IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS, VOL. 54, NO.
2, MARCH/APRIL 2018
Transformer Energization From Low-Voltage Side
With Limited Generation—Power System Constraints
and Protection Considerations—A Case Study
Gautami Bhatt , Senior Member, IEEE, Terry Tadlock , Senior Member, IEEE,
and Dragan Ristanovic , Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—A large existing delta-wye step-down transformer was
proposed to be temporarily used as a step-up transformer and en-
ergized from the low-voltage wye winding by multiple small diesel
generators (DGs) to accelerate commissioning activities by utilizing
existing temporary generation. This paper is a case study that dis-
cusses the associated power system constraints created by this pro-
posed modified power system configuration. The modified power
system configuration resulted in an ungrounded high-voltage (HV)
system created by the transformer’s delta winding, which required
HV system modifications to create a grounded system. Additionally,
the existing power system had generation and load flow constraints
and had protection and coordination constraints that needed to be
maintained to supply the existing loads. Also, the inrush current
resulting from the transformer energization needed to be evalu-
ated and compared with the generator’s short time current rating.
Finally, modifications to the protection and coordination settings
resulting from the modified power system configuration and con-
firmation that the arc flash incident energy levels were acceptable
after implementation of modified settings were required.
Index Terms—Diesel generator (DG), generator short time cur-
rent rating, inrush restraint, interconnect transformer, reverse
power flow, transformer energization, transformer inrush current,
ungrounded system.
I. INTRODUCTION
IESEL generators (DGs) were provided to supply power
D to the temporary power system and supply the associated
construction power and man camp loads during the early phases
of the construction of a multitrain liquefied natural gas (LNG)
facility. This international facility was designed in accordance
with the International Electrotechnical Commission standards
and is a 50-Hz system. A 33–11.55 kV, 13 MVA, delta-wye,
step-down transformer was designed and installed to allow the
permanent plant gas turbine generators (GTGs) to provide power
to the temporary power system after the GTGs were commis-
Manuscript received June 9, 2016; accepted November 29, 2016. Date of
publication November 16, 2017; date of current version March 19, 2018. Pa-
per 2016-PCIC-0596, presented at the 2016 Petroleum and Chemical Industry
Conference, Philadelphia, PA, USA, Sep. 19–22, and approved for publica-
tion in the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS by the Petroleum
and Chemical Industry Committee of the IEEE Industry Applications Society.
(Corresponding author: Gautami Bhatt.)
The authors are with Bechtel Oil, Gas, and Chemicals, Houston, TX
77056 USA (e-mail: gnbhatt@bechtel.com; trtadloc@bechtel.com; dristano@
bechtel.com).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online
at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIA.2017.2774767
0093-9994 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
1861
sioned. This would allow the DGs to be shut down, which would
avoid diesel fuel consumption and the associated premium costs
due to a remote project site location.
Due to project schedule changes and desire to accelerate com-
missioning activities, an opportunity was identified to utilize the
13 MVA step-down transformer in reverse operation to back-
feed, or step-up, from the temporary power system to the perma-
nent power system. Implementing this scheme presented several
technical challenges.
First, utilizing the delta-wye resistance grounded step-down
transformer in a step-up configuration creates an ungrounded
high-voltage system. Section II of the paper discusses the con-
cerns with the ungrounded high-voltage (HV) system and mod-
ifications to the HV system to create system grounding.
Additionally, the system short circuit current in this modified
configuration was much lower than the minimum short circuit
currents on which the system protection settings were originally
based. They were comparable to the expected transformer inrush
current that the system may see during transformer energization.
Section III of the paper discusses the power system generation
and load flow constraints and protection and coordination limits.
Also, energizing the 13 MVA transformer with much smaller
2.08 MW DGs presented the challenge of large transformer
energization while avoiding nuisance tripping of the DGs, which
were already in service and supplying power to the construction
power system. Section IV of the paper discusses transformer
energization and inrush currents. This section also shows the
results of the software simulation of the transformer energization
and the effect of this energization on the DGs.
Section V demonstrates the relay logic and interlocks
implemented to avoid nuisance trip on inrush. This section also
shows the new protection settings implemented for the modified
system configuration. Section VI discusses reevaluation of sys-
tem arc-flash incident energy levels to ensure personnel safety.
Section VII shows actual results of transformer energization in
the site conditions.
II. SYSTEM GROUNDING
A. Planned Power System Configuration
During the initial phases on the project, DGs were being
used to supply power to the 11 kV temporary power system
and supply the associated construction power and man camp
1862 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS, VOL. 54, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2018
Fig. 1. Planned Power System Configuration.
loads. During normal operation, three DGs were running with
two additional DGs available for peak loading and redundancy.
Each 11 kV DG is rated at 2.08 MW. Also during this initial
phase, the 33 kV permanent power system was not energized
and there was no interconnection between the 11 kV temporary
power system and the 33 kV permanent power system.
After the GTGs were commissioned and ready to accept load,
there was a planned interconnection between the 33 kV perma-
nent power system and the 11 kV temporary power system. As
shown in Fig. 1 for this planned configuration, the GTGs, rep-
resented by GTG, would supply power via its generator step-up
transformer, equipment ID meant to indicate ET-GSU, to the
33 kV switchgear ES-33. The 33 kV switchgear would supply
power to the permanent plant commissioning loads and would
supply power to the 11 kV temporary power system, ES-11,
via the delta-wye step-down transformer ET-1, which was used
to interconnect the permanent power system and the temporary
power system. The 11 kV temporary power system would then
supply the existing construction power and man camp loads. At
that time, the DGs would be turned off [circuit breaker (CB)-DG
opened], which would save fuel costs.
B. Modified Power System Configuration
Due to project schedule changes and desire to accelerate com-
missioning activities, an opportunity was identified to utilize the
transformer ET-1 in reverse operation to backfeed, or step-up,
from the 11 kV temporary power system to the 33 kV permanent
power system.
To support this opportunity, modifications to the planned
power system configuration would be necessary. These mod-
ifications include that the DGs, DG1 thru DG5, would continue
to supply the 11 kV temporary power system, which means CB-
DG would remain closed. The 11 kV temporary power system,
ES-11, would continue to supply the existing construction power
and man camp loads. Additionally, the DGs would supply power
to the 33 kV permanent power system by backfeeding the ET-1
transformer. The commissioning loads connected to the 33 kV
power system would then be energized. Also, these modifica-
tions to the planned power system configuration include that the
Fig. 2. “Effect on line-to-ground voltages of a single line to ground fault on
an ungrounded neutral system” [1, Fig. 6.4, p. 343].
GTGs and the associated generator step transformer ET-GSU
would not be energized and, therefore, the generator incomer
breaker CB-GSU would be open.
By reviewing Fig. 1, it can be seen that the 11 kV neutral
grounding reference can either be developed by the DG’s 100 A
neutral grounding resistor, by the ET-1 transformer’s 100 A
neutral grounding resistor, or by both operating concurrently.
Also, by reviewing Fig. 1, it can be seen that the 33 kV neu-
tral grounding reference can only developed by the ET-GSU
generator step-up transformer’s 400 A neutral grounding re-
sistor. However, since CB-GSU is open, the generator step-up
transformer and its associated neutral grounding resistor are not
connected to the 33 kV permanent power system. This results
in an ungrounded 33 kV permanent power system.
C. Ungrounded HV System
An ungrounded system is a system where there is no in-
tentional connection to ground. Since the generator incoming
breaker, CB-GSU, is open, the 33 kV permanent power system,
ES-33, has no intentional connection to ground and is thus an
ungrounded system. However, in any power system, there ex-
ists capacitive coupling between the system components, i.e.,
cables, generator windings, motor windings, transformer wind-
ings, etc., to ground. This has the effect of establishing the
neutral reference point via capacitive coupling to ground [1].
In a steady state, balanced and unfaulted power system, the
neutral reference point will float at ground potential. However,
in the event of a line to ground fault, the system’s voltage triangle
shifts such that, and assuming no fault impedance, the voltage of
the faulted phase to ground is 0 V. The line-to-ground voltage of
the other two phases becomes equal to the line-to-line voltage.
Fig. 2 shows a phasor representation of the normal unfaulted
condition and shows a phasor representation of a single line-
to-ground fault condition from [1]. An ungrounded system can
continue to operate with a single line-to-ground fault without
protection operation. Only when a second line-to-ground fault
occurs or a line-to-line fault occurs will protection trip and
isolate the faults [1].
The equipment used for the 33 kV permanent power sys-
tem consists of 38 kV rated gas insulated switchgear suitable
for 38 kV line-line voltage and 21.9 kV line-neutral voltage.
The cables used for the 33 kV permanent power system are
BHATT et al.: TRANSFORMER ENERGIZATION FROM LOW-VOLTAGE SIDE WITH LIMITED GENERATION—POWER SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS
Fig. 3. Modified power system configuration.
rated 19/33(36) kV which are suitable for a maximum line-line
voltage of 36 kV and a maximum line- ground voltage of
20.7 kV. This includes the 1220 m cable that connects trans-
former ET-1 to the 33 kV switchgear ES-33. In this configu-
ration, if a line to ground fault were to occur, the line-ground
voltage of the unfaulted phases would become equal to the line-
line voltage of 33 kV. The equipment and the cables are not rated
for this magnitude of line-ground voltage. Insulation breakdown
due to the overvoltage would occur which would permanently
damage the insulation and could result in flashover. Further, the
fault could propagate to a line-line-ground fault and cause high
magnitude unrestricted ground fault currents [1].
D. Modification to HV System to Create Grounding
In order to avoid damaging the insulation of the equipment
and cables, and to limit ground fault current magnitudes in the
event of a fault, the system must be resistance grounded. There
are multiple methods available to establish the neutral grounding
reference on the 33 kV permanent power system. These include
adding a grounding transformer or replacing transformer ET-
1 so that the system ground is established when backfeeding
the transformer. Both these methods involve adding a neutral
grounding resistor so that the 33 kV system neutral point is
physically connected rather than capacitively coupled to the
ground potential.
For the application described in this paper and to avoid the
purchase of additional equipment or replacement of existing
equipment, an innovative solution was evaluated. This inno-
vative solution utilized the neutral grounding resistor of the
generator step-up transformer ET-GSU to establish the neutral
grounding reference. Fig. 3 shows the modified power system
configuration with DGs supplying power to the system.
To implement this, the 11 kV cable connection between
the GTG and its generator step-up transformer ET-GSU was
disconnected and isolated at the transformer so that the GTG
could not be backfed. This is represented in Fig. 3 by the
open switch between GTG and ET-GSU. With circuit breaker
CB-GSU closed, the 33 kV permanent power system is now
grounded by the ET-GSU generator step-up transformer’s
400 A neutral grounding resistor. Under normal conditions,
no current will flow through ET-GSU. During ground faults,
1863
the zero-sequence current will flow through the system to the
ET-GSU neutral grounding resistor and the magnitude of the
ground fault current will be limited to 400 A. Additionally, the
ground fault current can now be detected by system relaying
and the appropriate breaker tripped to isolate the ground fault.
As seen in Fig. 3, there are two 33 kV circuit breakers,
CB-33 and CB-GSU, between the 33 kV delta winding of in-
terconnect transformer ET-1 and the ET-GSU generator step-up
transformer’s 400 A neutral grounding resistor. If either of these
breakers were to be opened or tripped, the 33 kV neutral ground-
ing reference would be lost. Since it is important to ensure the
system is grounded at all times, interlocks are implemented in
the system to ensure intertrip of source circuit breaker CB-11 if
either of the two 33 kV circuit breakers, CB-33 and CB-GSU,
open or trip. Details of these interlocks are beyond the scope of
this paper.
The modified power system configuration now has two trans-
formers, rated 13 MVA and 20 MVA, connected in series that
need to be energized from relatively small sized 2.08 MW DGs.
Moreover, the ET-1 energization is from the low-voltage side
of the transformer which increases the current and the ET-GSU
energization is over a long cable which increases the system
impedance.
Additionally, the applications of using transformer ET-GSU
to develop the 33 kV neutral grounding reference and using
transformer ET-1 in a step-up application when it was designed
for a step-down application were reviewed with the transformer
manufacturer. The use of transformer ET-GSU in this applica-
tion was approved without restriction and without any impact
on equipment warranty. The use of transformer ET-1 in this ap-
plication was conditionally approved and without any impact on
equipment warranty. The condition of approval for transformer
ET-1 was that it could not be used in an application where it
would experience generator load rejection since it had not been
designed as a generator transformer.
If a transformer that has not been designed as a generator
transformer is subjected to load rejection, there is a risk of
transformer core saturation due to over-fluxing caused by high-
voltage transient during load rejection which could cause trans-
former damage or insulation degradation. However, by review
of Fig. 3, it can be seen that there are two circuit breakers, CB-
DG and CB-11, between DG1 thru DG5 and transformer ET-1
which would trip and isolate the transformer and protect it from
experiencing generator load rejection.
Prior to implementation, a design review was performed for
the proposed modified power system configuration and included
representatives from Engineering, Construction, Commission-
ing, and Operations, and included members from both the en-
gineer of record and the client/owner. The results of the design
review was that the modified power system configuration was
approved for implementation.
III. POWER SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS
A. Generation and Load Flow Constraints
Although the interconnect transformer is rated for the total
generation capability, the amount of load the temporary power
1864 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS, VOL. 54, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2018
system can supply to the permanent power system while still
supplying its construction power and man camp loads had to be
determined in order to define the load limit for commissioning
activities. The total generation capability of the system is 5 ×
2.6 MVA, which is 13 MVA. The system limit also depends on
medium-voltage motors that need to be started as part of the
permanent plant commissioning activities. This analysis is done
using power system simulation software and it is found that the
modified power system configuration can support a maximum of
5 MVA of permanent plant load, including capability of starting
the two medium-voltage motors required for commissioning
activities, which results in requiring five DGs to be running.
The details of the associated power system analysis performed
to obtain these results are beyond the scope of this paper.
While the DGs may be adequately rated to supply electrical
power in the steady state condition, it is necessary to verify their
short term capability during transformer energization. Accord-
ing to the DG data sheet, generator-rated stator current is equal
to 137 A, with the short time rating of 786 A. The total short time
rating of five DGs running in parallel is 5 × 786 A = 3930 A.
B. Protection and Coordination Constraints
The minimum and maximum short circuit currents of the
modified power system configuration are required to determine
appropriate protection settings of the modified system. The orig-
inal protection settings of the system were based on the planned
power system configuration and modified protection settings are
to be determined. The minimum short circuit of the modified
power system configuration is based on two DGs running and
is found to be 1.148 kA at the 11 kV bus and 0.305 kA at the
33 kV bus. The maximum short circuit of the system is based
on maximum DGs running and is found to be 7.743 kA at the
11 kV bus and 1.396 kA at the 33 kV bus.
IV. TRANSFORMER ENERGIZATION AND INRUSH
A. Transformer Energization and Inrush
When a transformer is connected to a power source and ener-
gized, a transient current flows known as the magnetizing inrush
current. This current lags the applied voltage by 90 degrees elec-
trical. This transient current flows because of the difference in
the pre-energization flux of the transformer and the steady-state
flux [2].
The magnitude of inrush current is variable and depends on
conditions of energization. If the transformer is energized at the
positive peak voltage, there would be little inrush current and
exciting currents would be 2% to 5% of the full-load current.
If the transformer is energized at the zero crossing voltage, the
peak current during first magnetization can range between 8
and 30 times the full-load current. This event can last from ten
cycles to as long as 1 min in highly inductive circuits [3].
In the modified power system configuration, the ET-1 trans-
former is being applied and energized in the reverse direction
from the low-voltage side, transformer inrush can be higher
than expected. In fact, when a core-type transformer is ener-
gized from the low-voltage side, the inrush currents may be
double the inrush current when compared to the inrush current
upon energization from the high-voltage side [2]. Knowledge of
transformer design details is important when an accurate value
of transformer inrush is required [2].
The transformer manufacturer was contacted to obtain de-
tails of the transformer design and expected inrush values when
energizing the transformers from the low-voltage side. The
manufacturer-provided design data are used in transient mag-
netizing simulation discussed in the next section. The inrush
current provided by the transformer manufacturer is based on
zero-crossing voltage, assumes a zero impedance source, and is
conservative for the system design.
As seen in Section III, the maximum short circuit result of
the new system is 7.743 kA at 11 kV and 1.396 kA at the
33 kV bus and the estimated inrush current for the 13 MVA
transformer provided by the manufacturer is 5.109 kA at the
11 kV side and for the 20 MVA transformer it is 1.664 kA
at the 33 kV side. With the maximum fault currents and esti-
mated inrush currents within comparable range, it is important
to obtain a more realistic estimate of the actual inrush when the
transformers are energized from the actual DGs rather than the
zero impedance source. This is also critical because the impact
of this energization on the source DGs should be analyzed to
evaluate the impact on the DGs and determine if DG short time
rating is adequate for transformer energization. The transformer
energization simulation is discussed in the following section.
B. Transformer Energization Simulation
Before the modification is implemented, the magnitude of
the expected inrush current, the expected decay in inrush cur-
rent over time, and its effect on the temporary power system DG
should be evaluated. This is achieved with the help of a switch-
ing transient analysis software model to simulate transformer
energization. The details of how to perform such analysis is be-
yond the scope of this paper. An example of how to develop a
software model to perform the transformer switching transient
simulation is given in [6].
Design details of the transformers and DGs are obtained from
the respective suppliers and applied as input to the analysis.
Several scenarios with different number of DGs running were
simulated to validate the model. The scenario to be implemented
involved energizing both the transformers ET-1-rated 13 MVA
and ET-GSU-rated 20 MVA from five DGs. The results of that
case are shown in Figs. 4 and 5.
Based on the switching transient analysis, the following is
estimated for the system.
1) The magnitude of the peak inrush current when energizing
both transformers in series from the DGs is 2.115 kA on
the 11 kV side. The duration of decay to fully dissipate is
approximately 5 s (full scale of the x-axis in Fig. 4).
2) The magnitude of the peak inrush current when energizing
both transformers in series from the DGs is 0.798 kA on
the 33 kV side. The duration of decay to fully dissipate is
approximately 1 s (full scale of the x-axis in Fig. 5).
The short time rating of 3930 A for five DGs running in paral-
lel is greater than the maximum expected peak inrush current of
BHATT et al.: TRANSFORMER ENERGIZATION FROM LOW-VOLTAGE SIDE WITH LIMITED GENERATION—POWER SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS
Fig. 4. Expected inrush current at 11 kV.
Fig. 5. Expected inrush current at 33 kV.
2115 A, with sufficient margin of 3930−2115 A = 1815 A at the
11 kV level to supply the running loads in the temporary power
system. The short time generator rating is considered adequate
for transformer energization.
Based on the switching transient analysis, it is found that the
system should be capable of energizing the transformers. The
transformer inrush current waveform is used in the next section
for proper protection of the transformer.
V. PROTECTION
A. Challenges in Determining New Settings and Coordination
The magnitudes of short circuit current for the modified power
system configuration are significantly lower than their corre-
sponding values for the planned power system configuration.
The minimum and maximum short circuit currents of the orig-
inal system design are 8.36 and 35.6 kA at the 33 kV bus. The
protection settings of the planned power system configuration
are based on those short circuit currents and need to be modified
for proper protection.
The challenges in determining new protection settings of the
system are as follows.
1) The high-harmonic content in the current during trans-
former energization contains dc currents that decay slowly
and can cause CT saturation and nuisance trip of sensitive
1865
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF FAULT CURRENTS AND EXPECTED PEAK TRANSFORMER
INRUSH CURRENTS
Bus Minimum Maximum Estimated Total
Fault Fault Peak Inrush
Current (kA) Current (kA) Current (kA)
11 kV bus 1.148 (L-L) 7.743 (3 PH) 2.115
33 kV bus 0.305 (L-G) 1.396 (3 PH) 0.798 a
a
Inrush current for the 13 MVA transformer does not flow through the
33 kV secondary circuit.
protective functions applied on the transformer or adjacent
equipment [4].
2) The magnitude of the modified system short circuit cur-
rents are comparable to the expected magnetizing inrush
currents of the transformers. Table I is a comparison of the
fault currents with the peak inrush current, as tabulated in
Table I. The settings should be such that the overcurrent
functions protect for the fault current but do not trip on
transformer inrush current.
3) The DGs in the temporary power system were already in
service and supplying power to the associated construction
power and man camp loads. The new settings should co-
ordinate with the existing settings of the temporary power
system such that the DGs do not trip for a fault due to the
interconnect transformer. A trip of the DGs will disrupt
service to construction power and man camp loads and im-
pact the ongoing construction activities, which potentially
would impact the project schedule.
4) The arc-flash incident energy levels with the new settings
should be within acceptable levels for personnel safety.
The system arc flash incident energy levels without mod-
ifications for the protection settings cause the time taken
to trip longer. This increases the system incident energy
to unacceptable levels.
B. Avoiding Trip on Inrush
Industrial power transformers are typically furnished with dif-
ferential protection that is fast operating and set to pick up for
small magnitudes of in-zone fault currents. Magnetizing inrush
currents are seen as in-zone faults by the relays. The leading
component of the harmonics in the inrush current is the second
harmonic component, which forms about 25% of the fundamen-
tal value [5]. Many of the modern microprocessor relays have
inrush detection function that detects inrush condition based on
harmonic content in the current flowing through the system.
This feature in the relay is available for some of the relays in
the system and will be used in implementation of the modified
protection scheme to avoid trip due to inrush current.
The temporary power system relays that are already in ser-
vice have inrush detection function that has not been utilized
because it was not required for the original system design. The
differential relays for transformers ET-1 and ET-GSU and the
overcurrent relay from the 11 kV feeder breaker CB-11 have
inrush detection function. The overcurrent relays for the 33 kV
1866 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS, VOL. 54, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2018

circuit breakers CB-33 and CB-GSU do not have the harmonic

detection function.
Since the temporary power system is already energized and
serving construction and camp loads, disrupting its service due
to trip on inrush should be avoided. In order to do that, the
current transformers (CTs) to unit protection relays need to be
checked for adequacy for saturation against the inrush. In this
case, the generator differential protection relay is the only unit
protection relay in the temporary power system for which this
verification is needed.
In normal operation, the existing temporary power system
has three generators in service and two are out of service. Each
DG has generator differential protection relay receiving input
from a 200/1, 0.1 PX 15 R 0.5 CTs. For a peak inrush current
of 7.743 kA, the current is divided equally among the three
generators as 2.581 kA. Accounting for the CT ratio, the current Fig. 6. Power system with protective devices and relays identified.
seen by the CT secondary circuit is 12.905 A. With an internal
resistance of the CT as 0.5 Ω, the secondary voltage developed
due to peak inrush will be 6.45 V where the knee voltage of the
CT is 15 V. It is found that the CTs for generator differential
protection are adequately rated and that the differential function
will not trip on inrush due to CT saturation.
Further, the phase and ground overcurrent protection settings
of the DG incomers should coordinate with the relay for CB-11
such that the CB-11 circuit breaker is always the first to trip.
Although this feature may impinge upon the ability to actualize
the modified scheme, the likelihood of system black out should
be avoided.
To ensure that in the event of energization, the DG incomers
do not trip, the harmonic restraint function in the overcurrent
relay for CB-11 is also not utilized. The phase and ground over-
current settings of the CB-11 overcurrent relay are set to coor-
dinate with the DG incomer overcurrent relay on circuit breaker
CB-DG. This is discussed in further detail in Section V-C
and V-D.
The transformers that are being energized, ET-1 and ET-GSU,
have dedicated relays for transformer differential and restricted
earth fault protection with harmonic block and harmonic re-
straint function that is set to detect the second and the fourth
harmonics and is utilized with a maximum time delay of 0.9 s
to avoid transformer differential functions tripping during a non-
fault inrush condition.
Although all sensitive differential functions will not trip dur- Fig. 7. Phase overcurrent coordination curve—33 kV circuit.
ing energization, it should be noted that the overcurrent relays
need to be set for the new lower fault currents that are compa-
rable to the expected inrush. Relay logic that is implemented settings implemented in the interconnect transformer 33 kV side
in the transformer differential relays is utilized as an interlock for the modified system.
for the overcurrent relays over a communication link. This in- 1) The inrush curve is plotted on the time current curve to
terlock would block tripping of the overcurrent relays during avoid tripping of phase overcurrent functions when inrush
a non-faulted inrush condition for a maximum of 0.9 s. This current has reduced from its peak value but still signifi-
ensures the overcurrent functions do not trip due to inrush. The cant enough to cause relay misoperation. The peak inrush
actual settings are discussed in Section V-C and V-D. current provided by the transformer manufacturer is also
plotted on the curve as a point to avoid trip on inrush.
2) Discrimination and selectivity on the interconnect trans-
C. Phase Overcurrent Protection former has been sacrificed due to the intertrips imple-
Fig. 6 shows the power system with protective devices and mented in the system that would initiate trip of all inter-
relays identified. Fig. 7 shows the phase overcurrent protection connect breakers to avoid an ungrounded system.
BHATT et al.: TRANSFORMER ENERGIZATION FROM LOW-VOLTAGE SIDE WITH LIMITED GENERATION—POWER SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS
Fig. 8. Phase overcurrent coordination curve—11 kV circuit.
Fig. 8 shows the phase overcurrent protection settings imple-
mented on the 11 kV circuit breaker CB-11-RELAY to coordi-
nate with the existing setting of DG incomer.
D. Ground Fault Protection
The ground fault relay setting of the 11 kV feeder relay in
the system CB-11-RELAY should be set in a way that it meets
below criteria.
1) It should coordinate with the existing ground fault settings
of the temporary power system.
2) It should be set high enough to avoid trip on zero-sequence
component of the magnetizing inrush current.
Fig. 9 shows the ground fault protection settings implemented
in the modified configuration.
1) When coordinating settings on a system with multiple
sources, the relay curves need to be multiplied with the
appropriate factor to account for contribution from each
source. Each DG incomer is set to operate at 30 A, 300 ms.
This setting will be maintained to avoid DG shutdown to
modify and test new settings.
2) With three DGs operating, all the three DG incomers will
trip if the total zero-sequence current is 90 A (3 × 30 A
per DG).
3) If five DGs are operating, all the five DG incomers will
trip if the total zero-sequence current is 150 A (5 × 30 A
per DG).
4) The CT ratio of the 11 kV feeder is 1250:1 and 0.1 is
the minimum pickup available for the relay. The 11 kV
feeder ground fault setting is set at 125 A (0.1 pickup)
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Fig. 9. Ground fault protection coordination.
with a time delay of 100 ms to coordinate with the source
relay setting with five DGs in service.
Therefore, five DGs are required if existing temporary power
system settings are to be maintained. The increase in the number
of generators also increases the system capability to meet the
reactive power demand during inrush condition. Five genera-
tors are also required for motor starting of the medium-voltage
motors in the permanent power system, the details of which are
beyond the scope of this paper.
VI. REEVALUATION OF SYSTEM ARC FLASH INCIDENT
ENERGY LEVELS
Before implementation of the modified protection settings
and energization of the transformer, it is critical to re-evaluate the
system for arc-flash incident energy levels to ensure personnel
safety. Although the fault currents in the modified system are
low, the incident energy levels may be higher due to much
slower relay trip times at the lower fault currents or fault currents
that were below the pickup values of the original protection
settings. The system is reevaluated for incident arc-flash energy
levels. This analysis was done using a power system simulation
software. Relay settings of permanent power system that were
going to be commissioned as part of the modified power system
configuration are also part of this evaluation. After modifications
to system protection settings, the analysis confirms the incident
energy levels are within acceptable levels and are bounded by
existing arc flash incident energy levels and personal protective
equipment requirements.
1868
Fig. 10. Waveforms and signals at the 11 kV side during transformer ener-
gization.
VII. FIELD RESULTS FROM TRANSFORMER ENERGIZATION
After the anticipated inrush currents have been analyzed as de-
scribed in Section IV and relay settings and interlocks have been
modified as presented in Section V for the new temporary sys-
tem configuration, the transformer backfeed energization from
five parallel DGs was successfully implemented.
Transformers ET-1-rated 13 MVA and ET-GSU-rated 20
MVA were energized in series, and transformer protection relay
at ET-1 captured the 11 kV side waveforms, as shown in Fig. 10
From Fig. 10, the peak inrush equal to 1020 A occurred
in phase A, which is less than the expected maximum inrush
of 2115 A obtained by simulation presented in Fig. 4 in
Section IV–B. Such a difference between the actual peak inrush
and the maximum simulated peak inrush can be expected since
the actual energization may occur on any point on the voltage
waveform while the simulation is done for the worst-case
energization at the voltage zero crossing.
The relay recorded a distorted current waveform with second
harmonic content, which is expected during transformer ener-
gization. Since the inrush current is a nonsymmetrical event and
different inrush magnitudes occur in different phases, the relay
recorded the presence of the zero-sequence current component.
Zero-sequence component of less than 10 A occurred for both,
residual element IGW2, and the direct measurement by IN1
from the ground CT in the transformer neutral.
The voltage waveform presented in Fig. 10 shows the sag
expected during transformer energization. The voltage peak
dropped to 84.6% of the nominal value in the first cycle af-
ter energization and recovered to 95% by the fifteenth cycle.
Similar waveforms were captured on the 33 kV side where
measured peak inrush was equal to 370 A, which is less than the
expected 798 A obtained by simulation for the worst-case ener-
gization scenario at voltage zero crossing simulation presented
in Fig. 5 in Section IV-B.
Due to modifications in protective relay settings explained in
Section V and implemented prior to transformer energization,
the relays did not trip during the energization.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The following conclusions can be made from this case study.
1) An ungrounded system can cause severe power system
problems including overvoltage and stress on equipment
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS, VOL. 54, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2018
insulation. Grounding the system to avoid such conditions
and to limit the ground fault currents to reasonable limits
is important.
2) Note the following when energizing transformers with
small or comparable sources.
a) It is preferred to ramp the system voltage from low
voltage to system voltage while the transformer is
connected. This would reduce the undesired effects
of high inrush currents on system voltage sources
and sensitive protective devices. However, in this
application, existing loads had to remain energized
and this was not an option.
b) Effect of energization on source voltage should be
evaluated.
c) Effect on high harmonic content on CTs and sensi-
tive differential protection settings need to be eval-
uated to avoid tripping due to energization.
d) Harmonic restraint feature within the relay that
block operation in the event of inrush should be
utilized where available.
e) Transformer energization is a non-symmetrical
event with transient currents far exceeding the nor-
mal system currents. Analysis of the impact of trans-
former inrush on protective relay functions is nec-
essary, and implementation of relays with inrush
restrain feature may be required to avoid nuisance
trips during transformer energization.
3) When modifying power system configurations from their
original design, system studies, short circuit studies, pro-
tection settings, arc flash analysis need to be revalidated to
confirm implementation of the scheme and identify power
system operating limits, if any.
4) When potential exists to interconnect the temporary and
permanent electrical systems in a bidirectional manner,
such interconnection should be evaluated and, if deter-
mined beneficial, incorporated in early stages of the design
process. Considerations for the design of interconnected
systems are further explained in [7].
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank A. Tiwari from Bechtel Oil,
Gas, and Chemicals for his valuable comments. The authors
would also like to thank T. Turner and K. Hackart from Pow-
ertech Services for performing the transformer energization sim-
ulation.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Beeman, Ed., Industrial Power Systems Handbook, New York, NY, USA:
McGraw-Hill, 1955.
[2] J. E. Hobson and R. L. Witzke, Electrical Transmission and Distribution
Reference Book, L. Witzke and J. S. Williams, Ed., Raleigh, NC, USA:
ABB Power T&D, 1997.
[3] J. L. Blackburn, Applied Protective Relaying, Principles and Applications.
New York, NY, USA: Taylor & Francis, 2006.
[4] B. Kasztenny, “Impact of transformer inrush currents on sensitive protection
functions,” in Proc. 32nd Annu. Protective Relay Conf., Oct. 25–27, 2005..
[5] M. M. Adibi and D. P. Milanicz, “Protective system issues during restora-
tion,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 1492–1497, Aug. 1995.
BHATT et al.: TRANSFORMER ENERGIZATION FROM LOW-VOLTAGE SIDE WITH LIMITED GENERATION—POWER SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS
[6] I. Hassan, H. V. Nguyen, and R. Jamison, “Analysis of energizing a large
transformer from a limited capacity engine generator,” in Proc. IEEE Power
Eng. Soc. Winter Meeting, 2000, vol. 1, pp. 446–451.
[7] C. J. Mozina, “Interconnect protection of dispersed generators,” in Proc.
IEEE/PES Trans. Distrib. Conf. Exp., vol. 2, 2001, pp. 709–723.
[8] G. Bhatt, T. Tadlock, and D. Ristanovic, “Transformer energization
from low voltage side with limited generation—Power system con-
straints and protection considerations—A case study,” in Proc. 2016
Petroleum Chem. Ind. Tech. Conf., Philadelphia, PA USA, pp. 1–9, doi:
10.1109/PCICON.2016.7589246.
Gautami Bhatt (M’08–SM’18) received the B.Tech.
degree in electrical and electronics engineering from
Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyder-
abad, India, in 2009, and the master’s degree in elec-
trical engineering from the University of Houston,
Houston, TX, USA, in 2010.
In 2011, she joined Bechtel Oil, Gas, and Chem-
icals, Houston, as an Electrical Engineer, where she
is involved in power system analysis and protective
relaying studies.
Ms. Bhatt is the Co-Chair for the IEEE Industry
Applications Society Houston Section. She is a registered Professional Engineer
in the state of Texas.
1869
Terry Tadlock (M’92–SM’11) received the B.S. de-
gree in electrical engineering from the University of
Washington, Seattle, WA, USA, in 1992, and the M.S.
degree in systems and engineering management from
Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, USA, 2013.
He joined Bechtel Oil, Gas, and Chemicals, Hous-
ton, TX, in 1992, and has worked on various types of
projects including power, telecommunications, min-
ing, petrochemical, coal gasification, and liquefied
natural gas projects. He is currently an Electrical Prin-
cipal Engineer with Bechtel Oil, Gas, and Chemicals,
specializing in industrial power systems analysis, protection, and control appli-
cations.
Mr. Tadlock is a member of the Industry Applications Society. He is a regis-
tered Professional Engineer in the states of Texas and Washington.
Dragan Ristanovic (S’01–M’03–SM’12) received
the Dipl.Ing. degree in electrical engineering from
the University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia, in 1996,
and the M.Sc. degree in electrical engineering from
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA,
in 2003.
He has 17 years of experience in the industry. For
four years, he was an Electrical Engineering Con-
sultant on power grid projects in the Middle East,
where he was engaged in performing substation de-
sign, relay coordination studies, and relay testing and
commissioning. In 2003, he joined Bechtel Oil, Gas, and Chemicals, Houston,
TX, where he is a Senior Electrical Engineer with responsibilities in power
system analysis and protective relaying studies.
Mr. Ristanovic is a Professional Engineer in the state of Texas and registered
Professional Engineer in QLD, Australia.