondent forgot to greet the petitioner during her birthday in
1992 and likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions. The
respondent indicated as well in his visa application that he was single.
In April 1995, the respondent’s mother died. The respondent blamed the
petitioner, associating his mother’s death to the pain that the discovery of his
secret marriage brought. Pained by the respondent’s action, the petitioner
severed her relationship with the respondent. They eventually reconciled
through the help of the petitioner’s father, although they still lived separately.
In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a job in
Davao. A year later, the petitioner and her mother went to the respondent’s
house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva
(Cynthia). When she confronted the respondent about it, he denied having an
affair with Cynthia.11 The petitioner apparently did not believe the respondents
and moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the pain and anguish that her
discovery brought.12
The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that communication
between her and respondent had ceased. Aside from her oral testimony, the
petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract;13 and
the testimony, curriculum vitae,14 and psychological report15 of clinical
psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following
tests on the petitioner: a Revised Beta Examination; a Bender Visual Motor
Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person Test; a
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI.16 She thereafter prepared a
psychological report with the following findings:
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an average intellectual
level. Logic and reasoning remained intact. She is seen to be the type of
woman who adjusts fairly well into most situations especially if it is within her
interests. She is pictured to be faithful to her commitments and had
reservations from negative criticisms such that she normally adheres to social
norms, behavior-wise. Her age speaks of maturity, both intellectually and
emotionally. Her one fault lies in her compliant attitude which makes her a
subject for manipulation and deception such that of respondent. In all the years
of their relationship, she opted to endure his irresponsibility largely because of
the mere belief that someday things will be much better for them. But upon the
advent of her husband’s infidelity, she gradually lost hope as well as the sense
of self-respect, that she has finally taken her tool to be assertive to the point of
being aggressive and very cautious at times – so as to fight with the frustration
and insecurity she had especially regarding her failed marriage.
Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a very self-centered manner
as he believes that the world revolves around him. His egocentrism made it so
easy for him to deceitfully use others for his own advancement with an extreme
air of confidence and dominance. He would do actions without any remorse or
guilt feelings towards others especially to that of petitioner.

REMARKS
Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond the
expectations people tagged with it. In love, "age does matter." People love in
order to be secure that one will share his/her life with another and that he/she
will not die alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or
let love die – it is a choice one had to face when love is not the love he/she
expected.
In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent that love really
happened for her towards the young respondent – who used "love" as a
disguise or deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence she extended towards
him. He made her believe that he is responsible, true, caring and thoughtful –
only to reveal himself contrary to what was mentioned. He lacked the
commitment, faithfulness, and remorse that he was able to engage himself to
promiscuous acts that made petitioner look like an innocent fool. His character
traits reveal him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder - declared to be
grave, severe and incurable.17 [Emphasis supplied.]
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of April 19, 2002. The
trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, and
concluded as follows:
xxxx
Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his wife.
Respondent imposed limited or block [sic] out communication with his wife,
forgetting special occasions, like petitioner’s birthdays and Valentine’s Day;
going out only on occasions despite their living separately and to go to a motel
to have sexual intercourse.
It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant facts in this case
which show the psychological incapacity of respondent, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of the parties, to enter into lawful marriage and to
discharge his marital responsibilities (See Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This
incapacity is "declared grave, severe and incurable."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage between petitioner
Rowena Padilla Rumbaua and respondent Edwin Rumbaua is hereby declared
annulled.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA Decision
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.19 The
CA decision of June 25, 2004 reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and
denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage.20
In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not
mention the cause of the respondent’s so-called "narcissistic personality
disorder;" it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus failed to give
the court an insight into the respondent’s developmental years. Dr. Tayag
likewise failed to explain why she came to the conclusion that the respondent’s
incapacity was "deep-seated" and "incurable."
The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the incapacity to be
psychological, although its manifestations may be physical. Moreover, the
evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party was mentally or
physically ill so that he or she could not have known the marital obligations
assumed, knowing them, could not have assumed them. In other words, the
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect, or difficulty to perform the essential obligations of marriage. In the
present case, the petitioner suffered because the respondent adamantly
refused to live with her because of his parents’ objection to their marriage.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion
in its resolution of January 18, 2005. 21
The Petition and the Issues
The petitioner argues in the present petition that –
1. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v. Molina22 (the Molina
case) cannot be dispensed with because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed
the requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;
2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the
RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the defects in her testimony, as well
as to present additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and
3. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric
report.
The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be reversed and
set aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in
the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s decision be set aside and
the RTC’s decision be reinstated.
The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was
applicable although it took effect after the promulgation of Molina; (b)
invalidating the trial court’s decision and remanding the case for further
proceedings were not proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish
respondent’s psychological incapacity.23
The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they filed.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis supplied.]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC24 -- which this Court promulgated on March 15, 2003
and duly published -- is geared towards the relaxation of the OSG certification
that Molina required. Section 18 of this remedial regulation provides:

SEC. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the
date the trial is terminated.lawphil.net It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the
State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19, 2002 should be
vacated for prematurity, as it was rendered despite the absence of the required
OSG certification specified in Molina. According to the petitioner, A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, which took effect only on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the
requirements of Molina that was promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.
The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.
The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or
remedial in character; it does not create or remove any vested right, but only
operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. The
settled rule is that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect,25 as we
held in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:26
Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law,
or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues - they may be
given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature
of an OSG certification and may be applied retroactively to pending matters.
In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on
the certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes27 and
Navales v. Navales28 have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of certification,
although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus,
what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the
remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From this perspective,
the petitioner’s objection regarding the Molina guideline on certification lacks
merit.
A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper
The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts’ decisions and the
remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are
procedurally permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence
during the trial was the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and
asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would allow her to cure the
evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in this regard that while mistakes of
counsel bind a party, the rule should be liberally construed in her favor to serve
the ends of justice.
We do not find her arguments convincing.
A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant
of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37
provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a
judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the
period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only
on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that
could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of
which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could
not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter
the result if presented.
In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence
presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however,
specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of
nullity prima facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent
in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner’s counsel had been
negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e.
one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The
negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First
Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:29
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a
result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify
as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-
opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new
counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not
been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on
the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to
securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the
instant case.
Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s requested remand.
Petitioner failed to establish the
respondent’s psychological incapacity
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the
Family Code which provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." In Santos v. Court
of Appeals,30 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The
defect should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage."
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically
ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in
Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.31 These requisites must
be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since
the Family Code does not define "psychological incapacity," fleshing out its
terms is left to us to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.32
We emphasized this approach in the recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting33 when
we explained:
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that
each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we find the
totality of the petitioner’s evidence insufficient to prove that the respondent is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband.
a. Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability
of respondent’s condition
The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a) reneged on
his promise to cohabit with her; (b) visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997;
(c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards during
special occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e)
blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in
Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity"
that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations
that characterize some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,34 we ruled that it was not
enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse
integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – had
to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted
in some psychological illness. As the petitioner’s testimony reveals,
respondent merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing his
application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his
family. The respondent’s failure to greet the petitioner on her birthday and to
send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming
petitioner for his mother’s death and of representing himself as single in his
visa application, could only at best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity or
emotional immaturity, not necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the
respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into the marriage
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially
when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already
existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that
respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time
after their marriage; their problems only came in later.
To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character flaws.
The presence of these imperfections, however, does not necessarily warrant
a conclusion that he had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage
that rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations. To use the
words of Navales v. Navales:35

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect"
in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse
is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness
that is contemplated by said rule.
b. Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and court testimony
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one
side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.
While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons
of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a
more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.36
For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a
third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent
and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and
on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric,
and unremorseful person who "believes that the world revolves around him";
and who "used love as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence
[petitioner] extended towards him." Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea
of "love"; made a generalization that respondent was a person who "lacked
commitment, faithfulness, and remorse," and who engaged "in promiscuous
acts that made the petitioner look like a fool"; and finally concluded that the
respondent’s character traits reveal "him to suffer Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave
and incurable."
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's
narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged
disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus,
we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e.,
that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of
Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable" – is an
unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests
administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess
her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with
respect to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayag’s subsequent testimony in
court cured whatever deficiencies attended her psychological report.
We do not share this view.
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish
the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent was already
suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume
the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she
adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondent’s
condition was grave and incurable. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:
Q: I would like to call your attention to the Report already marked as Exh. "E-
7", there is a statement to the effect that his character traits begin to suffer
narcissistic personality disorder with traces of antisocial personality disorder.
What do you mean? Can you please explain in layman’s word, Madam
Witness?
DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:
A: Actually, in a layman’s term, narcissistic personality disorder cannot accept
that there is something wrong with his own behavioral manifestation. [sic] They
feel that they can rule the world; they are eccentric; they are exemplary,
demanding financial and emotional support, and this is clearly manifested by
the fact that respondent abused and used petitioner’s love. Along the line, a
narcissistic person cannot give empathy; cannot give love simply because they
love themselves more than anybody else; and thirdly, narcissistic person
cannot support his own personal need and gratification without the help of
others and this is where the petitioner set in.
Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder?
A: Clinically, considering that label, the respondent behavioral manifestation
under personality disorder [sic] this is already considered grave, serious, and
treatment will be impossible [sic]. As I say this, a kind of developmental
disorder wherein it all started during the early formative years and brought
about by one familiar relationship the way he was reared and cared by the
family. Environmental exposure is also part and parcel of the child disorder.
[sic]
Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the present?
A: Actually, the respondent behavioral manner was [present] long before he
entered marriage. [Un]fortunately, on the part of the petitioner, she never
realized that such behavioral manifestation of the respondent connotes
pathology. [sic]
xxxx
Q: So in the representation of the petitioner that the respondent is now lying
[sic] with somebody else, how will you describe the character of this
respondent who is living with somebody else?
A: This is where the antisocial personality trait of the respondent [sic] because
an antisocial person is one who indulge in philandering activities, who do not
have any feeling of guilt at the expense of another person, and this [is] again
a buy-product of deep seated psychological incapacity.
Q: And this psychological incapacity based on this particular deep seated [sic],
how would you describe the psychological incapacity? [sic]
A: As I said there is a deep seated psychological dilemma, so I would say
incurable in nature and at this time and again [sic] the psychological pathology
of the respondent. One plays a major factor of not being able to give meaning
to a relationship in terms of sincerity and endurance.

Q: And if this psychological disorder exists before the marriage of the
respondent and the petitioner, Madam Witness?
A: Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted from the early formative years and
so if it takes enough that such psychological incapacity of respondent already
existed long before he entered marriage, because if you analyze how he was
reared by her parents particularly by the mother, there is already an unhealthy
symbiosis developed between the two, and this creates a major emotional
havoc when he reached adult age.
Q: How about the gravity?
A: This is already grave simply because from the very start respondent never
had an inkling that his behavioral manifestation connotes pathology and
second ground [sic], respondent will never admit again that such behavior of
his connotes again pathology simply because the disorder of the respondent
is not detrimental to himself but, more often than not, it is detrimental to other
party involved.
xxxx
PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:
Q: You were not able to personally examine the respondent here?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: Efforts were made by the psychologist but unfortunately, the respondent
never appeared at my clinic.
Q: On the basis of those examinations conducted with the petitioning wife to
annul their marriage with her husband in general, what can you say about the
respondent?
A: That from the very start respondent has no emotional intent to give meaning
to their relationship. If you analyze their marital relationship they never lived
under one room. From the very start of the [marriage], the respondent to have
petitioner to engage in secret marriage until that time their family knew of their
marriage [sic]. Respondent completely refused, completely relinquished his
marital obligation to the petitioner.
xxxx
COURT:
Q: Because you have interviewed or you have questioned the petitioner, can
you really enumerate the specific traits of the respondent?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent and the dependent
attitude of the respondent.
Q: Even if he is already eligible for employment?
A: He remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-go-lucky simply
because he never had a set of responsibility. I think that he finished his
education but he never had a stable job because he completely relied on the
support of his mother.
Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am asking you something specific?

A: The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent attitude on the part of
the mother merely because respondent happened to be the only son. I said
that there is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship [sic] developed between the
son and the mother simply because the mother always pampered completely,
pampered to the point that respondent failed to develop his own sense of
assertion or responsibility particularly during that stage and there is also
presence of the simple lying act particularly his responsibility in terms of
handling emotional imbalance and it is clearly manifested by the fact that
respondent refused to build a home together with the petitioner when in fact
they are legally married. Thirdly, respondent never felt or completely ignored
the feelings of the petitioner; he never felt guilty hurting the petitioner because
on the part of the petitioner, knowing that respondent indulge with another
woman it is very, very traumatic on her part yet respondent never had the guts
to feel guilty or to atone said act he committed in their relationship, and
clinically this falls under antisocial personality. 37
In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag’s answer was very vague and inconclusive,
thus:
xxxx
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO
Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness?
DR. NEDY TAYAG
A: Clinically, if persons suffering from personality disorder curable, up to this
very moment, no scientific could be upheld to alleviate their kind of personality
disorder; Secondly, again respondent or other person suffering from any kind
of disorder particularly narcissistic personality will never admit that they are
suffering from this kind of disorder, and then again curability will always be a
question. [sic]38
This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the general
characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder,
she did not really show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited these
traits. She mentioned the buzz words that jurisprudence requires for the nullity
of a marriage – namely, gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the
marriage, psychological incapacity relating to marriage – and in her own limited
way, related these to the medical condition she generally described. The
testimony, together with her report, however, suffers from very basic flaws.
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her
testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on
particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering
from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is
grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the
marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of
and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All
these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it
was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted
to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only the petitioner.
Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires, of course, that the person sought
to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined
by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such
declaration.39 If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent
means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and
given credit.40 No such independent evidence, however, appears on record
to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondent’s early
life and associations, and about events on or about the time of the marriage
and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be
no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meager facts
that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that
a ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because
only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and given
focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better
qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to improve
himself through studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the
marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what character
and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the
respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent
to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all
correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have
failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses,
but because of basic incompatibilities and marital developments that do not
amount to psychological incapacity. The continued separation of the spouses
likewise never appeared to have been factored in. Not a few married couples
have likewise permanently separated simply because they have "fallen out of
love," or have outgrown the attraction that drew them together in their younger
years.
The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital predicament. The
respondent may indeed be unwilling to discharge his marital obligations,
particularly the obligation to live with one’s spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that respondent refuses to
comply with his marital duties. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it
is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.41
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and
AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 25,
2004 and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure a
remand of this case to the trial courts for the introduction of additional
evidence; the petitioner’s evidence in its present state is woefully insufficient
to support the conclusion that the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent
should be nullified on the ground of the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
RICARDO P. TORING v. TERESITA M. TORING
Not Cited Recently
THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 165321, August 03, 2010 RICARDO P. TORING,
PETITIONER, VS. TERESITA M. TORING AND REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P. Toring from the May 31,
2004 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The
CA reversed the August 10, 2001 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 106 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-36662,[2] nullifying
Ricardo's marriage with respondent Teresita M. Toring on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunt's house in Cebu.
Teresita was then his cousin's teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting
lessons at his aunt's house. Despite their slight difference in age (of five years),
the younger Ricardo found the dance teacher attractive and fell in love with
her. He pursued Teresita and they became sweethearts after three months of
courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend,
already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon.
Remigio Zari of the City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children:
Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed
a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their
marriage. He asked the court to declare his marriage to Teresita null and void.
At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the
psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr.
Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albaran's respective testimonies. Teresita
did not file any answer or opposition to the petition, nor did she testify to refute
the allegations against her.[3]
Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was
an adulteress and a squanderer. He was an overseas seaman, and he
regularly sent money to his wife to cover the family's living expenses and their
children's tuition. Teresita, however, was not adept in managing the funds he
sent and their finances. Many times, Ricardo would come home and be
welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle these to avoid
embarrassment.
Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, Teresita
likewise failed to remit amounts she collected as sales agent of a plasticware
and cosmetics company. She left the family's utility bills and their children's
tuition fees unpaid. She also missed paying the rent and the amortization for
the house that Ricardo acquired for the family, so their children had to live in a
small rented room and eventually had to be taken in by Ricardo's parents.
When confronted by Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the excuse that she
spent the funds Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for their children.
Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was
pregnant with another man's child. During one of his visits to the country, he
noticed that Teresita's stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to
have a medical examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five months into
her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child
could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita
were characterized by "withdrawals"; other than these, no other sexual
contacts with his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives
after a month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors
that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went out on dates
with other men when he was not around.
Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling
and demanding person, who mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for
the nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn
and independent, also most unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was
unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their family; and was most
painfully unmindful of him.[4] He believed that their marriage had broken down
beyond repair and that they both have lost their mutual trust and love for one
another.[5]
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise
of the marriage was Teresita's Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered
her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations. To
quote Dr. Albaran:
Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest the following pervasive
pattern of behaviors: a sense of entitlement as she expected favorable
treatment and automatic compliance to her wishes, being interpersonally
exploitative as on several occasions she took advantage of him to achieve her
own ends, lack of empathy as she was unwilling to recognize her partners [sic]
feelings and needs[,] taking into consideration her own feelings and needs
only, her haughty and arrogant behavior and attitude and her proneness to
blame others for her failures and shortcomings. These patterns of behavior
speaks [sic] of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which started to manifest in
early adulthood. The disorder is considered to be grave and incurable based
on the fact that individuals do not recognize the symptoms as it is ego syntonic
and they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Because of that[,] they remain
unmotivated for treatment and impervious to recovery.[6]
She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her
psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresita's
eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did not personally observe and
examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a personally-delivered notice for the
conduct of a psychiatric evaluation, but the notice remained unanswered.
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) contended that there was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically
incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted on
Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague and general
conclusion on these parties' personality traits but not on Teresita's
psychological makeup. The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did
not clinically identify and sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the alleged
psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor that the
incapacity was grave and incurable.
The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. In short,
the RTC believed Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation and testimony and,
on the totality of Ricardo's evidence, found Teresita to be psychologically
incapacitated to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The OSG
appealed the decision to the CA.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial court's findings did
not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina.[7] The RTC failed to specifically point out the root illness
or defect that caused Teresita's psychological incapacity, and likewise failed
to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of celebration of
marriage.
The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation
do not appear to have been drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and
dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that
Ricardo's allegations on Teresita's overspending and infidelity do not
constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations, even if true, could only
effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge for
adultery.
THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court,
particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court
- in declaring the nullity of the marriage - fully complied with Molina.
In its Comment,[8] the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTC's
decision, particularly in its conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with this
Court's guidelines for the proper interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code. Reiterating its earlier arguments below, the OSG asserts that
the evidence adduced before the trial court failed to show the gravity, juridical
antecedence, or incurability of the psychological incapacity of Teresita, and
failed as well to identify and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise,
failed to show that Teresita was completely unable to discharge her marital
obligations due to her alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Ricardo's Reply[9] reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the
root cause of Teresita's psychological incapacity and identified it as
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He claimed that sufficient proof had been
adduced by the psychiatrist whose expertise on the subject cannot be doubted.
Interestingly, Ricardo further argued that alleging the root cause in a petition
for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary,
citing Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.[10]
These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the parties
filed.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error
when it set aside the RTC's decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[11] we held that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to
be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should
refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."[12]
We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down
definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article. These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability established in the Santos case, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically
ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle of Ejusdem Generis
(Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.[13]
Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic
guidelines to varying factual situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal
validity of Santos. In so far as the present factual situation is concerned, what
should not be lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent
of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most
serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in
the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and
significance to the marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the
psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from the
inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that
Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply
recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the
affliction - already then existing - was so grave and permanent as to deprive
the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.[14]
In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the
petitioner's evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. As already
mentioned, the evidence presented consisted of the testimonies of Ricardo
and Dr. Albaran, and the latter's psychological evaluation of Ricardo and
Richardson from where she derived a psychological evaluation of Teresita.
a. Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation and testimony
Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically
incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations. To support her findings
and conclusion, she banked on the statements told to her by Ricardo and
Richardson, which she narrated in her evaluation. Apparently relying on the
same basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresita's disorder manifested during her
early adulthood and is grave and incurable.
To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and
evaluation that, in this case, became the basis for the conclusion that no
marriage really took place because of the psychological incapacity of one of
the parties at the time of marriage.
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo
and Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological tests
administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient
basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical in considering
psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-
sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.
In So v. Valera,[15] the Court considered the psychologist's testimony and
conclusions to be insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
finding of respondent's psychological incapacity because the facts, on which
the conclusions were based, were all derived from the petitioner's statements
whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be discounted. In another case,
Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,[16] the Court declared that while the various
tests administered on the petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge
to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement could not be
made with respect to the respondent-husband's psychological condition. To
our mind, conclusions and generalizations about Teresita's psychological
condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in
kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content
of such evidence.[17]
To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly
incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.[18] This recognition, however,
does not signify that the evidence, we shall favorably appreciate, should be
any less than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its nature, requires.
Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity outlined in
Santos and Molina need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated
spouse. In other words, it is still essential - although from sources other than
the respondent spouse - to show his or her personality profile, or its
approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of the inability to
appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence
and incurability of the condition.
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately
related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or
lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at
or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace
their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever
asked to give statements for purposes of Teresita's psychological evaluation
was Richardson, the spouses' eldest son who would not have been very
reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to
know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth.
We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the summary of
Richardson's interview with the psychologist: Richardson's statement
occupied a mere one paragraph (comprising eleven sentences) in the
psychological evaluation and merely recited isolated instances of his parents
fighting over the foreclosure of their house, his father's alleged womanizing,
and their differences in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while Teresita is a
Mormon).[19]
We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate that
Teresita suffered from some psychological disorder as far back as the time of
her marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find these fights to be indicative of problems
traceable to any basic psychological disorder existing at the time of marriage.
For one, these points of dispute are not uncommon in a marriage and relate
essentially to the usual roots of marital problems - finances, fidelity and
religion. The psychologist, too, never delved into the relationship between
mother and son except to observe their estranged relationship due to a
previous argument - a money problem involving Ricardo's financial
remittances to the family. To state the obvious, the psychologist's evaluation
never explained how the recited incidents, made by one who was not even
born at the time of the spouses' marriage, showed a debilitating psychological
incapacity already existing at that time.
Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardo's cause, is the failure of Dr.
Albaran's psychological evaluation to fully explain the details - i.e., the what,
how, when, where and since when - of Teresita's alleged Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. It seems to us that, with hardly any supporting evidence
to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply stated out of the blue that Teresita's
personality disorder manifested itself in early adulthood, presuming thereby
that the incapacity should have been there when the marriage was celebrated.
Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresita's
alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the essential marital
obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately
explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and incurable was Teresita's
psychological disorder.
Dr. Albaran's testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for
Ricardo, as it still failed to provide the required insights that would have
remedied the evidentiary gaps in her written psychological evaluation. In fact,
Dr. Albaran's cross-examination only made the evidentiary situation worse
when she admitted that she had difficulty pinpointing the root cause of
Teresita's personality disorder, due to the limited information she gathered
from Ricardo and Richardson regarding Teresita's personal and family history.
To directly quote from the records, Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation when
she said that "[t]he only data that I have is that, the respondent seem [sic] to
have grown from a tumultuous family and this could be perhaps the [sic]
contributory to the development of the personality disorder."[20] Dr. Albaran's
obvious uncertainty in her assessment only proves our point that a complete
personality profile of the spouse, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated,
could not be determined from meager information coming only from a biased
source.
b. Ricardo's testimony
Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress.
We do not, however, find Ricardo's characterizations of his wife sufficient to
constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article
36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal, or "neglect" in the
performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is
different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition
or illness.[21]
Ricardo's testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in
managing the family's finances by not paying their rent, utility bills and other
financial obligations. Teresita's spendthrift attitude, according to Ricardo, even
resulted in the loss of the house and lot intended to be their family residence.
This kind of irresponsibility, however, does not rise to the level of a
psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most,
Teresita's mismanagement of the family's finances merely constituted
difficulty, refusal or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds
intended for the family's financial support.
Teresita's alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In order for
sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's
unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered
personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the
essential obligations of the marital state;[22] there must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying
with the obligation to be faithful to her spouse.[23]
In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that Teresita
suffered from a disordered personality of this kind. Even Ricardo's added
testimony, relating to rumors of Teresita's dates with other men and her
pregnancy by another man, would not fill in the deficiencies we have observed,
given the absence of an adverse integral element and link to Teresita's
allegedly disordered personality.
Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresita's alleged character traits
already existed at the inception of their marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.[24] In the absence of this element, a marriage cannot
be annulled under Article 36.
Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be
alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of
the Family Code
Citing Barcelona,[25] Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the
root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is
no longer necessary. We find this argument completely at variance with
Ricardo's main argument against the assailed CA decision - i.e., that the RTC,
in its decision, discussed thoroughly the root cause of Teresita's psychological
incapacity as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. These conflicting positions,
notwithstanding, we see the need to address this issue to further clarify our
statement in Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted and misinterpreted to
support his present petition that "since the new Rules do not require the
petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that
there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological
incapacity."[26]
In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state
the "root cause" of the respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. The
Court resolved this issue, ruling that the petition sufficiently stated a cause of
action because the petitioner - instead of stating a specific root cause - clearly
described the physical manifestations indicative of the psychological
incapacity. This, the Court found to be sufficiently compliant with the first
requirement in the Molina case - that the "root cause" of the psychological
incapacity be alleged in an Article 36 petition.
Thus, contrary to Ricardo's position, Barcelona does not do away with the "root
cause" requirement. The ruling simply means that the statement of the root
cause does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the
root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is
enough to merely allege the physical manifestations constituting the root cause
of the psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (Rules)[27] in fact provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
xxxx
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specially allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a
petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code was not dispensed
with by the adoption of the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated was the
need for an expert opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. The Court further held that the Rules, being procedural in nature,
apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.
To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that
Teresita suffered from psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for
annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely established that Teresita had
been remiss in her duties as a wife for being irresponsible in taking care of
their family's finances - a fault or deficiency that does not amount to the
psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We
reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to
a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage
that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family
Code addresses.[28]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
RAMON REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in
disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before
making a finding of psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing
personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On the other hand,
blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution1 and in our
statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing
proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage
that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its
hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 897612 which reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.3
First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at
the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both
nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university
subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baños campus. The
casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend
relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought
was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and
traditions.4 Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other
every day and drove home together from the university.
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style of courtship which
included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a
university student’s budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family
business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of the
respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even
by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree
in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school
on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her
father’s death, petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner
was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center
Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent’s family in Mandaluyong
City. All living expenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents, and the
couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially,
respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started.
Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly
allowance of ₱1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no
longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough
courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had
resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondent’s
game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels
and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new
business took respondent away from his young family for days on end without
any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the
situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested
that they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement
engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends
meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondent’s business
floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro,
was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically.
Compounding the family’s financial woes and further straining the parties’
relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That
his business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent;
he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in
Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this
time, moved in with petitioner’s mother. But the new set up did not end their
marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner
continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in
most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to
their third son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even
inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later,
respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby,
with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business stopped
operations. Although without any means to support his family, respondent
refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came up with
another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with
all of respondent’s business ventures, this did not succeed and added to the
trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well.
Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-
marital affair. She overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former
secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondent’s gift to her.
Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide
financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation
to remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a
surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was
about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive;
and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested
that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the
operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondent’s lack of
concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery
room.
Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their
marriage. Petitioner approached respondent’s siblings and asked them to
intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even
respondent’s siblings waved the white flag on respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina,
members of a marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to
join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner
and respondent, but these did not improve the parties’ relationship as
respondent remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a
psychological assessment to "determine benchmarks of current psychological
functioning." As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and
did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to undergo
psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told
respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space
to petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did
respondent’s relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration
of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was
psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss
in performing his obligations to his family—both as a spouse to petitioner and
father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and
Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in
evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between
the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The
trial court ruled, thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the
petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner MA.
SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES
contracted on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishop’s Chapel Villa San Miguel
Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code,
as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH
MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are already of age and have the full civil
capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having finished their studies,
are free to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice
to the parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for
Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public
Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding
Decree if the parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe
the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.
 SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.7
AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued by the Court only after compliance with
Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules on Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02- following issues:
11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties have properties.
I
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT
Registry of Mandaluyong and Quezon City. IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office
of the Solicitor General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil II
Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS
City and the Civil Registrar General at their respective office addresses. LIKEWISE PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
SO ORDERED.6
III
Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
for reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY
parties’ marriage. PETITIONER.

Taking exception to the trial court’s rulings, respondent appealed to the Court IV
of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS
court, agreeing with the respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.
parties’ marriage as valid and subsisting. Significantly, a special division of five
(two members dissenting from the majority decision and voting to affirm the V
decision of the RTC) ruled, thus: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY
OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH
dated May 23, 2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED and
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH
THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED,
NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES’
MARRIAGE, WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE
36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF
THE STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE,
NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE
PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED
PETITION WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.8
Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage
between the parties is void ab initio on the ground of both parties’
psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and
documentary evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors
Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds
merit in the petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after solemnization."
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital
partner towards each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code
express the duties of parents toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the
determination of the same solely to the Court on a case to case basis.
xxxx
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of
psychological incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence
presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the
respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses,
Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of
the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its
inception has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which
pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally,
intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties
to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help
and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche
in the psychological constellation of respondent which created the death of his
marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the
truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their
findings that respondent is suffering from personality disorder which
psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage.
Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the Court
considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an honest
evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This psychological
incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert
witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders
him a helpless victim of his structural constellation. It is beyond the
respondent’s impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or powerless to
restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because he did not
consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion
that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their
relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to
counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family members to save
his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his
marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who
appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her
misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save
their marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent finally
constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the
siblings of the respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to
the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand
of his siblings.
xxxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and
not a one sided one. It also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential
duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed by the parties as a
consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of
marriage between the parties did not create a monument of marital integrity,
simply because the personality disorder of the respondent which renders him
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is deeply
entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that
there is nothing wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent.
Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted
with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized with
the personality of the respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-
organized person or a perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited or
carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent cannot be catered by
the petitioner and vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the
thunder bolt or principal culprit on their inability to nurture and reward their
marital life with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity that
though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty kingdom due to
their psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable and has origin from
unhealthy event in their growing years.
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they
are entitled to live in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy
life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to any party
aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled
matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their
marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral parlor. Stated
differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at all.
The Court finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by
continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in paper only. Hence, it could
no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage remains in its crib with its
boots and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional, intellectual
and social ability of the parties to sustain.9
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided
decision, the appellate court diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis-
à-vis the totality of evidence presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the
latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband, as well as of herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity
of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is
psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed
[respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder
(Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical
psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial
Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr.
Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of
the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially
along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely
advisory in character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon such
testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with
the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither
clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a
psychological examination on the [respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas
are hearsay. They are "unscientific and unreliable" as they have no personal
knowledge of the psychological condition of the [respondent] as they never
personally examined the [respondent] himself.
xxxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported
psychological incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner]
would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that [respondent] was referred
to Dayan for "psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning." The undeniable fact is that based on Dayan’s
personal examination of the [respondent], the assessment procedures used,
behavioral observations made, background information gathered and
interpretation of psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a
way to help the [respondent] through individual therapy and counseling
sessions.
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on
[respondent], such as his failure to give regular support, substance abuse,
infidelity and "come and go" attitude are true, the totality of the evidence
presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent] is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations within the
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s findings regarding the
[respondent’s] alleged mixed personality disorder, his "come and go" attitude,
failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his family,
sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioner’s] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to
consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay
debts in connection with his failed business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are
not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital
difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. [Respondent’s] "defects" were not present at
the inception of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first
few years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact,
[petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably
and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most
Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned
from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent]
failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has
been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact
was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].
xxxx
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas’
Psychiatric Report states that [petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her
affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her
husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically
allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage
at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest
only after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said
Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976
to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
respondent at the time of the celebration of marriage x x x.
xxxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their
marriage. However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity
must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
While [petitioner’s] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without
hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
State.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36,
it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from
Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render
the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care
must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should
not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission
to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.10
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the
appellate court’s ruling that the psychological incapacity of respondent was not
sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage
between the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals11 solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the
principle that the factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the
essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3)
incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.12
As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing
respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to
an average social status, intellectual achievement is quite important to the
family values (sic). All children were equipped with high intellectual potentials
(sic) which made their parents proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite
his handicap, he was able to assume his financial and emotional
responsibilities to his family and to a limited extent, his social functions (sic).
Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home.
Doing volunteer and community services, she was not the demonstrative,
affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love and concern came in the
form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the
caressing, sensitive and soothing touches of an emotional reaction (sic).
Psychological home environment did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling
or depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained
her to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any
undertakings (sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable,
systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic). But
emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense
of objectivity predisposed her to a superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on
the dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how she feels (sic). The above
qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual
relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of
inadequacy, insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual
assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than
20 years, trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and
relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when others, like her husband
would make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon. But the
more [petitioner] tried to compensate for [respondent’s] shortcomings, the
bigger was the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end,
[petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized
their marriage as very much lacking in relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the
second set of brood (sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations
during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was acknowledged as the favorite
of his mother, and was described to have a close relationship with her. At an
early age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on
marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high intellectual potentials (sic), he
felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free spirit",
attracted [petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted,
without being bothered by untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing
ideas from other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety
for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too much of
a pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent
high intellectual resources (sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his
worth, he quit work from his family employment and ventured on his own. With
no much planning and project study, his businesses failed. This became the
sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and
consultations (sic) with each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm,
stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face which impliedly meant "you
are nothing as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses for a strong sense
of inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this
seemed not coupled with emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience,
maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and confidence to make it work.
He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding his decision
to go into his own business. But when he failed, the more he became
negativistic and closed to suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He was too
careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy,
ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority,
for fear of rejection or loss of pride. When things did not work out according to
his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such as
stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight
and primitive drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional
and different from others. Preoccupation is centered on himself, (sic) an
unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of his dependency
needs, (sic) in his mother-son relationship. From this stems his difficulties in
heterosexual relationship with his wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic) demands
and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong
masculine strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to
assume his duties and responsibilities as a husband and father, but because
of a severe psychological deficit, he was unable to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that
[petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her
less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great
amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform
the duties and responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand,
has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a
Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders
him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms
that ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His
being a "free spirit" associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no
anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake
[marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his
ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense
mechanisms, or the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to
resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother
encouraged cross identification and developed a severe sense of inadequacy
specifically along masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his
weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision
making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His
narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due
to marital demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature
because it started early in his psychological development, and therefore
became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as
severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his
normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis
supplied)13
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]’s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic.
According to them, respondent has not really taken care of his wife and
children. He does not seem to have any direction in life. He seems to be full of
bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish
anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is still
taking drugs. There are times when they see that [respondent] is not himself.
He likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing. They
wish that he’d be more responsible and try to give priority to his family.
[Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner of the family because she has a
stable job. [Respondent]’s brothers learned from friends that [petitioner] is
really disappointed with him. She has discussed things with him but he always
refused to listen. She does not know what to do with him anymore. She has
grown tired of him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he
stopped taking it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is
so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had been hooked to it
for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what his problems
are at the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does
not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his wife [have] drifted apart.
He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person but he
is not given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that
he is very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the
time. He wants to avoid conflict so he’d rather be submissive and compliant.
He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make
other people happy.
xxxx
Interpretation of Psychological Data
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning
xxxx
B. Vocational Preference
xxxx
C. Socio Emotional Functioning
xxxx
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof
and detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has
deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior
and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is
"different" and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the
discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and social
involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and accentuates
his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt
to be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow than
when he has to take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not really
need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He
has a small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,]
feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being
hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may choose to repress this
feeling. [Respondent’s] strong need for social approval, which could have
stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him submissive and over
[compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[,
he] already feels victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive
behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and
disapproval [of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in
anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing
considerable tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and
nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is
preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no
sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be
able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty
concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has
many plans but he can’t accomplish anything because he is unable to see
which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further aggravated by the
lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to
accomplish anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in social
relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning – Fair (Emphasis supplied)14
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Summary and Conclusion
From the evidence available from [petitioner’s] case history and from her
psychological assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of the
respondent, it is possible to infer with certainty the nullity of this marriage.
Based on the information available about the respondent, he suffers from [an]
antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic and dependent features that
renders him too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations
of a marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious
person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her
achievements in
this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her
comprehension of human situations is very shallow for a woman of her
academic and professional competence. And this explains why she married
RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took so
long to do something about her situation.
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouse’s
immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive
sadistic and dependent features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
xxxx
One has to go back to [respondent’s] early childhood in order to understand
the root cause of his antisocial personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the
ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared of by his
grandmother. [Respondent’s] father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent]
was [reared] by his mother. Unfortunately, [respondent’s] mother grew up
believing that she was not her mother’s favorite child, so she felt "api, treated
like poor relations." [Respondent’s] mother’s reaction to her perceived
rejection was to act out—with poor impulse control and poor mood regulation
(spent money like water, had terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his
mother became [respondent’s] role model.
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he
learned to use his good looks and his charms, and learned to size up the
weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people wanted to
hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his siblings
from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love and to
empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot sustain a relationship
with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.
[Respondent’s] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-
centeredness (e.g. moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his
family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just
"come and go," without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of
entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of
his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for
all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when
asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think
about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested
whom he has physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when
high on drugs; and his dependent personality features were manifested by his
need for others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his life, and
in his difficulty in doing things on his own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked
narcissistic features and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to
love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A personality
disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage
of [petitioner] and [respondent is] null and void from the very beginning.
(emphasis supplied)15
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the
testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never
personally examined and interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other
person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the
testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition,16 necessarily involves only two
persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and
marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this
case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state
of the parties’ marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein
petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact
with, and experience, respondent’s pattern of behavior which she could then
validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not
based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other
informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-
law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent’s
behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew
him.17 These were also used as the basis of the doctors’ assessments.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,18 citing The Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),19 instructs us
on the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates
markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is
manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and
events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of
emotional response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of
personal and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in
social, occupational or other important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back
at least to adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a
consequence of another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a
substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition
(e.g., head trauma).
Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial
Personality Disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of
others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the
following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning
others for personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain
consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having
hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course
of schizophrenia or a manic episode.20
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the
psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from
various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not
necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a
personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by
the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate
diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical
findings of experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayan’s findings and recommendation,
the psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In
general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or
even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock’s textbook
entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry,21 treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to
pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders are
recommended. In short, Dr. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent should
undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent’s
psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.22 As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the
ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina:23
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person’s entire life, both before and
after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to
give professional opinions about a party’s mental capacity at the time of the
wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted
as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
… [Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There
was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a
marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and
the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1)
respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic
irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of
his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of
unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person
has personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of
declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or
psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that
a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties’ or both
parties’ psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an expert’s opinion concerning
the supposed psychological incapacity of a party.24 In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,25
we ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic
v. Court of Appeals & Molina,26 the stringent requisites provided in Santos v.
Court of Appeals27 must be independently met by the party alleging the nullity
of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We declared, thus:

It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr.
Villegas with nary a link drawn between the "psychodynamics of the case" and
the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse
testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not
illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating
effect on their marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders
was not supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical
psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The
supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses
were made, could have been fully established by psychometric and
neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of people's
intelligence, thinking, or personality.
xxxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7)
hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot
tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding
on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an
expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in
the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve
as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his
conclusion is founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during
trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality
disorder exhibit the following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and
even charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas
of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts,
fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that
patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their
antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their mental content reveals
the complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In
fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often
impress observers as having good verbal intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry
out any task or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable
finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they appear to lack a
conscience.28
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability,
nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as
shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3)
substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations;
(6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and
(7) criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioner’s purported psychological incapacity, we agree
with the CA’s ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the
complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity became manifest only after its
celebration x x x. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended
Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent
at the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioner’s] Amended Petition was
indeed amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5,
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas’ finding that [petitioner] is
supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the
affectional area does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a debilitating
psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the Psychological
Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a
glowing evaluation as she was found to be a "good, sincere, and conscientious
person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her
achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric
report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for
more than 20 years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better
understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no
less than [petitioner’s] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she
is psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the
Family Code.29
All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro
R. Padilla in his separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina:30
x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing
disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the
time of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36
of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015
GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 rendered on January 29, 2013 and Resolution2
issued on August 7, 2013 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
96448. The CA set aside the Decision3 dated January 29, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. SP-
6564(09), which declared the marriage between Glenn Vifias (Glenn) and Mary
Grace Parel-Vifias (Mary Grace) as null and void.
Antecedents
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old,
respectively, got married in civil rites held in Lipa City, Batangas.4 Mary Grace
was already pregnant then. The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness
and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infant’s death was caused by
Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, while
Mary Grace was a production engineer.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with
Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai.
At the time the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Mary Grace.He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure,
extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to
be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank
and smoked heavily even when she was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace
refused to perform even the most essential household chores of cleaning and
cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited the foregoing traits
and behavior during their whirlwind courtship.6
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death of
the infant whom she delivered. She lived as if she were single and was
unmindful of her husband’s needs. She was self-centered, selfish and
immature. When Glenn confronted her about her behavior, she showed
indifference. She eventually left their home without informing Glenn. Glenn
later found out that she left for an overseas employment in Dubai.7
Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends. They informed him
that Mary Grace came from a broken family and was left to be cared for by her
aunts and nannies. The foregoing circumstance must have contributed to her
sense of insecurity and difficulty in adjusting to married life.8
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and
submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy
Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as "amply aware of his marital roles"
and "capable of maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual relationship."9
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the
data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito),
who knew Mary Graceway back in college.

Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college graduate. She
belongs to a middle class family. Her father is an overseas contract worker,
while her mother is a housewife. At the time Dr. Tayag prepared her report,
Mary Grace was employed in Dubai and romantically involved with another
man.10
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed
Glenn during the couple’s fights. Mary Grace is also ill-tempered and carefree,
while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-oriented.11
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary
Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect,
commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the
propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage.12
In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:
The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious, grave,
permanent and chronic in proportion and is incurable by any form of clinical
intervention. It has already been deeply embedded within her system as it was
found to have started as early as her childhood years. Because of such, it has
caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and functionally[-]impaired especially
with regards to heterosexual dealings.
Such disorder of [Mary Grace]is mainly characterized by grandiosity, need for
admiration and lack of empathy[,] along with her pattern of disregard for and
violation of the rights of others[,] which utterly distorted her perceptions and
views especially in terms of a fitting marital relationship. Such disorder
manifested in [Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of
entitlement and arrogance. Throughout her union with [Glenn], she has
exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her marked inability to show
proper respect for her husband. x x x She is too headstrong that most of the
time[,] she would do things her own way and would not pay close attention to
what her husband needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled for
power and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn], being too considerate
to her, was often subjected to her control.x x x She is into many vices and
loved hanging out with her friends at night[,] and she even got involved in an
illicit relationship[,] which was still going on up to the present time. x x x.
The root cause of [Mary Grace’s]personality aberration can be said to have
emanated from the various forms of unfavorable factors in her milieu way back
as early as her childhood years[,] which is the crucial stage in the life of a
person as this is the time when the individual’s character and behavior are
shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and
tolerating parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon] their children.
Considering such fact, she apparently failed to feel the love and affection of
the nurturing figures that she had[,] who were supposed to be the first to show
concern [for] her. x x x She has acquired a domineering character as she was
not taught to have boundaries in her actions because of the laxity she had from
her caregivers and also because she grew up to be the eldest in the brood.
She sees to it that she is the one always followed with regards to making
decisions and always mandates people to submit to her wishes. She has not
acquired the very essence of morality [and] has certainly learned set of
unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to assume mature roles.
Morals and values were not instilled in her young mind that as she went on
with her life, she never learned to restrain herself from doing ill-advised things
even if she is amply aware of the depravity of her actions.
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical antecedence as
it was already inhere system even prior to the solemnization of her marriage
with [Glenn]. x x x.13 (Underlining ours)
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for the Declaration
of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. Substituted service of summons
was made upon Mary Grace through her aunt, Susana Rosita.14 Mary Grace
filed no answer and did not attend any of the proceedings before the RTC.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were offered
as evidence. Glenn and Rodelito described Mary Grace as outgoing, carefree,
and irresponsible. She is the exact opposite of Glenn, who is conservative and
preoccupied with his work.15 On her part, Dr. Tayag reiterated her findings in
the psychological report dated December 29, 2008.
Ruling of the RTC
On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage
between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on account of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the following as grounds:
The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the] grant of the
petition. Reconciliation between the parties under the circumstances is nil. For
the best interest of the parties, it is best that the legal bond between them be
severed.
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the miserable life
[Glenn] had with [Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic Personality Disordered
person with anti[-]social traits and who does not treat him as her husband.
[Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are separated in fact since the year 2006. [Mary
Grace] abandoned [Glenn] without telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it
not for the insistence of[Glenn] that he would not know the whereabouts of his
wife. The law provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are obliged to live together,
[and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x x x For all intents and
purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a quandary on what it really means.
x x x.
From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace] failed to
comply with the basic marital obligations of mutual love, respect, mutual help
and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have their marriage saved but [Mary
Grace] did not cooperate with him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of her
marital obligations.
The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a clinical
psychologist with sufficient authority to speak on the subject of psychological
incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and was able to gather sufficient data and
information about [Mary Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic] personality disorder
of[Mary Grace] is ingrained in her personality make-up, so grave and so
permanent, incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this personal
incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is already pre-existing before
the marriage and was only manifested after. It has become grave, permanent
and incurable.17 (Underlining ours and italics in the original)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but it was
denied by the RTC in its Order18 dated December 1, 2010.
The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA
On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist
proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital obligations. Specifically,
the RTC decision failed to cite the root cause of Mary Grace’s disorder.
Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayag’s
statements anent the gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The
RTC resorted to mere generalizations and conclusions Sans details. Besides,
what psychological incapacity contemplates is downright incapacity to assume
marital obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown, but these do
not warrant the grant of Glenn’s petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to
assume her marital duties, but this does not translate into a psychological
illness.19
Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSG’s appeal.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing
the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as
valid and subsisting. The CA stated the reasons below:
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The psychological
condition must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.
In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace] was carefree,
outgoing, immature, and irresponsible which made her unable to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. He likewise alleged that she refused to
communicate with him to save the marriage and eventually left him to work
abroad. To Our mind, the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a
case of psychological incapacity on her part.
While it is true that [Glenn’s] testimony was corroborated by [Dr. Tayag], a
psychologist who conducted a psychological examination on [Glenn],
however, said examination was conducted only on him and no evidence was
shown that the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive value in
determining the psychological incapacity of a person as she would be in the
best position to assess and evaluate the psychological condition of the couple,
she being an expert in this field of study of behavior. Although the psychologist
stated that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
she did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she make a
conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. Moreover, she admitted that she
was not able to examine the respondent[,] hence, the information provided to
her may be subjective and self-serving. Essential in this petition is the
allegation of the root cause of the spouse’s psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts
and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of
marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family
Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in
the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.

Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did not establish
the root cause of the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] nor was such
ground alleged in the complaint. We reiterate the ruling of the Supreme Court
on this score, to wit: the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a)
medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently
proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, has this to say:
"Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological– not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,] such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists."
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that"Article 36 of the Family
Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves". It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume." Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.
From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage of the
parties for the obvious failure of [Glenn] to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity of [Mary Grace] is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability; and for his failure to observe the guidelines outlined in the
afore-cited cases.
Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
[Glenn]. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted from the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family.20 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and
emphasis and italics in the original)
The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution21 dated August 7, 2013,
denied the Motion for Reconsideration22 filed by Glenn.
Issue
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of whether or not
sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace.
In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage should be judged according to its own set of facts, and not
on the basis of assumptions, predilections or generalizations. The RTC judge
should pains takingly examine the factual milieu, while the CA must refrain
from substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.23 Further, Glenn
argues that in Marcos v. Marcos,24 the Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non
requirement for the respondent spouse to be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist before a marriage could be declared as a nullity.25
However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his or her testimony should be
considered as decisive evidence.26 Besides, the findings of the trial court
regarding the credibility of the witnesses should be respected.27
In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes that the
arguments Glenn raise for our consideration are mere reiterations of the
matters already resolved by the CA.28
Ruling of the Court
The instant petition lacks merit.
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a
psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."29
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag
and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove
the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The evidence
merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to
perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is
romantically-involved with another man. She has not been maintaining lines of
communication with Glenn at the time the latter filed the petition before the
RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is the
exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess
incompatible personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do not necessarily
indicate psychological incapacity. Rumbaua v. Rumbaua30 is emphatic that:
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was not shown in this cited
case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted
in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with
another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated
with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown
that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In
fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when
they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only
came in later.
x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect"
in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse
is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness
that is contemplated by said rule.31 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and
emphasis in the original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or
less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that
living together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s
departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty,
but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr.
Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more convincing evidence to
prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the former’s
condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn’s testimony is wanting
in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn.
Glenn’s statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both
referred to Mary Grace’s traits and acts, which she exhibited during the
marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the antecedence of Mary Grace’s
alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before they got
married, they saw each other almost every day.32 Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring
and well[-]educated person"33 in Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s condition, the Court finds the
same as unfounded.1âwphi1 Rumbaua34 provides some guidelines on how
the courts should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in
petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one
side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.
While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons
of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a
more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.
For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a
third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent
and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and
on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric,
and unremorseful person who "believes that the world revolves around him";
and who "used love as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence
[petitioner] extended towards him." x x x.
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent’s
narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged
disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus,
we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e.,
that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of
Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable" – is an
unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests
administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess
her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with
respect to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
xxxx
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish
the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent was already
suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume
the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she
adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondent’s
condition was grave and incurable. x x x
xxxx
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her
testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on
particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering
from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is
grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the
marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of
and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All
these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it
was wholly based on what the petitioner related toher. x x x If a psychological
disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such
independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent
evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case,
particularly about the respondent’s early life and associations, and about
events on orabout the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus,
the testimony and report appearto us to be no more than a diagnosis that
revolves around the one-sided and meagre facts that the petitioner related,
and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify
the nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities
of the respondent’s life were examined and given focus; none of these qualities
were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus on
having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies, his care
and attention in the first six months of the marriage, among others. The
evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities the petitioner
brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondent’s family opposed
the marriage and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for
the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are
important because not a few marriages have failed, not because of
psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic
incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological
incapacity. x x x.35 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Grace’s status
as the eldest among her siblings,36 her father’s being an overseas contract
worker and her very tolerant mother, a housewife.37 These, however, are not
sufficient to establish and explain the supposed psychological incapacity of
Mary Grace warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the
statements of witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a person’s
psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from
complying with what the law requires. While the Court also commiserates with
Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides
inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenn’s
spouse.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January
29, 2013 and Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of
the Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005 amended decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004 decision3 (original
decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside
the June 5, 2002 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children,
Maricar and Manny.6 To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia
on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned
that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7
Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin.
Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar
filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of
his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.8
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used
to be an associate in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not
psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of
irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.9
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent
abandonment of the family home.10 He testified that he continued to provide
financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit
affair with Alvin.11
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by
Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores
found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric
illness,"13 but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her
for a good and lasting marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to
the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her
impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her
husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family
relationship."16
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita
void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to
the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of
personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply with
her marital obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA significantly
observed that infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the
declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due course,
attained his objective. The CA set aside its original decision and entered
another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision,20 the
CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological
incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal
to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and
deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not
disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological illness nor did it
establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and
abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely
grounds for legal separation.
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her marital
obligations established her grave and incurable psychological incapacity.
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis
to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to
Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume the basic marital obligations";21 not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the
existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of
the condition of the errant spouse.23
Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s
psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological
incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged
affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home,24 as well as his
continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of
the affair,25 but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with
Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution31
if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence
grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute psychological incapacity, it must its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity.32 It
be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from one party to the other during the marriage.
discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No evidence on record exists
to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005
manifestations of any psychological illness. amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583.
Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.
to prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in
fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness.28 Costs against the respondent.
Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29
to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she SO ORDERED.
was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to enter into
a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her
professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are
poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human
relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully
established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison
with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and
submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s
refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good
marital relationship30 is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in
fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s psychological
incapacity; thus, the CA committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its
original decision.1âwphi1
G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RODOLFO O. DE
GRACIA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS–BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June
2, 2005 and Resolution3 dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA–G.R. CV No. 69103 which affirmed the Decision4 dated October 17,
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11 (RTC) in
Civil Case No. S–665 declaring the marriage of respondent Rodolfo O. De
Gracia (Rodolfo) and Natividad N. Rosalem (Natividad) void on the ground of
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines5 (Family Code).
The Facts
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St.
Vincent Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte.6 They lived in Dapaon,
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2) children, namely, Ma.
Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza),
who were born on August 20, 1969 and January 15, 1972, respectively.7
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage (complaint) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S–
665, alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
her essential marital obligations. In compliance with the Order8 dated January
5, 1999 of the RTC, the public prosecutor conducted an investigation to
determine if collusion exists between Rodolfo and Natividad and found that
there was none.9 Trial on the merits then ensued.
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met
Natividad when they were students at the Barangay High School of
Sindangan,10 and he was forced to marry her barely three (3) months into
their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy.11 At the time of their
marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18 years of age. He had
no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as “kristo” and
“bangkero sa hantak.” When he decided to join and train with the army,12
Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house without his consent.13
Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain
Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez.14 After
cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage on January 11,
1991 with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then
with the latter in Cagayan de Oro City.15 From the time Natividad abandoned
them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza16
and he exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved
futile because of Natividad’s psychological incapacity that appeared to be
incurable.17
For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during trial,
despite service of summons.18 Nonetheless, she informed the court that she
submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr.
Zalsos) in response to Rodolfo’s claims.19 Rodolfo also underwent the same
examination.20
In her two–page psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos stated that both
Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from “utter
emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior
considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established norms of
conduct.”22 As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the
willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly,
Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired
a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition
of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage,
although it only manifested after. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos
concluded that the “couple’s union was bereft of the mind, will and heart for
the obligations of marriage.”23
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed an opposition24 to the
complaint, contending that the acts committed by Natividad did not
demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere
grounds for legal separation under the Family Code.25
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision26 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage
between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Zalsos, holding that Natividad’s
emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral pattern which in psychiatry
constitutes a form of personality disorder that existed at the time of the parties’
marriage but manifested only thereafter. It likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsos’s
observation that Natividad’s condition is incurable since it is deeply rooted
within the make–up of her personality. Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad
could not have known, much more comprehend the marital obligations she
was assuming, or, knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
thereof.27
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that
Natividad’s personality traits constituted psychological incapacity as
envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that the testimony of the
expert witness was not conclusive upon the court.28
The CA Ruling
In a Decision29 dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC,
finding that while Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily equate to psychological
incapacity, “their degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has
sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so profound as to
render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.”30
The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a
Resolution31 dated February 3, 2006, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining
the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
“Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 3632
of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical
– incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 6833 of the Family Code,
among others,34 include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.35 In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first
declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity
(i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).37 The
Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA,38 whose salient
points are footnoted hereunder.39 These guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements that the Court established in Santos.40
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA,41 held that therein
respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated
with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable
to discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely
due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.42 In the same light, the
Court, in the case of Pesca v. Pesca43 (Pesca), ruled against a declaration of
nullity, as petitioner therein “utterly failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity
on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract,
so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage,” significantly noting
that the “[e]motional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity.” In Pesca, the Court upheld the
appellate court’s finding that the petitioner therein had not established that her
husband “showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the
Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is
incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a
psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has
been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and
that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.”44
The Court maintains a similar view in this case. Based on the evidence
presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that
Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity,
can be equated with psychological incapacity.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation
report of Dr. Zalsos which does not, however, explain in reasonable detail how
Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply–rooted, and
incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence.
Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which she
administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root
cause of Natividad’s condition and to show that it existed at the time of the
parties’ marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividad’s
behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations
sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos’s report. Further, the finding contained
therein on the incurability of Natividad’s condition remains unsupported by any
factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare
conclusion and even self–serving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsos’s testimony
during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of her report, also fails to convince
the Court of her conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated.
Verily, although expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight
by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by
independent evidence.45 After poring over the records, the Court, however,
does not find any such evidence sufficient enough to uphold the court a quo’s
nullity declaration. To the Court’s mind, Natividad’s refusal to live with Rodolfo
and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties’ marriage. Indeed, to
be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be
reluctant to perform one’s duties is another. To hark back to what has been
earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.46 In the final
analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in the
present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the recognition that
marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family,47
the instant petition is hereby granted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005

and Resolution dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA–GR. CV
No. 69103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188400
MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner
vs
RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply
with or comprehend essential marital obligations.
This resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Maria Teresa B. Tani- De La
Fuente (Maria Teresa) assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 and
Resolution3 dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV. No. 76243, which reversed the Decision4 dated August 14, 2002 of
Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q- 99-
37829.
Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo)
first met when they were students at the University of Sto. Tomas. Soon
thereafter, they became sweethearts.5
After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work at the University of
Sto. Tomas Treasurer's Office.6 Meanwhile, Rodolfo, who was unable to finish
his college degree, found continued employment at his family's printing press
business.7
While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo
was an introvert and was prone to jealousy.8 She also observed that Rodolfo
appeared to have no ambition in life and felt insecure of his siblings, who
excelled in their studies and careers.9
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in Mandaluyong City.
They had two children: Maria Katharyn, who was born on May 23, 1985, and
Maria Kimberly, who was born on April 6, 1986.10
Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He was
jealous of everyone who talked to Maria Teresa, and would even skip work at
his family's printing press to stalk her.11 Rodolfo's jealousy was so severe that
he once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin who was staying at their
house because he suspected his cousin of being Maria Teresa's lover.12
In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would have
sex four (4) or five (5) times a day.13 At times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria
Teresa from her office during her lunch break, just so they could have sex.14
During sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the bed or poke her
with things.15 Rodolfo also suggested that they invite a third person with them
while having sex, or for Maria Teresa to have sex with another man in
Rodolfo's presence.16 Rodolfo's suggestions made Maria Teresa feel
molested and maltreated.17 Whenever Maria Teresa refused Rodolfo's
advances or suggestions, he would get angry and they would quarrel.18
Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a priest, as well as
any person she thought could help her and Rodolfo.19 Maria Teresa also
suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo marriage counselling, but Rodolfo
refused and deemed it as mere "kalokohan".20
Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because Rodolfo suspected that
Maria Teresa was having an affair.21 In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo
poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. Maria Teresa, with their two (2) daughters
in tow, left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gunpoking incident. Maria
Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that, and she supported their children
by herself.22
On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage23 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was
initially archived because Rodolfo failed to file a responsive pleading.24 Maria
Teresa moved for the revival of the Petition.25 The trial court granted the
motion and referred the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for collusion
investigation.26 Assistant City Prosecutor Jocelyn S. Reyes found no collusion
and recommended the trial of the case on the merits.27
Despite notice, Rodolfo failed to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference.28
The pre-trial conference was declared closed and terminated, and Maria
Teresa was allowed to present her evidence.29
Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical
psychologist, was presented as an expert witness.30 Dr. Lopez testified that
he conducted an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to gather information on
her family background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and subjected her to
a battery of psychological tests.31 Dr. Lopez also interviewed Rodolfo's best
friend.32
After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr. Lopez concluded that
Maria Teresa was not suffering from any severe mental disorder and had no
indication of any organic or functional impairment.33 Although Dr. Lopez found
that Maria Teresa had an emotionally disturbed personality, he opined that this
was not severe enough to constitute psychological incapacity.34
Dr. Lopez affirmed that he sent Rodolfo a letter of invitation through registered
mail.35 After two (2) months, Rodolfo contacted Dr. Lopez and said, "Doctor,
ano ba ang pakialam niyo sa amin, hindi niyo naman ako kilala." Dr. Lopez
explained that he only wanted to hear Rodolfo's side of the story, but Rodolfo
replied with, "[I]nuulit ko doktor, wala kayong pakialam sa akin."36
Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested
by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy;
his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends
and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse;
his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe
immaturity."37
Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the severe forms of
personality disorder, even more severe than the other personality disorders
like borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.38 Dr. Lopez explained
that Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably caused by a pathogenic
parental model.39 Rodolfo's family background showed that his father was a
psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic contamination
called double insanity, a symptom similar to his father's.40 Dr. Lopez further
claimed that Rodolfo's disorder was serious and incurable because of his
severe paranoia.41
Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's marriage be
annulled due to Rodolfo's incapacity to perform his marital obligations.42
Summons was served upon Rodolfo but he did not file any responsive
leading.43 He likewise did not appear during the pre-trial conference.44 He
was given a specific date to present evidence but he still failed to appear.45
he trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right
to present evidence.46
On June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor General to
submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence.47 The Office
of the Solicitor General was also directed to submit its certification.48 The
Office of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's
orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the certification and
comment from the Office of the Solicitor General.49
On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision50 granting the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo, the trial court
gave credence to his findings as they were based on information gathered from
credible informants. The trial court held that the marriage between Maria
Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared null and void because "[Rodolfo's]
psychological incapacity [was] grave, serious and incurable."51 The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered,
to wit:
(1) Declaring the marriage of petitioner, MARIA TERESA B. TANI DE LA
FUENTE to respondent, RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR. null and void on the
ground of respondent's psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code. Their conjugal partnership (sic) property relations is hereby
dissolved. There being no mention of properties acquired by the parties, no
pronouncement as to its liquidation and partition is hereby made;
(2) Their children, Maria Katharyn and Maria Kimberly, both surnamed De la
Fuente shall remain legitimate. They shall remain in the custody of the
petitioner.
(3) Both parties must support their children. There being no evidence
presented as to the capability of the respondent to give support, no
pronouncement is hereby made in the meantime;
(4) Henceforth, the petitioner shall be known by her maiden name, TANI.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Quezon
City and Mandaluyong City where the marriage was celebrated upon the
finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)
On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for
reconsideration.53 The Office of the Solicitor General explained that it was
unable to submit the required certification because it had no copies of the
transcripts of stenographic notes.54 It was also unable to inform the trial court
of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it was handling.55
On September 13, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration,
with the dispositive portion reading:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby deemed moot and academic.
This Court would like to call the attention of the Office of the Solicitor General
that this case was filed on June 3, 1999 and there should be no more delay in
the disposition of the case.56
The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals.57 It argued that the trial court erred a) in deciding the case without
the required certification from the Office of the Solicitor General,58 and b) in
giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality
disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did
not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case.59
The Court of Appeals granted60 the Office of the Solicitor General's appeal.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for
being hearsay, thus, the trial court should not have given it weight.61 The Court
of Appeals also disagreed with Dr. Lopez's finding that Rodolfo's behavior
descended from psychological illness contemplated under Article 36 of the
Family Code.62
In addition, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Maria Teresa's admission
that she married Rodolfo with the belief that he would change, and that they
were in a relationship for five (5) years before getting married, showed that
they were in good terms during the early part of their marriage. It also negated
her claim that Rodolfo's psychological defect existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, and that it deprived him of the ability to assume
the essential duties of marriage.63 The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED AUGUST 14, 2002 is REVERSED and
the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.64 (Emphasis in the original)
Maria Teresa moved for reconsideration65 but this was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution66 dated May 25, 2009.
On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.67
Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence, trial courts had a wider
discretion on whether expert opinion was needed to prove psychological
incapacity.68 Petitioner further argued that for as long as the trial court had
basis in concluding that psychological incapacity existed, such conclusion
should be upheld.69
Rodolfo filed a Comment70 stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's
Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense in
adjudging him and petitioner as married."71
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment,72 agreed that a physician
was not required to declare a person psychologically incapacitated but
emphasized that the evidence presented must be able to adequately prove the
presence of a psychological condition. The Office of the Solicitor General
maintained that Maria Teresa was unable to sufficiently prove Rodolfo's
alleged psychological incapacity.73
The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr. Lopez's psychological
report stated that his assessment was based on interviews he made with
petitioner and two (2) of the parties' common friends. However, Dr. Lopez did
not name the two (2) common friends in the report.74 Furthermore, during trial
Dr. Lopez testified that he only interviewed petitioner and Rodolfo's best friend,
not two (2) friends as indicated in his report.75 The Office of the Solicitor
General insisted that the finding of Rodolfo's psychological incapacity should
be dismissed as hearsay as it was based solely on information given by
petitioner to Dr. Lopez.76
The only issue raised for the resolution of this Court is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in denying the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
because petitioner's evidence was insufficient to prove that Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
The Petition is granted.
The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals77 was the first case that
attempted to lay down the standards for determining psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Santos declared that "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability."78 Furthermore, the incapacity "should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage[.]"79
Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,80 provided the
guidelines to be followed when interpreting and applying Article 36 of the
Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically
ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law on
evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church - while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other - shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.81 (Emphasis in the original)
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient
compliance with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with
respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that
respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.
The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the
testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct a
thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological
condition. The Court of Appeals cited Republic v. Dagdag,82 where this Court
held that "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts."83 The Court of Appeals
then ruled that "[o]bviously, this requirement is not deemed complied with
where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testifies on the alleged psychological
incapacity of one party."84
The Court of Appeals is mistaken.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes85 states that the non-examination of one of the
parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the
examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition,
necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one
spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely
witnessed mainly by the other."86
Marcos v. Marcos87 emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician to
examine a person and declare him/her to be psychologically incapacitated.
What matters is that the totality of evidence presented establishes the party's
psychological condition.88
Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that
respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. Respondent's paranoid
personality disorder made him distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy and
acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the
essential obligations of marriage. As the trial court found:
Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of respondent' [s]
personality by taking into consideration the psychological impression and
conclusion he gathered from the analysis of the different behaviors he
manifested during the time that he and petitioner were living together.
According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, he found the
respondent to be suffering from a paranoid personality disorder manifested by
the respondent's damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme
jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust
of friends and relatives of the petitioner; his being irresponsible and lack of
remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe
immaturity. He also testified that this kind of disorder is actually one of the
severe forms of personality disorder even more severe than the other
personality disorders like the borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.
As to the root cause, [h]e explained that this must have been caused by a
pathogenic parental model. As he investigated the family background of the
respondent, Dr. Lopez discovered that his father was a psychiatric patient such
that the respondent developed a similar symptom or psychic contamination
which is called double insanity. This, according to Dr. Lopez is usually
developed among close family members, bestfriends (sic), sweethearts and
even couples who are close to one another; that people close to one another
get psychically contaminated; that surprisingly, the symptom that the father
manifested is the same as those of the respondent. The said disorder started
during respondent's late childhood years and developed in his early
adolescent years.
He further testified that this disorder is very severe, serious and incurable
because of the severe paranoia of the patient; that patients with this kind of
personality disorder could never accept that there is something wrong with
them and if ever forced to seek treatment, they would rather engage in an
intellectual battle with the therapist rather than cooperate with them.
Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and
support to the petitioner.1âwphi1 He recommends that the marriage be
annulled.89 (Emphasis supplied)
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task of
decision-making, must give due regard to expert opinion on the psychological
and mental disposition of the parties.90
The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was hereditary
in nature as his own father suffered from a similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated
that respondent's own psychological disorder probably started during his late
childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years. Dr. Lopez
explained that respondent's psychological incapacity to perform his marital
obligations was likely caused by growing up with a pathogenic parental model.
The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was also
sufficiently proven during trial. Petitioner attested that she noticed
respondent's jealousy even before their marriage, and that he would often
follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him.91 She
believed that he would change after they got married;92 however, this did not
happen. Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and severe that
these caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head.93
The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were
likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid
personality disorder would refuse to admit that there was something wrong and
that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when
she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted
a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counselling to
respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking
professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but the facts
narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with
the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that
petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards
petitioner, which show his need to intimidate and dominate her, a classic case
of coercive control. At first, respondent only inflicted nonphysical forms of
mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from her family and friends due to
his jealousy, and stalking her due to his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon
escalated into physical violence when, on separate instances, he poked a gun
at his teenage cousin, and at petitioner.
Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a pattern of
behavior meant to dominate a partner through different tactics such as physical
and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults, and economic deprivation.94
Although not specifically named, coercive control as a form of psychological
abuse or harm has been recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife,
or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or
is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to,
the following acts:
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to
cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography
in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating,
stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his
increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack
of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of
utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to
respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their
family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in
their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and
perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to
believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.
In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of Maria Teresa and
Rodolfo, this Court reiterates the pronouncement we made in an opinion in
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin:95
Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent ironically in our
individuality. Consequently, when the law speaks of the nature, consequences,
and incidents of marriage governed by law, this refers to responsibility to
children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other matters
limited to ensuring the stability of society.1âwphi1 The state's interest should
not amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties.
Since the State's interest must be toward the stability of society, the notion of
psychological incapacity should not only be based on a medical or
psychological disorder, but should consist of the inability to comply with
essential marital obligations such that public interest is imperiled.96
Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's observation that a
straitjacket application of the Molina guidelines "has taken its toll on people
who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social institutions."97 Ironically, the
ultimate effect of such stringent application of the Molina guidelines is the
perversion of the family unit, the very institution that our laws are meant to
protect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The marriage
of Maria Teresa Tani-De La Fuente and Rodolfo De La Fuente is declared
NULL and VOID. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV. No. 76243
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 14, 2002 of
Branch 107, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-37829
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141528 October 31, 2006
OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a
subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage
license?
The facts are not disputed:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition1 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration
of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of
Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the Family Code,
citing respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the
petition in a decision2 dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that
petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the
relief he is seeking."3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise
dismissed in a resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay
the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed
on July 12, 1999 another petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage with the
RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent
was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss6
dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground
of res judicata and forum shopping.
In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent’s motion to
dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order9 dated
January 21, 2000.
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:
A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF
HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE
REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN
EARLIER PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME
MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS WIFE’S PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL
COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS
PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY AND
DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW.

B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND
MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES
JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION AND FORUM
SHOPPING.10
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same,
that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of
action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in
the present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as
well as the evidence required to sustain either were different. Because there
is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does
not lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that
there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which
proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters
that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the
same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of
petitioner and respondent’s marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is,
the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that
petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts
that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in
this petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-
95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the
invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed
by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the
marriage is being impugned on the ground of a party’s psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code?
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute
separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the prohibition
against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle
of res judicata.
The contention is untenable.
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a
final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points
and matters determined in the former suit."11
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law,
namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary
doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of
suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.12
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b)
and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person,
or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular
person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters
of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator
or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or
final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13 Section 47 (b)
pertains to it in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict,"
which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action
upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other hand, Section
47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness of judgment"
or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in
any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action.14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the
present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the
merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.15
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is
in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether
the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in
the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or
evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a
judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.16
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by
him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate
causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which
was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is
different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is
anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the
same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another.17 In both petitions, petitioner has
the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What
differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These
grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal
issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual
status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null
and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the
alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however,
petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and
celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission.
The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could
have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that
parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to
sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that
could have been adjudged in that case.18
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of
res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case. 19 As this Court stated in Perez v. Court of
Appeals:20
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of
action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress
for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action
simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under the
pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action
after the loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories
of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff
is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the
suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set
forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon
which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in
successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court,
either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect
a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and
prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which
a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit
if the first fails. There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal
presentation is allowed. (Citations omitted.)
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take
in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is
filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein.
The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will
be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is
barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again.21
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their
marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects
therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the
decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City,
in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERATO P. MOLA
CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner) asking the Court to reverse and set aside the April 25, 2017
Decision1 and January 11, 2018 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 105873, which affirmed the May 8, 2015 Decision3 and
September 16, 2015 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva
Ecija, Branch 34 (RTC) declaring the marriage of Liberato P. Mola Cruz
(respondent) and Liezl S. Conag (Liezl) void ab initio.
The Antecedents
Respondent and Liezl were married on August 30, 2002 in Bacolod City. Their
dating relationship began when Liezl's sister gave Liezl's mobile phone
number to respondent so they could become textmates. In the course of their
relationship, Liezl left for Japan to work as an entertainer for six (6) months.
The couple got married after Liezl returned home. They lived for some time in
Manila where respondent worked, but later moved to Japan where Liezl again
secured a contract as an entertainer and respondent found work as a
construction worker. It was while living in Japan when respondent noticed
changes in Liezl. She began going out of the house without respondent's
permission and started giving respondent the cold treatment. Liezl also started
getting angry at respondent for no reason. The couple later returned to the
Philippines after Liezl was released from detention due to overstaying in
Japan. It was then that Liezl confessed to respondent her romantic affair with
a Japanese man. Despite the confession, Liezl did not end the illicit
relationship, which caused respondent such stress that he was hospitalized.
Respondent expressed her willingness to forgive Liezl but she chose to walk
away from their marriage.
The couple reconciled after respondent made efforts to woo Liezl back. One
day, however, respondent found Liezl's Japanese lover in their house. To
respondent's surprise, Liezl introduced him to her lover as her elder brother.
Respondent went along with the charade, and allowed Liezl to share her bed
with her lover as she threatened to leave their home. Liezl went on with her
partying ways, and continued working in a Manila nightclub despite
respondent's offer for her to start a business.
Despite the concessions given her, Liezl left respondent a second time.
Respondent tried to move on and left for Singapore to work in 2008. Though
abroad, he continued to woo his wife back, but found out that Liezl already
cohabited with her lover.
Respondent decided to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The public prosecutor assigned to the case
reported, submitted a written report to the RTC, stating, among others, that the
filing of the petition was not a result of collusion between the spouses.5
Thereafter, pre-trial was held and trial on the merits ensured.
The RTC's Decision
The RTC granted respondent's petition, and declared respondent and Liezl's
marriage void ab initio and their property regime dissolved.
The RTC relied on the psychological report and testimony of expert witness,
Dr. Pacita Tudla (Dr. Tudla) a clinical psychologist. Based on the evaluation
and assessment procedure she followed, Dr. Tudla found that Liezl was
afflicted by histrionic personality disorder, a pervasive pattern of behavior
characterized by excessive emotionality and attention seeking. A histrionic so
afflicted tends to be perceived by others as selfish, egotistical and unreliable;
seeking immediate gratification; over-reactive to even minor provocations;
suggestible; and lacking in analytical ability.
Dr. Tudla presented the following indicators of Liezl's disorder: going out
without her husband's knowledge or permission; coldly treating her husband,
verbally and sexually; quick anger at the slightest provocation or for no reason;
arrest in Japan due to overstaying; admission to an affair; insensitivity towards
her husband's feelings, as shown by introducing her husband as her brother
to her Japanese lover; threats of leaving if her ideas are not agreed to;
unabashed declaration of having no feelings for her husband; maintaining a
night life with friends; and choosing to work in a nightclub instead of engaging
in a decent job.
Dr. Tudla found that Liezl's psychological incapacity existed prior to the
marriage because she grew up irritable, hard-headed and more fond of friends
than family. She despised advice or suggestion from her elders, and would
rebel when her demands were not met. This personality aberration was
determined by Dr. Tudla as rooted on Liezl's poor upbringing - Liezl's father
resorted to corporal punishment to instill discipline, while her mother tolerated
her whims. Liezl also tended to skip house and spend nights with her friends
to avoid her father's spanking. According to Dr. Tudla, the irregular treatment
she received from her parents led to Liezl acquiring unsuitable behavioral
patterns.
Aside from the existence of Liezl's psychological incapacity prior to the
marriage, Dr. Tudla found her incapacity too grave that it seriously impaired
her relationship with her husband, and caused her failure to discharge the
basic obligations of marriage which resulted in its breakdown. Her incapacity
was also found incurable because it was deeply ingrained in her personality.
Further, Dr. Tudla found Liezl unconscious of her personality disorder and,
when confronted, would deny it to avoid criticism. The disorder was also
permanent as it started during her adolescence and continued until adulthood.
Treatment was also deemed ineffective as lack of any indication that
behavioural or medical therapy would play a significant role, considering Liezl's
unawareness of her disorder. Only the people around her noticed her
maladaptive behavior.
The RTC found that Liezl was largely responsible for the failure of her
marriage. Her moral bankruptcy, coupled with respondent's weakness in
character inconsistent with what is expected of the head of a family, left the
marital union bereft of any mutual respect. According to the RTC, the marriage
was wrong from the very beginning.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, and argued that Dr. Tudla's findings were
based on hearsay because she lacked personal knowledge of the facts on
which her evaluation was anchored; and that the hopelessness of the parties'
reconciliation should not mean that their marriage should be declared void ab
initio.
In its Order,6 the RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals' Decision
On appeal, petitioner raised the sole issue of whether respondent was able to
prove Liezl's psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations. It
claimed that respondent failed to do so, and that witness Dr. Tudla only made
a sweeping statement that Liezl's condition was grave and permanent.
Petitioner questioned Dr. Tudla's report as it lacked details regarding Liezl's
condition and how Liezl was unable to comply with her marital obligations.
Petitioner contended that the change in Liezl's behavior was only caused by
her illicit relationship and not because of psychological incapacity. Petitioner
asserted that sexual infidelity, indulgence and abandonment can only be
grounds for legal separation as they do not constitute psychological incapacity.
In its decision, the CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the
RTC's decision. It reasoned that:
What matters in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. In the task of ascertaining the
presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage,
the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves
on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave,
antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis of experts.
In the present case, the Psychological Evaluation Report prepared by
petitioner's witness Pacita P. Tudla. Ph.D concluded [that] respondent is
suffering from histrionic personality disorder. From interviews of said
psychologist with petitioner, respondent and her sister, it was revealed how
her psychological disorder resulted in the failure of their marriage. At the time
the parties were living in Japan, respondent had an affair with a Japanese
national which she admitted to petitioner. Furthermore, her attitude towards
her husband had changed ever since she met her Japanese lover, giving him
the cold treatment and getting angry at him at the slightest provocation. She
likewise refused to have sexual intercourse with petitioner. Respondent
preferred to work at a nightclub over a decent business offered to her by
petitioner. Worst, she let her Japanese boyfriend visit the conjugal home she
shared with petitioner and introduced the latter as her older brother to her lover.
Petitioner was forced to keep silent because she threatened to leave him. And
ultimately, Liezl left Liberato and cohabited with her Japanese boyfriend.
According to Ms. Tudla, respondent's psychological incapacity has
antecedence since it already existed long before she married petitioner.
Growing up, Liezl was irritable, hard-headed and was fond of her group of
friends. She did not know how to accept advice and suggestion from elders.
Respondent's psychological incapacity is considered by the expert witness to
be grave, permanent and incurable. Liezl's histrionic personality disorder
seriously impaired the quality of her relationship with her husband and caused
her failure to discharge the basic obligations of marriage - love, respect,
concern, support and fidelity to her husband. Further, she is unconscious of
her personality disorder and if confronted about it, she would deny it in her
attempt to protect herself from criticisms.
Ms. Tudla said in her report that Liezl's psychological incapacity is permanent
because it started in the adolescent stage of her life and continued to manifest
as she grew up into adulthood. Thus, it is already ingrained in her personality
make-up and no treatment will be effective.7
The CA described Liezl's acts of allowing her lover to stay in the conjugal home
and introducing her husband as her brother as extreme perversion and
depravity. It then concluded that, in dissolving marital bonds on account of
psychological incapacity, the court is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
The Present Appeal
Petitioner now questions whether the totality of the evidence adduced by
respondent proves Liezl's psychological incapacity, thus warranting the
declaration of their marriage as null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Using the guidelines set forth in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina (Molina),8 petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the RTC's
findings because there was no sufficient evidence to prove that Liezl is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations. Dr. Tudla's
assessment, based only on the information given by respondent, Liezl and her
sister, must be weighed strictly and with due care. Petitioner avers that there
must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the couple to obtain a
conclusive diagnosis of psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and
incurable. Information retrieved from Liezl's interview does not necessarily
enhance Dr. Tudla's conclusion because the details Liezl conveyed were
wanting. There is also no independent collateral informants, which made Dr.
Tudla's evaluation fallible. Therefore, Dr. Tudla's findings should not be
accepted without question.
For petitioner, Liezl's purported actuations were not proven to have existed
prior to the marriage; nor was it alleged in respondent's petition that she
showed abnormal and peculiar character and behavior prior to the celebration
of the marriage that would support a conclusion that she is suffering from any
psychological incapacity. Petitioner argues that the CA observed nothing
peculiar about the spouses that would insinuate that they are suffering from
psychological incapacity, and that the finding that Liezl was suffering from a
psychological disorder was merely based on incidents that occurred after the
celebration of the marriage. Petitioner, thus, avers that Liezl's incapacity is
merely conjectural since there was no mention or proof that her incapacity
manifested, or at least was hinted at, before the celebration of the marriage.
Petitioner also claims that the CA failed to detail how Liezl's disorder could be
characterized as grave, deeply rooted in her childhood and incurable. There
should be a causal connection between the failure of the marriage and the
psychological disorder. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty", a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Petitioner maintains that sexual infidelity and abandonment are
only grounds for legal separation and not for the declaration of nullity of
marriage. The change in the spouses' feelings toward each other could hardly
be described as a psychological illness.
Issue
Whether Liezl's psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations
was sufficiently established by the totality of evidence presented by
respondent.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,9 the Court explained psychological incapacity
as follows:
"[P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. x x x.10
Further, "x x x psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand
the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them
x x x."11
Jurisprudence consistently adhered to the guidelines in appreciating
psychological incapacity cases set in Molina. We quote the fairly recent
iteration of the guidelines in Republic v. Pangasinan12 for reference:
x x x [P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thereafter, in Molina, the Court laid
down more definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity
cases, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
expe1ts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non--complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition.
In sum, a person's psychological incapacity to comply with his or her essential
obligations, as the case may be, in marriage must be rooted on a medically or
clinically identifiable grave illness that is incurable and shown to have existed
at the time of marriage, although the manifestations thereof may only be
evident after marriage. x x x.13
In addition, the Court is mindful that the Molina guidelines should no longer be
viewed as a stringent code which all nullity cases on the ground of
psychological incapacity should meet with exactitude, in consonance with the
Family Code's ideal to appreciate allegations of psychological incapacity on a
case-to-case basis and "to allow some resiliency in its application" as legally
designed.14Ngo Te v. Yu-Te15 predicated, thus:
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina
in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga
in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle
that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat
for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.16
In the case at hand, petitioner is again assailing the CA's affirmance of the
RTC's conclusion that Liezl is psychologically incapacitated to carry out her
marital obligations to respondent (1) by attacking the reliability of expert
witness Dr. Tudla's medical conclusions on the ground that they were based
only on interviews of Liezl and her sister; (2) by claiming that Liezl's actions
manifesting her disorder occurred after the celebration of the marriage; and (3)
because the CA failed to detail why it found Liezl's disorder grave, deeply
rooted in her childhood and incurable. These issues were resolved by the CA
by affirming the factual findings earlier made by the RTC as regards the
histrionic personality disorder suffered by Liezl, all of which were deemed
binding to the Court. The Court is so bound "x x x owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court
of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts."17 A sharper pronouncement
on the respect accorded to the trial court's factual findings in the realm of
psychological incapacity was made in Kalaw v. Fernandez (Kalaw):18
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-
existence of a party's psychological incapacity should be final and binding for
as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and
other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every
situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the
facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain
itself from substituting its own judgment. It is not enough reason to ignore the
findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate
tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage
as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a
marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal
existence.19
The CA decision itself recognized and Our own review of Dr. Tudla's
psychological report confirms, contrary to petitioner's allegation, that Dr. Tudla
personally interviewed both spouses regarding their personal and familial
circumstances before and after the celebration of their marriage. Information
gathered from the spouses was then verified by Dr. Tudla with Ma. Luisa
Conag, Liez's youngest sister,20 a close relation privy to Liezl's personal
history before and after she got married. Dr. Tudla then based her
psychological evaluation and conclusions on all the information she gathered.
Her findings were, thus, properly anchored on a holistic psychological
evaluation of the parties as individuals and as a married couple under a factual
milieu verified with an independent informant. The courts a quo properly
accorded credence to the report and utilized it as an aid in determining whether
Liezl is indeed psychologically incapacitated to meet essential marital
functions. Clearly, petitioner has no basis to assail Dr. Tudla's psychological
findings as wanting evidentiary support.
Even the failure of an expert to conduct personal examination of the couple
will not perforce result to the expert's opinion becoming unreliable, as petitioner
advances. In Kalaw, a case also involving a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage wherein the expert witnesses declared the respondent spouse
therein as suffering from narcissistic personality disorder without personally
examining the latter albeit with the support of the medical findings of the
respondent spouse's own clinical psychologist. In said case, the Court had the
occasion to re-emphasize that such lack of personal examination does not per
se invalidate the experts' findings of psychological incapacity. Citing Marcos v.
Marcos,21 the Court emphasized the importance of the presence of evidence
that adequately establishes the party's psychological incapacity and the
inessentiality of a physician's personal examination to have a party declared
psychologically incapacitated. Kalaw expounded on the point, as follows:
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly
result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion
should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting
such other evidence on the causation. Indeed, an expert opinion on
psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative
and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to
establish causation. The expert's findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. This is so,
considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure
adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear
that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties' upbringing and
psychodynamics.22
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential premise, the Court holds that both the
CA and the RTC did not err in finding that the totality of evidence presented by
respondent in support of his petition, sufficiently established the link between
Liezl's actions showing her psychological incapacity to understand and
perform her marital obligations and her histrionic personality disorder. The
Court respects the RTC's appreciation of respondent's testimony during trial
on what transpired before and during the marriage, considering that "[t]he
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is
generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other."23 In addition, Dr.
Tudla was able to collect and verify largely the same facts in the course of her
psychological evaluation of both spouses and her interview of Liezl's sister. Dr.
Tudla's report gave a description of histrionic personality disorder, and
correlated the characteristics of this disorder with Liezl's behavior from her
formative years through he course of her marriage to petitioner. Indubitably,
Dr. Tudla's report and testimony enjoy such probative force emanating from
the assistance her opinion gave to the courts to show the facts upon which her
psychological conclusion was based.24
The fact that Liezl's disorder manifested itself through actions that occurred
after the marriage was celebrated does not mean, as ,petitioner argues, that
there is no psychological incapacity to speak of. As held in Republic v.
Pangasinan,25 psychological incapacity may manifest itself after the
celebration of the marriage even if it already exists at the time of the marriage.
More importantly, Art. 36 of the Family Code is explicit - a marriage contracted
by a psychologically incapacitated party is also treated as void even if the
incapacity becomes manifest only after the marriage was celebrated.26
Also, contrary to petitioner's allegation, the CA did expound on the reasons
why it found Liezl's disorder grave, deeply rooted in her childhood and
incurable.
To entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her
marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that the
respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and
existing prior to the time of the marriage.27 The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.28 "There must be proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
the marriage which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity."29
The CA explained that Liezl's histrionic personality disorder was the cause of
her inability to discharge her marital obligations to love, respect and give
concern, support and fidelity to her husband. The CA also narrated how the
disorder was evidenced by Liezl's actions after the marriage was celebrated,
starting from when she and petitioner lived together in Japan. The gravity of
her disorder is shown by appreciating the totality of her actions after she got
married. Liezl was unable to accommodate the fact that she was already
married into the way she wanted to live her life, and essentially treated
petitioner as a manipulable inconvenience that she could ignore or threaten to
accede to her desires. It is clear that Liezl is truly incognitive of her marital
responsibilities.
The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an
adolescent and continued well into adulthood. It fully appreciated Liezl's
psychological evaluation that revealed her unconsciousness of her disorder.
Together with its rootedness in Liezl's personality since her teens, the CA
came to agree with the expert findings that any medical or behavioral treatment
of her disorder would prove ineffective.
Petitioner also relies on the premise that Liezl's sexual infidelity and
abandonment are only grounds for legal separation and cannot be used as
basis to hold a marriage void ab initio. According to petitioner, Liezl cheated
on and abandoned her husband because of her illicit affair and not because
she is psychologically incapacitated.
person who reasonably understand the principle and responsibilities of
marriage.
The Court has to affirm the declaration of respondent's marriage as void ab
initio, even as it is clear from the records how much petitioner must love his
wife to endure the pain and humiliation she callously caused him in the hope
that their relationship could still work out. Clearly, Liezl does not recognize the
marital responsibilities that came when she married petitioner. The severance
of their marital vinculum will better protect the state's interest to preserve the
sanctity of marriage and family, the importance of which seems utterly lost on
respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 25, 2017 Decision and
January 11, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA--G.R. CV No.
105873 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

It is true that sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for legal
separation. It may be noted, however, that the courts a quo duly connected
such aberrant acts of Liezl as actual manifestations of her histrionic personality
disorder. A person with such a disorder was characterized as selfish and
egotistical, and demands immediate gratification.30 These traits were
especially reflected in Liezl's highly unusual acts of allowing her Japanese
boyfriend to stay in the marital abode, sharing the marital bed with his
Japanese boyfriend and introducing her husband as her elder brother, all done
under the threat of desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for
the sanctity of the marital bond and home cannot be expected from a married
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 28, Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance
of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are
living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro
Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is
in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent
sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy
that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not
bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving
instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even
alienated the affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with
whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn
statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent
caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with
De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro
and that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's
claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he
was even a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed
by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De
Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits
having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went
through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25,
1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon
the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another
marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party
applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago,
leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los
Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for
all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage
was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage.
Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.

Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does
not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was
governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took
place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested
right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may
not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229
[1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA
674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a
mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to
cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the
practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage
ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any
marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity
to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for
the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two
occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as
a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De
Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free
of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of
morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and
in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be
overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon,
229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of
all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any
branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no
grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The
petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged
among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA
Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-
76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown
to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25,
1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior
marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for
bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in
Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would
avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer
since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely
dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings,
she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she
further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties
without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and
thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to
take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession
and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is
not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of
their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act
of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be
declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of
their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no
cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the
declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added
that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying
the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a
man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is
no dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein
petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and void.
However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially
declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of
the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in
his possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the
merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of
Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to
the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the
motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt
within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of
certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to
dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It explained
that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS
relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there
being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the successional
rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property
corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the
separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the
union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital
relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first
marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and
multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this
proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties
involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private
respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be
raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of
their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged
error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which
the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial
and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion
for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private
respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging
to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7
contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being
unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of
Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since
the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's
intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but
in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the properties
acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz
was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning.8 Petitioner
himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by
petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree
is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is
noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these
occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there
would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that
marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent
cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court
abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing
the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property
acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or
annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there
is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an
action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second marriage
can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the
Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife
asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of
the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second
marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his
first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court
reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee
16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the
position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry
again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then
Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only
void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision
be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for
himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed.
Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice
Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they
still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it
include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is
void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in
some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice
Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first
a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with
which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable
marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the
other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the
phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they
change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is
the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense
as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the
provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void
and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void,
while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are,
therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated
that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the marriage
is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense
that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista
added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or
invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding.
It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa
saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked
only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not
solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one
enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring
the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the
original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is
illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his
or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a
necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage
before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court,
in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly
immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with
another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter
remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for
the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision
of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify
"final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for
careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee
members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for
purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of
petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus
rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes
that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of
other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between
the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such
cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party
who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to
enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law
to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes
of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a
previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable?

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall
be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal,
and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and
peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another
cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties
or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites
of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect
— and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be
reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And
the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as
human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant
institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing
less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open
and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a
second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from
new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application
for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the
Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private
respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her
to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term
"solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for
purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment."
Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final judgment."
Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only,"
which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of
marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should
have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to
have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court
would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with
jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he
pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition
admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together
with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters
had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific
effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:

Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted
said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of property
relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom
the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with
jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's
properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in
finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20,
revoked by operation of law; 1992 are AFFIRMED.

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who SO ORDERED.
acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law. (n) 26

Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for

separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil
G.R. No. 189607
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV
No. 90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed the same. The CA reversed the
Decision3 dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 84.
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
between the parties on the ground that respondent had a previous valid
marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the other hand,
that respondent was not prevented from contracting a second marriage if the
first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to
await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.
The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was
correct in holding thus and consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of
nullity of the second marriage.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin
Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner
Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage,4 praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to
her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that petitioner did
not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for
this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license
therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged.5
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to
Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision6 declaring that Lea's first marriage to
Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued
a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had
become final and executory. 7
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that
the proof adduced by petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of
nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. In his Opposition,
9 petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was
valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she
entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and
subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer in its Order 10
dated 8 March 2005.
In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it
was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. 12 The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby
declares the marriage between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-
CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen Parish
Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the Family Code. 13
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when
she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato
bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's
argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could
presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so
long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing.
Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage
judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to
obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before
contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their
properties were concerned. 15 His motion, however, was denied by the RTC
in its Order16 dated 6 September 2007. Thereafter, both petitioner17 and
Respondent18 filed their respective Notices of Appeal.
In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's
Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In
reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in
1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August
1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time
the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.20 Furthermore, the
CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary
in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise
denied in the questioned CA Resolution22 dated 16 September 2009.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her
marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in toto, and that all properties acquired
by the spouses during their marriage be declared conjugal. In his Reply to the
Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition.
OUR RULING
We deny the Petition.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration.25 In this case,
the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code.
The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect
i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using
the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles
80,26 81,27 82,28 and 83 (first paragraph);29 and those on voidable marriages
are Articles 83 (second paragraph),30 8531 and 86.32

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the
following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage
from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until
annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a
voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void
marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership
and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage
there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of
annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial
decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage
there must be a judicial decree.33
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v.
Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante, 36 that the Civil
Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration
of nullity of a void marriage. 37
In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and
1949. The second marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was
already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the death of the
second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until
annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous.
Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its
performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree
declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the
same factual antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the
Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the
rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated
after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now
expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage. 38 A second marriage contracted
prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous
and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind
the institution of this requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall
be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and
peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore,
the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one
that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a
contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and
nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced
to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the
grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human
ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution,
an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will
satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of
marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible
to everyone.40 (Emphases supplied)1âwphi1
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of
Appeals, 42 the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to
marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code,
particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in
force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to be governed by
Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:
x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge
of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his
first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife
whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied
Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took
place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of
Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence
at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found
in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent
being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this
case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to
petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the
vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of
Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner
and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to
this case. The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to
Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because
of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration
that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was
contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring
the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that
her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no
reason to disturb its ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September
2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as
"void."
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its
January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision
affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal
Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a.
Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
[the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three
(3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as
minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against accused."2
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court’s judgment,
as follows: "From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that
accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married
on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez
[by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the
parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was ‘single’. There
is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with
complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful
wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April
10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage
Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further
blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at
the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage
between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on
June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese
of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first
consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child,
Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant
through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually
resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said
accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
January 22, 1993.
"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was
lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and
in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado
and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma.
Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in
lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City,
without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the
evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are
present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2)
that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4)
that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for
validity. x x x
"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited
the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and
void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of
accused.
"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with
Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accused’s prior marriage with Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or
any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage
ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused
was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with
complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his
first wife."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before
the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy
against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of
bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent
marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved."4
Hence, this Petition.5
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
"A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to
convict petitioner.
"B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the
Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
"C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable
doubt."6
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue: Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides:
"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings."
The elements of this crime are as follows:
"1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity."7
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of
bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva
on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he
contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan
who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it
void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set
aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never
to have taken place at all.8 Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage
to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries9 of former Justice Luis
Reyes that "it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning,
it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not
a defense."
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that
declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the
crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration
of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a person can
marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity
of the previous marriage has been characterized as "conflicting."10 In People
v. Mendoza,11 a bigamy case involving an accused who married three times,
the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the
accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first.
When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then
charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second
marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted while the first
marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and
illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its
nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the
third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon,12 which
involved substantially the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS,13 Jose Consuegra
married for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon
his death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits
to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children,
notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: "And with
respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observes that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,14 however, the Court again held that judicial declaration
of nullity of a void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married
twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving
spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death
Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that "the second
marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the
first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,15 the Court stressed the need for such declaration.
In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior
existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present
evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been
married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such
evidence, the Court ruled: "x x x There is likewise no need of introducing
evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according
to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x."
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,16 the Court reverted to the ruling in People v.
Mendoza, holding that there was no need for such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,17 the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of
nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of
erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family
Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for
a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy."18
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited
was not a criminal prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo
underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on
the basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several
years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613
(Marriage Law), which provided:
"Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case
until declared null and void by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first
spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
marriages."19
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the
1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the
Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void."
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such
marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the
earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil
Code Revision Commitee has observed:
"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that
the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial
declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the
second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143
SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision
changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its
performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)."20
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that
there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has
been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now
necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that
declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,21
which involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying
twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s argument that he was free to enter into a second
marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: "for purposes
of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage,
a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential." The Court further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory
form by Article 40 of the Family Code." Significantly, it observed that the
second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was
cited by petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the
Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent
marriage:22
"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning
is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the
second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code
Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure
a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed
to marry again. x x x."
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there
was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he
instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after
complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed
the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been
consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the
prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare
his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against
him.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of
the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorney’s
fees.23
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her;
hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court.24 In any event, we
find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this
point, which we quote hereunder:
"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that
Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well
aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted
matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove
this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
xxx xxx xxx
"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous
marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado
had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge
anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr.
Mercado, she being by then already living with another man.

"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was
fully conscious of the consequences of her act. She should have known that
she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did
in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed
damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making."25

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose
“death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans
whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed
in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in
Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño
(hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings,
namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10,
1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee),
with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23,
1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial
(GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia,
that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred
forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death
benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to
file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of
nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met
petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the
petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the
spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in
this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a
true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this
archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for
whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee,
holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death
benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s
fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS.
GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING
EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND
UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN
MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF
THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage,
no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity
of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must
be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass
upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to
the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of
the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject
to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity
of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and,
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office
has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15
the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value,
he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial
court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence
of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this
Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from
pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed
validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death
benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of
the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property
regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property,
but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions ...”

In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their
actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries
earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions
in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral
inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is
a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a
previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased
as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the
contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry
in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone
and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate
succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal
heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of
them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article
147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who
are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage,
but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of
a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries
earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in
equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party
earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably,
even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of
bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed
to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny
shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half
pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal
heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the
case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20
where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased
to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared
void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor
has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband
under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should
she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share
in the property here in dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second
wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed
to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was
dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable
solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her
share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and
consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.” 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the
rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the
rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40
of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of
a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a
second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the
first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if
the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine
for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of
money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from
which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to
the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage
involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with
the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court
explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family
Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose
of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of
P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July
21, 2003, and its Resolution2 dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in
Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of
the crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage
with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only
discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and,
thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil
wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal
Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN
dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage
in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital
union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975
(Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before
then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-
1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew
in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for
annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City x x x.

xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000,
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for
declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused
Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as
the nullity of accused’s bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children
and their property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court
of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that
assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.3
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to
Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a
certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her
marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage
license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage
to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision
dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she
contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her
marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court.
This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still
existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of
sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were
celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous
marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision
dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to
Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological
incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a
ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July
8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,4 denied reconsideration
and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, the said marriage is not without legal consequences, among which
is incurring criminal liability for bigamy."5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court where petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE
WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO
MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY
FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL
SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY
PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND
EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS
PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be
discussed jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution
evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground
of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages
to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her
appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the
proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA struck
down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically
stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not
be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for
all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop,
any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination
of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was
held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already
been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that
action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence
or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time
the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case,
even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was
void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s
conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be
considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner
contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s
marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court
of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a
judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any
difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage."11
Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision
mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty.
Article 90 thereof provides that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties
shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as
1978; hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who
raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant
or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise,
failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.12 Thus, for petitioner’s
defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce
evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her
previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly
failed to present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s
testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already
married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any
corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who
allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be
obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution
of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.13

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the
crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as
opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous
marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of
prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore,
ineffectual.1avvphi1
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous
penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely
within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as
long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of
the indeterminate sentence.16
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is
proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty
for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional,
which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six
years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the
duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor
should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to
10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10
years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s
marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment17 to be void
ab initio on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which,
petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to
reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2)
years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated
July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED
in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the
old Civil Code is the legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought by the
petitioner whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower
courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had
no right to bring the action.
Antecedents
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.1 The case was docketed as Special
Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract
between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had
been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued
only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for
having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being
the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled
him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his
death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself
included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage
being void ab initio.2
Ruling of the RTC
On October 18, 2000, 3 the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby
resolved to DISMISS the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed
out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the
marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on
December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration on November 14, 2000.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error
that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and
that the petitioner is not a party to the marriage.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003,4 however, the CA affirmed the
dismissal order of the RTC, thus:

While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the
beginning does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same
action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by
any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition was filed by
Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the
marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The
contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real party in interest
under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions
for annulment of marriage will not prosper if persons other than those specified
in the law file the case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party
to file the subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be
prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on
appeal are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF
DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT
CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in
interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife
and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such
relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the
validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the
marriage is contracted.6 As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already
celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing
law.7 To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void
under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code;
yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void
nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under
the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void,
considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the
time of the marriage ceremony.8
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed
herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages),
which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the
limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to
distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003.10
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to
March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code,
the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule
on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate
the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v.
Bayadog,12 the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a
petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s marriage to their
stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage
license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a
voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned,
thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary
in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require
a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary,
yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained
and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can
be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material,
either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife,
and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of
the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into
a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action
or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or
the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise
in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity
is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40
of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.13
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil
Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an
action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v.
Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural
law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party in interest.15 Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper
interest" can file the action.16 Interest within the meaning of the rule means
material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When
the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground
of lack of cause of action.17
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and
surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be,
then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be
adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the
petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the
right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions
stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the
petitioner from succeeding to the deceased’s estate.18 Necessarily, therefore,
the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination
of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late
Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the
trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue
presented in this case. We reverse their error, in order that the substantial right
of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the
late Cresenciano’s surviving wife,19 stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the
nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not
all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required
a marriage license for their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is
made all the more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage
had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage
might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power.1avvphi1 It is precisely "when an indispensable party
is not before the court [that] the action should be dismissed." The absence of
an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.21
We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 91025 entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza
and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to
determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property
involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on
November 26, 2009, and the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is
reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and
Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As
such, Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial right any
judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise
implead Leila.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the
present action, however, considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of
Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for
the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading
in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead
an indispensable party may be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial
court’s) own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by
the Court of Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage
Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza,
petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are returned to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with
instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in
order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as
parties-defendants; then to determine whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza
had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the
time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and
surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate
of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.
No costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 167139 : February 25, 2010]
SUSIE CHAN-TAN, PETITIONER, VS. JESSE C. TAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of (i) the 17 May 2004 Resolution[2] amending
the 30 March 2004 Decision[3] and (ii) the 15 February 2005 Resolution[4] of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, in Civil Case No. Q-01-
45743. In its 30 March 2004 Decision, the trial court declared the marriage
between petitioner Susie Chan-Tan and respondent Jesse Tan void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Incorporated as part of the decision was the 31
July 2003 Partial Judgment[5] approving the Compromise Agreement[6] of the
parties. In its 17 May 2004 Resolution, the trial court granted to respondent
custody of the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent
documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowed respondent to stay in
the family dwelling. In its 15 February 2005 Resolution, the trial court denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 Resolution[7]
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the 12
October 2004 Resolution,[8] which in turn denied for late filing petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution.
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral
in Intramuros, Manila.[9] They were blessed with two sons: Justin, who was
born in Canada in 1990 and Russel, who was born in the Philippines in
1993.[10]
In 2001, twelve years into the marriage, petitioner filed a case for the
annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties
submitted to the court a compromise agreement, which we quote in full:
1. The herein parties mutually agreed that the two (2) lots located at Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City and more particularly described in the Contract to Sell,
marked in open court as Exhibits "H" to "H-3" shall be considered as part of
the presumptive legitimes of their two (2) minor children namely, Justin Tan
born on October 12, 1990 and Russel Tan born on November 28, 1993. Copies
of the Contract to Sell are hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B" and made
integral parts hereof.
2. Susie Tan hereby voluntarily agrees to exclusively shoulder and pay out of
her own funds/assets whatever is the remaining balance or unpaid amounts
on said lots mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof directly with Megaworld
Properties, Inc., until the whole purchase or contract amounts are fully paid.
Susie Tan is hereby authorized and empowered to directly negotiate, transact,
pay and deal with the seller/developer Megaworld Properties, Inc., in
connection with the Contract to Sell marked as Annexes "A" and "B" hereof.
The property covered by CCT No. 3754 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City and located at Unit O, Richmore Town Homes 12-B Mariposa St., Quezon
City shall be placed in co-ownership under the name of Susie Tan (1/3), Justin
Tan (1/3) and Russel Tan (1/3) to the exclusion of Jesse Tan.
The property covered by TCT No. 48137 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City and located at View Master Town Homes, 1387 Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City shall be exclusively owned by Jesse Tan to the exclusion of Susie Tan.
The undivided interest in the Condominium Unit in Cityland Shaw. Jesse Tan
shall exclusively own blvd. to the exclusion of Susie Tan.
The shares of stocks, bank accounts and other properties presently under the
respective names of Jesse Tan and Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned by
the spouse whose name appears as the registered/account owner or holder in
the corporate records/stock transfer books, passbooks and/or the one in
possession thereof, including the dividends/fruits thereof, to the exclusion of
the other spouse.
Otherwise stated, all shares, bank accounts and properties registered and
under the name and/or in the possession of Jesse Tan shall be exclusively
owned by him only and all shares, accounts and properties registered and/or
in the possession and under the name of Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned
by her only.
However, as to the family corporations of Susie Tan, Jesse Tan shall execute
any and all documents transferring the shares of stocks registered in his name
in favor of Susie Tan, or Justin Tan/Russel Tan. A copy of the list of the
corporation owned by the family of Susie Tan is hereto attached as Annex "C"
and made an integral part hereof.
The parties shall voluntarily and without need of demand turn over to the other
spouse any and all original documents, papers, titles, contracts registered in
the name of the other spouse that are in their respective possessions and/or
safekeeping.
3. Thereafter and upon approval of this Compromise Agreement by the
Honorable Court, the existing property regime of the spouses shall be
dissolved and shall now be governed by "Complete Separation of Property".
Parties expressly represent that there are no known creditors that will be
prejudiced by the present compromise agreement.
The parties shall have joint custody of their minor children. However, the two
(2) minor children shall stay with their mother, Susie Tan at 12-B Mariposa St.,
Quezon City.
The husband, Jesse Tan, shall have the right to bring out the two (2) children
every Sunday of each month from 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM. The minor children
shall be returned to 12-B Mariposa Street, Quezon City on or before 9:00 PM
of every Sunday of each month.
The husband shall also have the right to pick up the two (2) minor children in
school/or in the house every Thursday of each month. The husband shall
ensure that the children be home by 8:00 PM of said Thursdays.
During the summer vacation/semestral break or Christmas vacation of the
children, the parties shall discuss the proper arrangement to be made
regarding the stay of the children with Jesse Tan.
Neither party shall put any obstacle in the way of the maintenance of the love
and affection between the children and the other party, or in the way of a
reasonable and proper companionship between them, either by influencing the
children against the other, or otherwise; nor shall they do anything to estrange
any of them from the other.
The parties agreed to observe civility, courteousness and politeness in dealing
with each other and shall not insult, malign or commit discourteous acts
against each other and shall endeavor to cause their other relatives to act
similarly.
4. Likewise, the husband shall have the right to bring out and see the children
on the following additional dates, provided that the same will not impede or
disrupt their academic schedule in Xavier School, the dates are as follows:
Birthday of Jesse Tan
Birthday of Grandfather and Grandmother, first cousins and uncles and aunties
Father's Day
Death Anniversaries of immediate members of the family of Jesse Tan
During the Christmas seasons/vacation the herein parties will agree on such
dates as when the children can stay with their father. Provided that if the
children stay with their father on Christmas Day from December 24th to
December 25th until 1:00 PM the children will stay with their mother on
December 31 until January 1, 1:00 PM, or vice versa.
The husband shall always be notified of all school activities of the children and
shall see to it that he will exert his best effort to attend the same.
5. During the birthdays of the two (2) minor children, the parties shall as far as
practicable have one celebration.
Provided that if the same is not possible, the Husband (Jesse Tan) shall have
the right to see and bring out the children for at least four (4) hours during the
day or the day immediately following/or after the birthday, if said visit or
birthday coincides with the school day.
6. The existing Educational Plans of the two children shall be used and utilized
for their High School and College education, in the event that the Educational
Plans are insufficient to cover their tuition, the Husband shall shoulder the
tuition and other miscellaneous fees, costs of books and educational materials,
uniform, school bags, shoes and similar expenses like summer workshops
which are taken in Xavier School, which will be paid directly by Jesse Tan to
the children's school when the same fall due. Jesse Tan, if necessary, shall
pay tutorial expenses, directly to the tutor concerned.
The husband further undertake to pay P10,000.00/monthly support pendente
lite to be deposited in the ATM Account of SUSIE CHAN with account no. 3-
189-53867-8 Boni Serrano Branch effective on the 15th of each month. In
addition Jesse Tan undertakes to give directly to his two (2) sons every
Sunday, the amount needed and necessary for the purpose of the daily meals
of the two (2) children in school.
7. This Compromise Agreement is not against the law, customs, public policy,
public order and good morals. Parties hereby voluntarily agree and bind
themselves to execute and sign any and all documents to give effect to this
Compromise Agreement.[11]
On 31 July 2003, the trial court issued a partial judgment[12] approving the
compromise agreement. On 30 March 2004, the trial court rendered a decision
declaring the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of mutual psychological incapacity of the parties. The trial court incorporated
in its decision the compromise agreement of the parties on the issues of
support, custody, visitation of the children, and property relations.
Meanwhile, petitioner cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills
Subdivision Lot No. 12, Block 2. She authorized Megaworld Corp. to allocate
the amount of P11,992,968.32 so far paid on the said lot in the following
manner:
(a) P3,656,250.04 shall be transferred to fully pay the other lot in Corinthian
Hills on Lot 11, Block 2;
(b) P7,783,297.56 shall be transferred to fully pay the contract price in Unit 9H
of the 8 Wack Wack Road Condominium project; and
(c) P533,420.72 shall be forfeited in favor of Megaworld Corp. to cover the
marketing and administrative costs of Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot 12,
Block 2.[13]
Petitioner authorized Megaworld Corp. to offer Lot 12, Block 2 of Corinthian
Hills to other interested buyers. It also appears from the records that petitioner
left the country bringing the children with her.
Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the
children. The evidence presented by respondent established that petitioner
brought the children out of the country without his knowledge and without prior
authority of the trial court; petitioner failed to pay the P8,000,000 remaining
balance for the Megaworld property which, if forfeited would prejudice the
interest of the children; and petitioner failed to turn over to respondent
documents and titles in the latter's name.
Thus, the trial court, in its 17 May 2004 resolution, awarded to respondent
custody of the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent
documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowed respondent to stay in
the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City.
Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration[14] alleging
denial of due process on account of accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. She alleged she was not able to present evidence because of the
negligence of her counsel and her own fear for her life and the future of the
children. She claimed she was forced to leave the country, together with her
children, due to the alleged beating she received from respondent and the
pernicious effects of the latter's supposed gambling and womanizing ways.
She prayed for an increase in respondent's monthly support obligation in the
amount of P150,000.
Unconvinced, the trial court, in its 12 October 2004 Resolution,[15] denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period. It also declared petitioner in contempt of court for non-
compliance with the partial judgment and the 17 May 2004 resolution. The trial
court also denied petitioner's prayer for increase in monthly support. The trial
court reasoned that since petitioner took it upon herself to enroll the children
in another school without respondent's knowledge, she should therefore defray
the resulting increase in their expenses.
On 4 November 2004, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss[16] and a motion for
reconsideration[17] of the 12 October 2004 Resolution. She claimed she was
no longer interested in the suit. Petitioner stated that the circumstances in her
life had led her to the conclusion that withdrawing the petition was for the best
interest of the children. She prayed that an order be issued vacating all prior
orders and leaving the parties at the status quo ante the filing of the suit.
In its 28 December 2004 Resolution,[18] the trial court denied both the motion
to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. It held that the
30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution had become final and
executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely
appeal having been filed by either party.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28 December
2004 resolution, which the trial court denied in its 15 February 2005
resolution.[19] The trial court then issued a Certificate of Finality[20] of the 30
March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution.
The Trial Court's Rulings
The 30 March 2004 Decision[21] declared the marriage between the parties
void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological
incapacity. It incorporated the 31 July 2003 Partial Judgment[22] approving the
Compromise Agreement[23] between the parties. The 17 May 2004
Resolution[24] amended the earlier partial judgment in granting to respondent
custody of the children, ordering petitioner to turn over to respondent
documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowing respondent to stay in
the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City. The 15 February 2005
Resolution[25] denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 28
December 2004 Resolution[26] denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and
motion for reconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution,[27] which in turn
denied for late filing petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004
resolution.
The Issue
Petitioner raises the question of whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the
17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court have attained finality despite the
alleged denial of due process.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to
file pleadings and appear at the hearings for respondent's omnibus motion to
amend the partial judgment as regards the custody of the children and the
properties in her possession. Petitioner claims the trial court issued the 17 May
2004 resolution relying solely on the testimony of respondent. Petitioner further
claims the trial court erred in applying to her motion to dismiss Section 7 of the
Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages. Petitioner argues that if indeed the provision is
applicable, the same is unconstitutional for setting an obstacle to the
preservation of the family.
Respondent maintains that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004
resolution of the trial court are now final and executory and could no longer be
reviewed, modified, or vacated. Respondent alleges petitioner is making a
mockery of our justice system in disregarding our lawful processes.
Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared in court at
the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on petitioner's motion to
dismiss.
The issue raised in this petition has been settled in the case of Tuason v. Court
of Appeals.[28] In Tuason, private respondent therein filed a petition for the
annulment of her marriage on the ground of her husband's psychological
incapacity. There, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of the
marriage and awarding custody of the children to private respondent therein.
No timely appeal was taken from the trial court's judgment.
We held that the decision annulling the marriage had already become final and
executory when the husband failed to appeal during the reglementary period.
The husband claimed that the decision of the trial court was null and void for
violation of his right to due process. He argued he was denied due process
when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed
him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment based
solely on the evidence presented by private respondent. We upheld the
judgment of nullity of the marriage even if it was based solely on evidence
presented by therein private respondent.
We also ruled in Tuason that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding
upon the client and the neglect or failure of the counsel to inform the client of
an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the latter's right to appeal is not a
ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.[29]
In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004
resolution of the trial court had become final and executory upon the lapse of
the reglementary period to appeal.[30] Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the 17 May 2004 resolution, which the trial court received on 28 June 2004,
was clearly filed out of time. Applying the doctrine laid down in Tuason, the
alleged negligence of counsel resulting in petitioner's loss of the right to appeal
is not a ground for vacating the trial court's judgments.
Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she
may have lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence
of her counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in court. Records show
petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below,
filing motion after motion. Contrary to petitioner's allegation of negligence of
her counsel, we have reason to believe the negligence in pursuing the case
was on petitioner's end, as may be gleaned from her counsel's manifestation
dated 3 May 2004:
Undersigned Counsel, who appeared for petitioner, in the nullity proceedings,
respectfully informs the Honorable Court that she has not heard from petitioner
since Holy Week. Attempts to call petitioner have failed.
Undersigned counsel regrets therefore that she is unable to respond in an
intelligent manner to the Motion (Omnibus Motion) filed by respondent.[31]
Clearly, despite her counsel's efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter
disinterest in the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion seeking, among
others, custody of the children. The trial judge was left with no other recourse
but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion based on the evidence
presented by respondent. Petitioner cannot now come to this Court crying
denial of due process.
As for the applicability to petitioner's motion to dismiss of Section 7 of the Rule
on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, petitioner is correct. Section 7 of the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages provides:
SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed
except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the
parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a
dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.
(Emphasis supplied)
The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all
possible defenses in an answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so that
judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a statute, the purpose or
object of the law is an important factor to be considered.[32] Further, the letter
of the law admits of no other interpretation but that the provision applies only
to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only a respondent in a petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable
marriage files an answer where any ground that may warrant a dismissal may
be raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to the provision. The only logical
conclusion is that Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to a motion to dismiss
filed by the party who initiated the petition for the declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage.
Since petitioner is not the respondent in the petition for the annulment of the
marriage, Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to the motion to dismiss filed
by her. Section 7 of the Rule not being applicable, petitioner's claim that it is
unconstitutional for allegedly setting an obstacle to the preservation of the
family is without basis.
settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to
be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.[33] The reason is grounded on the
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk
of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some
definite date fixed by law. Once a judgment has become final and executory,
the issues there should be laid to rest.[34]

Section 1 of the Rule states that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to a WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. We AFFIRM the (i) 17 May
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment 2004 Resolution amending the 30 March 2004 Decision and (ii) the 15
of voidable marriage. In this connection, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court allows February 2005 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
dismissal of the action upon notice or upon motion of the plaintiff, to wit: 107, in Civil Case No. Q-01-45743.

Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. - A complaint may be dismissed Costs against petitioner.
by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the
answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, SO ORDERED.
the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. x x x

Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as provided in the

preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance
save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004, the
30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had
long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary
period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. The 30
March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution may no longer be
disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by petitioner. The
trial court was correct in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. Nothing is more
G.R. No. 159031 June 23, 2014
NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and
in existent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined and
penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 29,
2002,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for bigamy
under the judgment rendered on October 30, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 49808
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1968,2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court
of San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and
Socorro Patingo3 without the benefit of a marriage license.4 The records show
that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to
excuse the lack of the marriage license.5 On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and
Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr.
Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City.6 They submitted no
marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose.7 Both ceremonies
were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates.8 In 1982, Lasanas
and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences.9
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban
in a religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria
Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the
accused as single.10
On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and
damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City,11 which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch 39 of the RTC. The complaint
alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in
securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches,
psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to suffer
mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting the award
of damages. In support of his complaint, he further alleged, among others, that:
He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage was
officiated by Hon. Carlos B. Salazar, Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Exhibit "A" and
made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San Jose
Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of Iloilo City
Registrar. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as
Annex "B";
Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no properties except some
personal belongings;
Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967 at the house of Mr.
Raul L. Cataloctocan in Burgos Street, Lapaz, Iloilo City wherein the purpose
of their meeting was for the plaintiff to consult and seek treatment by the
defendant because the latter was a "babaylan": Plaintiff was treated by the
defendant and the subsequent treatments were performed by the defendant
at her residence in Barangay, Banga, Mina, Iloilo, the treatment made being
on a continuing basis;
xxxx
On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to come with her to Iloilo
City. They went to Dainty Restaurant at J.M. Basa Street. Plaintiff saw several
persons therein. After eating plaintiff was made to sign the marriage contract,
which was null and void for lack of marriage license and based on a false
affidavit of cohabitation. After their marriage, they went home to Barangay
Bangac, Mina, Iloilo, which marked the start of a married life rocked with marital
differences, quarrels and incompatibilities, without love, but under the
uncontrollable fear of harm that should befall him should he not follow her;
xxxx
During the period the parties are living together defendant would nag the
plaintiff, fabricate stories against him and displayed her fit of jealousy, neglect
her marital obligations even committed infidelity, which psychological
incompatibilities and marital breaches have forced the petitioner to live
separately from defendant since 1982 up to the present.12
In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Iloilo City.13 After due proceedings, the accused was
formally indicted for bigamy under the information filed on October 20, 1998 in
the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel
Lasanas being previously united in a lawful marriage with Socorro Patingo and
without the said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with Josefa Eslaban.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was raffled to
Branch 38 of the RTC in Iloilo City. The accused pleaded not guilty at his
arraignment,15 and trial ensued in due course.
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its
judgment in Civil Case No. 23133 dismissing the accused’s complaint for
annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage between him and Socorro
valid and legal, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the complaint filed by the plaintiff Noel Arenga Lasanas against the defendant,
Socorro Patingo, considering that the marriage between them is valid and
legal.
The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give monthly support to his
wife, the defendant in this case, Ma. Socorro Patingo in the amount of
₱3,000.00 a month, from the time that she filed her answer with counterclaim
on February 3, 1997, pursuant to Article 203 of the Family Code and every
month thereafter. Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.16
The accused appealed to the CA.17
Ruling of the RTC
On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision in
Criminal Case No. 49808, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, judgment is hereby entered ordering him to serve an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum.
The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him under Art. 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.18
Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA,
insisting that the RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally married
Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation
and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to
Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not established; that his good faith
and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he had
been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent
marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision,
decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal
and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He
argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied in
Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before
one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely
criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was
applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was
null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as
provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that,
consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the
subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25 and that his good faith and lack
of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability.26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has
been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas
and private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence of a
marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious
wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential
and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of these
requisites is a valid marriage license except in those instances when this
requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor
affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious
rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured
a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant
Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but after his
marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these
cases have already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel
v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine
but Yap’s ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by
Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing
pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all
respect.28
Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the
RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the
absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the
solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to
Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not established; that his good faith
and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he had
been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent
marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision,
decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal
and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He
argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied in
Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before
one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely
criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was
applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was
null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as
provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that,
consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the
subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25 and that his good faith and lack
of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability.26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has
been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas
and private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence of a
marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious
wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential
and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of these
requisites is a valid marriage license except in those instances when this
requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor
affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious
rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured
a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant
Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but after his
marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these
cases have already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel
v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine
but Yap’s ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by
Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing
pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all
respect.28
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements
attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence
of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and
Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of
the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:29
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee
which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position
that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage
is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is
illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his
or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration
of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or
else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can
simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered
therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in
petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared
a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioner’s argument, even
assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the
offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier
marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be
allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability
or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on
complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s
strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is affirmed.1âwphi1
The crime of bigamy was consummated from the moment he contracted the
second marriage without his marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared
null and void, because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting due to such
marriage not being yet declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction.30 "What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy," according
to People v. Odtuhan:31
x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it beheld as void, and so long as there is no such declaration,
the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration
especially because the records show that he had filed a complaint for the
annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the criminal
complaint against him but after he had already contracted his second marriage
with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC
(Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage after the
information for bigamy had already been filed against him, thus confirming the
validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering that the accused’s subsequent
marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was
established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid
because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage. Such argument
had no worth, however, because it was he himself who failed to secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of his previous marriage prior to contracting his
subsequent marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court has
explained that "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se
an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage."33
The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People:34 x x x Nollora may
not impugn his [subsequent] marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself
from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing
the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise
would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy is prision
mayor. With neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance attendant in
the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the medium period of
prision mayor,35 which ranges from eight years and one day to 10 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence should be within the range of prision correccional, the penalty next
lower than that prescribed for the offense, which is from six months and one
day to six years. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of two years and four
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of
prision mayor as maximum, as imposed by the RTC, was proper.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals

promulgated on August 29, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs
of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code.
The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or,
in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial
Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General
in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a
"well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,"2 and second,
Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was
a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he
had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during
one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica
Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they
returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November
1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent
married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated
by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he
obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his
parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working
overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that
Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that
Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately
asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in
November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever
his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters
he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool,
England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all
returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they
too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later
married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family
background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such
information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report
the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government
authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She
testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to
return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7
December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to
leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used
to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she
had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her
son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave
Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December
1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no information as to the
missing person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988
the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No.
227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet
Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court
erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because
respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded belief
for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that
respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent
spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a
Petition for Review where the following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there
existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker
was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the
petition was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41, Family Code.5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not
Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead."6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it
superseded,7 the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the
time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable
the spouse present to remarry.8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes
a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely
requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the
absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code.9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded
belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these
requirements.11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent
failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the
existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his
missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that
she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in
searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was
charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief
that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not
exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting
that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the
whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He
did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of
Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her
whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was
dead. He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had
been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after
learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract
and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her
there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the
whereabouts of your wife?

A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I
went to London to look for her I could not find her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for
Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in
England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical
difference between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio
the two places could mean one — place in England, the port where his ship
docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they
leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would
announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent error
in naming of places of destination does not appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring
cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed
out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers
apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London
with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there —
which is in effect what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a reasonably
diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give
any information as to her personal background even after she had married
respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The
same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his
wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he
had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that
he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that
respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals
ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is
good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In
any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before,
there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted
as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse
had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not
that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter
sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to
San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months
from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to
November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover,
claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents
and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did
not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's
departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to
regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:

. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public
is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate
it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis
supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple
expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never to
return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes
that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court
in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the
parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through
existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry
Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since
respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a
judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not
view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code
emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to
protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation
of which the State bas the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is
of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there
is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines
in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are
governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
family shall be recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief
required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the
issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990,
affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
G.R. No. 161062 July 31, 2009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
FERVENTINO U. TANGO, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated November 28,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76387 which denied the
Republic’s appeal from the Order2 dated July 23, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 11 in Special Proceeding No. 357. The trial
court had declared the wife of respondent Ferventino U. Tango (Ferventino),
Maria Jose Villarba (Maria), presumptively dead under Article 413 of the
Family Code.
The present controversy arose from the following facts:
On March 9, 1987, Ferventino and Maria were married4 in civil rites before
then Mayor Ignacio Bunye of Muntinlupa City. None of Maria’s relatives
witnessed the ceremony as they were opposed to her relationship with
Ferventino. The two had only spent a night together and had been intimate
once when Maria told Ferventino that she and her family will soon be leaving
for the United States of America (USA). Maria assured Ferventino, however,
that she will file a petition so he can live with her in the USA. In the event that
said petition is denied, she promised to return to the Philippines to live with
him. On March 13, 1987, Maria and her family flew to Seattle, USA.
Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year before she stopped
responding to his letters. Out of resentment, he burned all the letters Maria
wrote him. He claims to have forgotten her address since.
Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find Maria. Upon inquiry from the
latter’s uncle, Antonio Ledesma, in Las Piñas, Ferventino learned that even
Maria’s relatives were unaware of her whereabouts. He also solicited the
assistance of a friend in Texas, Capt. Luis Aris of the U.S. Air Force, but to no
avail. Finally, he sought the aid of his parents Antonio and Eusebia in Los
Angeles, and his aunt Anita Castro-Mayor in Seattle. Like, Ledesma though,
their attempts to find Maria proved fruitless. The next 14 years went by without
any news of Maria.
On the belief that his wife had died, Ferventino filed a verified petition5 dated
October 1, 2001 before the Ligao City RTC for the declaration of presumptive
death of Maria within the contemplation of Article 41 of the Family Code.
When the case was called for initial hearing on January 8, 2002, nobody
entered any opposition. On July 22, 2002, Ferventino presented evidence ex
parte and testified in court about the details of his search. On July 23, 2002,
Branch 11 of the Ligao City RTC issued an Order, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring MARIA JOSE V.
VILLARBA, wife of FERVENTINO U. TANGO, presumptively dead within the
meaning of Article 41 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED. 6
This prompted the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the Republic, to
file a Notice of Appeal.7 Acting thereon, Presiding Judge Romulo SG.
Villanueva of the Ligao City RTC had the records of the case transmitted to
the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, affirmed the RTC’s Order. It held that Maria’s
absence for 14 years without information about her location despite diligent
search by Ferventino was sufficient to support a well-founded belief of her
death. The appellate court observed that neither the OSG nor the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor objected to the evidence which Ferventino presented on
trial. It noted, in particular, that the OSG did not dispute the adequacy of
Ferventino’s basis to engender a well-founded belief that Maria is dead.
Hence, in a Decision dated November 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied
the Republic’s appeal in this tenor:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the July 23, 2002
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Ligao City, Branch 11 in Spec. Proc. No.
357 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.8
Before us, petitioner anchors this petition for review on certiorari on the
following two grounds:
I.
THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT ON THE ALLEGED EFFORTS MADE
BY HIS FRIEND AND RELATIVES IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE IN
SEATTLE, UNITED STATES, IS HEARSAY AND DEVOID OF PROBATIVE
VALUE[; AND]
II.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE AFORESAID TESTIMONY MAY BE
CONSIDERED IN EVIDENCE, THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF
RESPONDENT’S FRIEND AND RELATIVES IN LOCATING HIS MISSING
WIFE IN SEATTLE, UNITED STATES, DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT
A "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT’S ABSENT SPOUSE IS
PROBABLY DEAD.9
Unadorned, the issues for our determination are: (1) whether the testimony of
respondent Ferventino is hearsay; and (2) whether respondent Ferventino has
established a basis to form a well-founded belief that his absent spouse is
already dead.
The Republic, through the OSG, contests the appellate court’s holding that the
absence of respondent’s wife Maria for 14 years provides sufficient basis to
entertain a well-founded belief that she is dead. The OSG discounts
respondent’s testimony, on the steps he took to find Maria, as hearsay
because none of the persons who purportedly helped in his search testified in
court. Notably, the OSG observes that only Capt. Aris gave a detailed account
of his efforts to track down Maria. According to Capt. Aris, he went over the
Seattle phone directory for Maria’s name and inquired about her from the
registrar’s office in Seattle, but both efforts proved to be in vain.
The OSG belittles its failure to object to the admissibility of respondent’s
testimony during trial. Instead, it invokes Constitutional provisions that
advocate the state policy of preserving marital institutions.
On March 16, 2007, respondent’s counsel, Atty. Richie R. Regala, manifested
to this Court his intent to withdraw as counsel for respondent. According to
Atty. Regala, he received a letter by which respondent expressed a desire to
withdraw from the proceeding.10 In view of this, the Court issued a
Resolution11 on April 21, 2008 which deemed as waived the filing of
respondent’s comment on the petition. Previously, the Court of Appeals had
also issued a Resolution12 dated October 15, 2003 submitting the case for
decision and ordering its re-raffling for respondent’s failure to file an appellee’s
brief. In other words, apart from the verified petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of Maria dated October 1, 2001, which respondent filed
before the Ligao City RTC, he has not submitted any other pleading in
connection with the petition.
Respondent’s apparent lack of desire to pursue the proceedings
notwithstanding, the Court is inclined to rule against the Republic.
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and
accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules
in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217,
insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it
follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure,
even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.13 From
the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme
Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise
of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
appeal.141avvphi1
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse when it
filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead of a petition for
certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving due course to said appeal and
ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court. By no
means did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction to review the judgment of
the RTC which, by express provision of law, was immediately final and
executory.
Adding to the confusion, the Court of Appeals entertained the appeal and
treated the same as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.
As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed
to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction because, by express provision of the law, the judgment was not
appealable.15

Before us, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. But, even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal at
this level, the hands of the Court are tied. Without a doubt, the decision of the
trial court had long become final.

Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.16 In light of the foregoing,
it would be unnecessary, if not useless, to discuss the issues raised by
petitioner.

The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle

of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the
judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final
on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are
the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and
inequitable.17 None of the exceptions obtains here to merit the review sought.

WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No

pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23
January 20091 and 3 April 20092 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus
Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in
Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually got married at
the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of
their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus
went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she
had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding
efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of
Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino
Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
2002-0530.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this
Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to
locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was
already dead. However, in an Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the
motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably
under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She
argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article
41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the
judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino,3 the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus,
judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated 3 April 2009.4
Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.
Issues
1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that
the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code
based on the evidence that respondent presented
Our Ruling
1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground
that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the
Petition assailing the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death of the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,5 the appellate court noted that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a summary
judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein
is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties, by express
provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The decision is therefore not subject
to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal is
unavailing.
We affirm the CA ruling.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for
the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the
Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family
Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled "Summary Judicial Proceedings
in the Family Law." Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which
provide:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217,
insofar as they are applicable.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that
since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding,
the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,6 the Republic likewise appealed the CA’s
affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was
an error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the
matter to the CA, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family
Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory."
xxx xxx xxx
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench
and the bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s decision dated November 7, 2001,
was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was
erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due
course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case,
and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result
reached by the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that
what the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not
a petition for review under Rule 45.
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been
superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc,7
issued a few months later.
In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondent’s Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage.
Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal.
The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under the
Rules of Court,8 a record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing
special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the
CA, this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence
under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special
proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of
the same Code. Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent
valid marriage, petitioner’s action was a summary proceeding based on Article
41 of the Family Code, rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the
Rules of Court. Considering that this action was not a special proceeding,
petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC
Decision to the CA.
We do not agree with the Republic’s argument that Republic v. Jomoc
superseded our ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by the
CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a
summary proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in
Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an
ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial court’s Decision in a
summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
the Family Code was intended "to set the records straight and for the future
guidance of the bench and the bar."
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal
of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when
it ruled in Republic v. Tango:9
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and
accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules
in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217,
insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it
follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure,
even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme
Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise
of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s
Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondent’s spouse was immediately
final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.

2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family
Code based on the evidence that respondent had presented
Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she
had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that
her absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of
the Family Code. Petitioner cites Republic v. Nolasco,10 United States v.
Biasbas11 and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro12 as authorities on
the subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA’s affirmation of
the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
of his absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines
soon after giving birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel
working as a seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on
the ground that respondent was not able to establish his "well-founded belief
that the absentee is already dead," as required by Article 41 of the Family
Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized that this provision imposes more
stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code.13 The Civil Code
provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still
alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed
to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a
"well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that
case, the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the
Family Code are as follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence
of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court in
Nolasco cited United States v. Biasbas,14 which it found to be instructive as
to the diligence required in searching for a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due
diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his
admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the
only basis of that suspicion was the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic
sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that
the respondent therein had not been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that
his spouse was already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition,
and provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-
founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been
absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law
does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes
that "es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt
act.1âwphi1 It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence
which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a
determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to
the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life
which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions,
was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw
light on their intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of
his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent
spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether
or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
(Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent
husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired
about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were
not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was
allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if
she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular
Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the
Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did
not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to
deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her
"well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her
filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can
no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law
than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law."15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARIA FE ESPINOSA
CANTOR, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated
August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. SP No. 01558–MIN
which affirmed the order3 dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case
No. 313–25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor’s
husband, presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived
together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a
violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach “sexual
climax” whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s
expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time
that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen,
communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s
disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a petition4 for her
husband’s declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No.
313–25. She claimed that she had a well–founded belief that Jerry was already
dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother–in–law, her brothers–
in–law, her sisters–in–law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail.
In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the
patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts,
the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s
petition and declaring Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the
respondent had a well–founded belief that her husband was already dead
since more than four (4) years had passed without the former receiving any
news about the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order
dated December 15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that
respondent Jerry F. Cantor is presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6 filed by the
petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision, the CA dismissed the
petitioner’s petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part,
and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED and the assailed Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry
F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court.
The Petition
The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions,
judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It
maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial
proceedings, including presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately
final and executory (hence, not appealable under Article 247 of the Family
Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well–founded
belief to justify the declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It claims
that the respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her
missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Court’s attention to the
attendant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of
search conducted and the respondent’s resultant failure to meet the strict
standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Issues
The petition poses to us the following issues:
(1) Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders
of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well–founded belief that Jerry is already
dead.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
Court’s Judgment in the Judicial Proceedings for Declaration of Presumptive
Death Is Final and Executory, Hence, Unappealable
The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary
proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and
executory.
Article 41, in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well–founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
[underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject
to an appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein having become
immutable and unalterable not only as against the parties but even as against
the courts.8 Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter how erroneous is no
longer permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary proceeding
thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v.
Bermudez–Lorino,9 the right to appeal is not granted to parties because of the
express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of [Article] 247, Family
Code, supra, are “immediately final and executory.” It was erroneous,
therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic’s appeal
and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of
Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by
express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said
in Veloria vs. Comelec, “the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part
of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege.” Since, by express
mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary
judicial proceedings in Family Law are “immediately final and executory,” the
right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of
the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive
death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the Decisions, Judgments or Final Orders of Trial
Courts in a Summary Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under the Family Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy.
While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court’s
judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in De los Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has
become final does not automatically negate the original action of the CA to
issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in connection with orders or
processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a court
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure
finds support in the case of Republic v. Tango,11 wherein we held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and
accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
“ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.”
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules
in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
“ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise
govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and
217, insofar as they are applicable.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
“ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory.”
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it
follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure,
even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis
ours]
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry
presumptively dead was proper.
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well–Founded Belief
The Essential Requisites for the Declaration of Presumptive Death Under
Article 41 of the Family Code
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the present spouse had a well–founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential
requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
That the present spouse has a well–founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.12
The Present Spouse Has the Burden of Proof to Show that All the Requisites
Under Article 41 of the Family Code Are Present
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites
under Article 41 of the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse
who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts
the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with
him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation
is not evidence.13
Declaration of Presumptive Death Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the
Civil Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a “well–
founded belief” that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We have had occasion to
make the same observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we noted the
crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the
Civil Code, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of
the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of
the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee
is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed
to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as
“well founded belief” that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law),
lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or
general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This
conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code
places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more
stringent requirement of “well–founded belief” which can only be discharged
upon a showing of proper and honest–to–goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.15
The Requirement of Well–Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by “well–founded belief.” It depends upon
the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak,
remains on a case–to–case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement,
the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a
mere passive one).
To illustrate this degree of “diligent and reasonable search” required by the
law, an analysis of the following relevant cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court
ruled that the present spouse failed to prove that he had a well–founded belief
that his absent spouse was already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts
to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the following:
(1) He went to his in–laws’ house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her
whereabouts among his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part–time taxi driver to look for her in
malls during his free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.
Despite these alleged “earnest efforts,” the Court still ruled against the present
spouse. The Court found that he failed to present the persons from whom he
allegedly made inquiries and only reported his wife’s absence after the OSG
filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of
a “well–founded belief” under Article 41 of the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent
spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether
or not the spouse present acted on a well–founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present
spouse.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ii. Republic v. Granada19
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove
her “well–founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her
filing of the petition. In this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother
had made inquiries from their relatives regarding the absent spouse’s
whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid
of the mass media. Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),20 the Court ruled against the present spouse,
as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent
husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired
about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were
not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was
allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if
she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular
Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the
Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did
not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
iii. Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive
death of his wife, who had been missing for more than four years. He testified
that his efforts to find her consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved
fruitless.
The Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations were too sketchy to
form a basis that his wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of
evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate with their
common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
iv. The present case
In the case at bar, the respondent’s “well–founded belief” was anchored on her
alleged “earnest efforts” to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1)
She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in–laws, neighbors
and friends; and
(2)
Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the
patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the “stringent standard” and degree of
diligence required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be
inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking
of the patients’ directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely
undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not
planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these
attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the
aid of the authorities to look for him. While a finding of well–founded belief
varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed,
under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse,
whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the
very least, report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and
friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons,
from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in
Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his friends
about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the
friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor
presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s
claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting
evidence proving that she had a well–founded belief other than her bare claims
that she inquired from her friends and in–laws about her husband’s
whereabouts.
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
“passive search” where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in–
laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because
her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well–founded belief that her
husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 “[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well–
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by [the] present spouse.”
Strict Standard Approach Is Consistent with the State’s Policy to Protect and
Strengthen Marriage
In the above–cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of
spouses in nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the “strict
standard” approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to
conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural
shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard required by the Family
Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),23
we emphasized that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of
due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above–mentioned cases in
locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with.
There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted
to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing
spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their
marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort
to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx summary nature
of its proceedings.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we
consider the State’s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of
marriage.24 Since marriage serves as the family’s foundation25 and since it is
the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of
the parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying
rationale – to uphold the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals27
reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
[The] protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the
preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy
here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under Article 41 of the Family Code Is for the
Present Spouse’s Benefit
The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse
(and consequently, the application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is
also for the present spouse’s benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a
criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
which might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the
court’s declaration.
Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse
presumptively dead, the present spouse’s good faith in contracting a second
marriage is effectively established. The decision of the competent court
constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in
case of remarriage is effectively negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage,
it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard and have the
absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.
Final Word
As a final word, it has not escaped this Court’s attention that the strict standard
required in petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully
observed by the lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this
Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and
reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a
denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of
the strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family
Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August
27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December
15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199194
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to challenge a trial court's declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 ofThe Family Code of the Philippines1 (Family Code).2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3assails the October 24, 2011 Decision4
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 04158-MIN dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic).
Factual Antecedents
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a
Petition5 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz6 City-Branch 15 for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S.7 Sareñogon
(Netchie).8
In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the Petition for
initial hearing on April 16, 2009. It likewise directed the publication of said
Order in a newspaper of general circulation in the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz
and Oroquieta, all in the province of Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the
Petition.9 Trial then followed.10
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991.11
They later became sweethearts and on August 10, 1996, they got married in
civil rites at the Manila City Hall.12 However, they lived together as husband
and wife for a month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie
went to Hongkong as a domestic helper.13 For three months, he did not
receive any communication from Netchie.14 He likewise had no idea about her
whereabouts.15 While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but
failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental.16 He
returned home after his contract expired.17 He then inquired from Netchie’s
relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where
she was.18 Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was
already dead.19 He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract
another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.20
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and
by Netchie’s aunt, Consuelo Sande.21 These two witnesses testified that Jose
and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month prior to
their leaving the Philippines for separate destinations abroad.22 These two
added that they had no information regarding Netchie’s location.23
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision24 dated January 31, 2011 in Spec. Proc. No. 045-08, the RTC
held that Jose had established by preponderance of evidence that he is
entitled to the relief prayed for under Article 41 of the Family Code.25 The RTC
found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough
for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.26 The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring respondent presumptively dead for purposes of remarriage of
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.27
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On April 19, 2011, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition for
Certiorari28 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In its Decision29 of October 24, 2011, the CA held that the Republic used the
wrong recourse by instituting a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The CA perceived no error at all in the RTC’s judgment
granting Jose’s Petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his wife,
Netchie. The CA thus held in effect that the Republic’s appeal sought to correct
or review the RTC’s alleged misappreciation of evidence which could not
translate into excess or lack of jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of
discretion.30 The CA noted that the RTC properly caused the publication of
the Order setting the case for initial hearing.31 The CA essentially ruled that,
"[a] writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower court’s evaluation of
the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere
errors of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal."32 The CA then
disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.33
Issues
The Republic filed the instant Petition34 raising the following issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION BECAUSE:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC’S PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, ON THE GROUND THAT THE
PROPER REMEDY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL THE RTC
DECISION, BECAUSE IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY
JUDGMENTS OR DECISIONS ARE NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE
EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW.
II
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING
WIFE DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELLFOUNDED BELIEF"
THAT RESPONDENT’S ABSENT WIFE X X X IS PROBABLY DEAD.35
Petitioner’s Arguments
The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge an RTC’s immediately final
and executory Decision on a presumptive death.36
The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose’s alleged efforts in
locating Netchie did not engender or generate a well-founded belief that the
latter is probably dead.37 It maintains that even as Jose avowedly averred that
he exerted efforts to locate Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the
assistance of the relevant government agencies like the Philippine National
Police, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Foreign Affairs,
the Bureau of Immigration, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration.38 It likewise
points out that Jose did not present any disinterested person to corroborate
his allegations that the latter was indeed missing and could not be found.39 It
also contends that Jose did not advert to circumstances, events, occasions, or
situations that would prove that he did in fact make a comprehensive search
for Netchie.40 The Republic makes the plea that courts should ever be vigilant
and wary about the propensity of some erring spouses in resorting to Article
41 of the Family Code for the purpose of terminating their marriage.41
Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he
wanted to have Netchie declared presumptively dead because he intends to
get married again, an essential premise of Article 41 of the Family Code.42
Respondent’s Arguments
Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic’s Petition because
the latter’s petition is erected upon the ground that the CA did not correctly
weigh or calibrate the evidence on record, or assigned to the evidence its due
worth, import or significance; and that such a ground does not avail in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.43 Jose also
contends that the Republic should have instead filed a motion for
reconsideration44 of the RTC’s Decision of January 31, 2011, reasoning out
that a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
law. Jose furthermore submits that the RTC did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously in granting his petition because it even dutifully complied with the
publication requirement.45 He moreover argues that to sustain the present
petition would allow the executive branch to unduly make inroads into judicial
territory.46 Finally, he insists that the trial court’s factual findings are entitled
to great weight and respect as these were arrived after due deliberation.47
This Court’s Ruling
This Court finds the Republic’s petition meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to question the RTC’s Decision
in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death
In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,48 we held that the RTC’s
Decision on a Petition for declaration of presumptive death pursuant to Article
41 of the Family Code is immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has
no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to such judgment.49
Concurring in the result, Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban
further therein pointed out that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC
Decision was to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and not a
petition for review under Rule 45.50
We expounded on this appellate procedure in Republic v. Tango:51
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and
accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code:

ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules
in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217,
insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it
follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure,
even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. x x x52
(Citation omitted; Underscoring supplied)
"In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
From the Decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court."53
In fact, in Republic v. Narceda,54 we held that the OSG availed of the wrong
remedy when it filed a notice of appeal under Rule 42 with the CA to question
the RTC’s Decision declaring the presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda.55
Above all, this Court’s ruling in Republic v. Cantor56 made it crystal clear that
the OSG properly availed of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge
the RTC’s Order therein declaring Jerry Cantor as presumptively
dead.1âwphi1
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly availed of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in assailing before the
CA the aforesaid RTC’s Decision.
The "well-founded belief" requisite
under Article 41 of the Family Code is
complied with only upon a showing that
sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had
indeed been made to ascertain whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead
We now proceed to determine whether the RTC properly granted Jose’s
Petition.

Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
In Republic v. Cantor,57 we further held that:
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already
dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites
for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.58
(Underscoring supplied)
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this
case invites extended discussion), the holding is that the –
mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack
of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the
absentee spouse or invocation of the] general presumption on absence under
the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise
that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden
of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded
belief" which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is [either]
still alive or is already dead.
xxxx
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon
the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak,
remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement,
the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a
mere passive one).59 (Emphasis omitted; underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose has "well-founded belief" that
Netchie was already dead upon the following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie’s parents while he was still out of
the country, but did not reach them as they had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis
Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he
returned home, he was not able to obtain any information that Netchie was still
alive from Netchie’s relatives and friends;
(3) Jose’s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must
be presumed dead, was corroborated by Jose’s older brother, and by Netchie’s
aunt, both of whom testified that he (Jose) and Netchie lived together as
husband and wife only for one month and that after this, there had been no
information as to Netchie’s whereabouts.
In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor,60 this Court held that the
present spouse (Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor) merely conducted a "passive
search" because she simply made unsubstantiated inquiries from her in-laws,
from neighbors and friends. For that reason, this Court stressed that the
degree of diligence and reasonable search required by law is not met (1) when
there is failure to present the persons from whom the present spouse allegedly
made inquiries especially the absent spouse’s relatives, neighbors, and
friends, (2) when there is failure to report the missing spouse’s purported
disappearance or death to the police or mass media, and (3) when the present
spouse’s evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse chose not
to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed dead.61 The
rationale for this palpably stringent or rigorous requirement has been marked
out thus:
x x x [T]he Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying
their marriage, has consistently applied the "strict standard" approach. This is
to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws.
Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the
stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. x x x
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we
consider the State’s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.
Since marriage serves as the family’s foundation and since it is the state’s
policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution,
marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. x
xx
x x x [I]t has not escaped this Court’s attention that the strict standard required
in petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed
by the lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this Court, on
review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that
anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To
rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict
standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code."
(Citations omitted)62
Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that
there was no basis at all for the RTC’s finding that Jose’s Petition complied
with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-
founded belief" standard. If anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to
locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent
diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he
had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts,
Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he
allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly
missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the
pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he
undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for
at least two years (and what those years were), and naming the particular
places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went
to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course
of his search.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 24,

2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04158-MIN is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The respondent’s Petition in said Spec. Proc. No. 045-08 is
accordingly DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated November 28, 2016 and
Resolution3 dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 129467.
The facts are as follows:
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of her husband, Wilfredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).4 The allegations of the
petition read:
[Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a
resident of 106 Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
[Wilfredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was
assigned in Arayat, Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]
The [petitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7,
1968 in Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;
After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal
home at 106 Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
[Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he
set out from their conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine
Constabulary;
[Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since
1979 and he never made contact or communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to
his relatives;
That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police
Commission, [Wilfredo] was already declared missing since 1979 x x x;
Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news
regarding [her] beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary
had no answer to his whereabouts, [neither] did they have any news of him
going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place frequented by the
New People's Army;
[W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never
gave up hope, and after more than three (3) decades of waiting, the [petitioner
is still hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, specially with a meager
source of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary for her to request
for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;
[T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of
death or at least a declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;
That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for
the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch
65 of the Tarlac City RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein
respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic).5
On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision6 in Spec. Proc. No. 4850
granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:7
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declared (sic)
WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines for purposes of claiming financial benefits due
to him as former military officer.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiorari.8
On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari
petition of the Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC. It
accordingly disposed:
WFIEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
The Decision dated January 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65,
Tarlac City, in Special Proceeding no. 4850 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE,
and the petition is DISMISSED.
The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:
The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of
Article 41 of the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not apply to the
instant petition as it was clear that petitioner does not seek to remarry. If
anything, the petition was invoking the presumption of death established under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not that provided for under Article
41 of the FC.
Be that as it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should
have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without authority to take
cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code.
As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely
express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a
person is dead—which presumption may be invoked in any action or
proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an independent action or
proceeding.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence,
this appeal.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal.
I
The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed
by the petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by
the RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside.
RTC Erred in Declaring the Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under Article 41 of
the FC; Petitioner's Petition for the Declaration of Presumptive Death Is Not
Based on Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil Code
A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.
It can be recalled that the RTC, in the fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision,
granted the petitioner's petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead
"under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, the RTC gave the impression that
the petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was
likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.9 This is wrong.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not
an action that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC
because petitioner was not seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the
FC shows that the presumption of death established therein is only applicable
for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law.
Thus:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the
presumptive death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition
for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the
same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit
under P.D. No. 1638 as amended."10
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed
for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption
of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code11as the basis
of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule
regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age
of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that
his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which
is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel
or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and
his existence has not been known for four years.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the
presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper. The
petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was based
on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.
Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been
Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is to Declare a Person
Presumptively Dead Under the Civil Code, Like that Filed by the Petitioner
Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our Jurisdiction
The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo.
The decision itself is objectionable.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of
presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have
dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition
whose sole objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead under
the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to
take cognizance of the same.
The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for
the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw.12 In the said case, we held that
a rule creating a presumption of death13 is merely one of evidence that—while
may be invoked in any action or proceeding—cannot be the lone subject of an
independent action or proceeding. Szatraw explained:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court
to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been
unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may
arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special
proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a
competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the
presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an
action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor
is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband.
Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for
the ascertainment of a particular fact, for the petition does not pray for a
declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a
declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in
seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the
petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it
is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband
is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not
improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already
established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and
executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It
is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or
declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which
a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy
between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or
establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations
arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgement,
or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established, by a final
decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree
upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact,
becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare
instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject
to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. (Citations
omitted and emphasis supplied)
The above ruling in Szatraw has since been used by the subsequent cases of
Lukban v. Republic14 and Gue v. Republic15 in disallowing petitions for the
declaration of presumptive death based on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and,
implicitly, also those based on Article 391 of the Civil Code).
Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to
ascertain the considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive
death based on the Civil Code was disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:16
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that
only allow a court or a. tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the
establishment of certain facts.
Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence,
an action brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under
either of the said articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court
could decide. In such action, there would be no actual rights to be enforced,
no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be established.
A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article
390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon,
would never really become "final" as the same only confirms the existence of
a prima facie or disputable presumption. The function of a court to render
decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between litigants is thereby
compromised.
Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the
said articles is already established by law.
Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take
cognizance of a petition that—like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at
bench—only seeks to have a person declared presumptively dead under the
Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law.17 Hence, by acting upon
and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration of
presumptive death, the RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby
committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore, was only correct in
setting aside the RTC's decision.
II
Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few
points the Court is minded to make.
It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from
the misconception that a court declaration is required in order to establish a
person as presumptively dead for purposes of claiming his death benefits as a
military serviceman under pertinent laws.18 This misconception is what moved
petitioner to file her misguided petition for the declaration of presumptive death
of Wilfredo and what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in
prosecuting an otherwise simple claim for death benefits either before the
Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office (PVAO) or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP).
What the Court finds deeply disconcerting, however, is the possibility that such
misconception may have been peddled by no less than the PVAO and the AFP
themselves; that such agencies, as a matter of practice, had been requiring
claimants, such as the petitioner, to first secure a court declaration of
presumptive death before processing the death benefits of a missing
serviceman.
In view of the foregoing circumstance, the Court deems it necessary to issue
the following guidelines—culled from relevant law and jurisprudential
pronouncements—to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing
with claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:
The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing
soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the
presumptive death of such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can
make their own determination, on the basis of evidence presented by the
claimant, whether the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code may be applied or not. It must be stressed that the presumption of
death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is
without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in hopeful that, by the foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the
the said articles are established.19 Hence, requiring the claimant to further petitioner would no longer be replicated in the future.
secure a court declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of a
missing soldier is not proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on the WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November
matter.20] 28, 2016 and Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 129467 are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial
In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present decision of a court of law that a person is presumptively dead is not a
before the PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office or the Armed Forces
"evidence" which shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such of the Philippines can grant and pay the benefits under Presidential Decree
number of years and/or under the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 No. 1638.
and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to here excludes
a court declaration of presumptive death. Let a copy of this decision be served to the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.
The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence
submitted by the claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the SO ORDERED.
requisite factual conditions specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code
in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP
determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient, they
should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's claim.
4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the
claimant is not sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under the Civil
Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof, the claimant may file an
appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition
for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court. And finally,
should such recourse still fail, the claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with
the Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 210580
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
LUDYSON C. CATUBAG, Respondent
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
Nature of the Petition
Challenged before this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court are the Resolutions2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 131269 dated September 3, 2013 3 and December 6, 2013.4
The assailed Resolutions denied the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for
failure to file a motion for reconsideration.
Likewise challenged is the Decision5 dated May 23, 2013 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11, declaring Ludyson C. Catubag's
(private respondent) spouse, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag (Shanaviv), as
presumptively dead.
The Antecedent Facts
Prior to the celebration of their marriage in 2003, private respondent and
Shanaviv had been cohabiting with each other as husband and wife. Their
union begot two (2) children named Mark Bryan A. Catubag and Rose Mae A.
Catubag, both of whom were born on May 18, 2000 and May 21, 2001,
respectively.6
In 2001, in order to meet the needs of his family, private respondent took work
overseas. Meanwhile, Shanaviv stayed behind in the Philippines to tend to the
needs of their children.7
On June 26, 2003, private respondent and Shanaviv tied the knot in Rizal,
Cagayan. The marriage was solemnized by Honorable Judge Tomas D.
Lasam at the Office of the Municipal Judge, Rizal, Cagayan.8
Sometime in April 2006, private respondent and his family were able to acquire
a housing unit located at Rio del Grande Subdivision, Enrile Cagayan.
Thereafter, private respondent returned overseas to continue his work. While
abroad, he maintained constant communication with his family.9
On July 12, 2006, while working abroad, private respondent was informed by
his relatives that Shanaviv left their house and never returned. In the
meantime, private respondent's relatives took care of the children. 10
Worried about his wife's sudden disappearance and the welfare of his children,
private respondent took an emergency vacation and flew back home. Private
respondent looked for his wife in Enrile Cagayan, but to no avail. He then
proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts from their close friends
and relatives, but they too could offer no help. Private respondent travelled as
far as Bicol, where Shanaviv was born and raised, but he still could not locate
her.11
Private respondent subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo Philippines,
one of the more well-known radio networks in the Philippines, to broadcast the
fact of his wife's disappearance. Moreover, private respondent searched
various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and in Bicol, with no avail.
12
On May 4, 2012, after almost seven (7) years of waiting, private respondent
filed with the RTC a petition to have his wife declared presumptively dead. 13
On May 23, 2013, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the Petition. The
dispositive portion of the decision which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. SHANAVIV G. ALVAREZ-
CATUBAG is hereby adjudged PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD only for the purpose
that petitioner LUDYSON C. CATUBAG may contract a marriage subsequent
to what he had with SHANAVIV G. ALVAREZ-CATUBAG without prejudice to
the reappearance of the latter.
SO ORDERED. 14
On August 5, 2013, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner's main contention is
that private respondent failed to establish a "well-founded belief' that his
missing wife was already dead. 15
In its Resolution16 dated September 3, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition
because no motion for reconsideration was filed with the court a quo. The CA
ruled that such defect was fatal and warranted the immediate dismissal of the
petition. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.17
On September 18, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the
same was denied by the CA in its Resolution 18 dated December 6, 2013.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The Issues
The petitioner anchors its plea for the annulment of the assailed resolutions
and the denial of private respondent's petition to declare his wife presumptively
dead on the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER DID
NOT PREVIOUSLY FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE
THE COURT A QUO.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR [CERTIORARI] ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO ATTACH THERETO COPIES OF ALL PERTINENT AND
RELEVANT DOCUMENTS AND PLEADINGS.
III. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A WELLFOUNDED
BELIEF THAT HIS WIFE IS PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD.
IV. PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE HIS INTENTION TO RE-
MARRY. 19
In sum, the instant petition rests on the resolution of two issues: (1) whether or
not petitioner's resort to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the
decision of the RTC declaring Shanaviv presumptively dead was proper; and
(2) whether or not private respondent complied with the essential requisites of
a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
Basic is the rule that the nature of the proceeding determines the appropriate
remedy or remedies available. Hence, a party aggrieved by an action of a court
must first correctly determine the nature of the order, resolution, or decision,
in order to properly assail it.20
Since what is involved in the instant case is a petition for declaration of
presumptive death, the relevant provisions of law are Articles 41, 238, and 253
of the Family Code. These provisions explicitly provide that actions for
presumptive death are summary in nature. Article 41 provides:
Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Article 238 in relation to Article 253, under Title XI: SUMMARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, of the Family Code
provides:
Article 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.
xxxx
Article 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise
govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and
217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis Supplied)
Consequently, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor appeal decisions in
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code because by express
mandate of law, judgments rendered thereunder are immediately final and
executory.21 As explained by the Court in Republic of the Phils. vs. Bermudez-
Lorino,22 citing Atty. Veloria vs. Comelec:23
[T]he right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it
is merely a statutory privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article 24 7 of the
Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in
Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not
granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as
oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be
treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7,
2001.24
Further, it is well settled in our laws and jurisprudence that a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 25
While parties are precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration or a notice
of appeal, in a petition for declaration of presumptive death, they may
challenge the decision of the court a quo through a petition for certiorari to
question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.26
In Republic vs. Sarenogon, Jr., 27 the Court outlined the legal remedies
available in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death. If
aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, then filing with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 would be proper. Any subsequent decision by the CA
may then be elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45. 28
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner's resort to certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to challenge the RTC's Order declaring
Shanaviv presumptively dead was proper.
Having determined the propriety of petitioner's mode of challenging the RTC's
Order, the Court shall now proceed to tackle the issue of whether or not private
respondent has sufficiently complied with the essential requisites in a petition
for declaration of presumptive death.
Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out four (4) requisites
under Article 41 of the Family Code that must be complied with for the
declaration of presumptive death to prosper: first, the absent spouse has been
missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code.29 Second, the
present spouse wishes to remarry. Third, the present spouse has a well-
founded belief that the absentee is dead. Fourth, the present spouse files for
a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee. 30
In seeking a declaration of presumptive death, it is the present spouse who
has the burden of proving that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family
Code are present. In the instant case, since it is private respondent who
asserts the affirmative of the issue, then it is his duty to substantiate the same.
He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegations will
not suffice.31
Notably, the records reveal that private respondent has complied with the first,
second, and fourth requisites. Thus, what remains to be resolved is whether
or not private respondent successfully discharged the burden of establishing a
well-founded belief that his wife, Shanaviv, is dead.
The Court in Cantor,32 pointed out that the term, "well-founded belief' has no
exact definition under the law. In fact, the Court notes that such belief depends
on the circumstances of each particular case. As such, each petition must be
judged on a case-to-case basis. 33
This is not to say, however, that there is no guide in establishing the existence
of a well-founded belief that an absent spouse is already dead. In Republic vs.
Orcelino-Villanueva,34 the Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided that
such belief must result from diligent efforts to locate the absent spouse. Such
diligence entails an active effort on the part of the present spouse to locate the
missing one. The mere absence of a spouse, devoid of any attempt by the
present spouse to locate the former, will not suffice. The Court expounded on
the required diligence, to wit:
The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse
to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to
locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence
of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that
the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise
is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief'
which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or
is already dead.35 (Citations omitted)
Furthermore, jurisprudence is replete with cases which help determine
whether belief of an absent spouses' death is well-founded or not.1âwphi1 A
perusal of the cases of Republic vs. Granada,36 Cantor,37 and Orcelino-
Villanueva38 reveal the circumstances which do not meet the Court's
standards in establishing a "well-founded belief."
In Granada,39 the present spouse alleged that she exerted efforts in locating
her absent spouse by inquiring from the latter's relatives regarding his
whereabouts. The Court ruled against the present spouse and stated that the
mere act of inquiring from relatives falls short of the diligence required by law.
It pointed out that the present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the
aid of mass media. Even worse, the present spouse did not even bother to
present any of the absent spouses' relatives to corroborate her allegations.40
Similarly in Cantor,41 the present spouse alleged that she exerted "earnest
efforts" in attempting to locate her missing husband. She claimed that she
made inquiries with their relatives, neighbors, and friends as to his
whereabouts. She even stated that she would take the time to look through the
patient's directory whenever she would visit a hospital.42
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled otherwise. It held
that the present spouse engaged in a mere "passive-search" Applying the
"stringent-standards" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence, the
Court pointed out four acts of the present spouse which contradict the claim of
a diligent and active search, 43 to wit:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be
inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking
of the patients' directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely
undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not
planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these
attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry's absence to the police nor did she seek the
aid of the authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief
varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed,
under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse,
whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the
very least, report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry's relatives or their neighbors and
friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons,
from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in
Nolasco, the present spouse's bare assertion that he inquired from his friends
about his absent spouse's whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the
friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor
presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent's
claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting
evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims
that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband's
whereabouts.44 (Citations omitted)
The foregoing conduct of the present spouse led the Court to conclude that
her efforts in searching for her absent spouse were insincere. Ultimately, the
Courts considered these attempts insufficient to comply with the requirement
of conducting a reasonable, diligent, and active search.45
In Orcelino-Villanueva, the Court likewise ruled that the present spouse failed
to prove that she had a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already
dead. In said case, the present spouse began her "search" by returning home
from her work overseas to look for her missing husband. She then inquired
from her in-laws and common friends as to his whereabouts. The present
spouse even went as far as Negros Oriental, where the absent spouse was
born. Additionally, the present spouse claimed that fifteen (15) years have
already lapsed since her husband's disappearance.46
In that case, the Court held that the factual circumstances were very similar to
the two aforementioned cases. It further held that it was erroneous for the lower
courts to grant the petition for declaration of presumptive death. The Court
explained why the present spouse's allegations should not have been given
credence, to wit:
Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases,
particularly Cantor, Edna's efforts failed to satisfy the required well-founded
belief of her absent husband's death.
Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it
merely consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on
record. She also failed to present any person from whom she inquired about
the whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her children from
whom she learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact, she was the lone
witness. Following the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence and is
not equivalent to proof, the Court cannot give credence to her claims that she
indeed exerted diligent efforts to locate her husband. 47 (Citations omitted)
Having laid out the foregoing jurisprudential guidelines in determining the
existence of a "well-founded belief," the Court now shifts focus to the specific
circumstances surrounding the current case. In the case at bar, private
respondent first took a leave of absence from his work in the United Arab
Emirates and returned to the Philippines to search for Shanaviv. He then
proceeded to inquire about his wife's whereabouts from their friends and
relatives in Cagayan and Bicol. Next, private respondent aired over Bombo
Radyo Philippines, a known radio station, regarding the fact of disappearance
of his wife. Finally, he claims to have visited various hospitals and funeral
parlors in Tuguegarao City and nearby municipalities.48
Applying the foregoing standards discussed by the Court in Cantor,49
Granada,50 and Orcelino-Villanueva,51 the Court finds that private
respondent's efforts falls short of the degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, private respondent claims to have inquired about his missing wife's
whereabouts from both friends and relatives. Further, he claims to have carried
out such inquiries in the place where they lived and in the place where his wife
was born and raised. However, private respondent failed to present any of
these alleged friends or relatives to corroborate these "inquiries." Moreover,
no explanation for such omission was given. As held in the previous cases,
failure to present any of the persons from whom inquiries were allegedly made
tends to belie a claim of a diligent search.
Second, private respondent did not seek the help of other concerned
government agencies, namely, the local police authorities and the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In Cantor, the Court reasoned that while a
finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation, it would
still be prudent for the present spouse to seek the aid of the authorities in
searching for the missing spouse. Absent such efforts to employ the help of
local authorities, the present spouse cannot be said to have actively and
diligently searched for the absentee spouse. 52
Finally, aside from the certification of Bombo Radyo's manager, private
respondent bases his "well-founded belief' on bare assertions that he
exercised earnest efforts in looking for his wife. Again, the present spouse's
bare assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of evidence, falls short of the
diligence required to engender a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse
is dead.
Taken together, the Court is of the view that private respondent's efforts in
searching for his missing wife, Shanaviv, are merely passive. Private
respondent could have easily convinced the Court otherwise by providing
evidence which corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no explanation or
justification was given for these glaring omissions. Again, he who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it by some other means than mere allegations.
Stripped of private respondent's mere allegations, only the act of broadcasting
his wife's alleged disappearance through a known radio station was
corroborated.53 This act comes nowhere close to establishing a well-founded
belief that Shanaviv has already passed away. At most, it just reaffirms the
unfortunate theory that she abandoned the family.
To accept private respondent's bare allegations would be to apply a liberal
approach in complying with the requisite of establishing a well-founded belief
that the missing spouse is dead. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),54 the Court cautioned against such a liberal approach. It opined that to
do so would allow easy circumvention and undermining of the Family Code.
The Court stated:
There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted
to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing
spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their
marriages x x x declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code
resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary
nature of its proceedings.
Stated otherwise, spouses may easily circumvent the policy of the laws on
marriage by simply agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and
never return again. Thus, there is a need for courts to exercise prudence in
evaluating petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse.
A lenient approach in applying the standards of diligence required in
establishing a "well-founded belief' would defeat the State's policy in protecting
and strengthening the institution of marriage.55
On this basis, it is clear that private respondent failed to fulfill the requisite of
establishing a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead. Thus, the
RTC should have denied private respondent's petition for declaration of
presumptive death.

In fine, having determined the propriety of petitioner's resort to a petition for

certiorari and private respondent's failure to meet the stringent standard and
degree of due diligence required by jurisprudence to support his claim of a
"well-founded belief' that his wife, Shanaviv, is already dead, it is proper for the
Court to grant the petition. Consequently, the other issues raised by the
petitioner need not be discussed further.

WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May

23, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 and the
Resolutions dated September 3, 2013 and December 6, 2013 rendered by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 131269 are hereby ANNULED and SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the petition of private respondent Ludyson C. Catubag
to have his wife, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag, declared presumptively dead
is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de
Castro for appellant.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the
defendant Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge
of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of
her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or
penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above
existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason
he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.
On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint.
She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions
of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of
Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State
to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or
fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the
defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician
to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days
from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14
March 1957 the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to
comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning that her failure to
undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate
would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment
upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the
Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the
defendant. On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decree thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that the
defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by
law; that she had not been physically examined because she had refused to
be examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have
punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a physical
examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree sought to be
reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their
marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of
one of them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be
subjected to a physical examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city
attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for
reconsideration was denied.
The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be
annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed
and testified that his wife was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the
complaint, was absent during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical
examination.
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply
interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of the
community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are
governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the
legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a
marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he
sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to
have been satisfactorily established, becase from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part
therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of
the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of
this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the
Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-
incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled
to be a witness against herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency."2 The lone
testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them
together as husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without
pronouncement as to costs.