541067

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JOU0010.1177/1464884914541067JournalismPost

Article

Journalism

Scientific objectivity in
1­–20
© The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/1464884914541067
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objectivity, assess its

attainability, and rate its
desirability

Senja Post
University of Koblenz-Landau, Germany

Abstract
Journalism critics have repeatedly proposed that journalists adopt scientific standards
of objectivity. A comparative survey of 134 German journalists (34%) and 163
academics (33%) from different subject areas was conducted to investigate to what
degree scientific criteria of objectivity resonate in journalists’ attitudes toward and
understandings of objectivity. Results show that journalists and academics equally think
that objectivity is attainable and desirable. Yet members of both professions dealing
with cultural or historical subjects consider it less desirable than members dealing
with social or natural scientific subjects. Journalists and academics define objectivity
in different terms. Journalists think objectivity demands ‘trying to let the facts speak
for themselves’, and academics think it requires systematic methods and transparent
accounts. In others words, respondents’ attitudes toward objectivity depend on the
subjects they deal with, while their understandings of objectivity depend on their
professional belonging.

Keywords
Journalism studies, journalistic ethics, journalistic practice, objectivity in journalism,
objectivity in science, science communication, sociology of knowledge, survey
research

Corresponding author:
Senja Post, Department of Communication Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Landau D-76829,
Germany.
Email: postsenja@uni-landau.de

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2 Journalism 

Journalism and scientific objectivity

Scientific objectivity has repeatedly been regarded as a model for journalists to follow.
For the first time, such normative comparisons between journalists and scientists were
prominent in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when scientists sought objectivity by
observing and depicting the objects of their inquiries in a quasi-mechanical way (Daston
and Galison, 2007: 115–190). Although the US press was still widely partisan before the
1920s (Schudson, 1978: 155–159; Streckfuss, 1990; Vos, 2012), influential publishers
proposed that journalists follow the scientific ideal to give mechanical-like accounts of
reality that were true to the given facts (Schiller, 1979: 49; Vos, 2012). When objectivity
was codified in journalistic codes of ethics and handbooks in the 1920s (Schudson, 1978:
121–144, 2001; Streckfuss, 1990; Vos, 2012), many sources envisioned journalists work-
ing like scientists, ‘registering’ or ‘weighing’ (Vos, 2012: 444) the news (Schiller, 1979:
56; Schudson, 2001: 161–162; Streckfuss, 1990: 975).
From the 1940s, US journalists increasingly criticized the ideal of factual objectivity
as they found it more important to deliver interpretations of the facts they reported
(Schudson, 1978: 134–143; Weaver and McCombs, 1980: 487–488). As a consequence,
journalism critics again proposed scientists as a model for journalists. By that time, the
scientific concept of objectivity had changed. Karl Popper (1965 [1959]: 93–111) had
argued influentially that investigators could neither observe nor depict any ‘given’ facts
because human observations and their representations were necessarily guided by pre-
conceptions of reality. Instead, Popper (1965 [1959]: 31–34) suggested checking whether
investigators’ presuppositions corresponded with reality. Following this, it became cru-
cial for scientists to disclose their methods so that everybody could reproduce their tests
of hypotheses under the same or similar conditions (Popper (1965 [1959]: 31–34).
When journalists increasingly interpreted the facts they reported, journalism critics
pointed out that journalists generalize facts or connect them without checking the valid-
ity of their assertions. Proposing that journalists put their assertions on representative
empirical bases, test the validity of their claims in systematic ways (Dennis, 1990;
Donsbach, 2004: 151–152; Meyer, 1973: 8; Tankard, 1976: 60–71), and make their
methods transparent (e.g. Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007: 69), they drew on the new sci-
entific standards of objectivity.
Proposing that journalists use scientific criteria of objectivity, critics imply that such
criteria would enhance the quality of journalistic reporting. They argue that, like scien-
tists, journalists seek to describe and explain reality and can thus borrow from the stand-
ards and practices scientists have developed over centuries. Although critics have
repeatedly put forth these ideas, little is known about how they resonate in practicing
journalists’ attitudes toward and understandings of objectivity. Do journalists accept sci-
entific criteria of objectivity and do they think that objectivity is appropriate for their
goals? Is the scientific concept of objectivity adequate to the job journalists aim to ful-
fill? The goal of this article is to shed light on these knowledge gaps for the case of
German journalists and academics. It seeks to investigate journalists’ and academics’
attitudes toward and understandings of objectivity and to answer to what degree their
concepts of objectivity converge. The goal is, essentially, to test whether the proposition
that journalists use scientific criteria of objectivity is practical or reasonable with respect

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to journalists’ goals and working conditions. In the following, the literature will be
reviewed to answer what is known about (1) the acceptance of objectivity among scien-
tists and German journalists and (2) journalists’ and academics’ understandings of objec-
tivity. Based on this, the research questions of this study will be derived.

Literature review
Acceptance of objectivity
The pursuit of objectivity implies that it is attainable and desirable. Yet these assumptions
are debated. Some challenge the idea of an external reality existing independently of the
subjects perceiving and describing it. In their view, scientific facts and journalistic informa-
tion cannot be objective as they do not reflect reality but the social and cognitive conditions
underlying them (for science: for example, Kuhn, 1967; Polanyi, 1964 [1946]; for journal-
ism: for example, Tuchman, 1978; Fishman, 1978; Glasser, 1984; Merrill, 1990). Others
question that objectivity is desirable because it reinforces social structures by favoring
established modes of thinking or inhibits specific insights or conclusions (for science: for
example, Code, 1991: 323–324; for journalism: cf. Schudson, 1978: 160; Glasser, 1984;
McQuail, 1992: 188; Lichtenberg, 2000: 249). This is why some claim that scientists or
journalists rather ought to empathize with people (cf. Merton, 1972; Bell, 1998), partici-
pate in social debates, or criticize social grievances (for science: for example, Habermas,
1979; for journalism: Glasser, 1984) than seek to be objective. Others yet defend objectiv-
ity. Although many concede that it may not be fully attainable, they suggest pursuing it as
a ‘regulative idea’ (for science: Popper, 1965 [1959]: 89; for journalism: Lichtenberg,
2000: 249). They argue that even if the truth may not be captured perfectly, it can still be
approximated. In this view, it is possible to distinguish more from less appropriate accounts
of reality (Lichtenberg, 2000: 241; Popper, 1965 [1959]: 49–50).
While there is no empirical data on how these epistemic positions are distributed
among practicing academics, several surveys indicate that most journalists in Germany
and the United States commit themselves to objectivity. In a survey of 50 leading editors
at 50 US newspapers in the 1970s, Boyer (1981) found that about two-thirds believed
objectivity was more or less attainable. More than 10 years later, Donsbach and Klett
(1993) showed that almost all US journalists as well as four in five German journalists
believed that objectivity was ‘very important’. In addition, findings on their self-image
show that most German journalists consider themselves ‘a neutral reporter of events’
(Köcher, 1986: 54–55; Schönbach et al., 1998: 222–224). Most of them want to ‘get
information to the public neutrally and precisely’ and to ‘present reality as it is’
(Weischenberg et al., 1998: 242–246, 2006: 279).
Some journalists, however, seem to be skeptical about objectivity. In the 1970s, about
one-third of the leading editors at 50 leading US newspapers thought that ‘objectivity is
in a pure sense unattainable – a myth’ and that ‘the obsession with objectivity is itself a
distortion of reality’ (Boyer, 1981). There are no similar data on German journalists. Yet
data on their self-image show that most German journalists consider themselves ‘a
spokesperson for the underdog’ (Köcher, 1986: 55; Schönbach et al., 1998: 223;
Weischenberg et al., 1998: 242–246) although this share seems to have decreased recently

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4 Journalism 

(Weischenberg et al., 2006: 279). In addition, most journalists aim at ‘taking up griev-
ances’ (Köcher, 1986: 55; Schönbach et al., 1998: 223) or want to ‘criticize bad states of
affairs’ (Weischenberg et al., 1998: 242–246, 2006: 279). Thus, presumptively, many
journalists do not consider objectivity an exclusive goal but one that may collide with
alternative ideals in day-to-day practice.

Criteria of objectivity
Telling from ethical and methodological guidelines, one can assume that the commonly
accepted scientific meaning of objectivity corresponds to Popper’s theory of knowledge,
his critical rationalism. One of its premises is the methodological, inter-subjective test
of hypotheses (Anderson, 2008: 3351). Many authors agree that in journalism, objectiv-
ity requires factuality and accuracy (Merrill, 1990; Westerstahl, 1983: 406; cp. McQuail,
1992: 185). But while some apply the need for accuracy to factual statements (cf.
Ekstrom, 2002), some extend it to relational statements (Meyer, 1973; Tankard, 1976).
They argue that as journalists frequently start their investigations with concrete assump-
tions (Stocking and LaMarca, 1990), they should test them in a scientific fashion (Dennis,
1990; Donsbach, 2004: 151–152; Meyer, 1973: 8; Tankard, 1976: 60–71). Some authors
have proposed that journalists also base their presentation of sources’ views on scientific
methods by selecting them in proportion to their distribution in society (Meyer, 1973:
115–245; Rothman and Lichter, 1987; Snyderman and Rothman, 1990; Tankard, 1976:
53–54; Weaver and McCombs, 1980: 489–490).
Yet some authors have pointed at differing working conditions. They argue that scien-
tists deal with repetitive, foreseeable occurrences aiming at discovering regularities,
whereas journalists deal with singular occurrences aiming at giving timely cross-cut sec-
tions of day-to-day affairs (Lippmann, 1997 [1922]: 215–217; Park, 1940). These differ-
ences raise doubts about the practicability of scientific criteria of objectivity in journalism
– especially about journalists’ capabilities to test assumptions. Some sources suggest
indeed that, with respect to objectivity, journalists are more concerned about the truth of
their facts than about the validity of their assumptions (cf. Tankard, 1976; Merrill, 1990;
Ekstrom, 2002). Little support for the scientific criteria of objectivity was also found in
a survey of 175 German newspaper editors in the early 2000s. Only 48 percent of them
thought objectivity required that ‘the content of a news report must be considered true by
several observers of the reported events’ (Knirsch, 2005: 72–76). Instead, almost all
agreed that an objective ‘news report contains all relevant information’ and that ‘reports
on controversies put equal weight on the views of both sides’ (Knirsch, 2005: 72–76).
Wide support for the latter had already been documented in the 1990s. At that time, a
great majority of the German journalists also believed that objectivity required going
‘beyond the statements of the contending sides to the hard facts of a political dispute’
(Donsbach and Klett, 1993: 65).

Assumptions and research questions

The goal of this article is to determine journalists’ and academics’ attitudes toward and
understandings of objectivity. Specifically, it seeks to answer three research questions:

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1. To what degree do academics and journalists consider objectivity attainable?

As several authors have pointed out, academics and journalists work in different condi-
tions and may thus consider objectivity attainable to different degrees. Scientists assert a
high degree of control over the objects of their inquiry as they deal with repetitive inci-
dents. In experimental research, they even induce certain incidents to occur. For these
reasons, they can determine causal relationships relatively unambiguously. Journalists,
as well as scholars from the humanities, by contrast, have no control over the occurrence
they investigate. They mostly deal with singular, unique incidents. Most often, they
reconstruct certain developments or occurrences from hindsight. This is why they can
determine causal relationships only by making occurrences and the developments that
led to them plausible. For these reasons one, can assume that

a. Academics are more convinced that objectivity is attainable than journalists

and that
b. Professionals dealing with (natural) scientific phenomena are more con-
vinced that objectivity is attainable than professionals dealing with social
phenomena, who, in turn, are more convinced that objectivity is attainable
than professionals dealing with historical or cultural phenomena.

Journalists and academics may think that objectivity is more or less attainable but still
think that it is undesirable. This study seeks to clarify.

2. To what degree do academics and journalists consider objectivity an appropriate

goal?

As epistemological discussions of objectivity have shown, the pursuit of objectivity may

have certain advantages and disadvantages, depending on the subject and purpose of an
inquiry. As was argued, the strength of objectivity lies in its potential to reveal inter-
subjective, that is, more or less indisputable aspects of reality. Its limitation is a conse-
quence of this. The realm of objective knowledge excludes subjective insights such as
those that follow from empathy or value judgments. It seems plausible that the limita-
tions of objectivity are particularly relevant when dealing with issues in a social context,
which is why it is assumed that

a. Academics consider the advantages of objectivity more relevant than jour-

nalists, while journalists consider the limitations of objectivity more relevant
than academics and that
b. Professionals dealing with natural (scientific) phenomena consider the
advantages of objectivity more relevant and its limitations less relevant than
professionals dealing with social or cultural subjects.

In the course of the 20th century, philosophers of knowledge have proposed different
criteria of objectivity. Around 1900, philosophers believed that objectivity was about
determining the given facts as they were. Karl Popper later argued that objectivity was

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6 Journalism 

about testing one’s assumptions in a way that everybody can reproduce the outcome
under the same or similar conditions. Although historical studies show that journalists
have adopted the scientific ideal of factual objectivity in the early 20th century, survey
results suggest that they have not adopted the two requirements of objectivity that follow
from Popper’s philosophy of knowledge – systematic and transparent methods that allow
everybody to reproduce the results in question. This study asks the following question:

3. How do journalists and academics think they can attain objectivity?

In particular, it is assumed that

a. Journalists think more than academics that objectivity is about being exact
about the facts, while
b. Academics think more than journalists that objectivity is about applying sys-
tematic methods and making them transparent.

Method
The inquiry is based on a comparative survey of journalists and academics fulfilling two
criteria. First, subjects with a high norm-awareness were sought. They were assumed to
work in leading positions in the most acknowledged and influential newsrooms or aca-
demic institutes. Journalists were selected from the most widely circulated German daily
newspapers (>100,000). Academics were selected from the most renowned research
departments according to the German university ranking. The selection of journalists
was restricted to newspapers to ensure that the members of both professions present their
findings primarily in print. Second, participants dealing with comparable subjects were
sought, that is, cultural, natural, and social phenomena. Journalists were recruited from
the arts and culture, the science, politics, and economics sections. Academics were
selected from the humanities, the natural sciences, and social sciences sections.
The subjects were selected in two steps. First, the newspapers and academic depart-
ments were identified. Based on a list compiling the circulations of all German news-
papers (Schütz, 2009), 63 dailies were selected. Based on the German university
ranking, the leading departments of classical subjects within each subject area were
identified.1 Second, the subjects were recruited. The journalists were selected propor-
tionally to the newspapers’ circulations. For each newsroom and section, they were
drawn randomly from a compilation of the leading German editors (Zimpel, 2010).
The academics were selected randomly from the websites of the most renowned aca-
demic institutes. Only full professors were recruited. Overall, 404 journalists were
selected evenly from the science, politics, economics, and culture sections, and 500
academics were selected, 150 each from the natural sciences and humanities and 200
from the social sciences.2
In February 2011, the journalists and academics were sent a standardized paper-and-
pencil questionnaire. After 1 month each, they were sent two more requests to partici-
pate. The questionnaire contained questions on the job conditions, the professional
goals, objectivity, and other professional norms (e.g. accuracy). For both professions,

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the questionnaires were nearly identical. They differed only in naming different profes-
sions (e.g. journalism vs science) and using different job-related terms (e.g. information
vs data).
Of the 404 journalists addressed, 14 were ineligible. Of the 390 eligible ones, 134 (34%)
participated. And 127 journalists were sent a postcard that was attached to the question-
naire to confirm their participation. The return rate was highest among political editors
(44%), second among art/culture (34%) and economics editors (31%), and weakest among
science editors (26%). Of the 500 academics contacted, three were ineligible. Of the 497
eligible ones, 163 (33%) participated and 147 confirmed their participation. The return rate
was highest among natural scientists (37%), second among scholars from the humanities
(32%), and weakest among social scientists (26%). On average, the participating journal-
ists are 47 years old. In all, 72 percent are male and 27 percent female.3 The academics have
an average age of 51 years; 74 percent of them are male and 25 percent are female.
In the sample, the journalists and academics from different subfields are nearly evenly
distributed. Of the participating journalists, 19 percent are from the science, 33 percent
from the politics, 23 percent from the economics, and 25 percent from the culture sec-
tions. Thus, the science editors are slightly underrepresented, and the politics editors
slightly overrepresented. Of the academics, 34 percent work in the natural sciences, 32
percent in the social sciences, and 29 percent in the humanities. In all, 4 percent did not
mention their area of research.
In the following, the views of journalists and academics will be contrasted in mean
comparisons. In addition, professionals dealing with comparable subjects will be com-
pared, that is, science editors will be contrasted with natural scientists, politics and
economics editors with social scientists, and culture editors with scholars from the
humanities.

Results
Attainability of objectivity
It was assumed that academics are more convinced than journalists that objectivity is
attainable. In order to test this, respondents were asked to assess the possibilities of being
objective in several aspects of their work.4 The question was, ‘How objective can a jour-
nalist in your editorial section (academic in you subject) be in the following steps of their
work?’ Respondents were asked to rate each work step on a 5-point scale from −2 (‘can
impossibly be objective’) to +2 (‘can totally be objective’). When ‘collecting singular
facts’, journalists and academics equally think that objectivity is attainable (Table 1).
Without any significant difference, the members of both professions are a bit more skep-
tical about being objective when ‘inferring states of affairs from singular facts’. Asked
about the possibility of being objective when ‘determining the causes’ or ‘assessing the
consequences’ of something, their answers differ. As assumed, journalists have more
doubts about the feasibility of objectivity when determining causes and consequences
than academics.5
It was further assumed that professionals dealing with natural scientific subjects are
more convinced that objectivity is attainable than professionals dealing with social or

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 Table 1.  Practicability of objectivity in several steps in journalists’ and scientists’ work.
Question: ‘How objective can a journalist in your section (academic in your subject) be in the following work steps?’ Ratings on a 5-point scale
from −2 (‘one cannot possibly be objective’) to +2 (‘one can be totally objective’).

Mean ratings of respondents (standard deviations)

‘How objective can a journalist Journalists writing about … Academics from the …
in your section (an academic
in your subject) be when  Science Politics/ Arts/ Total Natural Social Humanities Total One-factor
economy culture sciences sciences ANOVA
… collecting singular facts?’ 1.52 1.57 1.45 1.53 1.50 1.43 1.32 1.43 F = 0.653; df = 5;
(1.046) (0.701) (0.686) (0.771) (1.019) (0.842) (0.809) (0.911) ns
… inferring states of affairs 0.708 0.689 0.778 0.712 1.04 1.06 0.658 0.930 F = 1.893; df = 5;
from singular facts?’ (1.160) (1.006) (0.801) (0.990) (0.885) (0.845) (0.966) (0.909) ns
… determining the causes of 0.875 0.595 0.679 0.667 1.19 1.10 0.622 1.001 F = 4.525; df = 5;
some state of affairs?’ (0.992) (0.843) (0.863) (0.876) (0.658) (0.963) (0.861) (0.857) p < .005
… assessing the consequences 0.667 0.164 0.310 0.294 0.615 0.796 0.184 0.559 F = 3.678; df = 5;
of events or developments?’ (0.817) (1.080) (0.891) (1.004) (0.771) (0.935) (1.062) (0.934) p < .005

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Bases: 24 journalists from the science, 73–75 journalists from the politics/economics, and 26–28 journalists from the arts/culture sections; 52 natural scientists,
47–49 social scientists, and 32–37 scholars from the humanities – all of whom consider objectivity more or less attainable and worthwhile
8 Journalism 
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cultural subjects. The results partly confirm this. Professionals dealing with natural sci-
entific subjects are more convinced that objectivity is possible when determining causes
and consequences than professionals dealing with cultural subjects. But there is a remark-
able contrast between academics and editors dealing with social subjects. Social scien-
tists are almost as convinced that causes and effects can be determined objectively as
natural scientists. Politics and economics editors, by contrast, doubt that causes and con-
sequences can be determined objectively almost as much as culture editors. This differ-
ence may be due to different working conditions. Social scientists deal with recurring
incidents. For this reason, they may be able to control the subjects of their investigation
and determine causes and consequences relatively unambiguously. Political and eco-
nomics editors, by contrast, usually deal with unique occurrences and can often only
speculate about causal relationships in hindsight. This may explain their different degrees
of skepticism toward the possibilities to be objective when determining causes and
consequences.

Desirability of objectivity
It was assumed that academics consider the advantages of objectivity more and the limi-
tations of objectivity less relevant than journalists. To test this, they were asked, ‘One can
argue for or against objectivity for several reason. How relevant are the following rea-
sons for your work?’ Respondents were asked to rate two arguments for and three argu-
ments against objectivity on a scale from −2 (‘irrelevant for my work’) to +2 (‘relevant
for my work’). The journalists and academics are about equally convinced that the pur-
suit of objectivity has epistemic advantages. They think that by seeking objectivity, ‘one
has a good chance of giving a truthful account of particular states of affairs and that ‘one
obtains results one can rely on’ (Table 2). As assumed, journalists and academics dealing
with cultural phenomena consider these arguments less relevant than professionals deal-
ing with natural or social phenomena.
The journalists and academics consider the limitations of objectivity similarly irrel-
evant. Academics think a little more than journalists that it is irrelevant that the pursuit
of objectivity makes it difficult to ‘empathize with those affected by human or social
problems’.6 They equally think that it is irrelevant that ‘striving for objectivity, one
easily overlooks deeper issues behind the facts’ and makes it impossible ‘to declare
oneself against objectionable views’. As assumed, there are differences between pro-
fessionals dealing with different subjects. Professionals who deal with cultural phe-
nomena consider it more relevant than professionals who deal with social or natural
scientific phenomena that objectivity does not allow them to go beyond the facts or to
voice their opinions against objectionable views. When it comes to the lack of empa-
thy, there is an unexpected difference between natural scientists and science journal-
ists. Natural scientists consider the lack of empathy almost completely irrelevant,
whereas the science journalists think much less so. This may be due to the fact that in
their research, natural scientists are totally detached from social or individual human
problems. Science journalists, by contrast, report natural scientific findings and pre-
sumably seek to point out their social significance – for example, for the environment
and medical cures.

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 Table 2.  Relevance of arguments for and against objectivity.
Question: ‘There are a number of reasons arguing for or against the pursuit of objectivity. How relevant are the following reasons for you work?’
Ratings on a 5-point scale from −2 (‘irrelevant for my work’) to +2 (‘relevant for my work’).

Mean ratings of respondents (standard deviations)

Journalists writing about … Academics from the … One-factor

ANOVA
  Science Politics / Arts/ Total Natural Social Humanities Total
economy culture sciences sciences
‘Trying to be objective, one has 1.23 1.34 0.813 1.19 1.34 1.39 0.750 1.16 F = 4.682;
a good chance of giving truthful (0.813) (0.708) (1.120) (0.867) (0.783) (0.640) (1.149) (0.949) df = 5; p < .001
accounts of particular states of
affairs.’
‘Pursuing objectivity, one obtains 1.08 0.877 0.303 0.769 1.19 2.00 0.262 0.820 F = 6.066;
results one can rely on.’ (0.881) (0.957) (1.104) (1.016) (0.973) (1.021) (1.270) (1.159) df = 5; p < .001
‘Keeping objective distance, it –0.014 –0.760 –0.364 –0.534 –1.56 –0.878 0.310 –0.980 F = 9.187;
is hard to empathize with those (1.147) (1.025) (1.319) (1.152) (0.898) (1.201) (1.473) (1.283) df = 5; p < .001
affected by human or social
problems.’
‘Seeking objectivity, one easily –0.783 –1.08 –0.375 –0.850 –1.18 –0.612 –0.415 –0.767 F = 4.154;
overlooks deeper issues behind (1.204) (0.868) (1.338) (1.099) (1.107) (1.204) (1.360) (1.255) df = 5; p < .005

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the facts.’
‘Always seeking objectivity, one –0.652 –0.836 0.062 –0.578 –1.24 –1.00 –0.80 –1.04 F = 4.956;
cannot declare oneself against (1.526) (1.118) (1.435) (1.326) (1.069) (1.123) (1.203) (1.135) df = 5; p < .001
objectionable views.’

Bases: 22–24 journalists from the science, 72–74 journalists from the politics/economics, and 32–33 journalists from the culture/arts sections; 51–55 natural scien-
tists, 47–49 social scientists, and 40–42 scholars form the humanities.
10 Journalism 
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Table 3.  Criteria of objectivity.

Question: ‘And, in your opinion, what does one have to do to be objective?’ Ratings on a 5-point scale from −2 (‘does not apply at all’) to 2
(‘totally applies’). Selected rules.

Mean ratings (standard deviations)

‘One needs to … Journalists writing about … Academics from …

  Science Politics/ Arts/ Total Natural Social Humanities Total One-factor.

economy culture Science Science ANOVAa
… present findings in a way 1.21 1.25 1.28 1.25 1.76 1.55 1.54 1.61 F = 3.057;
that others can understand (1.021) (0.931) (0.702) (0.896) (0.612) (0.914) (0.897) (0.817) df = 5; p < .05
how they were obtained.’
… consistently follow a 0.391 0.467 0.621 0.488 1.25 1.49 1.16 1.29 F = 10.048;
systematic method in an (0.722) (1.057) (0.979) (0.983) (1.022) (0.938) (0.973) (1.005) df = 5; p < .001
investigation.’
… try to let the facts speak 1.21 1.12 0.966 1.10 0.873 0.333 0.158 0.442 F = 7.123;
for themselves.’ (0.977) (0.821) (0.944) (0.877) (1.019) (1.243) (1.285) (1.244) df = 5; p < .001

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Bases: 22–24 science editors, 74–75 politics/economics, and 28 culture and arts editors; 54–55 natural scientists, 48–49 social scientists, and 36–39 scholars from
the humanities, all surveyed in 2011.
11
12 Journalism 

Criteria of objectivity
According to the premises of Popper’s critical rationalism, objectivity is a matter of
method demanding that investigators test their assumptions in a systematic and transpar-
ent way. According to a more fact-centered view, it is a matter of attitude demanding that
investigators register the supposedly ‘given’ facts. It was assumed that academics con-
sider systematic and transparent methods more a requirement of objectivity than journal-
ists. Furthermore, it was assumed that journalists accept transmitting the mere facts more
a requirement of objectivity than academics. In order to test this they were asked, ‘What
does one have to do to be objective?’ The journalists and academics were asked to rate to
what degree certain practical rules apply to their understandings of objectivity on a
5-point scale from −2 (‘does not apply at all’) to +2 (‘totally applies’).
Scientists and scholars typically agree with the critical rational criteria of objectivity,
while journalists have a rather fact-centered definition of it. There is almost no variation
within the two professional groups. Academics consider the demands that ‘one needs to
present findings in a way that others can understand how they were obtained’ and that
‘one needs to follow a systematic method consistently in an investigation’, much more
in line with objectivity than journalists (Table 3).7 Journalists, by contrast, think much
more than academics that one must ‘try to let the facts speak for themselves’ to be
objective.8

Summary
Journalists’ and academics’ understandings of objectivity largely depend on their profes-
sion. Irrespective of the subjects they deal with, journalists consider objectivity a matter
of getting the facts rights, while academics consider it a matter of applying systematic
methods and making them transparent. Journalists’ and academics’ attitudes toward
objectivity, by contrast, largely depend on the subjects they deal with. To summarize
their attitudes toward objectivity, three indices were calculated.9
The belief in the attainability of objectivity when making inferences includes respond-
ents’ ratings of the feasibility of objectivity when drawing conclusions, determining
causes, and assessing consequences. With a high internal consistency (Cronbach’s
( = .744) its values range between (6 and +6. Higher values indicate that respondents
consider objectivity feasible. As assumed, academics (x = 2.48) think a little more than
journalists ( x = 1.73) that objective inferences are feasible.10 Furthermore, as assumed,
professionals dealing with natural scientific phenomena (academics: x = 2.85 ; journal-
ists: x = 2.25 ) are more convinced that objective inferences are possible than profes-
sionals dealing with cultural phenomena (academics: x = 1.43 ; journalists: x = 2.04 ).
There is a striking contrast, however, between journalists and academics dealing with
social subjects. Among the academics, the social scientists are most convinced that
objective inferences are feasible ( x = 2.94) . Among the journalists, the politics and eco-
nomics editors are least convinced that objective inferences are feasible ( x = 1.45) . As
was presumed before, the different levels of control social scientists and journalists from
the economics or politics section have of the objects of their inquiries may be an explana-
tion for this contrast.

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Post 13

The perceived relevance of objectivity as a means to ensure reliability includes

respondents’ ratings of the arguments that the pursuit of objectivity facilitates reliable
and truthful claims. With a sufficient internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .674), its val-
ues range between −4 and +4. High values indicate that respondents consider it relevant.
Academics ( x = 1.97) and journalists ( x = 1.95) perceive objectivity as a means to
ensure reliability equally relevant. As assumed, professionals dealing with natural scien-
tific subjects consider it most relevant (academics: x = 2.53 ; journalists: x = 2.36 ),
followed by professionals dealing with social subjects (academics: x = 2.39 ; journal-
ists: x = 2.21 ), followed by professionals dealing with cultural subjects (academics:
x = 0.98 ; journalists: x = 1.06 ). To what degree respondents appreciate objectivity as a
means to ensure reliability thus depends on the subjects they deal with and not on their
professional belongings. The results of a two-factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA)
make this clear (factor professional belonging: F = 0.787,; not significant (ns); factor
2
subjects area: F = 10.579; p < .001; and ηpart  = .144).11
The perceived relevance of objectivity limiting important insights includes respond-
ents’ ratings of the arguments that the pursuit of objectivity inhibits empathy, disallows
opinioned claims, and conceals what goes on behind the facts. With a sufficient internal
consistency (Cronbach’s α= .668), its values range between −6 and +6. High values indi-
cate that respondents consider the limitations of objectivity relevant. As assumed, jour-
nalists consider them more relevant ( x = −1.91) than academics ( x = −2.84) .12 In both
groups, professionals dealing with culture consider the shortcomings of objectivity most
relevant (academics: x = −1.60 ; journalists: x = 0.63 ). Among the academics, the
natural scientists consider the shortcomings of objectivity least ( x = −4.04) , the social
scientists more relevant ( x = −2.57) . Among the journalists, the politics and economics
editors consider the shortcomings of objectivity least ( x = −2.62) , the science editors
more relevant ( x = −1.50) . As mentioned, the striking contrast between the natural sci-
entists and the science editors may be due to the fact that natural scientists are not con-
cerned with social issues, while science editors try to give natural scientific findings a
social meaning.
Journalists’ and academics’ understandings of and attitudes toward objectivity can be
clearly distinguished by two criteria. Figure 1 illustrates this. Their understandings of
objectivity largely depend on their profession. Regardless of their subject areas, academ-
ics agree that objectivity requires systematic methods, while the journalists from all edi-
torial sections have more doubts about that. Their attitudes toward objectivity, by
contrast, largely depend on the subjects they deal with. Regardless of their profession,
professionals dealing with cultural phenomena appreciate the strength of objectivity – its
function as a means to ensure reliability – least. Those dealing with social phenomena
appreciate the strength of objectivity more and those dealing with natural scientific sub-
jects appreciate it most.

Discussion
Critics of journalism have repeatedly proposed that journalists borrow from the scientific
concept of objectivity. Since the 1970s, they have particularly suggested that, just like
scientists, journalists use systematic methods and make them transparent to ensure the

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14 Journalism 

2
B
Belief that
o
objectivity requires
sy
systematic methods Social scientists

Scholars Academics

Natural scientists
1
Culture editors
Politics / Economics editors

Journalists
Science editors

0
–1 0 1 2 3 4
Relevance of objectivity
ensuring reliabilty

–1

Figure 1.  Journalists’ and academics’ belief that objectivity requires systematic methods and
attitude toward objectivity as a means to ensure reliability.
Bases – Acceptance of objectivity requiring systematic methods: 55 natural scientists, 49 social scientists, and 38
scholars from the humanities; 23 science editors, 75 politics/economics editors, and 29 culture editors. Atti-
tude toward objectivity as a means to ensure reliability: 53 natural scientists, 49 social scientists, and 40 scholars
from the humanities; 22 science editors, 73 politics/economics editors, and 32 culture editors.

reliability of their accounts. Yet these ideas resonate in journalists’ understandings of

objectivity only weakly.
Journalists and academics appreciate objectivity to a similar degree. How far they
acknowledge the strength or regret the limitations of objectivity is much less a question
of their profession than of the subjects they deal with. It shows that while there may be a
significant body of literature questioning the sense of objectivity in journalism (e.g.
Glasser, 1984; Merrill, 1990), such arguments are not relevant to practicing journalists.
As previous studies have suggested (Donsbach and Klett 1993; Knirsch, 2005), jour-
nalists do not accept the scientific criteria of objectivity. While academics think objectiv-
ity requires systematic and transparent methods, journalists think it requires ‘letting the
facts speak for themselves’. Their different understandings of objectivity may be related
to their beliefs in the attainability of objectivity. Like academics, journalists are rather
optimistic about being objective when reporting facts. Yet journalists, particularly poli-
tics and economics editors, are more skeptical than academics when making causal infer-
ences from singular facts.
Journalists’ fact-centered view of objectivity may result from their working condi-
tions. As Lippmann (1997) and Park (1940) have pointed out early on, journalists and
academics work in different conditions. Compared with scientists, journalists have little
control over the subjects they investigate and thus limited capabilities to detect causal

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Post 15

relationships in an unambiguous way. This may not only cause journalists to be skeptical
about the attainability of objectivity when making inferences, but their pessimism may
also function as an excuse for not being objective or reliable when reporting the causes
and consequences of events or developments. In its extreme, this may result in an any-
thing-goes attitude when making causal inferences. When there is no standard of objec-
tivity, there is no point of reference to criticize journalists’ causal inferences.
The purpose of critics proposing that journalists adopt scientific criteria of objec-
tivity was to provide a standard against which journalistic accounts could be criti-
cized and held accountable for (Donsbach, 2004). Although journalists appreciate the
strength of objectivity as much as academics, they lack a practicable criterion of
objectivity when making causal inferences. Despite the repeated proposition that
journalists adopt scientific standards of objectivity, journalists refuse to do so. The
question remains what kinds of standards journalists could adopt to enhance their
optimism about objectivity.
While the scientific criteria of objectivity, particularly the testing of hypotheses, may
be impractical in journalism, one possibility would be to cultivate a general ethos of
objectivity in journalism by encouraging discussions of objectivity. Such discussions
could include references to the potential of objectivity in science as well as its strength
and limitations in journalism. An awareness of objectivity and the willingness to aspire
to objectivity would presumably affect journalists’ news reporting as various works indi-
cate. For instance, in a survey of British and German journalists, Köcher (1986: 60)
found that journalists’ general commitment to impartiality strengthens their inclination to
report fully and neutrally about a political party. A more recent survey of German news-
paper journalists showed that journalists’ definitions of objectivity correlate with their
criticism toward flaws: The more they think objectivity requires factuality, the more they
criticize exaggerations; the more they think it requires balance, the more they criticize
one-sided accounts (Knirsch, 2005: 123–125). Efforts should be made in future research
to find out more about the practical effects of objectivity on journalistic news accounts.
This would help to specify and cultivate a journalistic understanding of objectivity that
is practical and effective at the same time.

Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.

Notes
 1. Natural Sciences: biology, chemistry, geology, and physics. Social sciences: economics,
political sciences, psychology, and sociology. Humanities: anthropology, history, musicol-
ogy, and philology.
  2. Initially, the social scientists should have been subdivided into groups working with qual-
itative or quantitative methods. As only 12% (n = 20) of the participating social scientists
worked ‘primarily with qualitative methods’, they will not be divided here.
  3. The rest did not tell.
 4. The questions were asked in German and were translated into English by the author
(Appendix).

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16 Journalism 

  5. For determining the causes, the difference is significant (T-test for inhomogeneous variances,
with T = 3.291; df = 259.171; and p < .05). For assessing the consequences, the difference is
significant (T-test for homogenous variances, with T = 2.254; df = 267; and p < .05).
  6. The difference is significant (T-test for inhomogeneous variances, with T = 3.05; df = 280; and
p < .005).
  7. The differences are significant (T-tests). Demand for transparency: T = 3.345; df = 258.637;
and p < .005, with inhomogeneous variances; demand that investigations must follow a sys-
tematic method: T = 6.499; df = 270; and p < .001, with homogeneous variances.
  8. The difference is significant (T-tests): T = −5.033; df = 260.669; and p < .001, with inhomoge-
neous variances.
  9. A factor analysis of all the items on the attainability of objectivity as well as on the relevance
of the advantages and limitations of objectivity presented yielded three factors: The belief in
the attainability of objectivity including respondents ratings of the possibility to be objective
when making inferences from facts (.743), when determining the causes (.767), and assessing
the consequences (.869) of events or developments; the perceived relevance of objectivity as a
means to make reliable claims including respondents ratings of the relevance of objectivity as
a means to ensure reliable claims (.857) and truthful accounts (.755); and the perceived rele-
vance of the limitations of objectivity including respondents ratings of the relevance of objec-
tivity inhibiting empathy (.753), speaking out against objectionable views (.676), and going
beyond the mere facts (.794). The factor analysis explains 64 percent of the total variance.
10. The difference is significant (T-test for homogeneous variances, with T = 2.0; df = 263; and
p < .01).
11. Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) require, among others, that the variances of the individual
variables are homogenous across the groups. For this variable, this condition is not fulfilled.
The demand of homogeneity can be neglected, however, if the size of the groups analyzed is
equal (Bortz, 2005: 286–287). For this reason, a random sample of the respondents from each
group (i.e. journalists from the science section; journalists from the politics or economics
section; journalists from the arts and culture sections; natural scientists, social scientists, and
scholars from the humanities) was drawn to assimilate the group sizes. This ANOVA is hence
based on 22 randomly selected subjects in each group.
12. The difference is significant (T-test for homogeneous variances, with T = 2.698; df = 266; and
p < .01).

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Author biography
Senja Post studied Communication Research and English at the Technische Universität Dresden,
Boston University, and the Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. In 2007, she completed her
Master’s Degree at the Johannes Gutenberg-University in Mainz with a thesis on German cli-
mate change communication. In 2012, she completed her PhD at the Johannes Gutenberg-
University in Mainz with a doctoral thesis on journalists’ and scientists’ criteria of truth. Since
2013, she has worked at the University of Koblenz-Landau as a Post-Doc Researcher in Science
Communication.

Appendix
Translation Of Questions (German–English)
1. German: Wie objektiv kann man als Wissenschaftler in Ihrem Fach [Journalist in Ihrem
Ressort] bei den folgenden Arbeitsschritten sein?

Wie objektiv kann man sein, Da kann man Da kann man

wenn man… unmöglich objektiv durchaus objektiv
sein sein
… einzelne Fakten sammelt? ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
… Sachverhalte aus einzelnen ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Fakten ableitet?
… Folgen von Ereignissen oder ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Entwicklungen abschätzt?
… die Ursachen für einen ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Sachverhalt bestimmt?

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English: How objective ca an academic in your subject [journalist in your editorial section] be
in the following work steps?

How objective can they be can impossibly be can totally be

when… objective objective
… collecting singular facts? ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
… infering states of affairs ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
from singular facts?
… assessing the ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
consequences of events or
developments?
… determining the causes ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
of some state of affairs?

2. German: Und was muss man nach Ihrer Ansicht tun, um objektiv zu sein?

Man muss … trifft gar trifft voll zu

nicht zu
… sich in einer Untersuchung konsequent an eine ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
systematische Vorgehensweise halten.
… Erkenntnisse so darstellen, dass andere ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
nachvollziehen können, wie sie ermittelt wurden.
… versuchen, die Fakten für sich sprechen zu lassen. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

English: And, in your opinion, what does one have to do to be objective?

One needs to … does not apply totally applies

at all
… consistently follow a systematic method ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
in an investigation.
… present findings in a way that others can ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
understand how they were obtained.
… try to let the facts speak for themselves. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

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20 Journalism 

3. German: Es gibt eine Reihe von Gründen, die für oder gegen das Streben nach Objektivität
sprechen. Wie relevant sind die folgenden Gründe für Ihre Arbeit?

für meine Arbeit für meine Arbeit

relevant irrelevant
Wenn man objektive Distanz wahrt, kann ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
man sich schlecht in menschliche oder
soziale Probleme einfühlen.
Wenn man sich um Objektivität bemüht, ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
ermittelt man Befunde, auf die man sich
verlassen kann.
Wenn man objektiv sein will, übersieht ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
man leicht tieferliegende Sachverhalte
hinter den Fakten.
Wenn man sich um Objektivität bemüht, ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
ist man weniger angreifbar.
Wenn man immer objektiv sein will, kann ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
man nicht Stellung gegen verwerfliche
Ansichten beziehen.
Wenn man sich um Objektivität bemüht, ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
hat man eine gute Chance, Sachverhalte
wahrheitsgemäß zu ermitteln.

English: One can argue for or against objectivity for the following reasons. How relevant are
the following reasons for you work?

irrelevant for relevant for

my work my work
Keeping objective distance, it is hard to empathize ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
with those affected by human or social problems.
Pursing objectivity, one obtains results one can ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
rely on.
Aspiring to be objective, one easily overlooks deeper ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
issues behind the facts.
Always seeking objectivity, one cannot declare ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
oneself against objectionable views.
Trying to be objective, one has a good chance of ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
giving truthful accounts of particular states of affairs.

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