THINKING MATTER Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain By John W. Yolton University of Minnesota Press, MinneapolisIntroduction ‘The seventeenth and cighsecnth cents in Gren Brtain are marked ‘ya poneral and pereren concem about texts to orthodoxy ‘Rigo; Many docine andsiews were ace a creating: teases {bt the niga and naar of humaa kaowlede, metaphyseal claims Bout the nature of te wor, clas about human natre, abou the erson and acon Lacks views in mos of ths fess were cen By Than’ of his contemporaieseither a aeacks on atonal rligon ot Tein hemos fo te who ere need undermining ‘elgon, Labes suchas ‘Socn dest even atest ete arched To Love, Hobbes another writer whose doctrines were conseed Ineligous in his east wns what was tae to be he uteri Of hs octines that was atacked The mechan of the Catesan feeounto mater angot the pysology of he human body were alo Fequcety ewe sleading co andaking aterm explanations tf human ston ca be given in tem of he mechanism ofthe body, Some people thought, en mind or spit may be short-changed, oF ven more. “Thee wer wo ways in which mind was gored. mate inert and pase, an if tat Kid of rater acento be dominant here Seen tobenotoom for mind or spit The results mechan, ato- IMatsm and neces. On theater band mater cog co ave eve panies nhent ny or i reepive vo seh pinesimpoted upon i, once aptin ther is no nts for spicular nent austy tthe workings of nature, A more exes venion of thi Secon! alternative that thought is rened inthe account ofthe ‘Tord, but Becomes property of atc, ether inerent ork posed, For the orthodox ip Ylign, ie was important that there be Ione, cl he her mara Te ety ff the soul wats aceany condition for immorality. Any gestion {hat the two sbtance Bereduced tone iet0 marl substance) liminsted the soul Locke's asount of the person located the sen {iyo sel i conscousnes, notin an immaterial substance. Many viewed thi account as daconnesting he property of though frm Ssbance A property without sdbrtange was hard enough notion forthe tadivonali, but when Lacke also insted that we do not ow the exenceof mater or of immaterial substance, such cept «Som, copied with his account of the person, soul oniy beset {antamount eo locating both extension dd though sn one subtance Such's notion sounded to many of Locke's somtemporatis (and 10 smany in the cghtcceh cena) susprousy ke Spinnas When feader of Locke’ Essay conceming Human Understanding cane von his sigestion that here was nothing contradictory in the no fiom that Go could add so ster he power of though, he case OF Iatetlsm spine Locke was seed ‘Locke's suggestion tht mater might be made to chin reve and reinforced te fexrsmany held ot Spimors and of Spinosam. Hobbes teas frequently linked with Spinoss, be wae the pars doctrine ip Spinoza’. philosophy, which entfes substance wth the worl, that focused those fea, a not Without reason that Spinara ws sve as “the most famous ahestof ou tine," for not ony a he prediete thought and extension of one subwence: tht one sub Stance was ented with God The world was material and God was {Hat wor, The mata world the Was God was bo tera an ‘When Locke diseases the elim that matter eternal (4.10.18) he has in min anoles enim one the std there a so eternal beng. Go and matter, Locke explains hat people were le to this ina part because of the eifclty of conceiving how something could ome fom nothing. Thi problem, and a sche of cloiy relied sues, had bon thoroughly and repettiosly presented and discussed by Godwort in 1678, in his The True Inelctul Sytem of the Gnizese" Wherein, all the Reasow and Phlorophy of Athen Is onfaed: and is impossibly Demonstrated. Por Cagwortscon- temporans,chis work musthave beens major source book of ancient | | ‘versions of materialism, aswell s for the aeay of arguments to com- bat it His book was orginally planned to deal only wieh iberty and retesity, Dut he wat len tie to give attention tothe metaphysical Upucrpanings of the necessitarans expecially the democratic corpore- ‘ytsoe aeomt. Acheom for Cudworth i closely Linked wich materi ‘ism, The atheist’ principe is cited a “whatsoever isnot Extended E'Nowhere and Nothing” (p. 9). He denies four diferee kinds of shes Fin, he Hopton or Ansvimandian hat deine al things rom Dea an ‘Spit Seri the way of Que aed For, Generale an Comapae ‘Scene Atom oe Domocrtal,wbich doth the sae thing ne way STiarams and Figures Ty, the Coomoplesch on Stal Ate, which Slopncs one Pach and eho bue Sts Nee, 0 pie ove the Shut cuipee nen ana, etn Sena hae halle, schs aero Ling and Bertck Metre, bt devo of ‘analy, Some and Conon (pp. 13499) ‘acoder erin oe OA ce ee em a ecco Be re ee Tee Bee AOeSRe coun heir ‘or Stratonical materilists discussed by Cudworth, but the explanatory sipagadateete etc tert eae” Rett Sly bute eres (Mimic objet of hisattack in dhe arguments proaad con, Cudwors's ee ee er cae Toe ee eps Caer (9) The Nature of Mater for the Corporelists In what Cudworth refers (0 asthe ‘Atomical Physiology’ body it Doshing but extended lk: No oper ar rebut taht included inthe Natur and [dea of ito. more o es Magn Tave with Divsbity into Pars, Figure, and Position, rogeher withMoon and Re” a pe ef hay an oe Te ge tation of the appearances of perceived qual, was done enti) feeonce tae smple “Elemento Mapuude, Figure, Scand MG. {lon (which ae all erly intllpe as iferot Modes of cxcaded ‘Nhe No ecrencisneed onan rns cineca sped of corporeal effi coming from objet orto any other IEESeosen ov Acvon tes dines Koss Local Movin Gach se Generation and Altern)” Mare on this ie sence fndisctive The only easation i cha system 8 mecha he impact of partie. (©) Incorporea Principles Ccudworth points out chat even those who ty to sy all there fis mat= ter in motion have to admit tha appearances belie sch a claim. This some account of theappearanees must be given, As soon. an atime |S made to sive the appearances, iis difficut not to recognize the Phancies or Phantastick Idea” produced by the figure al motion ot marter to be themselves other than "Modes of the Badies without 1s" (p29). The “Ancient Physiologers” tied, Cudworth say, to teat these products as mere fancy, since their goal was to revolve "al nto Mecbanism and. Pheney” (32). Their claim was that “from those diferent Modifications of the small Pariles of Bodies (they being not so distinctly perceived by our Senses), there ate begotten in us ‘certain confused Phasmata ot Phantasmata, Apparitions, Phancies, and Passions, a8 of Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, andthe like, which ate those ching, that ate vulgaty mistaken for rel Qualities xisting in the Bodies without us, whereas indeed there is Nothing Abslucey fn the Bodies themselves ike vo those Pbanastick Idea’ that we have af em; and yet they are wascly contivd bythe Author of Nate, forthe Adoring and Embelishing ofthe Corporal World tos" (p. 33). Bodies were thus considered in two diferent ways: they are Absolutely in themselves, or elseasshey are Relatively tous. Cd ‘worth insists that the second way of considering body forces us to ‘eognze those phancer and idets se modes of eogitavon, st Cog ‘sion egues a incorpored stance (p29), apittion oo must be expltined That Life and Understanding are not Essential to Mater assath,"and tht “dey ean never poly rise wi of any Mica ot Mouton of Dead ah Stupid Mater” were ruth chat Culworth asters over and ove. He does aot believe that ie Democritck and Epicurean" went so fa 38 to identity thought with master, They were neither so ‘Sottsh’ nor s0 Impeudent” 28's ‘Modeen Weiter hath done, to maintain, that Cogitation,Inteletion and Volition, are themselves realy Nothing ese, but Local Motion or Mecbonsn in the inwazd Parts ofthe Brain and Heart” (p. 761). The Feference is clestly to Hobbes. Cadworth argues epestedy th auch Seduction extends to men what Descartes claimed for animals it Inskes men “Really Nothing ce, but Macbines, and Automata” (p. Tél ef pp. 50, 4, 846,830)" "The reduetionise thesis isthe stcongest version of materialism, but Ccudworth worked juse as diligently to scredi the lsser thesis thar ‘ought eould be produced by matte in marion. Since “there No- {thingof Soul and Mind, and Reason and Understanding, orindeedof Cogtstion and Life, contained in the Modifications and Mechanism ‘of Bodies,” to claim that thought rises out of bodies would be ro say Something, some ‘entity, can-come from nothing. Cudworth's re Sponse Rete i colored by is acceptance of the principe that proper USstequiresubstances, If cogitation were produced by matter sub- Stance without anything of thought in its nawre—that cogitation would have to come wih «sobreance, an incorporea substance. Such ‘substance would be che real entity reared By corporeal substance, “One possible way to avoid wolting the ex milo mii fe principle woul be to say that "Senseless Matcet may 2 wel ecomne Sense, hd as it were Tbe] kindled ino Life and Cogitation” (p. 46). feet {light and heat are generated in bodies whi before were devoid of| Such qualies. To this attempt, Cudworth replies that light and bext inhodies are never more than the agitation of invensble partces. Un less we went to siy thought is no more shan an appearance, a fancy, for sentient creates (at perceived light and heat ate, the difference ‘between pactices in motion and perceived light will not help the cor porealst sustain the thesis tht senseless matter can become sensitive. Sell another possibly i o say that matter as such has “an Ante cedent hfe nd Understanding” in it—that pat of is nature is sensi thes A eductio (one often repeated by later writer) faces the Se {nical corporealse over this thesis: if matter did have as part of its inatare life andunderstending, "then every Atom of Matter must aceds bea Distinct Pereipient, Antal, and Inteligent Person by i self”. 72). The consequence would be thac "every Man would be « «5 4 Heap of innumerable Animals ang Prcipients,” Besides ths abwunity, tis tiplooick sltemative adulterates she Sery "Notiom of Maier, living it properties of two difereat kinds of substance. Life and un- ‘lerstanding ste neither esevial to matter, par ofits nature, nor can they rise out of any sxure or organization of mater, (See aso PP. 1348, 850, 871)(6) Sel-Aetivty and Intentional Causality In rejecting thes attempts to link thoughe with matter, Cudworth be led he wes undermine pound fo steam te pote side, he argued for an ineligible world, the cue inelectual system, to which man belongs As a grounding for this intellect worl he ‘dvocates something ike the Hylovoist life what hecalled a Plastik [Nature He rejected che Hylogoists life because that life was blind, iretionles All of the corporealiss rejected final causes, claiming thar "everything comes wo pats Foreutonny, and heppensto be ait without the Guidance and Direction of any Mind or Understanding. ‘The corporeaiss "banish all Mental, and conseuenty Divine Cows ity, quite out of the World” (p. 147). Order and organization cannot, ‘Cadworth insists, come about through chance, or ly mechaaieal ea sation. "Mind and Understanding isthe only trae Case of Onderly Regularity andhe that asses Pastick Natur, asserts Mental Cask fnzan the World” (pp. 15485). Forwitous mechanism versus final or intending exusaliy* that is che central debate Cadweorth hes with all materials. His concept of a plastic nature embodies the sense of Plan, intention, and order that is present inthe worl, Ie isa force and presence. Since God does not act immediately inthe world Certain norall the time), His plan and His intention are monitored and guided by that force (pp. 149-80). This force, which Cudworeh sometimes ems almost to personify, “doth not comprebend the Reason of is ‘own Action” (p.158). He contrasts the ation ofthe plastic nature with expres consciousaetion. The metaphysical categories for Cu Worth ate two: "Resting or Anttypous Extension, and Life, (he, Intensl Energy and Seaeiity" (py. 159). The category of Life dt Vides into two again: that which "ether ace with express Conscious est and Synaestes, or ac a without "Tee the ae that fis ‘plasick nature, a phrase that designates "all Action distinc from ‘Local Motion.” 1 the eneagy of nature It x cogtative but uncon ‘scious. This force is responsible forthe action of matter, i is what begin action. 'Vital Autokinesc'is the phase Cadworthusesin chat acteriing ths internal energy (pp. 159, 844-45). Ultimately is God {rom whom such seltinitiation derives, but all cognitive beings have the ability to initiate actions. Tei this internal energy, presen inno {ure and in tan, which catches an important diference between the ‘auslity of human sevion and the causality of body The Action ofan onde Thing a ac, obi bt Lac Motion, Change ‘2f Disuace. or amttion fom Peto Pace meer Ostend Seperial things ut issn that Coptaion, Pane election and Volo ate Ll Noss nr hemes Pisin pa dows, of he Pa ofa xen ‘Smance chong ee Pe tl Ds # Ung an er Sut oth on Ena ibe he vey Sine oF em, “feu ch Thay orl ede fp. 830 By virtwe of suchintera energy, ma able act on extended body, Chvevenpenetite rand ences i the same lace that body (a) Space and Extension sense in wich thinking sostance can coexist in a place witha ntndedsubtance wasan portant sue for understanaing both th Stinson tothe ous wel ss Gos presen foal hing. aly can enn ony m space point for poi; nt mind which Sean ac once both compredend x Whole Eten thin TAL bc All of fimevery Pare cherect= 432. This principle let {Obs mocked by Humes oftensaed by the materi in the {Spec cenay state human sol inevery pr ofthe oy SS Giusti the whe Unies and n every pare but ether thesoul tor Godessin apace nthe wny body does. Gods everywhere but Nowhere Many wes who cexpted sh exitenceofigcorporel sus anc sill fa thar that substance had some hd of extension, a though not bodily exteion “thas who aged for space without body bo often ud tha space was algo extend, As ld a sad to be ble to penctate bod, so Space devoid of body was sad eobepenerateand angle (76) me ot the abet stacked by Cao rested making space Someting separate fom body yng that wus "ony Sigua Body tps00) Tie debate so rebar inthe eighteenth century bs sate ‘Sinething real or only anastracted ideas The interpretation of God's oumipreence and God's eaton to space Was sly ded to this de- Sate"Somenines God is sad tobe preset all thgs by knowing thes emmacence omnipresence "somewhat sar qoestom sen ver ow faite mind can know boty “Cwerh warn agus mang or ances fox che hy Themes, seeming dying 4 dest knowledge of body (768 Op the oer hans hes very car about not config ies oe te physa coat with option of body The sal he 5. Conve Extend higher, ested and nly fo Drone of: whole Hemp econiaed into are Compas inte Pop Ste Eyes a al tics omni he Sa el, nd se Ue Son deny. ave Tong se Dee, Tea ose ieSonate ca tearceetar ion Se ena ls re ich anton in the eal eas othe een. Claes ‘De Ongine Ma (1702), Laws notes take up mich spice thoughout Teepe ae bete eat mre rr inthe century, many ofthe ise over space and extension, the naare bf mater, thought ae popery ofthe ban and active plop Og ite Hume's dramatic Dagan concering Nace Religion 1779). “tres ae Just some of the more prominent sources forthe debate in the eighteenth centry over what was Wewed 82 growing mater ism, The term vce hiker was sociated wth ths atnalism, 2 fermgiven prominence by Cllns'® Dicourc on Pree binking (1713), ‘Tas work wa heavily atacked by Bentley in his Remarks Upon a Lave Discourse of Pee-Thnking (1713), and aso by Berkely nthe pages of The Gurren Thee ote: journals played an important ole the powingcontroveny. Later in the century, The London Review ind The Monthly Review caved reviews, cations ft, and com tenon esting ers teeter) many fee took ts Contovesy. The London Review particularly gave extensive ater tion to Pecaceys wings on mind sad marten and to his edition of Hare ‘One of che more important journal coverages ofthis long debate was Jean LeCler's Bibliotheque Chose. Pubahed in Holandin dv Uzcimo, writen ia Frenchy LeClre’sjouraal kept hs continental fenders wel Informed of Brteh pletion. Ie was ao read in Em land. From 1703 to 1713, LeClere ran review ater review fall of {he central books He rok ar his bse text Cuwortns True Pelle: fal System. Beginning n volume {for 1703, he reviewed that work, then presented inst subsequent Sates, hscugh 1706, long ean ons f sections ad chaptes from nll en ales were devoted fo presenting Cudworty Thess aticles consumed 633 pages of hi journal Fors work published in 1678, Leer’ atetion (in the Eiiy yeas ofthe eihtecnth century gives some indeaton ofthe ime portance of andthe interes in the fase and doctrines Cudworth Teak with® Lecter occasonal "Remargues de auteur de la sreallon the side of orthodoxy In addtion woth coverage of Cadworch through reviews and rane Intions there along eworartrviewexteat of Nenemiah Grew’ Cosmologr Sars (70), nf very fst woe of the blot que ‘Ghote X shird pare of tis reviews found in volume Hl Gres Swork sf intrest to LeClere in prt becuse of Grew notion of ‘Sa! principle in bodies, In volume V LeClee devotes an article 0 ‘Somparing Cudwort’s pls nature and Grew vial piniple, ie Spon to some cecal comments by Bayle ow both ites a vo ine IX Clee sep to more comments on Cuworth by Bayle. “Ecclercs attention to ts controversy over te natife of mater and thought wasnot limited to Cudworth and Grew. In volume Il heremarks on Bayles objections to Locke's acount of substance, pat Svlary 8 they relate to thinking matter. Leer defends Locke Spans what he kes toe Hale's mieaigs, He reiens Cakes BiyicIevtrcs Gn volume XXVI, 1713) as wel, and the exchange (like bs with Coins. The same ise ls contains sroew of se sa other books stemming from tie Clarke Colins exchange. Another Sporn contibution to the defer of intern reve i HamphreyDition's Discourse Concerning the Resiretion of Jess Ge (711), with specalatevion gen tot appendix om mare Sndehougne With this indication ofthe kindof attention accorded some ealy eighteentvcentury books in the defense of orthodox metaphysical ‘tom with an undereanding ofthe promnenee gen Cuworth's Exly seady, and with hits of Locke role inthe ehtcentcenary {lsiopments we are now rely to examine in detail some of the ‘muny pamphlet weien to defend or attack the materi cain ‘The theres, he agurnents and counter arguments sven much of the ‘ocabulay were extablaed by Cudworhe Thee wee gien 8 mor Stesnce statement by Locke, a the context of Syste of thought which suadded orthodoxy and change We shall str with Locke’ Simei he Go col pad mace ipower of huge ‘Westall ollow the reactions ths uggnion by some of Locke's immediate contemporaries, We hl lien to fers ofthe astomatsn {ha would ensie some ofthe new views sbowesustanceand about zman were aceped. We sal follow Hume's rather aie! poraya Othe immaceristmatraist debate We shall ako cover that ne tmuch of this controreny wee crea sei views Aout the nacae of matter mate should tar out nat to be the Ins, pasive, shggish sei? deserved by Cadworth-if ie ncae soul! prove be cloner t0 Tore than pase patiles “then he esis for materialism change deat, a they dd in the ands of Prete. Closely related fo there tops a intrest nthe ature ‘and possibile” of human actions do move my arm? If how is tae possible given the detailed workings of my physiology? In this context we sll examine some of the vey many works, beth metical and religous, tat dsc the mechani of the body. ig ne urine prot 21s cu p59 Sent 7 ge cin is, tian" gonor Tip tetas sects ‘pout was eset lt tna ata wh See e | i | | | ev ergs ash mys Bye ay hema ey penn’ Sheets hn, pt eos Sou ‘ii ge a pops a mesr {MS wa tat heen ner Sura Aas, td et he uc spt tt haper Opes ag Ps a era er ie cn oy ent ee ‘Sy aspen wa sen i Clie mi anes Os, toy Cb Toe osetlemoe ete ge st 97). a sei waa eoweecon ey hon ei ‘SETEh Manonty uhcnweseened nth Robeee Raed se ron Sar Rien ut fer pn ae