Comparative Analysis

on
Fule vs CA (G.R. No. L-40502) and Eusebio vs Eusebio (G.R. No. L-8409)

Whereas, in Section 1, Rule 73 on settlement of a decedent`s estate

(jurisdiction), Fule vs CA defines the term `residence` as referring to the actual
residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile, Eusebio vs Eusebio
considers that residence at the time of the death absence of satisfactory proof to the
contrary, domicile of origin applies and domicile is synonymous to residence.

Factual Comparison

In Fule vs CA, Amado G. Garcia died intestate in the City of Manila. He left real
estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna. Virginia G. Fule (a debtor of the
estate of Amado G. Garcia and a step-sister of the deceased) filed with the Court of
First Instance of Laguna a petition for letters of administration and to be the
administratrix. Factual findings showed that the last place of residence of the
decedent was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at
Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death.

In Eusebio vs Eusebio, Andres Eusebio died in the City of Quezon. Eugenio

Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of his father Andres Eusebio. Factual findings revealed that
Andres Eusebio was, and had always been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga,
where he had his home, as well as some other properties. The decedent only bought a
house and lot in Quezon City due to his illness in order that he could be near his
doctor and have a more effective treatment.

Supreme Court`s Ruling`s Comparison

In Fule vs CA, the court laid down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides"
connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time
of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.

In Eusebio vs Eusebio, the court ruled that the deceased retained his domicile,
and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it was
well-settled that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga,
where he resided for over seventy (70) years; "a domicile once acquired is retained
until a new domicile is gained". Under the circumstances surrounding, if Andres
Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the
following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of
choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein
permanently. Admittedly, the decedent was capable of choosing a domicile. There is
no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appear to have
manifested his wish to live indefinitely in Quezon City.

Personal Comment

There is no conflict in the court`s ruling on `residence` in the two cases. The
term residence as a requirement under Section 1, Rule 73 on settlement of a
decedent`s estate is clearly defined and exemplified in the case of Fule vs CA. Similarly,
the term residence also finds application in the case of Eusebio vs Eusebio even
though the deceased`s physical presence at the time of his death is in Quezon City.
Residency has no particular length of time but has to be more than temporary (Fule vs
CA), and such requirement has been met in the case of Eusebio vs Eusebio because the
deceased stay in Quezon City is due to his illness and for more convenient and
effective treatment, there was no clear manifestation the he would indefinitely stay in
the said city, thus his stay could only be temporary.