People vs.

Emeliano Trindad
GR. No. 79123-25 January 9, 1989
Facts:
Lolito Soriano is a fish dealer. His helpers were Ricardo Tan and Marcial Laroa. While, the three
were driving on their way to Davao City to sell fish, the accused Emeliano Trinidad asked for a
ride to Agusan del Norte. Trinidad, a member of the Integrated National Police, was in uniform
and had two firearms, a carbine and a .38 caliber revolver.
Tan, the driver at that time, was instructed by Trinidad to slow down because they were treading
dangerous territory. Suddenly, Tan heard two gunshots. Soriano and Laroa slumped dead for
both were hit on the head. Trinidad had used his carbine in killing the two victims. Tan was able
to get off the car, hid in the bushes and hailed a jeepney. Tan sat in front of the jeepney and
thereafter saw Trinidad from behind. He immediately got off followed by Trinidad. When the
jeepney started to drive away, Tan suddenly clung to its side, but Trinidad fired two shots, one of
which hit Tan on his right thigh. Tan jumped from the jeepney and fortunately a Philippine
Constabulary member chanced upon him and helped him board a bus for Butuan.
Trinidad was charged with frustrated murder in relation to the shooting of Tan, and was found
guilty by the RTC. On appeal, Trinidad claims that the RTC erred in convicting him of the crime
of frustrated murder.

Issue:
Whether or not Trinidad is correct in contending that he can only be convicted of attempted
murder.

Ruling:
Wherefore, Trinidad should only be held criminally liable for attempted murder.
Trinidad had commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but was unable to
perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some causes or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, such as, that the jeep to which Tan was
clinging was in motion, and there was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body.
Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound
inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, the
accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the death.
People vs. Ceilito Orita
G.R. 88724 /April 3,1990
Facts:
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, Cristina Abayan arrived at her boarding house coming
from a party. While she was knocking at the door of her boarding house, someone held her and
poked a knife at her neck. She recognized the person as Ceilito “Lito” Ortia because he is a
frequent visitor of another boarder. Lito then ordered her to go upstairs but because of the front
door being locked, he forced the complainant to use the back door. Once inside, Lito dragged the
complainant and ordered her to look for a room. After entering the room, the accused pushed the
complainant and ordered her to undress herself. He mounted the victim and tried to penetrated
her but only a small portion was inserted because of the constant moving of the victim. He
thereafter asked the accused to hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. The accused laid down
and ordered the victim to mount him and the victim used this chance to escape. She dashed to
the next room while the accused pursued her until she was able to jump out through the window.
She ran towards the municipal building and knocked on the front door. When there was no
answer, she rushed to the back of the building. When the policemen went out, they found her
sitting naked while crying. After hearing what happened, they went back to the boarding house
and saw somebody running but they failed to apprehend the accused. She was brought to a
hospital for physical examination. Her PE revealed that she is still a virgin, with abrasions on the
left breast, left and right knees, and multiple pinpoint marks on her back, among others. The trial
court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.

Issue:
Whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape
Ruling:
Wherefore, the decision of the RTC is hereby modified. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well
as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.

In the crime of rape, the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually
attains his purpose and, from that moment also the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the
last act necessary to product the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In the set of uniform
rule for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is sufficient.
People of the Philippines vs. Amadeo Peralta, et. Al.
G.R. No. L-19069 October 29, 1968

Facts:
On February 16,1958, in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, two known warring gangs inside the New
Bilibid Prison as “Sigue-Sigue” and “OXO” were preparing to attend a mass at 7am. However, a
fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners were
currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved where led away to the investigation
while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters.
In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, “OXO” members, Amadeo Peralta, Andres
Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the
twenty-two defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the
said prisons by virtue of final judgments.
They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident
premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously killed “Sigue-Sigue” sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio
Barbosa, and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institutions by hitting,
stabbing and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed
and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which
directly caused their deaths.

Issue:
Whether or not there was conspiracy in the commission of the multiple murder.
Ruling:
Wherefore, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission of the murders.
Although, there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court can safely say that there are several
circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. First, all the
deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of “Sigue-Sigue” gang (OXO members
were from ether Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing
has been planned. Second, the accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that
they really prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team work
precision going from one brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have
previously marked for liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the
Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.
Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora,
Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty
of thee separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties;
all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims
in the sum of P12,000.00; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.
People of the Philippines vs. Melchor Real
G.R. No. 93436 March 24, 1995
Facts:
At about 9:00 A.M. on March 17, 1978, in the public market of Aroroy, Masbate, appellant and
Edgardo Corpuz, both vendors, engaged in a heated argument over the right to use the market
table to display their fish. Moreno de la Rosa, the Municipal Mayor, who happened to be at the
public market, tried to pacify them, saying that they were arguing over trivial matters. The two
protagonists momentarily kept their peace but after a while Corpuz raised his voice again and
said something to appellant. When Corpus kept on walking to and fro near the disputed fish table,
appellant started to sharpen his bolo while murmuring to himself. Once Corpus turned around
with his back towards appellant, the latter hacked him on the nape which the blow caused Corpus
to collapse and was rushed to a medical clinic. A police investigator went to the clinic to take the
dying declaration of Corpus, who said that it was appellant who stabbed him. Corpus died two
days later.

Issue:
Whether or not Treachery was employed in the case at bar.

Ruling:
Yes. As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is
treachery if such mode of attack was cooly and deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of
depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. It is agreeable that the offense committed
was homicide. He is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as to whether he acted with alevosia when
he attacked the victim. As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from
behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was cooly and deliberately adopted by him with the
purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply,
however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered
by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the victim
(People v. Aguiluz, 207 SCRA 187 [1992]). This is more so, where the assault upon the victim
was preceded by a heated exchange of words between him and the accused (People v. Rillorta,
180 SCRA 102 [1989]). In the case at bench, the assault came in the course of an altercation and
after appellant had sharpened his bolo in full view of the victim. Appellant’s act of sharpening his
bolo can be interpreted as an attempt to frighten the victim so the latter would leave him alone. It
was simply foolhardy for the victim to continue walking to and fro near appellant in a taunting
manner while the latter was sharpening his bolo.
People vs. Juan Ponce Enrile
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand
R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup
attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in
Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police
District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.

Issue:

(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an offense
being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist
in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not
be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does
indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
simple rebellion.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled
to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners
being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to
the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed
by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court
shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

Benjamin Abejuela vs People of the Philippines and CA

G.R. No. 80130 August 19,1991

Facts:
Petitioner Benjamin Abejuela, a businessman, had a savings deposit in Banco Filipino
Tacloban Branch of which his close friend, Glicerio Balo Jr. was an employee. One day, Balo
visited Abejuela to borrow the latter’s passbook because he wanted to deposit checks, purporting
to be proceeds of his father’s insurance policy, in Abejuela’s account. Abejuela told Balo to deposit
the proceeds in his own account but Balo said that he was disqualified being an employee of
Banco Filipino. Abejuela advised Balo to open an account in another bank but Balo insisted
depositing the checks in Abejuela’s so he can facilitate the checks’ immediate encashment and
avail himself of privileges. Because of Balo’s assurances and explanations, he entrusted his
passbook to Balo. Balo’s practice of depositing and withdrawing money using Abejuela’s
passbook continued for quite some time until the bank noticed a discrepancy between the interest
reconciliation balance and subsidiary ledger balance. After a further examination of bank records,
the bank officials concluded that Balo was able to manipulate the ledger by posting fictitious
deposit. They then confronted Balo who admitted having posted the false deposits. Consequently,
Balo and Abejuela were charged for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty as an accomplice in estafa thru falsification of commercial

documents.
Ruling:
Wherefore, In the light of the facts and the evidence on record, the guilt of petitioner
Abejuela has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt for which reason he must be
acquitted.
The prosecution miserably failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Abejuela had
knowledge of the fraudulent scheme of Balo. The most that could be attributed to Abejuela was
his negligence in lending his passbook and his utter gullibility.
 Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal in this case, (Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential
in order that petitioner Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa thru
falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice, there must be
cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. However, the
cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly or intentionally, which
assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of the offense intended to be
committed.

People of the Philippines vs Jose Vera

G.R. No. L-45685, November 16,1937
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was
referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition
for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The
Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed
a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance
of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu
Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation
is only meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a
province, and that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no designated probation officer –
hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.

Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is
unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC
averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the
probation law – if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will appoint a probation
officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed – hence, that makes it violative
of the equal protection clause.

Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it gave
the option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law – however, the
legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executive’s power
to grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect
encroached upon the executive’s power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with
the issues raised by HSBC – ironic because their main stance was the non-applicability of the
probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).

For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the
State as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221,
which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself
had used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now questioning the validity of the
said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:

1. May the State question its own laws?

2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

RULING:

Wherefore,

1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from
questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been
using an invalid law.

2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of the
equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law by
simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation officer,
then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation
Law.

There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to
provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But
nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial
boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their province. This only
creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.

Encroachment of Executive Power

Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to
provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the President’s power to grant pardon.
Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon
is a power of the president to commute penalties.
ALFREDO CHING VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164317 February 6, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner was the Senior Vice-President of Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (PBMI). In 1980, PBMI,
through petitioner, applied with the RCBC (respondent bank) for the issuance of commercial
letters of credit to finance its importation of assorted goods. Respondent bank approved the
application, and irrevocable letters of credit were issued in favor of petitioner. The goods were
purchased and delivered in trust to PBMI. Petitioner signed 13 trust receipts as surety,
acknowledging delivery of the goods. Under the receipts, petitioner agreed to hold the goods in
trust for the said bank, with authority to sell but not by way of conditional sale, pledge or otherwise;
and in case such goods were sold, to turn over the proceeds thereof as soon as received, to apply
against the relative acceptances and payment of other indebtedness to respondent bank. In case
the goods remained unsold within the specified period, the goods were to be returned to
respondent bank without any need of demand. Thus, said "goods, manufactured products or
proceeds thereof, whether in the form of money or bills, receivables, or accounts separate and
capable of identification" were respondent bank’s property. When the trust receipts matured,
petitioner failed to return the goods to respondent bank, or to return their value amounting to
P6,940,280.66 despite demands. Thus, the bank filed a criminal complaint for estafa against
Petitioner.(First Attempt) The City Prosecutor found probable cause for estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, in relation to the Trust Receipts Law. Petitioner appealed the to the
then Minister of Justice which was first dismissed but after MR the Minister granted the motion,
reversing the previous resolution finding probable cause against petitioner. In the meantime, the
Court rendered judgment in Allied Banking Corporation v. Ordoñez, holding that the penal
provision of P.D. No. 115 encompasses any act violative of an obligation covered by the trust
receipt; it is not limited to transactions involving goods which are to be sold (retailed), reshipped,
stored or processed as a component of a product ultimately sold. The Court also ruled that "the
nonpayment of the amount covered by a trust receipt is an act violative of the obligation of the
entrustee to pay."(Second attempt) The respondent bank refiled the criminal complaint for estafa
against petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. The City Prosecutor ruled
that there was no probable cause to charge petitioner with violating P.D. No. 115, as petitioner’s
liability was only civil, not criminal, having signed the trust receipts as surety. Respondent bank
appealed the resolution to the DOJ which granted the petition and reversed the assailed resolution
of the City Prosecutor. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
the CA. CA dismissing the petition for lack of merit. CA ruled that the assailed resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice were correctly issued for the following reasons: (a) petitioner, being the
Senior Vice-President of PBMI and the signatory to the trust receipts, is criminally liable for
violation of P.D. No. 115; (b) the issue raised by the petitioner, on whether he violated P.D. No.
115 by his actuations, had already been resolved and laid to rest in Allied Bank Corporation v.
Ordoñez; and (c) petitioner was estopped from raising the City Prosecutor’s delay in the final
disposition of the preliminary investigation because he failed to do so in the DOJ. ISSUE: WON
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against
the petitioner for violation of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code,
in relation to P.D. No. 115.
HELD:

Wherefore, the petition was denied. The Court ruled that the arguments advanced in support of
the petition are not persuasive enough to justify the desired conclusion that respondent Secretary
of Justice gravely abused its discretion in coming out with his assailed Resolutions. Petitioner
posits that, except for his being the Senior Vice-President of the PBMI, there is no iota of evidence
that he was a participes crimines in violating the trust receipts sued upon; and that his liability, if
at all, is purely civil because he signed the said trust receipts merely as a xxx surety and not as
the entrustee. Petitioner’s being a Senior Vice-President of the Philippine Blooming Mills does not
exculpate him from any liability. Petitioner’s responsibility as the corporate official of PBM who
received the goods in trust is premised on Section 13 of P.D. No. 115, which provides: Section
13. Penalty Clause. The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods,
documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the
entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or instruments if
they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute
the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions of Article Three hundred and fifteen,
paragraph one (b) of Act Numbered Three thousand eight hundred and fifteen, as amended,
otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. If the violation or offense is committed by a
corporation, partnership, association or other juridical entities, the penalty provided for in this
Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons
therein responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal
offense. Petitioner having participated in the negotiations for the trust receipts and having
received the goods for PBM, it was inevitable that the petitioner is the proper corporate officer to
be proceeded against by virtue of the PBM’s violation of P.D. No. 115.Inthecase at bar, the
transaction between petitioner and respondent bank falls under the trust receipt transactions
envisaged in P.D. No. 115. Respondent bank imported the goods and entrusted the same to PBMI
under the trust receipts signed by petitioner, as entrustee, with the bank as entruster. It must be
stressed that P.D. No. 115 is a declaration by legislative authority that, as a matter of public policy,
the failure of person to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt
or to return said goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions. The Court likewise rules that the issue of whether P.D. No. 115 encompasses
transactions involving goods procured as a component of a product ultimately sold has been
resolved in the affirmative in Allied Banking Corporation v. Ordoñez. The law applies to goods
used by the entrustee in the operation of its machineries and equipment. The nonpayment of the
amount covered by the trust receipts or the non-return of the goods covered by the receipts, if not
sold or otherwise not disposed of, violate the entrustee’s obligation to pay the amount or to return
the goods to the entruster. The Court rules that although petitioner signed the trust receipts merely
as Senior Vice-President of PBMI and had no physical possession of the goods, he cannot avoid
prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 115.The crime defined in P.D. No. 115 is malum prohibitum
but is classified as estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, or estafa
with abuse of confidence. It may be committed by a corporation or other juridical entity or by
natural persons. Though the entrustee is a corporation, nevertheless, the law specifically makes
the officers, employees or other officers or persons responsible for the offense, without prejudice
to the civil liabilities of such corporation and/or board of directors, officers, or other officials or
employees responsible for the offense. The rationale is that such officers or employees are vested
with the authority and responsibility to devise means necessary to ensure compliance with the
law and, if they fail to do so, are held criminally accountable; thus, they have a responsible share
in the violations of the law. If the crime is committed by a corporation or other juridical entity, the
directors, officers, employees or other officers thereof responsible for the offense shall be charged
and penalized for the crime, precisely because of the nature of the crime and the penalty therefor.
A corporation cannot be arrested and imprisoned; hence, cannot be penalized for a crime
punishable by imprisonment. However, a corporation may be charged and prosecuted for a crime
if the imposable penalty is fine. Even if the statute prescribes both fine and imprisonment as
penalty, a corporation may be prosecuted and, if found guilty, may be fined. A crime is the doing
of that which the penal code forbids to be done, or omitting to do what it commands. A necessary
part of the definition of every crime is the designation of the author of the crime upon whom the
penalty is to be inflicted. When a criminal statute designates an act of a corporation or a crime
and prescribes punishment therefor, it creates a criminal offense which, otherwise, would not exist
and such can be committed only by the corporation. But when a penal statute does not expressly
apply to corporations, it does not create an offense for which a corporation may be punished. On
the other hand, if the State, by statute, defines a crime that may be committed by a corporation
but prescribes the penalty therefor to be suffered by the officers, directors, or employees of such
corporation or other persons responsible for the offense, only such individuals will suffer such
penalty. Corporate officers or employees, through whose act, default or omission the corporation
commits a crime, are themselves individually guilty of the crime. The principle applies whether or
not the crime requires the consciousness of wrongdoing. It applies to those corporate agents who
themselves commit the crime and to those, who, by virtue of their managerial positions or other
similar relation to the corporation, could be deemed responsible for its commission, if by virtue of
their relationship to the corporation, they had the power to prevent the act. Moreover, all parties
active in promoting a crime, whether agents or not, are principals. Whether such officers or
employees are benefited by their delictual acts is not a touchstone of their criminal liability. Benefit
is not an operative fact. In this case, petitioner signed the trust receipts in question. He cannot,
thus, hide behind the cloak of the separate corporate personality of PBMI. In the words of Chief
Justice Earl Warren, a corporate officer cannot protect himself behind a corporation where he is
the actual, present and efficient actor

People of the Philippines vs Feliciano Muñoz

G.R. No. L-38969 February 9, 1989

Facts: On June 30, 1972 in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Feliciano Muñoz,
Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men, went
out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who had complained of having been victimized
by cattle rustlers. Having found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each
one of them in cold blood without further ado and without mercy. Mauro Bulatao was shot
in the mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter looked on in horror. Alejandro
Bulatao was forced to lie down on the ground and then shot twice, also in the head, before
his terrified wife and son. Aquilino Bulatao, who was only sixteen years old, was kicked
in the head until he bled before he too had his brains blown out. The four identified
accused were convicted for the crime of murder qualified by treachery. The penalty for
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987
Constitution which provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. It further provides that neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:

Whether or not Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, abolish the death
penalty.

Ruling:

A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein
which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says
that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough.
And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is
plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of
the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. Thus, Article III, Section 19(l) does not
change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it
to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains
unchanged.

People vs. Latupan

G.R. Nos. 112453-56 June 28, 2001

Fact:

At the arraignment on May 25, 1993, accused Latupan pleaded not guilty to the charge
of frustrated murder. During the pre-trial conference of the four cases, accused offered to
change his plea of not guilty to guilty of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated
murder. The prosecution did not interpose any objection. Thus, on July 20, the trial court
re-arraigned the accused. He withdrew his plea of not guilty and instead pleaded guilty to
the single offense of multiple murder with multiple frustrated murder. The facts are as
follows: On April 29, 1991, accused Latupan went to the house of Ceferino Dagulo with
the intent to kill but later on told Ceferino to bring him to the authorities and tried to give
the knife to Ceferino. The latter refused to touch the knife and told accused to go to the
authorities by himself. Hearing this advice, accused ran away. Meanwhile, the house of
Emy Asuncion was 100 meters from Ceferino’s house. At around the same time of the
same day, Emy found his wife, Lilia, dead on the ground with several stab wounds on her
body and his one-year old son, Leo, was lying on top of Lilia. He ran upstairs and saw
Jose wounded. He asked who stabbed him, and he replied “Uncle Jerry” then died.

Issue:

Whether or not trial court erred in convicting Latupan of the complex crime of double
murder
Ruling:

The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of the complex crime of double
murder and separate offenses of serious physical injuries. Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides: “When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
or when an offense is necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applies in its maximum period.” The
instant case does not fall under any of the two mentioned instances when a complex
crime is committed. Thus, accused-appellant is liable for two separate counts of murder
and separate counts of physical injuries.