THE DUTY TO ERADICATE GLOBAL POVERTY: POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE?

Author(s): PABLO GILABERT

Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 7, No. 5 (January 2005), pp. 537-550
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25733600 .
Accessed: 21/06/2014 03:32

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7: 537-550, 2004.
DOI: 10.1007/s10677-005-6489-9 ? Springer2005

PABLO GILABERT

THE DUTY TO ERADICATE GLOBAL POVERTY: POSITIVE

OR NEGATIVE?

Accepted: 19November 2004

ABSTRACT. InWorld Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge argues that the "global
rich" have a duty to eradicate severe poverty in the world. The novelty of Pogge's approach
is to present this demand as stemming from basic commands which are negative rather
than positive in nature: the global rich have an obligation to eradicate the radical poverty of
the "global poor" not because of a norm of beneficence asking them to help those in need
when they can at little cost to themselves, but because of their having violated a principle of

justice not to unduly harm others by imposing on them a coercive global order thatmakes
their access to the objects
of their human right to subsistence insecure. In this paper, I claim
that although Pogge is right in arguing that negative duties are crucial in an account of

global justice, he is wrong in saying that they are the only ones that are crucial. Harming
the global poor by causing their poverty provides a sufficient but not a necessary condition
for theglobal rich to have a duty of justice to assist them.After engaging in a critical
analysis of Pogge's argument, I conclude by suggesting the need for a robust conception
of cosmopolitan solidarity that includes positive duties of assistance which are not mere
duties of charity, but enforceable ones of justice.

KEY WORDS: cosmopolitanism,duties (negative and positive), global justice, human

rights,Pogge, poverty,solidarity

In his path-breaking World Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge

argues that the "global rich" have "an urgent duty to eradicate world
poverty".1 The novelty of Pogge's approach is to present this demand
as stemming from basic commands which are negative rather than pos
itive in nature: the global rich have an obligation to eradicate the radi
cal poverty of the "global poor" not because of a norm of beneficence
asking them to help those in need when they can at little cost to them
selves, but because of their having violated a principle of justice not to
unduly harm others by imposing on them a coercive global order that

1
Pogge (2002, p. 204). Parentheticalpage numbers in thepaper referto pages in this
book. I do not address in thispaper therelationbetweenwhat Pogge says in thisbook and
what he says inpreviousworks. For excellentreviewsofPogge's book, see Fleisch (2003)
andLaFollette (2003).

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
538 PABLO GILABERT

makes their access

to the objects of their human right to subsistence
insecure.2 The benefit of this approach to the eradication of global poverty
is, according to Pogge, that it relies on a moderate conception of justice
that is widely shared (whereas the approach invoking positive duties is
highly controversial in its disregard for the distinction between causing
poverty and merely failing to reduce it). In this paper, I claim that although
Pogge is right in arguing that negative duties are crucial in an account
of global justice, he is wrong in saying that they are the only ones that
are crucial. I proceed as follows. First, I give a brief summary of Pogge's

strategy of justification of the obligation to eradicate global poverty in

terms of negative duties. Second, I refer to two internal problems in this
strategy which render it insufficient to fulfill its own objective. Third, I
advance several reasons
for thinking that the moral goal of eradicating
global poverty requires mobilizing positive duties besides negative ones.
Though it is truethatiftheglobal richharm theglobal poor by causing
their poverty they have a duty of justice to assist them in eliminating their
poverty,it is not truethattheglobal richhave thisduty only if theyare
responsible for the poverty of the global poor. Adding to the (partial) cri
tique of Pogge's argument, I conclude by suggesting an outline for a more
robust conception of solidarity that explicitly includes positive duties of as
sistance which are not mere duties of beneficence, but enforceable ones of

justice.

II

Pogge's critical intention is to target the following commonly held argument

according towhich "we", themembers of affluent countries, do not have a

duty of justice to eradicate severe global poverty.

1. "While it is seriously wrong to harm the poor by causing severe poverty,

it is not seriously wrong to fail to benefit them by not eradicating as much
severe poverty as we might" (p. 12).
2. "We are not harming the global poor by causing severe poverty, but
merely failing to benefit them by not eradicating as much poverty as we
might" (p. 12).

2Pogge's list of basic human rights includes "secure access tominimally adequate shares
of basic freedoms and participation, of food, drink, clothing, shelter, education, and health
care" (p. 51). The extenttowhich the subset of objects pertainingto thehumanright to
subsistence is withdrawn from secure access by the global poor in our contemporary world
is astonishing."Some 2,800 million or 46% of humankind live below theWorld Bank's
... Each
$2p/day poverty line year, some 18 million of them die prematurely from poverty
-
related causes. This is one-third of all human deaths 50,000 every day, including 34,000
childrenunderage five" (p. 2).

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 THE DUTY TO ERADICATE GLOBAL POVERTY 539

3. Therefore, we have no duty of justice to eradicate severe global poverty.

There are two ways of attacking this argument. One is to target the first,
moral premise. This criticism is based on a principle thatwe have a positive
duty of justice to assist those in need when that would not involve great
sacrifices on our part.3 Given thatmembers clearly of affluent societies
could help eradicate global poverty without sacrificing anything morally

significant,4 the opposite to the conclusion of the targeted argument would

follow: theywould have a strong duty of justice to eradicate global poverty.
Pogge does not think this strategy is the best. He "reject[s] such heavily
... with libertarians"
recipient-oriented approaches and agree[s] (p. 13).
He chooses not to challenge the first,moral premise of the argument and
decides to attack instead the second, factual one. This would involve show
ing thattheglobal richare actuallyharmingtheglobal poor by imposing
on them a global order inwhich access to objects of theirmost basic hu
man rights ismade insecure. If this critique is successful, then, again, the
opposite of conclusion (3) follows. But this second strategy construes the
duty to eradicate global poverty as a negative duty, not a positive one.5
The basic negative duty involved would be that "one ought not to cooper
ate in the imposition of a coercive institutional order that avoidably leaves
human rights unfulfilled without making reasonable efforts to aid its vic
tims and to promote institutional reform" (p. 170, see also 25 and 67).
This line of argument deploys a libertarian minimal conception of "human
rights and justice as involving solely negative duties," "specific minimal
constraints... on what harms persons may inflict upon others" (p. 13). In
the case of the discussion on global poverty, this involves accepting and
stressing "the distinction between causing poverty and merely failing to
reduce it" (p. 13).
To summarize,Pogge's strategyis toprevent(3) by rejecting(2). He
thus claims the following.

3A familiar
presentationof thisapproach is givenby Singer (1972). Pogge (p. 134) also
refers, critically, to a similar approach in Rawls's account of natural duties of justice. See
Rawls (1999, Sections 19 and 51).
4
According to Pogge's calculation, by giving up 1.2% of their annual aggregate income
for some years, the global rich could provide sufficient funds for eliminating global poverty
(p. 7).
5
"I propose... to call negative any duty to ensure that others are not unduly harmed (or

wronged) through one's own conduct and to call positive the remainder: any duty to benefit

persons or to shield them from other harms. This negative/positive distinction is doubly

moralized, because its application requires us to decide whether A's conducts harms P

(relative to some morality-stipulated baseline) and, if so, harms P unduly" (p. 130). Pogge's
"baseline" is, in the context of the present discussion, the non-violation of basic human

rights(see pp. 44-48). A good recentdiscussion of differentconceptionsof negative and

positiveduties can be found inOrend (2002, Chapter 5).

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
540 PABLO GILABERT

4. The existing global system, imposed and sustained by the global rich,
harms the global poor by causing them severe and avoidable poverty
(pp. 14-20, 109, 129, 199-204).
This strategy does not challenge (1), and avoids the postulation of a basic

dutyof justiceof thefollowingkind.

5. There is a general positive duty of justice to eradicate severe global
poverty (regardless of whether the bearers of this duty are causally
responsible for it).

Ill

Can this strategy, if followed, secure the eradication of global poverty?

Pogge's argument proceeds on the assumption that the global rich have a
duty of justice to eradicate global poverty only if, and to the extent that,
they are responsible for its existence. The global rich would have a duty
to eradicate (as opposed todiminish)global povertyonly ifthefollowing
statement is false.

6. There are some endogenous causes of severe global poverty which are
not reducible to the impact of the global economic system imposed by
the global rich.

If (6) were true, then the following would follow.

7. Not all of severe global poverty would necessarily be eradicated by

stoppingongoingpracticesof undue harmand by fulfillingthe special
duty to compensate for previous harm stemming from (1) and (4).6

Pogge is forced to show that (6) is false. This is a phenomenal burden

of proof for any empirical account of global poverty. Pogge effectively ar
gues, however, that the common belief that the poverty of the global poor
is primarily their own fault (which he calls "explanatory nationalism") is
patently false. It would not be mistaken for an explanatory story about
the causes of global poverty tomention the corruption of the governing
elites of some poor countries, their lack of a robust liberal culture, or their
technical incompetence. Such story would be, however, seriously incom
plete if it failed tomention the background factors making domestic causal

61 am not claiming that it is impossible for global poverty to be eradicated as a result

of policies introducedby theglobal rich thatstopongoing harm and compensate forpast
harms.Those policies may be sowell designed thattheytriggerprocesses thatwill indeed
eradicatepoverty.My point is thatit ispossible for theglobal rich to introducepolicies that
do not cause the complete eradication of poverty because they (legitimately, in accordance
to thenegativeduties conception) targetonly a subsetof thepovertythatcould be eradicated
(namely, the one for whose generation they are responsible). I thank an anonymous referee
for pressing me on this point.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 THE DUTY TO ERADICATE GLOBAL POVERTY 541

variables operative. Among these background factors we need to list the

presence of certain global economic frameworks. Two powerful examples,
introduced by Pogge are the "international borrowing privilege" and the
"international resource privilege", according to which corrupt dictatorial
elites are internationally allowed, and even encouraged, to size and sell
the natural resources of the countries they rule despotically, and contract
public debt in their people's name, with crippling economic consequences
in terms of poverty generation (pp. 22-23, 112-116).7
Inmentioning examples like these, Pogge goes a long way toward show

ing that the global rich are systematically implicated in the causal pro
duction of global poverty. As Alan Patten has shown, however, Pogge's
successful refutation of "explanatory nationalism" is not sufficient for re
jecting a more plausible "explanatory pluralism" according towhich, even
if the global rich are largely responsible for the poverty of the global poor,

they are not fully or completely responsible for it (as an extreme "explana
tory cosmopolitanism" would have it).8 If explanatory pluralism is right
in pointing out that there is at least some poverty whose causal pedigree
cannot be reduced to the impact of the global order imposed by the global
rich, then it seems that (6) is true, and (7) follows, and therefore Pogge's
goal of showing that the fulfillment of special duties emerging from viola
tion of general negative duties would suffice to eradicate global poverty
remains unsatisfied. In other words, it seems that the following is the
case.

8. If the eradication of severe global poverty (as an objective demanded

by justice) is tobe fullyjustified,thensome generalpositivedutieswill
have to be invoked: we should invoke (5).

7A recent report from Transparency International (TI) documents the astonishing levels
of corruption in poor countries allowed and encouraged by rich countries' governments and

companies. During his 32 years as dictator of resource-rich Zaire, Mobutu pocketed half of
the$12 billion dollars of aid receivedfromtheIMF.Knowing this,theUS governmentkept
pressuring the IMF to continue
lending. The citizens of Zaire (now theDemocratic Republic
of Congo) are liablefor a crippling debt inherited from Mobutu's years even after he was
overthrown in 1997. The strangling effect of external debts contracted under obviously

illegitimate circumstances is characteristic in poor countries around the world, particularly

in Latin America. As Peter Eigen, TI's chairman points out, "a lot of the responsibility
for corruption in the developing world has been with Northern companies and Northern
institutions"(quoted inThe Guardian Weekly,April 1-7, 2004, p. 3).
81 follow here Alan Patten's paper delivered in the session "Author Meets Critics" devoted
to Pogge's book in the Eastern Division meeting of theAmerican Philosophical Association,
DC, December 27-30, 2003. Patten also advances an argument (similar to
Washington
mine) according to which Pogge's account of "harm" might be more maximalist (or less
"ecumenical") than Pogge recognizes.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
542 PABLO GILABERT

The only way out for Pogge is to introduce an inflationary conception

of negative duties according towhich X (a person or an institution) unduly
harms Y when there is a feasible institutional framework different from
the one X is imposing on Y which would render Fs access to the objects of
her human rights fully secure or as secure as possible. The problem with
this conception is that it seems to collapse the notion of negative duties
into a veiled positive duties view: harming someone becomes equivalent
to failing to improve her condition as much as possible. Indeed, when
Pogge says that socio-economic human rights require that "each member
of society, according to his or her means, is to help bring about and
sustain a social and economic order within which all have secure access
to basic necessities" (p. 69), he seems to be detaching himself from the
minimalist libertarian conception of justice which he claims to utilize.
The latter only demands from us that we avoid depriving others from
the extent of access to the objects of their basic needs that they have.
Our unilateral appropriation of resources or imposition of a certain order

requires from us that we compensate those excluded from the resources

and decision making regarding the order. But this compensation, according
to a minimalist libertarian conception, would involve that the condition of
those excluded be better than itwould have been had the appropriation or

imposition not taken place,9 not thatwe make their access to the objects of
their basic needs fully secure (or as secure as possible) by protecting them
from all possible deprivations or by aiding them when they are deprived by
others (or by nonhuman causes).10 Pogge's imperative is "Do not impose
coercive economic institutions unless you make the condition of those on
whom you impose them optimal in terms of their access to the objects of
their right to subsistence", whereas the libertarian (were she to accept an
act of imposition at all) would only command "Do not impose coercive
economic institutions unless you make the condition of those on whom
you impose them better (in terms of their access to the objects of their

9See, in this respect, Nozick (1974, pp. 174-182). For a discussion of the implications and

problemsof libertarianismin thecontextof global justice, see Beitz (1999, pp. 280-285).
Pogge's theory of global justice is not, strictly speaking, a form of libertarianism, but Pogge
thinks his argument for the eradication of global poverty would be accepted by libertarians.
In a forthcoming article in the Journal of Ethics (entitled "Real World Justice"), Pogge says
that his argument mentioning alternative feasible institutions is not addressed to libertarians,
but to users of broadly consequentialist theories of justice that reject his claim that there is
a duty of justice to eradicate
global poverty. If this is the case, however, Pogge's discussion
of those theories would amount to an internal critique of their views about the scope of

positive, not negative duties. According to those theories, X wrongs Y ifX fails to protect
or aid Y (in certain circumstances), but "wronging" here is not equivalent with "harming".
10The connections between the triad including "non-deprivation", "protection", and "aid"
and theexistenceof a fundamentalrightto subsistenceisexploredby Shue (1996,Chapter 2).

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 THE DUTY TO ERADICATE GLOBAL POVERTY 543

right to subsistence, for example) than itwould have been without your
intervention".

IV

Asking for a complementation of the negative duties conception with a

positive duties one (by appealing to (5)) would, however, clash with Pogge's
insistence that his "argument conceives... both human rights and justice
as involving solely negative duties" (p. 13).11 What are Pogge's reasons
for excluding positive duties in his account of global justice? At least the
following three.

9. Only negative duties can be duties of justice.12

10. We should ground claims about duties related to human rights and
global justice in terms that are broadly shareable (pp. 54-55), and
conceptions invoking negative duties are less controversial than con
ceptions invokingpositiveones (pp. 172, 198).

111 want to emphasize thatmy argument calls formodifying and complementing Pogge's
negative duties view, not for abandoning it. I agree that the global rich "do not merely let

people starvebut also participatein starvingthem"(p. 214), and thatthisviolates a weighty

negative duty of justice. My point will be that the complete and permanent eradication of

global poverty also requires the mobilization of positive duties of justice, and that Pogge's

argument fails to recognize this.

12
Pogge does notdeny thattherearepositiveduties,buthis argumententails that(contrary
to (5)) suchduties cannotbe duties ofjustice. Pogge dissociates duties of justice and duties
related tohuman rights(i.e. duties of global justice) fromgeneral positiveduties of aid to
those in need when he says that he "conceives... both human rights and justice as involving

solelynegativeduties" (p. 13,my emphasis); that"humanrightsentailonlynegativeduties"

(p. 66, my emphasis); and that "so long as there is a plurality of self-contained cultures,
the responsibility for unfulfilled human rights does not extend beyond their boundaries"

(p. 171). Pogge also advances or allows for contrasts between negative duties and positive
duties that associate the former with duties of justice and the latter with demands of charity or
beneficence. This is evident in Pogge's critique of Rawls's theory of natural duties of justice,
which, inconceiving suchduties as positive,degrades them(according toPogge) by seeing
them as "on a par with beneficence and charity" (p. 134); and in Pogge's unwillingness to

challenge the following striking line of thought: "Suppose we discovered people on Venus
who are very badly off, and suppose we could help them at little cost to ourselves. If we
did nothing, we would surely violate a positive duty of beneficence. But we would not be

violating a negative duty of justice, because we would not be contributing to the perpetuation
of their misery" (p. 198). These strong claims by Pogge are not equivalent to, or entailed

by his weaker thesis (presentedin thispaper as proposition (11)) thatnegative duties are
more stringent than positive ones. A positive duty may be less stringent than a negative

dutywithout this implyingthatthe latteris, and theformeris not, a duty of justice.As I

will argue momentarily, we can and should endorse the weaker claim (11) and reject the

stronger claim (9).

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
544 PABLO GILABERT

11. Negative duties are weightier than positive duties (pp. 133, 197-198,
201).13

Given these reasons, one can interpretPogge's recommendation to focus

on negative duties in two ways.

12. Strong strategy: (9) stands on its own as an evidently intuitive claim.
13. Weak strategy: since the force of positive duties seems controversial
(pp. 136,172,197-198), and (11) and the idea that negative duties are
duties of justice are widely accepted, and we should search for broadly
shareable conceptions (as (10) demands), we should explore the pos
sibility that the duty to eradicate severe global poverty is a special one
of compensation resulting from violations of negative duties (as well
as, of course, one to stop causing undue harm).

The weak strategy, which we may call "political", seeks to proceed on

the basis of an overlapping consensus on a minimal conception of justice as
avoidance of undue harm. There ismuch to recommend for this approach.
Pogge indeed succeeds at showing that we do not need to assume very
demandingprinciplesof justice to justifythe claim that theglobal rich
have a duty of justice to aid the global poor. There is a wealth of empirical
evidence regarding the use by the global rich of their overwhelming bar

gaining power in the creation and maintenance of international institutions

and policies which slant theglobal playing fieldin favorof theaffluent
and to the detriment of the destitute. This evidence, together with a general

negative duty to avoid undue harm regarding access to objects of basic hu

man rights, suffices to claim that the global rich ought to stop harming the

global poor and fulfilla special duty tocompensate theglobal poor forthe
harm done to them. However, given the results of Section III, thismight not
be sufficient to ground the demand to completely eradicate global poverty.
There is only so much juice to be extracted from the fruit of the negative
duties conception. If the goal is to ground a duty to completely eradicate

13As
pointedout in thepreviousnote, itis importantto see thatclaim (11) does not imply
claim (9). Pogge seems to recognize this when he sees (11) as consistent with "leaving open"
the issue whether some positive duties may become quite stringent in some circumstances
(see p. 240, no 207). This seems to allow for some positive duties to become duties of justice.
In "Real World Justice", Pogge concedes that since the global rich "are able to alleviate"

global poverty, and can do it quite "cheaply", they "surely have positive duties to do so".
But ifitappeals todutiesofjustice, thenthismove would forcePogge todenywhat he says
inhis book thathe does notwant todeny,namely thatjustice and human rightsentailonly
negativeduties (pp. 13,66). Pogge might replythatthereare somepositivedutieswhich are
neither duties of justice nor duties of beneficence or charity, but so far he has not
explained
what that thesis would amount to.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 THE DUTY TO ERADICATE GLOBAL POVERTY 545

global poverty, thenwe need to go beyond theweak strategy and explore

(8) and (5), i.e. make room for general positive duties of justice. But this
would require challenging (9), which entails that positive duties are not
duties of justice. In what follows I will do precisely this. Before proceed
ing, however, it is important to note that taking certain positive duties to be
duties of justice amounts to challenging Pogge's strong strategy (12), but
need not requirerejecting(11). Other thingsbeing equal, negativeduties
regarding a certain object of human rights are normatively stronger than
positive duties regarding the same object. It is certainly worse to torture
someone than to fail to protect her from someone else's attempt to torture
her. It is true, as Pogge argues, that basic negative duties are at the top of the
scale of stringency, and that they are less contingent upon distance between

duty-bearers and right-holders than positive duties are (pp. 132-133). My

point will not be that positive duties have the same weight or stringency as
negative ones, but that some of them are strong duties of justice (with global
scope) rather than weak duties of beneficence. My argument includes four
moves.

(i) Pogge's argument assumes that one has no positive duties of justice to
others unless they result from previous causal relationships with them (e.g.
family ties, contracts, or responsibility for having caused harm). This claim
is certainly counterintuitive. Consider the following two commonly used
examples. First, consider whether you would have a duty to stop your car
in a highway and pick up a victim of an accident to bring her to the hospital
when no one else can do it and you can at no particularly grievous cost to
yourself. Certainly you would have more of a duty here if you had caused
the accident, but you would still have a strong duty to prevent the avoidable
death of the victim when you can, even if you were not responsible for the
accident. Second, consider whether a just society should tax its able and
productive members in order to assist congenitally disabled ones. Able and
productive citizens are not responsible for the disability of the congenitally
disabled.But theystillhave thepositivedutytohelp themavoiddestitution
resulting from lack of marketable abilities and personal ties securing their
survival. The first example suggests that there are interpersonal positive
duties to rescue those in distress, whereas the second example suggests that
there are institutional positive duties to assist citizens whose disadvantages
are morally arbitrary (resulting, e.g., from a "natural lottery" over whose
results they have no responsibility). Are these mere duties of beneficence?
Or are they stronger duties of justice? Focusing on the institutional context

14And thisseems tobe the

goal positedby Pogge when he articulateshis argumentative
strategy for gathering "adherents of the dominant strands of Western normative political
into a coalition focused on world 199, see also 3, 24-25,
thought eradicating poverty" (p.
197).

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 546 PABLO GILABERT

(the one favored by Pogge's approach (pp. 44-48,64-67)), we can certainly

say that the duty to assist the congenitally disabled is a duty of justice, one
which we are willing to accept (and require) public institutions to coercively

enforce}5 If some able, wealthy citizens refrain from paying taxes to help
the congenitally disabled, we are not merely moved to condemn them (or
an institutional framework allowing them not to contribute) for their lack
of beneficence, but to shun them for their lack of sense of justice and
to compel them legally to contribute to the protection of those who are
vulnerable. Ifwe recognize that there are strong positive duties at the local
interpersonal level and at the institutional domestic one, why not claim that
they also exist at the level of relationships and institutions of global scope?
We can say that certain global positive duties of justice to protect and to
aid exist at the global level without being contingent upon the violation
of negative duties not to cause undue harm. Consider whether people in a
rich and powerful country F have a duty to intervene (either by imposing
economic sanctions or by direct military intervention) to protect a minority
of the inhabitants of a country G which is threatened with genocide by its
government. Or consider whether people of a rich and powerful country F
have a duty to assist those in a poor country H who are suffering from a
massive epidemic as a result of the floods caused by a devastating hurricane.
Let us assume that the vulnerability of those living in G and H is not the
result of previous actions on the part of the people inF. Would not members
of F still have a duty of justice to protect members of G or assist members
ofHI
(ii) Invoking some general positive duties is not only correct in the
construction of a complete picture of just individual behavior and social
institutions. It is also particularly relevant for a conception of global jus
tice that aims at the permanent eradication of global poverty. Satisfying

negative duties is not enough for securing the absence of global poverty
even if all of presently existing poverty can be traced back to the impact
of harmful policies by the global rich. Strong inequality (including se
vere poverty) may result, in time, from a situation of strong equality if
no general positive duties are recognized and enforced as basic duties of

151 assume, with David Miller, that a "test of the distinction between justice and humanity

[mere benevolence or charity] is whether those in need are regarded as having enforceable
claims to the resources that will meet their needs, and correspondingly whether potential
donors are regarded as being under enforceable obligations to provide those resources". See
- when
Miller (1999, p. 76). This does not imply,of course, thatenforceability required,in
-
certain circumstances, for the fulfillment of a certain claim is a sufficient condition for a
claim to be one of justice. Not all enforceable claims are claims of justice, but all claims of

justice (unlikemere claims of beneficence)ought tobe enforceable ifthatis a precondition

for theirfulfillment.

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 THE DUTY TO ERADICATE GLOBAL POVERTY 547

justice.16 A negative duty to compensate for previous harm done may suf
fice to justify a redistribution of resources compensating present victims at
a certain time tl. But given unavoidable differences in natural and social
endowments, it is only to be expected that some people will, at time tl, be
unable to stay afloat in the new social framework if it does not include a
permanent and enforceable positive duty to help those in need. This sce
nario is no less plausible at the global level than it is at the domestic one. A
lasting eradication of global poverty requires the creation of a global basic
institutional structure which does not only undo, in a backward-looking
fashion, the effects of past harms, but also ensures, in a forward-looking
way, that no morally arbitrary inequalities make people's access to the ob
ject of their human rights insecure. Such basic structure involves positive
duties besides negative ones.
It is important when articulating the goal of eradicating global poverty to
distinguish between different causes of poverty. A useful distinction may be
the following: (a) poverty caused by external agents; (b) poverty caused by
natural forces (droughts, floods, handicaps, etc.); and (c) poverty brought
about by the agents themselves.17 An account of global justice incorporat
ing positive duties, unlike one based only on negative duties, demands that
we attend to cases (b) besides cases (a) (and thatwe attend to cases (a) even
ifwe are not the "external agents" who bear causal responsibility). (As I
said above, this demand does not conflict with the thesis thatnegative duties
are more stringent than positive ones.) It is not always necessary, however,
for the goal of eradicating global poverty to focus on cases (c). This is
obvious when the poverty in question is the result of voluntary choice, as
itmight be the case with certain people who for religious or other reasons
decide to live without some of thematerial possessions considered neces
sary for not falling below some internationally established poverty line. An
account of global positive duties should then be choice-sensitive, targeting
primarily those conditions of poverty whose causes are not intentionally
controlled by the agents who suffer them.18
(hi) These considerations suggest that an account of global justice may
require amore robust conception of solidarity than Pogge's approach allows

16
Consider, again, the case of the congenitally handicapped without any marketable
skills.
17
Though these causes normally interact, they are still conceptually different. I thank an

anonymous referee for suggesting that I address the importance of the distinction between

(a), (b) and (c).

18An
interestingand difficultcase of type (c) would be one inwhich poverty is the
responsibility of the agent but is not, in any direct sense, the result of a voluntary choice.
Some people may become poor as a result of a long chain of negligent decisions, not as a
resultof choosing tobe poor.Can itbe requiredfromotherpeople to supportinstitutions
that would "rescue" the negligent? Or would this be only a weak moral recommendation?

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 548 PABLO GILABERT

for.We can identify at least three forms of universal solidarity (i.e. three
ways of expressing the general disposition to recognize themoral standing
of all human beings as human beings in one's non-instrumental practical
reasoning):

(a) Beneficence or charity

(b) Reasonable assistance securing the conditions of autonomous agency
(c) Harm avoidance

All of these forms of universal solidarity require thatwe assist those in

need in certain circumstances. There are two sets of differences, however.
First, aid based on (a) and (b) does, and aid based on (c) does not, go
beyond demands stemming from preexisting relationships between duty
bearers and recipients. Second, (b) and (c) are, and (a) is not, part of what
justice and human rights demand ((c) refers to duties not to deprive someone
of the objects of her rights, whereas (b) refers to duties to provide someone
with the objects required tomake her functioning as an autonomous agent

possible when she is deprived of them and provision is not unreasonably

costly to the duty bearer). The problem with Pogge's approach to justice
based solidarity is that it assumes thatwe face only an alternative between
(a) and (c). This misses the importance of (b). A Kantian approach to justice
could be sensitiveto (b) besides focusingonly,as Pogge does, on (c) (pp.
135-137). Kant's second formula of themoral law demanding thatwe treat
all rational agents (including ourselves) as always being ends in themselves
besides being merely means, and his account of the obligatory ends a virtu
ous person should have, require us to embrace basic positive duties of help
besides negative ones of harm avoidance. Furthermore, and crucially, some
of the former are not mere duties of beneficence or charity, but stronger du
ties of justice thatmay require institutional expression and enforcement.19
(iv) What about the worry that the second form of solidarity identi
fied, in its invocation of (5), violates (10)? Is acosmopolitan conception

19
Kant's second formulation of themoral law in the Groundwork of theMetaphysics of
Morals is "So actthat you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of
any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (AK 4:429). Kant
explicitly demands that we avoid a merely negative interpretation of this formula when it
comes to issues of assistance: "Humanity might indeed subsist if no one contributed to
the happiness of others but yet did not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but there
is still only a negative and not a positive agreement with humanity as an end in itself
unless everyone also tries, as far as he can, to further the ends of others" (AK 4:430). Kant
discusses thepositive dutyof beneficence in theMetaphysics ofMorals, AK 4:452-454.
A justificationof coercive taxationto supporttheneedy can be found in theMetaphysics
ofMorals, AK 6:326. (This suggests thatsome imperfect dutieswhose latitudeisnotwide
may be seen, in certain contexts, as requiring institutionalized enforcement.) Both texts
are included in Kant (1996). For useful recent discussion on Kant's account of duties of
beneficenceand justice seeHerman (2002). See also O'Neill (2000, Chapters 7 and 10).

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 the duty to eradicate global poverty 549

of just solidarity including basic positive duties to help all human beings
achieve conditions of autonomous agency too demanding? Would it fail to
be broadly shareable by all? This is an undeniable difficulty.20 Even if the
second form of solidarity, unlike the first, is focused on a certain subset of
basic goods that all human beings may be said to have a human right to,
itmay still seem too demanding to those who think that their basic duties
of justice to others can never include improving their condition but only to
avoid unduly worsening it.At this point we may, however, ask ourselves
whether some people's currently dominant intuitions about solidarity are
not too narrow and should be criticized rather than serviced. Broad share

ability must be an aim of moral and political inquiry. But we should not
interpret it too strongly as suggesting thatwe should rely on already exist
ing agreements as opposed to those which may emerge as a result of critical
discussion which challenges problematic assumptions. Moral and political
philosophy can in this sense be seen as part of an ongoing movement of
change in our emerging global moral culture which is beginning to take a
more robust universal solidarity seriously.21 This emerging global moral
culture calls us to eradicate global poverty, and to see this duty as being
both negative and positive.

Acknowledgments

I thank Arash Abizadeh, Roberto Gargarella, Mira Johri, Kai Nielsen,

Henry Shue, and two anonymous referees for Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. I
especially want to thank Thomas Pogge for detailed and trenchant critical
comments. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University
ofMichoacan, Mexico, and in the Colloquium "Human Rights: The Chal

lenges of Global Justice" at the University of Dayton, Ohio. I thank the

participants in these events for helpful questions and criticisms. Research
for this paper has been supported by grants from the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Fonds Quebecois de la
Recherche sur la Societe et la Culture.

20
Thus, for example, according to a recent study, only 18% of the American public thinks
that protecting weaker nations against aggressors and improving the standard of living in

developing nations should be a very important goal of US foreign policy. (The numbers
are higher, however, with respect to leaders' opinion.) The Economist, October 2, 2004,
p. 33.
21 on negative
For a discussion of how a cosmopolitan solidarity focused both and

positive duties is emerging from the cross-cultural practice and discussion sparked by the
humanrightsmovement, See Shue (2004, pp. 227, 233).
international

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 550 PABLO GILABERT

References

Beitz, C.R., International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought,
World Politics 51(2) (1999), pp. 269-296.
Fleisch, B., Book Review, Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Ethical Theory
andMoral Practice 6(4) (2003), pp. 455-458.
Herman, B., The Scope ofMoral Requirement,Philosophy & Public Affairs 30(3) (2002),
pp. 227-256.
Kant, I., inM.J. Gregor (ed. and Trans.), Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.

LaFollette, H., Book Review: Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Ethics

113(4) (2003), pp. 907-911.

Miller, of Social Justice. Cambridge,
D., Principles MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974.

O'Neill, O., Bounds of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Orend, B., Human Rights. Concept and Context. Ontario: Broadview Press, 2002.
Pogge, T.W., World
Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity, 2002.
Rawls, J.,A Theory of Justice, 2nd Ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Shue, H., Basic Rights. Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd Ed. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996.

Shue, H.,
Thickening Convergence: Human Rights and Cultural Diversity, in D.K.

Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance. Morality and the Distant Needy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 217-241.
Singer, P., Famine, Affluence and Morality, Philosophy & Public Affairs 1(3) (1972),
pp. 229-243.

Department of Philosophy, Concordia University

1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. West, PR 305
Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3G 1M8
E-mail: pablo.gilabert@concordia.ca

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 03:32:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions