682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People us. Echegaray desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the accused’s
G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997. *
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO
ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Appeal; Matters neither alleged in the pleadings
nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the
first time on appeal before the Supreme Court.—It is a rudimentary
principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor
raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first
time on appeal before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have
stated in our Resolution in Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of
Appeals: “If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue
only for the first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such
issue be disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court.”
Criminal Procedure; Affidavits; An affidavit of desistance is
merely an additional ground to buttress the accused’s defenses not the
sole consideration that can result in acquittal.—It must be stressed
that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the ac-
_______________
* EN BANC.
683
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 683
People vs. Echegaray
cused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission made
by the victim herself in open court that she had signed an Affidavit
of Desistance, she, nevertheless, “strongly pointed out that she is not
withdrawing the charge against the accused because the latter might
do the same sexual assaults to other women.” Thus, this is one
occasion where an affidavit of desistance must be regarded with
disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in
court that she was pursuing the rape charges against the
accusedappellant. We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry
Ballabare, that: “As pointed out in People v. Lim (190 SCRA 706
[1990], which is also cited by the accused-appellant, an affidavit of
defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal.
There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the
retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the
testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the
judge.”
Constitutional Law; Death Penalty; Our courts are not the fora
for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death
sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and
welldefined criminal acts.—Consequently, we have time and again
emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a protracted debate
on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law
itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts.
Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that: “x x x there are
quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as
long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our
criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty
of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their
private opinions.” and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case
of People v. Veneracion.
Same; Same; Congress has the power to re-impose the death
penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.—Article III,
Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the
power to re-impose the death penalty “for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes.” This power is not subsumed in the plenary
legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of
“compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.” The constitutional
exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails:
(1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes;
(2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes
684
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death
can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly
proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty
bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be
singularly motivated by “compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes.”
Same; Same; Definition of Heinous Crimes.—In the second
whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the
definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that:
“x x x crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society.” Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion
in People v. Alicando, traced the etymological root of the word
“heinous” to the Early Spartans’ word, “haineus,” meaning, hateful
and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix “haton,”
denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil.
Same; Same; R.A. No. 7659; Insofar as the element of
heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified
crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death.—We have no
doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is
concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting
the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No.
7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly
no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The
proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law,
is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death
sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death
sentence in exercise of judicial discretion, This is not to say, however,
that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code
need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the
crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the
crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
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People vs. Echegaray
Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 7659 provides the test and
yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death.—In the first place, the
1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly,
R.A. No, 7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify
a crime provided therein to be punished by the maximum penalty of
death, neither amends nor repeals the aggravating circumstances
under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No, 7659
in pari materia with the Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed
when: (1) aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the
crime as to make operative the provision of the Revised Penal Code
regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty; and (2) other
circumstances attend the commission of the crime which indubitably
characterize the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659
that justify the imposition of death, albeit the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand the
rationale for the guided discretion granted in the trial court to
cognize circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime
as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that may
attend the commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no
telling the evil that man is capable of. The legislature cannot and
need not foresee and inscribe in law each and every loathsome act
man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. No. 7659 provides
the test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation
warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death. Needless
to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing danger of abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in meting out the death
sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of executing an
innocent man or one criminal but not heinously criminal, R.A. No.
7659 is replete with both procedural and substantive safeguards that
ensure only the correct application of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
Same; Same; Same; Furman did not outlaw the death penalty
because it was cruel and unusual per se.—The issue in Furman was
not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the
procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused
by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered
not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction
but on the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out
the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional
discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death
686
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
penalty. In fact, the long road of the American abolitionist
movement leading to the landmark case of Furman was trekked by
American civil rights advocates zealously fighting against racial
discrimination. x x x Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty
because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme
Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it
did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial-
judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any
parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not
altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices
and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing
juries.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Remedial Law; Appeal; Same; Same; Determination of when to
prescribe the death penalty now lies with the sound discretion of the
law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines subject to the
conditions that the fundamental law has set forth.—The
determination of when to prescribe the death penalty now lies with
the sound discretion of the law-making authority, the Congress of the
Philippines, subject to the conditions that the fundamental law has
set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the
imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must
involve a heinous crime.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Remedial Law; Appeal; The automatic commutation or
reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the
effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that while the
conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains death as a
penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may no longer be
carried out.—Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides: “Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.” (Italics supplied) The second and third
sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written
in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 “Freedom Constitution.” They
proscribe the imposition of the death penalty “unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for
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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 687
People vs. Echegaray
it,” and reduced “any death penalty already imposed”
to reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it
bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it
reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of
imprisonment). This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that
the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the death
penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books.
The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion perpetua of any
death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly
recognizes that, while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime
remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and
thus may no longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the
framers of our Constitution.
Same; Same; R.A. No. 7659 did not change the nature or the
elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special
laws.—But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the
crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely
made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than
the preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify the
reasons for the more severe sanction, either collectively for all the
offenses or individually for each of them. Generally, it merely
reinstated the concept of and the method by .which the death penalty
had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took
effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2)
the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating
circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
 Same; Same; R.A. 7659 merely amended certain laws to
prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court
appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances.—
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to
prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court
appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances.
There’s nothing really new that Congress did which it could not have
otherwise done had such provision not been included in our
fundamental law. In other words, it just reinstated capital
punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death
prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible
exception of plunder and qualified bribery, no new crimes were
introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said
law were already so punishable by the Revised Penal Code and by
special laws. In short, Sec. 19, Article III of the Constitution did not
have any impact
688
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
upon the legislative action. It was effectively ignored by
Congress in enacting the capital punishment law.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the
Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Free Legal Assistance Group, Anti-Death Penalty Task
Force for accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case
affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime
of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been
committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death
Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the
victim’s grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged
false accusation of rape against the accused. We find no
substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb our
verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the
defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the
services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal
Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).
On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of
accused-appellant. The motion raises the following grounds for
the reversal of the death sentence;
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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 689
People vs. Echegaray
1. "[1]Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted
since the pardon by the offended party and her mother
before the filing of the complaint acted as a bar to his
criminal prosecution.
2. [2]The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the
commission of the offense in the Complaint and
throughout trial prevented the accused-appellant from
preparing an adequate defense.
3. [3]The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
4. [4]The Honorable Court erred in finding that the
accusedappellant was the father or stepfather of the
complainant and in affirming the sentence of death
against him on this basis.
5. [5]The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due
process and manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.
 6. [6]The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel and to due
process, due to the incompetence of counsel.
7. [7]R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se:
1. a.For crimes where no death results from the offense, the
death penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in
violation of Article III, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution.
2. b.The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987
Constitution.”
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises
three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters
relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant’s former counsel; and (3)
purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
I prompting her grandchild to file the rape case;
It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither
alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings
below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before
the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our
Resolution in Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of
Appeals: 1
________________
1 249 SCRA 303, 307–308.
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690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
“If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for
the first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue
be disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court.”
It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape
case against the accused-appellant before the sala of then
presiding judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, the defense attempted
to prove that:
1. a)the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere
concoction of the alleged victim’s maternal
grandmother;
2. b)the accused is not the real father of the complainant;
3. c)the size of the penis of the accused cannot have
possibly penetrated the alleged victim’s private part;
and
4. d)the accused was in Parañaque during the time of the
alleged rape.
In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for
automatic review, the accused-appellant reiterated as grounds
for exculpation:
1. a)the ill-motive of the victim’s maternal grandmother in
2. b)the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis
which could not have caused the healed hymenal
lacerations of the victim; and
3. c)the defense of alibi.
Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new
counsel of the accused-appellant reveals that in their messianic
appeal for a reversal of our judgment of conviction, we are
asked to consider for the first time, by way of a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, the following matters:
1. a)the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which
acted as a bar to the criminal prosecution for rape
against the accused-appellant;
 2. b)the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission
of the offense in the Complaint which deprived the
accused-appellant from adequately defending himself;
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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 691
People vs. Echegaray
1. c)the failure of this Court to clearly establish the
qualifying circumstance that placed the accused-
appellant within the coverage of the Death Penalty
Law;
2. d)the denial of due process and the manifest bias
exhibited by the trial court during the trial of the rape
case.
Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for
reconsideration, the only legitimate issue that We can tackle
relates to the Affidavit of Desistance which touches on the lack
of jurisdiction of the trial court to have proceeded with the
prosecution of the accused-appellant considering that the issue
of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any
time, even during appeal. 2
It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the
rape case against the accused-appellant, it appeared that
despite the admission made by the victim herself in open court
that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she,
nevertheless, “strongly pointed out that she is not withdrawing
the charge against the accused because the latter might do the
same sexual assaults to other women." Thus, this is one
3 highly prejudiced and prevented, in effect, from having his day
occasion where an affidavit of desistance must be regarded
with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age,
manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape charges
against the accused-appellant.
We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry
Ballabare, that:
4 him relative to his client’s defense. As the rape case was being
“As pointed out in People v. Lim (190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also
cited by the accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely
an additional ground to buttress the accused’s defenses, not the sole
consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other
circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or
________________
2 See Amigo v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 382, 390 [1996]; De Leon v. Court of
Appeals, 245 SCRA 166, 172 [1995].
3 RTC Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 19.
4 G.R. No. 108871 promulgated on November 19, 1996.
692
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by
the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge." 5
In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as
defenses mainly consisted of denial and alibi which cannot
outweigh the positive identification and convincing testimonies
given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance,
which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier
discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal prosecution
against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court’s
jurisdiction over the case.
II
The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or
mistakes of his counsel. One of the recognized exceptions to
6
this rule is gross incompetency in a way that the defendant is
in court to defend himself. 7
In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the
accused-appellant to whom the FLAG lawyers now impute
incompetency had amply exercised the required ordinary
diligence or that reasonable decree of care and skill expected of
tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from the time he was assigned
to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings thereof.
Moreover, he had seasonably submitted the
AccusedAppellant’s Brief and the Motion for Reconsideration
of our June 25, 1996 Decision with extensive discussion in
support of his line of defense. There is no indication of gross
incompetency that could have resulted from a failure to present
any
________________
5 People v. Pimentel, 118 SCRA 695 [1982]; citing People v. Manigbas, 109
Phil. 469 [1960].
6 Greenhills Airconditioning and Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 245 SCRA 384, 389 [1995]; Arambulo v. Court of Appeals, 226
SCRA 589, 601 [1993]; Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980].
7 Suarez v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 274, 279–280 [1993].
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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 693
People vs. Echegaray
argument or any witness to defend his client. Neither has he
acted haphazardly in the preparation of his case against the
prosecution evidence. The main reason for his failure to
exculpate his client, the accused-appellant, is the
overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. The alleged errors
committed by the previous counsel as enumerated by the new
counsel could not have overturned the judgment of conviction
against the accused-appellant.
III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of
death as punishment for violation of law or custom, religious or
secular, is an ancient practice. We do know that our forefathers
killed to avenge themselves and their kin and that initially, the
criminal law was used to compensate for a wrong done to a
private party or his family, not to punish in the name of the
state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the
increasing sensitization throughout the later generations
against past barbarity and the institutionalization of state
power under the rule of law. Today every man or woman is both
an individual person with inherent human rights recognized
and protected by the state and a citizen with the duty to serve
the common weal and defend and preserve society.
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to
secure society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to
this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws
that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by
its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and
the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in accordance
with these laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped
debating on the causes of criminal behavior and the purposes
of criminal punishment, our criminal laws have been perceived
as relatively stable and functional since the enforcement of the
Revised Penal Code on January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding
occasional opposition to the death penalty pro-
694
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
visions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally
promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes
under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital
punishment had entered our legal system through the old
Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal
Code of 1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form
of a constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty
is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation
of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments. We unchangingly answered this question in the
negative in the cases of Harden v. Director of Prisons, People v.
8
Limaco, People v. Camano, People v. Puda and People v.
9 10 11
Marcos. In Harden, we ruled:
12
“The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive.
In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme
Court said that ‘punishments are cruel when they involve torture or
a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.’ “
13
Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our
courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality
or propriety of the death sentence where the law itself provides
therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had
ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that:
“x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that
the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.
However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute
________________
8 81 Phil. 741 [1948].
9 88 Phil. 36 [1951].
10 115 SCRA 688 [1982].
11 133 SCRA 1 [1984].
12 147 SCRA 204 [1987].
13 81 Phil. 741, 747 [1948].
695
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 695
People us. Echegaray
books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in
certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply
the law regardless of their private opinions."14
and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v.
Veneracion. 15
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the
crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during times
of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide,
kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly
weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery
with homicide, and arson resulting in death. The list of capital
offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to the
emergencies of the times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act (C.A.)
No. 616 added espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at the height
of the Huk rebellion, the government enacted Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law,
which carried the death penalty for leaders of the rebellion.
From 1971 to 1972, more capital offenses were created by more
laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking Law, the Dangerous
Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law. During martial law,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted penalizing
with death, among others, crimes involving homicide
committed with an unlicensed firearm.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the
Marcos regime and led to the nullification of the 1973
Constitution, a Constitutional Commission was convened
following appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was
catapulted to power by the people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new
found freedom of a rejuvenated people, the Constitutional
Commissioners grouped themselves into working committees
among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose B.
Laurel, Jr. as Chairman and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.,
as Vice-Chairman.
_______________
14 88 Phil. 36, 43 [1951].
15 249 SCRA 246, 253 [1995].
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696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft
of the proposed bill of rights to the rest of the commission. What
is now Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution was
first denominated as Section 22 and was originally worded as
follows:
“Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment, or the death penalty inflicted. Death penalty
already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua.”
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the
result of a consensus among the members of the Bill of Rights
Committee that the death penalty should be abolished. Having
agreed to abolish the death penalty, they proceeded to
deliberate on how the abolition was to be done—whether the
abolition should be done by the Constitution or by the
legislature—and the majority voted for a constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. Father Bernas explained:
“x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the
death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the
abolition should be done by the Constitution—in which case it cannot
be restored by the legislature—or left to the legislature. The majority
voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the
reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his
family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried
out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly
criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that
other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another
man is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death
penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial
should not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable
than an institution intended precisely to serve human life. So,
basically, this is the summary of the reasons which were presented
in support of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty."16
The original wording of Article III, Section 19(1), however, did
not survive the debate that it instigated. Commissioner
________________
16 Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. I, p. 676.
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People vs. Echegaray
Napoleon G. Rama first pointed out that “never in our history
has there been a higher incidence of crime” and that
“criminality was at its zenith during the last
decade." Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an
17
unwillingness to absolutely excise the death penalty from our
legal system and leave society helpless in the face of a future
upsurge of crimes or other similar emergencies. As
Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. suggested, ‘although
we abolish the death penalty in the Constitution, we should
afford some amount of flexibility to future legislation," and his
18
concern was amplified by the interpellatory remarks of
Commissioner Lugum L. Uka, Commissioner and now
Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M.
de Castro, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Commissioner
Christian Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo, and
Commissioner Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Padilla put it
succinctly in the following exchange with Commissioner
Teodoro C. Bacani:
“BISHOP BACANI. x x x At present, they explicitly make it clear
that the church has never condemned the right of the state to inflict
capital punishment.
MR. PADILLA. x x x So it is granted that the state is not deprived
of the right even from a moral standpoint of imposing or prescribing
capital punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the
Catholic point of view, that right of the state is not forbidden.
MR. PADILLA. In fact x x x we have to accept that the state has
the delegated authority from the Creator to impose the death penalty
under certain circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to
do what is needed for the sake of the common good, but the issue at
stake is whether or not under the present circumstances that will be
for the common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be
denied.
_______________
17 Id., p. 678.
18 Id., p. 680.
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698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a
particular stage in history, but it is not clear whether or not that
delegation is forever under all circumstances.
 MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to
determine, under certain specified conditions or circumstances,
whether the retention of the death penalty or its abolition would be
for the common good. I do not believe this Commission can a priori,
and as was remarked within a few days or even a month, determine
a positive provision in the Constitution that would prohibit even the
legislature to prescribe the death penalty for the most heinous
crimes, the most grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and
aggravating circumstances." 19
What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the
beleaguered provision. The move to add the phrase, “unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the national
assembly provides for the death penalty,” came from
Commissioners Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de los Reyes.
Commissioner Rodrigo, however, expressed reservations even
as regards the proposed amendment. He said:
“x x x [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this
matter in the Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our
legislature. Arguments pro and con have been given x x x. But my
stand is, we should leave this to the discretion of the legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because
we will, in effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation and
after repealing this piece of legislation, tell the legislature that we
have repealed the law and that the legislature can go ahead and
enact it again. I think this is not worthy of a constitutional body like
ours. If we will leave the matter of the death penalty to the
legislature, let us leave it completely to the discretion of the
legislature, but let us not have this half-baked provision. We have
many provisions in the Revised Penal Code imposing the death
penalty. We will now revoke or repeal these pieces of legislation by
means of the Constitution, but at the same time say that it is up to
the legislature to impose this again.
x x x The temper and condition of the times change x x x and so
we, I think we should leave this matter to the legislature to enact
________________
19 Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. I, p. 712.
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People vs. Echegaray
statutes depending on the changing needs of the times. Let us
entrust this completely to the legislature composed of
representatives elected by the people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the
fact that we are not elected by the people and if we are going to
entrust this to the legislature, let us not be half-baked nor
halfhearted about it. Let us entrust it to the legislature 100 percent.20
Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with
twenty-three (23) commissioners voting in favor of the
amendment and twelve (12) voting against it, followed by more
revisions, hence the present wording of Article III, Section
19(1) of the 1987 Constitution in the following tenor:
“Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.”
The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of
the death penalty provisions in the Revised Penal Code and
certain special criminal laws and the state of the scale of
penalties thereunder, were tremendous.
The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty
for what used to be capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra, we 21
stated that “in view of the abolition of the death penalty under
Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that
may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua" thereby eliminating
22
death as the original maximum period. The constitutional
abolition of the death penalty, it seemed, limited the penalty
for murder to only the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum
and the medium, which we then, in People v.
_______________
20 Id., p. 744
21 155 SCRA 327 [1987].
22 Id., p. 335.
 700
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
Masangkay, People v. Atencio and People v. Intino divided
23 24 25
into three new periods, to wit, the lower half of reclusion
temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of
reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion
perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with the three-grade
scheme under the Revised Penal Code. In People v.
Muñoz, however, we reconsidered these aforecited cases and
26
after extended discussion, we concluded that the doctrine
announced therein did not reflect the intention of the framers.
The crux of the issue was whether or not Article III, Section
19(1) absolutely abolished the death penalty, for if it did, then,
the aforementioned new three-grade penalty should replace the
old one where the death penalty constituted the maximum
period. But if no total abolition can be read from said
constitutional provision and the death penalty is only
suspended, it cannot as yet be negated by the institution of a
new three-grade penalty premised on the total inexistence of
the death penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled
in Muñoz:
“The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for
murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the
medium. These should now be divided into three new periods in
keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature.
Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(1) merely
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by
reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the
remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that
there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition
of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death
penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already
________________
23 155 SCRA 113 [1987].
24 156 SCRA 242 [1987].
25 165 SCRA 637 [1988].
26 170 SCRA 107 [1989].
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People vs. Echegaray
imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while
rather awkward, is still plain enough."27
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III,
Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which
the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death
penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the
Constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to
this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step
process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy,
to re-impose the death penalty or not; and second, the vote to
pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of
arguments for and against capital punishment, the Members
of the Senate voted on the policy issue of death penalty. The
vote was explained, thus:
“SUSPENSION OF THE RULES
Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body
suspended the Rules of the Senate. Thereafter, upon motion of
Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Chair directed that a
nominal voting be conducted on the policy issue of death penalty.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate
would vote on this policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a vote
of Yes would mean a vote in favor of death as a penalty to be
reincorporated in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised
Penal Code, and a vote of No would be a vote against the
reincorporation of death penalty in the scale of penalties in the
Revised Penal Code.
________________
27 Id., p. 121.
702
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People us. Echegaray
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
xxx
The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would
first decide the question whether or not death penalty should be
reimposed, and thereafter, a seven-man committee would be formed
to draft the compromise bill in accordance with the result of the
voting. If the Body decides in favor of the death penalty, the Chair
said that the committee would specify the crimes on which death
penalty would be imposed. It affirmed that a vote of Yes in the
nominal voting would mean a vote in favor of death penalty on at
least one crime, and that certain refinements on how the penalty
would be imposed would be left to the discretion of the seven-man
committee.
xxx
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAÑADA
In reply to Senator Tañada’s query, the Chair affirmed that even
if a senator would vote ‘yes’ on the basic policy issue, he could still
vote ‘no’ on the imposition of the death penalty on a particular crime.
REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the
basic policy issue of whether or not the death penalty would be
included in the scale of penalties found in Article 27 of the Revised
Penal Code, so that if it is voted down, the Body would discontinue
discussing Senate Bill No. 891 pursuant to the Rules, but if approved,
a special committee, as agreed upon in the caucus, is going to be
appointed and whatever course it will take will depend upon the
mandate given to it by the Body later on.
The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino’s observations.
REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not
death as a penalty will be reincorporated in the scale of penalties
provided by the Revised Penal Code. However, he pointed out that if
the Body decides in favor of death penalty, the Body would still have
to address two issues: 1) Is the crime for which the death penalty is
supposed to be imposed heinous pursuant to the constitutional
mandate? 2) And, if so, is there a compelling reason to impose the
703
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 703
People vs. Echegaray
death penalty for it? The death penalty, he stressed, cannot be
imposed simply because the crime is heinous. “ 28
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative
votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has
voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. A nineperson
committee was subsequently created to draft the compromise
bill pursuant to said vote. The mandate of the committee was
to retain the death penalty, while the main debate in the
committee would be the determination of the crime to be
considered heinous.
On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of
the Special Committee on the Death Penalty, delivered his
Sponsorship Speech. He began with an explanation as to why
the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the death penalty by
amending the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws
and includes provisions that do not define or punish crimes but
serve purposes allied to the re-imposition of the death penalty.
Senator Tolentino stated:
“x x x [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death
penalty on heinous crimes and delegated to the Special Committee
the work of drafting a bill, a compromise bill that would be the
subject for future deliberations of this Body, the Committee had to
consider that the death penalty was imposed originally in the
Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with
the death penalty, unless Congress should, for compelling reasons
reimpose that penalty on heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was
the Revised Penal Code that was affected by that provision of the
Constitution. The death penalty, as provided in the Revised Penal
Code, would be considered as having been repealed—all provisions
on the death penalty would be considered as having been repealed by
the Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling reasons,
reimpose such penalty on heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not only
one article but many articles of the Revised Penal Code that were
actually affected by the Constitution.
________________
28 Journal, Senate, February 15, 1993, Vol. 2, p. 1246.
704
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional
provision that our Special Committee had to consider the Revised
Penal Code itself in making this compromise bill or text of the bill.
That is why, in the proposed draft now under consideration which we
are sponsoring, the specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code are
actually either reenacted or amended or both. Because by the effect
of the Constitution, some provisions were totally repealed, and they
had to be reenacted so that the provisions could be retained. And
some of them had to be amended because the Committee thought
that amendments were proper." 29
In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
to whether or not it would have been better if the Senate were
to enact a special law which merely defined and imposed the
death penalty for heinous crimes, Senator Tolentino explicated,
thus:
“x x x [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in
mind that the death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal Code.
Therefore, when the Constitution abolished the death penalty, it
actually was amending the Revised Penal Code to such an extent
that the Constitution provides that where the death penalty has
already been imposed but not yet carried out, then the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the Revised Penal Code.
So we thought that it would be best to just amend the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, restoring the death penalty for some crimes
that may be considered as heinous. That is why the bill is in this form
amending the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the
whole trouble is, when a special bill is presented and we want to
punish in the special bill the case of murder, for instance, we will
have to reproduce the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
murder in order to define the crime for which the death penalty shall
be imposed. Or if we want to impose the death penalty in the case of
kidnapping which is punished in the Revised Penal Code, we will do
the same—merely reproduce. Why will we do that? So we just
followed the simpler method of keeping the definition of the crime as
the same and merely adding some aggravating circumstances and
________________
29 Record, Senate, March 17, 1993, Vol. IV, p. 77.
705
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People vs. Echegaray
reimposing the death penalty in these offenses originally punished
in the Revised Penal Code." 30
From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was
presented for discussion until August 16, 1993, the Members of
the Senate debated on its provisions.
The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator
Lina who kept prodding the sponsors of the bill to state the
compelling reason for each and every crime for which the
supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on the
statement in the preamble of the death penalty bill that the
same is warranted in the face of “the alarming upsurge of
[heinous] crimes,” Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics
showing that in the case of each and every crime in the death
penalty bill, there was a significantly higher incidence of each
crime after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2,
1987 when the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the majority
of the Filipino people, than before such ratification. Inasmuch
as the re-impositionists could not satisfy the abolitionists with
sufficient statistical data for the latter to accept the alarming
upsurge of heinous crimes as a compelling reason justifying the
re-imposition of the death penalty, Senator Lina concluded that
there were, in fact, no compelling reasons therefor. In the
alternative, Senator Lina argued that the compelling reason
required by the constitution was that “the State has done
everything in its command so that it can be justified to use an
inhuman punishment called death penalty." The problem, 32
Senator Lina emphasized, was that even the re-impositionists
admit that there were still numerous reforms in the criminal
justice system that may and must be put in place, and so
clearly, the recourse to the enactment of a death penalty bill
was not in the nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional
in the absence of compelling reasons. As an initial reaction to
Senator Lina’s contentions, Senator Tolen-
_______________
30 Id., May 18, 1993, Vol. IV, p. 596.
31 Record, Senate, March 18, 1993, Vol. IV, pp. 106–112.
32 Journal, February 10 & 11, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1223.
706
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
tino explained that the statement in the preamble is a general
one and refers to all the crimes covered by the bill and not to
specific crimes. He added that one crime may not have the same
degree of increase in incidence as the other crimes and that the
public demand to impose the death penalty is enough
compelling reason. 33
Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Tañada to
whom the battle lines were clearly drawn. He put to issue two
things: first, the definition of “heinous crimes” as provided for
in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of
compelling reasons for each and every capital crime. His
interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed his
31 objections to the bill:
“Senator Tañada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous, Mr.
President? Are crimes heinous by their nature or elements as they
are described in the bill or are crimes heinous because they are
punished by death, as bribery and malversation are proposed to be
punished in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr.
President, but that is not supposed to be the exclusive criterion. The
nature of the offense is the most important element in considering it
heinous but, at the same time, we should consider the relation of the
offense to society in order to have a complete idea of the heinous
nature of these offenses. In the case of malversation or bribery, for
instance, these offenses by themselves connected with the effect upon
society and the government have made them fall under the
classification of heinous crimes. The compelling reason for imposing
the death penalty is when the offenses of malversation and bribery
becomes so grave and so serious as indicated in the substitute bill
itself, then there is a compelling reason for the death penalty.
Senator Tañada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr.
President, does the Gentleman believe that these compelling
reasons, which would call for the reimposition of the death penalty,
should be separately, distinctly and clearly stated for each crime so
that it will be very clear to one and all that not only are these crimes
________________
33 Journal, Senate, March 22, 1993, Vol. II, pp. 1574–1575.
707
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 707
People vs. Echegaray
heinous but also one can see the compelling reasons for the
reimposition of the death penalty therefor?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually
considered by the Committee. But the decision of the Committee was
to avoid stating the compelling reason for each and every offense that
is included in the substitute measure. That is why in the preamble,
general statements were made to show these compelling reasons.
And that, we believe, included in the bill, when converted into law,
would be sufficient notice as to what were considered compelling
reasons by the Congress, in providing the death penalty for these
different offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I
would suppose that with the preamble already in general terms, the
Supreme Court would feel that it was the sense of Congress that this
preamble would be applicable to each and every offense described or
punishable in the measure.
So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling
reasons for each and every offense.
Senator Tañada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the
constitutional limitations upon the power of Congress to enact
criminal legislation, especially the provisions on the Bill of Rights,
particularly the one which says that no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the
compelling reasons be so stated in the bill so that the bill, when it
becomes a law, will clearly define the acts and the omissions
punished as crimes?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as
substantive law, this is sufficient. The question of whether there is
due process will more or less be a matter of procedure in the
compliance with the requirements of the Constitution with respect to
due process itself which is a separate matter from the substantive
law as to the definition and penalty for crimes.
Senator Tañada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it
appears that the reimposition of the death penalty is subject to three
conditions and these are:
1. 1.Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death
penalty;
2. 2.There are compelling reasons; and
3. 3.These involve heinous crimes.
708
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
Under these provisions of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13,
does the distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to
state clearly the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death
penalty for each crime, as well as the elements that make each of the
crimes heinous included in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion
already. I believe that whether we state the compelling reasons or
not, whether we state why a certain offense is heinous, is not very
important. If the question is raised in the Supreme Court, it is not
what we say in the bill that will be controlling but what the Supreme
Court will feel as a sufficient compelling reason or as to the heinous
nature whether the crime is heinous or not. The accused can
certainly raise the matter of constitutionality but it will not go into
the matter of due process. It will go into the very power of Congress
to enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So that would be entirely
separate from the matter of due process." 34
Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the
death penalty bill violated our international commitment in
support of the worldwide abolition of capital punishment, the
Philippines being a signatory to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol.
Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified, however, that in the United
Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different
committees which vote on them for consideration in the plenary
session. He stressed that unless approved in the plenary
session, a declaration would have no binding effect on signatory
countries. In this respect, the Philippines cannot be deemed
irrevocably bound by said covenant and protocol considering
that these agreements have reached only the committee level. 35
After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate
voted on Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading. With seventeen
(17) affirmative votes, four (4) negative votes, and one
abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on third
reading on August 16, 1993.
_______________
34 Record, Senate, May 11, 1993, Vol. IV, pp. 500–501.
35 Journal, Senate, February 2, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1161.
709
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People vs. Echegaray
The Senate’s vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading
on August 16, 1993 was a vindication of the House of
Representatives. The House had, in the Eight Congress, earlier
approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on the
restoration of the death penalty for certain heinous crimes. The
House was in effect rebuffed by the Senate when the Senate
killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming from the
House. House Bill No. 295 was resurrected during the Ninth
Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which was introduced
by twenty one (21) Members of the House of Representatives
on October 27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger of House
Bill Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506; 781, 955, 1565, 1586, 2206,
3238, 3576 and 3632 authored by various Members of the
Lower House.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R.
Sanchez of Rizal ably essayed the constitutional vesting in
Congress of the power to re-impose the death penalty for
compelling reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as the
nature of this constitutional pre-requisite to the exercise of
such power.
“Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, as I
quote:
‘Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for it. . .'
The phrase ‘unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for it was introduced
as an amendment by then Comm. Christian Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this
amendment, the death penalty was not completely abolished by the
1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty
and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.
Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision,
Comm. Ricardo Romulo said, and I quote:
“The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at some future
time, the people might want to restore death penalty through initiative and
referendum.
710
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:
We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely
possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we should not
preclude today.
xxx xxx xxx
I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit
the reimposition of the capital punishment. The violent manner and
the viciousness in which crimes are now committed with alarming
regularity, show very clearly a patent disregard of the law and a
mockery of public peace and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims
of heinous crimes—the Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the
Castañoses, and many more, and they are all crying for justice. We
ought to listen to them because their lives, their hopes, their dreams,
their future have fallen asunder by the cruel and vicious criminality
of a few who put their selfish interest above that of society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly
violent manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of
its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of
the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense
whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant
and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self
of a people.
Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.
The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her
two lovely daughters, will stand in the people’s memory for many
long years as the epitome of viciousness and atrocity that are
repugnant to civilized society.
The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, an up-and-coming young
business executive, was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral
self of our people.
The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultmann, a comely 16
year-old high school student who dreamt of becoming a commercial
model someday, at the hands of a crazed man was so repulsive, so
brutal that it offends the sensibilities of Christians and
nonChristians alike.
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom
Castaños, the lovely and promising couple from the University
 711
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 711
People vs. Echegaray
of the Philippines, is eternally lodged in the recesses of our minds
and still makes our stomach turn in utter disgust.
xxx xxx xxx
The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is
taken by this body in restoring death penalty as a positive response
to the overwhelming clamor of the people, then, as Professor Esteban
Bautista of the Philippine Law Center said, and I quote:
When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable
to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, there are
sown the seeds of anarchy—of self-help, of vigilante justice and lynch law.
The people will take the law upon their hands and exact vengeance in the
nature of personal vendetta.’
It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support
House Bill No. 62.
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we
ought to listen to our constituents and heed their plea—a plea for
life, liberty and pursuit of their happiness under a regime of justice
and democracy, and without threat that their loved ones will be
kidnapped, raped or butchered.
But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could
rely on for justice. A law that will exact retribution for the victims. A
law that will deter future animalistic behavior of the criminal who
take their selfish interest over and above that of society. A law that
will deal a deathblow upon all heinous crimes.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of
all that we hold dear and sacred, let us restore the death penalty."
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the
Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals that, while
both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death
penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the
form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain
heinous crimes without regard to the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code and more unified in the perception
________________
36 Record, House of Representatives, Vol. III, November 9, 1992, pp. 417–418.
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712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very
heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to
suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the
foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez on the
following details of the nature of the heinous crimes
enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L.
Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the
hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt
as to their cause:
“My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty
not only for the importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous
drugs, but also for other heinous crimes such as treason; parricide;
murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape as defined by the Revised Penal
Code with or without additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as
defined in R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532;
carnapping, as defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the owner,
driver or occupant is killed; hijacking, as defined in x x x RA 6235;
and arson resulting in the death of any occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies
them to the level of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by
reason of its inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
or perversity, is repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
of decency and morality in a just and civilized society.
For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of
36
allegiance to a government, committed by a person who owes
allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad, 1 Phil. 437). By the ‘allegiance’ is meant
the obligation of fidelity and obedience which individuals owe to the
government under which they live or to their sovereign in return for
the protection which they receive (52 Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the thought alone of one’s loved one being held
against his or her own will in some unidentified x x x house by a
group of scoundrels who are strangers is enough to terrify and send
shivers of fear through the spine of any person, even scoundrels
themselves.
In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson,
what is being punished by death is the fact that the perpetrator, at
the time of the commission of the crime, thinks nothing of the other
crime he commits and sees it merely as a form of selfamusement.
When a homicide is committed by reason of the rob-
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People vs. Echegaray
bery, the culprits are perceived as willing to take human life in
exchange for money or other personal property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony
of the parents over the personal shock and suffering of their child but
the stigma of the traumatic and degrading incident which has
shattered the victim’s life and permanently destroyed her reputation,
not to mention the ordeal of having to undergo the shameful
experience of police interrogation and court hearings.
Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for
the universal hostility of the perpetrators against their victims who
are passengers and complement of the vessel, and because of the fact
that, in the high seas, no one may be expected to be able to come to
the rescue of the helpless victims. For the same reason, Mr. Speaker,
the crime of air piracy is punished due to the evil motive of the
hijackers in making unreasonable demands upon the sovereignty of
an entire nation or nations, coupled with the attendant circumstance
of subjecting the passengers to terrorism."37
The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992
to February 11, 1993. On February 11, 1993, the Members of
the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the
death penalty bill on second reading.
On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the
Members of the House of Representatives cast their vote on
House Bill No. 62 when it was up for consideration on third
reading. The results were 123 votes in favor, 26 votes against,
38
and 2 abstentions.
After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on
February 23, 1993 and of Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16,
1993, the Bicameral Conference Committee convened to
incorporate and consolidate them.
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
entitled, “An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain
Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal
Code,
________________
37 Record, House of Representatives, Vol. III, November 9, 1992, pp. 419–420.
38 Record, House of Representatives, Vol. V, February 23, 1993, p. 98.
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714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other
Purposes,” took effect. 39
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect,
and the present time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted
under said law, and one of them, herein accusedappellant, has
been, pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme penalty of
death for raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction,
his case was elevated to us on automatic review. On June 25,
1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this
court’s affirmation of his death sentence and raises for the first
time the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659. His thesis
is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is
unconstitutional per se for having been enacted in the absence
of compelling reasons therefor, and (2) that the death penalty
for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against punishment
of such nature.
We reject accused-appellant’s proposition.
Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with
accused-appellant’s view that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659
without complying with the twin requirements of compelling
reasons and heinous crimes.
At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the
enactment of R.A. No. 7659 as unfurled in the beginning of this
disquisition, necessarily provide the context for the following
analysis.
 Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly
vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty “for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.” This power is
not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for
it is subject to a clear showing of “compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes.”
________________
39 People
v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 [1994]; People v. Timple, 237 SCRA
52 [1994].
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People vs. Echegaray
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to reimpose
the death penalty entails: (1) that Congress define or describe
what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and
penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be
imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in
court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance
with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill;
and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be
singularly motivated by “compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes.”
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No.
7659, we find the definition or description of heinous crimes.
Said clause provides that:
“x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society.”
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People
v. Alicando, traced the etymological root of the word “heinous”
40
to the Early Spartans’ word, “haineus,” meaning, hateful and
abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix “haton,”
denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil.
We find the foregoing definition or description to be a
sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime.
This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the
circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the
manner of commission of crime, its proximate consequences
and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the
sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion
in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases where R.A. No.
7659
_______________
40 251 SCRA 293 [1995].
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716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more flexible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill,
Senators Lina and Tañada grilled the sponsors of the bill as
regards what they perceived as a mere enumeration of capital
crimes without a specification of the elements that make them
heinous. They were oblivious to the fact that there were two
types of crimes in the death penalty bill: first, there were
crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death; and second,
there were crimes penalized by mandatory capital punishment
upon the attendance of certain specified qualifying
circumstances.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by
reclusion perpetua to death:
1. (1)Treason (Sec. 2);
2. (2)Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
3. (3)Parricide (Sec. 5);
4. (4)Murder (Sec. 6);
 5. (5)Infanticide (Sec. 7);
6. (6)Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended
by any of the following four circumstances: (a) the
victim was detained for more than three days; (b) it was
committed simulating public authority; (c) serious
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats
to kill him were made; and (d) if the victim is a minor,
except when the accused is any of the parents, female
or a public officer (Sec. 8);
7. (7)Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation
(Sec. 9);
8. (8)Destructive arson if what is burned is; (a) one or more
buildings or edifice; (b) a building where people usually
gather; (c) a train, ship or airplane for public use; (d) a
building or factory in the service of public utilities; (e) a
building for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence of a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or
government museum; and (g) a storehouse or factory of
explosive materials located in an inhabited place; or
regardless of what is burned, if the arson is perpetrated
by two or more persons (Sec. 10);
9. (9)Rape attended by any of the following circumstances:
(a) the rape is committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the
rape is commit
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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 717
People vs, Echegaray
1. ted by two or more persons; and (c) the rape is attempted
or frustrated and committed with homicide (Sec. 11);
2. (10)Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
3. (11)Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
4. (12)Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and
transportation of prohibited drugs (id.);
5. (13)Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of
prohibited drugs (id.);
6. (14)Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);
7. (15)Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain
specified amounts (id.);
8. (16)Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited
drugs (id.);
9. (17)Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
10. (18)Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);
11. (19)Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery,
transportation, and distribution of regulated
drugs (id.);
12. (20)Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of
regulated drugs (Sec. 15);
13. (21)Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified
amounts (Sec. 16);
14. (22)Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to
account dangerous drugs confiscated by the arresting
officer (Sec. 17);
15. (23)Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or
immediate vicinity of another to implicate the latter
(Sec. 19); and
16. (24)Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the
uniform penalty for all of them being not mandatory death but
the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In other
words, it is premature to demand for a specification of the
heinous elements in each of the foregoing crimes because they
are not anyway mandatorily penalized with death. The
elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death in these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial
court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua,
instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has, in
appreciating the evidence proferred before it, found the at-
718
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
tendance of certain circumstances in the manner by which the
crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on his
own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of
significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on the
victim or on society, which circumstances characterize the
criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or inherently or
manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms
of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory
penalty of death is imposed in the following crimes:
(1) Qualified bribery
“If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and be refrains from
arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise,
gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not
prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he
shall suffer the penalty of death.” (Sec. 4)
(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting
in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected
to dehumanizing acts
“The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of ransom from the victim or any other person,
even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is
raped, or is subject to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
[of death] shall be imposed.” (Sec. 8)
(3) Destructive arson resulting in death
“If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed.” (Sec. 10)
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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 719
People vs. Echegaray
(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and
qualified rape
“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be death.
xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed,
the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. 1.when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. 2.when the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities.
3. 3.when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent,
any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity.
4. 4.when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. 5.when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. 6.when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency.
7. 7.when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered permanent physical mutilation.” (Sec. 11)
(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation
of prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim
“Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if
the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in
any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of victim
thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed.”
(Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited
drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
720
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
the maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in every case where
a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is
allowed to use the same in such place.
 Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person
using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary.” (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the
victim dies
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if
the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in
any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be
imposed.” (Sec. 14)
(8.) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated
drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed in every
case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor
who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person
using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary.” (Sec. 15)
(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees
or officers including members of police agencies and armed forces
“The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Sections 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6,
7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15-A(1), 16,
and 19 of Article III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall be imposed,
if those found guilty of any of the same offenses are government officials,
721
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 721
People vs. Echegaray
employees or officers including members of police agencies and the armed
forces.” (Sec. 19)
(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with
the mandatory death penalty if convicted are government officials,
employees or officers
“Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty
of ‘planting’ any dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13
of Article II and Sections 14, 14A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as
evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same penalty as therein
provided.” (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in R.A. No. 7659 in their qualified form
“When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender
of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum [of
death] regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime
group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more
persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for
purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.” (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the
test of heinousness must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes
that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life
was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal
course of his or her growth as a human being. The right of a
person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this
means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her
individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or
her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or
her own spiritual, psychological, material and social
preferences and needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
722
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped,
tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or
resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes;
as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more
than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on
the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a
minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation,
destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous
by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in
the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in
the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in
which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from
decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the
culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of
society and the psyche of the populace. Terribly lacking the
money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any
form of misappropriation or misapplication of government
funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it
governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the
effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery,
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses
involving government officials, employees or officers, that their
perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction
and damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of
heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly
identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death,
As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion
per-
723
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 723
People vs. Echegaray
petua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than
those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to
determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when
on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence
involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death
sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say,
however, that the aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as
establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to
validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No.
7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or
repeal the provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to
aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while it
specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided
therein to be punished by the maximum penalty of death,
neither amends nor repeals the aggravating circumstances
under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No. 7659
in pari materia with the Revised Penal Code, death may be
imposed when: (1) aggravating circumstances attend the
commission of the crime as to make operative the provision of
the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the
maximum penalty; and (2) other circumstances attend the
commission of the crime which indubitably characterize the
same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify
the imposition of death, albeit the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand
the rationale for the guided discretion granted in the trial court
to recognize circumstances that characterize the commission of
the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of
circumstances that may attend the commission of a crime to
the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is
capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and
inscribe in law each and every loathsome act man is capable of.
It is sufficient thus that R.A. No. 7659 provides the test and
yardstick for the determination of the legal situation war-
724
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
ranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing danger
of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in meting out
the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to. nil the possibility of
executing an innocent man or one criminal but not heinously
criminal, R.A. No. 7659 is replete with both procedural and
substantive safeguards that ensure only the correct application
of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the
constitutional requirement that the death penalty be re-
imposed for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, we
note that the main objection to the death penalty bill revolved
around the persistent demand of the abolitionists for a
statement of the compelling reason in each and every heinous
crime and statistical proof that such compelling reason actually
exists.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and
compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with
each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting
and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human
standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications
and consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or
aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic
agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be
frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated. There can be
no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and we cannot afford to wait
until we rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and
thrashing it to its demission.
The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal
reforms first be pursued and implemented before the death
penalty be re-imposed in case such reforms prove unsuccessful.
They claimed ‘that the only compelling reason contemplated of
by the constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is
left for the government to resort to that could check the chaos
and the destruction that is being caused by unbridled
criminality. Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that the
compelling reason required by the constitution is that there
occurred a dramatic and significant change in the sociocultural
milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on
725
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 725
People vs. Echegaray
February 2, 1987 such as an unprecedented rise in the
incidence of criminality. Such are, however, interpretations
only of the phrase “compelling reasons” but not of the
conjunctive phrase “compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes.” The imposition of the requirement that there be a rise
in the incidence of criminality because of the suspension of the
death penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced demand,
for what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death
penalty first proves itself to be a truly deterrent factor in
criminal behavior. If there was a dramatically higher incidence
of criminality during the time that the death penalty was
suspended, that would have proven that the death penalty was
indeed a deterrent during the years before its suspension.
Suffice it to say-that the constitution in the first place did not
require that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent;
what it requires is that there be compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes.
Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution simply
states that Congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said
provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill
to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher
incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically
proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither
does the said provision require that the death penalty be
resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms
have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and
irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an
“alarming upsurge of such crimes,” for the same was never
intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the
existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that “the Congress,
in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the
need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for
heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death
penalty for said crimes.”
We now proceed to answer accused-appellant’s other ground
for attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659,
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726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
i.e., that the death penalty imposed in rape is violative of the
constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per
se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the
United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To 41
state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court,
in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and
inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself
but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the
death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing
jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much
on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but
on the discrimination against the black accused who is meted
out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the
unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose
the death penalty. In fact, the long road of the American
abolitionist movement leading to the landmark case
of Furman was trekked by American civil rights advocates
zealously fighting against racial discrimination. Thus, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated in Furman:
“We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these
defendants were sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our
task is not restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled
these death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system of law and of
justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries
the determination whether defendants committing these crimes
should die x x x.
xxx
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no
permissible ‘caste’ aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the
discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables
the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the
accused if he is poor and despised x x x.
xxx
________________
41 408 US 238, 33 L Ed 2d 346, 92 S Ct 2726.
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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 727
People vs. Echegaray
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their
operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination
is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of
the laws that is implicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’
punishments.”
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was
cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court
nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it
did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the
trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to
lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal
biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the
trial judges and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of
the states re-enacted their death penalty statutes now bearing
the procedural checks that were required by the U.S. Supreme
Court, said court affirmed the constitutionality of the new
death penalty statutes in the cases of Gregg v. Georgia, Jurek
42
v. Texas, and Profitt v. Florida
43 44
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty
is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of
rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve
the taking of life. In support of his contention, accusedappellant
largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker
v. Georgia. In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
45
“x x x It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel
and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of
punishment for crime; neither is it always disproportionate to the
crime for which it is imposed. It is also established that imposing
________________
42 428 US 153, 49 L Ed 2d 859, 96 S Ct 2909.
43 428 US 262, 49 L Ed 2d 929, 96 S Ct 2950.
44 428 US 242, 49 L Ed 2d 913, 96 S Ct 2960.
45 433 US 584, 53 L Ed 2d 982, 97 S Ct 286.
728
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
capital punishment, at least for murder, in accordance with the
procedures provided under the Georgia statutes saves the sentence
from the infirmities which led the Court to invalidate the prior
Georgia capital punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia x x x
xxx
In Gregg [v. Georgia] x x x the Court’s judgment was that the
death penalty for deliberate murder was neither the purposeless
imposition of severe punishment nor a punishment grossly
disproportionate to the crime. But the Court reserved the question of
the constitutionality of the death penalty when imposed for other
crimes. x x x
That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now
before us.
xxx
x x x [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in
the statutes providing the punishment for that crime, has been
dramatically different. In reviving death penalty laws to satisfy
Furman’s mandate, none of the States that had not previously
authorized death for rape chose to include rape among capital
felonies. Of the 16 States in which rape had been a capital offense,
only three provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in
their revised statutes—Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana. In
the latter two States, the death penalty was mandatory for those
found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by Woodson and
Roberts. When Louisiana and North Carolina, respondent to those
decisions, again revised their capital punishment laws, they
reenacted the death penalty for murder but not for rape; none of the
seven other legislatures that to our knowledge have amended or
replaced their death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976, including
four States (in addition to Louisiana and North Carolina) that had
authorized the death sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had reacted
to Furman with mandatory statutes, included rape among the crimes
for which death was an authorized punishment.
xxx
It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also
authorized the death penalty in some rape cases, but only where the
victim was a child and the rapist an adult, the Tennessee statute has
since been invalidated because the death sentence was mandatory. x
x x The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United
States at the present time that authorizes a sentence
729
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 729
People vs. Echegaray
of death when the rape victim is an adult woman, and only two other
jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the victim is a child.
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape
is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously
weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a
suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.
x x x [T]he legislative r ejection of capital punishment for rape
strongly confirms our own judgment, which is that death is indeed a
disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt
for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for
the latter’s privilege of choosing those with whom intimate
relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the
‘ultimate violation of self.’ It is also a violent crime because it
normally involves force, or the threat of force. or intimidation, to
overcome the will and the capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is
very often accompanied by physical injury to the female and can also
inflict mental and psychological damage. Because it undermines the
community’s sense of security, there is public injury as well.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in
terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the
public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the
unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by
another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or
even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the
rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it
was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have
the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which ‘is unique in its
severity and irrevocability’ x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist
who, as such, does not take human life.”
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two
grounds: first, that the public has manifested its rejection of
the death penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of rape
through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include
rape in their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath
of Furman; and second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly
contemptuous violation of a woman’s spiritual in-
730
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
tegrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not
involve the taking of life.
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have
any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of
our own culture.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court’s
predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants
the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance
of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an
ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of “an eye
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” We have already demonstrated
earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of
life simply because life was taken, never was a defining essence
of the death penalty in the context of our legal history and
cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in
heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have
committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely
destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses
from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies
based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they
have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their
victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose
actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of
government, they must be permanently prevented from doing
so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate
heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in the
case of People v. Cristobal: 46
“Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another
person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the
respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every
person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim
for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act x x x an outrage upon
decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society
itself.”
________________
46 G.R. No. 116279, promulgated on January 29, 1996.
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People vs. Echegaray
We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have
so essayed here, at the heart of the issue of capital punishment
is the wistful, sentimental life-and-death question to which all
of us, without thinking, would answer, “life, of course, over
death.” But dealing with the fundamental question of death
provides a context for struggling with even more basic
questions, for to grapple with the meaning of death is, in an
indirect way, to ask the meaning of life. Otherwise put, to ask
what the rights are of the dying is to ask what the rights are of
the living.
“Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is
substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts
which invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise
from a sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge
from the society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to
preserve the humane society we will have to retain sufficient
strength of character and will to do the unpleasant in order that
tranquility and civility may rule comprehensively. It seems very
likely that capital punishment is a x x x necessary, if limited factor
in that maintenance of social tranquillity and ought to be retained
on this ground. To do otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of
permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over the necessity of
social survival." 47
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration are hereby DENIED for LACK OF MERIT.
48
________________
47 Donald Atwell Zoll, “A Wistful Goodbye to Capital Punishment,” National
Review, December 3, 1971, pp. 1351–1354.
48 Three members of the Court voted to declare R.A. 7659 unconstitutional
insofar as it reimposes the death penalty. Two of them wrote Separate Opinions,
which are attached as annexes hereto, without indicating the names of the
authors consistent with the Court’s policy that, in death cases, ponentes of
opinions—whether majority or minority—are not to be indicated.
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732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.); Padilla, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza
, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
SEPARATE OPINION
Time has transformed man into a highly intellectual and
civilized, as well as, I wish to believe, a humane and
compassionate, being. The ancient edict of “an eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth” has since been abandoned by a society that
recognizes the good in every man and gives a transgressor an
opportunity to reform. Somehow, however, certain vestiges of
savage retribution still remain; indeed, the taking of a human
life continues, at least in some penal systems, to be an
acceptable punishment
In this country, the issue of whether or not the State should
impose the death penalty has recently been resolved with the
ratification, on 02 February 1987, of the Constitution by
76.29% of the electorate. Section 19, Article III, thereof, states:
“Sec. 19.(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua”
Ours is a rule of law. The Supreme Court is not a political
entity; it can merely apply and interpret the law. It cannot, and
it will not, spare itself from this constitutionallymandated
duty. Death penalty cases are not excepted. In the discharge of
its grave responsibility, nevertheless, the Court must act with
greatest caution and strictest circumspection for there can be
no stake that can be higher, and no penalty that can be graver,
than the extinction by the State of human life.
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty
now lies with the sound discretion of the law-making author-
733
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 733
People vs. Echegaray
ity, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions
that the fundamental law has set forth; viz:
1. (1)That there must be compelling reasons to justify the
imposition of the death penalty; and
2. (2)That the capital offense must involve a heinous crime.
It appears to me that the Constitution did not contemplate a
simple “reimposition” of the death penalty to offenses
theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or just
because of it.
The term “compelling reasons” should be enough to indicate
that there must be a marked change in the milieu from that
which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987
Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the
enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon
the other hand, that would make it distinctively inexorable to
mandate the death penalty. That milieu must have turned from
bad to worse.
Most importantly, the circumstances that would
characterize the “heinous nature” of the crime and make it so
exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must
be spelled out with great clarity in the law. To venture, in the
case of murder, the crime could become “heinous” within the
Constitutional concept when, to exemplify, the victim is
unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death, or
in the crime of rape when the offended party is callously
humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused.
I submit that, given the circumstances and the law before
us, the Constitutional fiat (now being raised for the first time
in the instant Motion for Reconsideration) in the imposition of
the death penalty has not been satisfied.
I, therefore, vote for imposing instead the penalty
of reclusion perpetua (the next lower penalty than death).
734
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
SEPARATE OPINION
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated August
1
22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, the accused raises
2
for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that
Republic Act No. 7659, the law reimposing the death penalty,
is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original) Motion for
Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, this 3
transcendental issue was not brought up. Hence, it was not
passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial
court’s sentence of death. 4
________________
1 It is called “Supplemental” because there was a (main) Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the previous counsel of the accused, which this Court
already denied.
2 The Anti Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group—
Pablito V. Sanidad, Jose Manuel I. Diokno, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren Moncupa,
Eduardo R. Abaya and Ma. Victoria I. Diokno—filed its Notice of Appearance
dated August 22, 1996 only on August 23, 1996, after the Per Curiam Decision
of this Court was promulgated on June 25, 1996.
3 Atty. Julian R. Vitug, Jr.
4 The bulk of jurisprudence precludes raising an issue for the first time only
on appeal. See, for instance, Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 249 SCRA 303, October 13, 1995; Manila Bay Club Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 715, July 11, 1995; Securities and Exchange
Commission vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 738, July 21, 1995. However, the
Court resolved to tackle the question of constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7659 in this case, anticipating that the same question would be raised anyway
in many other subsequent instances. The Court resolved to determine and
dispose of the issue once and for all, at the first opportunity. To let the issue
pass unresolved just because it was raised after the promulgation of the decision
affirming conviction may result in grave injustice.
735
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 735
People vs. Echegaray
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua” (Italics supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new
and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986
“Freedom Constitution.” They proscribe the imposition of the 5
death penalty “unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, Congress provides for it,” and reduced “any death
penalty already imposed” to reclusion perpetua. The provision
has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of
the penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital
sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the
Constitution did not merely suspend the’ imposition of the
death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the
statute
________________
5 In People vs. Muñoz, 170 SCRA 107, February 9, 1989; the Court, prior to
the enactment and effectivity of RA 7659, ruled by a vote of 9–6 (J.
Cruz, ponente, C.J. Fernan, JJ. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, concurring) that the death penalty was not
abolished but only prohibited from being imposed. But see also the persuasive
Dissenting Opinion of Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera (joined
by JJ. Narvasa, Paras, Sarmiento, Cortes and Regalado) who contended that
the Constitution totally abolished the death penalty and removed it from the
statute books. People vs. Muñoz reversed the earlier “abolition” doctrine
uniformly held in People v. Gavarra, 155 SCRA 327, October 30, 1987,
(per C.J. Yap); People vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113, October 27, 1987, (per J.
Melencio-Herrera) and People vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242, December 10, 1987
(per C.J. Narvasa). It is time that these cases are revisited by this Court.
736
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion
perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the
Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction of an
accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased
to exist in our penal laws and thus may no longer be carried
out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution.
As Comm. Bernas exclaimed, "(t)he majority voted for the
6
constitutional abolition of the death penalty.”
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the
distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina
MelencioHerrera emphasized, “It is thus clear that when Fr.
7
Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition
of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total
abolition and removal from the statute books of the death
penalty. This
_______________
6 This quote is taken from I Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 676
(July 17, 1986) as follows:
“Fr. Bernas:
xxx xxx xxx
“My Collection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not on whether
the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition should
be done by the Constitution—in which case it cannot be restored by the legislature—or
left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his
family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried out. There is no
evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be
destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the
life of another man is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty
as an institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us from
reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution intended precisely to serve
human life. So basically, this is the summary of the reasons which were presented in
support of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. (italics supplied)
7 Dissenting Opinion in People vs. Muñoz, supra, p. 129.
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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 737
People vs. Echegaray
became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they
approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights.”
With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes
an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception
and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be
strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
people. In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of
8
constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively
removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes but
(2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to
enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition that it
(Congress) finds “compelling reasons, involving heinous
9
crimes.” The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if
________________
8 Thus in People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, September 4, 1986, we held that a
statute which allows an exception to a constitutional right (against warrantless
arrests) should be strictly construed.
9 In his scholarly Memorandum, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. as amicus
curiae in People vs. Pedro V. Malabago (G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996),
vigorously argues that RA 7659 has validly restored the death penalty which
may now be imposed provided that the prosecution proves, and the court is
convinced, that (a) the accused is guilty of a crime designated by RA 7659 as
capital, (b) whose commission is accompanied by aggravating circumstances as
defined by Arts, 14 and 15 of the Revised Penal Code, (c) the accompanying
aggravating circumstance must be one which can be characterized by the court
as making the crime “heinous,” and (d) that the execution of the offender is
demanded by “compelling reasons” related to the offense. In other words,
according to him, it is the courts—not Congress—that have the responsibility of
determining the heinousness of a crime and the compelling reason for its
imposition upon a particular offender, depending on the facts of each case. I
cannot however subscribe to this view. The Constitution clearly identifies
Congress as the sovereign entity which is given the onus of fulfilling these two
constitutional limitations.
738
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
“awkward" ): the authority of Congress to “provide for it” is not
10
absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:
1. (1)by “compelling reasons” that may arise after the
Constitution became effective; and
2. (2)to crimes which Congress should identify or define or
characterize as “heinous.”
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden
of determining the existence of “compelling reasons” and of
defining what crimes are “heinous” before it could exercise its
law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For
clarity’s sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by
law, prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes; and courts,
by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress
enacted RA 7659 to “provide for it” (the death penalty) (1) by
11
amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; (2) by 12
incorporating a new article therein; and (3) by amending
13
certain special laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of
the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It
merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provi-
________________
10 People vs. Muñoz, supra, p. 121.
11 Which became effective on December 31, 1993, per People vs. Burgos, 234
SCRA 555, 569, July 29, 1994; People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, December 6,
1995; People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136, December 11, 1995.
12 Art. 114—Treason; Art. 123—Qualified Piracy; Art. 246—Parricide; Art.
248—Murder; Art. 255—Infanticide; Art. 267—Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention; Art. 294—Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons;
Art. 320—Destructive Arson; Art. 335—Rape.
13 Art. 211-A on Qualified Bribery.
14 Section 2, RA 7080—Plunder; Secs, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II of RA
6425—Prohibited Drugs; Secs. 14, 14-A and 15 of Article III of said RA 6425—
Carnapping.
739
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 739
People vs. Echegaray
sions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general
terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more severe
sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or individually
for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the
method by which the death penalty had been imposed until
February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows:
(1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the
commission of which was accompanied by aggravating
circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did
Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the
Constitution? More legally put: In reviving the death penalty,
did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of
the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III,
Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeat, while the Constitution limited the power of Congress
to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to “heinous” crimes, it did
not define or characterize the meaning of “heinous.” Neither
did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected
some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an
applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a
characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the
heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too
well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In deference
thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or
“whereas” clauses of RA 7659, as follows:
“WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are
heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society.”
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an
insufficient definition or characterization of what a hei-
740
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
nous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain
crimes to be “heinous” without adequately justifying its bases
therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and
unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness
can be determined. Calling the crimes “grievous, odious and
hateful” is not a substitute for an objective juridical definition.
Neither is the description “inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity.” Describing blood as blue
does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming
gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It
is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble
can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail
over its text. In this case, it cannot be the authoritative source
15
to show compliance with the Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain
laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty
once the court appreciates the presence or absence of
aggravating circumstances. There’s nothing really new that
16
Congress did which it could not have otherwise done had such
provision not been included in our fundamental law. In other
words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which
were already punishable with death prior to the
________________
15 A preamble is not an essential part of a statute. (Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, Second Edition 1990; Martin, Statutory Construction, Sixth
Edition, 1984). The function of the preamble is to supply reasons and
explanation and not to confer power or determine rights. Hence it cannot be
given the effect of enlarging the scope or effect of a statute. (C. Dallas
Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition, Volume IA,
§20.03).
16 Under Sec. 11, RA 7659, it appears that death is the mandatory penalty
for rape, regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, "(w)hen by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed,” or when it is “committed with any of the attendant circumstances
enumerated” in said section.
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People vs. Echegaray
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception
of plunder and qualified bribery, no new crimes were
17
introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by
death under said law were already so punishable by the
Revised Penal Code and by special laws. In short, Sec. 19,
18
Article III of the Constitution did not have any impact upon the
legislative action. It was effectively ignored by Congress in
enacting the capital punishment law.
 During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later
became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of
Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19
“So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President, and from existing special laws which, before abolition of
the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.”
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same
crimes which were already penalized with death prior to the
charter’s effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its
specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional
Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe
death for these very same crimes, it would not have written
Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the
stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the
death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its
restoration possible only under and subject to stringent
conditions is evident not only from the language of the
Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.
________________
17 While plunder and qualified bribery are “new” capital offenses, RA 7659
nonetheless fails to justify why they are considered heinous. In addition, the
specific compelling reasons for the prescribed penalty of death are not laid out
by the statute.
18 In the case of rape, RA 7659 provided certain attendant circumstances
which the prosecution must prove before courts can impose the extreme penalty.
Just the same however, the law did not explain why said circumstances would
make the crimes heinous. Neither did it set forth the compelling reasons
therefor.
19 Record of the Senate, First Regular Session, January 18 to March 11, 1993,
Volume III, No. 48, January 25, 1993, p. 122.
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742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
The critical phrase “unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes” was an amendment introduced by Comm.
Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could
qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on
“organized murder” or “brutal murder of a rape victim." Note 20
________________
20 I Record of the Constitutional Commission, July 18, 1986, pp. 742–743:
“MR. SUAREZ. The Gentleman advisedly used the words ‘heinous crimes,’ whatever is
the pronunciation. Will the Gentleman give examples of ‘heinous crimes’? For example,
would the head of an organized syndicate in dope distribution or dope smuggling fall
within the qualification of a heinous offender such as to preclude the application of the
principle of abolition of death penalty?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President. That is one of the possible crimes that would
qualify for a heinous crime. Another would be organized murder. In other words,
yesterday there were many arguments for and against, and they all had merit. But in the
contemporary society, we recognize the sacredness of human life and—I think it was
Honorable Laurel who said this yesterday—it is only God who gives and takes life.
However, the voice of the people is also the voice of God, and we cannot presume to have
the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely possible in the future that circumstances
may arise which we should not preclude today. We know that this is a very difficult
question. The fact that the arguments yesterday were quite impassioned and meritorious
merely tell us that this is far from a well-settled issue. At least in my personal opinion,
we would like the death penalty to be abolished. However, in the future we should allow
the National Assembly, in its wisdom and as representatives of the people, to still impose
the death penalty for the common good, in specific cases.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. I would like to pursue some more the Gentleman’s defi-
nition of ‘heinous crimes.’ Would the brutal murder of a rape victim be considered as
falling within that classification?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, yes, particularly, if it is a person in authority. He
would, therefore, add as an ag
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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 743
People vs. Echegaray
that the honorable commissioners did not just say “murder”
but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a
rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather scanty,
I believe that the available information shows that, when
deliberating on “heinousness,” the Constitutional Commission
did not have in mind the offenses already existing and already
penalized with death. I also believe that the heinousness clause
requires that:
1. 1)the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the
elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or
level of perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of
until then; or
2. 2)even existing crimes, provided some new element or
essential ingredient like “organized” or “brutal” is
 added to show their utter perversity, odiousness or
malevolence; or
3. 3)the means or method by which the crime, whether new
or old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of
extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as
to demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of
circumstances to qualify the crime as “heinous,” in the same
manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide
aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is
prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of
heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to
determine “compelling reasons” for the revival of the capital
penalty. It
________________
gravating circumstance to the crime the abuse of his position in authority.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.”
21 Some examples of this may be taken by Congress from Richmond vs.
Lewis, 506 US 40, like “gratuitous violence” or “needless mutilation” of the
victim.
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744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People us. Echegaray
is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA
7659 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But
22
such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It should be
remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is
sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and
the characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale
but must be shown for each and every crime, individually and
separately.
The words “compelling reasons” were included in the
Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, “in the future,
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today x
x x and that the conditions and the situation (during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change
for very specific reasons” requiring the return of the
constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved
into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to
questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to
explain these compelling reasons: 23
“MR. LAGMAN. So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr.
Speaker? x x x
________________
22 Paragraph 3 & 4 of the preamble reads:
“WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not only in the
loss of human lives and wanton destruction of property but has also affected the nation’s efforts
towards sustainable economic development and prosperity while at the same time has
undermined the people’s faith in the Government and the latter’s ability to maintain peace and
order in the country;
WHEREAS, the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and the rule of law, and
the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling
reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes”;
23 Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, 1992–1993,
Volume IV, February 10, 1993, p. 674, italics supplied.
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People vs. Echegaray
MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the
country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.
MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished
sponsor would like to justify or serve as an anchor for the
justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged
worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that
that is one of the compelling reasons. But before we dissect this
particular “compelling reason,” may we know what are the other
compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could
the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a
compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the
Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason
should be a supervening circumstance after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and
again that if one lives in an organized society governed by law,
justice demands that crime be punished and that the penalty
imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.
MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the
Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the
reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would
supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is
he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate
penalty for the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when
the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people
ratified it?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now,
under present conditions, because of the seriousness of the
offenses being committed at this time, justice demands that the
appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have
committed heinous crimes.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular
justifications of “worsening peace and order” and “justice.” With all
due respect I submit that these grounds are not “compelling” enough
to
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746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that
these “reasons” were even non-existent. Statistics from the
Philippine National Police show that the crime volume and crime
rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen
but in fact declined between 1987, the date when the Constitution
took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted.
Witness the following debate also between Representatives
24
Garcia and Lagman:
“MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker. Now, can we go to 1987.
Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the
crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is
12,305.
MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987. Mr. Speaker, could the
distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521
in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the
abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18
percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the
statistics supplied by the PC.
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution
abolished the death penalty? May we know from the distinguished
Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm
it.
MR. LAGMAN. No. Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate
was 40 percent.
________________
24 Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, 1992–1993, Vol.
III, November 10, 1992, p. 448; italics supplied.
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People vs. Echegaray
MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of
the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of
robbery cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr.
Speaker that the volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in
1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29
percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say. I understand we
are reading now from the same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume in 1987 was
12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in 1988 was
11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the Gentleman
confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). As I said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the
same document and I would not want to say that the Gentleman
is misreading the document that I have here.
MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.”
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina
gave some figures on the number of persons arrested in regard
to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991:
“Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drugs Board.
In 1987—this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished—the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062,
and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this
report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit
to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased
again to 2,862 in 1991.
________________
25 Record of the Senate, First Regular Session, January 18 to March 11, 1993,
Volume III, No. 50, January 27, 1993, pp. 176–177.
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748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the
drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a downward
trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to
1991."
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the
proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition
“would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous
crimes." However no statistical data, no sufficient proof,
26
empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with any
conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription of the
death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-
commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and
on, in the same manner that another proposition—
27
_______________
26 See “Sponsorship Remarks” of Rep. Manuel Sanchez, Record of the House
of Representatives, November 9,1992, pp. 40–42.
27 Witness, for instance, this interesting exchange between Commissioners
Joaquin Bernas and Napoleon Rama (I Record of the Constitutional
Commission, p. 678):
“FR. BERNAS. When some experts appeared before us and we asked
them if there was evidence to show that the death penalty had deterred the
commission of deadly crimes, none of them was able to say that there was
25
evidence, conclusive evidence, for that.
MR. RAMA. I am curious. Who are these experts then—social scientists
or penologists or what?
FR. BERNAS. Penologists.
MR. RAMA. Of course, we are aware that there is also another school of
thought here, another set of experts, who would swear that the death
penalty discourages crimes or criminality. Of course, Commissioner Bernas
knows that never in our history has there been a higher incidence of crime.
I say that criminality was at its zenith during the last decade.
FR. BERNAS. Correct, in spite of the existence of the death penalty.
MR. RAMA. Yes, but not necessarily in spite of the existence of the death
penalty. At any rate, does the sponsor think that in removing the death
penalty, it would not affect, one way or another, the crime rate of the
country?
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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 749
People vs. Echegaray
that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate
arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without
unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his
heirs or his witnesses—can be argued indefinitely. This debate 28
can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but
it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of
Congress to act within the “heinousness” and “compelling
reasons” limits of its death-prescribing power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the
death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it
should.—like any other guarantee in favor of the accused—be
zealously protected, and any exception thereto meticu-
29
________________
FR. BERNAS. The position taken by the majority of those who voted in
favor of this provision is that means other than the death penalty should be
used for the prevention of crime.”
28 Cf. Report to the United Nations Committee on Crime Prosecution and
Control, United Nations Social Affairs Division, Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice Branch, Vienna, 1988, p. 110.
29 Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his book The Bill of Rights,
(Second Edition, 1972, p. 4) states: “A regime of constitutionalism is thus
unthinkable without an assurance of the primacy of a bill of rights. Precisely a
constitution exists to assure that in the discharge of the governmental
functions, the dignity that is the birthright of every human being is duly
safeguarded. x x x” In the context of the role of a bill of rights the vast powers
of govern-ment are clearly to be exercised within the limits set by the
constitution, particularly the bill of rights. In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators vs. City Mayor of Manila, (L-24693, July 31, 1967), it was held that
the exercise of police power, insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property
of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. The guarantee in Sec. 1 of Article III
of the Constitution embraces life, liberty and property. In the words of Justice
Roberto Concepcion in People vs. Hernandez, (99 Phil. 515, 551–2 [1956]), “x x x
individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican
state, like ours, to be denied upon mere general princi
750
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People us. Echegaray
lously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
people, particularly where the right pertains to persons
accused of crimes. Here the issue is not just crimes—but
30
capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one
ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." This primary right of the people to enjoy life—life at its
31
fullest, life in dignity and honor—is not only reiterated by the
1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro-life and pro-
human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights, expressly prohibits any form of torture which
32 33
is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the
individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the
mother and the unborn from the moment of conception and 34
establishes the people’s rights to health, a balanced ecology and
education. 35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than
property, for people more than the state, and for life more than
mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the
constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty
________________
ples and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of
liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied
with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of Section (1) of the
Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5),
(6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1)
to the protection of several aspects of freedom. x x x” These guarantees are
preserved in the 1987 Constitution, according to Fr. Bernas.
30 See, for instance, People vs. Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554, 571, October 25, 1995,
and People vs. Pidia, 249 SCRA 687, 702–703, November 10, 1995.
31 Art. III, Sec. 1.
32 Art. III, Sec. 11.
33 Art. II, Sec. 12(2).
34 Art. II, Sec. 12.
35Art. II, Secs. 15, 16 & 17.
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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 751
People vs. Echegaray
as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its
perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights
to free speech, assembly and even religion. But the most basic
and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without
life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and
expression.
 This opinion would not be complete without a word on the
wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the
poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The “Profile of 165
Death Row Convicts” submitted by the Free Legal Assistance
Group highlights this sad fact:
36
1. "(1)Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186
persons have been sentenced to death. At the end of
37
1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end
of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7)
convicts per month, double the monthly average of
capital sentences imposed the prior year. From January
to June 1996, the number of death penalty convicts
reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost
double the monthly average of capital sentences
imposed in 1995.
2. (2)Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one
percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900
monthly; while approximately twenty seven percent
(27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those
earning above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly
few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999,
four percent (4%)
________________
36 For details, see Annex A of the Memorandum for the Accused-Appellant
dated September 26, 1996 filed by the Free Legal Assistance Group in People
vs. Malabago, G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996.
37 The FLAG-submitted Profile states that 186 have been sentenced to death
by trial courts since the effectivity of RA 7659. The Philippine Star issue of
December 9, 1996, page 17, however reports that, quoting Sen. Ernesto Herrera,
the total number of death row inmates has gone up to 267, as of November,
1996, of whom more than one half (139) are rape convicts. Some major
dailies (Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Manila Standard) in their
February 3, 1997 issue up the death row figure to 300, as of the end of January
1997, with 450 as the probable number at the end of 1997.
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752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
1. earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn
between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between
P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four percent
(4%), those earning P 15,000 and above only one percent
(1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn
nothing at all, while approximately two percent (2%)
earn subsistence wages with another five percent (5%)
earning variable income. Approximately nine percent
(9%) do not know how much they earn in a month.
2. (3)Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about
112 of them, earn below the government-mandated
minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn
below the official poverty line set by
government. Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00
and P11,000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the
middle class; only one (1) earns P30,000.00 monthly.
Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a
percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do
not know or are unsure of their monthly
income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
3. (4)In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one
percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in
animal husbandry\ of these, thirty (30), or almost one-
fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are
in the transport and construction industry, with thirty
one (31) construction workers or workers in allied fields
(carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty seven (27)
are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic,
tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them
drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and
services industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers
(engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice
vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers,
beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour guides,
computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4)
 clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk). About
four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6)
persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and
even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee
and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine
percent (9%) are unemployed.
4. (5)None of the DRC’s use English as their medium of
communication, About forty four percent (44%),
or slightly less than half speak and understand
Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-
fourth, speak and understand Cebuano. The rest speak
and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo,
Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1)
convict is a foreign national and speaks and understand
Niponggo.
5. (6)Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from
college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying
levels of ele
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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 753
People vs. Echegaray
1. mentary education with twenty seven (27) graduating
from elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty
eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of high
school, with more than half of them graduating from
high school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational
education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.”
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socioeconomic
situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has
militated against the poor and the powerless in society—those
who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital
crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research
and presentation are required. The best example to show the
sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the
crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the
proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court until
the Free Legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is
complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible language.
Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated,
intimidating and damning. The net effect of having a death
penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the
impecunious is to engender in the minds of the latter, a sense—
unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless—of the
unequal balance of the scales of justice.
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing
arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in
a very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of
the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving capital
punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate
against the poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged. To put
it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned,
the law would still be complex and written in a strange and
incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings
complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate penalty
involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole
controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it seems
to me that there will always be a certain class or classes of
people in our society who, by reason of their pov-
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754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
erty, lack of educational attainment and employment
opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and
subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-
thangenteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and
are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims
or perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that
perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither
improves or worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more
precise, such law may even be said to help improve their
situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger
deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic
differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-
poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are,
they require and deserve a greater degree of protection and
assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts
and the State, so that in spite of themselves, they can be
empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The
basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that
everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot
better ourselves individually to any significant degree if we are
unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-
poor provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet
we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate
punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged in
the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so
obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope
of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no
place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
1. (1)The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty
from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or
prohibit its imposition.
2. (2)The Charter effectively granted a new right: the
constitutional right against the death penalty, which is
really a species of the right to life.
755
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 755
People vs. Echegaray
1. (3)Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused because such a statute denigrates the
Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to
deny equal justice to the underprivileged.
2. (4)Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred
and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside.
3. (5)Congressional power to prescribe death
is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:
1. (a)First, Congress must provide a set of attendant
circumstances which the prosecution must prove
beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of
the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and
how these circumstances define or characterize the
crime as “heinous.”
2. (b)Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear
and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of
the Constitution compelling the enactment of the law.
It bears repeating that these requirements are
inseparable. They must both be present in view of the
specific constitutional mandate—“for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes.” The compelling
reason must flow from the heinous nature of the
offense.
1. (6)In every law reviving the capital penalty, the
heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out
for each and every crime, and not just for all crimes
generally and collectively.
“Thou shall not kill” is a fundamental commandment to all
Christians, as well as to the rest of the “sovereign Filipino
people” who believe in Almighty God. While the Catholic
38
Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong,
acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the
death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to
“cases of extreme gravity." To quote Pope John Paul II in his
39
________________
38 The preamble of the Constitution is theistic. It declares the “sovereign
Filipino people’s” imploration of the “aid of Almighty God.”
39 Catechism of the Catholic Church, p. 512, Word and Life Publications:
756
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), “punishment 40
must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not
_______________
“2266. Preserving the common good of society requires rendering the aggressor unable to
inflict harm. For this reason the traditional teaching of the Church has acknowledged as
well-founded the right and duty of legitimate public authority to punish malefactors by
means of penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime, not excluding, in cases
of extreme gravity, the death penalty. For analogous reasons those holding authority
have the right to repel by armed force aggressors against the community in their charge.
40 Evangelium Vitae, items Nos. 55 and 56, states:
“55. This should not cause surprise: to kill a human being, in whom the image of God is
present, is a particularly serious sin. Only God is the master of life! Yet from the
beginning, faced with the many and often tragic cases which occur in the life of
individuals and society, Christian reflection has sought a fuller and deeper
understanding of what God’s commandment prohibits and prescribes. There are, in fact,
situations in which values proposed by God’s Law seem to involve a genuine paradox.
This happens for example in the case of legitimate defense, in which the right to protect
one’s own life and the duty not to harm someone else’s life are difficult to reconcile in
practice. Certainly, the intrinsic value of life and the duty to love oneself no less than
others are the basis of a true right to self-defense. The demanding commandment of love
of neighbor, set forth in the Old Testament and confirmed by Jesus, itself presupposes
love of oneself as the basis of comparison: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself (Mk
12:31). Consequently, no one can renounce the right to self-defense out of lack of love for
life or for self. This can only be done in virtue of a heroic love which deepens and
transfigures the love of self into a radical self-offering, according to the spirit of the Gospel
Beatitudes (cf. Mt. 5:38–40). The sublime example of this self-offering is the Lord Jesus
himself.
Moreover, legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone
responsible for another’s life, the common good of the family or of the State.’
Unfortunately it happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of causing harm
sometimes involves taking his life. In this case,
757
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 7, 1997 757
People vs. Echegaray
go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of
absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be
possible otherwise to defend society x x x (which is) very rare, if
not practically non-existent.”
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution
and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty, Both are
________________
the fatal outcome is attributable to the aggressor whose action brought it about, even
though he may not be morally responsible because of a lack of the use of reason.
56. This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty. On this
matter there is a growing tendency, both in the Church and in civil society, to demand
that it be applied in a very limited way or even that it be abolished completely. The
problem must be viewed in the context of a system of penal justice even more in line with
human dignity and thus, in the end, with God’s plan for man and society. The primary
purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is “to redress the disorder caused by the
offense.” Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by im
posing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the
offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also fulfills
the purpose of defending public order and ensuring people’s safety, while at the same
time offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or her behavior and be
rehabilitated.
It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of the
punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the
extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words,
when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society. Today however, as a result of
steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare,
if not practically non-existent.
In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic
Church remains valid: “lf bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an
aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must
limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of
the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person,”
758
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Echegaray
pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of
human life over and above even the state which man created
precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution
reluctantly allows capital punishment only for “compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes” just as the Church
grudgingly permits it only for reasons of “absolute necessity”
involving crimes of “extreme gravity,” which are very rare and
practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has Congress, in
enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden
of proving the existence of “compelling reasons” to prescribe
death against well-defined “heinous” crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I respectfully vote to
grant partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial
court by deleting the words “DEATH, as provided for under RA
7659," and substitute therefor reclusion perpetua. I further
vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its
text.
Motion for reconsideration denied.
Note.—If capital punishment is justified, it serves as a
deterrent but if injudiciously imposed, it generates
resentment. (People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 [1995])

——o0o——

759
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All ri

G.R. No. 124736. September 29, 1999. *
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ROMEO GALLO y IGLOSO, accused-appellant.
Criminal Procedure; Information; The additional attendant
circumstances introduced by Republic Act 7659 should be considered
as special qualifying circumstances distinctly applicable to the crime
of rape and if not pleaded as such could only be appreciated as generic
aggravating circumstances.—The Court in the case of People vs.
Garcia, speaking through then, Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
ratiocinated that the additional attendant circumstances introduced
by R.A. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying
circumstances distinctly applicable to the crime of rape and, if not
pleaded as such, could only be appreciated as generic aggravating
circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Accused-appellant’s relationship to the
victim although proven but not alleged in the information, cannot be
considered to be a qualifying circumstance.—The above indictment
has not specifically alleged that accused-appellant is the victim’s
father; accordingly, accused-appellant’s relationship to the victim,
although proven during the trial, cannot be considered to be a
qualifying circumstance.
Same; Same; Court has the authority to suspend the execution of
a final judgment or to cause a modification thereof as and when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.—The Court has had the opportunity
to declare in a long line of cases that the tribunal retains control over
a case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably
with established legal processes. It has the authority to suspend the
execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification thereof as
and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or
when supervening events warrant it.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Br. 68.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
_______________
*EN BANC.
462
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gallo
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The penalty of death imposed upon accused-appellant Romeo
Gallo y Igloso by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, of
Binangonan, Rizal, after finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of qualified rape, was affirmed by this Court
in its decision promulgated on 22 January 1998.
On 24 August 1999, accused-appellant filed a “Motion to Re-
open Case (with Leave of Court)” seeking a modification of the
death sentence to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant
proffers that the reduction sought by him would be in line with
the new Court rulings which annunciate that the seven
attendant circumstances introduced in Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659 partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances
that must be pleaded in the indicment in order to warrant the
imposition of the penalty.
The Court in the case of People vs. Garcia, speaking through
1
then, Justice Florenz D. Regalado, ratiocinated that the
additional attendant circumstances introduced by R.A. 7659
should be considered as special qualifying circumstances
distinctly applicable to the crime of rape and, if not pleaded as
such, could only be appreciated as generic aggravating
circumstances. 2
The Information filed against accused-appellant reads:
“That on or sometime in the period of May, 1994 in the Municipality
of Cardona, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd designs
and by means of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with a 13 year old
girl, Marites Gallo y Segovia.”
3
_______________
1 281 SCRA 463, 484-489.
2 People vs. Rodico, 249 SCRA 309.
3 Rollo, p. 7.
463
VOL. 315, SEPTEMBER 29, 1999
People vs. Gallo
The above indictment has not specifically alleged that
accused-appellant is the victim’s father; accordingly, accused-
appellant’s relationship to the victim, although proven during
the trial, cannot be considered to be a qualifying
circumstance. 4
The next crucial point is whether the Court must now apply
retroactively the Garcia doctrine to the conviction of accused-
appellant.
The Court has had the opportunity to declare in a long line
of cases that the tribunal retains control over a case until the
full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with
established legal processes. It has the authority to suspend the
execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification thereof
as and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice or when supervening events warrant it. 5
The doctrine declared in People vs. Garcia, and its
reiteration in People vs. Ramos, People vs. Ilao, and People vs.
6 7
Medina, came only after almost a year from the promulgation
8
of the instant case.
The Office of the Solicitor General, when requested to
comment on the aforesaid 24th August 1999 motion of accused-
appellant, had this to state:
_______________
4 ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—In all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed. (Revised Penal Code)
5 Candelaria vs. Cañizares, 4 SCRA 738; Philippine Veterans Bank vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 645; Lipana vs. Development Bank of
Rizal, 154 SCRA 257; Lee vs. De Guzman, 187 SCRA 276; Bachrach
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128349, 25 September 1998, 296
SCRA 487; Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, 19 January
1999, 301 SCRA 96.
6 G.R. No. 129349, 25 September 1998, 296 SCRA 559.
463
7 G.R. No. 129529; 29 September 1998, 296 SCRA 658.
8 G.R. No. 126575, 11 December 1998, 300 SCRA 98.
464
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gallo
“Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the land (Article
8, Civil Code of the Philippines). Medina, which has the force and
effect of law, forms part of our penal statutes and assumes
retroactive effect, being as it is, favorable to an accused who is not a
habitual criminal, and notwithstanding that final sentence has
already been pronounced against him (Article 22, Revised Penal
Code).
“Indeed, by operation of law, appellant is rightfully entitled to the
beneficial application of Medina. Accordingly, the Office of the
Solicitor General hereby joins appellant’s prayer for reduction of his
sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.”
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its
above observations and sees merit in its stand to join accused-
appellant in praying for a modification of the sentence from
death to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the motion to re-open the case is GRANTED
and the decision sought to be reconsidered is MODIFIED by
imposing on accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in lieu of the death penalty and ordering him to
indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00.
Considering that the records of all cases where the death
penalty is imposed are forwarded to the Office of the President
in accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, the Court directs
the Clerk of Court to furnish the Office of the President with a
copy of this resolution for appropriate guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, P
anganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Motion to re-open case granted; Decision sought to be
reconsidered modified.
Note.—Republic Act No. 7659 provides the test and
yardstick for the determination of the legal situation
warranting
465
VOL. 315, SEPTEMBER 29, 1999 465
People vs. Tahop
the imposition of the supreme penalty of death. (People vs.
Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682 [1997])

——o0o——

G.R. No. 196390. September 28, 2011.*
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),
petitioner, vs. RICHARD BRODETT and JORGE JOSEPH,
respondents.
Forfeiture Proceedings; In a criminal proceeding, the court
having jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order upon
conviction of an accused the seizure of (a) the instruments to commit
the crime, including documents, papers, and other effects that are the
necessary means to commit the crime, and (b) contraband, the
ownership or possession of which is not permitted for being illegal; In
case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the
convict are absolutely divested and shall pass to the Government, but
it is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the court
in such manner that it can be said to be within its jurisdiction.—It is
not open to question that in a criminal proceeding, the court having
jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order upon conviction
of an accused the seizure of (a) the instruments to commit the crime,
including documents, papers, and other effects that are the necessary
means to commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or
possession of which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification
for the first, the accused must not profit from his crime, or must not
acquire property or the right to possession of property through his
unlawful act. As justification for the second, to return to the convict
from whom the contraband was taken, in one way or another, is not
prudent or proper, because doing so will give rise to a violation of the
law for possessing the contraband again. Indeed, the court having
jurisdiction over the offense has the right to dispose of property used
in the commission of the crime, such disposition being an accessory
penalty to be imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to
a third person not liable for the offense that it was used as the
instrument to commit. In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title
and ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and shall pass
to the Government. But it is required that the property to be forfeited
must be before the court in such manner that it can be said to be
within its jurisdiction.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; A proper court may order the return
of property held solely as evidence should the Government be
unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal prosecution.—
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in
connection with a criminal offense either by authority of a search
warrant or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If
the search is by virtue of a search warrant, the personal property
that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the offense; or
that which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits
of the offense; or that which has been used or intended to be used as
the means of committing an offense. If the search is an incident of a
lawful arrest, seizure may be made of dangerous weapons or
anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in the
commission of an offense. Should there be no ensuing criminal
prosecution in which the personal property seized is used as
evidence, its return to the person from whom it was taken, or to the
person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of course,
except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may order
the return of property held solely as evidence should the Government
be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal prosecution. The
order for the disposition of such property can be made only when the
case is finally terminated.
Same; Same; The text of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9165
relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that of Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the interpretation of the latter is extended by
analogy to the former.—There is no question, for even PDEA has
itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165 relevant
to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of
the unlawful act is similar to that of Article 45 of the Revised Penal
Code, which states: Article 45. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.—Every penalty imposed for
the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the
proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was
committed. Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be
the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but
those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed. The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45 of
the Revised Penal Code in People v. Jose, 37 SCRA 450
(1971), concerning the
341
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 341
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four accused
when they committed the forcible abduction with rape, although the
car did not belong to any of them, holding: xxx Article 45 of
the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an
instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such “be the
property of a third person not liable for the offense,” it is the sense of
this Court that the order of the court below for the confiscation of the
car in question should be set aside and that the said car should be
ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in replevin case.
xxx Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20.
Same; Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; The determination
of whether or not any article confiscated in relation to the unlawful
act would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the
judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings.—We note that the
RTC granted accused Brodett’s Motion To Return Non-Drug
Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the criminal proceedings were
still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the
release of the car at that point of the proceedings was premature,
considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly
forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or
income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the
accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the
proceedings in the Regional Trial Court. Section 20 further expressly
requires that such property or income derived therefrom should
remain in custodia legis in all that time and that no bond shall be
admitted for the release of it. Indeed, forfeiture, if warranted
pursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code and Section
20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the penalty to be prescribed.
The determination of whether or not the car (or any other article
confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject of
forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be rendered
in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
Same; Same; Same; The Court rules that henceforth the Regional
Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs
or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of
the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the
unlawful act.—The directive to return the non-drug
342
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
evidence has overtaken the petition for review as to render
further action upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the
opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter
of confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those
belonging to third persons not liable for the offense, in order to clarify
the extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165. This the Court must now do in view of the question about the
confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of
repetition in the future. We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial
Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A.
No. 9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-
drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of the
judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the
unlawful act.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alvaro Bernabe Lazaro for petitioner.
Verano Law Firm for respondent Brodett.
Fornier, Fornier, Saño & Lagumbay Law Firm for
respondent Joseph.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an
enforcement of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002 (Republic Act No. 9165) that are the property of a third
person are subject to be returned to the lawful owner who is not
liable for the unlawful act. But the trial court may not release
such objects pending trial and before judgment.
Antecedents
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, charged Richard Brodett
(Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Sec-
343
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 343
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
tion 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No. 91651 in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 09-208, the accusatory portion of the
information for which reads as follows:
“That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding each other,
they not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver and give away to
another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored tablets with Motorala (M)
logos, contained in six (6) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets
with recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which when
subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous drug.”2
Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed another
information charging only Brodett with a violation of Section
11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-209,
with the information alleging:
“That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the
City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the
following:
a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10)
transparent capsules containing white powdery
substance contained in one self-sealing transparent
plastic sachet having a net weight of 4.9007 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded
positive results for presence of METHYLENE
DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA), commonly
known as “Ecstasy,” a dangerous drug;
_______________
1 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
2 Rollo, p. 51.
344
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets
containing white powdery substance with total recorded
net weight of 1.2235 grams, which when subjected to
laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets
containing white powdery substance, placed in a light-
yellow folded paper, with total recorded net weight of
2.7355 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of
COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets
containing dried leaves with total recorded net weight of
54.5331 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of
TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a dangerous drug.”3
In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30,
2009, Brodett filed a Motion To Return Non-Drug Evidence. He
averred that during his arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) had seized several personal non-drug effects
from him, including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate
no. XPF-551; and that PDEA refused to return his personal
effects despite repeated demands for their return. He prayed
that his personal effects be tendered to the trial court to be
returned to him upon verification.4
On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor
submitted its Comment and Objection,5 proposing thereby that
the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for
safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the
trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defense to
exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City
Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it appeared
to be the instrument in the commission of the violation
_______________
3 Id., pp. 54-55.
4 Id., pp. 58-61.
5 Id., pp. 63-64.
345
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 345
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the vehicle used
in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directed the release of the
car, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized
officer or custodian is hereby directed to: (1) photograph the
abovementioned Honda Accord, before returning the same to its
rightful owner Myra S. Brodett and the return should be fully
documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as listed in this
Order of both accused, Richard S. Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to this
court for safekeeping, to be held as needed.
SO ORDERED.”6
PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its
motion was denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of merit, to
wit:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of
the Court dated November 4, 2009 is upheld.
SO ORDERED.”7
Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of
Appeals (CA) by petition for certiorari, claiming that the orders
of the RTC were issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its
Decision,8 dismissing the petition for certiorari thusly:
_______________
6 Id., p. 107.
7 Id., p. 110.
8 Id., pp. 37-46; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with
Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz,
concurring.
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
“xxxx
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this
petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett,
not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the
records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any
crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale
of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at
bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord
may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject
car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms.
Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law
are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary
construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial
construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are
not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation
is consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may
not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”9
Hence, PDEA appeals.
 Issues
Essentially, PDEA asserts that the decision of the CA was
not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of
the framers of R.A. No. 9165.10 It contends that the CA gravely
erred in its ruling; that the Honda Accord car, registered under
the name of Myra S. Brodett (Ms. Brodett), had been seized
from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation
and should not be released from the custody of the law; that
the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence did
_______________
9 Id., pp. 44-46.
10 Id., pp. 2-32.
347
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 347
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third
person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a
third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its
release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the
RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime.
In his Comment,11 Brodett counters that the petitioner failed
to present any question of law that warranted a review by the
Court; that Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165 clearly and
unequivocally states that confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds or instruments of the supposed unlawful act in favor
of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless such proceeds
or instruments are the property of a third person not liable for
the unlawful act; that PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading
that the third person must still prove in the trial court that he
has no knowledge of the commission of the crime; and that
PDEA failed to exhaust all remedies before filing the petition
for review.
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in
affirming the order for the release of the car to Ms. Brodett.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing
property confiscated in criminal proceedings
It is not open to question that in a criminal proceeding, the
court having jurisdiction over the offense has the power to
order upon conviction of an accused the seizure of (a) the
instruments to commit the crime, including documents, papers,
and other effects that are the necessary means to commit the
crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or posses-
_______________
11 Id., pp. 158-177.
348
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
sion of which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification
for the first, the accused must not profit from his crime, or must
not acquire property or the right to possession of property
through his unlawful act.12 As justification for the second, to
return to the convict from whom the contraband was taken, in
one way or another, is not prudent or proper, because doing so
will give rise to a violation of the law for possessing the
contraband again.13 Indeed, the court having jurisdiction over
the offense has the right to dispose of property used in the
commission of the crime, such disposition being an accessory
penalty to be imposed on the accused, unless the property
belongs to a third person not liable for the offense that it was
used as the instrument to commit.14
In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and
ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and shall pass
to the Government.15 But it is required that the property to be
forfeited must be before the court in such manner that it can be
said to be within its jurisdiction.16
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be
seized in connection with a criminal offense either by authority
of a search warrant or as the product of a search incidental to
a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue of a search warrant,
the personal property that may be seized may be that which is
the subject of the offense; or that which has been stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or that
which has been used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.17 If the search is an incident of a lawful
arrest, seizure may be made of dangerous weapons or anything
that may have been used or may consti-
_______________
12 24 CJS, Criminal Law, § 1733.
13 Villaruz v. Court of First Instance, 71 Phil. 72 (1940).
14 United States v. Bruhez, 28 Phil. 305 (1914).
15 United States v. Surla, 20 Phil. 163 (1911).
16 United States v. Filart and Singson, 30 Phil. 80 (1915).
17 Section 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
349
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 349
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
tute proof in the commission of an offense.18 Should there be no
ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal property
seized is used as evidence, its return to the person from whom
it was taken, or to the person who is entitled to its possession
is but a matter of course,19 except if it is contraband or
illegal per se. A proper court may order the return of property
held solely as evidence should the Government be
unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal prosecution.20 The
order for the disposition of such property can be made only
when the case is finally terminated.21
Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal
discretion in the matter of disposing of property claimed as
evidence,22 and this discretion extends even to the manner of
proceeding in the event the accused claims the property was
wrongfully taken from him.23 In particular, the trial court has
the power to return property held as evidence to its rightful
owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized by
the Government.24 Property used as evidence must be returned
once the criminal proceedings to which it relates have
terminated, unless it is then subject to forfeiture or other
proceedings.25
_______________
18 Section 13, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
19 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson, G.R. No. 164605, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA
704, 711.
20 24 CJS, Criminal Law, §1733, c., citing United States v. Premises Known
as 608 Taylor Ave., Apartment 302, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, C.A. Pa., 584 F.
2d 1297.
21 Padilla v. United States, C.A. Cal., 267 F. 2d 351.
22 24 CJS, Criminal Law, §1733, c., citing State v. Allen, 66 N.W. 2d 830,
159 Neb. 314.
23 Id., citing Hutchinson v. Rosetti, 205 N.Y.S. 2d 526, 24 Misc. 2d 949.
24 Id., citing United States v. Estep, C.A. 10(Okl.), 760 F. 2d 1060.
25 Id., citing United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave.,
Apartment 302, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, C.A. Pa., 584 F. 2d 1297.
350
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
II
Order of release was premature and made
in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car
belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in
connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs
involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of the
criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other criminal
proceedings.
In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:
“A careful reading of the above provision shows
that confiscation and forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to
“all the proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act,
including but not limited to, money and other assets obtained
thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular
unlawful act was committed unless they are the property of a
third person not liable for the unlawful act.” Simply put, the
law exempts from the effects of confiscation and forfeiture
any property that is owned by a third person who is not liable
for the unlawful act.
 Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this
petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S.
Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear
from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been
charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of
possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the
law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the
subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and
forfeiture.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is
clear and unambiguous, the court has no alternative but to apply the
same according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the first and fundamental
duty of courts is to apply the law according to its express terms,
interpretation being called only when such literal application is
impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be
resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for
application.351
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 351
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject
car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms.
Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law
are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary
construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial
construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are
not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation
is not consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person
may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law.”26 (emphases are in the original text)
The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and
forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act,
including the properties or proceeds derived from illegal
trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and essential
chemicals, is Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently
provides as follows:
“Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds
Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Precursors and Essential Chemicals.—Every penalty imposed for the
unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation,
delivery, distribution, transportation or manufacture of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical,
the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous
drugs, and the possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus
and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other
laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and
forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived from
unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money and other assets
obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the
particular unlawful act was committed, unless they are the
property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act, but
those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed
without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate
criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing
_______________
26 Rollo, pp. 44-45.
352
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense
and all the assets and properties of the accused either owned or held
by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be
found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income:
Provided, however, That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the
same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of
confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no
property, or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and
forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same
shall be in custodia legis and no bond shall be admitted for the
release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated
or forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all proper
expenses incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture,
custody and maintenance of the property pending disposition, as well
as expenses for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of
the above expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its
campaign against illegal drugs.”27
There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out,
that the text of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165 relevant to the
confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the
unlawful act is similar to that of Article 45 of the Revised Penal
Code, which states:
“Article 45. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of the Crime.—Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the
proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was
committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the property
of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles
which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.”
_______________
27 Emphasis supplied.
353
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 353
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45 of
the Revised Penal Code in People v. Jose,28 concerning the
confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four accused
when they committed the forcible abduction with rape,
although the car did not belong to any of them, holding:
“xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation
and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the
crime if such “be the property of a third person not liable for the
offense,” it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court below
for the confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that
the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for
foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Manila in replevin case. xxx”29
Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section
20, supra. To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments
belonging to a third person, therefore, there must be an
indictment charging such third person either as a principal,
accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will not suffice to
prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the third
person, for a mere suspicion of that person’s participation is not
sufficient ground for the court to order the forfeiture of the
goods seized.30
However, the Office of the City Prosecutor proposed through
its Comment and Objection submitted on August 27, 2009 in
the RTC31 that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal
effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the
duration of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and
the Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The
Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the return of
the car because it appeared to be the vehicle used in the
transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs, and, as such,
_______________
28 No. L-28232, February 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450.
29 Id., p. 482.
30 I Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 15th Edition, pp. 638-639.
31 Rollo, pp. 63-64.
354
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
was the instrument in the commission of the violation of
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not
in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the
framers of R.A. No. 9165,32 and contends that the car should not
be released from the custody of the law because it had been
seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal
operation. It argues that the Motion to Return Non-Drug
Evidence did not intimate or allege that the car had belonged
to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms.
Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso
facto authorize its release, because she was under the
obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the
commission of the crime. It insists that the car is a property
in custodia legis and may not be released during the pendency
of the trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted accused Brodett’s Motion To
Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the
criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet
to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at that point of
the proceedings was premature, considering that the third
paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly forbids
the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or
income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the
accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of
the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court. Section 20 further
expressly requires that such property or income derived
therefrom should remain in custodia legis in all that time and
that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warranted pursuant to either Article 45
of the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165,
would be a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determi-
_______________
32 Id., pp. 2-32.
355
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 355
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
nation of whether or not the car (or any other article confiscated
in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture
could be made only when the judgment was to be rendered in
the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in
relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the
RTC as being in custodia legis is primarily intended to preserve
it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To release
it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court
and the parties access to it as evidence. Consequently, that
photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was not
enough, for mere photographs might not fill in fully the
evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTC’s
assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for being in
contravention with the express language of Section 20 of R.A.
No. 9165.
Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders
of the RTC, or reverse the decision of the CA. It appears that
on August 26, 2011 the RTC promulgated its decision on the
merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208 and Criminal Case No. 09-
209, acquitting both Brodett and Joseph and further ordering
the return to the accused of all non-drug evidence except the
buy-bust money and the genuine money, because:
“The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links
in the chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar. The Court cannot
merely rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official function in view of the glaring blunder in the handling of
the corpus delicti of these cases. The presumption of regularity
should bow down to the presumption of innocence of the accused.
Hence, the two (2) accused BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged for Illegal
Selling and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, RICHARD
BRODETT y SANTOS and JOR-
356
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
GE JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in
Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and 09-209.
The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper
disposition. All the non-drug evidence except the buy bust
money and the genuine money are ordered returned to the
accused.
The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the
genuine money confiscated from both accused are ordered escheated
in favor of the government and accordingly transmitted to the
National Treasury for proper disposition.” (emphasis supplied)33
 The directive to return the non-drug evidence has overtaken Notes.—Some might argue that the evidentiary
the petition for review as to render further action upon it requirement in civil forfeiture cases has an even higher
superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to perform standard, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt—forfeiture of
its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter of confiscation property is in substance a criminal proceeding, and such
and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those belonging to forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty.
third persons not liable for the offense, in order to clarify the (Yuchengo vs. Sandiganbayan, 479 SCRA 1 [2006])
extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. Forfeiture retroacts to the date of the commission of the
No. 9165.34 This the Court must now do in view of the question offense. (Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Appeals, 481
about the confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being SCRA 109 [2006])
susceptible of repetition in the future.35 ——o0o——
We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall _______________
** Vice Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. per Special Order No.
comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No.
1080 dated September 13, 2011.
9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs or non- *** Vice Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, per Special Order No. 1093 dated
drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of September 21, 2011.
the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable
for the unlawful act.
_______________
33 Judgment dated August 26, 2011 rendered in Criminal Case No. 09-208
and Criminal Case No. 09-209.
34 Salonga v. Cruz Paño, No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438,
463; David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160,
215.
35 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA
160, 215; Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004,
435 SCRA 98; Acop v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA
577; Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421
SCRA 656.
357
VOL. 658, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 357
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) vs.
Brodett
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is
DENIED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to
disseminate this decision to all trial courts for their guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro (Actg. Chairperson), Del Castillo,
Perez** and Mendoza,*** JJ., concur.
Petition for review denied.

G.R. No. 170281. January 18, 2008. *
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL,
petitioner, vs. GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION
SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC.,
respondents.
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 (R.A. No. 9160); Civil
Forfeiture; Actions; Venue; Motions to Dismiss; The motu proprio
dismissal of a complaint by the trial court on the ground of improper
venue is plain error.—Inasmuch as Glasgow never questioned the
venue of the Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture against it, how
could the trial court have dismissed the complaint for improper
venue? In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 641
(1991), (reiterated in Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of Deeds
of Parañaque City, 344 SCRA 680 (2000)], this Court ruled:
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by [the] trial
court on the ground of improper venue is plain error… .
(emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; The venue of civil forfeiture cases is
any Regional Trial Court of the judicial region where the monetary
instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating
to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located.—
Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is any RTC of
the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
96
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection
Services, Inc.
or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful
activity or to a money laundering offense are located. Pasig City,
where the account sought to be forfeited in this case is situated, is
within the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly, the
complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC
of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of the RTCs of the NCJR,
it was a proper venue of the Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture
of Glasgow’s account.
Same; Same; Two Conditions When Applying for Civil
Forfeiture; It is the preliminary seizure of the property in question
which brings it within the reach of judicial process.—RA 9160, as
amended, and its implementing rules and regulations lay down two
conditions when applying for civil forfeiture: (1) when there is a
suspicious transaction report or a covered transaction report deemed
suspicious after investigation by the AMLC and (2) the court has, in
a petition filed for the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary
instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly,
related to said report. It is the preliminary seizure of the property in
question which brings it within the reach of the judicial process. It is
actually within the court’s possession when it is submitted to the
process of the court. The injunctive writ issued on August 8, 2003
removed account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 from the effective control
of either Glasgow or CSBI or their representatives or agents and
subjected it to the process of the court.
Same; Same; A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is
not a prerequisite for the institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding—
a finding of guilt for an unlawful activity is not an essential element
of civil forfeiture.—Whether or not there is truth in the allegation
that account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 contains the proceeds of
unlawful activities is an evidentiary matter that may be proven
during trial. The complaint, however, did not even have to show or
allege that Glasgow had been implicated in a conviction for, or the
commission of, the unlawful activities of estafa and violation of the
Securities Regulation Code. A criminal conviction for an unlawful
activity is not a prerequisite for the institution of a civil forfeiture
proceeding. Stated otherwise, a finding of guilt for an unlawful
activity is not an essential element of civil forfeiture.
97
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008 97
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection
Services, Inc.
Same; Same; Dismissal of Cases; While a court can dismiss a
case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of
such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is
chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with
reasonable promptitude.—In Marahay v. Melicor, 181 SCRA 811
(1990), this Court ruled: While a court can dismiss a case on the
ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power
is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with
want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the
disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the
plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to
dispense with rather than wield their authority to
dismiss. (emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem—service
may be made by publication; The same principle in forfeiture
proceedings under RA 1379 applies in cases for civil forfeiture under
RA 9160, as amended, since both cases do not terminate in the
imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties
either acquired illegally or related to unlawful activities in favor of
the State.—In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 406 SCRA 190 (2003),
this Court declared that the rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings
are actions in rem. While that case involved forfeiture proceedings
under RA 1379, the same principle applies in cases for civil forfeiture
under RA 9160, as amended, since both cases do not terminate in the
imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties
either acquired illegally or related to unlawful activities in favor of
the State. As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing
itself instead of against the person. In actions in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon
the defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of due process. For
this purpose, service may be made by publication as such mode of
service is allowed in actions in rem and quasi in rem.
PETITION for review on certiorari of an order of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Br. 47.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
98
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Lilian E. Elepaño and Edward G. Gan for respondent
City State Savings Bank, Inc.
SEDALAW for Glasgow Credit & Collection Services Inc.
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the order dated October 27,
1 2
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47,
dismissing the complaint for forfeiture filed by the Republic of
3
the Philippines, represented by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC) against respondents Glasgow Credit and
Collection Services, Inc. (Glasgow) and Citystate Savings
Bank, Inc. (CSBI).
On July 18, 2003, the Republic filed a complaint in the RTC
Manila for civil forfeiture of assets (with urgent plea for
issuance of temporary restraining order [TRO] and/or writ of
preliminary injunction) against the bank deposits in account
number CA-005-10-000121-5 maintained by Glasgow in CSBI.
The case, filed pursuant to RA 9160 (the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001), as amended, was docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-107319.
Acting on the Republic’s urgent plea for the issuance of a
TRO, the executive judge of RTC Manila issued a 72-hour TRO
4
dated July 21, 2003. The case was thereafter raffled to Branch
47 and the hearing on the application for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction was set on August 4, 2003.
After hearing, the trial court (through then Presiding Judge
Marivic T. Balisi-Umali) issued an order granting the
_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Penned by Judge Augusto T. Gutierrez. Rollo, pp. 49-58.
3 Docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107319.
4 Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas.
99
 VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008 99
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The injunctive writ
was issued on August 8, 2003.
Meanwhile, summons to Glasgow was returned “unserved”
as it could no longer be found at its last known address.
On October 8, 2003, the Republic filed a verified omnibus
motion for (a) issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of court
to serve summons by publication. In an order dated October 15,
2003, the trial court directed the issuance of alias summons.
However, no mention was made of the motion for leave of court
to serve summons by publication.
In an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial court archived
the case allegedly for failure of the Republic to serve
the alias summons. The Republic filed an ex parte omnibus
motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its pending
motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.
In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the
reinstatement of the case and directed the Republic to serve
the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days.
However, it did not resolve the Republic’s motion for leave of
court to serve summons by publication declaring:
“Until and unless a return is made on the alias summons, any action
on [the Republic’s] motion for leave of court to serve summons by
publication would be untenable if not premature.”
On July 12, 2004, the Republic (through the Office of the
Solicitor General [OSG]) received a copy of the sheriff’s return
dated June 30, 2004 stating that the alias summons was
returned “unserved” as Glasgow was no longer holding office at
the given address since July 2002 and left no forwarding
address.
Meanwhile, the Republic’s motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication remained unresolved. Thus, on
August 11, 2005, the Republic filed a manifestation and ex
parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication.
100
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
On August 12, 2005, the OSG received a copy of Glasgow’s
“Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special Appearance)” dated
August 11, 2005. It alleged that (1) the court had no jurisdiction
over its person as summons had not yet been served on it; (2)
the complaint was premature and stated no cause of action as
there was still no conviction for estafa or other criminal
violations implicating Glasgow and (3) there was failure to
prosecute on the part of the Republic.
The Republic opposed Glasgow’s motion to dismiss. It
contended that its suit was an action quasi in rem where
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court. It asserted that
prior conviction for unlawful activity was not a precondition to
the filing of a civil forfeiture case and that its complaint alleged
ultimate facts sufficient to establish a cause of action. It denied
that it failed to prosecute the case.
On October 27, 2005, the trial court issued the assailed
order. It dismissed the case on the following grounds: (1)
improper venue as it should have been filed in the RTC of Pasig
where CSBI, the depository bank of the account sought to be
forfeited, was located; (2) insufficiency of the complaint in form
and substance and (3) failure to prosecute. It lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction and directed CSBI to release to Glasgow
or its authorized representative the funds in CA-00510-000121-
5.
Raising questions of law, the Republic filed this petition. On
November 23, 2005, this Court issued a TRO restraining
Glasgow and CSBI, their agents, representatives and/or
persons acting upon their orders from implementing the
assailed October 27, 2005 order. It restrained Glasgow from
removing, dissipating or disposing of the funds in account no.
CA-005-10-000121-5 and CSBI from allowing any transaction
on the said account.
 The petition essentially presents the following issue:
whether the complaint for civil forfeiture was correctly dis-
101
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008 101
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
missed on grounds of improper venue, insufficiency in form and
substance and failure to prosecute.
The Court agrees with the Republic.
THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED IN THE PROPER
VENUE
In its assailed order, the trial court cited the grounds raised by
Glasgow in support of its motion to dismiss:
1. 1.That this [c]ourt has no jurisdiction over the person of
Glasgow considering that no [s]ummons has been served
upon it, and it has not entered its appearance voluntarily;
2. 2.That the [c]omplaint for forfeiture is premature because of
the absence of a prior finding by any tribunal that Glasgow
was engaged in unlawful activity: [i]n connection
therewith[,] Glasgow argues that the [c]omplaint states no
cause of action; and
3. 3.That there is failure to prosecute, in that, up to now,
summons has yet to be served upon Glasgow. 5 “Sec. 3. Venue of cases cognizable by the regional trial court.—A
But inasmuch as Glasgow never questioned the venue of the
Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture against it, how could
the trial court have dismissed the complaint for improper
venue? In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court (reiterated in Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of
6
Deeds of Parañaque City), this Court ruled:
7
“The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by [the] trial
court on the ground of improper venue is plain error….”
(emphasis supplied)
At any rate, the trial court was a proper venue.
On November 15, 2005, this Court issued A.M. No. 05-1104-
SC, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture,
_______________
5 Order dated October 27, 2005, supra note 2, p. 49.
6 G.R. No. 74854, 02 April 1991, 195 SCRA 641.
7 398 Phil. 626; 344 SCRA 680 (2000).
102
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument,
Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to
an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense under RA
9160, as amended (Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture). The order dismissing the Republic’s complaint for
civil forfeiture of Glasgow’s account in CSBI has not yet
attained finality on account of the pendency of this appeal.
Thus, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture applies
to the Republic’s complaint. Moreover, Glasgow itself judicially
8
admitted that the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture
is “applicable to the instant case.” 9
Section 3, Title II (Civil Forfeiture in the Regional Trial
Court) of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture
provides:
petition for civil forfeiture shall be filed in any regional trial court
of the judicial region where the monetary instrument,
property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to
an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are
located; Provided, however, That where all or any portion of the
monetary instrument, property or proceeds is located outside the
Philippines, the petition may be filed in the regional trial court in
Manila or of the judicial region where any portion of the monetary
instrument, property, or proceeds is located, at the option of the
petitioner.” (emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of
Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is
any RTC of the judicial region where the monetary instrument,
property or proceeds representing, involving, or
_______________
8Section 59, Title IX (Common Provisions) of the Rule of Procedure in Cases
of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 59. Transitory provision.—This Rule shall apply to all pending civil forfeiture cases
or petitions for freeze order.
9Memorandum dated January 11, 2007 for Glasgow. Rollo, pp. 329-347.
103
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008 103
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering
offense are located. Pasig City, where the account sought to be
forfeited in this case is situated, is within the National Capital
Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly, the complaint for civil
forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR.
Since the RTC Manila is one of the RTCs of the NCJR, it was 10
a proper venue of the Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture of
Glasgow’s account.
THE COMPLAINT WAS SUFFICIENT INFORM AND
SUBSTANCE
In the assailed order, the trial court evaluated the Republic’s
complaint to determine its sufficiency in form and substance:
“At the outset, this [c]ourt, before it proceeds, takes the opportunity
to examine the [c]omplaint and determine whether it is sufficient in
form and substance.
Before this [c]ourt is a [c]omplaint for Civil Forfeiture of Assets
filed by the [AMLC], represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General[,] against Glasgow and [CSBI] as necessary party. The
[c]omplaint principally alleges the following:
1. (a)Glasgow is a corporation existing under the laws of the
Philippines, with principal office address at Unit 703, 7th
_______________
Section 3 of BP 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended)
10
provides:
Section 13.Creation of Regional Trial Courts.—There are hereby created thirteen (13)
Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the following judicial regions:
xxx xxx xxx
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon,
Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San
Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and
Valenzuela[.] (emphasis supplied)
104
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
1. Floor, Citystate Center [Building], No. 709 Shaw Boulevard[,]
Pasig City;
2. (b)[CSBI] is a corporation existing under the laws of the
Philippines, with principal office at Citystate Center
Building, No. 709 Shaw Boulevard, Pasig City;
3. (c)Glasgow has funds in the amount of P21,301,430.28
deposited with [CSBI], under CA 005-10-000121-5;
4. (d)As events have proved, aforestated bank account is related
to the unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of
Securities Regulation Code;
5. (e)The deposit has been subject of Suspicious Transaction
Reports;
6. (f)After appropriate investigation, the AMLC issued
Resolutions No. 094 (dated July 10, 2002), 096 (dated July
12, 2002), 101 (dated July 23, 2002), and 108 (dated August
2, 2002), directing the issuance of freeze orders against the
bank accounts of Glasgow;
7. (g)Pursuant to said AMLC Resolutions, Freeze Orders Nos.
008-010, 011 and 013 were issued on different dates,
addressed to the concerned banks;
8. (h)The facts and circumstances plainly showing that
defendant Glasgow’s bank account and deposit are related to
the unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of Securities
Regulation Code, as well as to a money laundering offense
[which] [has] been summarized by the AMLC in its
Resolution No. 094; and
9. (i)Because defendant Glasgow’s bank account and deposits
are related to the unlawful activities of Estafa and violation
of Securities Regulation Code, as well as [to] money
laundering offense as aforestated, and being the subject of
covered transaction reports and eventual freeze orders, the
 same should properly be forfeited in favor of the government
in accordance with Section 12, R.A. 9160, as amended.” 11
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the
focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
_______________
Order dated October 27, 2005, supra note 2, pp. 52-53.
11
105
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008 105
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
allegations. The determination is confined to the four corners
12
of the complaint and nowhere else. 13
“In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action,
the question submitted to the court for determination is the
sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a
cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for
said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged
in the complaint.
The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint.” (emphasis ours)
14
In this connection, Section 4, Title II of the Rule of Procedure
in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
“Sec. 4. Contents of the petition for civil forfeiture.—The petition for
civil forfeiture shall be verified and contain the following allegations:
1. (a)The name and address of the respondent;
2. (b)A description with reasonable particularity of the
monetary instrument, property, or proceeds, and their
location; and
3. (c)The acts or omissions prohibited by and the specific
provisions of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended,
which are alleged to be the grounds relied upon for the
forfeiture of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds;
and
4. [(d)]The reliefs prayed for.
Here, the verified complaint of the Republic contained the
following allegations:
_______________
12 Malicdem v. Flores, G.R. No. 151001, 08 September 2006, 501 SCRA 248.
13 Id.
14 Id., citing Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, 30 September
2005, 471 SCRA 227.
106
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
1. (a)the name and address of the primary defendant therein,
Glasgow; 15
2. (b)a description of the proceeds of Glasgow’s unlawful
activities with particularity, as well as the location thereof,
account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 in the amount of
P21,301,430.28 maintained with CSBI;
3. (c)the acts prohibited by and the specific provisions of RA
9160, as amended, constituting the grounds for the forfeiture
of the said proceeds. In particular, suspicious transaction
reports showed that Glasgow engaged in unlawful activities
of estafa and violation of the Securities Regulation Code
(under Section 3(i)(9) and (13), RA 9160, as amended); the
proceeds of the unlawful activities were transacted and
deposited with CSBI in account no. CA-005-10-000121-5
thereby making them appear to have originated from
legitimate sources; as such, Glasgow engaged in money
laundering (under Section 4, RA 9160, as amended); and the
AMLC subjected the account to freeze order and
4. (d)the reliefs prayed for, namely, the issuance of a TRO or writ
of preliminary injunction and the forfeiture of the account in
favor of the government as well as other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises.
The form and substance of the Republic’s complaint
substantially conformed with Section 4, Title II of the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture.
 Moreover, Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as amended, provides:
“SEC. 12. Forfeiture Provisions.—
(a) Civil Forfeiture.—When there is a covered transaction report
made, and the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose ordered
seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in whole or
_______________
With CSBI impleaded as a co-defendant for being a necessary party.
15
107
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008 107
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report, the Revised
Rules of Court on civil forfeiture shall apply.”
In relation thereto, Rule 12.2 of the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of RA 9160, as amended, states:
RULE 12
Forfeiture Provisions
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.2. When Civil Forfeiture May be Applied.—When there is
a SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORT OR A COVERED
TRANSACTION REPORT DEEMED SUSPICIOUS AFTER
INVESTIGATION BY THE AMLC, and the court has, in a petition
filed for the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary instrument
or property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said
report, the Revised Rules of Court on civil forfeiture shall apply.
RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and
regulations lay down two conditions when applying for civil
forfeiture:
1. (1)when there is a suspicious transaction report or a covered
transaction report deemed suspicious after investigation by
the AMLC and
2. (2)the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered
the seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in
whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report.
It is the preliminary seizure of the property in question which
brings it within the reach of the judicial process. It is actually
16
within the court’s possession when it is submitted to the
process of the court. The injunctive writ issued on August 8,
17
2003 removed account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 from the
effective control of either Glasgow or CSBI or their repre-
_______________
36 Am Jur 2d, Forfeiture, Section 30.
16
Id., Section 28.
17
108
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
sentatives or agents and subjected it to the process of the court.
Since account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 of Glasgow in CSBI
was (1) covered by several suspicious transaction reports and
(2) placed under the control of the trial court upon the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction, the conditions provided in
Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as amended, were satisfied. Hence,
the Republic, represented by the AMLC, properly instituted the
complaint for civil forfeiture.
Whether or not there is truth in the allegation that account
no. CA-005-10-000121-5 contains the proceeds of unlawful
activities is an evidentiary matter that may be proven during
trial. The complaint, however, did not even have to show or
allege that Glasgow had been implicated in a conviction for, or
the commission of, the unlawful activities of estafa and
violation of the Securities Regulation Code.
A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a
prerequisite for the institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding.
Stated otherwise, a finding of guilt for an unlawful activity is
not an essential element of civil forfeiture.
Section 6 of RA 9160, as amended, provides:
“SEC. 6. Prosecution of Money Laundering.—
 1. (a)Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the
offense of money laundering and the unlawful activity as
herein defined.
2. (b)Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be
given precedence over the prosecution of any offense or
violation under this Act without prejudice to the freezing
and other remedies provided.” (emphasis supplied)
Rule 6.1 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of
RA 9160, as amended, states:
109
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008 109
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
Rule 6.1. Prosecution of Money Laundering—
1. (a)Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the
offense of money laundering and the unlawful activity as
defined under Rule 3(i) of the AMLA.
2. (b)Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be
given precedence over the prosecution of any offense or
violation under the AMLA without prejudice to
the application ex-parte by the AMLC to the Court of
Appeals for a freeze order with respect to the monetary
instrument or property involved therein and resort to
other remedies provided under the AMLA, the Rules
of Court and other pertinent laws and rules.”
(emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 27 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture provides:
“Sec. 27. No prior charge, pendency or conviction necessary.—No
prior criminal charge, pendency of or conviction for an
unlawful activity or money laundering offense is necessary for
the commencement or the resolution of a petition for civil
forfeiture.” (emphasis supplied)
Thus, regardless of the absence, pendency or outcome of a
criminal prosecution for the unlawful activity or for money
laundering, an action for civil forfeiture may be separately and
independently prosecuted and resolved.
THERE WAS NO FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
The trial court faulted the Republic for its alleged failure to
prosecute the case. Nothing could be more erroneous.
Immediately after the complaint was filed, the trial court
ordered its deputy sheriff/process server to serve summons and
notice of the hearing on the application for issuance of TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The subpoena to Glasgow
was, however, returned unserved as Glasgow “could no longer
be found at its given address” and had moved out of the
building since August 1, 2002.
110
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
Meanwhile, after due hearing, the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining Glasgow from removing,
dissipating or disposing of the subject bank deposits and CSBI
from allowing any transaction on, withdrawal, transfer,
removal, dissipation or disposition thereof.
As the summons on Glasgow was returned “unserved,” and
considering that its whereabouts could not be ascertained
despite diligent inquiry, the Republic filed a verified omnibus
motion for (a) issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of court
to serve summons by publication on October 8, 2003. While the
trial court issued an alias summons in its order dated October
15, 2003, it kept quiet on the prayer for leave of court to serve
summons by publication.
Subsequently, in an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial
court archived the case for failure of the Republic to cause the
service of alias summons. The Republic filed an ex
parte omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve
its pending motion for leave of court to serve summons by
publication.
In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the
reinstatement of the case and directed the Republic to cause
the service of the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within
15 days. However, it deferred its action on the Republic’s
motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication until
a return was made on the alias summons.
Meanwhile, the Republic continued to exert efforts to obtain
information from other government agencies on the
whereabouts or current status of respondent Glasgow if only to
save on expenses of publication of summons. Its efforts,
however, proved futile. The records on file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission provided no information. Other
inquiries yielded negative results.
On July 12, 2004, the Republic received a copy of the sheriff’s
return dated June 30, 2004 stating that the alias summons had
been returned “unserved” as Glasgow was no longer holding
office at the given address since July 2002 and left no
forwarding address. Still, no action was taken by the trial
111
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008 111
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
court on the Republic’s motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication. Thus, on August 11, 2005, the
Republic filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve
its motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.
It was at that point that Glasgow filed a motion to dismiss
by way of special appearance which the Republic vigorously
opposed. Strangely, to say the least, the trial court issued the
assailed order granting Glasgow’s motion.
Given these circumstances, how could the Republic be
faulted for failure to prosecute the complaint for civil
forfeiture? While there was admittedly a delay in the
proceeding, it could not be entirely or primarily ascribed to the
Republic. That Glasgow’s whereabouts could not be ascertained
was not only beyond the Republic’s control, it was also
attributable to Glasgow which left its principal office address
without informing the Securities and Exchange Commission or
any official regulatory body (like the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Department of Trade and Industry) of its new
address. Moreover, as early as October 8, 2003, the Republic
was already seeking leave of court to serve summons by
publication.
In Marahay v. Melicor, this Court ruled:
18
“While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur,
the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the
circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in
failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of
a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a
wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the
rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts
should decide to dispense with rather than wield their
authority to dismiss.” (emphasis supplied)
We see no pattern or scheme on the part of the Republic to
delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe
the mandatory requirement of the rules. The trial court
_______________
G.R. No. 44980, 06 February 1990, 181 SCRA 811.
18
112
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
should not have so eagerly wielded its power to dismiss the
Republic’s complaint.
SERVICE OF SUMMONS MAY BE BY PUBLICATION
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court declared that the
19
rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem.
While that case involved forfeiture proceedings under RA 1379,
the same principle applies in cases for civil forfeiture under RA
9160, as amended, since both cases do not terminate in the
imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the
properties either acquired illegally or related to unlawful
activities in favor of the State.
As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself
instead of against the person. In actions in rem or quasi in
20
rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided
that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless,
21
summons must be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy
the requirements of due process. For this purpose, service may
22
be made by publication as such mode of service is allowed in
actions in rem and quasi in rem. 23
In this connection, Section 8, Title II of the Rule of Procedure
in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
“Sec. 8. Notice and manner of service.—(a) The respondent shall be
given notice of the petition in the same manner as service of
summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and the following rules:
_______________
19 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 461 Phil. 598; 406 SCRA 190 (2003).
20 Id.
21 Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, 10 March 2004, 425 SCRA 98.
22 Id.
23 Sps. Jose v. Sps. Boyon, 460 Phil. 354; 414 SCRA 216 (2003).
113
VOL. 542, JANUARY 18, 2008 113
Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
1. 1.The notice shall be served on respondent personally, or by
any other means prescribed in Rule 14 of the Rules of Court;
2. 2.The notice shall contain: (i) the title of the case; (ii) the
docket number; (iii) the cause of action; and (iv) the relief
prayed for; and
3. 3.The notice shall likewise contain a proviso that, if no
comment or opposition is filed within the reglementary
period, the court shall hear the case ex parte and render such
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
petition and its supporting evidence.
(b) Where the respondent is designated as an unknown owner or whenever
his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon
him by publication of the notice of the petition in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order. In the event that the cost of publication exceeds the value or
amount of the property to be forfeited by ten percent, publication shall not
be required.” (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The October
27, 2005 order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
47, in Civil Case No. 03-107319 is SET ASIDE. The August 11,
2005 motion to dismiss of Glasgow Credit and Collection
Services, Inc. is DENIED. And the complaint for forfeiture of
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Anti-Money
Laundering Council, is REINSTATED.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 47 which shall forthwith proceed with the
case pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 05-11-04SC.
Pending final determination of the case, the November 23, 2005
temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby
MAINTAINED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Azcuna and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
114
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
State Land Investment Corporation vs. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue
Petition granted, order of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br.
47 set aside.
Notes.—It is logically congruent that violations of R.A. No.
1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the
forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a
penalty. (Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, 460 SCRA 600 [2005])
In civil cases to recover or for restitution, reparation of
damages, or indemnification for consequential and other
damages or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other
existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand
E. Marcos, et al., the Sandiganbayan is not to look for proof
beyond reasonable doubt, but to determine, based on the
evidence presented, in light of common human experience,
which of the theories proffered by the parties is more worthy of
credence. (Yuchengco vs. Sandiganbayan, 479 SCRA 1 [2006])

——o0o——

G.R. No. 92163. June 5, 1990. * determine probable cause.—It is also contended that the respondent
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN.
EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern
Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO
MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164. June 5, 1990. * relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO ANDERLINDA E. PANLILIO,
petitioners, vs. PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON,
AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND
EU-
_______________
*EN BANC.
218
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
LOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR.,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine prohibits
complexing of rebellion with any other offense.—The rejection of both
options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,
which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes
rebellion.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Personal evaluation of report
and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor, sufficient to
Judge issued the warrant for petitioner’s arrest without
first personally determining the existence of probable cause by
examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his
witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. This
Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty
of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient
that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.
Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour
and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent
Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go
over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. Merely
because said respondent had what some might consider only a
no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied;
nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Same; Same; Same; Bail; Courts; Respondent Court has
jurisdiction to deny or grant bail to petitioner.—The criminal case
before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner’s right to have provisional liberty pending trial and
judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with
said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that
jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right
to bail per se or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against
him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the
review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then,
not without first apply-
219
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 219
Enrile vs. Salazar
ing to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Incumbent on the accused, to whom
no bail is recommended, to claim the right to bail hearing to prove the
reason or weakness of evidence against him.—There was and is no
reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was
beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge—indeed
such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our
trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or
transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this
Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify
bypassing established judicial processes designed to orderly move
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthetically, this
is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against
the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not
thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or
deny bail and, if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to
correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge
here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice
sanctions simply following the prosecutor’s recommendation
regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for
the judge motu propio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is
charged. It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no
bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail
hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the
evidence against him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Court has no power to change,
but only to interpret the law as it stands at any given time.—It is
enough to give anyone pause—and the Court is no exception—that
not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such
unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies
every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need
to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty
therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be
considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently
utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken
in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can
only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is
needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive
the need for promptly the initiative in this matter, which is properly
within its province.
220
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
FERNAN, C.J., Dissenting and Concurring:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine should not be
interpreted as an all embracing authority; Reasons.—To my mind,
the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-
embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed
on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion
are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the
view of the majority in the instant case that “Hernandez remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion
with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an
activity that constitutes rebellion.”
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Separate Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Statutes; The rules
on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed.—While litigants,
should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing
should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought
before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any procedural flaw
notwithstanding. The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally
construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of habeas
corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The
scope and flexibility of the writ—its capacity to reach all manner of
illegal detention—its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes—have always been emphasized and jealously
guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau
of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [italics ours].
FELICIANO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Statutes; Non-retroactivity rule
applies to statutes principally; Expost facto law.—The non-
retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not
exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the
specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their
norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific
shape and content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms
become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them by the courts
and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf. Caltex v.
Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial
interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that
the law was originally
221
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 221
Enrile vs. Salazar
enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one
overruling a previous existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36
years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal
in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than
the pre-existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [19741; People
v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37
SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in
respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional
implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a
judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or
enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense, is
vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex
post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 US 347, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L.
Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections,
866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Rebellion consists of many acts; Case
at bar.—The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping
of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion.
Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of
thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or
thousands of separate offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens
to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act cannot
be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the
fancy of prosecutors—punishment for the killing of soldiers or
retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also loses
sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the
killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian economies, the
massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes,
and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion.
We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for
each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion.
We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to-
be-enacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack
on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the
rebellion.
PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex yCrime; Crime of Rebellion complexed with
murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not exist.—
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was
“ground- breaking” on
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder,
arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the
prosecution and the lower court, not only had
the Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of
President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to
bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not
exist.
Same; Same; Same; Case at bar; The reformation is clearly a
nullity and plainly void ab initio.—And yet, notwithstanding
these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights—absent when this
Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine—the prosecution has
insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in hearing, an
information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly
a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head should not be allowed to
surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has
given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto
are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored.
And, since the entire question of the information’s validity is before
the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the
information is fatally defective, even under procedural law, because
it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of
Court).
BIDIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Bail; Habeas Corpus is the proper
remedy to petitioner as an accused; Case at bar.—I submit that the
proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the
purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein
as charging simple rebellion, an offense which is bailable.
Consequently, habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to
petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion,
a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by the
respondent judge in violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right
to bail. In view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail
and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief
is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
SARMIENTO, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Bail; No useful
purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when the
Supreme Court has been satisfied that petitioner is entitled to
temporary
223
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 223
Enrile vs. Salazar
freedom.—I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the
remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when
we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner
“provisional liberty” upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we
granted him bail. The fact that we gave him “provisional liberty” is
in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It
will serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident
again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is
entitled to temporary freedom.
PETITION for Habeas Corpus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal
jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez once more takes center
1
stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would
reexamine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its
applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number
of similar cases that took issue with the ruling—all with a
2
marked lack of success—but none, it would seem, where season
and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract
wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even
among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind
and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the
same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27,
1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo
Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of
a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 90-
10941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and
earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
_______________
1 99 Phil. 515 (1956).
2 People vs. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 (1956); People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil.
90 (1956); People vs. Romagosa, 103 Phil. 20 (1958); and People vs.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 (1960).
224
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio
Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup
attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator
Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none
having been recommended in the information and none fixed in
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990,
he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where
he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile,
through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein
(which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March
2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional
rights in being, or having been:
1. (a)held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in
the statute books;
2. (b)charged with a criminal offense in an information for which
no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation
was conducted, hence was denied due process;
3. (c)denied his right to bail; and
4. (d)arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally
determined the existence of probable cause. 4 The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990
and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. On March 5, 5 spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within
1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return for the
respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164, which had 7 Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios),
been
_______________
3 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 32-34.
4 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 34 et seq.
5 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, p. 26.
6 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 305-359.
7 Originally a petition for certiorari and prohibition which the Court, upon
motion of the petitioners, resolved to treat as a petition
225
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 225
Enrile vs. Salazar
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
Enrile’s co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio,
and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the
petitioners’ case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because—and this is putting it very simply—the information
3 in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes
committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et
al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise,
the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex
crime (“delito complejo”) arising from an offense being a
necessary means for committing another, which is referred to
in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is
the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime
(“delito compuesto”) arising from a single act constituting two
or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first
clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of
the same date granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio
8
6 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for
respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without
prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the
provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was
not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four
Members of the Court voted against granting bail to Senator
9
Enrile, and two against granting bail to the Panlilios.
10
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are
raised and litigated in Senator Enrile’s petition, G.R. No.
92163.
The parties’ oral and written pleas presented the Court with
the following options:
_______________
for habeas corpus; Rollo, G.R. No. 92164, pp. 128-129.
8 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 407-411.
9 Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, Cortés and Griño-Aquino, JJ.
10 Fernan, C.J. and Narvasa, J.
226
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
1. (a)abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view
expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said
case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and
that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion
may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called;
this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral
argument although it is not offered in Ms written pleadings;
2. (b)hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of
rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a
rebellion which also constitute “common” crimes of grave or
less grave character;
3. (c)maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb
all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not
necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted
against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the
doctrine should be re-exainined. In the view of the majority,
10-a
the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases
have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are
presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete
reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long
ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the
1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others,
Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which
precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting
a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the
effect that “(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the
crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which
includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which
graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty
for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be
imposed upon the offender.” In thus acting, the President in
11
effect by legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than
accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful
reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject
________________
Two Members are on leave.
10-a
Executive Order No. 187 issued June 5, 1987.
11
227
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 227
Enrile vs. Salazar
the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its
application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be
interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with
other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, thereof While four Members of the Court felt that
the proponents’ arguments were not entirely devoid of merit,
the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome
what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its
course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is
made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion
in that case:
“There is one other reason—and a fundamental one at that—why
Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If
murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following
penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the
crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in
the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision
mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to
him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus,
said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
“Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose
of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more
severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed
toy Mm were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez
Navarro:
‘La unificacion de penas en los casos de eoncmrso de delitos a que hace
referenda este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado franeamente en
el principio pro reo.’ (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p.
2168.)
“We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71
(later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article
48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
‘Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que
un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea
medio necesario para cometer el otro.
‘En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas
grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represente la suma de las
que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
‘Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los
delitos por séparado.’ (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in
said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the
graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not
exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged
were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our
Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of
said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses,
there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that
the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to
prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each
offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit
of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the
result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when
he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of
sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must
suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate
penalties for each offense.” 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the
primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner’s
guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less
adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time.
The Court’s ruling merely provides a take-off point for the
disposition of
________________
People vs. Hernandez, supra at 541-543.
12
229
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 229
Enrile vs. Salazar
other questions relevant to the petitioner’s complaints about
the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he
has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the
information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an
offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would
complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple
rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
“In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said
defendants, as means “necessary” (4) for the perpetration of said
offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned
amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that
the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed
twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that, in
conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail.” 13
The plaint of petitioner’s counsel that he is charged with a
crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically
correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion
thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information
does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and
punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been
initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The
record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for
simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said
complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the
respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the ques-
_______________
Id., at 551.
13
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
tioned information. There is nothing inherently irregular or
14
contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for
an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory
complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the
preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the
warrant for petitioner’s arrest without
first personally determining the existence of probable cause by
examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his
witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the
Constitution. This Court has already ruled, however, that it is
15
not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established
procedure by personally evaluating the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. Petitioner
16
claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and
twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent
Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to
personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation. Merely because said respondent had what some
17
might consider only a relatively brief period within which to
comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single
circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail.
In the light of the Court’s reaffirmation of Hernandez as
applicable to petitioner’s case, and of the logical an.d necessary
corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion,
which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted
as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the
facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas
corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a
right to bail or vindicating its denial?
_______________
14 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp, 78-79 and 73-76.
15 Supra, footnote 4.
16 Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394.
 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 46-47.
17
established judicial processes designed to orderly move
231
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthetically,
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 231 this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court
Enrile vs. Salazar against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal
venue for invoking the petitioner’s right to have provisional _______________
liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to
Sec. 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court.
18

grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct
course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a
petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by
reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after
that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate
relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner’s premise that going by
the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent
crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter,
denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no differ*
ence that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest
fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following
the prosecutor’s recommendation regarding bail, though it may
be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to
set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. It is, in
19

charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his
any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has
improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the
been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing
obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought
and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the
in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18

evidence against him.

There thus seems to be no question that all the grounds upon
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has
which petitioner has founded the present petition, whether
triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar
these went into the substance of what is charged in the
situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or
information or imputed error or omission on the part of the
contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular
prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with
manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only
the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the
contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to
criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought
avoid by coming directly to this Court.
up there instead of directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of
outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash the
any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of
Court’s hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only
the respondent Judge—indeed such an assumption would be
compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court
demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever
now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court
to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental
cannot express too strongly the view that said petition
importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, irom
interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings
deciding them; none, in short that would justify by-passing
that should have started with the trial court and reached this
Court only if the relief applied for was denied by the former
and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no
longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the
present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and
burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the
original competence of the lower courts.
What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and
decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164)
which is virtually identical to that of petitioner Enrile in
factual
_______________
Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55.
19
233
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 233
Enrile vs. Salazar
milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles
already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly
pleaded that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-
20
accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941,
that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in
the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody
and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in
violation—they claim—of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of
rebellion has lost that quitessentially quixotic quality that
justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and
punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by
love of country than by lust for power and have become no
better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the
sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their
ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash
of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and
assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often
perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military,
but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called
rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause—and the Court is no
exception—that not even the crowded streets of our capital City
seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of
the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic
recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on
rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define
and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed
thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the
umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its
name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can
only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what
is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will
perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the
doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
_______________
Rollo, G.R. No. 92164, pp. 124-125.
20
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging
simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail,
before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court’s earlier
grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail
to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said
respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail
bond filed with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED,
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 Fernan, C.J., See separate dissenting and concurring
opinion.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., See separate
opinion.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., See concurring opinion.
Paras, J., I concur with the separate opinion of Justice
Padilla.
Padilla, J., See dissent.
Bidin, J., See concurring and dissenting opinion.
Sarmiento, J., See concurring and dissenting in part.
Cortés and Griño-Aquino, JJ., On leave.
Medialdea, J., Concurring in G.R. No. 92164; No part
in G.R. No. 92163.
FERNAN, C.J., Dissenting and Concurring:
I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems
to be a rigid adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court. The
numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case
of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once
demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of said
doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-
settled principles of criminal law and jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be
interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all
common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance
of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter.
To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority
in the
235
VOL. 186 JUNE 5, 1990 235
Enrile vs. Salazar
instant case that “Hernandez remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an
activity that constitutes rebellion” (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it
was applied by the Court in 1956 during the communist-
inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in
the span of 34 years since then have far-reaching effects on the
all-embracing applicability of the doctrine considering the
emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the
duly-constituted Government not contemplated in Articles 134
and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects
on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but
I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez
doctrine that needs clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the
Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant case, should have
further considered that distinction between acts or offenses
which are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the
one hand, and those acts or offenses that are merely
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion,
on the other. The majority of the Court is correct in adopting,
albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an
offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing
another, which is an element of the latter, the resulting
interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple
offense and must be deemed outside the operation of the
complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code.
As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the
instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from what is
merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting
thus in the rule that common crimes like murder, arson,
robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the occasion of
rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements
thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more
particularly, if applied to contemporaneous events happening
in our country today. Theoretically, a crime which is
indispensable in the commission of another must necessarily
be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely necessary
but not indis-
 236
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
pensable in the commission of another is not an element of the
latter, and if and when actually committed, brings the
interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime
provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that
distinction, common crimes committed against Government
forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly
considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are
logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or elements
thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian
population in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in
furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in
committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as
elements of the said crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths
occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between
government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion,
and would be those resulting from the bombing of military
camps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in
carrying out the rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an
unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos among
the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion,
should not be absorbed in the crime of rebellion as the felonious
act is merely necessary, but not indispensable, In the latter
case, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d’etat in our country as a mode of
seizing the powers of the duly-constituted government by
staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of
which this Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a
new dimension to the interpretation of the provisions on
rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code.
Generally, as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-
constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of
rebellion under the Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed,
a coup d’etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of its
execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the
lives of the people distinguish a coup d’etat from the traditional
definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised
Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to
the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950’s. A coup d’etat
may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting
to the commission of other serious crimes such as murder,
arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the
237
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 237
Enrile vs. Salazar
element of surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In
extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and other
common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d’etat,
the distinction referred to above on what is necessary and what
is indispensable in the commission of the coup d’etat should be
painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the
case of herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved
by the Court but I take exception to the vote of the majority on
the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Separate Opinion:
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine,
which has been with us for the past three decades, remains
good law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite
periodic challenges to it that, ironically, have only served to
strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas
corpus was not the proper remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple
crime of Rebellion, that proposition could have been plausible.
But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with
Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does
not exist in our statute books. The charge was obviously
intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its
maximum period imposable upon the offender pursuant to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was
recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the
Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed
a Motion to Quash before the lower Court would not have
brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that
petitioner was seeking. During the pendency of said Motion
before the lower Court, petitioner could have continued to
languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may
still issue even if another remedy, which is less effective, may
be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not lie when a
person is under custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court.
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the
process. In this case, the Court below must be deemed to have
been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed
petitioner’s liberty. Habeas corpus is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint. But where the detention or confinement is the
result of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may
still be invoked though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded
from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed.
Even if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing
doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist,
would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case, habeas corpus could be
relied upon to regain one’s liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391)
[Italics ours].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the
violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to bail inasmuch as
rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a bailable
offense and the crime for which petitioner stands accused of
and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law. While
litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial
ladder, nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance
of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional
issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v.
Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility
of the writ—its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention—its
ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes—have
always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and
lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420)
[italics ours].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the
wake of this Petition, was brought about by the insistence of
the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed
with other common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this
Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that charge and had
granted provisional liberty to petitioner,
239
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 239
Enrile vs. Salazar
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital
offense (now punishable by reclusion perpetua), the remedy lies
in legislation. But Article 142-A of the Revised Penal Code,
1
along with P.D« No. 942, were repealed, for being “repressive,”
fey EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further explicitly
provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the
Revised Penal Code was “restored to its full force and effect as
it existed before said amendatory decrees.” Having been so
repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into
existence, under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a
“creature unknown in law”—the complex crime of Rebellion
with Murder.
The remand of the case to the lower Court for further
proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served
its purpose.
FELICIANO, J., Concurring
I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of
the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of law,
could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in mind in
particular matters such as the correct or appropriate
relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept
of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines the actual
terms of Article 134 (entitled: “Rebellion or Insurrection—How
Committed”), it would appear that this Article specifies both
the overt acts and the criminal purpose which, when put
together, would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article
134 states that “the crime of rebellion is committed by rising
publicly and taking arms against the Government—”(i.e., the
overt acts comprising rebellion), “for the purpose of (i.e., the
specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the
allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines
_______________
1 “ART. 142-A. Cases where other offenses are committed.—When by reason
or on the occasion of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter, acts which
constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are
committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall
be imposed upon the offender.”
240
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed
forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature,
wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives.” At the
same time, Article 135 (entitled: “Penalty for Rebellion or
Insurrection.”) sets out a listing of acts or particular measures
which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or
insurrection: “engaging in war against the forces of the
Government, destroying property or committing serious
violence, exacting contributions or diverting public funds from
the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated.” Are
these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular
modes by which those “who promote [ ], maintain [ ] or head [
] a rebellion or insurrection” commit rebellion, or particular
modes of participation in a rebellion by public officers or
employees? Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of rebellion
relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the
indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under
the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differing
optional modes of seeking to carry out the political or social
objective of the rebellion or insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine
once more even the above threshold questions is that the
results of such re-examination may well be that acts which
under the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may
be characterized as separate or discrete offenses which, as a
matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from
rebellion or prosecuted under the provisions of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2 thereof)
clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct
offenses. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar, would,
as far as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-
retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised
Penal Code; both in relation to Article 8, Civil Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally.
But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon
the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial
decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions
construing statutory norms give specific shape and content to
such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted
with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses
become integral with the norms (Cf. Caltex v. Palomar, 18
SCRA 247
241
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 241
Enrile vs. Salazar
[1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a
statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was
originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied
rigorously where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in
particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine of long
standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the
statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is
more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People
v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA
270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA
420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in
respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has
constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United
States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an
act criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed
for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based
upon the rule against ex post facto laws and the due process
clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L. Ed. 2d 894
[1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260
[1977]; Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866
F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity
principle does not present any real problem for the reason that
the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second
clause, of the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause
thereof, while it is precisely the first clause of Article 48 that
the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious
doubt whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and
sharply characterized. And assuming the Hernandez could be
so characterized, subsequent cases refer to
the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not distinguish
clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article
48 (e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears to me that
the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary
intelligence would have necessarily read or understood
the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48,
second clause. Put in slightly different terms, the important
question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by
the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of
average intelligence (or counsel of average competence in the
law) from an examination of Articles 134 and
242
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
135 of the Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in
the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To formulate the
question in these terms would almost be to compel a negative
answer, especially in view of the conclusions reached by the
Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new
doctrine that the Government would have us discover for the
first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in
1932, would be more onerous for the respondent accused than
the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that murders
which have been committed on the occasion of and in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be deemed absorbed
in the offense of simple rebellion
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be
viewed as charging only the crime of simple rebellion.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion
I join the Court’s decision to grant the petition. In reiterating
the rule that under existing law rebellion may not be
complexed with murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot
legislate a new crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for
its commission. That function is exclusively for Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view
certain issues arising from these cases, especially on how the
defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have
been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is
ordinarily not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail
Under the special circumstances of this case, however, the
petitioners had no other recourse. They had to come to us.
 First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision
in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) that there is net
such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with
murder, that murder committed in connection with a rebellion
is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort to arms
resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes
neither two or more offenses nor a complex crime but one
crime—rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has
been reiterated in equally sensational cases. All lawyers and
even
243
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 243
Enrile vs. Salazar
law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the
doctrine re-examined have been consistently rejected by this
Court
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then
legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942, thereby installing
the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder
where graver penalties are imposed by law. However,
President Aquino using her then legislative powers expressly
repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby
erased the crime of rebellion complexed with murder and made
it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling
rule. The prosecution has not explained why it insists on
resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by the President.
The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the President
in repealing a repressive decree, a decree which, according to
the repeal order, is violative of human rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine
brings the ex post facto principle into the picture. Decisions of
this Court form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that
rebellion may be complexed with murder, our declaration can
not be made retroactive where the effect is to imprison a person
for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court
reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from
the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings charged in
the information were committed “on the occasion of, but not a
necessary means for, the commission of rebellion” result in
outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of
rebellion. Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped
on PTV-4 which kills government troopers results in simple
rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the
rebellion succeed. However, if the same bomb also kills some
civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb
becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing
of civilians is not necessary for the success of a rebellion and,
therefore, the killings are only “on the occasion of but not a
“necessary means for” the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping
of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion.
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244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing
of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a
hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if each bomb or each
bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property.
The same act cannot be punishable by separate penalties
depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors—
punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the
deaths of civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the
regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of
civilians, the laying waste of civilian economies, the massacre
of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes, and
other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in
rebellion. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent
of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not
connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to-beenacted legislation. The
killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities
furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above
considerations. I cannot understand why the trial Judge issued
the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that
the accused was not entitled to bail. The petitioner was
compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without
bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an
established doctrine of the Supreme Court. Worse, it issued a
warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure
based on a well-known Supreme Court ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an
independent judicial system; they do not belong to the
prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands
of the prosecution and blindly comply with its erroneous
manifestations. Faced with an information charging a
manifestly non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to
throw it out. Or, at the very least and where possible, make it
conform to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of
the Supreme Court especially a decision consistently followed
for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court
ruling, he is free to express his reservations in the body of his
decision, order, or resolution. However, any judgment he
renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues
must
245
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 245
Enrile vs. Salazar
follow the Supreme Court precedent. A trial court has no
jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme
Court. In this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor
General coming to this Court to question the lower court’s
rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail.
It should have been the Solicitor-General provoking the issue
of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed
from their arrest for a non-existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
“Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all.
It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised.
This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as
that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-
31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) The delicate task of ascertaining
the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory
provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal
ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no
less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in
the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal
relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does
so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial
organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and
authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the
judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.’ (Ibid, 107. The
opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was
cited). The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further
emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: ‘Judge
Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court,
by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last
word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable
controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions
all other courts should take their bearings.’ ” (Ibid. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br.
VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of
Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978]. See also Albert v. Court of First
Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine
Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando
de Leon, et al. even more inexplicable. In the case of the
Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non-existent crime
of rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of
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246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
the prosecutors, not in the records of the case.
 I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the
members of the Supreme Court. I listened intently to the oral
arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that
the constitutional requirement of probable cause was not
satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for any other proofs to
support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was
that the evidence would be submitted in due time to the trial
court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the
restaurant business for decades. Under the records of these
petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves
food to rebels is a co-conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity
of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that rebels
ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when
mealtime finds them in the vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and
other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend
masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in
various gatherings. Even if the hosts recognize them to be
rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow
that the former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of
the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that the petitioners served
food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor
asked two or three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a
vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger showing of probable
cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then
Senator Salonga was charged as a conspirator in the heinous
bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the
bomb had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph
taken during a birthday party in the United States with the
Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved
through a group picture. Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought
to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
‘The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect
him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state
from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA
247
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 247
Enrile vs. Salazar
241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a
preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it
would be to transgress constitutional due process. (See People v.
Oandasa, 2S SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process
clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is
conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not
escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only
the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the
guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the
judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going
through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient
to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form
a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no
general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause
since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the
judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise
Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal,
therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that
some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would
be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created
to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission
by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been
before. It should continue to be so.” (id., pp. 461-462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the
ponencia which will read the informations as charging simple
rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an
information charges murder but its contents show only the
ingredients of homicide, the Judge may rightly read it as
charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a
deliberate attempt to charge the petitioners for an offense
which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution
wanted Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has
filed informations for a crime which, under our rulings, does
not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void.
New informations charging the correct offense should be filed.
And in G.R, No, 92164 an extra effort should be made to see
whether or not the principle in Salonga v. Cruz Paño, et
al. (supra) has been violated.
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248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from
using more effective weapons to suppress rebellion. If the
Government feels that the current situation calls for the
imposition of more severe penalties like death or the creation
of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder, the
remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the
respondent court to DISMISS the void informations for a
nonexistent crime.
PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the
ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 “remains binding
doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as
a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect
of an activity that constitutes rebellion.”
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it
holds that the information in question, while charging the
complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, “is to be read as charging simple rebellion.”
The present cases are to be distinguished from
the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material respect. In
the Hernandez case, this Court was confronted with
an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez had been convicted by the
trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson
and robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the
Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to the now
celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder, arson and robbery does not exist. In
the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted
with an original case, i.e., where an information has been
recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners have not
even pleaded thereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case,
was “ground-breaking” on the issue of whether rebellion can be
complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present
cases, on the other hand, the prosecution and the lower court,
not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but
Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated
5 June
249
VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 249
Enrile vs. Salazar
1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition
that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and
multiple frustrated murder does not exist
And yet, notwithstanding
these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights—absent
when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine—the
prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has
persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners
with rebellion complexed with murder an multiple frustrated
murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void
ab initio. Its head should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity
in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise to
nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as
null and void as the information on which they are anchored.
And, since the entire question of the information’s validity is
before the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say
that the information is fatally defective, even under procedural
law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule
110, Rules of Court}.
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead
and, at best, fatally decrepit information by labelling or
“baptizing” it differently from what it announces itself to be.
The prosecution must file an entirely new and
proper information, for this entire exercise to merit the serious
consideration of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH
the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the information for
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated
murder in Criminal Case Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City,
DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered
permanently released and their bails cancelled.
BIDIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the
dispositive portion thereof which orders the remand of the case
to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the
respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have
construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion,
an offense which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is
the
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250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Enrile vs. Salazar
proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had
feeen charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who
had been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in
violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to bail. In view
thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and
approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief
is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is
a matter of right to the defendant, accused before the Regional
Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article
III, Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before
Us, on a petition for habeas corpus praying, among others, for
his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged
(construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail, it is incumbent
upon us in the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition
for habeas corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution;
Section 2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and
having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in such
sums as the court deems reasonable. Thereafter, the rules
require that “the proceedings together with the bond” shall
forthwith be certified to the respondent trial court (Section 14,
Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00
posted by petitioner for his provisional release pursuant to our
resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and
admitted as his bail bond for his provisional release in the case
(simple rebellion) pending before the respondent judge, without
necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for
his (petitioner’s) appearance before the trial court to abide its
order or judgment in the said case.
SARMIENTO, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that People v. Hernandez should abide. More than
1
three decades after which it was penned, it has firmly settled
in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means “engaging in war
against the forces of the government,” which implies “resort to
2
arms,
_______________
199 Phil. 515 (1956).
2Supra, 520.
251
 VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 251 ——o0o——
Enrile vs. Salazar
_______________
requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and
contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical 3Supra, 521.
injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and 4US v. Santiago, 41 Phil. 793 (1917).
unhappiness that war leaves in its wake....” whether 3
252
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
committed in furtherance, of as a necessary means for the
commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion
may be completed with any other offense, in this case murder,
is to play into a contradiction in terms because exactly,
rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation
for simple rebellion. Since the acts complained of as
constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information,
mention therein of murder as a complexing offense is a
surplusage, because in any case, the crime of rebellion is left
fully described.
4

At any rate, the government need only amend the

information by a clerical correction, since an amendment will
not alter its substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the
remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that
when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the
petitioner “provisional liberty” upon the filing of a bond of
P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him
“provisional liberty” is in my view, of no moment, because bail
means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful purpose to
have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves
have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary
freedom.
Proceedings in both cases remanded to respondent judge to
fix the amount of bail.
Note.—Amnesty granted by former President Marcos
covers crimes for violation of subversion laws or those defined
under crimes against public order. (Macaga-an vs. People, 152
SCRA 480.)
 No. L-28865. February 28, 1972.
NICANOR NAPOLIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
_______________
13 Rule 107, sec. l(c) of the old Rules, now Rule 111, sec. 3(b) of the Revised
Rules of Court.
302
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
Remedial law; Exceptions to conclusiveness of factual findings of
the Court of Appeals.—On appeal from a decision of the Court of
Appeals, the findings of fact made in said decision are final, except—
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) When there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went bey ond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee.
Criminal law; Characterization of crime of robbery with force
upon things where robber lays his hands upon a person.—The
doctrine laid down in previous cases whereby in case of robbery
inside an inhabited house, the thief, in addition, lays his hands upon
any person without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of
the injuries mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty decreed—under
paragraph (15) thereof—is much lighter defies logic and reason and
is now expressly abandoned. It is more plausible to believe that Art.
294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation
of person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the
conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code, When tie
elements of both provisions are present, the crime is a complex one,
calling for the imposition—as provided in Art. 48 of the Code—of the
penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period, which,
in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals. Lucero, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Victor Arichea for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix V. Maka siar, Assistant Solicitor
General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T.
Limcaoco for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal taken by Nicanor Napolis from a decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
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VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 28, 1972 303
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court
hereby finds the accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis and
Apolinario Satimbre guilty bey ond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery in band and sentences Bonifacio Malana as an accessory
after the fact to suffer imprisonment of from six (6) months, arresto
mayor, as minimum to six (6) years, prision correccional, as
maximum and to indemnify the offended party, Ignacio Peñaflor in
the sum of P80.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency but not to exceed one-third (1/3) of the principal penalty
and the accused Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre to suffer
imprisonment of from ten (10) y ears and one (1) day, prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day, reclusion temporal, as maximum, both to indemnify the
spouses Ignacio Peñaflor and Casimira Lagman in the sum of Two
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty-Seven Pesos (P2,557.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and all three to pay
the proportionate part of the costs.”
The main facts, on which there is no dispute, are set forth in
the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:
“At about 1:00 o’clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, Mrs.
Casimira Lagman Peñaflor, 47-y ear old wife of Ignacio Peñaflor, the
owner of a store located at the new highway, Hermosa, Bataan, after
answering a minor call of nature, heard the barkings of the dog
nearby indicating the presence of strangers around the vicinity.
Acting on instinct, she woke up husband Ignacio Peñaflor who, after
getting his flashlight and .38 caliber revolver, went down the store to
take a look. As he approached the door of the store, it suddenly gave
way having been forcibly pushed and opened by 4 men, one of them
holding and pointing a machinegun. Confronted by this peril, Ignacio
Peñaflor fired his revolver but missed. Upon receiving from someone
a stunning blow on the head, Ignacio fell down but he pretended to
be dead. He was hogtied by the men. The fact, however, was that he
did not lose consciousness (tsn. 5, I). The men then went up the
house. One of the robbers asked Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor for money
saying that they are people from the mountain. Mrs. Casimira L.
Peñaflor, realizing the danger, took from under the mat the bag
containing P2,000.00 in cash and two rings worth P350.00 and
delivered them to the robber. Thereupon, that robber opened and
ransacked the wardrobe. Then they tied the hands of Mrs Casimira
L. Peñaflor and those of her two sons. After telling them to lie down,
the robbers covered them with blankets and left. The revolver of
Ignacio, valued at P150.00, was taken by the robbers. The spouses
thereafter called for help and Councilor Almario, a neighbor, came
and untied Ignacio
304
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
Peñaflor. The robbery was reported to the Chief of Police of Hermosa
and to the Philippine Constabulary.
“Chief of Police Delfin Lapid testified that he went to the premises
upon receiving the report of Councilor Almario and found owner
Ignacio Peñaflor with a wound on the head (tsn. 23, I). The wardrobe
was ransacked and things scattered around. It appears that the
robbers bore a hole on the sidewall of the ground floor of the store
and passed through it to gain entrance. According to Chief of Police
Delfin Lapid, ‘they removed the adobe stone and that is the place
where they passed through’ (tsn. 24, I). In that same morning,
policeman Melquiadea Samaniego reported seeing suspicious
characters passing through a nearby field and when the field was
inspected, the authorities were able to locate a greasegun with 5
bullets and a pistol with 3 bullets (tsn. 24, I, testimony of Chief of
Police). x x x.”
It appears that, shortly after the occurrence, a criminal
complaint for robbery in hand was filed with the Justice of the
Peace Court of Hermosa, Bataan. Named as defendants in the
complaint, as subsequently amended, were Nicanor Napolis,
Bonifacio Malana, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, alias Mori,
Jose Escabel, alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John
Doe, alias Somray Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Paul Doe, et
al. Napolis, Malana, Anila and Casimiro having waived their
right to a preliminary investigation, the case, insofar as they
are concerned, was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, where the corresponding information was filed. As
subsequently amended, by the inclusion, as defendants
therein, of Antonio Bededia alias Toning, Domingo
Flores alias Eko, Ben de la Cruz, Jose Escabel alias Pepe,
Apolinario Satimbre, Oarlito Veloso and Paul Doe, it is alleged
in said information:
“That on or about 1:00 o’clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956,
in the Municipality of Hermosa, Province of Bataan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused
Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis. Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila,
Alias Mori, Jose Escabel, Alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning,
John Doe, Alias Sammy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito
Veloso, Domingo Flores, Alias Eko, and Paul Doe, by conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with the intent to gain and
armed with a Grease Gun, Three (3) caliber .45 pistols and two (2)
revolvers, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
entered the dwelling of the spouses IGNACIO PEÑAFLOR and
CASIMIRA L. PEÑAFLOR by boring a hole under
305
VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 28, 1972 305
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
the sidewall of the ground floor of the house and once inside, attack,
assault and hit Ignacio Peñaflor with the handle of the Grease Gun
causing him to fall on the ground and rendering him unconscious,
tied his hands and feet and then leave him; that the same accused
approached Casimira L. Peñaflor, threatened her at gun point and
demanded money; that the same accused while inside the said house
searched and ransacked the place and take and carry away the
following cash money and articles belonging to said spouses Ignacio
Peñaflor and Casimira L. Peñaflor, to wit: P2,000.00 in cash,
Philippine Currency, One (1) ring (Brillante) valued at P350.00, One
(1) licensed Commando Colt Revolver, Serial No. 532132 and One (1)
Flashlight, valued at P7.00, to the damage and prejudice of said
spouses in the total sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
FIFTY-SEVEN PESOS, (P2,557.00) Philippine Cur-rency.”
At the trial of Malana, Napolis, Satimbre, De la Cruz, Anila,
Casimiro and Flores, the evidence for the prosecution
1
consisted of the testimo ny of the offended parties, Ignacio
Peñaflor and his wife Casimira Lagman Peñaflor, Provincial
Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea, Deputy
Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina, Delfin Lapid, the Chief of
Police of Hermosa, Bataan , and Lt. Luis Sacra-mento of the
Constabulary and the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and C of
defendants Napolis, Satimbre and Malana, respectively,
admitting their participation in the commission of the crime
charged.
Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor testified mainly on the robbery
involved in the charge, whereas Fiscal Kahayon narrated the
circumstances under which the affidavit Exhibit A was
subscribed and sworn to before him by appellant Napolis;
Police Chief Lapid and Lt. Sacramen to dwelt on the
investigations conducted by them and the circumstances under
which said defendants made their aforementioned affida-vits;
and Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea and Deputy Clerk of Court
Eulogio C. Mina explained how Exhibits B and C were
subscribed and sworn to before them by defendants Satimbre
and Malana, respectively.
Upon the other hand, Napolis tried to establish an alibi.
Testifying in his own defense, he would have Us believe that
_______________
1 Other defendants were granted a separate trial, whereas still others had
not been apprehended as yet.
306
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
on October 1, 1956, he was in his house in Olongapo, Zambales,
because of a tooth extracted from him by one Dr. Maginas.
Defendant Satimbre, in turn, introduced his own testimony
and that of his wife Engracia Mendoza. Satimbre claimed to be
innocent of the crime charged and said that, although reluctant
to sign Exhibit B, he eventually signed thereon, upon the
advice of his wife Engracia Mendoza—who sought to
corroborate him—and Mayor Guillermo Arcenas of Hermosa,
in order that he may not be implicated in a robbery that took
place in Balamja, Bataan, and that he could be sent back to his
hometown, Hermosa, Bataan.
Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first instance
of Bataan dismissed the case as against defendants Flores,
Anila, Casimiro and De la Cruz.
In due course, said court convicted Nicanor Napolis,
Bonifacio Malana and Apolinario Satimbre, as above indicated.
Said defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which,
however, dismissed Malana’s appeal, and affirmed the decision
of the Court of First Instance, insofar as Napolis and Satimbre
are concerned, Satimbre did not appeal from said decision of
the Court of Appeals, whereas Napolis alleges that said court
has erred—
1. “I.In affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner herein, of
the crime charged based upon a lurking error of identity.
2. “II.In affirming the conviction of petitioner based upon an
extra-judicial confession extracted through duress.
3. “III.In affirming the decision of the court a quo based upon
the evidence on record adduced during the trial.
4. “IV.In deciding the case not in accordance with the provision
of law and jurisprudence on the matter.”
Under the first assignment of error, it is urged that appellant
has not been sufficiently identified as one of those who
perpetrated the crime charged. In support of this contention, it
is argued that the identification made by Mrs. Peñaflor was due
to a picture of appellant taken by Lt. Sacramento from the files
of the police in Olongapo, Zambales, and then shown to her,
before he (appellant) was appre-
307
 VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 28, 1972 307
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
hended and then brought to her presence for identification, It
is thus implied that Mrs. Peñaflor identified him in
consequence of the suggestion resulting from the picture she
had seen before he was taken to her for said purpose. The
defense further alleges that she could not have recognized
appellant herein, in the evening of the occurrence, because the
same was dark, and the flashlight used by the male-factors was
then focused downward.
Appellant’s pretense is, however, devoid of factual basis. The
record shows that the authorities were notified immediately
after the occurrence; that, soon after, peace officers—Police
Chief Lapid and PC Lt. Sacramento—repaired to the house of
Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor and investigated them; that based upon
the description given by Mrs. Peñaflor, one individual was
apprehended and then presented to Mrs. Peñaflor, who said
that he was not one of the thieves; that another person
subsequently arrested and taken to Mrs. Peñaflor was,
similarly, exonerated by her; that in the course of the
investigation conducted by the Philippine Constabulary, Lt.
Sacramento later brought Mrs. Peñaflor to the offices of the
police force in Olongapo and showed her the pictures of police
characters on file therein; that among those pictures, she
noticed that of appellant herein, who, she believed, was one of
the culprits; and that appellant was, therefore, arrested and
brought to Mrs. Peñaflor, who positively identified him as one
of the malefactors.
In other words, Lt. Sacramento did not suggest to Mrs.
Peñaflor, through the aforementioned picture of appellant, that
he was one of the thieves. It was she who told Lt. Sacramento
that said picture was that of one of the thieves. Besides, the
fact that Mrs. Peñaflor readily exonerated the first two
suspects, arrested by the authorities, shows that appellant
herein would not have been identified by her if she were not
reasonably certain about it.
Then, again, she had ample opportunity to recognize
appellant herein because it was he who demanded money from
her and to whom she delivered P2,000 in cash and two (2) rings
worth P350; it was, also, he who opened and ransacked her
wardrobe; and it was he who tied her hands and those of her
two sons. These series of acts, performed in
308
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
her presence, consumed sufficient time—from 10 to 20
minutes—to allow her eyesight to be adjusted to existing
conditions, and, hence, to reco gnize some of the robbers. The
night was dark; but, there were two flashlights switched on,
namely, that of her husband, and the one used by the thieves.
Although the latter was, at times, focussed downward, it had
to be aimed, sometimes, in another direction, particularly when
the money and rings were delivered to appellant herein, and
when he opened and ransacked the wardrobe of Mrs. Peñaflor.
Lastly, her testimony was confirmed by other circumstances
presently to be mentioned, in connection with the consideration
of the other alleged errors pointed out by appellant herein.
The second assignment of error is based upon a wrong
premise—that appellant’s co nviction was based upon his
extrajudicial confession and that the same had been made
under duress.
Said extrajudicial confession was merely one of the tors
considered by His Honor, the trial Judge, and the Court of
Appeals in concluding that the evidence for the defense cannot
be relied upon and that the witnesses for the prosecution had
told the truth. Besides, appellant’s confession was not tainted
with duress. In this connection, the Court of Appeals had the
following to say:
“Apart from the reliability of Mrs. Casimiro Lagman Peñaflor’s
identification, we have the extrajudicial confession of appellant
Nicanor Napolis, marked Exh. A, subscribed and sworn to by said
accused on October 26, 1956, 25 day s after the occurrence, before
Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, the 64-y ear old prosecutor who,
since July 18, 1946, was the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan up to the
present. His testimony shows that he read the confession, Exh. A, to
said accused in the Tagalog dialect; asked him whether he
understood it to which appellant Napolis answered ‘yes’; inquired
whether he was coerced to which he replied ‘No’; and then, required
him to raise his hand in affirmation which he did (tsn. 14-15, I).
Thereupon, appellant Napolis signed the confession in his (Fiscal’s)
presence. Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahay on further testified that
he saw no signs of phy sical violence on the person of the appellant
who appeared normal in his appearance tsn. 15, I). In this confession,
Exh. A, appellant Napolis related that it was co-accused Antonio
Bededia (still-at-large) who pointed the greasegun to husband
Ignacio Peñaflor and who
309
VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 28, 1972 309
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
hit him (Peñaflor) on the head and that it was co-accused Ben de la
Cruz (whose case was dismissed) who wrested Peñaflor’s revolver.
For his part, appellant Napolis admitted that it was he who talked
to Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor and it was he who got the money bag.
The loot, according to him, was split from which he received a share
of P237.00 (Answer to Q, A, Exh. A). Among others, he mentioned
appellant Bonifacio Malana as the owner of the greasegun and the
one who got Peñaflor’s revolver from the hands of co-accused Ben de
la Cruz. x x x.”
It may not be amiss to advert to the fact that, on appeal from a
decision of the Court of Appeals, the findings of fact made in
said decision are final, except—
“(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went bey ond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee.” 2
and that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing-
exceptions.
The third assignment of error is predicated upon the theory
that the evidence for the prosecution is contradictory and,
hence, unworthy of credence. Counsel for the defense alleges
that, whereas Ignacio Peñaflor said that the thieves had
entered his house by forcing its door open, Mrs. Peñaflor
testified that their entry was effected through an excavation by
the side of the house, and the chief of police affirmed that the
malefactors had removed a piece of wood and an adobe stone to
get into said house. No such contradictions, however, exist. The
house of Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor consisted of two (2) parts, one
of which was a store and the other the dwelling proper,
adjoining the store, which had a doorleading thereto (to the
dwelling proper). Mrs. Peñaflor testified that the culprits had
entered the store by removing an adobe stone from a wall
thereof, and
_______________
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, L-26490, June 30, 1970, citing Roque v. Buan,
2
et al., L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., L-22533, Feb.
9, 1967; Hilario, Jr. v. City of Manila, L-19570, Sept. 14, 1967.
310
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
this was corroborated by the chief of police, although he added
that the malefactors had, also, removed a piece of wood from
said wall. Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mr. Peñaflor
referred to a door, inside the store, leading to the dwelling
proper, as distingu ished from the store.
In the light of the foregoing, and considering that the
findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals are supported by
those of His Honor, the trial Judge, who had observed the
behaviour of the witnesses during the trial, it is clear to Us that
the first three (3) assignments of error are untenable.
The fourth assignment of error refers to the characterization
of the crime co mmitted and the proper penalty therefor. It
should be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial cou rt convicting Napolis, Malana and Satimbre of
the crime of robbery committed by armed persons, in an
inhabited house, entry therein having been made by breaking
a wall, as provided in Article 299 (a) of the Revised Penal Code,
and, accordingly, sentencing Napolis and Satimbre to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as ma x
i mu m, wh ic h is in accordance with said legal provision.
In addition, however, to performing said acts, the male-
factors had, also, used violence against Ignacio Peñaflor, and
intimidation against his wife, thereby infringing Article 294 of
the same Code, under conditions falling under sub-paragraph
(5) of said article, which prescribes the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period, which is lighter than that prescribed in said
Article 299, although, factually, the crime co mmitted is more
serious than that covered by the latter provision. This Court
had previously ruled—
“x x x that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited house,
is characterized by intimidation, this factor ‘supplies the controlling
qualification,’ so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article
299 of the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that ‘robbery
which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person
is evidently graver than or-
311
VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 28, 1972 311
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
dinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where
violence or intimidation against the person is present there is greater
disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual.’
(U.S. vs. Turla, 38 Phil. 346; People vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89.) And
this view is followed even where, as in the present case, the penalty
to be applied under article 294 is lighter than that which would result
from the application of article 299. x x x.”
3
Upon mature deliberation, W e find ourselves unable to share
the foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall, enters,
with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals therefrom
valuable effects, without violence against or intimidation upon
persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal
Code with reclusión temporal. Pursuant to the above view,
4
adhered to in previous decisions, if, aside from performing said
5
acts, the thief lays hand upon any person, without committing
any of the crimes or inflicting any of, the injuries, mentioned in
subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the same Code, the
imposable penalty—under paragraph (5) thereof—shall
be much lighter. To our mind, this result and the process of
6
reasoning that has brought it about, defy logic and reason.
The argument to the effect that the violence against or
intimidation of a person supplies the “controlling
qualification,” Is far from sufficient to justify said result. We
agree with, the proposition that robbery with “violence or
intimidation against the person is evidently graver than
ordinary robbery committed by force upon things,”
but, precisely, for this reason, We cannot accept the conclusion
deduced therefrom in the cases above cited—reduction of the
penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence
_______________
3 People v. Sebastian, 85 Phil. 601, 603. See, also, Manahan v. People, 73
Phil. 691; U.S. v. Manansala, 9 Phil. 529, 530; U.S. v. De los Santos, 6 Phil. 411,
412.
4 From twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusión
temporal.
5 People v. Sebastian, 85 Phil. 601; Manahan v. People, 73 Phil. 691; People
v. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89; U.S. v. Turla, 38 Phil. 346; U.S. v. Manansala, 9 Phil.
529; U.S. v. De los Santos, 6 Phil. 411.
6 From four (4) y ears, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisión
correccional to ten (10) years of prisón mayor.
312
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
of violence or intimidation which made it a more serious one. It
is, to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies
only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of
person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under
the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.
 We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, Appeals only when reasonable men readily agree that the
when the elements of both provisions are present, that the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible. There
crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition—as provided is also a ruling that in special civil actions for certiorari and
in Art. 48 of said Code—of the penalty for the most Serious prohibition under Rule 67 (now Rule 65) of the Rules of Court,
offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, the theory of conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court
is reclusión temporal in its maximu m period. This penalty of Appeals does not apply (Medran v. C.A., 83 Phil. 164).
should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period—from
nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days to ————
twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal.—owing to the presence
of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime. In short, the
doctrine adopted in U.S. v. De los Santos and applied in U.S.
7

v. Manansala, U.S. v. Turla, People v. Baluyot, Manahan v.

8 9 10

People, and People v. Sebastian, is hereby abandoned and

11 12

appellant herein should be sentenced to an indeterminate

penalty ranging from ten (10) years, and one (1) day of prisión
mayor to nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11)
days of reclusión temporal.
Thus modified as to the penalty, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs
against herein appellant, Nicanor Napolis. It is so ordered.
Reyes,
J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, B
arredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., did not take part.
Decision affirmed with modification.

_______________

7 Supra.
8 Supra.
9 Supra.

10 Supra.

11 Supra.

12 Supra.

313
VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 28, 1972 313
Yturralde vs. Court of Appeals
Notes.—In De Luna vs. Linatoc (74 Phil. 15), the Supreme
Court held that it will review factual findings of the Court of
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE
TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-appellants.
Criminal law; Evidence; Witnesses; Where events transpired in
rapid succession in a train coach, it is not surprising that witnesses
would not give identical testimonies.—Where, as in this case, the
events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of the train and it
was nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not
give identical testimonies. There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel
witnessed some of the acts of the twins but they did not observe the
same events and their powers of perception and recollection are not
the same. x x x On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that
persons, other than the twins, could have inflicted the stab wounds.
There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And there can be no doubt
that the twins, from their own admissions and their testimonies, not
to mention the testimonies of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS
Investigators, were the authors of the killings.
________________
*EN BANC.
18
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
Same; Same; Same; Accused theory that they were held up by
two or more persons while on the coach of the train without this being
noticed by other passengers is incredible.—On the other hand, the
twins’ theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that crowded
coach No. 9, which was lighted, it was improbable that two or more
persons could have held up the twins without being readily perceived
by the other passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had
there really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they
sustained, could be attributed to the blows which the other
passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous rampage.
Same; Same; Same; Where there is no eyewitness-testimony as to
the jumping from the train of the four victims, same should preclude
imputation of their death on accused who went on a rampage inside
the train.—No one testified that those four victims jumped from the
train. Had the necropsy reports been reinforced by testimony
showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and
murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter would be criminally
responsible for their deaths. x x x The absence of
eyewitnesstestimony as to the jumping from the train of the four
victims already named precludes the imputation of criminal
responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said
victims. The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the
other victims x x x Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved
did not testify on the injuries inflicted on them.
Same; Under the criminal statutes, the presumption is that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act.—The
rule is that “if a man creates in another man’s mind an immediate
sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so
doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind
is responsible for the injuries which result.”
Same; Murder; Conspiracy; Complex crime; Where eight killings
and an attempted killing were considered not constituting a complex
crime.—The eight killings and the attempted killing should be
treated as separate crimes of murder and attempted murder
qualified by treachery. The unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrate
by the twins upon their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that
the twins would act like juramentados and who were unable to
defend themselves (even if some of them might have had weapons on
their persons) was a mode of execution that insured the
consummation of the twins’ diabolical objective to butcher their co-
passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and
community of design. The eight killings and the attempted murder
were perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they cannot be
regarded as constituting a complex crime
19
VOL. 62, JANUARY 17, 1975 19
People vs. Toling
under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases
where “a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.”
Same; Murder; Penalty where no generic aggravating or
mitigating circumstances proved.—As no generic aggravating and
mitigating circumstances were proven in this case, the penalty for
murder should be imposed in its medium period or reclusion
perpetua. The death penalty imposed by the trial court was not
warranted.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna. Arsenio Nañawa, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor
Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee.
Santiago F. Alidio (Counsel de Oficio) for defendants-
appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding them
guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder, sentencing
them to death and ordering them to indemnify each set of heirs
of (1) Teresita B, Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo S.
Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio, (5) Modesta R. Brondial, (6) Isabel
Felices and (7) Teodoro F. Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to
pay Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-
966). The judgment of conviction was based on the following
facts:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are
natives of Barrio Nenita which is about eighteen (or nine)
kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are
illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. They were forty-eight
years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than Jose. Being
twins, they look alike very much. However, Antonio has a
distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonio’s daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a
laundrywoman since September, 1964. Jose’s three children
one girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from
Leonora telling him that she would give him money. To have
money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat
20
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
to Jose’s wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in
order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos
for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants
and shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to Allen.
From there, they took a launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From
Matnog, they went to Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus,
and from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco
railroad station in Manila at about seven o’clock in the morning
of January 8th. It was their first trip to the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought
them to Tondo. By means of a letter which Aniano Espenola, a
labor-recruiter, had given them, they were able to locate an
employment agency where they learned the address of the Eng
Heng Glassware. Antonio’s daughter was working in that store.
Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the agency, they
proceeded to her employer’s establishment. Leonora gave her
father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis, Antonio’s grandson, gave him
thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket
of his pants. It was then noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The
twins returned to the agency where they ate their lunch at
Juan’s expense. From the agency, Juan took the twins to the
Tutuban railroad station that same day, January 8th, for their
homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol
express train at about five o’clock in the afternoon. The train
left at six o’clock that evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the
rear of the dining car. The coach had one row of two-passenger
seats and another row of three-passenger seats. Each seat
faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The
brothers were seated side by side on the fourth three-passenger
seat from the rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated
between Antonio, who was near the window, and a three-year
old boy. Beside the boy was a woman breast-feeding her baby
who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal.
There were more than one hundred twenty passengers in the
coach. Some passengers were standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two
men and an old woman who was sleeping with her head resting
on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). On the two-passenger seat
21
VOL. 62, JANUARY 17, 1975 21
People vs. Toling
across the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers were
sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the
window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the
opposite seat were seated a woman, her daughter and Amanda
Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were in front of
Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped
at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers bought some chicos which
they put aside. The vendors alighted when the train started
moving. It was around eight o’clock in the evening.
Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed,
Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors (Exh. B) stabbed
the man sitting directly in front of him. The victim stood up but
soon collapsed on his seat.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping
old woman who was seated opposite him. She was not able to
get up anymore. 1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her
baby, attempted to leave her seat, but before she could escape
Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand with which she
was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade entered the
dorsal side and passed through the palm. Fortunately, the child
was not injured. Most of the passengers scurried away for
_______________
1That initial stabbing was described by Corazon BernalAstrolavio in her
statement dated January 9, 1965 in this manner (page 16 of the Record):
“4. T: May nasaksihan ba kayong hindi
pangkaraniwang pangyayari na naganap nang
gabing iyon at kung mayroon maaari ba ninyong
maisalaysay sa maikli ngunit maliwanag na
pananalita?
“S: Mayruon po. Nakaupo ako nuon sa bandang
hulihan nang tren. Nagpapasuso ako nuon nang
aking anak nang biglang nagkagulo. Iyong katabi
kong lalaki na may katandaan na ay biglang
sinaksak iyong kaharap kong babae sa upuan.
Nabuwal iyong kanyang sinaksak, at ako naman
ay nagtatakbo na dala ko iyong dalawa kong anak.
Sumiksik kami doon sa may kubeta nang tren na
nang mangyari iyon ay lumalakad. Hindi ko alam
na iyong aking kanan sintido ay nagdurugo. Nang
tahimik na ay dinala kami sa ospital sa Calamba at
doon ay ginamot ako roon.
“5. T: Sinabi ninyo na nang biglang magkagulo
samantalang lumalakad ang tren ay iyong katabi
ninyong lalaki na may katandaan na ay biglang
sinaksak iyong kaharap ninyong babae sa upuan,
nakita ba ninyo kung ano ang ipinanaksak nang
lalaking ito?
“S: Hindi ko na po napansin dahil sa aking takot.”
22
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
safety but the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed everyone
whom they encountered inside the coach. 2
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary
Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort who, on that occasion,
was not on duty. He was taking his wife and children to
Calauag, Quezon. He was going to the dining ear to drink coffee
when someone informed him that there was a stabbing inside
the coach where he had come from. He immediately proceeded
to return to coach No. 9. Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a dead
man sprawled on the floor near the toilet. At a distance of
around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform separating
coaches Nos. 8 and 9, holding a knife between the thumb and
index finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward.
He shouted to the man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman
and a person in authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down
his knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, or he would be shot.
_______________
Mrs. Mapa’s statement (Exh. E) reads:
2
“4. T: Sino po ang sumaksak sa inyo?
S: Iyon pong lalaking mataas na payat
na bisaya. Hindi ko po kilala pero kung makikita
ko ay makikilala ko. Ito pong sumaksak sa akin na
ito ay dinala rin sa ospital sa Calamba, Laguna.
Nauna po lamang ako at nakita kong siya ang
isinunod na may saksak din.
5. T: Bakit naman ninyo namukhaan itong sumaksak
sa inyong ito?
S: Kahelera po namin iyan sa upuan.
6. T: Maaari po ba ninyong isalaysay sa maikli
ngunit maliwanag na pananalita. ang buong
pangyayaring inyong nasaksihan?
S: Opo. Nagpapasuso ako nuon nang aking anak.
nang walang ano-ano ay nakita ko na lamang
iyong nakasaksak sa akin na biglang tumayo sa
kanyang kinauupuan at biglang sinaksak iyong
kaharap niyang sa upuan na babae na
natutulog. Itong katabi nang nanaksak na ito ay
tumayo rin at nanaksak din nang nanaksak at ang
lahat nang makitang tao ay hinahabol at
sinasaksak. Bata, matanda ay sinasaksak nang
dalawang ito at madaanan. Nang bigla kong tayo
ay natamaan iyong aking kanang kamay nang
kabig niya nang saksak. Nagtuloy ako sa kubeta sa
tren at doon ako sumiksik. Nang payapa naang
lahat ay dinala ako sa Calamba sa ospital doon, at
ako’y ginamot nang pangunang lunas.
7. T: Itong katabi na lalaking sinasabi ninyong
nanaksak din ay kung makita ninyong muli ay
makikilala pa ninyo?
S: Makikilala ko rin po. Magkahawig po sila nang
nakasaksak sa akin.”
The statement of Cipriano Reganet who was wounded (Exh. D-4), in
23
VOL. 62, JANUARY 17, 1975 23
People vs. Toling
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by
clutching it between his palm and little finger (with the blade
pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on
his left breast. He slowly sank to the floor and was prostrate
thereon. Near the platform where he had fallen, Rayel saw
another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated
to the steps near the platform when he saw Rayel armed with
a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite
her was stabbed to death.
_______________
a way corroborates Mrs. Mapa’s statement. Reganet’s statement reads in
part as follows (Exh. F):
“3. T: Maaari po ba ninyong masabi kung bakit kayo
naririto ngayon sa PNR Hospital dito sa Caloocan
City?
S: Dahil po sa mga saksak na tinamo ko nang
magkaroon nang gulo sa loob nang tren kagabing
humigit kumulang sa mga alas nueve (9:00 P.M.)
petcha 8 nitong Enero 1965.
4. T: Sino po ang sumaksak sa inyo kung inyong
nakikilala?
S: Hindi ko po alam ang pangalan pero
mamumukhaan ko kung ihaharap sa akin. Ang
 sumaksak po sa akin ay iyong kasama ko sa
ambulancia na nagdala sa amin dito sa ospital na
ito.
5. T: Bakit naman ninyo natiyak na ang sumaksak sa
inyo ay iyong kasama ninyo sa ambulancia na
nagdala sa inyo sa ospital na ito?
S: Malapit po lamang ang kanyang inuupuan sa
aking inuupuan sa loob nang tren kaya
namukhaan ko siya.
6. T: Ilan beses kayong sinaksak nang taong ito?
S: Dalawang beses po.
7. T: Saan-saan panig nang katawan kayo nagtamo
nang saksak?
S: Sa aking noo at sa kanang kamay nang sangahin
ko ang kanyang pangalawang saksak.
8. T: Bakit po naman kayo sinaksak nang taong ito?
S: Hindi ko po alam. Primero nanaksak siya sa
kanyang kaharap sa upuan at saksak nang saksak
sa mga taong kanyang makita.
9. T: Ilan ang nakita ninyong nananaksak?
S: Dalawa pong magkatabi na magkahawig ang
mukha.
10. T: Nang mangyari po ba ito ay tumatakbo ang
tren?
S: Tumatakbo po.
10. T: Papaano kayo nakaligtas?
S: Tumakbo po ako at kumabit sa rampa at nang
medyo tahimik na balak kong magbalik sa loob
nang tren. Nakita ko na maraming sugatan at sa
wari ko ay patay na. Sa mga nakita ko sa loob
24
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He
was in the dining car when he received the information that
there were killings in the third coach. He immediately went
there and, while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa
who was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with his scissors
two women and a small girl and a woman who was later
identified as Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was
not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on the seats of the
coach and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made
a thrust at him with the scissors. When Antonio was about to
stab another person, Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly
struck Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol, knocking
him down. Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio’s
buttocks and wrested the scissors away from him. Antonio
offered resistance despite the blows administered to him.
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four
Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from the train and
turned them over to the custody of the Calamba police.
Sergeant Rayel took down their names. The bloodstained
______________
nang tren ay iyong sumaksak sa akin, na
nakasandal at nang makita ako ay tinanganan
iyong kanyang panaksak at tinangka akong
habulin. Tumakbo ako at tumalon sa lupa. Sa
pagtalon kong iyon ay napinsala ang aking
kaliwang balikat.
12. T: Ano po ang ipinanaksak sa inyo?
S: Para pong punyal na ang haba ay kumulang
humigit sa isang dangkal”.
Mrs. Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, who was also
wounded (Exh. D-3) executed a statement which
reads in part as follows (page 20, Record):
“4. T: Maaari po ba ninyong maisalaysay sa maikli
ngunit maliwanag na pananalita ang buong
pangyayari?
S: Opo. Nakaupo po ako nuon kaharap papuntang
Bicol. Walang ano-ano ay bigla na lamang nakita
 ko na may sinaksak at pagkatapos nakita ko na
lahat nang makita babae o lalaki at sinasaksak.
Nang ako’y tumayo para tumakbo ay nilapitan ako
at ako naman ang sinaksak. Sumigaw ako at
humingi nang saklolo at nakiusap sa isang tao na
tagpan nang tualya iyong tinamo kong saksak sa
kaliwang puson na tumama sa buto. Makalipas
ang ilang sandali ay dinala na ako sa ospital.
5. T: Nakikilala ba ninyo iyong sumaksak sa inyo?
S: Kilala ko po sa mukha at kasama ko pa kahapon
nang dalhin ako sa ospital na ito.
6. T: Ilan po itong nakita ninyong nanaksak?
S: Dalawa po sila na magkahawig ang mukha.”
25
VOL. 62, JANUARY 17, 1975 25
People vs. Toling
scissors and knife were turned over to the Constabulary
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while
others were picked up along the railroad tracks between
Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still alive were brought
to different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The dead
numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria Quiogue,
the official morgue of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were autopsied (Exh. C
to C-11). A Constabulary photographer took some pictures of
the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and J-2).
Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies
were found in the train, died from stab wounds, namely:
1. (1)Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
2. (2)Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan,
Quezon.
3. (3)Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
4. (4)Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
5. (5)Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San
Juan, Rizal.
6. (6)Modesta R. Brondial, 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi
City.
7. (7)Elena B. Erminio, 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao,
Quezon City and
8. (8)Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street,
Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N to
N-2, O to O-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2).
Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks.
Apparently, they jumped from the moving train to avoid being
killed. They were:
1. (1)Timoteo IL Dimaano, 53, married, carpenter, Miguelin,
Sampaloc, Manila.
2. (2)Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.
3. (3)Salvador A. Maqueda, 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon
and
4. (4)Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D
Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4, C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-
2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs.
Amanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano
26
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs.
Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn January 14, 1966).
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted
upon her right hand by Jose Toling, she was first brought to
the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred
to the hospital of the Philippine National Railways at Caloocan
City where she was confined for thirteen days free of charge.
As a result of her injury, she was not able to engage in her
occupation of selling fish for one month, thereby losing an
expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos. When she ran for
safety with her child, she lost clothing materials valued at
three hundred pesos aside from two hundred pesos cash in a
paper bag which was lost.
The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation
Service of the Second Constabulary Zone headquarters at
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965
Constabulary investigators took down the statements of Mrs.
Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal, Brigida de
Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the statements
of the Toling brothers were taken at the North General
Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train
he was stabbed by a person “from the station” who wanted to
get his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said
that he stabbed somebody “who might have died and others
that might not”. He clarified that in the train four persons were
asking money from him. He stabbed one of them. “It was a
holdup”.
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to
rob him, he stabbed other persons because, inasmuch as
he “was already bound to die”, he wanted “to kill everybody”
(Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded
because he was stabbed by a person “from Camarines” who was
taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with
the scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons who were
demanding money from him and who were armed with knives
and iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died
due to the stabbing, he commented that everybody was trying
“to kill each other” (Exh. 1-A).
27
VOL. 62, JANUARY 17, 1975 27
People vs. Toling
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in
his pocket and stabbed him in the back with the scissors and
then escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from his
back, gave them to him and told him to avenge himself with the
scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against
the Toling brothers in the municipal court of Cabuyao, Laguna
a criminal complaint for multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder. Through counsel, the accused waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation. The case was
elevated to the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the
Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965 filed against the Toling
brothers an information for multiple murder (nine victims),
multiple frustrated murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as
to three persons who died after jumping from the running train
to avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio
Nañawa rendered the judgment of conviction already
mentioned. The Toling brothers appealed.
In this appeal, appellants’ counsel de oficio assails the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, argues that the
appellants acted in self-defense and contends, in the
alternative, that their criminal liability was only for two
homicides and for physical injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished
from appellants’ statements, Exhibits 1 and 8), when the Toling
twins were at the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of
January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket counter to buy
tickets for himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he took out
his money from the right pocket of his pants and later put back
the remainder in the same pocket. The two brothers noticed
that four men at some distance from them were allegedly
observing them, whispering among themselves and making
signs. The twins suspected that the four men harbored evil
intentions towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed
them. They were facing the twins. They were talking in a low
voice. The twins sat on a two-passenger seat facing the front
door of the coach, the window being on the right of Antonio and
Jose being to his left. Two of the four men, whom they were
suspecting of having evil intentions towards them, sat on the
28
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
seat facing them, while the other two seated themselves behind
them. Some old women were near them. When the train was
already running, the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood
up, approached Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at his
throat while the other man who was sitting near the window
and who was holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick
Antonio s right pocket, threatening him with death if he would
not hand over the money. Antonio answered that he would give
only one-half of his money provided the man would not hurt
him, adding that his (Antonio’s) place was still very far.
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew
out his hunting knife or small bolo (eight inches long including
the handle) from the back pocket of his pants and stabbed the
man with it, causing him to fall to the floor with
his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was picking his
pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed
as those shown in the photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh.
L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and 5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1
and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the
second man, another person from behind allegedly stabbed him
on the forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and to fall
on the floor (Antonio has two scars on his forehead and a scar
on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained
consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised him. His
money was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with
the scissors the man who had wounded his brother. Jose hit the
man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by
somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the middle part
of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men
whom he had stabbed because he was already weak. He fell
down and became unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the
knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which he
himself had used. He recovered consciousness when a
Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a
physician of the North General Hospital who treated them
during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who testified
that he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:
“Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches
each, mid-frontal (wound on the forehead) and
29
VOL. 62, JANUARY 17, 1975 29
People vs. Toling
“Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line
level of 3rd ICS, right, penetrating thoracic cavity” (chest wound
(Exh. 11).
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the
paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left, penetrating the
thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the spinal column
in line with the armpit or “about one inch from the midline to
the left” (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from the hospital
on January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for
the twins’ rampageous behavior, which resulted in the macabre
deaths of several innocent persons, made the following
observations:
“What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run
amuck? It appears that the accused travelled long over land and sea
spending their hard-earned money and suffering privations, even to
the extent of foregoing their breakfast, only to receive as recompense
with respect to Antonio the meager sum of P50 from his daughter
and P30 from his grandson and with respect to Jose to receive
nothing at all from any of his three children whom he could not locate
in Manila.
“It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike,
a fact which could easily invite some people to stare or gaze at them
and wonder at their very close resemblance. Like some persons who
easily get angry when stared at, however, the accused, when stared
at by the persons in front of them, immediately suspected them as and the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and 11). Those parts of
having evil intention towards them (accused). the evidence reveal that the one who was armed with the knife
“To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part was Antonio and the one who was armed with the scissors was
of the accused coupled with their unfounded suspicion of evil Jose. The prosecution witnesses and the trial court assumed
intention on the part of those who happened to stare at them that
that Antonio was armed with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose
broke the limit of their self-control and actuated them to run amuck.”
was armed with the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the
erroneous.
spectacle of middle-aged rustic twins, whom, in the limited
In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he
space of the coach, their co-passengers had no choice but to
was armed with a knife, while Jose declared that he was armed
notice and gaze at, was a novelty. Through some telepathic or
with the scissors which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban
extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed that their
station, before he boarded the train and which he gave to Jose
co-passengers were talking about them in whispers and
because the latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors was
making depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble
already rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom Sergeant
persons. In their parochial minds, they might have entertained
Rayel espied as having attempted to commit suicide on the
the notion or suspicion that their male companions, taking
platform of the train by stabbing himself on the chest would be
advantage of their ignorance and naivete, might victimize them
Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the medical
by stealing their little money. Hence, they became hostile to
certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that Antonio had
their co-
30
a wound in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED subdued after the former had stabbed several persons with a
pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not Antonio.
People vs. Toling
That fact is contained in his statement of January 9, 1965 (p.
passengers. Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and
9, Record).
murderous fury.
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the
for Jose and vice-versa does not detract from their credibility.
conclusion that the trial court and the prosecution witnesses
The controlling fact is that those witnesses confirmed the
confounded one twin for the other. Such a confusion was
admission of the twins that they stabbed several passengers.
unavoidable because the twins, according to a Constabulary 31
investigator, are “very identical”. Thus, on the witness stand VOL. 62, JANUARY 17, 1975 31
CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong, People vs. Toling
after pointing to the twins, refused to take the risk of
Appellants’ counsel based his arguments on the summaries of
identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They confessed
the evidence found in the trial court’s decision. He argues that
that they might be mistaken in making such a specific
the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory
identification (28 tsn September 3, 1965; 32 tsn November 5,
but he does not particularize on the supposed contradictions.
1965).
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose,
other. The main point of Rayel’s testimony is that he saw one
the reliable guides would be their sworn statements (Exh. 1
of the twins stabbing himself in the chest and apparently trying
and 8), executed one day after the killing, their own testimonies
to commit suicide. Aldea’s testimony is that he knocked down
the other twin, disabled him and prevented him from
committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayel’s testimony that Aldea took
the knife of Jose Toling was not corroborated by Aldea. Neither
did Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on the platform of
the train. Those discrepancies do not render Rayel and Aldea
unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea and Rayel did not
give rehearsed testimonies or did not compare notes.
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid
succession in the coach of the train and it was nighttime, it is
not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give identical
testimonies (See 6 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court,
1970 Ed. 139-140: People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26,
1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel
witnessed some of the acts of the twins but they did not observe
the same events and their powers of perception and recollection
are not the same.
Appellants’ counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He
contends that no one corroborated her testimony that one of the
twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat
opposite the seat occupied by the twins. The truth is that Mrs.
Mapa’s testimony was confirmed by the necropsy reports and
by the twins themselves who admitted that they stabbed some
persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons,
other than the twins, could have inflicted the stab wounds.
There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And there can be no
doubt that the twins, from their own admissions (Exh. 1 and 8)
and their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies of Rayel,
Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were the authors
of the killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins’
culpability, since they were caught in flagrante delicto, the CIS
32
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
investigators did not bother to get the statements of the other
passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no one actually
saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end because
everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save
his life. The ensuing commotion and confusion prevented the
passengers from having a full personal knowledge of how the
twins consummated all the killings.
On the other hand, the twins’ theory of self-defense is highly
incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9, which was lighted, it
was improbable that two or more persons could have held up
the twins without being readily perceived by the other
passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had there
really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they
sustained, could be attributed to the blows which the other
passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous rampage.
Appellants’ view is that they should be held liable only for
two homicides, because they admittedly killed Antonio B.
Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical injuries because
they did not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have
to reject that view.
Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing
judgment on the aberrant behavior of two yokels from the
Samar hinterland, who reached manhood without coming into
contact with the mainstream of civilization in urban areas, we
exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence.
We are convinced that the record conclusively establishes
appellants’ responsibility for the eight killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be
indemnified, according to the trial court, because they died due
to stab wounds, should be added the name of Susana C.
Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her name in
the trial court’s judgment was probably due to inadvertence.
According to the necropsy reports, four persons, namely,
Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte
and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic
injuries consisting of abrasions, contusions, lacerations and
fractures on the head, body and extremities (Exh. J to J-2 K to
K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving train to
avoid being killed but in so doing they met their untimely and
horrible deaths. The trial court did not adjudge them as victims
whose heirs should be indemnified. As to three of them, the
33
VOL. 62, JANUARY 17, 1975 33
People vs. Toling
information charges that the accused committed homicide. The
trial court dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the
train. Had the necropsy reports been reinforced by testimony
showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was the
violent and murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter
would be criminally responsible for their deaths.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended”. The presumption is that “a person intends
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act” (Sec. 5[c], Rule
131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that “if a man creates in another man’s mind an
immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to
escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who
creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries
which result” (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited
in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497, 500).
Following that rule, it was held that “if a person against
whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes
himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in
order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct
of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicide in
case death results by drowning” (Syllabus, U.S. vs.
Valdez, supra. See People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from
the train of the four victims already named precludes the
imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the
ghastly deaths of the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the
other victims. The charge of multiple frustrated murder based
on the injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal,
Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5)
was dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence. Unlike
Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did not testify on the
injuries inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be
treated as separate crimes of murder and attempted murder
qualified by treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal
Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the
twins upon their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that the
twins
34
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
would act like juramentados and who were unable to defend
themselves (even if some of them might have had weapons on
their persons) was a mode of execution that insured the
consummation of the twins’ diabolical objective to butcher their
co-passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and
community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were
perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they cannot be
regarded as constituting a complex crime under article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where “a single
act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other”.
As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called “concurso formal o
ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho
constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b)
cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer otro (el
llamado delito complejo). (1 Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).
On the other hand, “en al concurso real de delitos”, the rule,
when there is “acumulación material de las penas”, is that “si
son varios los resultados, si son varias las acciones, está
conforme con la lógica y con la justicia que el agente soporte la
carga de cada uno de los delitos” (Ibid, p. 652, People vs.
Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted
murder. (See People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where the
accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen persons and
wounded others, was convicted of sixteen separate murders,
one frustrated murder and two attempted murders; People vs.
Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre case, where
six defendants were convicted of fourteen separate
murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where a person
who fired successively at six victims was convicted of six
separate homicides; U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272, involving four
murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven
murders; U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil.
260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 82, 102-
103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs. Sakam, 61
Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs.
Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People
vs. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 236; People vs. Peñas, 66 Phil.
682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes
committed by means of separate acts were held to be complex
on the theory that they were the
35
VOL. 62, JANUARY 17, 1975 35
People vs. Toling
product of a single criminal impulse or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances
were proven in this case, the penalty for murder should be
imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[1]
and 248, Revised Penal Code. The death penalty imposed by
the trial court was not warranted.
A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed
on the appellants, No modifying circumstances can be
appreciated in the attempted murder case.
WHEREFORE, the trial court’s judgment is modified by
setting aside the death sentence. Defendants-appellants
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty, as
coprincipals, of eight (8) separate murders and one attempted
murder. Each one of them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion
perpetuas for the eight murders and to an indeterminate
penalty of one (I) year of prision correccional as minimum to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for the
attempted murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of
P12,000 to each set of heirs of the seven victims named in the
dispositive part of the trial court’s decision and of the eighth
victim, Susana C. Hernandez, or a total indemnity of P96,000,
and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the service of
the penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate
paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be
observed. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal,
C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Esguerra, Fernan
dez and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Makasiar, J., did not take part.
Judgment modified.
Notes.—(a) Complex crimes.—An accused cannot be
convicted of the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder where the grave offenses committed by him
were not caused by one single act. (People vs. Bernal, 28 SCRA
25). Thus, where the killing is not shown to have been
committed by a single discharge of firearms, the crime cannot
be considered complex (People vs. Tilos, 30 SCRA 734). A
complex crime, therefore, will arise where one shot from a gun
results in the death of two or more persons, or where one
stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter’s body and
36
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Toling
wounded another, or where a person plants a bomb in an Moran, M.V., Comments on the Rules of Court, vols. 5 and 6,
airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result that a number 1971 Edition.
of persons are killed. (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). Padilla, A., Evidence Annotated, 1971 Edition, 2 vols.
(b) Conspiracy.—Conspiracy arises from the very instant Salonga, J.R., Philippine Law on Evidence, 1964 Edition.
the plotters agree to commit the felony and pursue it (People
vs. Indic, 10 SCRA 130). Conspiracy to exist does not require a ————o0o————
definite agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence or commission of the offense; in law, conspiracy
exists, if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the
accused had the same criminal purpose and were united in its
execution (People vs. Cadag, 2 SCRA 388). Consequently,
conspiracy need not be established by direct proof (People vs.
Bersalona, 1 SCRA 1110; People vs. Verzo, 21 SCRA
1403; People vs. Cabiltes, 25 SCRA 112). However, conspiracy
must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission
of the defense itself (People vs. Vicente, 28 SCRA 247). Thus,
although some of the accused might have intended to cause
harm or injury to the offended victim as their action of running
after him, holding his arm and pointing a revolver at the said
victim after the latter stumbled on the ground quite clearly
indicated, no conspiracy will be appreciated between them and
a third accused who later hacked the victim to death, where the
evidence shows that the former did not carry their intent and
instead desisted entirely and fled from the scene when the
latter suddenly appeared and attacked the victim. Under the
circumstances, the former will not even be considered as
accomplices of the actual assailant and are entitled to an
acquittal. (People vs. Cajandab, 52 SCRA 165).

LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE

See SCRA Quick Index-Digest volume one, page 570 on

Criminal Law; and page 826 on Evidence.
Aquino, R.C., The Revised Penal Code, 1961 Edition, 2 vols.
Padilla, A., Criminal Law Annotated, 1972-74 Editions, 3
vols.

G.R. No. 86163. April 26, 1990. *
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO
CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, AND SIMPLICIO
CANASARES, BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, defendant-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Robbery; From the moment the offender gained
possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to
dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.—It is no defense
either that Appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to
dispose of the personalties taken. That fact does not affect the nature
of the crime. From the moment the offender gained possession of the
thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same,
the unlawful taking is complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code
Annotated, Book II, 1981 ed., p. 594).
Same; Same; Failure to mention the taking in a sworn statement
would not militate against the credibility of the witness.—It is the
contention of Appellant that Rodita could not have seen the taking
because the place was dark since the doors were closed and there
were no windows. It will be recalled, however, that Rodita was one of
the hostages herself and could observe the unfolding of events. Her
failure to mention the taking in her sworn statement would not
militate against her credibility, it being settled that an affidavit is
almost always incomplete and inaccurate and does not disclose the
complete facts for want of inquiries or suggestions.
Same; Same; Same; Findings of the trial court, as to the
credibility of the witness, are entitled to great weight.—In the last
analysis, the basic consideration centers around the credibility of
witnesses in respect of which the findings of the Trial Court are
entitled to great weight as it was in a superior position to assess the
same in the course of the trial (see People vs. Ornoza, G.R. No. L-
56283, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 495; People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No.
L-38042, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 326).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Surrender of the accused was not to
be mitigating when he gave up only after he was surrounded by the
constabulary and police forces.—The “surrender” by the Appellant
and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements. They were,
indeed,
________________
*SECOND DIVISION.
672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Salvilla
asked to surrender by the police and military authorities but
they refused until only much later when they could no longer do
otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they were
completely surrounded and there was no chance of escape. The
surrender of the accused was held not to be mitigating as when he
gave up only after he was surrounded by the constabulary and police
forces (People vs. Sigayan, et al., G.R., No. L-18523-26, 30 April 1966,
16 SCRA 839; People vs. Mationg, G.R. No. L-33488, 29 March 1982,
113 SCRA 167). Their surrender was not spontaneous as it was
motivated more by an intent to insure their safety. And while it is
claimed that they intended to surrender, the fact is that they did not
despite several opportunities to do so. There is no voluntary
surrender to speak of (People vs. Dimdiman, 106 Phil. 391 [1959]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The crime of serious illegal detention
was such a necessary means as it was selected by appellant and his
co-accused to facilitate and carry out their evil design to stage a
robbery.—Under Article 48, a complex crime arises “when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other.” The term “necessary
means” does not connote indispensable means for if it did then the
offense as a “necessary means” to commit another would be an
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient
thereof. The phrase “necessary means” merely signifies that one
crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the
other (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624, citing
Dissent, Montemayor, J., Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). In this
case, the crime of Serious Illegal Detention was such a “necessary
means” as it was selected by Appellant and his co-accused to
facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a
robbery.
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Br. 28. Gustilo, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Resurreccion S. Salvilla for defendant-appellant.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Accused Bienvenido Salvilla alone appeals from the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Iloilo City, dated 29
**
_______________
Penned by Judge Edgar D. Gustilo.
**
673
VOL. 184, APRIL 26, 1990 673
People vs. Salvilla
August 1988, in Criminal Case No. 20092, finding him and his
co-accused Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio, all surnamed
Canasares, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
“Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal
Detention” and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The Information filed against them reads:
“The undersigned City Fiscal accuses BIENVENIDO SALVILLA,
REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and
SIMPLICIO CANASARES, whose maternal surnames, dated and
places of birth cannot be ascertained of the crime of ROBBERY
WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION (Art. 294, paragraph 3, in conjunction with Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code), committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1986, in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused,
conspiring and confederating among themselves, working together
and helping one another, armed with guns and handgrenade and
with the use of violence or intimidation employed on the person of
Severino Choco, Mary Choco, Mimia Choco and Rodita Hablero, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally take and carry
away, with intent of gain, cash in the amount of P20,000.00, two (2)
Men’s wrist watches, one (1) Lady’s Seiko quartz wrist watch and one
(1) Lady’s Citizen wrist watch and assorted jewelries, all valued at
P50,000.00; that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, Mary
Choco suffered serious physical injuries under paragraph 2 of Article
263, Bienvenido Salvilla likewise suffered serious physical injuries
and Reynaldo Canasares also suffered physical injuries; that the said
accused also illegally detained, at the compound of the New Iloilo
Lumber Company, Iznart Street, Iloilo City, Severino Choco, owner/
proprietor of said Lumber Company, Mary Choco, Mimie Choco, who
is a minor, being 15 years of age, and Rodita Hablero, who is a
salesgirl at said Company; that likewise on the occasion of the
robbery, the accused also asked and were given a ransom money of
P50,000.00; that the said crime was attended by aggravating
circumstances of band, and illegal possession of firearms and
explosives; that the amount of P20,000.00, the ransom money of
P50,000.00, two (2) Men’s wrist watches, two (2) Lady’s wrist
watches, one (1) .38 caliber revolver and one (1) live grenade were
recovered from the accused; to the damage and prejudice of the New
Iloilo Lumber Company in the amount of P120,000.00.”
674
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salvilla
The evidence for the prosecution may be re-stated as follows:
On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused
at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at about noon time. The plan
was hatched about two days before. The accused were armed
with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they entered
the establishment, they met Rodita Habiero, an employee
thereat who was on her way out for her meal break and
announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was made to go
back to the office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his gun
at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters, Mary and
Mimie, the latter being a minor 15 years of age, and told the
former that all they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino
told his daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag wherein he placed
P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to the defense) and
handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino pleaded with the
four accused to leave the premises as they already had the
money but they paid no heed. Instead, accused Simplicio
Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after
which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were herded
to the office and kept there as hostages.
At about 2:00 o’clock of the same day, the hostages were
allowed to eat. The four accused also took turns eating while
the others stood guard. Then, Appellant told Severino to
produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could be
released. Severino answered that he could not do so because it
was a Saturday and the banks were closed.
In the meantime, police and military authorities had
surrounded the premises of the lumber yard. Major Melquiades
B. Sequio, Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo City,
negotiated with the accused using a loud speaker and appealed
to them to surrender with the assurance that no harm would
befall them as he would accompany them personally to the
police station. The accused refused to surrender or to release
the hostages.
Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, of Iloilo City arrived
and joined the negotiations. In her dialogue with the accused,
which lasted for about four hours, Appellant demanded
P100,000.00, a coaster, and some raincoats. She offered them
P50,000.00 instead, explaining the difficulty of raising more as
it was a Saturday. Later, the accused agreed to receive the
same and to release Rodita to be accompanied by Mary Choco
in going
675
VOL. 184, APRIL 26, 1990 675
People vs. Salvilla
out of the office. When they were out of the door, one of the
accused whose face was covered by a handkerchief, gave a key
to Mayor Caram. With this, Mayor Caram unlocked the
padlocked door and handed to Rodita the P50,000.00, which the
latter, in turn, gave to one of the accused. Rodita was later set
free but Mary was herded back to the office.
Mayor Caram, Major Sequio, and even volunteer radio
news-casters continued to appeal to the accused to surrender
peacefully but they refused. Ultimatums were given but the
accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military
authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the
place. This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary
Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo
Canasares. Mary suffered a “macerated right lower extremity
just below the knee” so that her right leg had to be amputated.
The medical certificate described her condition as “in a state of
hemorrhagic shock when she was brought in to the hospital and
had to undergo several major operations during the course of
her confinement from April 13, 1986 to May 30, 1986.”
For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at about noon
time of 12 April 1986 he and his co-accused entered the lumber
yard and demanded money from the owner Severino Choco. He
demanded P100,000.00 but was given only P5,000.00, which he
placed on the counter of the office of the lumber yard. He
admitted that he and his co-accused kept Severino, his
daughters, and Rodita inside the office. He maintained,
however, that he stopped his co-accused from getting the wallet
and wristwatch of Severino and, like the P5,000.00 were all left
on the counter, and were never touched by them. He claimed
further that they had never fired on the military because they
intended to surrender. Appellant’s version also was that during
the gunfire, Severino’s daughter stood up and went outside; he
wanted to stop her but he himself was hit by a bullet and could
not prevent her. Appellant also admitted the appeals directed
to them to surrender but that they gave themselves up only
much later.
After trial, the Court a quo meted out a judgment of
conviction and sentenced each of the accused “to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
provided by law and to pay the costs.”
676
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salvilla
Appellant Salvilla’s present appeal is predicated on the
following Assignments of Error:
 1. “1.The lower court erred in holding that the crime charged
was consummated and in not holding that the same was
merely attempted.
2. “2.The lower court erred in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.”
Upon the facts and the evidence, we affirm.
The defense contends that “The complete crime of larceny
(theft/robbery) as distinguished from an attempt requires
asportation or carrying away, in addition to the taking. In other
words, the crime of robbery/theft has three consecutive stages:
1) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the carrying away or
asportation. And without asportation the crime committed is
only attempted” (Memorandum for Appellant Salvilla, Records,
p. 317).
There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there
be a taking of personal property belonging to another. This is
known as the element of asportation, the essence of which is
the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner without
his privity and consent and without the animus revertendi
(Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 97, citing 5 C.J. 607). In fact,
if there is no actual taking, there can be no robbery. Unlawful
taking of personal property of another is an essential part of
the crime of robbery.
Appellant insists that while the “giving” has been proven,
the “taking” has not. And this is because neither he nor his
three co-accused touched the P5,000.00 given by Severino nor
the latter’s wallet or watch during the entire incident; proof of
which is that none of those items were recovered from their
persons.
Those factual allegations are contradicted by the evidence.
Rodita, the lumberyard employee, testified that upon demand
by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and
subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused Simplicio
Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino. In
respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram, Rodita declared
that the Mayor handed the amount to her after she (the Mayor)
had opened the padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the
amount to one of the holduppers. The “taking” was, therefore,
677
VOL. 184, APRIL 26, 1990 677
People vs. Salvilla
sufficiently proved (TSN, July 1, 1987, pp. 12-13, 15-16, 27-31).
The money demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch were
within the dominion and control of the Appellant and his co-
accused and completed the taking.
“The State established a ‘taking’ sufficient to support a conviction of
robbery even though the perpetrators were interrupted by police and
so did not pick up the money offered by the victim, where the
defendant and an accomplice, armed with a knife and a club
respectively, had demanded the money from the female clerk of a
convenience store, and the clerk had complied with their instructions
and placed money from the register in a paper bag and then placed
the bag on the counter in front of the two men; these actions brought
the money within the dominion and control of defendant and
completed the taking.” (Johnson vs. State, 432 So 2d 758).
“Severance of the goods from the possession of the owner and
absolute control of the property by the taker, even for an instant,
constitutes asportation.” (Adams vs. Commonwealth, 154 SW
381; State vs. Murray 280 SW 2d 809; Mason vs. Commonwealth,
105 SE 2d 149) [italics supplied].
It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no
opportunity to dispose of the personalties taken. That fact does
not affect the nature of the crime. From the moment the
offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had
no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is
complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code Annotated, Book II, 1981
ed., p. 594).
“The crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession of
the property, even if for a short time, and it is not necessary that the
property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he should have
actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of
the lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it”
(People vs. Quinn, 176 P 2d 404; Woods vs. State, 220 SW 2d
644; People vs. Beal, 39 P 2d 504; People vs. Clark, 160 P 2d 553).
Contrary to Appellant’s submission, therefore, a conviction for
consummated and not merely attempted Robbery is in order.
It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could not have
seen the taking because the place was dark since the doors
were
678
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salvilla
closed and there were no windows. It will be recalled, however,
that Rodita was one of the hostages herself and could observe
the unfolding of events. Her failure to mention the taking in
her sworn statement would not militate against her credibility,
it being settled that an affidavit is almost always incomplete
and inaccurate and does not disclose the complete facts for
want of inquiries or suggestions (People vs. Andaya, G.R. No.
L-63862, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 570; People vs. Tan, et al., 89
Phil. 337 [1951]).
The fact, too, that Rodita was an employee of Severino would
not lessen her credibility. The defense has not proven that she
was actuated by any improper motive in testifying against the
accused.
In the last analysis, the basic consideration centers around
the credibility of witnesses in respect of which the findings of
the Trial Court are entitled to great weight as it was in a
superior position to assess the same in the course of the trial
(see People vs. Ornoza, G.R. No. L-56283, 30 June 1987, 151
SCRA 495; People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. L-38042, 30 June
1987, 151 SCRA 326).
Anent the second assignment of error, the “surrender” of the
Appellant and his co-accused cannot be considered in their
favor to mitigate their liability. To be mitigating, a surrender
must have the following requisites: (a) that the offender had
not been actually arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority or to his agent; and (c) that the
surrender was voluntary (People vs. Canamo, G.R. No. L-
62043, 13 August 1985, 138 SCRA 141).
The “surrender” by the Appellant and his co-accused hardly
meets these requirements. They were, indeed, asked to
surrender by the police and military authorities but they
refused until only much later when they could no longer do
otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they were
completely surrounded and there was no chance of escape. The
surrender of the accused was held not to be mitigating as when
he gave up only after he was surrounded by the constabulary
and police forces (People vs. Sigayan, et al., G.R., No. L-18523-
26, 30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 839; People vs. Mationg, G.R. No.
L-33488, 29 March 1982, 113 SCRA 167). Their surrender was
not spontaneous as it was motivated more by an intent to
insure their
679
VOL. 184, APRIL 26, 1990 679
People vs. Salvilla
safety. And while it is claimed that they intended to surrender,
the fact is that they did not despite several opportunities to do
so. There is no voluntary surrender to speak of (People vs.
Dimdiman, 106 Phil. 391 [1959]).
All told, the assigned errors remain unsubstantiated and we
find the guilt of the accused-appellant, Bienvenido Salvilla,
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Although unassigned as an error, we deem it necessary to
turn now to the nature of the linked offenses involved and the
penalty imposed by the Trial Court.
Appellant and his co-accused were charged in the
Information with “Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and
Serious Illegal Detention (“Art. 295, par. 3, in conjunction with
Art. 267, RPC”), and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. We agree
with the Trial Court that a complex crime under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code has been committed such that the
penalty for the more serious offense of Serious Illegal Detention
(Art. 267, Revised Penal Code), or “reclusion perpetua to
death,” is to be imposed instead of the penalty prescribed for
Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 294 (3), which is
reclusion temporal.
 Under Article 48, a complex crime arises “when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other.” The term
“necessary means” does not connote indispensable means for if
it did then the offense as a “necessary means” to commit
another would be an indispensable element of the latter and
would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase “necessary means”
merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and
insure the commission of the other (Aquino, Revised Penal
Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624, citing Dissent, Montemayor, J.,
Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). In this case, the crime of
Serious Illegal Detention was such a “necessary means” as it
was selected by Appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and
carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a robbery.
The facts of this case differ from those in People vs. Astor, et
als. (G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, 29 April 1987, 149 SCRA 325)
where the accused were convicted of Robbery but acquitted in
the case for Serious Illegal Detention and where it was held
that “the detention is absorbed in the crime of robbery.” For
one, in Astor, there were two (2) separate Informations filed,
one for Robbery
680
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salvilla
and another for Serious Illegal Detention. In the present case,
only one Information was filed charging the complex offense.
For another, in Astor, the robbery had already been
consummated and the detention was merely to forestall the
capture of the robbers by the police. Not so in this case, where
the detention was availed of as a means of insuring the
consummation of the robbery. Further, in Astor, the detention
was only incidental to the main crime of robbery so that it was
held therein:
“x x x were appellants themselves not trapped by the early arrival of
the police at the scene of the crime, they would have not anymore
detained the people inside since they have already completed their
job. Obviously, appellants were left with no choice but to resort to
detention of these people as security, until arrangements for their
safe passage were made. This is not the crime of illegal detention
punishable under the penal laws but an act of restraint in order to
delay the pursuit of the criminals by peace officers (People v. Sol, 9
Phil. 265; People v. Uday, 55 Phil. 167, cited in the Revised Penal
Code, Aquino, Vol. 3, 1976 ed., p. 1337). Where the victims in a
robbery case were detained in the course of robbery, the detention is
absorbed by the crime of robbery (P. v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008, id.). In
the case at bar, the detention was only incidental to the main crime
of robbery, and although in the course thereof women and children
were also held, that threats to kill were made, the act should not be
considered as a separate offense. Appellants should only be held
guilty of robbery.”
In contract, the detention in the case at bar was not only
incidental to the robbery but was a necessary means to commit
the same. After the amount of P20,000.00 was handed to
Appellant, the latter and his co-accused still refused to leave.
The victims were then taken as hostages and the demand to
produce an additional P100,000.00 was made as a prerequisite
for their release. The detention was not because the accused
were trapped by the police nor were the victims held as security
against the latter. The detention was not merely a matter of
restraint to enable the malefactors to escape, but deliberate as
a means of extortion for an additional amount. The police and
other authorities arrived only much later after several hours of
detention had already passed. And, despite appeals to
appellant and his co-accused to surrender, they adamantly
refused until the amount of P100,000.00 they demanded could
be turned over to
681
VOL. 184, APRIL 26, 1990 681
People vs. Salvilla
them. They even considered P50,000.00, the amount being
handed to them, as inadequate.
The foregoing features also distinguish this case from those
of U.S. v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265 [1907] where the restraint was for no
other purpose than to prevent the victims from reporting the
crime to the authorities; from People v. Gamboa, 92 Phil.
1085 [1953] where the victims were taken to a place one
kilometer away and shot in order to liquidate the witnesses to
the robbery; from People v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008 [1953]; People
v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167 [1922], all of which cases were cited
in Astor, and where the victims were only incidentally detained
so that the detention was deemed absorbed in robbery.
In other words, unlike in the above cases, the elements of
the offense of Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case.
The victims were illegally deprived of their liberty. Two
females (Mary and Minnie), and a minor (Minnie), a specified
circumstance in Article 267 (3), were among those detained.
The continuing detention was also for the purpose of extorting
ransom, another listed circumstance in Article 267 (last
parag.), not only from the detained persons themselves but
even from the authorities who arrived to rescue them.
It follows then that as the detention in this case was not
merely incidental to the robbery but a necessary means
employed to facilitate it, the penalty imposed by the Trial Court
is proper.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED. Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Note.—Detention is absorbed if it is incidental to the crime
of robbery. (People vs. Astor, 149 SCRA 325.)

——o0o——

682
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

G.R. No. 127663. March 11, 1999. *
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ROLANDO VALDEZ, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; The lack of precision with which a
witness distinguished between the person who flagged down the
tricycle and the other person whom he recognized because of the
headlight of the tricycle cannot be considered as inconsistency at
all.—In his Statements dated September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1) and
September 24, 1995 (Exhibit 4), William Montano pointed to Bernard
Castro as the person who flagged down the motorized tricycle ridden
by the victims. On November 8, 1995, William and his co-
victim/survivor Randy Tibule executed a “Pinagsamang Salaysay sa
Pag-uurong ng Demanda” where they disclaimed having seen
Bernard Castro at the scene of the crime. They declared that after a
more thorough consideration of what transpired, they have realized
that the filing of the complaint against Bernard Castro was a mistake
and the result of misunderstanding or misapprehension of what
actually happened. In his testimony in court, William, however,
identified accused-appellant as the person illuminated by the
headlight of the tricycle, for which reason William readily recognized
him. We, therefore, find nothing inconsistent between his
declarations during the investigation and his testimony in court. The
lack of precision with which he distinguished between the person
who flagged down the tricycle and the other person whom he
recognized because of the headlight of the tricycle cannot be
considered as inconsistency at all. The same holds
_______________
*EN BANC.
612
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
true with claimed discrepancies between the statements of
Randy Tibule during the investigation and his testimony in court.
Same; Motive; Judicial Notice; Lack of motive for committing
the crime does not preclude conviction, considering that, nowadays, it
is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have killed or
committed serious offense for no reason at all.—It is basic and
fundamental rule that proof of motive is necessary for conviction only
when there is doubt as to the identity of the accused, not when
accused has been positively identified as in the present case (People
vs. Caggauan, 94 Phil. 118 [1953]; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422
[1980]; People vs. Pano, 257 SCRA 274 [1996]). Besides, it is also to
be noted that lack of motive for committing the crime does not
preclude conviction, considering that, nowadays, it is a matter of
judicial knowledge that persons have killed or committed serious
offense for no reason at all (People vs. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187
[1996]).
Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; The
settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it
is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it
or defend himself against such attack.—Under paragraph 16, Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code, the qualifying circumstance of
treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods, or
forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and especially
to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from any
defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make (People vs.
Santos, 270 SCRA 650 [1997]). The settled rule is that treachery can
exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected,
giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself against
such attack. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack,
without the slightest provocation from the victim who is unarmed,
made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate
(People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]).
Same; Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; It is not enough
that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal
intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing
determination to commit the crime—in order to be considered an
aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be
“premeditation” but must be “evident premeditation.”—The trial
court ruled that evident premeditation is likewise present. After
reviewing the evidence, however, we do not find any showing of
613
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999 613
People vs. Valdez
evident premeditation on the part of accused-appellant. While
there may be testimonial evidence pointing to an altercation between
Bernard Castro and a certain Capistrano, it does not sufficiently 614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident ANNOTATED
premeditation. It is not enough that evident premeditation is People vs. Valdez
suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by
Same; Same; Same; Abuse of Superior Strength; The
notorious outward acts evidencing determination to commit the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in
crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the
treachery.—The other aggravating circumstance considered by the
circumstance must not merely be “premeditation”; it must be
trial court is that of abuse of superior strength. This contravenes the
“evident premeditation” (People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158 [1972]).
very basic and elementary doctrine in our jurisdiction that the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites.—To establish the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed
existence of evident premeditation, the following have to be proved:
in treachery (People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 [1948]; People vs. Nierra,
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2)
96 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs. Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369 [1996]).
an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his
Same; Same; Complex Crimes; Where there was more than one
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the
gunman and several victims, each act by each gunman pulling the
determination and the execution to allow the offender to reflect on
trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at
the consequences of his act (People vs. Juan, 254 SCRA 478 [1996]).
different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot
Same; Same; Same; Same; Establishing a basis or motive for the
give rise to the complex crime of multiple murder.—The case at bar
commission of the crime does not constitute sufficient ground to
does not fall under any of the two instances defined above. The Office
consider the existence of evident premeditation.—Establishing a basis
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan erroneously considered
or motive for the commission of the crime does not constitute
the case as falling under the first. It is clear from the evidence on
sufficient ground to consider the existence of evident premeditation.
record, however, that the four crimes of murder resulted not from a
At best, it may indicate the time when the offenders determined to
single act but from several individual and distinct acts. For one
commit the crime (the first element). Their act of arming themselves
thing, the evidence indicates that there was more than one gunman
with caliber .30 carbines and thereafter waiting for their supposed
involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from that of the
victims at ambush positions may have also indicated that they clung
other. It cannot be said therefore, that there is but a single act of
to their determination to commit the crime (the second element).
firing a single firearm. There were also several empty bullet shells
More important than these two elements is the proof that a sufficient
recovered from the scene of the crime. This confirms the fact that
period of time had elapsed between the outward act evidencing intent
several shots were fired. Furthermore, considering the relative
and actual commission of the offense (the third element). There must
positions of the gunmen and their victims, some of whom were riding
have been enough opportunity for the initial impulse to subside. This
the motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside the
element is indispensable for circumstance of evident premeditation
sidecar thereof, it was absolutely impossible for the four victims to
to aggravate the crime. In People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA 134 [1972],
have been hit and killed by a single bullet. Each act by each gunman
this Court reiterates: In other words, this circumstance can be taken
pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each
into account only when there had been a cold and deep meditation,
particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and
and a tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal
individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of
act. There must be ‘an opportunity to coolly and serenely think and
multiple murder. We therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty,
deliberate on the meaning and the consequences of what they had
not of a complex crime of multiple murder, but of four counts of
planned to do, an interval long enough for the conscience and better
murder for the death of the four victims in this case. In the same
judgment to overcome the evil desire and scheme.
614
manner, accused-appellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of
frustrated murder.
 Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Firearms; Aggravating
Circumstances; There can be no separate conviction of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 in
view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294, illegal
posses-
615
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999 615
People vs. Valdez
sion being merely taken as an aggravating circumstance to the
other crime committed.—Now, to the matter of accused-appellant’s
conviction for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm under
Presidential Decree No. 1866. It was recently held in the case
entitled People vs. Molina (G.R. Nos. 115835-36, July 22, 1998), and
reiterated in People vs. Feloteo (G.R. No. 124212, September 17,
1998), that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 in view of
the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294. Instead,
illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating
circumstance per Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294, which in part,
provides: If homicide or murder is committed with the use of
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 8294; Ex Post Facto Laws;
Insofar as Republic Act 8294 will spare the accused from a separate
conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms, it may be
given retroactive application.—Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on
July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on June 21, 1997. The
crimes involved in the case at bar were committed on September 17,
1995. As in the case of any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act
No. 8294 will generally have prospective application. In cases,
however, where the new law will be advantageous to the accused, the
law may be given retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal
Code). Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant in the case at bar
from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of
firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 may be given retroactive application
in Criminal Case No. U-8749 (for Illegal Possession of Firearm)
subject of this present review.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In general, all pending cases
involving illegal possession of firearms should continue to be
prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic
Act No. 8294 are involved.—As a word of caution, however, the
dismissal of the present case for illegal possession of firearm should
not be misinterpreted as meaning that there can no longer be any
prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. In general,
all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should
continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly
indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved (murder or homicide
under Sec-
616
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
tion 1, and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup
d’etat under Section 3).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Insofar as the use of an
unlicensed firearm, as a special aggravating circumstance, unduly
raises the penalty for the four counts of murder from four reclusion
perpetua to that of four-fold death, Republic Act No. 8294 will not be
given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of an
expost facto law.—The use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar
cannot be considered as a special aggravating circumstance in
Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder),
also under review herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty for
the four counts of murder from four reclusion perpetua to that of four-
fold death. Insofar as this particular provision of Republic Act No.
8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly
aggravates the crime, this new law will not be given retroactive
application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post
facto law.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Br. 45.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaitniff-appellee.
Fernando P. Cabrera for accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Rolando Valdez seeks reversal of the
judgment of conviction promulgated by Branch 45 of the
Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region stationed in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, on October 24, 1996 sentencing him to
death for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double
Frustrated Murder, and likewise separately sentencing him to
suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua for the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions (Presidential
Decree No. 1866).
617
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999 617
People vs. Valdez
The Information against accused-appellant, Bernardo Castro,
and one John Doe for the complex crime of Multiple Murder
with Double Frustrated Murder charged:
That on or about 8:30 o’clock in the evening of September 17, 1995,
at Sitio Cabaoangan, barangay Nalsian, municipality of Manaoag,
province of Pangasinan, and within and jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another with intent to kill, and each armed
with caliber .30 carbines did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength
and treachery, simultaneously attacked and fired their caliber .30
carbines at Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta,
Sandra Montano, William Montano and Randy Tibule while they
were on board a tricycle, on their way to a dance party, hitting them
in the different parts of their bodies which caused the instantaneous
death of Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta and
Sandra Montano, to the damage and prejudice of their respective
heirs, and inflicting fatal injuries to William Montano and Randy
Tibule, in the different parts of their bodies, having thus performed
all the acts which would have produced the crime of murder with
respect to both but which did not by reason of causes independent of
the will of the accused, namely, the able and timely medical
assistance given the said victims William Montano and Randy
Tibule, which prevented their death.
Contrary to Article 248 in Relation to Article 48 and Article 6 of
the RPC.
(pp. 1-2, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8747)
The Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions pertinently averred:
That on or about 8:30 o’clock in the evening of September 17, 1995 at
Sitio Cabaoangan, Barangay Nalsian, Municipality of Manaoag,
province of Pangasinan and within and jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have in his possession, custody and control, a firearm, to
wit: Caliber .30 carbine without first having secured the proper
license thereof from the authorities and which he used in committing
the offense of multiple murder and double frustrated murder.
618
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
Contrary to Presidential Decree 1866.
(p. 1, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8749)
The inculpatory facts adduced by the prosecution during trial
are succinctly summarized in the People’s brief as follows:
On September 17, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening, William
Montano (16 years old), Randy Tibule (17 years old), Jean Marie
Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon Garcia, Jr. were
at the house of Randy Tibule in Manaoag, Pangasinan. They were
discussing how to go to the wedding party of Jean Marie’s cousin in
Sitio Cabaoangan (TSN, June 11, 1996, pp. 7-8; June 18, 1996, pp.
23-24).
After discussion, they rode in the tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia
going to Cabaoangan. Behind Garcia were Tibule and Willie. Jean
was seated inside the side car with Sandra and William Montano
(TSN, June 11, 1996, pp. 7-11; TSN, June 18, 1996, pp. 23-25). After
making a turn along the barangay road leading to Sitio Cabaoangan,
they met appellant Rolando Valdez and his companions who were
armed with guns. The tricycle’s headlight flashed on their faces.
Without warning, they pointed their guns and fired at Montano’s
group. Thereafter, after uttering the words, “nataydan, mapan
tayon” (They are already dead. Let us go), Valdez and companions
left (TSN, June 11, 1996, pp. 11-14).
The shooting incident left Ramon Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia,
Sandra Montano and Willie Acosta dead (TSN, June 11, 1996, pp. 14-
16). They sustained the following injuries:
Jean Marie Garcia:
—gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter, 1 inch lateral of the nipple right IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8747:—
through and through trajecting the middle lobe of the lungs, rt ventricle of the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA, GUILTY beyond
the heart, middle lobe of the lung, left with point of exit 1 inch in diameter reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE MURDER WITH
1 inch lateral of the nipple, left.
DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and penalized under
(Exhibit B)
Republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous Crime Law,
Ramon Garcia:
the offense having been a complex crime the penalty of which is in
—gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter point of entrance ear canal left thru
620
and thru trajecting the skull brain substance with point of exit temporal
area right. 620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
619 People vs. Valdez
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999 619 the maximum, and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
People vs. Valdez evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, hereby
—another gunshot wound .5 cm. in diameter point of entrance anterior sentences him the ultimum supplicum of DEATH to be executed
axilliary line left at the lable nipple trajecting the lung (left) heart ventricle pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177 known as the Lethal Injection
and lung (right) with point of exit 1 cm. in diameter, 1 inch lateral the nipple Law, to pay the heirs of the deceased RAMON GARCIA, JR., WILLIE
right. ACOSTA, JEMARIE GARCIA and SANDRA MONTANO and the
(Exhibit C) injured victims WILLIAM MONTANO and RANDY TIBULE, as
Sandra Montano: follows:
—gunshot wound, .6 cm. in diameter, point of entrance at the temporal area
left, penetrating the skin, skull minigas, brain substance (right) (tempral 1. 1)To the heirs of the deceased Ramon Garcia, Jr.:
regis) where the slug lodge.
(Exhibit D)
1. a)P50,000 as indemnity
Willie Acosta:
2. b)P52,116.00 as actual damages
—gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter below coastal arch point of entrance
trajecting the upper 3rd of the stomach thru and thru trajecting the upper 3. c)P500,000.00 as moral damages
third of the stomach of thoracic vein with the point of exit 1 cm. in diameter
at the level of the 7th thorasic vertebrae. 1. 2)To the heirs of the deceased WILLIE ACOSTA:
(Exhibit E)
On the other hand, William Montano and Randy Tibule survived 1. a)P50,000 as indemnity
the attack. They suffered serious gunshot injuries that could have 2. b)P26,358.00 as actual damages
caused their death were it not for the timely medical attention given 3. c)P500,000.00 as moral damages
them (TSN, July 3, 1996, p. 6). Montano sustained several gunshot
wounds on the left arm, two on the left upper back, another on the 1. 3)To the heirs of the deceased JEMARIE GARCIA:
left shoulder and middle right finger (TSN, June 25, 1996, p. 608).
Tibule sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the fifth upper 1. a)P50,000 as indemnity
quadrant (stomach) and the other at the left periumbelical (TSN, 2. b)P500,000.00 as moral damages
July 3, 1996, pp. 7-8).
(pp. 215-219, Rollo.) 1. 4)To the heirs of the deceased Sandra Montano:
In its decision dated October 24, 1996, the trial court rendered
a judgment of conviction in the two cases, finding and 1. a)P50,000 as indemnity
disposing: 2. b)P48,269.80 as actual damages
3. c)P500,000.00 as moral damages
 1. 5)To the victim WILLIAM MONTANO:
1. a)P39,133.92 as actual damages
2. b)P100,000.00 as moral damages
1. 6)To the victim RANDY TIBULE:
1. a)P36,233.65 as actual damages
2. b)P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.
WITH RESPECT TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8749:—the accused
ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND
AMMUNITIONS (Presidential Decree No. 1866) and hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA
and to pay the costs.
Finally, it is said: “Dura lex, sed lex,” translated as: “The law is
harsh, but that is the law!”
621
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999 621
People vs. Valdez
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 180-181, Rollo.)
Hence, the instant review, with accused-appellant anchoring
his plea for reversal on the following assigned errors:
1. I.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FAILING TO CONSIDER
THE MATERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL, IMPORTANT AND
SIGNIFICANT, DISCREPANCIES IN THE AFFIDAVITS
OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND THEIR
TESTIMONIES IN COURT;
2. II.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
RECANTATIONS OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
3. III.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE SERIOUS DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITY
OF ACCUSED, ROLANDO VALDEZ AS THE GUNMAN;
4. IV.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER MOTIVE ON THE PART OF BERNARDO
CASTRO TO FIRE AT, AS HE ACTUALLY FIRED AT THE
OCCUPANTS OF MOTORIZED TRICYCLE;
5. V.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE AGAINST THE PROSECUTION ITS
DELIBERATE FAILURE TO PRESENT THE POLICE
INVESTIGATORS WHO INVESTIGATED THE
INCIDENT AND IT WAS THE DEFENSE WHICH
PRESENTED SAID POLICE INVESTIGATORS;
6. VI.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
ACCUSED ROLANDO VALDEZ DID NOT DENY THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM FOR VIOLATION OF P.D.
1866 BECAUSE HE DID NOT ALLEGEDLY TOUCHED IT
IN HIS MEMORANDUM.
(pp. 106-107, Rollo)
After a painstaking review of the record and a deliberate
consideration of the arguments of accused-appellant, the Court
does not find enough basis to reverse.
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing
to consider what he says are material, substantial, important
and significant discrepancies between the affidavits of
622
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies in court. Accused-
appellant points to the Statement of William Montano, taken
by SPO1 Mario Suratos on September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1: p.
238, Record), and the Statement taken on September 24, 1995
(Exhibit 4: p. 291, Record), both in Villaflor Hospital, Dagupan
City where William Montano specifically named Bernard
Castro as the person who flagged down the motorized tricycle
he and the other victims were riding. This, he claims, is
inconsistent with his testimony during the trial where he
stated:
ATTY. RANCHEZ:
Q. Now, were you able to reach Sitio Cabauangan,
Nalsian, Manaoag, Pangasinan?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. When we were entering the road at Sitio
Cabauangan at around ten to fifteen meters,
somebody plugged (sic) down the tricycle, sir.
Q. And what happened next after somebody plugged
(sic) down your tricycle? motorcycle, sir.
A. Somebody standing was lighted by the headlight of
our
Q. Now, what happened next, if any?
A. The one who was standing and was lighted with
the headlight was immediately recognized by me,
sir.
Q. Who was that person whom you saw and you
immediately recognized?
A. That one, sir.
ACTG. INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person wearing white t-shirt
seated at the bench for the accused, and when
asked his name, he gave his name as Rolando
Valdez.
(pp. 11-12, tsn, June 11, 1996)
We are not persuaded.
In his Statements dated September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1) and
September 24, 1995 (Exhibit 4), William Montano pointed
623
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999 623
People vs. Valdez
to Bernard Castro as the person who flagged down the
motorized tricycle ridden by the victims. On November 8, 1995,
William and his co-victim/survivor Randy Tibule executed a
“Pinagsamang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Demanda” where
they disclaimed having seen Bernard Castro at the scene of the
crime. They declared that after a more thorough consideration
of what transpired, they have realized that the filing of the
complaint against Bernard Castro was a mistake and the result
of misunderstanding or misapprehension of what actually
happened. In his testimony in court, William, however,
identified accused-appellant as the person illuminated by the
headlight of the tricycle, for which reason William readily
recognized him. We, therefore, find nothing inconsistent
between his declarations during the investigation and his
testimony in court. The lack of precision with which he
distinguished between the person who flagged down the
tricycle and the other person whom he recognized because of
the headlight of the tricycle cannot be considered as
inconsistency at all. The same holds true with claimed
discrepancies between the statements of Randy Tibule during
the investigation and his testimony in court.
Accused-appellant stubbornly insists that following the
withdrawal or retraction of the accusation of several witnesses
against Bernard Castro, these same witnesses’ accusation
against accused-appellant becomes doubtful.
We are not convinced.
In all the references by accused-appellant in pages 10-12 of
his brief to the sworn declarations of prosecution witnesses
made during the investigation of the case, Bernard Castro may
have indeed been identified and named as one of the gunmen.
It may readily be noted in these very same references, however,
that all these prosecution witnesses referred to two other
companions, then unidentified, of Bernard Castro. Even in the
Joint Affidavit (Exhibit “7”) referred to in page 11 of the brief,
the police investigators categorically referred to “Bernard
Castro y Nazareno, alias Toti as one of the suspects or
assailants involved in the shooting incident” (p. 112, Rollo). The
logical conclusion that may be drawn
624
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
therefrom is that there is at least one other assailant in
addition to Bernard Castro, and as it developed, accused-
appellant was subsequently and positively named as such.
Withal, we cannot subscribe to accused-appellant’s
ratiocination that if the witnesses pointed to Bernard Castro as
one of the perpetrators of the crime, then it follows that
accused-appellant cannot be one other and additional
perpetrator anymore. Accused-appellant’s reasoning on this
point is absolutely flawed. It is totally unacceptable.
Accused-appellant likewise seeks shelter in the mysterious
withdrawal of the victims’ charges against Bernard Castro. He
insinuates that such recantation should not have been given
any consideration. But, this is water under the bridge. Anyway,
even in the remotest possibility that the retraction of the
accusation against Bernard Castro may be reversed, it does not
get accused-appellant off the hook. Considering that accused-
appellant had himself been positively identified, together with
Bernard Castro, as one of the other perpetrators of the crime,
his conviction may still stand independently and regardless of
whether or not Castro is indicted or remains unprosecuted.
Accused-appellant further argues that it is not he but Castro
who had the motive to shoot and fire at the occupants of the
motorized tricycle, mistaking one of the occupants thereof for
Isidro Capistrano, Castro’s former classmate and with whom
he earlier had an altercation. It is very clear in his brief,
however, that accused-appellant predicates this argument on
the mistaken premise that he was not positively identified in
the case at bar although he admits that it is established that
he was at the scene of the crime (p. 114, Rollo). This argument
will not hold simply because it is settled that accused-appellant
had been positively identified by eyewitnesses and victims
William Montano and Randy Tibule. It is basic and
fundamental rule that proof of motive is necessary for
conviction only when there is doubt as to the identity of the
accused, not when accused has been positively identified as in
the present case (People vs. Caggauan, 94 Phil.
118 [1953]; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422 [1980]; People vs.
625
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999 625
People vs. Valdez
Pano, 257 SCRA 274 [1996]). Besides, it is also to be noted that
lack of motive for committing the crime does not preclude
conviction, considering that, nowadays, it is a matter of judicial
knowledge that persons have killed or committed serious
offense for no reason at all (People vs. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA
187 [1996]).
Accused-appellant further contends that the prosecution’s
deliberate and intentional failure to present the investigating
police officers and their Joint Affidavit (Exhibit “7”) constitutes
culpable suppression of evidence which, if duly taken into
account, will merit his acquittal.
The argument is puerile, simply because the defense itself
was able to present the police officers and Exhibit “7” (p. 116,
Rollo). It is to be further noted that as earlier pointed out, the
declaration of SPO1 Suratos and SPO1 Carbonel did not
categorically rule out the possibility of convicting other persons
as co-principals of Castro. On the contrary, it is clear from such
affidavit that there was more than just one perpetrator of the
crime. It even confirms and corroborates the eyewitness
accounts of William Montano and Randy Tibule pointing to
accused-appellant as one of the other companions of Castro.
After meticulously and carefully going through each and
every piece of evidence on record, the Court finds no reason to
depart from the trial court’s accord of credence to the
eyewitness accounts of William Montano and Randy Tibule
who positively identified accused-appellant as one of the
persons who shot and fired at them and their companions that
fateful night. We agree with the trial court that the evidence
points beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was
one of those principally responsible for the deaths of the four
victims in this case and the wounding of two others. There is
also sufficient evidence that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery attended the killings, thus, qualifying the same to
murder.
Under paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,
the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the
offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of
the crime which tend directly and especially to ensure its
626
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 People vs. Valdez
execution without risk to himself arising from any defensive or
retaliatory act which the victim might make (People vs.
Santos, 270 SCRA 650 [1997]). The settled rule is that
treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden
and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or
defend himself against such attack. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from
the victim who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA
181 [1997]).
The trial court ruled that evident premeditation is likewise
present. After reviewing the evidence, however, we do not find
any showing of evident premeditation on the part of accused-
appellant. While there may be testimonial evidence pointing to
an altercation between Bernard Castro and a certain
Capistrano, it does not sufficiently prove the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. It is not
enough that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised,
but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward
acts evidencing determination to commit the crime. In order to
be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance
must not merely be “premeditation”; it must be “evident
premeditation” (People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158 [1972]).
To establish the existence of evident premeditation, the
following have to be proved: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the offender had clung to his determination;
and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and
the execution to allow the offender to reflect on the
consequences of his act (People vs. Juan, 254 SCRA
478 [1996]).
Establishing a basis or motive for the commission of the
crime does not constitute sufficient ground to consider the
existence of evident premeditation. At best, it may indicate the
time when the offenders determined to commit the crime (the
first element). Their act of arming themselves with caliber .30
carbines and thereafter waiting for their supposed victims at
ambush positions may have also indicated that they
627
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999 627
People vs. Valdez
clung to their determination to commit the crime (the second
element). More important than these two elements is the proof
that a sufficient period of time had elapsed between the
outward act evidencing intent and actual commission of the of-
fense (the third element). There must have been enough
opportunity for the initial impulse to subside. This element is
indispensable for circumstance of evident premeditation to
aggravate the crime. In People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA 134 [1972],
this Court reiterates:
In other words, this circumstance can be taken into account only
when there had been a cold and deep meditation, and a tenacious
persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal act. There must be
‘an opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the
meaning and the consequences of what they had planned to do, an
interval long enough for the conscience and better judgment to
overcome the evil desire and scheme . . . . (p. 649)
As early as in People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363 [1929], the Court
had stressed the importance of sufficient time between the
criminal act and the resolution to carry out the criminal intent,
affording such opportunity for cool thought and reflection to
arrive at a calm judgment. Obviously, this element is wanting
in the case at bar. Right after the supposed heated argument
between Bernard Castro and Capistrano, Castro and company
went home to get the firearms and not long thereafter mounted
the assault. There was no chance for the anger to subside. The
culprits in the case at bar had no opportunity for cool thought
and reflection to arrive at a calm judgment.
The other aggravating circumstance considered by the trial
court is that of abuse of superior strength. This contravenes the
very basic and elementary doctrine in our jurisdiction that the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
absorbed in treachery (People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil.
58 [1948]; People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs. The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the
Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369 [1996]). Revised Penal Code, to wit:
628 ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.—When a single act constitutes
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a
People vs. Valdez necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
629
Notwithstanding the absence of any aggravating
circumstances, if we were to uphold the trial court’s premises
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999 629
on the complex nature of the crime committed, the death People vs. Valdez
sentence, being the maximum penalty for murder, would still for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period. (As amended by Act No. 4000.)
have been the imposable penalty under Article 48 of the
The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances
Revised Penal Code. The Court however, finds compelling
defined above. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
reasons to reduce the sentence from one death penalty (for the
Pangasinan erroneously considered the case as falling under
complex crime of multiple murder with double frustrated
the first. It is clear from the evidence on record, however, that
murder) and one reclusion perpetua (for the crime of illegal
the four crimes of murder resulted not from a single act but
possession of firearms and ammunitions) to four counts
from several individual and distinct acts. For one thing, the
of reclusion perpetua (for 4 murders) and two indeterminate
evidence indicates that there was more than one gunman
sentences of prision mayor to reclusion temporal (for the 2
involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from that of
frustrated murders).
the other. It cannot be said therefore, that there is but a single
The recommendation of the Solicitor General in the People’s
act of firing a single firearm. There were also several empty
brief that accused-appellant should instead be convicted of four
bullet shells recovered from the scene of the crime. This
counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder is well
confirms the fact that several shots were fired. Furthermore,
taken.
considering the relative positions of the gunmen and their
The trial court erred when it allowed itself to be carried
victims, some of whom were riding the motorized tricycle itself
away by the erroneous Information filed by the Office of the
while the others were seated inside the sidecar thereof, it was
Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan charging the complex
absolutely impossible for the four victims to have been hit and
crime of multiple murder and double frustrated murder (p. 1,
killed by a single bullet. Each act by each gunman pulling the
Record: Crim. Case No. U-8747). It may be noted that in his
trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular
Resolution dated September 26, 1995, the investigating
moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual
municipal trial court judge of Manaoag, Pangasinan, found
acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of multiple
a prima facie case for four separate counts of murder (pp. 101-
murder. We therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty, not
102, Ibid.). Too, the same investigating judge in his Resolution
of a complex crime of multiple murder, but of four counts of
dated October 31, 1995 found a prima facie case for two counts
murder for the death of the four victims in this case. In the
of frustrated murder (pp. 43-44, Ibid.). It was upon
same manner, accused-appellant is likewise held guilty for two
reinvestigation by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
counts of frustrated murder.
Pangasinan that a case for the complex crime of murder with
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides
double frustrated murder was instead filed per its Joint
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of
Resolution dated November 17, 1995 (pp. 4-6, Ibid.).
murder. Without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
attendant in the commission of the crime, the medium penalty
is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. In the
case at bar, accused-appellant, being guilty of four separate
counts of murder, the proper penalty should be four sentences
of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being guilty of two counts
of frustrated murder, accused-appellant must be meted out an
indeterminate sentence ranging from a mini-
630
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Valdez
mum of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to a maximum of 12
years and 1 day of reclusion temporal for each offense. Now, to
the matter of accused-appellant’s conviction for illegal
possession of unlicensed firearm under Presidential Decree No.
1866. It was recently held in the case entitled People vs.
Molina (G.R. Nos. 115835-36, July 22, 1998), and reiterated
in People vs. Feloteo (G.R. No. 124212, September 17, 1998),
that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 in
view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294.
Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken
as an aggravating circumstance per Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 8294, which in part, provides:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days
after its publication on June 21, 1997. The crimes involved in
the case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995. As in
the case of any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No.
8294 will generally have prospective application. In cases,
however, where the new law will be advantageous to the
accused, the law may be given retroactive application (Article
22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare accused-
appellant in the case at bar from a separate conviction for the
crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294
may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. U-
8749 (for Illegal Possession of Firearm) subject of this present
review.
As a word of caution, however, the dismissal of the present
case for illegal possession of firearm should not be
misinterpreted as meaning that there can no longer be any
prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. In
general, all pending cases involving illegal possession of
firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other
crimes
631
VOL. 304, MARCH 11, 1999 631
People vs. Valdez
expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved
(murder or homicide under Section 1, and rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat under Section
3).
However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar
cannot be considered as a special aggravating circumstance in
Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple
Murder), also under review herein, because it will unduly raise
the penalty for the four counts of murder from four reclusion
perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as this particular
provision of Republic Act No. 8294 is not beneficial to accused-
appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law
will not be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire
the character of an ex-post facto law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision with
respect to Criminal Case No. U-8747 is hereby MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
four counts of murder and hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of four sentences of reclusion perpetua. He is also found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of frustrated
murder and hereby meted two indeterminate sentences, each,
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The appealed judgment relating to the
civil liabilities of accused-appellant towards the six victims is
AFFIRMED.
Criminal Case No. U-8749 involving Presidential Decree No.
1866 is hereby dismissed.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumb
ing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and GonzagaReyes, JJ., concur.
Mendoza and Panganiban, JJ., In the result.
632
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salva vs. Court of Appeals
Judgment modified.
Note.—Consistent with the doctrine that an appeal in a
criminal case throws the whole case open for review, the
appellate court may, applying the new law (Republic Act No.
8294), additionally impose a fine, which if unpaid, will subject
the convict to subsidiary imprisonment, pursuant to Art. 39 of
the Revised Penal Code. (Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 277
SCRA 518 [1997])

——o0o——
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and
ap pellee, vs. VICENTE DE LEON Y FLORA, defendant and
appellant.
1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; THEFT; HABITUAL
DELINQUENT; PENALTY.—The accused in the instant
case was convicted of the crime of theft, having taken two
game roosters belonging to different owners, and being an
habitual delinquent, in accordance with the provisions of Act
No. 3062, an additional penalty consisting of half the penalty
provided for the crime committed must be imposed upon
him. (People vs. Aguinaldo, 47 Phil., 728;
People vs. Espiritu, R. G. No. 24753, promulgated December
31, 1925, not reported.)
1. 2.ID. ; ID.—The act of taking two roosters in the same place
and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes
having an independent existence of their own, because there
are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes. (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of June 13, 1894.)
1. 3.ID. ; ID.—It is not an element of the crime of theft that the
culprit know the owner of the thing stolen, the crime being
consummated provided the thing stolen belongs to another
and the same is taken with intent to gain. Neither is it
necessary for the existence of the crime of theft that it should
appear in a specific manner who is the owner of the thing
stolen, because the law does not require it, nor does it affect
the criminal liability, but only the restitution or
indemnification of damages, which are merely of a civil
nature. (Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 22, 1898 and October 4, 1905.)
1. 4.ID. ; ID.—The doctrine laid down in the case of United
States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260), is not applicable to the
present case, as two separate complaints have been filed
herein against the accused, but the trial court convicted him
in the two cases, considering the facts alleged in the two
complaints as constituting but one crime.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Diaz, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Modesto Reyes for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
438
438 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Leon
VlLLAMOR, J.:
Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de
Leon y Flora entered the yard of Vicente Magat's house on
Domingo Santiago Street, Manila, and without violence or
intimidation against persons nor force upon things, took, with
intent to gain, two game roosters which were in the yard, one
with colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to Diego Magat,
and the other with white plumage and black spots, valued at
P10, belonging to Ignacio Nicolas.
Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal
court for two crimes of theft, one the theft of Magat's rooster
and the other that of Nicolas'. Upon being arraigned, the
accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the municipal
court in each case to suffer the penalty of three years, six
months and one day presidio correccional, to return the stolen
roosters to their respective owners and to pay the costs in both
cases. The accused appealed from this judgment .to the Court
of First Instance, and, upon being arraigned again upon the
same informations, pleaded not guilty in both cases, which
were tried jointly by agreement of the parties approved by the
court.
In view of the evidence, the trial court found the accused
guilty of one crime of theft, holding that the theft of the two
roosters constituted but one crime, and taking into
consideration the circumstance that the accused is an habitual
delinquent sentenced him in said two cases to the penalty of
three years, six months and one day presidio correccional and
to pay the costs in case R. G. No. 25375, declaring the costs in
case No. 25376, de oficio without the obligation to indemnify,
as the roosters were returned to their respective owners. The
accused appealed to this court and his counsel alleges that the
trial court erred: (a) In holding that the guilt of the accused was
proven by his own admission; (b) in not giving him the benefit
of reasonable doubt, and (c) in sentencing instead of acquitting
the accused, with the costs de oficio.
439
VOL. 49, OCTOBER 8, 1926 439
People vs. De Leon
We have reviewed the evidence and find no grounds to support
the contention of the appellant. We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that the guilt of the accused in the present case is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. The case falls under the provisions
of paragraph 5 of article 518 of the Penal Code, amended by
section 1 of Act No. 3244, in connection with paragraph 3 of
article 520 of the same Code. The penalty provided in the law
is that of presidio correccional in its full extent, and there
having been present the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity, the penalty must be imposed upon the accused in
its maximum degree, or four years, two months and one
day presidio correccional. The accused being an habitual
delinquent, under Act No. 3062 an additional penalty must be
imposed upon him consisting of half the penalty provided for
the crime committed, or 2 years and 1 month presidio
correccional. (People vs. Aguinaldo, 47 Phil., 728;
People vs. Espiritu, R. G. No. 24753 ).
1
We could stop right here, but the Attorney-General raises a
question in his brief which we believe it is necessary for us to
resolve now, due to the fact that it is not only important to our
jurisprudence, but also to the due prosecution of violators of the
law. The Attorney-General urges that the penalty for two
crimes of theft be imposed upon the accused for each of the
stolen roosters. The question, then, to determine is whether or
not the fact that the accused, with intent to gain, on the same
occasion and in the same place, took the two roosters, one
belonging to Vicente Magat and the other to Ignacio Nicolas,
constitutes two crimes of theft.
It will be remembered that article 517 of the Penal Code
contains three paragraphs enumerating the acts which
constitute the crime of theft The first defines theft in general;
the second declares a particular act to be theft which is not
included in the description in the first par-
_______________
1Promulgated December 31, 1925, not reported.
440
440 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Leon
agraph, and the third also considers theft a series of acts with
similar characteristics to the general type, with the exceptions
therein noted.
Article 517 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
"ART. 517. The following are guilty of theft:
1. "1.Any person who, with intent to gain, but without the use of
violence or intimidation against any person or the use of
force upon anything, shall take anything which is the
personal property of another without the latter's consent.
2. "2.Any person who, having found anything which has been
lost, shall with knowledge of its ownership appropriate the
same with intent of gain.
3. "3.Any person guilty of malicious damage who shall remove
or make use of the things damaged, subject to the exceptions
established by paragraphs one, two, and three of article five
hundred and ninety-two; paragraph one of article five
hundred and ninety-three; paragraph one of article five
hundred and ninety-five, and articles five hundred and
ninety-six, five hundred and ninety-eight, and six hundred
and three."
As may be seen, the act of taking another's property without
violence or intimidation against persons, nor force upon things,
with intent to gain and without the consent of its owner, is
what constitutes the crime of theft, as described in the first
paragraph of article 517.
The crime of theft is an offense against personal property
and what is punished is the alarm caused in the community by
the perpetration of the act which is violative of the individual
rights guaranteed by the law, as well as the damage that said
act may occasion to the members of the community. Under
sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in response
to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one occasion,
is not susceptible of being modified by the accidental
circumstance that the article unlawfully taken belonged to two
distinct persons. There is no series of acts here for the
accomplish-
441
VOL. 49, OCTOBER 8, 1926 441
People vs. De Leon
ment of different purposes, but only of one which was
consummated, and which determines the existence of only one
crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on
the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an
independent existence of their own, because there are not two
distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize
two separate crimes.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of July 13, 1894,
said:
"The act of unlawfully taking two colts, two cows and two
calves on one night, belonging to four owners, which livestock
was found in various adjacent and open meadows, constitutes
only one crime of theft, because the fact that the persons
injured by the taking of the cattle by the accused were several,
said accused knowing that the meadows in which this livestock
was found were open and adjacent, it being easy to pass from
one to the other, does not authorize the legal conception that
the said accused committed four thefts on said night, but only
one as found by the lower court, which did not commit an error
of law by holding that the acts were committed on a single
occasion."
It is not an element of the crime of theft that the culprit
know the owner of the thing stolen, the crime being
consummated provided the thing stolen belongs to another and
the same is taken with intent to gain. (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of November 22, 1898.) Neither is it necessary
for the existence of the crime of theft that it should appear in a
specific manner who the owner is of the thing stolen, because
the law does not require it nor does it affect the criminal
liability, but only the restitution or indemnification of
damages, which are merely of a civil nature. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, October 4, 1905.) What constitutes
the crime of theft is the taking of another's property with intent
to gain, without the consent of the owner, so that after the
unlawful act of taking another's property is proven, it is evident
that all the elements mentioned in the first par-
442
442 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Leon
agraph of article 517 of the Penal Code exist. Therefore, we are
of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a thing
belonging to another on one occasion and in the same place,
constitutes the commission of only one crime of theft; and the
fact that the things taken belong to different persons does not
produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be punished
separately.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have not lost sight of the
doctrine laid down in United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260),
according to which, where the accused made no objection to the
information on the ground that it charged more than one
offense, the prosecution properly submitted evidence as to the
commission of each and all of the offenses charged; and the trial
court also properly entered judgment of conviction of each and
all of these offenses which were established by the introduction
of competent evidence at the trial and should, therefore, have
imposed the prescribed penalties for each and all of the offenses
of which the accused was convicted in accordance with the
provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code. This doctrine,
however, is not applicable to the present case as two separate
complaints have been filed herein against the accused, but the
trial court convicted the accused in the two cases, considering
the facts alleged in the said complaints as constituting but one
crime.
In American cases the same doctrine is maintained as in
Spanish decisions in regard to the question which is here
debated:
In Corpus Juris, vol. 36, page 799, it is said in regard to the
taking of articles belonging to two different owners at the same
time and place: "In a few jurisdictions the rule obtains that if
two or more articles belonging to different owners are stolen at
the same time and place, the theft of the property of each owner
is a separate crime and may be prosecuted as such." (U.
S. vs. Beerman, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,560; 5 Cranch C. C.,
412; State vs. Thurston 27 S. C. L., 382; Morton vs. State, 1
Lea [Tenn.] 498.)
443
VOL. 49, OCTOBER 8, 1926 443
People vs. De Leon
In other jurisdiction it is held that such a theft may be
prosecuted, at the pleasure of the State, either as one offense
or as several distinct offenses. (Bushman vs. Com., 138 Mass.,
507; Com. vs. Sullivan, 104 Mass., 552; State vs. Douglas, 26
Nev., 196; 65 Pac., 802; 99 Am. St, 688; State vs. Lambert, 9
Nev., 321.) But the prevailing rule is that if several articles,
stored in the same place, are taken by a single larcenous act,
the mere fact that some of them belonged to one person and
some to another does not dissolve the act into separate crimes.
(Ala.-Clemm vs. State, 154 Ala., 12; 45 So., 212; 129 Am. St.,
17; D. C.-Chanock vs. U. S., 50 App., 54; 267 Fed.,
612; Hoiles vs. U. S., 10 D. C., 370; 36 Am. Rep., 106; Ga.-
Lowe vs. State, 57 Ga., 171; Dean vs. State, 9 Ga. A., 571; 71
South East, 932; Ill.-Peo. vs. Israel, 269 111., 284; 109 North
East, 969; Ind.-Furnace vs. State, 153 Ind., 93; 54 North East,
441; Bell vs. State, 42 Ind., 335; lowa-State vs. Sampson, 157
lowa, 257; 138 North West, 473; 42 Law. Rep. An. [N.S.],
967; State vs. Congrove, 109 lowa, 66; 80 North West,
227; State vs. Larson, 85 lowa, 659; 52 North West, 539; Ky.-
Nichols vs. Com., 78 Ky., 180; Md.-State vs. Warren, 77 Md.,
121; 26 Atl. Rep., 500; 39 Am. St., 401; Mich.-Peo. vs. Johnson,
81 Mich., 573; 45 North West, 1119; Miss.-State vs. Quintini,
51 So., 276; Dalton vs. State, 91 Miss., 162; 44 So., 802; 124
Am. St., 637; Ward vs. State, 90 Miss., 249; 43 So., 466; Mo.-
State vs. Morphin, 37 Mo., 373; Lorton vs. State, 7 Mo., 55; 37
Am. Dec., 179; Mont.-State vs. Mjelde, 29 Mont, 490; 75 Pac.,
87; N. H.-State vs. Merrill, 44 N. H., 624; N. M.-
State vs. Klasner, 19 N. M., 474; 145 Pac., 679; Ann. Cas. 1917-
D, 824; N. C.-State vs. Simons, 70 N. C., 336; Oh.-
State vs. Hennessey, 23 Oh. St., 339, 13 Am. Rep., 253;
State vs. Smith, 10 Oh. Dec. (Reprint), 682; 23 CincLBul., 85;
Or.-State vs. Clark, 46 Or., 140; 80 Pac., 101; Pa.-
Fulmer vs. Com., 97 Pa., 503; Com. vs. Lent, 15 Pa. Dist., 884;
S. D.-State vs. Kieffer, 17 S. D., 67; 95 North West, 289; Tex.-
Wilson vs. State, 45 Tex., 76; 23 Am. Rep., 602;
Hudson vs. State', 9 Tex. A., 151, 35 Am. Rep.,
444
444 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bretaña
732; Addison vs. State, 3 Tex. A., 40 Utah-State vs. Mickel, 23
Utah, 507; 65 Pac., 484; Vt.-State vs. Blay, 77 Vt., 56; 58 Atl.
Rep., 794; State vs. Emery, 68 Vt., 109; 34 Atl. Rep., 432; 54
Am. St, 878; State vs. Newton, 42 Vt., 537; Va.-
Alexander vs. Com., 90 Va., 809; 20 South East, 782; Wash.-
State vs. Laws, 61 Wash., 533; 112 Pac., 488; State vs. Butts,
42 Wash., 455; 85 Pac., 33; Terr. vs. Heywood, 2 Wash., 180; 2
Pac., 189; Wyo.-Ackerman vs. State, 7 Wyo., 504; 54 Pac., 228;
Eng.-Reg. vs. Bleasdale, 2 C. & K, 765; 61 Eng. C. L., 765.)
For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as
is hereby, modified and the accused Vicente de Leon y Flora is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years and three
months presidio mayor, with the accessories of the law, and to
pay the costs. So ordered.
 Avanceña, C.
J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Villa-Real,
JJ., concur.
Johns, J., concurs in the result.
Judgment modified; penalty increased.

_______________

G.R. No. 93028. July 29, 1994. * Same; Same; Same; The corpus delicti of the crime has been fully
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent. **
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; To sustain a
conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and
unmistakably established.—To sustain a conviction for selling
prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other
material consideration. It must, therefore, be established beyond
doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer,
in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
_______________
* EN BANC.
** This case was initially raffled to the Second Division of the Court but due
to the novelty and importance of the issues raised on the effects of R.A. No. 7659 in
amending R.A. No. 6425, the same was referred to and accepted by the Court en
banc pursuant to Circular No. 2-89 and Bar Matter No. 209, as amended.
556
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
Same; Same; Same; The practice of entrapping drug traffickers
through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake,
harassment, extortion and abuse.—We are aware that the practice of
entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers
is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse.
Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not
obtain in the case at bar. Appellant’s entrapment and arrest were not
effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the
team before the buy-bust operation was effected. No ill motive was
or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are
presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. Such lack
of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving
and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed,
erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi.
proved with certainty and conclusiveness.—When the drug seized
was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at
Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic
chemist therein, confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88
that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were
positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana. Thus,
the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty
and conclusiveness.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Minor error or discrepancy
neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as
a whole nor reflects on the witness’ honesty.—Even,
assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on who
actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an error or
discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither
impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole
nor reflects on the witnesses’ honesty.
Same; Same; Same; No law or jurisprudence requires that an
arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay
official or any other civilian or be accompanied by the taking of
pictures.—Again, appellant contends that there was neither a
relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the
seizure. He decries the lack of pictures taken before, during and after
his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the custody
of any barangay official or police authorities. These are absurd
disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or
seizure, to be valid,
557
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 557
People vs. Simon
be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other
civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Court finds and
declares the exhibits inadmissible in evidence.—However, we find
and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in
evidence. Appellant’s conformance to these documents are
declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime
charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person
under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there
being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel.
Although appellant manifested during the custodial investigation
that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in
writing and in the presence of counsel, hence whatever incriminatory
admission or confession may be extracted from him, either verbally
or in writing, is not allowable in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of
the selling transaction.—Notwithstanding the objectionability of the
aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his
predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of
marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the
offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction which happens the moment
the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In the present case, and
in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained
beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Same; Same; Same; Drug-pushing when done on a small scale
belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any time, and
in any place.—Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that
he would sell marijuana to a total stranger. We take this opportunity
to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when
done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of crimes
that may be committed at any time and in any place. It is not
contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total
stranger, for what matters is not an existing familiarity between the
buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the
sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves.
Same; Same; Penalties; Court holds that in the instant case the
imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 is prision correccional.—For the nonce, we
hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic
Act No. 6425, as
558
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be
taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.
DAVIDE, JR.,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; The mere use by
a special law of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no
means make an offense thereunder an offense “punished or
punishable” by the Revised Penal Code.—It is thus clear that an
offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition
and the penalty therefor are found in the said Code, and it is deemed
punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor
are found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from
the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make
an offense in the special law punished by or punishable under the
Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the special
law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty therefor, although
it adopts the Code’s nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use
by a special law of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by
no means make an offense thereunder an offense “punished or
punishable” by the Revised Penal Code. APPEAL from a judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Br. 51.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M. Sampang for accused-appellant.
REGALADO,J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged
on November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging
that on or about October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo,
Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration
of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to
laboratory
559
 VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 559
People vs. Simon
examination, were found positive for marijuana. 1 3 Ibid., 23.
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on
March 2, 1989, after his rearrest following his escape from
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was
temporarily detained, he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily
2 Pejoro as the investigator.
waived his right to a pre-trial conference, after which trial on
3 Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez’ testimony, claiming that
the merits ensued and was duly concluded.
I appellant. He also averred that he was the one who confiscated
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant,
later identified as a NARCOM operative, informed the police
unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal
drug activities of a certain “Alyas Pusa” at Sto. Cristo, Guagua,
Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer
of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a
buy-bust team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc.
Virgilio Villaruz and Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the
same unit. After securing marked money from Bustamante, the
team, together with their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo
after they had coordinated with the police authorities
and barangay officers thereof. When they reached the place,
the confidential informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who
consequently approached appellant and asked him if he had
marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez
offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and, upon
returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana
tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to
P40.00 as payment. Lopez then scratched his head as a pre-
arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around
ten to fifteen meters away, and the team closed in on them.
Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team,
arrested appellant. The latter was then brought by the team to
the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep
and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt.
_______________
1 Original Record, 2; Criminal Case No. G-2320, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 51, Guagua, Pampanga.
2 Ibid., 11.
560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
4
he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and the
the marijuana and took the marked money from appellant. 5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he
was part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from
the rest of the other members, that is, around two hundred
meters away from his companions. He did not actually see the
sale that transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw
his teammates accosting appellant after the latter’s arrest. He
was likewise the one who conducted the custodial investigation
of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to
remain silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant,
however, orally waived his right to counsel. 6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit “G,” the
“Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated” which appellant
signed, admitting therein the confiscation of four tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise
informed the court below that, originally, what he placed on the
receipt was that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in
exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected
his entry by telling him to put “two,” instead of “one” and “40,”
instead of “20”. He agreed to the correction since they were the
ones who were personally and directly involved in the purchase
of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant. 7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas,
examined appellant at 5:30 P.M. of the day after the latter’s
apprehension, and the results were practically normal except
for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also did not
find any trace of physical injury on the person of appellant. The
next day, he again examined appellant due to the latter’s
complaint of gastrointestinal pain. In the course of the
examination, Dr. Calara discovered that appellant has a
history of peptic ulcer, which
_________________
4 TSN, April 6, 1989, 5-32.
5 Ibid., May 5, 1989, 2.
6 Ibid., May 24, 1989, 18; May 5, 1989, 11.
7 Ibid., May 24, 1989, 21-24.
561
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 561
People vs. Simon
causes him to experience abdominal pain and consequently
vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant came back with the
same complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal pain, his
physical condition remained normal. 8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the
attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question, at around
4:30 P.M., he was watching television with the members of his
family in their house when three persons, whom he had never
met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that
they would just inquire about something from him at their
detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told
that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that
they were taking a different route. While on board, he was told
that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep
but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the
camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he
refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by
Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and
fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and
insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of
Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was
because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He
admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed
that he did so since he could no longer endure the maltreatment
to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded
to the house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias,
Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 P.M. There,
he consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by
his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at
Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined for three
days. 9
Appellant’s brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact
that appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga
after undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He
likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering from
peptic ulcer even before the latter’s arrest. Also, Dr. Evelyn
10
Gomez-Aguas, a
_________________
8 Ibid., June 14, 1989, 3-22.
9 Ibid., July 10, 1989, 5-26.
10 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 8-16.
562
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital,
declared that she treated appellant for three days due to
abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause
for this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see
any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or
contusion on his body. 11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence
presented, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos
and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the
Government. 12
 Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the
aforementioned judgment of the lower court, contending in his
assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding
his defense of “frame-up,” (2) not declaring Exhibit “G” (Receipt
of Property Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and
(3) convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People’s real
theory and evidence is to the effect that appellant actually sold
only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the other
two tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently from his
possession, the latter not being in any way connected with the
14
sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered four tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves. In view thereof, the issue
15
presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of
selling the two tea bags allegedly committed by appellant, and
does not include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal
possession of the other two tea bags which separate offense is
not charged herein. 16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale
must be clearly and unmistakably established. To sell means17
to
_______________
11Ibid., August 18, 1989, 36, 41-43, 47-49.
12 Original Record, 174-175; per Judge Arsenio P. Roman.
13 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 3; Rollo, 54.
14 Exhibits F and G, Folder of Exhibits; TSN, July 10, 1989, 53.
15 Original Record, 2.
16 See People vs. Salamat, G.R. No. 103295, August 20, 1993.
17 People vs. Alilin, G.R. No. 84363, March 4, 1992, 206 SCRA 772.
563
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 563
People vs. Simon
give, whether for money or any other material
consideration. It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt
18
that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-
buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence
adduced by both parties, we are morally certain that appellant
was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of
prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a
scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell
13 two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter
himself creditably testified as to how the sale took place and
his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As
between the straightforward, positive and corroborated
testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative
testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater
weight and is more entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug
traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is
susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and
abuse. Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and
19
doubt do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant’s entrapment
and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a
surveillance was conducted by the team before the buy-bust
operation was effected. No ill motive was or could be
20
attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed
to have regularly performed their official duty. Such lack of
21
dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over
the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of
having been framed, erected as it is upon the mere shifting
22
sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was caught red-handed
delivering
_________________
18 See People vs. Querrer, G.R. No. 97147, July 15, 1992, 211 SCRA 502.
19 People vs. Lati, G.R. No. 70393, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 336.
20 TSN, May 5, 1989, 5.
21 Sec. 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
22 See People vs. Labra, G.R. No. 98427, November 20, 1992, 215 SCRA 822.
564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 People vs. Simon
prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance for
him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have
plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime
Laboratory Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for
examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist
therein, confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88
23
that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from
appellant were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams
of marijuana. Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had been
24
fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness. 25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged
inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the
matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from
him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing
to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the
aforementioned “Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated,” he
signed it as the one who seized the same. 26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who
confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since such is
not an element of the offense with which appellant is charged.
What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was
confiscated from the possession of appellant. Even,
assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an error
on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an
error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such,
neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution
evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses’
honesty. Besides, there was clearly a mere imprecision of
27
language since Pejoro obviously meant that he did not take part
in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant,
but he participated in the legal seizure or confiscation
_______________
23 TSN, August 18, 1989, 3.
24 Ibid., id., 12; Exhibit M, Folder of Exhibits.
25 People vs. Celiz, et al., G.R. No. 92849, October 20, 1992, 214 SCRA 755.
26 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 4-5; Rollo, 55-56.
27 People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 86495, May 13, 1992, 209 SCRA 1.
565
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 565
People vs. Simon
thereof as the investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso
bills allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered for
finger-printing purposes contrary to the normal procedure in
buy-bust operations. This omission has been satisfactorily
28
explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:
“Q Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit
that in conducting such operation you do not
anymore provide a powder (sic) on the object so as
to determine the thumbmark or identity of the
persons taking hold of the object?
A We were not able to put powder on these
denominations because we are lacking that kind of
material in our office since that item can be
purchased only in Manila and only few are
producing that, sir.
xxx
Q Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C.
Crime Laboratory, CIS, as well as the office of
NICA?
A Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we
cannot make a request for that powder because
they, themselves, are using that in their own work,
sir.” 29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to
mark the money bills used for entrapment purposes can under
no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the prosecution
because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes “any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.” The dusting of said bills with phosphorescent
30
powder is only an evidentiary technique for identification pur-
poses, which identification can be supplied by other species of
evidence. Again, appellant contends that there was neither a
relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness
the seizure. He decries the lack of pictures taken before, during
and after his
_______________
28 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 6; Rollo, 57.
29 TSN, May 5, 1989, 7.
30 People vs. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990, 188 SCRA 376.
566
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the
custody of any barangay official or police authorities. These
are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that
an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative,
a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by
the taking of pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers
having caught appellant in flagrante delicto, they were not only
authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a
warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant’s contention, there was an
arrest report prepared by the police in connection with his
apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report states, inter alia, that “suspect was arrested for selling
32
two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the
confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana
dried leaves.” Below these remarks was affixed appellant’s
signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized
property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant
wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills
from him. 33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned
exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellant’s conformance to
these documents are declarations against interest and tacit
admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in
violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation
for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the
records to show that he was assisted by counsel. Although 34
appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he
waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing
and in the presence of counsel, hence whatever incriminatory
35
admission or confession may be extracted from him, either
verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence. Besides, 36
the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be
concocted to implicate a suspect.
_______________
31 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 6-7; Rollo, 57-58.
32 Exhibit F, Folder of Exhibits.
31 33 Exhibit G, ibid.
34 People vs. Mauyao, G.R. No. 84525, April 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 732.
35 TSN, May 5, 1989, 11.
36 Sec. 12(1), Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
567
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 567
People vs. Simon
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits,
appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament
since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana
has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction which happens the
37
moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In the 38
present case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale
has been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he
would sell marijuana to a total stranger. We take this 39
opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-
pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to
that class of crimes that may be committed at any time and in
any place. It is not contrary to human experience for a drug
40
pusher to sell to a total stranger, for what matters is not an
41
existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their
agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the
marijuana leaves. While there may be instances where such
42
sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse
circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the
incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that
occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars
are not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to
physical and mental torture by the arresting officers which
caused him to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was
placed under custody. This he asserts to support his
43
explanation as to how his signatures on the documents earlier
discussed were supposedly obtained by
_______________
37 People vs. Rumeral, G.R. No. 86320, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 194.
38 People vs. Sibug, G.R. No. 108520, January 24, 1994.
39 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 11; Rollo, 62.
40 People vs. Tandoy, G.R. No. 80505, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 28.
41 Cf. People vs. Cina, G.R. No. 88220, October 1, 1990, 190 SCRA 199.
42 People vs. Consuelo, G.R. No. 77755, April 18, 1990, 184 SCRA 402.
43 TSN, July 10, 1989, 12-13.
568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence
that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances. The
evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant’s
allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the
prosecution and the other for the defense, testified on the
45 46
absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury,
abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant. What is
evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic
ulcer from which he had been suffering even before his
arrest. His own brother even corroborated that fact, saying
47
that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer. 48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at
Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not divulging
the same to his brother who went to see him at the camp after
his arrest and during his detention there. Significantly, he
49
also did not even report the matter to the authorities nor file
appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the
opportunity to do so and with the legal services of counsel
50
being available to him. Such omissions funnel down to the
conclusion that appellant’s story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his
allegations that his arrest was baseless and premeditated for
the NARCOM agents were determined to arrest him at all
costs. Premeditated or not, appellant’s arrest was only the
51
culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society
and it was providential that it came about after he was caught
in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly,
this opinion
___________________
44 People vs. Eslaban, G.R. Nos. 101211-12, February 8, 1993, 218 SCRA 534.
45 TSN, June 14, 1989, 22.
46 Ibid., August 18, 1989, 48.
47 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 15-16.
48 Ibid., October 23, 1988, 15-16.
49 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 22; October 23, 1988, 15.
50 Ibid., July 10, 1989, 26-27.
51 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 4; Rollo, 55.
569
44
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 569
People vs. Simon
could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment
of the trial court. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective
December 31, 1993, which supervenience necessarily affects
52
the original disposition of this case and entails additional
questions of law which we shall now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to
the adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:
“SEC.13.Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby
amended to read as follows:
xxx
‘SEC.4.Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation
of Prohibited Drugs.—The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.’
xxx
“SEC.17.Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
‘Sec.20.Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds
or Instrument of the Crime.—The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4,
7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this
Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following
quantities:
xxx
5.750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx
_________________
52 Sec. 28 of Republic Act No. 7659 provides that it “shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation,” and
it was so published in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila Bulletin,
Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal.
570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
‘Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.’”
1.Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the
sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only
3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only
two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the
patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 should
be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty
provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special
law, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of the
previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, it has 53
long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the
beneficent provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall
be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special
laws. The exception in said article would not apply to those
54
convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to
convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious
or less serious physical injuries,robo, hurto, estafa or
falsification. 55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 could neither have then been involved nor invoked in
the present case, a corollary question would be whether this
court, at the present stage, can sua sponte apply the provisions
of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on
appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited
case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
“x x x. The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code,
declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are
favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and
nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill
such duty, irrespective
_______________
53 Title Five, Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs.
 54 U.S. vs. Hocbo, 12 Phil. 304 (1908); U.S. vs. Parrone, 24 Phil. 29 (1913); U.S.
vs. Almencion, 25 Phil. 648 (1913); People vs. Moran, et al., 44 Phil.
387 (1923); People vs. Parel, 44 Phil. 437 (1923); People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil.
225 (1935).
55 Article 62(5), Revised Penal Code.
571
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 571
People vs. Simon
of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all
provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty.”
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the
reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has
already become final and executory or the accused is serving
sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic
considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter being
brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ
of habeas corpus. 56
2.Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of
imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the
drafting of the aforesaid law, thereby calling for and
necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425, as now further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell,
administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to
the amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if
what is involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or
marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the
penalty shall range fromprision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the
provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its
dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where
the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum
of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or
more. The same error has been committed with respect to the
other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section
20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give
effect to the whole law, we hereby sold that the penalty to be
57
imposed
_________________
56See Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741 (1948); Gumabon, et al. vs.
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 420.
57Lopez and Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 100 Phil. 850 (1957).
572
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the
quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and
not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the
fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be
construed in a manner favorable to the accused.
3.Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug
is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable range of
penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now
modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from
said range “depending upon the quantity” of the drug involved
in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a
complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that
is, prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion
temporal. In such a situation, the Code provides that each one
shall form a period, with the lightest of them being the
minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the
maximum period. 58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which
period of such complex penalty shall be imposed on the accused.
The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section 20, however,
is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall
instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the
criminal transactions. Accordingly, by way of exception to
59
Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section
20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component
penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty
depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the
modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded.
Since each component penalty of the total complex penalty will
have to be imposed separately as determined by the quantity
of the drug involved, then the modifying circumstances can be
used to fix the proper period of that component penalty, as shall
hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section
20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition thereon that,
unless
________________
58Article 77, Revised Penal Code.
59Thisgraduated scheme of penalties is not stated with regard and does not
apply to the quantities and their penalties provided in the first paragraph, the
penalties therein being the same regardless of whether the quantities exceed
those specified therein.
573
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 573
People vs. Simon
there are compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of
the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into
three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the
same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty
proportionately among the three aforesaid periods according to
the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved is below
250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision
correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed
as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death. 60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana
subject of the case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional is
consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary and
cognate issue has first to be resolved.
4.Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day
to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods
as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided
by Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether or not in
determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be
taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or
absence of mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances
modifying criminal liability should be taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held
that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws,
the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review
of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that
the reason therefor was because the special laws involved
provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished
thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with
reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the
penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not
provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it
would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated
modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine
the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article
64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases
that
________________
Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 20, R.A. No. 7659.
60
574
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by
degrees could not be given supplementary application to special
laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of
or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71
of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code
to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot
be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of,
or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary
application.
The situation, however, is different where although the
offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special
law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised
Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with
its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of
penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law
involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense
under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and
absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable
penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the
medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.
5.At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the
developmental changes in the penalties imposed for offenses
under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional
practice in the United States but differently from the penalties
provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins,
provided for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with
definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for
one to five years but without division into periods or any
technical statutory cognomen. This is the special law
contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the
Indeterminate Sentence Law were passed during the
61
American regime.
________________
Act No. 4103, effective on December 5, 1933.
61
575
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 575
People vs. Simon
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special
law would direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished
under the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner
provided therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act
No. 303 penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages with
62
the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
“SEC.4.Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as
required by section one of this Act, shall prima facie be considered a
fraud committed by such employer against his employee or laborer
by means of false pretenses similar to those mentioned in article
three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of
the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same manner as
therein provided.” 63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses
defined therein were specifically punished by the penalties as
technically named and understood in the Revised Penal Code.
These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-
Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto
mayor to death; Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing
64
Decree) where the penalties run from arresto mayor to prision
mayor; and Presi-dential Decree No. 1866 (illegal possession
and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the penalties
wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion temporal,
reclusion perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is
imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not
more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed without
violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things; not less
than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when
committed with violence against or intimidation of any person,
or force upon
________________
Effective on June 9, 1938.
62
See a similar format in P.D. No. 330 which penalizes the illegal taking of
63
timber and forest products under Arts. 308, 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code by reference.
 64In fact, the penalty for officers or ranking leaders was prision mayor to
death, just like the penalty for treason by a resident alien under Article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code.
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under
the special law are different from and are without reference or
relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no
suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties
under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based
on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code.
In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given
example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the
penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is
virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised
Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides,
the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in
the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot
suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of
the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties
and the correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal
Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded upon and
applicable to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect
to the penalties under the former Republic Act No. 1700 and
those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and
1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties
for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised
Penal Code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the
related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the
corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence
of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To
hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial
truncation of an integrated system of penalties under the Code
and its allied legislation, which could never have been the
intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda, a prosecution under a special law
65
________________
G.R. No. 51368, November 6, 1981, 109 SCRA 35.
65
577
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 577
People vs. Simon
(Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the
prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal
Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein
that—
“We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special
law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal
Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of
the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily
imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be
deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to
the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject
to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised
Penal Code x x x. Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be
applicable, x x x.” (Italics supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the
rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act
No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we
have this more recent pronouncement:
“x x x. Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code shall be ‘supplementary’ to special laws, this
Court held that where the special law expressly grants to the court
discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is
no roomfor the application of the provisions of the Code. x x x
“The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623,
contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the application
of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the court must be
guided by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning
the application of penalties which distill the ‘deep legal thought and
centuries of experience in the administration of criminal laws.’”
(Emphasis ours.)
66
________________
66 People vs. Tsang Hin Wai, et al., G.R. No. 66389, September 8, 1986, 144
SCRA 22. In his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 891 as Chairman of the
Special Committee on the Death Penalty, Senator Arturo M. Tolentino made
this enlightening explanation as reported in the records of the Senate and which
is pertinent to our present discussion: “x x x Article 190, referring to prohibited
drugs, actually was repealed by the enactment of a special law referring to
drugs. But since we were only amending the Revised Penal Code in this proposed
bill or
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the
Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No.
7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of the
technical penalties defined in and constituting integral parts of
the three scales of penalties in the Code, with much more 67
reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation
and effects of all attendant modifying circumstances apply in
fixing the penalty. Likewise, the different kinds or
classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating such
penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on
Republic Act No. 6425, except if they would result in
absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this
aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying
circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat that
mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied
only if they affect theperiods and the degrees of the
penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation
and consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in
accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied
to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution
of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused.
However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two
or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also,
the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as
provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one
or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5),
67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the
proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results
which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
________________
draft, we reincorporated Article 190 in an amended form. x x x It
reincorporates and amends Article 190 on the importation, manufacture, sale,
administration upon another, or distribution of prohibited drugs, planting or
cultivation of any plant, which is a source of prohibited drugs, maintenance of
a den, dive or similar place, as defined in the Dangerous Drugs Law” (9th CRP,
1st Regular Session, Vol. 1, No. 71, 12).
67 See Articles 25, 70 and 71, Revised Penal Code.
579
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 579
People vs. Simon
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law
prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided for
in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall
proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty
prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be
imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree
shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the
former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied,
and since the complex penalty in this case consists of three
discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision
correccional, prision mayor and reclu-sion temporal, then one
degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto
mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still
one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three
penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure
remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying
circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of
the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty
by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be
considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the
lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in
order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may
continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial
solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse
should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to
Congress.
6.The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before us.
Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in nor
has appellant committed any act which would put him within
the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does
not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course,
that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of
imprisonment. The more important aspect, however, is how
68
the indeterminate sen-
_______________
Section 2, Act No. 4103, as amended.
68
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
tence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for
indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal
Code, states that “if the offense is punished by any other law,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same.” We hold that
this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an
offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was
not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal
Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it
may be said that the “offense is punished” under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on
indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was
necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties
under said laws which were not included or contemplated in
the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there
could be no minimum “within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense,” as is the
rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of
penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule
applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last
examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No.
4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but an application and is
justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio. 69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties
under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence
with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for
purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said
law to arrive atprision correccional and Article 64 of the Code
to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense,
although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished
by and under the
________________
69 Contemporaneous exposition, or construction; a construction drawn from
the time when, and the circumstances under which, the subject-matter to be
construed, such as a custom or statute, originated (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th
ed., 390).
581
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 581
People vs. Simon
Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum,
we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which
directs that “in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense.” (Italics ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of
context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui
haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has
never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act No. 4103 by
a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard
to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage
“persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty
or life imprisonment,” we have held that what is considered is
the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty imposable
under the law, and that reclusion perpetua is likewise
70
embraced therein although what the law states is “life
imprisonment.”
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition,
therefore, is that under the concurrence of the principles of
literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by
comparative decisions of this Court; of historical
interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law and
related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural
interpretation, considering the interrelation of the penalties in
the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated
scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have
interpreted the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103
in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best
mode of interpretation. 71
________________
70 People vs. Roque, et al., 90 Phil. 142 (1951); People vs. Dimalanta, 92 Phil.
239 (1952); People vs. Moises, et al., G.R. L-32495, August 13, 1975, 66 SCRA
151.
71Interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi
modus (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 953).
582
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure
of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of
the accused. The “minimum” sentence is merely a period at
72
which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the
prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his
sentence outside of his confinement. It does not constitute the
73
totality of the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue
serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That
minimum is only the period when the convict’s eligibility for
parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole may
readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his
reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has
served the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar,
appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum
sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next
lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range we
have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may
set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto
mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision
correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve
only one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated
tempest in the judicial teapot.
 ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the
judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against
accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but
with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is,
sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Melo, Pu
no, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I join Davide, Jr., J. in his concurring and
dissenting opinion.
________________
People vs. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515 (1951).
72
24 C.J.S., Indeterminate Sentence, Sec. 1993, 1217-1218.
73
583
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 583
People vs. Simon
Davide, Jr., J., Please see Concurring/Dissenting
opinion.
Bellosillo, J., On leave.
Quiason, J., I join Justice Davide in his dissenting
opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR.,J.:
I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate
cases where the penalty to be imposed would be prision
correccional pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 20 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the
sentence to be meted out, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose
minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower, i.e.,
arresto mayor; and (b) the presence of two or more mitigating
circumstances not offset by any mitigating circumstances or of
a privileged mitigating circumstance shall not reduce the
penalty by one or two degrees if the penalty to be imposed,
taking into account the quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved, would be prision correccional.
I.
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No.
7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the
Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence also their
technical signification and effects, then what should govern is
the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which directs that:
“in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense.”
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for
in the Revised Penal Code for the offenses penalized under the
Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, the latter
584
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
offenses would now be considered as punished under the
Revised Penal Code for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103,
as amended by Act No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides
that:
“if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the
same.” (Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be
taken into account in the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal
Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws (or special laws).
The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those
defined and penalized in Book II thereof, which is thus
appropriately titled CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To simplify
further, a crime is deemed punished under the Revised Penal
Code if it is defined by it, and none other, as a crime and is
punished by a penalty which is included in the classification of
Penalties in Chapter II, Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished
under any other law (or special law) if it is not defined and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised
Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor are
found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a special
law if its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the
special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the
Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not
make an offense in the special law punished by or punishable
under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It is
still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a
penalty therefor, although it adopts the Code’s nomenclature of
penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty
found in the Revised Penal Code can by no means make an
offense thereunder an offense “punished or punishable” by the
Revised Penal Code.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659
had adopted the penalties prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code in drug cases, offenses related to drugs should now be
considered aspunished under the Revised Penal Code. If that
were so, then
585
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 585
People vs. Simon
we are also bound, ineluctably, to declare that such offenses
are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised Penal
Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of
participation (Article 16), accessory penalties (Articles 40-45),
application of penalties to principals, accomplices, and
accessories (Article 46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article 48), and
graduation of penalties (Article 61), among others. We cannot
do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture
which is extremely hard to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the
Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Revised Penal
Code does not make an offense under the Dangerous Drugs Act
an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code. Consequently,
where the proper penalty to be imposed under Section 20 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is prision correccional, then, applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate sentence
to be meted on the accused should be that
whose minimum should not be less than the minimum
prescribed by the special law (the Dangerous Drugs
Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional.
II.
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty
provided for in Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is a
complex one composed of three distinct penalties, viz., prision
correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal, and that
pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code, each should
form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum,
the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum,
yet, considering that under the said second paragraph of
Section 20 the penaltydepends on the quantity of the drug
subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of exception to
Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the
purpose of Section 20, as amended, each of the aforesaid
component penalties shall be considered as a principal penalty
depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereafter,
applying the modifying circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code, the proper period of the component
penalty shall then be fixed. To illustrate, if by the quantity of
the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250 grams) the
proper principal penalty should be prision
 586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Simon
correccional, but there is one mitigating and no aggravating
circumstance, then the penalty to be imposed should be prision
correccional in its minimum period. Yet, the majority opinion
puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:
“The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may
be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding
penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should
such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or
lower thanprision correccional. It is for this reason that the three
component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each
be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the
lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order
not to depreciate the sriousness of drug offenses.”
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporal—if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the
quantity of the drugs involved—by two degrees, or to prision
correccional, if there are two or more mitigating circumstances
and no aggravating circumstance is present (paragraph 5,
Article 64, Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged
mitigating circumstance of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised
Penal Code), or under circumstances covered by Article 69 of
the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if the proper penalty to be
imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the fact that a
reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be reduced by
one degree because the rule does not allow a reduction
beyond prision correccional. Finally, if the proper penalty to be
imposed is prision correccional, no reduction at all would be
allowed. I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and
unfair. It is arbitrary because within the same second
paragraph involving the same range of penalty, we
both allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article
68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the
disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness of
drug offenses, is unconvincing because Section 20 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, has in fact
“depreciated” the serious-ness of drug offenses by providing
quantity as basis for the determination of the proper penalty
and limiting fine only to cases punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. It is unfair because an accused who is found
guilty of possessing MORE dangerous drugs—say 500 to
587
VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 587
People vs. Simon
749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be
imposed would be reclusion temporal—may only be sentenced
to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional minimum because of privileged mitigating circum-
stances. Yet, an accused who is found guilty of possession of
only one (1) gram of marijuana—in which case the penalty to
be imposed is prision correccional—would not be entitled to a
reduction thereof even if he has the same number of privileged
mitigating circumstances as the former has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be
the minority of the accused, then he is entitled to the reduction
of the penalty as a matter of right pursuant to Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code, which reads:
“ART.68.Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of
age.—When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his
case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the
last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. 1.Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who
is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having
declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary
penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees
at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he
committed.
2. 2.Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period.”
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No.
7659, we can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal Code in
one aspect and not to apply it in another.
Appealed judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.—In prosecutions for illegal sale of marijuana what is
material is the proof that the selling transaction transpired
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence (People vs. Mariano, 191 SCRA 136).

———o0o———

G.R. No. 130038. September 18, 2000. * Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human
ROSA LIM, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Criminal Law; Bouncing Checks Law; Section 2 creates a
presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists
when the first and third elements of the offense are present—B.P. No.
22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second
element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the
offense are present. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.
Same; Same; The gravamen of Batas Pambansa No. 22 is the act
of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment.—The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment. And the accused
failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its
payment within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor. The
act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent
against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued
is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions
surrounding the issuance of the checks are also irrelevant.
Same; Same; Unlike in estafa, under Batas Pambansa No. 22,
one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an
obligation, or that there was damage.—Unlike in estafa, under B.P.
No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of
an obligation, or that there was damage. The damage done is to the
banking system.
_____________
*EN BANC.
498
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lim vs. People
Same; Same; Penalty; The penalty of fine only for violation of BP
22 is to redeem valuable human material and to prevent unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty of the accused.—In Vaca v. Court of
Appeals, we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for
violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate
material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty
and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the
social order. There, we deleted the prison sentence imposed on
petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double the amount of
the check issued.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Br. 23.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
PARDO,J.:
The case is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
1
affirming in toto that of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu
City. Both courts found petitioner Rosa Lim guilty of twice
2
violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and imposing on her two
3
one-year imprisonment for each of the two violations and
ordered her to pay two fines, each amounting to two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00). The trial court also ordered
petitioner to return to Maria Antonia Seguan, the jewelry
received or its value with interest, to pay moral damages,
attorney’s fees and costs. 4
We state the relevant facts. 5
On August 25, 1990, petitioner called Maria Antonia Seguan
by phone. Petitioner thereafter went to Seguan’s store. She
bought
________________
1 In CA-G.R. CR No. 14641, promulgated on October 15, 1996, De la
Rama, J., ponente, Cui and Montenegro, JJ., concurring.
2 In Criminal Case Nos. CBU 22127 and 22128.
3 Bouncing Checks Law, hereinafter referred to as “B.P. 22.”
4 Rollo, p. 94.
 5Rollo, p. 12.
499
VOL.340,SEPTEMBER18,2000 499
Lim vs. People
various kinds of jewelry—Singaporean necklaces, bracelets
and rings worth P300,000.00. She wrote out a check dated
August 25, 1990, payable to “cash” drawn on Metrobank in the
amount of P300,000.00 and gave the check to Seguan.
6
On August 26, 1990, petitioner again went to Seguan’s store
and purchased jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner
issued another check payable to “cash” dated August 16, 1990
drawn on Metro-bank in the amount of P241,668.00, and sent 7
the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera.
Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The checks
were returned with a notice of dishonor. Petitioner’s account in
the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed.
Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the
amounts of the two dishonored checks. She never did.
On June 5, 1991, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed
8
with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 23 two
informations against petitioner. Both informations were
similarly worded, The difference is that in Criminal Case No.
22128, the bouncing check is Metro Bank Check No. CLN
094244392 dated August 26, 1990 in the amount of
P241,668.00. The informations read: 9 subsequent thereto, in this City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
Criminal Case No. 22127—
“The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu, accuses ROSA
LIM for VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22
committed as follows:
“That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the
time of issue of the check she does not have sufficient funds in the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of
causing damage, did then and there issue, make or draw Metro Bank
Check No. 1 CLN 094244391 dated August 25, 1990 in the amount
of P300,000.00 payable to Maria Antonia
_____________
6 Rollo, p. 89.
7 Ibid.
8 Rollo, p. 94.
9 Rollo, pp. 80-81.
500
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lim vs. People
Seguan which check was issued in payment of an obligation of said
accused, but when the said check was presented with the bank the
same was dishonored for reason “Account Closed” and despite notice
and demands made to redeem or make good said check, said accused
failed and refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses
to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Maria Antonia Seguan
in the amount of P300,000.00, Philippine Currency.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Criminal Case No. 22128—
“The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu, accuses ROSA
LIM for VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22,
COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:
“That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and for sometime
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the
time of issue of the check she does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its present-ment, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and
of causing damage, did then and there issue, make or draw Metro
Bank Check No. CLN-094244392 dated August 26, 1990 in the
amount of P241,668.00 payable to Maria Antonia Seguan which
check was issued in payment of an obligation of said accused, but
when the said check was presented with the bank, the same was
dishonored for reason “Account Closed” and despite notice and
demands made to redeem or make good said check, said accused
failed and refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses
to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Maria Antonia Seguan
in the amount of P241,668.00, Philippine Currency.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.
“Cebu City, Philippines, 30 May 1991.” 10
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded “not guilty” in both
cases,
After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court
rendered a decision in the two cases convicting petitioner, to
wit: 11
“WHEREFORE, prosecution having established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered
convicting
________________
10 Petition, Annex “A,” Rollo, pp. 80-81.
11 Rollo, pp. 93-94.
501
VOL.340,SEPTEMBER18,2000 501
Lim vs. People
the accused, Rosa Lim and sentencing her in Criminal Case No.
CBU-22127, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of
ONE (1) YEAR and a fine of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P200,000.00) PESOS and in Criminal Case No. CBO-22128, the
same penalty of imprisonment for ONE YEAR and fine of TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) is likewise imposed.
“The accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainant Maria
Antonia Seguan, the sum of P541,668.00 which is the value of the
jewelries bought by the accused from the latter with interest based
on the legal rate to be counted from June 5, 1991, the date of the
filing of the informations, or return the subject jewelries; and further
to pay private complainant:
1. “(a)The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages in compensation
for the latter’s worries with the freezing of her business
capital involved in these litigated transactions;
2. “(b)The sum of P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus costs.
“SO ORDERED.” 12
In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. 13
On October 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, dismissing the appeal in this wise:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED.
The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. “SO ORDERED.” 14
Hence, this appeal. 15
In this appeal, petitioner argues that she never knew
Seguan and much more, had any “transaction” with her.
According to petitioner, she issued the two checks and gave
them to Aurelia Nadera, not to Seguan. She gave the two
checks to Aurelia Nadera from whom she got two sets of
jewelry, as a “security arrangement” or “guarantee” that she
would return the jewelry received if she would not be able to
sell them. 16
___________________
12 Petition, Annex “A,” Rollo, pp. 80-94.
13 Docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 14641.
14 Rollo, pp. 10-20.
15 Petition for Review, Rollo, pp. 25-39.
16 Rollo, p. 13.
502
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lim vs. People
The appeal has no merit.
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are: 17
1. “(1)The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value;
2. “(2)The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and
3. “(3)The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.”
Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks. She argued
that the checks were not issued to Seguan and that they had
no preexisting transaction. The checks were issued to Aurelia issued is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and
Nadera as mere guarantee and as a security arrangement to conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also
cover the value of jewelry she was to sell on consignment irrelevant. 24

basis. These defenses cannot save the day for her. The first
18 Unlike in estafa, under B.P. No. 22, one need not prove that
25

and last elements of the offense are admittedly present. To the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there
escape liability, she must prove that the second element was was damage. The damage done is to the banking system. 26

absent, that is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did not InUnited States v. Go Chico, we ruled that in acts mala
know that her funds in the bank account were insufficient. She prohib-ita, the only inquiry is, “has the law been violated?”
did not prove this. When dealing with acts mala prohibita — 27

B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris “.. . it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with
tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment,
first and third elements of the offense are present. If not 19 the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely
rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. 20
immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a
deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be
__________________ impossible of execution. In many cases, the act complained of is itself
that which produces the pernicious effect the statute seeks to avoid.
17 Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125059, March 17,
In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the
2000, 328 SCRA 447. same force and result whether the intention of the person performing
18 Rollo, p. 13.

19 B.P. 22, Section 2 provides, “Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient

the act is good or bad.”
funds—The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is This case is a perfect example of an act mala
refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, prohibita. Petitioner issued two checks. They were dishonored
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall upon presentment for payment due to the fact that the account
be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit
was closed. Petitioner
unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon,
or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
__________________
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee.
20 Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 17.
21 King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999, 319 SCRA 654.
22 Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 17.
503
23 Codoy v. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333, 351 (1999).

VOL.346,SEPTEMBER18,2000 503 24 Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 423 (1997).

Lim vs. People 25 People v. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, October 28, 1999, 317 SCRA 617.

26 Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 658 (1998).

The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a 27 United States v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, 131 (1909).

worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment 504

for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of 504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the check or make arrangement for its payment within five (5) Lim vs. People
banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is malum failed to rebut the presumption that she knew her funds were
21

prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws insufficient at the time of issue of the checks. And she failed to
22

are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for its
against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was payment within five (5) banking days from receipt of notice of
23
dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per
quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be
exceedingly hard but so the law is written.
However, we resolve to modify the penalty imposed on
petitioner. B.P. No. 22 provides a penalty of “imprisonment of
not less than thirty days but not more than one year or a fine
of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed two hundred thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the Court.” 28
InVaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining the
29
penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material,
and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the
social order. There, we deleted the prison sentence imposed on
petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double the amount
of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners
brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of
B.P. No. 22 was committed, “otherwise, they would have simply
accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for
probation to evade prison term.” We do the same here. We
30
believe such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.
Consequently, we delete the prison sentences imposed on
petitioner. The two fines imposed for each violation, each
amounting to P200,000.00 are appropriate and sufficient.
The award of moral damages and order to pay attorney’s fees
are deleted for lack of sufficient basis.
________________
28 Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, Section 1.
29 Vaca v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 26.
30 Vaca v. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 664.
505
VOL.340,SEPTEMBER18,2000 505
Lim vs. People
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with modification the decision of
the Court of Appeals. We find petitioner Rosa Lim guilty
31
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22. We SET ASIDE the sentence of
imprisonment and hereby sentence her only to pay a fine of
P200,000.00 in each case, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency or non-payment not to exceed six (6)
months. We DELETE the award of moral damages and
32
attorney’s fees. The rest of the judgment of the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals shall stand. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, P
anganiban, Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., In the result.
Ynares-Santiago, J., On leave.
Judgment affirmed with modification. Sentence of
imprisonment set aside, moral damages and attorney’s fees
deleted.
Note.—What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing
check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance—the mere act of issuing
a worthless check being malum prohibitum. (Llamado vs.
Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 423 [1997])

G.R. Nos. 118950–54. February 6, 1997 * anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. LUCRECIA GABRES, also known as MONA
GABRES, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Labor Law; Estafa; Illegal
Recruitment; Accused-appellant has indeed committed estafa by
means of deceit punishable under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code.—Accused-appellant has indeed committed estafa by
means of deceit punishable under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. The trial court’s brief ratiocination is well
taken; viz: “There is no dispute that damages have been incurred by
the complainants. They parted with their money in consideration of
deployment for work in a foreign country, but which unfortunately
remains unrestituted despite the failure in that regard of the person
or persons who promised that they will be sent off to work abroad.”
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
582
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Gabres
Same; Same; Same; Same; Accused-appellant is likewise guilty
of illegal recruitment in large scale.—Accused-appellant is likewise
guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, an offense under Article
38(b), in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Indeterminate Sentence Law; The
penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the
Code for the offense without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime.—Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty
shall be “that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed” under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum
shall be “within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed” for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based
on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty
is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Benguet, Br. 10.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Antonio F. Angluben for accused-appellant.
VITUG, J.:
Five counts of estafa were filed against the spouses Perlito
(Lito) and Lucrecia (Mona) Gabres and, except for the names of
the private complainants and the amounts involved, the text in
each of the corresponding informations is substantially the
same in all; viz: 1
________________
1Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800.
583
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997 583
People vs. Gabres
The undersigned accuses SPOUSES LITO and LUCRECIA GABRES
also known as MONA GABRES of the crime of Estafa, defined and
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the months of April, 1992 up to July, 1992 and
sometime subsequent thereto, at Acop, Municipality of Tublay,
Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud
and by means of deceit through false representations and pretenses
made by them prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud JOEL PANIDA, by then and there representing themselves
as a duly authorized or licensed recruiters for overseas employment,
when in truth and in fact they were not, thereby inducing the said “Contrary to Law." 3

person to give to them the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P45,000), Philippine Currency, for placement abroad, which amount
they misappropriated for their own use and benefit and then either
fail or refuse and continue to fail or refuse to return the same despite
repeated demands, all to the damage and prejudice of said person in
the total sum aforesaid and other consequential damages.
“Contrary to Law." 2
The six cases were tried, preceded by the arraignment of the
accused, jointly.
The following version of the case is culled from the evidence
given by the prosecution.
Some time in March of 1992, Oreta Nisperos heard that the
accused couple were recruiting factory workers for abroad.

With great anticipation, Nisperos, accompanied by her son,

In addition, the spouses were charged with having engaged in
Ramil, and her neighbors, Joel Panida and Julius Aoay, went
large scale illegal recruitment; thus:
4

“The undersigned accuses Lito Gabres and Lucrecia Gabres also
known as Mona Gabres of Illegal Recruitment, defined under par. 1,
Art. 38 of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as The Labor Code
of the Philippines, and penalized under Art. 39(b) of the same Code,
as amended by P.D. 2018, committed as follows:
“That on or about the month of April, 1992 up to July, 1992 and
sometime subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Tublay,
Province Of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit ORETA NISPEROS,
TARCISO DACSIG, JULIUS AOAY, JOEL PANIDA and RONALD
MIRABUENO for overseas employment, by then and there
misrepresenting themselves as a duly authorized or licensed
recruiters when
to the residence of the Gabreses in Bauang, La Union. After the
group was introduced by Nisperos’ cousin, Rosario Zapanta, the
spouses confirmed their being engaged in the recruitment of
factory workers for Korea. A “package deal” was reached. Each
applicant was to be charged a placement fee of P45,000.00. The
parties agreed to meet again on 12 April 1992 at the Dr. Yares
Clinic in Baguio City. On the appointed date and time, Mona
Gabres alone showed up to meet with the applicants. The latter
were joined, in this meeting, by Tarciso Dacsig, Jr., Jonard
Dulay and Ronaldo Mirabueno, who all promised to also come
up with the required “placement fees.”
At the respective dates stated below, the accused spouses
received the following amounts from each of the applicants;
thus:

_______________ _______________

2 Rollo, pp. 46–47. 3Rollo, p. 47.

584 4All residents of Acop, Tublay, Benguet.
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 585

People vs. Gabres VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997 585

in truth and in fact they were not and by reason of said People vs. Gabres
misrepresentations, they were able to obtain from the said “DATE OF NAME OF AMOUNT
complainants the aggregate sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE PAYMENT PAYOR
THOUSAND PESOS (P185,000.00) Philippine Currency, all to the 1. April 26,1992 —Oreta —P5,000.00
damage and prejudice of the above-named complainants in the total Nisperos
aforesaid sum and other consequential damages. (for Ramil (No receipt)
“That such illegal recruitment having been committed by in large
Nisperos)
scale, it constitutes economic sabotage.
—Joel Panida —P5,000.00
 (Exh. ‘A'—CR 6. June 17, 1992 —Oreta —P5,000.00
No. 1800) Nisperos
—Tarciso —P5,000.00 (for Joan (Exh. ‘C'—CR
Dacsig, Jr. Nisperos) No. 1801)
(Exh. ‘A'—CR 7. June 18, 1992 —Oreta —P5,000.00
No. 1803) Nisperos
2. May 1,1992 —Julius Aoay —P5,000.00 (for Jonard (Exh. ‘D'—CR
(Exh. ‘A'—CR Dulay) No. 1801)
No. 1802) 8, July 3, 1992 —Joel Panida —. P35,000.00
3. May 5, 1992 —Tarciso —P5,000.00 (Exh. ‘C'—CR
Dacsig, Jr. No. 1800)
(Exh. ‘B'—CR —Tarciso —P25,000.00
No. 1803) Dacsig, Jr.
—Oreta —P5,000.00 (Exh. ‘D'—CR
Nisperos No. 1803)
(for Ramil (No receipt) —Julius Aoay —P30,000.00
Nisperos) (Exh. ‘C'—CR
4. June 7, 1992 —Oreta —P5,000.00 No. 1802)" 5

Nisperos
_______________
(for Ramil (Exh. ‘B'—CR
Nisperos) No. 1800) 5Rollo, pp. 44–45.
—Joel Panida —P5,000.00 586
(Exh. ‘B'—CR 586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
No. 1800) People vs. Gabres
—Tarciso —P5,000.00 On 03 July 1992, the accused spouses assured Ramil Nisperos,
Dacsig, Jr. Joan Nisperos, Joel Panida, Tarciso Dacsig, Jr., Julius Aoay,
(Exh. ‘B'—CR Jonard Dulay and Ronaldo Mirabueno that they could expect
No. 1800) within a few days their departure for abroad. The promise was
—Julius Aoay —P5,000.00 not fulfilled. Then, in order to appease the applicants, the
(Exh. ‘B'—CR spouses explained that it was only the call of the Korean
No. 1800) employer, Mr. Kim, that was being awaited so as to firm up the
5, June 10, 1992 —Oreta —P30,000.00 flight schedule. The call never came. After a series of follow-
Nisperos ups, the applicants were directed by the spouses to confer with
(for Ramil (Exh. ‘B'—CR the latter’s supposed associate in Manila, one Rebecca (Vicky)
Nisperos) No. 1801) Naval, who was said to be managing the Bachs and Cochs
Travel Agency. Naval initially denied any association with the
Gabreses; she later, however, told the group that she had been
engaged by the spouses to process the travel documents, plane
tickets and flight bookings of the applicants, and that the
required visas were already being applied for.
After several more months of waiting and still getting
nowhere, the applicants finally demanded the return of their
money from the spouses. Each applicant was issued four
checks, each for P10,000.00, but which, when presented for
payment, all bounced. 6 Brawner (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals)
The would-be overseas workers sought the assistance of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Cordillera
Administrative Region (“POEA-CAR") which certified, through
Atty. Justinian O. Lichnachan, that the accused spouses were
“not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment within the City of Baguio or any part of the
region." Forthwith, a joint affidavit-complaint was filed with
7
the Benguet Provincial Prosecutor’s Office that became the
basis of the criminal informations, aforesaid, against the
Gabreses. 8
________________
6 Apparently, though, it was Vicky Naval who issued the checks (Julius
Aoay, TSN, 15 June 1994, pp. 3–4).
7 Rollo, p. 46.
8 In his resolution, dated 12 August 1993, the investigating prosecutor
recommended the exoneration of Rebecca Naval on the
587
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997 587
People vs. Gabres
Lito Gabres managed to elude arrest, and the trial proceeded
only against his wife. Mona Gabres pleaded “not guilty” to each
of the accusations. She denied any involvement in her
husband’s activities.
The defense sought to establish that Mona was a mere fish
vendor in Bauang, La Union, and that this work demanded her
full attention. Her husband used to be an overseas contract
worker himself and, thereafter, a liaison officer for Caro Fran
Recruitment Agency, whose job included the processing and
following-up of travel papers with the Department of Foreign
Affairs. In July, 1992, her husband introduced her to Vicky
Naval who requested Mona to safekeep the collection of
placement fees from the applicants. She admitted having joined
her husband, but only once, in collecting the payments made
by private complainants on 03 July 1992 at Acop, Tublay,
Benguet, which was duly remitted to Naval.
In a decision, dated 14 December 1994, Judge Romeo A.
9
rendered judgment that concluded:
“WHEREFORE, all premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. “1.In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, this Court finds accused
Lucrecia ‘Mona’ Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to eight (8) years and ten (10) months of prision
mayor as MAXIMUM;
2. “2.In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1801, this Court finds accused
Lucrecia ‘Mona’ Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer an
indeter-minate sentence of imprisonment of five 15) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to nine (9) years and ten (10) months of prision
mayor as MAXIMUM;
________________
ground that her liability was purely civil in nature. The resolution was
approved by the Provincial Prosecutor (Records, p. 13).
9 Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet.
588
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gabres
1. “3.In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802, this Court finds accused
Lucrecia ‘Mona’ Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer an
 indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to seven (1} years of prision mayor as
MAXIMUM;
2. “4.In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, this Court finds accused
Lucrecia ‘Mona’ Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of Prision correccional as
MINIMUM to seven (7) years of prision mayor as
MAXIMUM;
3. “5.In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1804, this Court finds accused
Lucrecia ‘Mona’ Gabres NOT GUILTY of the offense charged
due to insufficiency of evidence and hereby acquits her with
proportionate costs de oficio;
4. “6.In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1805, this Court finds accused
Lucrecia ‘Mona’ Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged and hereby sentences her to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00).
“On the civil liability in the estafa cases, accused Lucrecia ‘Mona’
Gabres is hereby ordered to pay to Joel Panida, Oreta Nisperos,
Julius Aoay and Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. the amounts of P45,000.00,
P55,000.00, P40,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively, as actual
damages.
“Proportionate costs against the accused Lucrecia ‘Mona’ Gabres.
“In the service of her sentence, the accused shall be credited to the
full term of her preventive imprisonment as provided for by Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code, provided the conditions set forth
therein for the enjoyment of the same have been met.
“With respect to accused Perlito ‘Lito’ Gabres, let these cases be
sent to the files without prejudice to their revival as soon as he shall
have been arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.
“In order that he may not escape the clutches of the law, let
Warrants of Arrest issue addressed to the PNP Station Commander,
Bauang, La Union and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Manila. Further, the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
589
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997 589
People vs. Gabres
(CID), Manila is ordered to include the name of accused Perlito ‘Lito’
Gabres in its Hold Departure List.
“SO ORDERED." 10
Mona Gabres appealed the decision to this Court Appellant, in
main, would wish to sway the Court into thinking that the real
culprit was Lito Gabres and that the complaining witnesses
gave stress over her participation only because her husband
could not be apprehended.
The Court, regrettably, must sustain the conviction.
The testimony given by each of the private complainants
unquestionably would point to both the spouses to be the
culprits in an elaborate scheme to defraud the hopeful
applicants for overseas work. The Court quotes from the
transcript of the proceedings.
Testimony of Oreta Nisperos:
“ATTY. PAOAD:
“Now, Madam witness, you said a while ago that
it was the later part of March, 1992 that you and
your cousin went to see the two accused in
Bauang, what transpired then?
“A They told us that they were recruiting factory
workers for Korea.
“Q What else happened?
“A They told us that if my children are interested we
will see each other in Baguio City on April 12.
“Q What was your agreement as to where shall you
meet each other and the date.
“A I suggested that we will see each other at the clinic
of Dr. Yares.
“Q Where is the clinic of Dr. Yares located?
“A It is located at Harrison Road, Baguio City.
“Q On that particular of April 12, 1992 were you able
to meet each other?
“A Yes, ma’am.
“Q Who were your companions?
_______________ “A Yes, ma’am.
Rollo, pp. 53–54.
10
“Q Now, when the two accused came to your
590 residence on April 26, what happened?
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED “A My son paid an amount of P5,000.00.
People vs. Gabres “Q Who particularly paid for your son?
“A My companions were Julius Aoay, Joel Panida “A I paid for my son, ma’am.
and my son Ramil Nisperos. “Q Aside from you and your son who else were
“Q Who from the side of the accused came to see present?
you on April 12,1992. “A Also present were Joel Panida, Tarcisio Dacsig.
“A Mrs. Mona Gabres, ma’am. “Q How about Julius Aoay?
“Q How about the other accused, Lito Gabres. “A He was also present, ma’am.
“A He was not there, ma’am. “Q You said a while ago, Madam witness, that on
“Q Now, what transpired on April 12,1992? April 26 you paid P5,000.00 for your son, what is
“A They told us that if we are interested we will pay your basis in saying that you paid P5,000.00 on
an advance payment of P5,000.00 each. that day?
“Q For each applicant? “A They issued us a receipt, ma’am.
591
“A Yes, ma’am.
VOL. 267, 591
“Q What else did you talk about?
FEBRUARY
“A They told us that if we have money we will see
each other on April 26. 6, 1997
“Q Where will you see each other on April 26? People vs. Gabres
“A I told her that we will see at Acop, Tublay “Q Who received the payment?
because they knew where we are. “A It was Mona Gabres, ma’am.
“Q What particular place in Acop? “Q Who issued the receipt?
“A At our residence, sir. “A It was Lito Gabres who was making
“Atty. PAOAD: the receipt, ma’am.
“Now, how much all in all are the two accused “x x x x x x x x x.
asking you to pay in consideration of the same in “Q Now, after April 26,1992 what
Korea? happened?
“A They were asking P45,000.00. “A They told us that they will go back at
“Q Now, you said that you agreed to meet each other our residence on May 1 and if the
again on April 26,1992, what happened on that other applicants will have their
date? money at that time they will process
“A They came at our residence, both of them. their papers.
“Q The two accused? “Q Who paid on May 1,1992?
“A Julius Aoay, ma’am.
“ATTY. PAOAD:
“Who received the payment?
“A Both the two accused, ma’am. One
will receive the amount and the other
will issue the receipt."
11
Testimony of Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.:
“Q Now, to whom did you give this
P5,000.00?
“A I handed it to Aunt Oreta who gave it
to Mona Gabres, Ma’am.
“Q Now, who issued you a receipt?
“A Mona Gabres.
“Q What about her husband Lito Gabres?
“A Aunt Oreta gave the P5,000.00 to
Mona Gabres who counted the
money, after counting the money Lito
Gabres gave it to Mona Gabres.
“x x x x x x x x x.
“Q I would like to show to you this
receipt dated July 31, 1992 previously
marked as Exhibit ‘B-1' for Crim.
Case No. 92-CR-1803 and Exhibit ‘I-
1' in Crim. Case No. 92C R-1805, is
this the receipt you are referring to?
“A Yes, Ma’am.
“Q Now, who issued you this receipt?
“A Lito Gabres, Ma’am.
“Q Now, if this receipt was issued by
Lito Gabres what was the
participation of Mona Gabres?
“A I handed this P25,000.00 to Lito
Gabres, he counted it and then
handed it to Mona Gabres, Ma’am." 12
________________
TSN, 05 April 1994, pp. 6–11.
11
TSN, 10 May 1994, pp. 5–6.
12
592
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gabres
Testimony of Julius Aoay:
“Q I would like to show you a receipt dated June 7,
1992 which has been previously marked as
Exhibit ‘A' in Criminal Case 1801, as Exhibit ‘B'
in Criminal Case 1805, as Exhibit ‘B' in Criminal
Case 1800, as Exhibit ‘C' in Criminal Case 1803
and as Exhibit ‘B' in Criminal Case 1802, is this
the receipt issued to you?
“A Yes, it is.
“Q Could you tell us who wrote this receipt?
“A It was Mona Gabres, ma’am.
“Q How about Lito Gabres what was his
participation?
“A He was the one counting the money." 13
In the scheduled meeting on 12 April 1992, it was only accused-
appellant who, in fact, showed up to meet with the applicants
for overseas work. Joel Panida testified:
“Q On April 12,1992 were you present in that
meeting?
“A Yes, I was also there, ma’am.
“Q Who else were present on that day, April 12,1992?
“A Mrs. Nisperos, Tarcisio Dacsig, Ramil Nisperos
and Julius Aoay.
“Q Who from the side of the accused came to see
you?
“A It was Mona Gabres only, ma’am.
“Q How about Lito Gabres, was he also present?
“A He was not there, ma’am.
“Q On April 12,1992 what transpired in that meeting?
“A She introduced herself as a recruiter for workers
going to Korea. She also asked us that if we are
 interested then we will give P5,000.00 each as
down payment." 14
The Court finds it hard to accept the claim that private
complainants have prevaricated the evidence to implicate
Mona Gabres only because the authorities have yet to succeed
in arresting her husband. It is, of course, unfortunate that the
husband, at least momentarily, is able to ward off the long arm
of the law; nevertheless, it should, in the end, still catch up with
him.
________________
13 TSN, 23 May 1994, p. 6.
14 TSN, 26 April 1994, p. 12.
593
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997 593
People vs. Gabres
Accused-appellant has indeed committed estafa by means of
deceit punishable under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code. The trial court’s brief ratiocination is well taken; viz:
15
“There is no dispute that damages have been incurred by the
complainants. They parted with their money in consideration of
deployment for work in a foreign country, but which unfortunately
remains unrestituted despite the failure in that regard of the person
or persons who promised that they will be sent off to work abroad."16
Accused-appellant is likewise guilty of illegal recruitment in
large scale, an offense under Article 38(b), in relation to Article
39, of the Labor Code which provides:
“ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment.—(a) Any recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of
this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law
enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
"(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large
scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and
shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
“Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried
out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or
________________
15 “ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
“2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
"(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of
other similar deceits.”
16 Rollo, p. 49.
594
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People us. Gabres
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group.”
“x x x xxx x x x.
“ART. 39. Penalties.—(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if
illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.”
Quite appropriately, the trial court has observed:
"(T)here are two elements of the crime (of illegal recruitment),
namely: (1) that the offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers; and (2) that the offender undertakes any of the recruitment
activities defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, as amended,
or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the same
code. (PEOPLE vs. CORAL, G.R. Nos. 97849–54, March 1, 1994, 230
SCRA 499). Without any doubt, this Court finds the two elements of
the crime present in the case at bar. That the accused are
nonlicensees or non-holders of authority to lawfully recruit is evident
in the certification issued by Atty. Justinian Lichnacban of the
POEACAR Regional Extension Office of Baguio City (Exhibit ‘D', 93-
CR1800). Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and
placement as ‘any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,
that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged
in recruitment and placement.’ The act of the accused in holding out
a placement fee of P45,000.00 per applicant in exchange for an
employment abroad; the several collections made by them; and their
promise to send off the applicants for work in Korea were just some
of the circumstances that would qualify the acts of the accused under
the definition of recruitment and placement." 17
________________
Rollo, p. 52.
17
595
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997 595
People vs. Gabres
The Court, however, would have to reduce the award of actual
damages to Oreta Nisperos from P55,000.00 to P50,000.00.
Oreta concededly could not present any receipt for the supposed
payments she allegedly made on 26 April 1992 and on 05 May
1992, for P5,000.00 each, on behalf of Ramil Nisperos. Joel
Panida, in his testimony, attested to the payment made on 26
April 1992 but no similar evidence was presented to prove the
18
payment made on 05 May 1992.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
“ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
“1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
“2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but
does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over
200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
“4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if
such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four
cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following
means.”
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of
the penalty shall be “that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed” under the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum shall be “within the
________________
TSN, 26 April 1994, pp. 12–13.
18
596
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gabres
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed” for the
offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty
19
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering
any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by
20
law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The21
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition
of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. 22
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case
exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial
determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the
matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying
circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the
full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law
accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in
favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the
estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty
next lower would then be prision correccional minimum to
medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and two (2) months while the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6)
years and one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded
P22,000.00, plus an additional one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00.
Accordingly, the Court thus finds some need to modify in
part of the penalties imposed by the trial court; viz:
________________
19 See Section 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.
20 People vs. Gonzales, 73 Phil. 549.
21 People vs. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109.
22 People vs. Joya, 98 Phil. 238.
597
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997 597
People vs. Gabres
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, the amount involved is
P45,000.00. Hence, the minimum penalty should be reduced to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, which
is the maximum of the allowable minimum penalty of the
indeterminate sentence. The maximum penalty imposed by the
court a quo is within lawful range.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1801, the amount involved, as
so modified by this Court, is P50,000.00. The minimum penalty
should then be reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional (the maximum of the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence). The maximum penalty should at least
be six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor plus a period
of two (2) years (one [1] year for each additional P10,000.00) for
a total maximum period of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802 and No, 93-CR-1803, the
amounts involved in each total P40,000.00. The minimum
penalty of the indeterminate sentence imposed by the court a
quo of two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional is within lawful range. The maximum penalty,
however, should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor plus a period of one (1) year for a total
maximum period of seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
with modification only insofar as the penalties therein imposed
are concerned; thus—
1. (1)In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of
from (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as
MINIMUM, to eight (8) years and ten (10) months of prision
mayor as MAXIMUM.
2. (2)In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1801, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of
from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM, the actual damages being
reduced to P50,000.00.
598
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Gabres
1. (3)In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of
from two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
2. (4)Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of from two (2)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.
All other aspects of the dispositive portion of the decision
appealed from are AFFIRMED.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosis
ima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.—Illegal recruitment carries with it the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine which varies by degrees in accordance
with the enumeration made in Article 39 of the Labor Code as
amended. (People vs. Cabacang, 246 SCRA 530 [1995])

——o0o——
 G.R. No. 138876. November 24, 1999. * his contention that complainant did not undergo medical
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. EGMEDIO LAMPAZA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; Affidavits; Well-settled is the rule that
inconsistencies between an affidavit and a testimony do not
necessarily discredit the witness, for affidavits are generally
incomplete and are not considered final repositories of truth.—The
______________
*THIRD DIVISION.
113
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999 113
People vs. Lampaza
“conflicts” cited by appellant are largely semantical, not factual,
in character. Whether appellant forcibly made her lie down on the
floor or whether he dumped her makes no substantial difference in
appreciating the fact of the crime: that she was down on the floor
against her will. Likewise, appellant makes too much ado about the
discrepancy between her being “pressed forward” and her being
“lifted”; the allegedly conflicting statements equally mean that he
forced her to go to the nipa hut. Moreover, the well-settled rule is
that inconsistencies between an affidavit and a testimony do not
necessarily discredit the witness, for affidavits are generally
incomplete and are not considered final repositories of truth.
Same; Rape; The law does not impose upon a rape victim the
burden of proving resistance.—Appellant further argues that “if
there was any resistance [by the victim], it was couched in general
terms.” The argument is bereft of merit. We must stress that the law
does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance.
Indeed, physical resistance need not be established when the culprit
employed intimidation, which, insofar as it was directed at the mind
of the victim, must be viewed in the light of the latter’s perception
and judgment at the time. In the present case, the victim was
terrified because the threat of the appellant to kill her was
substantiated by the bolo he placed beside her. Furthermore, she
could not have successfully resisted because, according to her, he was
husky and strong.
Same; Same; The fact that the victim has no visible signs of
injury does not by itself disprove rape.—Neither are we persuaded by
examination to show signs of physical struggle or assault. The fact
that the victim had no visible signs of injury did not by itself disprove
rape. We reiterate that she was too intimidated to offer serious
resistance to the advances of appellant. More important, no law
requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution of
rape. Even without a medical report, the rape victim’s credible
testimony, standing alone, is a sufficient basis for conviction. In the
present case, we find no reason to disbelieve her testimony. Time and
time again, the Court has held that no woman in her right mind
would declare to the whole world that she was raped and subject
herself to the concomitant strain and stigma, unless she is telling the
truth. For his part, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to show
that the victim’s testimony was false.
114
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Lampaza
Same; Same; “Sweetheart Theory”; The “sweetheart” defense
cannot be given credence in the absence of corroborative proof like love
notes, mementoes, pictures or tokens—love is not a license to rape.—
Other than his bare assertions, appellant adduced no independent
proof that he was the sweetheart of the victim. His defense was
neither corroborated by any other witness nor substantiated by any
memento, love note, picture or token. Furthermore, even assuming
that the two were lovers, their relationship did not give him a license
to sexually assault her.
Same; Same; Witnesses; Indicative of an unrehearsed testimony,
slight contradictions even serve to strengthen a witness’ credibility.—
Appellant contends that the prosecution witnesses should not be
accorded credence because their testimonies were replete with
inconsistencies and “incredibilities.” In addition to the instances
alluded to earlier, appellant cites the following: the victim testified
that she shouted, although she said in her Sworn Statement that she
had not done so; she allegedly told her husband of the rape on the
evening of the fateful day, but her husband testified that he did not
return home until the afternoon of the following day. We are not
persuaded. The aforecited inconsistencies are minor in character
and, as such, do not impugn the credibility of the complainant.
Indicative of an unrehearsed testimony, the slight contradictions
even serve to strengthen her credibility. Indeed, the Court cannot
expect a rape victim to remember every ugly detail of the sexual
assault.
Same; Same; Same; There is no code of conduct prescribing the
correct reaction of a rape victim to the sexual assault.—Complainant’s
testimony was not weakened by her failure to immediately narrate
the incident to her nephew or to her husband. There is no code of
conduct prescribing the correct reaction of a rape victim to the sexual
assault. When placed under a great deal of emotional stress, the
workings of the human mind are unpredictable. Some may
immediately relay the incident to authorities and close relatives, but
others need time to compose themselves before deciding on a course
of action. Although she did not immediately inform her nephew about
the incident, she told her husband about it after he arrived from
another town, when they were about to sleep. That same night, she
and her husband decided to report the outrage to the authorities. In
this light, her account is far from incredible. Even assuming that
there was a delay in reporting the incident to the police, this fact is
not necessarily an indication of fabrication.
115
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999 115
People vs. Lampaza
Same; Same; Penalties; The Indeterminate Sentence Law does
not apply when the offense involved is punishable with reclusion
perpetua.—Under the law in effect when the crime was committed,
the penalty for simple rape was reclusion perpetua. In imposing a
lower indeterminate penalty, the trial court erred, because the
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply when the offense
involved is punishable with reclusion perpetua.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Cezar R. Tajanlangit for accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The medical examination of a victim is not a requisite for the
successful prosecution of rape. Even without a medical report,
a court may convict an accused based on the offended party’s
credible testimony. The “sweetheart” defense cannot be given
credence in the absence of corroborative proof like love notes,
mementos, pictures or tokens. Love is not a license to rape.
The Case
Egmedio Lampaza appeals the March 14, 1994 Decision of the 1
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Antique (Branch 10) in 2
Criminal Case No. 3692, finding him guilty of rape.
____________________
1 Although the Decision is dated March 14, 1994, it was promulgated only on
May 31, 1994. (See Order of the trial court, dated May 31, 1994, Records, pp.
171-172.)
2 Assisting Judge Marvie R. Abraham Singson wrote the assailed Decision,
but it was Judge Pedro Icamina who heard the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.
116
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lampaza
In an Information dated May 25, 1988 and “at the instance of
the offended party,” Assistant Provincial Fiscal Juan C.
Mission, Jr. charged appellant as follows: 3
“That on or about the 20th day of March, 1988, in the Municipality
of Tobias Fornier, Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd design, through intimidation, violence and force
and with the use of a deadly weapon, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Teodora
Wacay without and against the consent of the offended party.”
With the assistance of Atty. Esdras F. Tayco, appellant entered
a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 9, 1988. Trial 4
proceeded in due course. Thereafter, the trial court
promulgated its assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which
reads: 5
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the above facts, law and
jurisprudence, after the prosecution has presented thorough and
convincing evidence, the Court finds accused EGMEDIO LAMPAZA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for the period of Twelve (12) Years and one 7 Tenth Division, composed of J. Ruben T. Reyes, ponente; J. Quirino D.
(1) Day to Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months as minimum to Abad Santos, Jr. (chairman) and J. Hilarion L. Aquino (member), both
concurring.
Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to 8 CA Decision, p. 17; rollo, p. 133.

Twenty (20) Years as maximum and to indemnify Teodora Wacay [in] 9 It provides that “[w]henever the Court of Appeals should be of the opinion

the amount of P30,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.”
On June 1, 1994, appellant, through Counsel Cezar C.
Tajanlangit, filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA). After the defense and the prosecution filed their respec-
6
that the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher should be imposed in a case, the
Court, after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall render
judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher as the
circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment and forthwith certify
the case and elevate the records thereof to the Supreme Court.”
10 Records, p. 140. In a Resolution dated July 19, 1999, this Court informed

appellant that he “may file a SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF, if he so desires, within

__________________ 30 days from notice.” Because appellant did not do so, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed by the parties before
3 Records, p. 1. the Court of Appeals.
4 Records, p. 25. 11 Signed by Assistant Solicitor General Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang and

5 RTC Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 16-17.

Associate Solicitor Ma. Zorayda V. Tejones.
6 Records, p. 173. 12 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 3-6; rollo, pp. 86-89.

117 118
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999 117 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lampaza People vs. Lampaza
tive Briefs, the appellate court rendered a Decision affirming
7
“The first witness presented was a college student who is the nephew
the conviction of appellant, but modifying the penalty of the private offended party, who went to the house of the latter on
to reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the CA March 20, 1988, without finding her there. Witness looked for
Decision reads: 8 Teodora, proceeding to the place where farm animals are grazed,
“WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the which was two hills away. (pp. 2-4, TSN, September 27, 1989)
MODIFICATION that appellant EGMEDIO LAMPAZA is hereby “Witness saw [his] aunt running out [of] one of the nipa huts in
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the farm. When [his] aunt reached him, she was sobbing and very
complainant Teodora Wacay the amount pale. She immediately asked him to accompany her back to her
of P50,000.00 for moral damages.” house. His aunt explained to him that she ha[d] to leave that place
In the light of Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, the 9
immediately because she was afraid of somebody and therefore could
CA “recalled” the entry of the above judgment, certified the not stay in Sitio Namontonan, Brgy. Camandagan, Tobias Fornier,
Antique. (pp. 5-7, TSN, Ibid.)
case to this Court and elevated the records. 10

“During cross examination, defense counsel verified the details

The Facts regarding the testimony under direct-examination of this witness, as
Version of the Prosecution to the reason witness was in that sitio (p. 8, TSN, id.), the distance
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General adopted the
11
between the house and the grazing area of the farm animals, the
following facts as summarized by the trial court: 12
location of the nipa hut and other details. (p. 9, TSN, id.)
“Witness repeated to the Court that [his] aunt was very afraid
____________________ when he met her running out of the nipa hut although she did not
tell him yet what happened. That [his] aunt was trembling, very pale
and looking very weak. (p. 10, TSN, id.)
 “The private offended party herself testified, and positively
identified accused in open court. (p. 18, TSN, id.) That in the morning
of March 20, 1988 she was in her farm lot in Sitio Namontonan,
Barangay Camandagan, Tobias Fornier, Antique. When she was
about to graze their animals, all of a sudden accused came from
behind her and twisted both her arms. Then accused lifted her and
brought her to a nipa hut which was uninhabited. Victim struggled
to set herself free, to no avail despite kicking, shouting and
struggling to be free from the hold of the accused. (pp. 18-23,
TSN, id.)
“Accused dropped [the] victim to the floor of the nipa hut; pinned
both her legs including her right hand with [his] knees [and took] off
his pants. The accused ha[d] his bolo beside him with which he
threatened the victim. Victim testified that accused raped her then,
explaining in detail the commission of the said act. (pp. 23-29,
TSN, id.)
“Witness informed her husband and her mother about the rape
that evening. (pp. 31-32, TSN, id.)
“During cross-examination, defense counsel tried to impeach the
testimony of the witness by eliciting the information that accused
and victim were close neighbors; that during the incident
119
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999 119
People vs. Lampaza
private offended party passed by accused who was cutting bamboo
poles, on her way to the grazing area of the farm lot. (pp. 3-4, TSN,
November 7, 1989) She described again the force and intimidation
emanating from the accused in committing the act complained of.
Private offended party informed the Court of the great fear she felt
that she was trembling and almost speechless when the incident
happened. (pp. 5-7; 11-22, TSN, Ibid.)
“Witness was never attracted to the accused as she testified on
cross[-]examination. (p. 19, TSN, id.)
“When queried by the Court as to the length of the sexual
intercourse she stated that it lasted only three minutes, although the
acts of force, intimidation and the struggle lasted for more than ten
minutes. (pp. 22-23, TSN, id.)
“During the hearing of January 4, 1990, prosecution presented
another witness in the person of the husband of the offended party
(p. 32), who testified that the latter informed him about her being
raped by the accused; that [he] wanted to kill the accused but he was
prevailed upon by his wife and decided to file a case in Court, hence
the criminal complaint (p. 34). Witness was in another town during
the incident: that he returned to his house in the afternoon of the
following day, when his wife informed him of the incident. (pp. 32-
34)
“They went to the police authorities the following day and filed
their formal complaint, contained in a sworn statement. (pp. 34-38,
TSN, id.)”
Version of the Defense
Insisting that appellant and complainant were sweethearts,
the defense presents the following version of the facts: 13
“The defense’s version of the case is as follows: Accused Egmedio
Lampaza and complainant Teodora Wacay are neighbors. They have
known each other since childhood. Accused courted complainant who
later became his girlfriend. However, they married different persons,
but that notwithstanding, they have had intimate relations.
__________________
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 51-52. The Brief was signed by Atty.
13
Cezar R. Tajanlangit.
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lampaza
“In the morning of 20 March 1988, accused heard a signal from
complainant. The latter informed him that her husband was in
another town, and when he asked her “what now because your
husband is not there,” complainant just laughed. Complainant told
accused that she was going to fetch her carabao, so he followed her.
When he reached the place where she was, he put his arms around
her, but she brushed them aside, apprehensive that they might be
seen. Complainant went up the nipa hut, the same place where they
had had sexual intercourse, and made love again, with complainant
taking off her clothes first, followed by accused taking off his pants
and shirt. They made love consensually. He did not threaten
complainant; neither did he use force [or] violence in consummating
the sexual act because the same was with the consent of complainant
(t.s.n., August 6, 1991).
 “Filomena Lampaza, the lawfully-wedded wife of the accused,
testified that complainant is the mistress of her husband, the
accused. Because of her husband’s extra-marital relationship, they
were always quarreling. To avoid further trouble she went to Iloilo
to work as a housemaid for Judge Amelia K. Del Rosario (pp. 49-50,
t.s.n., Sept. 24, 1991). The latter testified that Filomena had worked
for her family as a housemaid, and during the course of her
employment she had confided to her employer that her (Filomena’s)
husband was maltreating her and ha[d] a ‘querida’ (t.s.n., Jan. 30,
1992).”
Ruling of the RTC and the CA
Debunking the claim that the sexual intercourse was
consensual, the trial court held that appellant used force
against the victim by twisting her arm and bodily lifting her
from the farm lot to the nipa hut. He also threatened and
intimidated her by placing a bolo beside her during the actual
rape. The trial court ruled: 14
“Our assessment and appraisal of the facts of the case show that
there was force committed on the victim when her arms were twisted
and she was bodily lifted from the farm lot to the nipa hut. She was
intimidated or there was a threat to intimidate her, when the bolo
was placed beside her during the rape.
___________________
RTC Decision, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 15-16.
14
Affirming appellant’s conviction, the Court of Appeals modified
the penalty to reclusion perpetua and increased the moral
damages to P50,000.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant contends that the trial court committed the following
errors: 15
“I
x x x [I]n holding that accused-appellant used force and intimidation
on complainant in order to consummate the sexual act
“II
x x x [I]n holding that the sexual intercourse herein complained
of “was done without the consent [or] approval of the victim”
“III
x x x [I]n finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape based on the inconsistencies, contradictions, and
incredibilities palpably apparent in complainant’s testimony and in
[the testimonies] of her witnesses”
In resolving this appeal, we shall address seriatim the three
grounds raised by appellant.

121 ___________________
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999 121
Appellant’s Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 47.
15

People vs. Lampaza 122

“This court finds that the incident complained of which occurred on 122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
March 20, 1988 was x x x done without the consent [or] approval of People vs. Lampaza
the victim.
“We do not see any reason why Teodora Wacay related the The Court’s Ruling
incident to her husband the following evening, if indeed the rape was The appeal has no merit.
not committed because the husband was out of town then. Much First Issue:
more, that she went to court. In People vs. Estolano, 193 SCRA 383, Force and Intimidation
the Supreme Court held that complainant would not have made the Appellant contends that rape was not proven because force and
offense subject and endured the ordeal of testifying to all its gory intimidation were not established beyond reasonable doubt.
detail if she had not in fact been raped.” Specifically, he argues that the testimony of the victim on this
point should be rejected, because it conflicted with her Sworn
Statement given during the preliminary investigation. First, in twisted the arms of the terrified victim, forced her to go inside
her statement she averred that “he pressed [her] forward the uninhabited nipa hut, placed the bolo beside her, and
towards” the nipa hut; but she testified that he “lifted” threatened to kill her in order to sate his lust. The victim
her. Second, she declared in her statement that he “forcibly testified as follows: 20

made [her] lie down,” but she testified that he “dump[ed] [her] “Q. Now, while you were untying the rope of your
on the floor.” Third, she also stated that appellant’s bolo was carabao, do you recall of any unusual incident
tucked to his side, but she testified that it was placed beside that happened?
her. 16
A. Yes, Sir.
We are not convinced. The “conflicts” cited by appellant are Q. What was that incident?
largely semantical, not factual, in character. Whether A. All of a sudden, a person came from behind me
appellant forcibly made her lie down on the floor or whether he and twisted both my hands. (Witness
dumped her makes no substantial difference in appreciating demonstrated with her right hand twisted towards
the fact of the crime: that she was down on the floor against her the left side of her body while the left hand was
will. Likewise, appellant makes too much ado about the also twisted towards the right side of her body,
discrepancy between her being “pressed forward” and her being both hands in front).
“lifted”; the allegedly conflicting statements equally mean that xxx xxx xxx
he forced her to go to the nipa hut. Moreover, the well-settled
Q. Now, after the accused Egmedio Lampaza twisted
rule is that inconsistencies between an affidavit and a
your arms, what else happened?
testimony do not necessarily discredit the witness, for
A. He lifted me.
affidavits are generally incomplete and are not considered
17

Q. Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable

final repositories of truth. 18

Court how you were lifted by Egmedio Lampaza?

__________________ A. (With Julie Magbanua acting in place of the
victim and the witness in place of the accused, the
16Appellant’s Brief, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 55-56.
17People v. Padao, 267 SCRA 64, January 28, 1997; Sumalpong v. CA, 268
accused stands behind the victim and place[s]
SCRA 764, February 26, 1997. both arms around the victim while the arms of the
18 People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689, April 18, 1997; People v. Pontilar, 275
victim are twisted with the right arms towards the
SCRA 338, July 11, 1997.
left and the left arms towards the right side of her
123
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999 123 body and from that position the accused lifts the
People vs. Lampaza victim upward, raising the victim about three
inches from the ground.)
In any event, we agree with the trial court that appellant used
force and intimidation in ravaging complainant. Although its _________________
factual findings are not absolutely binding on this Court
because it was not the ponente who heard the prosecution See footnote no. 2.
19

TSN, September 27, 1989, pp. 19-26.

witnesses, we believe and so hold that the totality of the
20
19
124
evidence presented indubitably demonstrates that appellant 124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
had sexual intercourse with complainant against her will. He
 People vs. Lampaza A. I kicked both my legs. (Witness demonstrates a
Q. Now, Madam Witness, while you were being movement as if she were pedalling an unseen
lifted by the accused in the position you have just bicycle).
mentioned, what else did he do? Q. Did you make any statement while you were
A. Egmedio Lampaza told me, ‘Come, let’s have trying to struggle from the hold of the accused?
sexual intercourse.’ A. I did not say anything. I only struggled.
Q. While saying that and while lifting you, what else Q. Why did you not say anything?
did Egmedio Lampaza do, if any? xxx xxx xxx
A. He brought me to the nipa hut, Sir. A. Because I was afraid, Sir.
Q. How far is that nipa hut from where you were at 125
that time? VOL. 319, 125
A. About five arms stretch away, Sir. NOVEMBER 24,
Q. Was that hut inhabited? 1999
A. No one lives there. People vs. Lampaza
xxx xxx xxx PROSECUTOR CASALAN:
Q. While you were being lifted by the accused and Q. Was the accused able to reach the
being carried to the nipa hut, what did you do if nipa hut with you?
you did anything? A. Yes, Sir.
A. I struggled to set myself free. Q. While you were already at the
Q. Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable nipa hut, what did the accused
Court how you struggled? do, if any?
A. (At this juncture, Julie Magbanua takes the place A. He dumped me on the floor of
of the accused while the witness takes the place the nipa hut.
of the victim and from the position previously xxx xxx xxx
described, with the x x x arms [of the accused] Q. After the accused dumped you on
around the victim, the victim struggle[s] to set the floor of the nipa hut, what
herself free by moving her body towards the left happened to you?
and right and trie[s] to push her head downward A. The accused pinned both my legs
away from the arms of the accused [who is] as well as my right hand, Sir,
embracing her. The witness further states that with both of his knees.
since her feet were off the ground, it [was] hard to xxx xxx xxx
set herself free). PROSECUTOR CASALAN:
Q. Now, aside from struggling hard to free yourself Q. Now, Madam Witness, while in
from the clutches of the accused, what else did this position, what next did the
you do if any? accused do?
A. The accused took off his pants.
 Q. While the accused was doing Neither are we persuaded by his contention that
that, was the accused saying complainant did not undergo medical examination to show
anything? signs of physical struggle or assault. The fact that the victim
25

A. Yes, Sir. had no visible signs of injury did not by itself disprove
Q. What did he say? rape. We reiterate that she was too intimidated to offer serious
26

A. ‘If you do not allow me to have resistance to the advances of appellant.

sexual intercourse with you, I am More important, no law requires a medical examination for
going to kill you.’ the successful prosecution of rape. Even without a medical
27

Q. Did you notice if there was any report, the rape victim’s credible testimony, standing alone, is
weapon carried by the accused a sufficient basis for conviction. In the present case, we find no
28

with him? reason to disbelieve her testimony. Time and time again, the
A. Yes, Sir. Court has held that no woman in her right mind would declare
to the whole world that she was raped and subject herself to
Q. What was he carrying?
the concomitant strain and stigma, unless she is
A. He was carrying a bolo, Sir.
Q. Where was the bolo of the ___________________
accused at that time?
23 People v. Rabosa, 273 SCRA 142, June 9, 1997; People v. Gaban, 262 SCRA
A. It was beside me, Sir.”
593, September 30, 1996.
Appellant further argues that “if there was any resistance [by 24 People v. Oarga, 259 SCRA 90, July 17, 1996; People v. Gumagob, 265

the victim], it was couched in general terms.” The argument is

21
SCRA 84, November 28, 1996; People v. Corea, 269 SCRA 76, March 3, 1997.
bereft of merit. We must stress that the law does not impose 25 Appellant’s Brief, p. 17; rollo, p. 62.

26 People v. Querida, 229 SCRA 745, February 7, 1994; People v.

upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Indeed, 22
Sabellina, 238 SCRA 492, December 1, 1994; People v. Arnan, 224 SCRA 37;
physical resistance need not be established when the June 30, 1993.
27 People v. Julian, 270 SCRA 733, April 4, 1997; People v. Manaay, 151

____________________ SCRA 31, June 18, 1987.

28 People v. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55, July 5, 1996. See also People v. De la

Appellant’s Brief, p. 10; rollo, p. 56.

21
Cruz, 224 SCRA 506, July 6, 1993; People v. Godines, 196 SCRA 765, May 7,
People v. Penero, 276 SCRA 564, July 31, 1997.
22
1991.
126 127
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999 127
People vs. Lampaza People vs. Lampaza
culprit employed intimidation, which, insofar as it was
23
telling the truth. For his part, appellant failed to adduce any
29

directed at the mind of the victim, must be viewed in the light
of the latter’s perception and judgment at the time. In the 24
present case, the victim was terrified because the threat of the
appellant to kill her was substantiated by the bolo he placed
beside her. Furthermore, she could not have successfully
resisted because, according to her, he was husky and strong.
evidence to show that the victim’s testimony was false.
Second Issue:
Sweetheart Theory
Appellant admits that he had sexual intercourse with the
complainant that fateful day, but argues that they were lovers
and the act was consensual. He adds that their respective
30
marriages to different persons had not prevented them from
engaging in sexual dalliances with each other.
We are not persuaded. Other than his bare assertions,
appellant adduced no independent proof that he was the
sweetheart of the victim. His defense was neither corroborated
by any other witness nor substantiated by any memento, love
note, picture or token. Furthermore, even assuming that the
31
two were lovers, their relationship did not give him a license to
sexually assault her. 32
Appellant’s defense is further negated by the behavior of the
victim who, according to Rogelio Sumbilon, was running out of
the crime scene “sobbing and very pale” immediately after the
33
commission of the crime. Elaborating during cross-
examination, he said that the victim “was in a hurry, as if she
was afraid of something and as if somebody was running after
her.” When they reached her house, she told him that she was
34
afraid and that they should hurry to her mother’s house
____________________
29 People v. Cabaluna, 264 SCRA 596, November 21, 1996; People v. De
Guzman, 265 SCRA 228, December 2, 1996.
30 Appellant’s Brief, pp. 11-12; rollo, pp. 57-58.
31 See People v. Acabo, 259 SCRA 75, July 17, 1996.
32 People v. Buendia, G.R. Nos. 133949-51, 314 SCRA 655, September 16,
1999; People v. Travero, 276 SCRA 301, July 28, 1997; People v. Laray, 253
SCRA 654, 662-663, February 20, 1996; People v. Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82, 110,
February 23, 1996.
33 TSN, September 27, 1989, p. 5.
34 Ibid., p. 10.
128
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lampaza
about three or four kilometers away. Her conduct clearly belied
appellant’s claim that the sexual act was consensual.
Third Issue:
Alleged Inconsistencies and “Incredibilities”
Appellant contends that the prosecution witnesses should not
be accorded credence because their testimonies were replete
with inconsistencies and “incredibilities.” In addition to the
instances alluded to earlier, appellant cites the following: the
victim testified that she shouted, although she said in her
Sworn Statement that she had not done so; she allegedly told
her husband of the rape on the evening of the fateful day, but
her husband testified that he did not return home until the
afternoon of the following day. 35
We are not persuaded. The aforecited inconsistencies are
minor in character and, as such, do not impugn the credibility
of the complainant. Indicative of an unrehearsed testimony, the
slight contradictions even serve to strengthen her
credibility. Indeed, the Court cannot expect a rape victim to
36
remember every ugly detail of the sexual assault. 37
Equally unconvincing is the alleged physical impossibility of
the victim’s narration that he was allegedly pinning her down
with both his hands while taking off his shirt at the same
time. The alleged impossibility does not imply the falsity of
38
her testimony; it only means that it was impossible for her to
remember the minutiae of appellant’s act.
Appellant also challenges the plausibility of the following
assertions of the victim: (a) she made no mention of the rape
____________________
35 Appellant’s Brief, p. 14; rollo, p. 60.
36 People v. Letigio, 268 SCRA 227, February 13, 1997; People v.
Magallano, 266 SCRA 305, January 16, 1997; People v. Devilleres, 269 SCRA
716, March 14, 1997; People v. Butron, 272 SCRA 352, May 7, 1997; People v.
Patawaran, 274 SCRA 130, June 19, 1997.
37 People v. Alas, 274 SCRA 310, June 19, 1997; People v. Sagucio, 277 SCRA
183, August 11, 1997.
38 Appellant’s Brief, pp. 15-16; rollo, pp. 60a-61.
129
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 24, 1999 129
People vs. Lampaza
to her nephew when she saw him right after the incident; (b) 39
she did not immediately tell her husband that she had been
raped; (c) she did not report the outrage to the police or to the
40
barangay officials. 41
 These arguments are puerile. Complainant’s testimony was
not weakened by her failure to immediately narrate the
incident to her nephew or to her husband. There is no code of
conduct prescribing the correct reaction of a rape victim to the
sexual assault. When placed under a great deal of emotional
stress, the workings of the human mind are
unpredictable. Some may immediately relay the incident to
42
authorities and close relatives, but others need time to compose
themselves before deciding on a course of action. Although she
43
did not immediately inform her nephew about the incident, she
told her husband about it after he arrived from another town,
when they were about to sleep. That same night, she and her
husband decided to report the outrage to the authorities. In
this light, her account is far from incredible. Even assuming
that there was a delay in reporting the incident to the police,
this fact is not necessarily an indication of fabrication. 44
Crime and Punishment
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is
committed when carnal knowledge of a woman is obtained
under any of the following circumstances: (1) force or
intimidation is used, (2) the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (3) the woman is under twelve years
of
_____________________
39Ibid., p. 14; rollo, p. 60.
40Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 17; rollo, p. 62.
42 People v. Apongan, 270 SCRA 713, April 4, 1997; People v. San Juan, 270
SCRA 693, April 4, 1997; People v. Cabel, 282 SCRA 410, December 14, 1995.
43 People v. Malunes, 247 SCRA 317, August 14, 1995; People v. Roncal, 272
SCRA 242, May 6, 1997.
44 People v. Julian, 270 SCRA 733, April 4, 1997; People v. Quitoriano, 266
SCRA 373, 378, January 20, 1997.
130
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lampaza
age or is demented. Herein appellant does not deny that he had
carnal knowledge of the victim. Moreover, the totality of the
evidence presented shows that he employed force and
intimidation against her. Clearly, his conviction of rape should
be affirmed.
Under the law in effect when the crime was committed, the
penalty for simple rape was reclusion perpetua. In imposing a
lower indeterminate penalty, the trial court erred, because the
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply when the offense
involved is punishable with reclusion perpetua.
Likewise, appellant should be ordered to pay the victim
P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, in line with existing
jurisprudence. We agree with the Court of Appeals that he
45
should also be ordered to pay P50,000 as moral damages. The
Court has held that “the fact that complainant has suffered the
trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings which
constitute the bases for moral damages is too obvious to still
require the victim’s recital thereof at the trial x x x.” 46
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the appellant
shall pay the victim P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto in addition
to the P50,000 awarded as moral damages. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Assailed decision affirmed with modification.
___________________
45 People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464, January 20, 1998; People v.
Betonio, 279 SCRA 532, September 26, 1997; People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441,
July 14, 1997.
46 People v. Ignacio, 294 SCRA 542, August 24, 1998, per Romero, J. See
also People v. Vergel, G.R. No. 128813, 316 SCRA 199, October 4, 1999.
131
VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 25, 1999 131
 Hold Departure Order Issued by Judge Felipe M.
Abalos, MTCC-Br. 1, Dipolog City in Crim. Cases
Nos. 15521 & 15522
Notes.—Love is not a license for carnal intercourse through
force or intimidation. (People vs. Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82 [1996])
The absence of love notes, mementoes or pictures casts
doubt on the accused’s claim that he and the victim were
sweethearts. (People vs. Laray, 253 SCRA 654 [1996])

——o0o——
G.R. Nos. 130634-35 March 12, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANOLITO OYANIB y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
PARDO, J.:
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint
decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and
parricide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty2 of
six (6) months one day (1) to six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years one (1) day to eight
(8) years of prision mayor as maximum,3 and to pay
P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the costs for the death of
Jesus Esquierdo, and to reclusion perpetua, to pay P50,000.00
and the costs for the death of his wife, Tita T. Oyanib.4
On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V.
Lagcao filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iligan City two (2)
separate informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza with murder and parricide, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6012</P>
"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon to wit: a
hunting knife about six inches long and with intent to kill and
evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby inflicting upon
him the following physical injuries, to wit:
Cardiorespiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
Multiple organ injury
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.
"Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances (sic) of
evident premeditation."5
Criminal Case No. 6018
"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, having conceived and (sic) deliberate
intent to kill his wife Tita Oyanib, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident
premeditation, attack, assault, stab and wound his wife, as a
result of said attack, the said Tita Oyanib died.
"Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code."6
The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary liberty
of accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza in both cases.
On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered to
the police authorities7 and was immediately detained at the
Iligan City Jail.8
On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused
Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza by reading the informations
against him and translating them into the Visayan
dialect.9 He pleaded not guilty to both charges.
As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the trial
court conducted a joint trial.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and
Tita T. Oyanib (hereafter Tita) were married on February 3,
1979 10 and had two (2) children, Desilor and Julius. They
lived in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita
separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their two (2)
children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of
Edgardo Lladas (hereafter Edgardo), not far from the place
where her family lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while
Edgardo and his family were watching TV at the sala located
at the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan,
Iligan City, they heard a commotion coming from the second
floor rented by Tita. The commotion and the noise lasted for
quite some time. When it died down, Edgardo went upstairs to
check.11
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and
sprawled on the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus
Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latter's
stomach. Jesus was wearing a pair of long black pants. When
Edgardo asked Manolito what he was doing, accused told
Edgardo not to interfere.
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police.
Meanwhile, the neighbors brought Tita to the hospital. She
died on the way to the hospital.12
SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation
Office, Iligan City Police Command, Precinct I, Poblacion,
Iligan City said that at about 9:00 in the evening of
September 4, 1995, while he was on duty, he received an
information regarding a stabbing incident at the Llagas
residence at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City.13
At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of Jesus
lying face up with several stab wounds in different parts of
the body. Jesus was clad in t-shirt and long pants. From the
crime scene, he recovered a knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr.
Uy Hospital to check on Tita; he was informed that she was
dead. Manolito was the suspect in the killing of Jesus and
Tita.14 The incident was recorded in the police blotter as
Entry No. 137138.15
On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, Medico-
Legal Officer, Iligan City examined the bodies of Jesus and
Tita.16 Jesus sustained multiple stab wounds, and those
inflicted in the right and left chests and stomach were
fatal.17 The cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest,
hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple organ injury and
multiple stab wound chest and abdomen."18
Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal
wounds inflicted in the left chest and right side of the
abdomen. The cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest,
hypovolemic shock and multiple stab wound."19
As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments,
Manolito and Tita decided to live separately. Manolito
retained custody of their two (2) children. Immediately after
the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyn's house for
two (2) months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas
residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and
rented the second floor.20 The rented space consisted mainly of
a sala with one adjoining room. It was arranged in a manner
that if one enters the main entrance door, one is immediately
led to the sala and from the sala, directly to the door of the
adjoining room.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and
exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the
children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with
Manolito.21 In fact, she was very open about her relationship
with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One
time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a
very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy.
Tambacan, Iligan City.22 Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus
about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she
was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened
to kill him.23
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his
daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan
City National High School. The letter mentioned that his son
Julius failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a
meeting at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the
morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito
went to Tita's house to ask her to attend the school meeting in
his behalf.24
Upon reaching Tita's rented place, he heard "sounds of
romance" (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the
door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and
Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and
his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek.
Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 5'9"
in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the
assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito
took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the
stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito, only to
come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in
the head, while at the same time shouting "kill him Jake, kill
him Jake."25
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the
abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him again.
Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken
Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in
the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in
different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of
her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of
the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor
and inquired about what had happened. Manolito told
Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to
Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his
friend's neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in
stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the
morning of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to
catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in
Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for
him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to
the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City.26
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his
wife's place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense.
Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and
her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could
live together.27
After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated a
joint decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and
pronouncements and having carefully observed the demeanor
of witnesses, this Court hereby declares accused MANOLITO
OYANIB y Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and Parricide
(Crim. Case No. II-6018) and and appreciating the two (2)
mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and
voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstances
to consider, this Court sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza to suffer an imprisonment as follows:
"1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:
To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS
ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6) YEARS as Minimum to Six (6)
YEARS ONE (1) DAY to EIGHT (8) YEARS as Maximum; to
indemnify heirs of Jesus Esquierdo the sum of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.
2.) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:
To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act No.
7659; to indemnify heirs of his wife P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and to pay the costs.
"It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is
subject to the forty (40) years limitation prescribed in Article
70 of the Revised Penal Code.
"Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive
imprisonment.
"SO ORDERED.
"Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.
"MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge"28
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
interposed an appeal from the joint decision of the trial court
to the Supreme Court.29
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them
both under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors
allegedly committed by the trial court, which boiled down to
the basic issue of whether accused is entitled to the
exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code. 30 He questioned the trial court's appreciation of the
facts and the evidence, contending that it ignored and
overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence material to the
defense of the accused, like the photograph of the lifeless body
of Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph graphically
showed that Jesus' pants were wide open, unzipped and
unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing any
underwear, lending credence to his defense that he caught his
wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. On the
other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that accused-
appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving, by clear
and convincing evidence, that he killed the victims under the
exceptional circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. Hence, the trial court did not err in
denying him the exempting privilege under the Article. 31
We find the appeal meritorious.
At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her
paramour. He invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
as an absolutory and an exempting cause. "An absolutory
cause is present 'where the act committed is a crime but for
reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty
imposed."'32
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to
prove the exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of the
court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following
essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter;
and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.33 Accused must
prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence,
otherwise his defense would be untenable. "The death caused
must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity.
Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife must concur
with her flagrant adultery."34
There is no question that the first element is present in the
case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must convincingly
prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour
in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the
testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have acted
within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised
his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately
thereafter."
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City in
Criminal Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences
accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and four
(4) months of destierro.36 He shall not be permitted to enter
Iligan City, nor within a radius of one hundred (100)
kilometers from Iligan city.37
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ
accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw ., concur.
his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse.
Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who
fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his
wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of
Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the police
when a call for him to surrender was made.

The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording

the offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of Article
247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People v.
Wagas:35

"The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the

scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this,
authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death.
But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as
that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is
caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only
with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and
appellee, vs. VALERIANO DUCOSIN, defendant and
appellant.
1. 1.INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW,
CONSTRUED; MAXIMUM AND MlNIMUM
PENALTIES.—Under section 1 of Act No. 4103 the court
must, instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two
penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Act as
the "maximum" and "minimum". The prisoner must' serve
the minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole under
the provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period
between the minimum and maximum penalty indeterminate
in the sense that he may, under the conditions set out in said
Act, be released from serving said period in whole or in part.
He must be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a
period which is not more than the "maximum" nor less than
the "minimum", as these terms are used in the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
1. 2.ID.; ID.—The maximum penalty must be determined, in
any case punishable by the Revised Penal Code, in
accordance with the rules and provisions of said Code exactly
as if Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, had
never been passed. It was not the purpose of said Act to make
inoperative any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Neither the title nor the body of the Act indicates any
intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal or amend
any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
1. 3.ID.; MINIMUM PENALTY.—In determining the
"minimum" penalty Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts in
the fixing of penalties the widest discretion that the courts
have ever had. The determination of the "minimum" penalty
presents two aspects: first, the more or less mechanical
determination of the extreme limits
110
110 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ducosin
1. of the minimum imprisonment period;, and second, the broad
question of the factors and circumstances that should guide
the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty
within the ascertained limits. We construe the expression in
section 1 "the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said
Code for the offense" to mean the penalty next lower to that
determined by the court in the case before it as the
maximum (that is to say the correct penalty fixed by the
Revised Penal Code).
1. 4.ID.; ID.—The Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103,
simply provides that the "minimum" shall "not be less than
the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next
lower." In other words, it is left entirely within the discretion
of the court to fix the minimum imprisonment anywhere
within the range of the next lower penalty without reference
to the degrees into which it may be subdivided.
1. 5.ID.; ID.—Keeping in mind the basic purpose of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of "personal liberty and economic usefulness"
(Message of the GovernorGeneral, Official Gazette No. 92,
vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the
criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of
society. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to
individualize the administration of our criminal law to a
degree not heretofore known in these Islands. Some factors
to be taken into consideration are indicated.
1. 6.ID.; ID.—Act No. 4103 does not require the court to fix the
minimum term of imprisonment in the minimum period of
the degree next lower to the maximum penalty.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Diaz, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Alejandra F. Antonio for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
BUTTE, J.:
This appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila convicting the appellant of the crime of frustrated
murder was referred by the first division to
111
VOL. 59, DECEMBER 14, 1933 111
People vs. Ducosin
the court in banc for the proper interpretation and application
of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature approved on
December 5, 1933, commonly known as the "Indeterminate
Sentence Law". As this is the first case which has come before
us involving the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it will be
convenient to set out here some of its provisions.
Section 1 of Act No. 4103 is as follows:
"Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
acts of the Philippine Legislature, otherwise than by the Revised
Penal Code, the court shall order the accused to be imprisoned for a
minimum term, which shall not be less than the minimum term of
imprisonment provided by law f or the offense, and f or a maximum
term which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law; and where
the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, or amendments
thereto, the court shall sentence the accused to such maximum as
may, in view of attending circumstances, be properly imposed under
the present rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall not
be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense. Except as
provided in section two hereof, any person who shall have been so
convicted and sentenced and shall have served the minimum
sentence imposed hereunder, may be released on parole in
accordance with the provisions of this Act."
Section 2 is as follows:
"This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished
with death penalty or lif e imprisonment; to those convicted of
treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted
of misprision of treason, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of
piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall
have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who
having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall
have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year; nor
112
112 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ducosin
to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval
of this Act, except as provided in section five hereof."
Section 3 of Act No. 4103 creates a "Board of Indeterminate
Sentence" to be composed of the Secretary of Justice as
chairman and four members to be appointed by the Governor-
General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate.
This section describes the qualifications of the members.
Section 4 gives the board authority to adopt rules of procedure
and provides for the compensation of the members.
Section 5 makes it the duty of the board to study the
physical, mental and moral record of the prisoners who shall be
eligible to parole and authorizes the board to determine the
proper time for the release of such prisoners. After a prisoner
has served the "minimum penalty" imposed upon on him and
the board is satisfied that such prisoner is fitted by his training
for release and that there is a reasonable probability that he
will not violate the law again and that his release "will not be
incompatible with the welfare of society", the board may in its
discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on parole. The
board may also recommend the release on parole of other
prisoners previously convicted of any offense other than those
named in section 2.
Section 6 provides for the surveillance of prisoners released
on parole for a period "equivalent to the remaining portion of
the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release
and discharge by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence."
Section 7 provides that a certified copy of the board's order of
conditional or final release shall be filed with the court and
with the Chief of Constabulary.
 Section 8 provides that any prisoner who violates any of the
conditions of his parole, who violates any law during the period
of surveillance for which he has been convicted, shall be subject
to re-arrest and confinement and "shall serve the remaining
unexpired portion of the maximum
113
VOL. 59, DECEMBER 14, 1933 113
People vs. Ducosin
sentence for which he was originally committed to prison"
unless the board grants a new parole.
Section 9 provides that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, shall not be construed to impair the powers
given to the Governor-General under section 64 of the
Administrative Code or the Organic Act of the Philippine
Islands.
By its terms, Act No. 4103 became law upon its approval,
that is to say, on December 5, 1933.
In the case before us, Valeriano Ducosin was tried on
September 30, 1932, for the crime of frustrated murder upon
the following information:
"That on or about the 23d day of September, 1932, in the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill,
treacherously attack, assault and wound one Rafael Yanguas by then
and there suddenly and without any warning, stabbing the latter
with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him several wounds in different
parts of the body, some of which are necessarily mortal, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the death
of the said Rafael Yanguas as a consequence, but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of said accused, that is, by the timely intervention of medical
assistance.
"Contrary to law."
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to ten years and one day of prisión mayor with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the costs. The
penalty for the crime of murder, under article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, is reclusión temporal in its maximum
period to death. Under article 50, the penalty for a frustrated
felony is the one next lower in degree to that prescribed for the
consummated felony, which in the present case is prisión
mayor in its maximum period to reclusión temporal in its
medium period, or from ten years and one day to seventeen
years and four months. The
114
114 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ducosin
accused having pleaded guilty, this extenuating circumstance,
in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, fixes the
penalty within the minimum period, that is to say, from ten
years and one day to twelve years, leaving to the discretion of
the court the precise time to be served within said range, i. e.,
not less than ten years and one day nor more than.twelve years.
The penalty imposed by the trial judge being within this range
is correct and therefore is the penalty prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for the offense which this accused has committed.
As Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, was
enacted after this appeal was lodged in this court, we are now
required to revise the sentence imposed upon the appellant and
to bring the same into conformity with Act No. 4103.
It will be observed from section 1 of said Act that the court
must now, instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two
penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Act as the
"maximum" and "minimum". The prisoner must serve the
minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole under the
provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between the
minimum and maximum penalty indeterminate in the sense
that he may, under the conditions set out in said Act, -be
released from serving said period in whole or in part. He must
be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period which is
not more than the "maximum" nor less than the "minimum", as
these terms are used in the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
This leads up to the important question: How shall the
"maximum" and the "minimum" penalty be determined?
 The maximum penalty must be determined, in any case
punishable by the Revised Penal Code, in accordance with the
rules and provisions of said Code exactly as if Act No. 4103, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, had never been passed. We think
it is clear from a reading of Act No. 4103 that it was not its
purpose to make inoperative any of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. Neither the
115
VOL. 59, DECEMBER 14, 1933 115
People vs. Ducosin
title nor the body of the Act indicates any intention on the part
of the Legislature to repeal or amend any of the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code. The legislative history of the Act
further shows that attention was called to the necessity for
taking care "so as not to bring the provisions of this bill in
conflict with the provisions of our penal laws, especially with
those treating with penalties." (Committee Report, House of
Representatives, H-3321, Ninth Philippine Legislature, Third
Session.)
The last mentioned report gives an illustration of the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to offenses
penalized by the Revised Penal Code:
"Suppose that a man is found guilty of malversation of public
funds in the amount of P10,000. No mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances are present. Under this law the court may
impose on him a maximum sentence not exceeding ten years
and eight months but not less than nine years, four months and
one day (see art. 217, No. 3, Revised Penal Code), and a
minimum which shall not be less than four years, two months
and one day (the minimum imprisonment period of prisión
correccional in its maximum to prisión mayor in its
minimum. See article 6'1, Revised Penal Code). The court,
therefore, may sentence the accused to be imprisoned for not
less than five years nor more than ten years or for not less than
seven years nor more than ten years and eight months, etc."
It will be seen from the foregoing example that the
"maximum" is determined in accordance with the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code. In the example given reference is
made to article 217, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that the defendant shall suffer the penalty
of prisión mayor in its medium and maximum period. The
penalty is placed in the medium degree because of the absence
of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, that is to say,
anywhere between nine years, four months and one day and
ten years and eight months in the discretion of the court. In the
case on appeal here the
116
116 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ducosin
penalty was imposed in the minimum of the proper penalty
under the Revised Penal Code because of the plea of guilty, that
is to say, between ten years and one day and twelve years in
the discretion of the court. This discretion is in nowise impaired
or limited by Act No. 4103. The trial court, in conformity with
the discretion conferred upon it by the Revised Penal Code,
might have assessed the penalty at, let us say, eleven years.
We wish to make it clear that Act No. 4103 does not require
this court to assess the said penalty at 12 years, which is the
longest time of imprisonment within the minimum degree.
We find, therefore, that ten years and one day of
imprisonment conforms to the provisions and rules of the
Revised Penal Code and is therefore fixed and established as
the maximum of the sentence which shall be imposed upon the
appellant.
We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment
period" referred to in Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act
provides that this "minimum which shall not be less than the
minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by said Code for the offense." We are here upon
new ground. It is in determining the "minimum" penalty that
Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts in the fixing of penalties
the widest discretion that the courts have ever had. The
determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two aspects:
first, the more or less mechanical determination of the extreme
limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and second, the
broad question of the factors and circumstances that should
guide the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty
within the ascertained limits.
We construe the expression in section 1 "the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense" to mean
the penalty next lower to that determined by the court in the
case before it as the maximum (that is to say the correct penalty
fixed by the Revised Penal Code, see our discussion above). In
the example which the Legisla-
117
VOL. 59, DECEMBER 14, 1933 117
People vs. Ducosin
ture had before it in the Committee Report above mentioned,
the maximum of the sentence was correctly stated to be the
medium degree of prisión mayor in its medium and maximum
period. The penalty next lower is prisión correccional in its
maximum degree to prisión mayor in its minimum degree
(article 61, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code), that is to say,
anywhere from f our years, two months and one day to eight
years. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, simply
provides that the "minimum" shall "not be less than the
minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower." In
other words, it is left entirely within the discretion of the court
to fix the minimum of the penalty anywhere between four
years, two months and one day and eight years. In the example
given by the committee they stated that the court might fix the
minimum penalty at five years or seven years.
In the case before us on this appeal the next lower penalty
to the maximum already determined as aforesaid, is prisión
correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its
medium period, that is to say, from four years, two months and
one day to ten years. As stated, it is in the discretion of the
court to fix the time of imprisonment within the said range
without reference to the technical subdivisions of maximum
degree, medium degree and minimum degree, and in this
particular the courts are vested as stated with a wider
discretion than they ever had before.
We come now to the second aspect of the determination of
the minimum penalty, namely, the considerations which
should guide the court in fixing the term or duration of the
minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind the basic
purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General. Official Gazette
No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider
the criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member
of society. This opens up an almost limitless field of
investigation and study which it is
118
118 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ducosin
the duty of the court to explore in each case as far as is humanly
possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not be
standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the individual,
with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the
social order.
Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the
factors that should be considered are: (1) His age, especially
with reference to extreme youth or old age; (2) his general
health and physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity and
personal habits; (4) his previous conduct, environment and
mode of life (and criminal record if any); (5) his previous
education, both intellectual and moral; (6) his proclivities and
aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his demeanor
during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime
committed; (8) the manner and circumstances in which the
crime was committed; (9) the gravity of the offense (note that
section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts certain grave crimes—this
should be kept in mind in assessing the minimum penalties for
analogous crimes).
 In considering the criminal as a member of society, his The judgment of the court below is modified to this extent:
relationship, first, toward his dependents, family and that the defendant-appellant is hereby sentenced to a
associates and their relationship with him, and second, his maximum penalty of ten years and one day of prisión mayor in
relationship towards society at large and the State are its maximum degree, and to a minimum imprisonment period
important factors. The State is concerned not only in the of seven years, and as thus modified, the judgment appealed
imperative necessity of protecting the social organization from is affirmed. With costs de oficio.
against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad
redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims Judgment modified.
to individualize the administration of our criminal law to a
degree not heretofore known in these Islands. With the
foregoing principles in mind as guides, the courts can give full
effect to the beneficent intention of the Legislature.
It is our duty now to assess the minimum imprisonment
period under Act No. 4103 in the case before us on this appeal.
Unfortunately, as this defendant was convicted before Act No.
4103 became effective, and as we know
119
VOL. 59, DECEMBER 14, 1933 119
Sy Tiangco vs. Pablo and Apao
nothing of his antecedents because his plea of guilty rendered
it unnecessary to take any testimony, we are confined to the
record before us. He plead guilty to all of the acts which
constitute the crime of murder and only the timely intervention
of medical assistance prevented the death of his victim and the
prosecution of the appellant for murder. He was given the f ull
benefit of the plea of guilty in the fixing of the maximum of the
sentence. With such light as we have received from the record
in this case, we have concluded that a reasonable and proper
minimum period of imprisonment should be seven years, which
is within the "range of the penalty next lower in degree to the
maximum, that is to say, within the range from four years, two
months and one day to ten years of prisión correccional in its
maximum period to prisión mayor in its medium period. We
repeat that Act No. 4103 does not require the court to fix the
minimum term of imprisonment in the minimum period of the
degree next lower to the maximum penalty.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and
appellee, vs. ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant and
appellant.
1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; IMBECILITY AS
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE; REQUISITES.—In order
that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the
meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be
exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will
at the time of committing the crime.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—A man who could feel the pangs of
jealousy and take violent measures to the extent of killing
his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the
belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could
hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
1. 3.ID. ; ID. ; FEEBLEMINDEDNESS AND ACT IN A FIT OF
JEALOUSY AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.—
Feeblemindedness of the accused warrants the finding in his
favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in either
paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code and the fact that the accused evidently killed his wife
in a fit of jealousy, he is, likewise, entitled to the mitigating
circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article—that of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to
have produced passion or obfuscation.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; PENALTY.—The penalty applicable for parricide
under article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed only
of two indivisible penalties, to wit, reclusión perpetua to
death. Altho the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance without any aggravating
circumstance to offset them, article 63 of the said code is the
one applicable and must be applied.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; ATTENTION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
INVITED TO THE CASE.—When the court believes that the
appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty the case should be
brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his
discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower
to reclusión perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive
clemency in the manner he sees fit.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur. Palacio, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
659
VOL. 87, NOVEMBER 29, 1950 659
People vs. Formigones
Luis Contreras f or appellant.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix
V. Makasiar for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty of
parricide and sentencing him to reclusión perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000,
and to pay the costs. The f ollowing f acts are not disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo
Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan,
municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wif e, Julia
Agricola, and his five children. From there they went to live in
the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the
barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find
employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month's stay
or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia
Agricola was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The
accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and
stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the
right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her
death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down
the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband
Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the
house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down
beside her. In this position he was found by the people who
came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest
daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the
stabbing of her mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo
signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he admitted
that he killed his wife. The motive was admittedly that of
jealousy because according to his statement he used to have
quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often
660
660 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Formigones
saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he
suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations
because he noticed that his wife had become indifferent to him
(defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the
justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused pleaded guilty, as
shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First
Instance, the def endant entered a plea of not guilty, but did
not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards
of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect
that his conduct there was rather strange and that he behaved
like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove his
clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow
prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent
to his surroundings; that he would refuse to take a bath and
wash his clothes until forced by the prison authorities; and that
sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or
even alone by himself without being asked; and that once when
the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from Inside
into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain
his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant
is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability
under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court
rejected this same theory and we are inclined to agree with the
lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr.
Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that
Abelardo was suffering only f rom f eeblemindedness and not
imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile
within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so
as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at
the.time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12
of the Revised Penal Code are copied
661
VOL. 87, NOVEMBER 29, 1950 661
People vs. Formigones
from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code
of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent
and applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his
Commentaries on. the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages
42 to 48
"The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting
circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing 'the act, that is,
that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility
for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; that
18
there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be
a total deprivation of freedom of the will For this reason, it was held
that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the
act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or f reedom of
will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability. 19
"The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness
cannot be equalled to imbecility or insanity.
"The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved.
without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his
reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal
condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be volun-tary,
and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciuosly, in
order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental
condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved."
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his
confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate
insanity, it may be attributed either to his being- feebleminded
or eccentric. or to a morbid mental condition produced by
remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of United
States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil., 88), we quote the following
syllabus-
"Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes 110 further
than to indicate that the accused was moved by a wayward or hyste
_______________
18 Decision of Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur.
Crim., 413.
19 Decision of Supreme Court of Spain of April 20. 1911; 86 Jur. Crim., 94,
97.
662
662 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Formigones
ical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the effect that,
while in confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly
at times, is not sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The
conduct of the defendant while in confinement appears to have been
due to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse."
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the
appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during
his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or
conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that
he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated
his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and
even maintained in school his children of school age, with the
fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra.
And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take violent
measures to the extent of killing his wif e whom he suspected
of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was
vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no
import. The f act is that he believed her f aithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of
justification and was not a mere product of hallucination and
aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a
lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In addition to
the observations made by appellant in his written statement
Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his wife first went to live
in the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter
was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant.
However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the house,
Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to sleep
there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly
confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of
thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems
to be one of those unfortunate beings, simple and
663
VOL. 87, NOVEMBER 29, 1950 663
People vs. Formigones
even f eebleminded, whose f aculties have not been f ully
developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife after
she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying
her on the floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his
feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he
thought that she had betrayed him. Al though he did not
exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to
flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In
his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his
wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate
said written statement, thus saving the government all the
trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring his
conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not
prepared to find that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems that
the prosecution was not intent on proving it. At least said
aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint
either in the justice of the peace court or in the Court of First
Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt
and we therefore decline to find the existence of this
aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the
accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his f avor of
the mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8
or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely,
that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus
restricts his means of action, defense or communication with
his fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish the
exercise of his will power." To this we may add the mitigating
circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article,—that of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation. The accused evidently killed
his wife in a fit of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without
any aggravating circumstance to offset them, at first we
thought of the possible applicability of the provisions
664
664 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Formigones
of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the
purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by article 246 for parricide, which is reclusión perpetua to
death. It will be observed however, that article 64 refers to the
application of penalties which contain three periods whether it
be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, each one of which f orms a period in accordance with
the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in the
present case where the penalty applicable for parricide is
composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand,
article 63 of the same Code refers to the application of
indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or
two indivisible penalties like that of reclusión perpetua, to
death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the one applicable
in the present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the
commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. Interpreting a similar legal
provision the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of
parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old
Penal Code) which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule
3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice
Arellano said the following:
"And even though this court should take into consideration the
presence of two mitigating circumstances of a qualifying nature,
which it can not afford to overlook, without any aggravating one, the
penalty could not be reduced to the next lower to that imposed by
law, because, according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80
above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that contained
in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code).
(Decision of September 30, 1879.)
"Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict
application of which is inevitable and which, under the law, must be
sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power conferred
by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal Code; and
"Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and
hereby order that a proper petition be filed with the executive
665
VOL. 87, NOVEMBER 29, 1950 665
People vs. Formigones
branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be deemed
proper in the exercise of the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign
power, may reduce the penalty to that of the next lower."
Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604),
another parricide case, the Supreme Court in affirming the
judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusión
perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous mitigating
circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for
parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is
composed of two indivisible penalties, namely, reclusión
perpetua, to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code
must be applied. The Court further observed:
"We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice
nor has exhibited such moral turpitude as requires life
imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, we respectfully invite the attention of the Chief
Executive to the case with a view to executive clemency after
appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement."
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we
hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court with the
modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half
of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant
will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this
same court in the two cases above cited, and believing that the
appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be
brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his
discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower
to reclusión perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive
clemency in the manner he sees fit.
Moran, C.
J., Parás, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes, and Jugo,
JJ., concur.

PADILLA, J.:

I concur in the result.

Judgment modified.