ART.

2
SPOUSES FORTUNA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES[G.R. No. 173423, March 05, 2014] T
FACTS:
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot
No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The application was filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC
No. 2372.The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence
the lot’s survey plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment.In its Decision dated May 7, 2001, the RTC
granted the application for registration in favor of the spouses Fortuna.In its decision dated May 16, 2005, the CA reversed
and set aside the RTC decision. Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the alienable and
disposable nature of the land, they failed to show that they complied with the length of possession that the law requires, i.e.,
since June 12, 1945.Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.They contend that
the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic
Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942 amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession to acquire imperfect title over an agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-year period, however, was
removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the possession should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment
introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and published on May 9, 1977; and the
PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Court’s ruling in Tañada, et al. v.
Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al., they allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and
January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA
No. 1942 amendment because Pastora’s possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.
ISSUE:Whether or not Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic
Act (RA) No. 1942 is applicable for registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457 in favor of the
spouses Fortuna.
HELD:
NO. the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the spouses
Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna’s application of registration of title.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that “[the] Decree shall take effect upon its promulgation,” the Court has declared
in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. that the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity.
“[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.” Accordingly,
Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon its publication, or on May 9,
1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words, applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947.
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain, the
spouses Fortuna’s application for registration of title would still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they
possessed the land since May 8, 1947.
Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.
They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 1942. RA No. 1942 amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect
title over an agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-year period, however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the
possession should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.[12]

The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on
June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Court's ruling in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.,[13] they allege that
PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have
already satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastora's possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.

2
 G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986
EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. On May
13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these
murders.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he
claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question
the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second
Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a
division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to
proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same
Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case
before the Commission. On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature,
having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. Finally, on July 23, 1984,
the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected
assemblyman of the province of Antique. The petitioner then came to this Court, asking to annul the said decision on the basis that it
should have been decided by COMELEC en banc.

The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight.
And a year later, Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to be moot and academic.

Issues:
1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to the petitioner being dead and the respondent missing.
2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984,
proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?
Held:
1. No.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private
respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are
larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more
important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the
simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to
us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter
because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the
dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the
vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

2. No.
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and
elective provincial and city officials.Section 3 provides:The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election
cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard
and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their
submission for decision.We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended
to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising
before the proclamation of the winners.As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful
consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the
proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-
protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates, which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the
real winners in the election. The respondent’s theory would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being
summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have
otherwise been observed by the Commission en banc.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot
and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside
as violative of the Constitution
ART. 8 of the Civil code states:Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.This article is the legal anchor of the doctrine of stare decisis in the Philippines.

Lazatin vs. Desierto (GR 147097) June 5, 2009

CASE: Petitioners were accused of violation of Article 220 of the RPCand R.A. No. 3019. After a premilinary investigation, it was
recommended that they be prosecuted. The Sandiganbayan, however,ordered a re-evaluation of the case. Subsequently the Office of
the Special Prosecutor (which is under the Office of the Ombudsman by virtue of R.A. No. 6770) recommended that the case be
dismissed. The Office of Legal Affairs on the other hand recommended the prosecution. The Ombudsman adopted the OLA
recommendation, which the petitioners assert is beyond his jurisdiction because the Constitution meant for the OSP to be independent
from the Ombudsman, and therefore the Obudsman has no power to prosecute. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution allows
the Legislative to grant the Ombudsman additional powers, including the power to investigate – which was done through R.A. No. 6770.
Thus, the Ombudsman was acting within its powers to prosecute petitioners. Also, petitioners cannot question the evaluation of
evidence made by Ombudsman in the Supreme Court because Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Petitioners failed
to prove that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.

DOCTRINE/APPLICATION: The Ombudsman has been granted by Legislature the power to prosecute, in line with the Constitution. •
Certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.

BACKGROUND:July 22, 1998 ! the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint Affidavit
charting petitioners with Illegal use of llegal Use of Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code
and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),as amended. The
complaint alleged there were irregularities in the use of that then Congressman Carmelo F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Development
Fund (CDF) for 1996. With the help of his co- petitioners, Lazatin was able to claim 18 checks amounting to P4,868,277.08 and convert
them into cash. May 29, 2000 ! The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution (and eventually
approved by the Ombudsman) recommending the filing of 14 counts each of malversation against petitioners in the Sandiganbayan.he
Sandiganbayan ordered re-evaluation of the case.September 18, 2000 ! The Office of Special Prosecutor (OSP) Resolution
recommended the dismissal of the case for lack or insufficiency of evidence.October 24, 2000 ! The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)
issued a memorandum after being ordered by the Ombudsman to review the OSP resolution. The OLA memorandum recommended
the OSP resolution be disapproved the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the case. October 27, 2000 ! The Ombudsman
adopted the OLA Memorandum, and the cases returned to the Sandiganbayan.

Major Point 2: R.A. No. 6770 is constitutional. The principle of stare decisis cannot be set aside. Petitioners maintain that R.A. No.
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck
down for being unconstitutional.• The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things
which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code1 of the Philippines Fermin v. People ! The doctrine of stare decisis is
based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemedsettled and closed to further
argument. Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation ! Stare decisis simply
means that for the sake of certainty,a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially
the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to
convince the Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case.They have not successfully demonstrated how or
why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with the power of control and
supervision over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.1 Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form apart of the legal system of the Philippines.

2 ! Whether or not the questioned resolution was based onmisapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and conjectures. ! The question is really
whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled thatthere was enough evidence to support a finding of probable cause. This Court cannot overturn the
Ombudsman finding of probable cause absent any proof that it acted with grave abuse of discretion. Major Point 1: Certiorari is a remedy meant to
correct only errors ofjurisdiction, not errors of judgment. • First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals ! Certiorari proceedings
do not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. It
is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.
Major Point 2: The Court cannot interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutor powers as long as his ruling are
supported by substantial evidence, and absent any proof of grave abuse of discretion Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto ! The Ombudsman has wide latitude in exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the three branches of government.
This is to ensure that his Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence. • Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Desierto ! Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's
exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation oflaw.FINAL VERDICT: The Ombudsman was acting in
accordance with R.A.No. 6770 and properly exercised its power of control and supervision over the OSP

The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that [a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and
compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public’s
confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished. Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case
override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.
Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.G.R. No.
148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS:

Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's
middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.

Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code,
she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her
middle name.

The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and
preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.

RULING:

Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of
Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear
the surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and
her mother.

Categories: G.R. No. 148311, Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code
INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL v. JOSE G. DE VERA, GR No. 205703, 2016-03-07
Facts:
Petitioner SNC Lavalin Engineers & Contractors, Inc. (SNC-Lavalin) is the principal of IPAMS, a Canadian company with business
interests in several countries. On the other hand, respondent... is a licensed general surgeon in the Philippines. Arriola was offered by
SNC-Lavalin... the position of Safety Officer... in Madagascar. Arriola was then hired... and his overseas employment contract was
processed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) According to Arriola, he signed the contract of employment in the
Philippines. Arriola started working in Madagascar. After three months, Arriola received a notice of pre-termination of employment...
due to diminishing workload in the area of his expertise and the unavailability of alternative assignments. Consequently,... Arriola was
repatriated. SNC-Lavalin deposited in Arriola's bank account his pay amounting to Two Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Six Dollars and
Eight Centavos (CA$2,636.80), based on Canadian labor law. Aggrieved, Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, vacation leave and sick leave pay before the Labor Arbiter (LA). He claimed that SNC-
Lavalin still owed him unpaid salaries equivalent to the three-month unexpired portion of his contract, amounting to, more or less, One
Million Sixty-Two Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos (P1,062,936.00). He asserted that SNC-Lavalin never offered any valid
reason for his early termination and that he was not given sufficient notice regarding the same. Arriola also insisted that the petitioners
must prove the applicability of Canadian law before the same could be applied to his employment contract.
Issues:
When can a foreign law govern an overseas employment contract?
Ruling:
.A. No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers Act, was enacted to institute the policies on overseas employment and to establish a higher
standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers.It emphasized that while recognizing the significant contribution
of Filipino migrant workers to the national economy through their foreign exchange remittances, the State does not promote overseas
employment as a means to sustain economic growth and achieve national development.Although it acknowledged claims arising out of
law or contract involving Filipino workers,... it does not categorically provide that foreign laws are absolutely and automatically
applicable in overseas employment contracts.A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a
contract is the law between the parties. The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in
Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient, "provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Thus, counterbalancing the principle of autonomy of
contracting parties is the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with
public policy, are deemed written into the contract. Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may not contract away
applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law
relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships
from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.
the general rule is that Philippine laws apply even to overseas employment contracts. This rule is rooted in the constitutional provision
of Section 3, Article XIII that the State shall afford full protection to labor, whether local or overseas. Hence, even if the OFW has his
employment abroad, it does not strip him of his rights to security of tenure, humane conditions of work and a living wage under our
Constitution.
As an exception, the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the employment contract. A synthesis of the existing laws and
jurisprudence reveals that this exception is subject to the following requisites:That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas employment
contract that a specific foreign law shall govern;That the foreign law invoked must be proven before the courts pursuant to the
Philippine rules on evidence;That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract must not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy of the Philippines; andThat the overseas employment contract must be processed through
the POEA.The Court is of the view that these four (4) requisites must be complied with before the employer could invoke the
applicability of a foreign law to an overseas employment contract. With these requisites, the State would be able to abide by its
constitutional obligation to ensure that the rights and well-being of our OFWs are fully protected. If the first requisite is absent, or that no
foreign law was expressly stipulated in the employment contract which was executed in the Philippines, then the domestic labor laws
shall apply in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus. If the second requisite is lacking, or that the foreign law was not
proven pursuant to Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, then the international law doctrine of processual
presumption operates. The said doctrine declares that "[w]here a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours." If the third requisite is not met, or that the foreign law stipulated is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, then Philippine laws govern. This finds legal bases in the Civil Code, specifically:
(1) Article 17, which provides that laws which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws of a foreign country; and (2) Article 1306, which states that the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions in a
contract must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Finally, if the fourth requisite is missing, or
that the overseas employment contract was not processed through the POEA, then Article 18 of the Labor Code is violated. Article 18
provides that no employer may hire a Filipino worker for overseas employment except through the boards and entities authorized by
the Secretary of Labor. In relation thereto, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended, declares that the State shall only allow the
deployment of overseas Filipino workers in countries where the rights of Filipino migrant workers are protected. Thus, the POEA,
through the assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs, reviews and checks whether the countries have existing labor and social
laws protecting the rights of workers, including migrant workers Unless processed through the POEA, the State has no effective means
of assessing the suitability of the foreign laws to our migrant workers. Thus, an overseas employment contract that was not scrutinized
by the POEA definitely cannot be invoked as it is an unexamined foreign law. In other words, lacking any one of the four requisites
would invalidate the application of the foreign law, and the Philippine law shall govern the overseas employment contract.
Principles:LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS
G.R. No. 179736 : June 26, 2013SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING,Petitioners, v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN
CHOACHUY, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaintfor
Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources,
Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop
building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages
with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to
petitioners property;that the court, in that case, denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its
allegations;that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the
building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners property;that respondents, through their
employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going construction;and that the acts of
respondents violate petitioners right to privacy.Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance
cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance. In their Answer with Counterclaim,respondents claimed that they did not
install the video surveillance cameras,nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners construction.They also clarified
that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders. On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Ordergranting the application
for a TRO. Respondents moved for a reconsiderationbut the RTC denied the same in its Orderdated February 6, 2006. Aggrieved,
respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decisiongranting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an
injunctive writ.The CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the
property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence. The CA alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of the
building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras.They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical
personality.Thus, they are not the proper parties.

ISSUE:. Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy?. Whether or not respondents are the proper parties to this
suit?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.

CIVIL LAW: right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public are excluded therefrom and
only certain individuals are allowed to enter. Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to privacy
and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states: Art. 26. Every person
shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts,
though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be
denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the
consent of the latter."The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to
privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino: Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of anothers residence." This
does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the
same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. Thus, an individuals right to
privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even
situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to
privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences. In this case, the RTC, in granting the
application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that: After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order.
The operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the
owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on respondents property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and
Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners. Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why
petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property.
The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the
building and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. Respondents camera cannot be made to
extend the view to petitioners lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as
property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." The RTC, thus,
considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence
and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their
consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that
the issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with,
unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in
finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ. This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this
suit.
 Radio Communication of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Alfonso Verchez, et. Al. ( case digest for article 26)
Facts: On January 21, 1991, Grace Verchez-Infantes, hired the services of RCPI to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog
asking money for their ailing mother Editha Verchez who at the same time was confined in a hospital. But it took 25 days
before such message was conveyed to Zenaida.

On April 17, 1992, Editha died. On September 8, 1993, her husband, Alfonso Verchez, along with his daughters Grace
and Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed an action for damages against RCPI before the Rtc of Sorsogon. They
alleged that the delayed in the delivery of the message contributed to the early death of Editha. RCPI argues that there is
no privity of contract between other except for Grace, also the delay in the delivery is by caused force majeure, and
maintaining further that they exercised due diligence in choosing their employees; hence they must be released from any
liability.

The trial court awarded the mount of P 100,000.00 as moral damages, and P 20,000.00 as attorney’s fee. Rcpi
appealled to the CA, but ot affirmed the decision of the rtc.

Issue: Whether or not the RCPI may be held liable for damages?

HELD:Yes.

Article 1170 of the civil code provides those who in thw performance of their obligations are guolty of fraud, negligence or
delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
As for RCPI’s tort based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil code provides; Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases; Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35
Article 26 of the civil code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts. Though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and relief. (2) meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another. (
Only 1 case was written in the book and it was digested by my partner Ms. Lindsay Ocera)
G.R. No. 183026 NESTOR N. PADALHIN and ANNIE PADALHIN,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

For review is the Decision1 rendered on February 14, 2008 and Resolution2 issued on May 20, 2008 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
81810. The CA affirmed, albeit with modification relative to the award of attorney's fees, the Decision 3 rendered on October 3, 2003 by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 165, which ordered herein petitioner Nestor Padalhin (Nestor), to pay herein respondent Nelson D. Lavina
(Lavina) the total amount of P775,000.00 as damages.

Antecedent Facts Laviña and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul General, respectively. In the
course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Laviña was raided twice. Prior to the raids, Bienvenido Pasturan 4 (Pasturan) delivered messages to
the Filipino household helpers in the ambassador’s residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to take photographs of
the ivory souvenirs kept therein. The first raid on April 18, 1996 was conducted while Laviña and his wife were attending a diplomatic dinner hosted
by the Indian High Commission. Lucy Ercolano Muthua, who was connected with the Criminal Investigation Division’s Intelligence Office of Kenya
and David Menza, an officer in the Digirie Police Station in Nairobi, participated in the raid. Photographs of the first and second floors of Laviña’s
residence were taken with the aid of James Mbatia,5 Juma Kalama,6 Zenaida Cabando7 (Cabando), and Edna Palao8 (Palao). The second raid was
conducted on April 23, 1996 during which occasion, the ambassador and his spouse were once again not present and additional photographs of the
residence were taken. On September 27, 1996, Laviña received an information from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in Manila that an
investigating team was to be sent to Nairobi to inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of the Philippine Embassy in Kenya, on
one hand, and his own complaint against the spouses Padalhin, on the other. The investigating team was led by Rosario G. Manalo (Manalo) and
had Franklin M. Ebdalin (Ebdalin) and Maria Theresa Dizon (Dizon) as members. The team stayed in Kenya from April 20, 1997 to April 30, 1997.
On April 29, 1997, the team entered Laviña’s residence unarmed with a search warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary. Laviña alleged
that in the course of the inspection, the team destroyed cabinet locks, damaged furnitures and took three sets of carved ivory tusks. Subsequently,
both Nestor and Laviña were recalled from their posts in Kenya. On November 17, 1997, Laviña filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against Nestor and his wife, petitioner Annie Padalhin (Annie) Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and Dizon. On July 6, 1998, Laviña amended his
complaint to include Pasturan as a defendant. Laviña’s complaint alleged the following causes of action, to wit: (a) affront against his privacy and the
sanctity and inviolability of his diplomatic residence during the two raids conducted by the Kenyan officials, supposedly instigated by Padalhin and
participated by all the defendants as conspirators; (b) infringement of his constitutional rights against illegal searches and seizures when the
investigating team sent by the DFA entered into his residence without a warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary and confiscated some
of his personal belongings; and (c) bad faith, malice and deceit exhibited by the defendants, including Padalhin, in conspiring on the conduct of the
raids, engaging in a smear campaign against him, and seizing without authority his personal effects. Laviña sought payment of actual, moral,
exemplary and nominal damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suits. In the course of the trial, Nestor denied any involvement in the raids conducted
on Laviña’s residence. As counterclaims, he alleged that the suit filed by Laviña caused him embarasssment and sleepless nights, as well as
unnecessary expenses which he incurred to defend himself against the charges. On the other hand, Annie denied prior knowledge of and
participation in the raids. On February 24, 2000, the RTC, upon oral motion of Laviña’s counsel informing the court that a settlement had been
reached, dismissed the charges against Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and Dizon. As a consequence, the RTC deemed it proper to no longer
resolve the claims of Laviña relative to the alleged seizure of his personal effects by the DFA investigating team. Laviña pursued his charges against
Nestor, Annie and Pasturan.

The Ruling of the RTC On October 3, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision9 ordering Nestor to pay Laviña P500,000.00 as moral damages,
P50,000.00 as nominal damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, P150,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, and costs of suit for
the former’s participation in the raid conducted in the Ambassador’s residence on April 18, 1996. The RTC ruled that: Defendant Nestor N. Padalhin
admitted in his sworn statement dated October 10, 1997 which was subscribed and sworn to on October 13, 1997 before the Executive Director
Benito B. Valeriano, Office of Personnel and Administrative Services of the Department of Foreign Affairs, that he caused the taking of pictures of the
raw elephant tusks in the official residence of the ambassador (Exh. "B"). x x x.

xxxx

The said affidavit was submitted by Nestor Padalhin in answer to the administrative charge filed against him by then Secretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon, Jr. in connection with the violation of the diplomatic immunity of the residence of the Philippine

Ambassador to Kenya on April 18, 1996. x x x.

xxxx

When Nestor Padalhin was presented by the plaintiff as hostile witness, he affirmed the truth of the contents of his affidavit marked as Exhibit "B". x x
x.

It is therefore clear that the taking of the pictures of the elephant tusks inside the residence of Ambassador Nelson Laviña while the latter and his
wife were out and attending a diplomatic function, was upon order of Nestor Padalhin to his driver James Mbatia with the cooperation of Juma
Kalama, a gardener in the ambassador’s residence. The admission of defendant Nestor Padalhin that he was the one who caused the taking of the
pictures of the elephant tusks in the official residence of Ambassador Laviña in effect corroborates the latter’s testimony that it was Nestor Padalhin
who masterminded the invasion and violation of the privacy and inviolability of his diplomatic residence in Kenya on April 18, 1996.

The invasion of the diplomatic residence of the plaintiff in Kenya and the taking of photographs of the premises and the elephant tusks inside the
residence upon order of defendant Nestor Padalhin without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff were done by the said defendant in bad faith.
The intention to malign the plaintiff is shown by the fact that Nestor Padalhin even went to the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reported the
raw elephant tusks of Ambassador Laviña as admitted in paragraph 2.a of his affidavit marked as Exhibit "B".

This incident reached not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya but also the Filipino community in Kenya, the Department of Foreign Affairs in
Manila and the circle of friends of plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff felt insulted, betrayed, depressed and even feared for his life because the intelligence
and local police were involved in this incident. Plaintiff suffered humiliation, sleepless nights, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation and wounded
feeling.The admission of defendant Nestor Padalhin in his affidavit (Exh. "B") regarding the first cause of action is binding upon him only but cannot
bind his co-defendants Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan who were not included in the administrative case where the affidavit ofNestor
Padalhin was submitted.The affidavits of plaintiff’s maids Zenaida Cabando and Edna Palao who implicated Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido
Pasturan in this case is hearsay evidence because the said househelpers did not appear to testify in this case and to identify their affidavits although
the record will show that plaintiff exerted all efforts to present them as witnesses but failed because their address/whereabouts could not be traced
and/or ascertained. In view of this, defendants Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the said
affiants.10 (Italics ours)The RTC was, however, not convinced of Nestor’s involvement in the raid staged on April 23, 1996. Laviña’s testimony relative
to the raid was not based on his own personal knowledge as it was only derived from the affidavits subscribed and sworn to before him by Cabando,
Palao, Helen Tadifa,11 John Ochieng12 and Leonidas Peter Logarta.13 During the trial before the RTC and even in the proceedings before the DFA,
Laviña had not presented the aforementioned persons as witnesses. Their affidavits were thus considered as hearsay evidence since the witnesses
were not subjected to cross-examination. The RTC likewise found no sufficient evidence to render Annie and Pasturan liable and to grant Nestor’s
counterclaims.Both Laviña and Nestor filed their respective appeals to assail the RTC decision. Laviña ascribed error on the part of the RTC when it
absolved Annie and Pasturan from liability anent their supposed participation in the raid conducted on April 18, 1996. Laviña likewise assailed as
insufficient the amount of exemplary and nominal damages imposed on Nestor by the RTC. Laviña also challenged the propriety of the RTC’s
dismissal of his claims relative to the conduct of the second raid on April 23, 1996. On the other hand, Nestor lamented that his participation in the
April 18, 1996 raid was not proven by clear and substantial evidence, hence, the award of damages made by the RTC in favor of Laviña lacked
basis.

The Ruling of the CA

On February 14, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision14 denying the appeals of both Laviña and Nestor. The CA, however, reduced to P75,000.00 the
award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses made in Laviña’s favor. In affirming, albeit with modification, the RTC’s disquisition, the CA
explained:There is no doubt in our mind that defendant-appellant indeed participated in the first raid that happened on April 18, 1997 [sic]. This
conclusion of ours is based on the admission made by the defendant- appellant himself in his affidavit dated October 10, 1997. x x x.

xxxx

Defendat-appellant’s affidavit constitutes as [sic] an admission against his interest. Being an admission against interest, the affidavit is the best
evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare
anything against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault
if it does not. As a Consul General of the Republic of the Philippines, defendant-appellant cannot pretend that the plain meaning of his admission
eluded his mind. On the witness stand, he testified that he was the one who voluntarily and freely prepared his affidavit. He further stated that the
contents thereof are true. His affidavit likewise contained an apology for his lack of judgment and discretion regarding the April 18, 1996 raid.

Anent plaintiff-appellant’s second cause of action, the court a quo correctly ruled that plaintiff-appellant was not able to prove defendant- appellant’s
participation in the second raid that happened on April 26, 1996 [sic]. Basic is the rule in evidence that the burden of proof is on the part of the party
who makes the allegations x x x. Plaintiff-appellant’s testimony regarding the second raid was not of his own personal knowledge. Neither does the
affidavit of defendant-appellant admit that he had anything to do with the second raid. Plaintiff-appellant came to know of the second raid only from
the stories told to him by his household helps and employees of the Philippine Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Inasmuch as these people were not
presented as witnesses in the instant case, their affidavits are considered hearsay and without probative value.

x x x.

Next, plaintiff-appellant bewails the dismissal of the complaint against Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan. He contends that the affidavits of
Cabando and Palao, which were executed and sworn to before him, linking defendant Annie Padalhin and B[ie]nvenido Pasturan to the two raids are
binding upon the latter two.

Such a contention by the plaintiff-appellant must fail. The failure of the plaintiff-appellant to put Cabando and Palao on the witness stand is fatal to
his case. Even if defendants Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan failed to object to the hearsay evidence presented by the plaintiff-appellant, it
would only mean that they have waived their right of confrontation and cross-examination, and the affidavits then are admissible. But admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value.

xxxx

Defendant-appellant contends that there is no factual basis to conclude that he was motivated by malice, bad faith or deceit, which would warrant the
award of damages in favor of the plaintiff-appellant.

x x x Plaintiff-appellant’s complaint is mainly anchored on Article 19 in relation to Articles 21 and 26 of the New Civil Code. These provisions of the
law state thus:

"Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."

"Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."

"Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence:

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations off [sic] another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition."

The Comment of Tolentino on what constitute an abuse of rights under Article 19 of the New Civil Code is pertinent:

"Test of Abuse of Right. – Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not unlawful, are anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of
right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be
concealed under the guise of exercising a right. The principle does not permit acts which, without utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to
another, because they violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just. x x x."

The question, therefore, is whether defendant-appellant intended to prejudice or injure plaintiff-appellant when he did the acts as embodied in his
affidavit.

We rule in the affirmative. Defendant-appellant’s participation in the invasion of plaintiff-appellant’s diplomatic residence and his act of ordering an
employee to take photographs of what was inside the diplomatic residence without the consent of the plaintiff-appellant were clearly done to
prejudice the latter. Moreover, we find that defendant- appellant was not driven by legitimate reasons when he did the questioned acts. As pointed
out by the court a quo, defendant-appellant made sure that the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Filipino community in Kenya knew about
the alleged illegal items in plaintiff-appellant’s diplomatic residence.

xxxx

Basic is the rule that trial courts are given the discretion to determine the amount of damages, and the appellate court can modify or change the
amount awarded only when it is inordinate. x x x We reduce the amount of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation from P150,000.00 to
P75,000.00 considering that the instant suit is merely for damages.

With regard to plaintiff-appellant’s contention that his prayer for "other reliefs which are just and equitable", consisting of his remuneration, salaries
and allowances which should have been paid to him in Nairobi if it were not for his illegal recall to Manila, the same must likewise fail. First of all, it is
not within our powers to determine whether or not plaintiff-appellant’s recall to Manila following the two raids was illegal or not. Second, the "other
reliefs" prayed for by the plaintiff- appellant are in the nature of actual or compensatory damages which must be duly proved with reasonable degree
of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof and
on evidence of the actual amount thereof. Here, plaintiff-appellant failed to present proof of his salary and allowances. x x x.15 (Citations omitted and
italics ours)

The Resolution16 issued by the CA on May 20, 2008 denied the respective motions for reconsideration filed by Laviña and Nestor.

Hence, Nestor filed before us the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari17 anchored on the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT NESTOR’S PARTICIPATION IN THE RAID CONDUCTED ON LAVIÑA’S RESIDENCE WAS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AS TO WARRANT THE AWARD OF MORAL, EXEMPLARY AND NOMINAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN
THE LATTER’S FAVOR.

II. WHETHER OR NOT NESTOR’S COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED CONSIDERING A CLEAR SHOWING THAT LAVIÑA’S
SUIT WAS GROUNDLESS.

The Arguments in Support of the Petition

Nestor reiterates that his admission of having caused the taking of photographs in Laviña’s residence was subject to the qualification that he did so
sans malice or bad faith. Padalhin insists that he did nothing unlawful. He merely intended to verify the complaints of some embassy personnel
against Laviña, with the end in mind of protecting and upholding the image of the Philippine diplomatic corps in Kenya. He may have committed a
lapse in the exercise of his discretion, but he never meant to cause Laviña harm, damage or embarrassment.

Nestor avers that Laviña kept grudges against him based on a mistaken sentiment that the former intended to oust the latter from his post. This,
however, did not justify Laviña’s filing of a suit for damages against Nestor.

Laviña’s Contentions

In his Comment,18 Laviña seeks the dismissal of the instant petition on both procedural and substantive grounds. He alleges that the verification and
certification of non-forum-shopping attached to the petition was signed not by Spouses Padalhin but by their son, Norman Padalhin (Norman). Such
being the case, it is as if the said verification and certification was not signed at all, hence, legally inexistent, rendering the petition defective.
Besides, even if the Special Power of Attorney19 (SPA) signed by Nestor were to be considered as the source of Norman’s authority to sign the said
verification and certification of non-forum-shopping, still, the instrument is wanting as Annie, a co-petitioner in the case at bar, had no participation in
its execution.

Laviña likewise emphasizes that since factual and not legal issues are raised, resort to a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure is erroneous.

In challenging the substantial merits of the instant petition, Laviña reiterates the arguments he proferred in the proceedings below. He also made
affirmative references to the portions of rulings of both the RTC and the CA, relative to the binding effect of the affidavits submitted by some of the
defendants either with the DFA or the RTC, to render all of them liable for damages for their participation in the conduct of the supposed raids.

Our Disquisition
The instant petition is procedurally flawed.

We deem it proper to first resolve the procedural issues raised by Laviña relative to the (a) alleged defective verification and certification of non-
forum shopping attached to the instant petition, and (b) the circumstance that factual and not legal issues are presented before us, hence, beyond
the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief" or lacks
a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum-shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (Italics ours)

Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly
be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.20 Time and again, this Court has strictly enforced the requirement of verification and
certification of non-forum shopping under the Rules of Court.21 Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have
been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.22 The attestation on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge
by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-
petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the current petition.23

The circumstances surrounding the case at bar do not qualify to exempt compliance with the rules and justify our exercise of leniency. The
verification and certification of non-forum shopping24 attached to the instant petition was not signed personally by the petitioners themselves. Even if
we were to admit as valid the SPA executed in Norman’s favor allowing him to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached
to the instant petition, still, his authority is wanting. Petitioner Annie did not participate in the execution of the said SPA. In the pleadings filed with us,
there is nary an explanation regarding the foregoing omissions. The petitioner spouses took procedural rules for granted and simply assumed that
the Court will accord them leniency. It bears stressing that procedural rules are crafted towards the orderly administration of justice and they cannot
be haphazardly ignored at the convenience of the party litigants.

Laviña also seeks the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground of being supposedly anchored on factual and not legal issues.The case of Vda.
De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank25 is emphatic on what issues can be resolved in a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Procedure, to wit:Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only questions of
law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one
of fact.

x x x The substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees is a factual issue
which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari.26 (Citation omitted and italics ours)

In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues with an intent to subject to review the uniform factual findings of the RTC and the
CA.1âwphi1 Specifically, the instant petition challenges the existence of clear and substantial evidence warranting the award of damages and
attorney’s fees in Laviña’s favor. Further, the instant petition prays for the grant of the Spouses Padalhin’s counterclaims on the supposed showing
that the complaint filed by Laviña before the RTC was groundless. It bears stressing that we are not a trier of facts. Undoubtedly, the questions now
raised before us are factual and not legal in character, hence, beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Even if we were to overlook the aforecited procedural defects of the instant petition, still, the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner spouses cannot be
granted.As already exhaustively discussed by both the RTC and the CA, Nestor himself admitted that he caused the taking of the pictures of Lavina's
residence without the latter's knowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates that he did so sans bad faith or malice. However, Nestor's surreptitious acts
negate his allegation of good faith. If it were true that Lavina kept ivories in his diplomatic residence, then, his behavior deserves condemnation.
However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one's residence and he
cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Hence, the award of damages and attorney's fees in
Lavina's favor is proper.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 14, 2008 and Resolution dated May
20, 2008 by the Court of Appeals in C A-G.R. CV No. 81810 are AFFIRMED[G.R. NO. 182013 : December 4, 2009]
 QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA & NOLASCO LAW OFFICE and LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS, LIMITED, Petitioners, v. THE SPECIAL
SIXTH DIVISION of the COURT OF APPEALS, KHOO BOO BOON and the Law Firm of PICAZO BUYCO TAN FIDER & SANTOS,Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a special civil action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioners Quasha Ancheta Peña and
Nolasco Law Office (Quasha Law Office) and Legend International Resorts, Limited (LIRL), seeking to reverse and set aside, on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Resolution1 dated 22 January 2008 of the Special Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87281, which refused to recognize the Entry of Appearance of petitioner Quasha Law Office as the duly authorized
counsel of petitioner LIRL in CA-G.R. CV No. 87281. Petitioner Quasha Law Office is the duly authorized counsel of petitioner LIRL in the
Philippines. Petitioner LIRL is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Hong Kong and licensed to operate a resort casino hotel in Subic
Bay, Philippines, on the basis of the 19 March 1993 Agreement it entered into with Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), which was later amended in July, 2000. It is doing business in the Philippines through its branch, LIRL-
Subic. Private respondent Khoo Boo Boon was the former Chief Executive Officer of LIRL-Subic. Private respondent Picazo Buyco Tan Fider and
Santos Law Office (Picazo Law Office) was the former counsel of petitioner LIRL in the Philippines.

The controversy in this case arose from the following facts:

Petitioner LIRL filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract, Specific Performance with Damages and Application for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72, docketed as Civil Case No. 219-0-2004, against
PAGCOR and SBMA for amending the 19 March 1993 Agreement, notwithstanding the total absence of any consideration supporting petitioner
LIRL's additional obligations imposed under the amended Agreement.On 28 December 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision2 annulling the
amendment to the 19 March 1993 Agreement executed between petitioner LIRL, PAGCOR and SBMA, as well as all the agreements that may have
been entered into by PAGCOR pursuant thereto. The trial court also restrained PAGCOR from enforcing the amendment. It further enjoined
PAGCOR from terminating the Agreement dated 19 March 1993 or from otherwise suspending, limiting, reducing or modifying petitioner LIRL's
license to operate the Subic Bay Casinos and from entering into or continuing with any agreement with other entities for the operation of other
casinos in the Subic Freeport Zone or from any such acts, which would in any way reduce or mitigate petitioner LIRL's right under the aforesaid
Agreement.3 Resultantly, PAGCOR filed its Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam before the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, and the case
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 87281.Meanwhile, in relation to petitioner LIRL Companies' Winding-Up No. 1139 of 2004 filed before the Hong
Kong Court of First Instance (Hong Kong Court), the said foreign court issued Orders dated 9 June 2006 appointing Kelvin Edward Flynn (Flynn) and
Cosimo Borrelli (Borrelli) as the joint and several liquidators of petitioner LIRL and granting them the power to carry on and manage the business of
petitioner LIRL, including its business in Subic, Philippines. Pursuant to the said Orders, Flynn sent a letter 4 dated 10 July 2006 to private respondent
Khoo Boo Boon informing him that he had already been terminated from his position as Chief Executive Officer of LIRL-Subic. On the same date,
Flynn also sent a letter5 to private respondent Picazo Law Office notifying it that its legal services as counsel of petitioner LIRL had also been
terminated. Petitioner LIRL later engaged the legal services of petitioner Quasha Law Office as its new counsel to represent it in all proceedings in
the Philippines.Accordingly, petitioner Quasha Law Office filed its Entry of Appearance as counsel for petitioner LIRL in CA-G.R. CV No. 87281
pending before the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, through a Manifestation and Motion Ex Abudante Cautelam attaching thereto a
copy of the letter dated 10 July 2006 terminating the services of Picazo Law Office and engaging the services of petitioner Quasha Law Office.In a
Resolution6 dated 19 October 2007, the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals refused to recognize the Entry of Appearance of petitioner
Quasha Law Office as the new counsel of petitioner LIRL. The appellate court ratiocinated that a mere photocopy of a letter dated 10 July 2006,
which was sent by one of the appointed liquidators of petitioner LIRL, informing private respondent Picazo Law Office that its legal services as
counsel of LIRL had been terminated, had no probative value. Further the appointment of petitioner LIRL's joint and several liquidators were made
pursuant to an Order of the Hong Kong Court. Because it was a foreign judgment, our courts could not take judicial notice thereof, as the final orders
of foreign tribunals could only be enforced in Philippine courts after appropriate proceedings filed therein. Thus, the appellate court concluded that
until the alleged Order of the Hong Kong Court had been validated and recognized in an appropriate proceeding before our local courts, private
respondent Picazo Law Office was recognized as the only counsel entitled to represent and file pleadings for and on behalf of petitioner
LIRL.7Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, but their Motion was denied in a Resolution 8 dated 9 January
2008.Petitioners filed a Manifestation with the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals that in a related case filed before the Special Tenth
Division of the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96717, the said Division issued a Decision9 dated 14 December 2007 recognizing
petitioner Quasha Law Office as the duly authorized counsel of petitioner LIRL. In such Manifestation, petitioner Quasha Law Office attached a copy
of the aforesaid 14 December 2007 Decision of the Special Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals.On 22 January 2008, the Special Sixth Division of
the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution wherein it simply noted petitioners' aforesaid Manifestation. The appellate court then pointed out
that decisions of a division of the Court of Appeals is not binding on the other divisions, for only decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the legal
system from which all other inferior courts must take its bearing. The appellate court even directed the petitioners to elevate the matter to this Court
to settle who between petitioner Quasha Law Office and private respondent Picazo Law Office can legally represent petitioner LIRL in the instant
case.

Hence, this Petition.

The grounds relied upon by the petitioners for the allowance of this Petition are as follows:

I.WHETHER OR NOT THE SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED PATENT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT REFUSED TO GIVE DUE DEFERENCE TO A DECISION OF A CO-DIVISION OF THE
SAME COURT.

i.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 96717 HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY CONSIDERING THAT THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI FILED BY [PRIVATE RESPONDENT PICAZO LAW OFFICE] WAS DISMISSED OUTRIGHT BY THE
SECOND DIVISION OF THIS HOROBALE COURT FOR BEING FILED OUT OF TIME.

II
IN A RELATED CASE WHERE THE ISSUE OF [PETITIONER QUASHA LAW OFFICE'S] AUTHORITY WAS RAISED, THE SEVENTH DIVISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SUSTAINED [PETITIONER QUASHA LAW OFFICE'S] STANDING AS THE DULY AUTHORIZED COUNSEL OF
[PETITIONER] LIRL.

III

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 48, RULE 39 OF THE 1997 REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT APPLIES IN THIS CASE.

SECTION 48, RULE 39 PRESUPPOSES THAT A FOREIGN JUDGMENT, REPRESENTING A CLAIM, IS SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED AGAINST
A SPECIFIC THING OR AGAINST A PERSON.

ii

COROLLARY TO THE ABOVE, THE ORDERS OF THE HONG KONG COURT DO NOT ASSERT A CLAIM AGAINST LIRL-SUBIC BRANCH, THE
APPOINTMENT OF LIQUIDATORS IS A PURELY INTERNAL MATTER BETWEEN A CORPORATION AND A MERE BRANCH THEREOF.

iii

[PETITIONER] LIRL-SUBIC BRANCH, WHICH [PRIVATE RESPONDENT] MR. KHOO BOO BOON PURPORTEDLY REPRESENTS, CANNOT
ASSAIL THE ORDERS OF THE HONG KONG COURT BY INVOKING A RIGHT INDEPENDENT OF ITS MOTHER OFFICE.

IV

[PRIVATE RESPONDENT] PICAZO LAW OFFICE AS COUNSEL DERIVES ITS AUTHORITY FROM [PRIVATE RESPONDENT] MR. KHOO BOO
BOON, THE FORMER CHIEF [EXECUTIVE] OFFICER OF [PETITIONER] LIRL.

[PRIVATE RESPONDENT] MR. KHOO BOO BOON IS NO LONGER THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HAVING RECOGNIZED THE
APPOINTED LIQUIDATORS OF [PETITIONER] LIRL BY VOLUNTARILY YIELDING CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF LIRL-SUBIC BRANCH.

ii

COROLLARY TO THE ABOVE, THE AUTHORITY OF [PRIVATE REPSONDENT] PICAZO LAW [OFFICE] TO REPRESENT [PETITIONER] LIRL
HAS BEEN TERMINATED BY THE APPOINTED LIQUIDATORS.10

On 16 June 2009, petitioner Quasha Law Office already filed its withdrawal of appearance as counsel for petitioner LIRL. Thus, the issue of
petitioner Quasha Law Office's authority or standing as the duly authorized counsel of petitioner LIRL has already become moot and academic.

Even if we are to resolve the issues in the case at bar on their merits, we will nevertheless arrive at the same conclusion.

Basically, the aforesaid grounds are the very arguments of the petitioners. Thus, the issues in this case may be summed up into: (1) whether the
Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in not giving due deference to a Decision of its co-division, which
similarly resolved the issue of proper legal representation of petitioner LIRL; and (2) whether the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in considering that the Orders of the Hong Kong Court appointing liquidators for petitioner LIRL involved enforcement
and recognition of a foreign judgment.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 96717 entitled "In the Matter of Corporate Rehabilitation of Legend International Resorts Limited," which was raffled to the
Special Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, petitioner LIRL's proper legal representation was raised as one of the issues. In the said case,
petitioner Quasha Law Office's authority to represent petitioner LIRL was questioned by private respondent Picazo Law Office, petitioner LIRL's
former counsel whose legal services had been terminated by petitioner LIRL's appointed liquidators. Private respondent Picazo Law Office argued
that the Orders of the Hong Kong Court from which the authority of the liquidators, who engaged the legal services of petitioner Quasha Law Office
to be the counsel of petitioner LIRL, was derived, could not be enforced in this jurisdiction, since these foreign orders have not been recognized by
Philippine courts.

On 14 December 2007, the said division of the appellate court rendered its Decision resolving the issue of petitioner LIRL's proper legal
representation in favor of petitioner Quasha Law Office. The said division of the appellate court ratiocinated that private respondent Picazo Law
Office ceased to be the counsel of petitioner LIRL when it received the 10 July 2006 letter of one of the appointed liquidators of LIRL, notifying it that
its legal services had been terminated and that petitioner Quasha Law Office's legal services were engaged in its stead. Moreover, there is actually
no foreign judgment or order that is being enforced in this jurisdiction because what is involved is the prerogative of petitioner LIRL, through its duly
authorized representative, which in this case is its appointed liquidators, to terminate and engage the services of a counsel, which is an internal affair
that requires no prior recognition in a separate action. The right of petitioner LIRL to terminate the authority of its counsel includes the right to cause
a change or substitution of counsel at any stage of the proceedings.

The said Decision of the Special Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals was immediately brought by the petitioners to the attention of the Special
Sixth Division of the said appellate court where CA-G.R. CV No. 87281 (the subject of this Petition) was pending. However, the Special Sixth
Division of the Court of Appeals merely noted the same and still refused to recognize petitioner Quasha Law Office's entry of appearance. It even
advised petitioner Quasha Law Office to elevate to this Court the issue of who between petitioner Quasha Law Office and private respondent Picazo
Law Office can legally represent petitioner LIRL in the instant case.
Thus, petitioners ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals in not giving due deference to the
decision of its co-division.Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.11In the case at bar, this Court holds that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals in not giving due deference to the decision of its co-division. As
correctly pointed out by the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, the decision of its co-division is not binding on its other division. Further, it
must be stressed that judicial decisions that form part of our legal system are only the decisions of the Supreme Court.12 Moreover, at the time
petitioners made the aforesaid Manifestation, the Decision dated 14 December 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96717 of the Special Tenth Division was still
on appeal before this Court.Therefore, the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for not giving due deference to the said
Decision of its co-division, and its actuation cannot be considered grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction.However,
as regards the second issue of whether the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in considering that the Orders
of the Hong Kong Court appointing liquidators for petitioner LIRL involved enforcement and recognition of a foreign judgment, we hold that the same
is already barred by the principle of res judicata conclusiveness of judgment.The doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two different concepts:
(1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.The second concept - conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or question,
which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future
action between such parties or their privies in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of
action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as
to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment
between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the
first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required, but merely identity of issues.13

Legarda v. Savellano14 elucidates the rationale for respecting the conclusiveness of judgment, thus'

As we have repeatedly enunciated, public policy and sound practice enshrine the fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests
that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issues more than once. It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence,
that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded
as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this
maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more even than an important principle of public policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a
fundamental concept in the organization of every jural sytem. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies.

It must be stressed that the Decision dated 14 December 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96717 of the Special Tenth Division of the Court of
Appeals was appealed to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 and was docketed as G.R No. 184463. The said
Decision resolved the issue of petitioner LIRL's proper legal representation in favor of petitioner Quasha Law Office. It also ruled that there was no
enforcement of a foreign judgment when one of the appointed liquidators terminated the legal services of private respondent Picazo Law Office and
engaged in its stead petitioner Quasha Law Office to be the duly authorized counsel of petitioner LIRL. What is involved is the prerogative of
petitioner LIRL, through its duly authorized representative - - which, in this case, is its appointed liquidators - - to terminate and engage the services
of a counsel, which is an internal affair that requires no prior recognition in a separate action.15 On 20 October 2008, this Court issued a
Resolution denying the said Petition for Review for being filed out of time and for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error. Thus, the
14 December 2007 Decision of the Special Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96717 became final and executory.

In a related case filed before the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98893,16 petitioner LIRL's proper legal
representation and Quasha Law Office's entry of appearance as tantamount to an enforcement of a foreign judgment, were also raised. On 26
February 2009, the said division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision stating that no enforcement of a foreign judgment was involved in the
said case. It further decreed that petitioner LIRL's appointed liquidators had been duly authorized to manage petitioner LIRL. The authority of the
said liquidators extended to all of petitioner LIRL's branches, wherever situated, the branch in the Philippines included. Pursuant to 9 June 2006
Orders of the Hong Kong Court, the appointed liquidators were given the power to, among other powers, "bring or defend any action or other legal
proceeding in the name and on behalf of the company or themselves in Hong Kong, the Republic of the Philippines or attorneys in the Republic of
the Philippines or elsewhere and appoint a solicitor in Hong Kong and lawyers or assist the Liquidators in the performance of their duties generally."
No cogent reason existed to prevent petitioner LIRL from exercising its prerogative in terminating the services of one counsel and in engaging the
services of another. Such act was purely an internal affair of the corporation, which did not require prior recognition in a separate action.17

The aforesaid Decision of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals was appealed to this Court via a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R. No. 189265. On 12 October 2009, this Court
rendered a Resolution denying the Petition for late filing, for failure to serve a copy of the Petition to the Court of Appeals, for lack of the
required number of plain copies of the Petition, and for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error. Thus, the Decision dated 26
February 2009 of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98893 became final and executory.

It has already been settled in the aforesaid two Decisions that the Orders of the Hong Kong Court appointing liquidators for petitioner LIRL did not
involve the enforcement of a foreign judgment. The act of terminating the legal services of private respondent Picazo Law Office and engaging in its
place petitioner Quasha Law Office was a mere exercise of petitioner LIRL's prerogative, through its appointed liquidators, which was an internal
affair that required no prior recognition in a separate action. Therefore, this Court can no longer pass upon the said issue.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari, is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.