Main articles: Cambodian Civil War and Khmer Rouge Killing Fields

Flag of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), the political arm of the Khmer Rouge[5]

In 1970, Premier Lon Nol and the National Assembly deposed Norodom Sihanouk as the head of
state. Sihanouk, opposing the new government, entered into an alliance with the Khmer Rouge
against them. Taking advantage of Vietnamese occupation of eastern Cambodia, massive United
States carpet bombing ranging across the country, and Sihanouk's reputation, the Khmer Rouge
were able to present themselves as a peace-oriented party in a coalition that represented the
majority of the people. Thus, with large popular support in the countryside, the capital Phnom
Penh finally fell on 17 April 1975 to the Khmer Rouge. The KR continued to use Sihanouk as a
figurehead for the government until 2 April 1976 when Sihanouk resigned as head of state. Sihanouk
remained under comfortable, but insecure, house arrest in Phnom Penh, until late in the war with
Vietnam he departed for the United States where he made Democratic Kampuchea's case before
the Security Council. He eventually relocated to China.
Thus, prior to the KR's takeover of Phnom Penh in 1975 and the start of the Zero Years, Cambodia
had already been involved in the Third Indochina War and tensions between Cambodia and Vietnam
were growing due to differences in communist ideology and the incursion of Vietnamese military
presence within Cambodian borders. The context of war destabilised the country and displaced
Cambodians while making available to the KR the weapons of war. The KR leveraged on the
devastation caused by the war to recruit members and used this past violence to justify the similarly,
if not more, violent and radical policies of the regime.[6] The birth of DK and its propensity for violence
must be understood against this backdrop of war that likely played a contributing factor in hardening
the population against such violence and simultaneously increasing their tolerance and hunger for it.
Early explanations for the KR brutality suggest that the KR had been radicalised during the war
years and later turned this radical understanding of society and violence onto their
countrymen.[7] This backdrop of violence and brutality arguably also affected everyday Cambodians,
priming them for the violence that they themselves perpetrated under the KR regime.
Phnom Penh fell on 17 April 1975. Sihanouk was given the symbolic position of Head of State for the
new government of Democratic Kampuchea and, in September 1975, returned to Phnom Penh from
exile in Beijing.[8] After a trip abroad, during which he visited several communist countries and
recommended the recognition of Democratic Kampuchea, Sihanouk returned again to Cambodia at
the end of 1975. A year after the Khmer Rouge takeover, Sihanouk resigned in mid-April 1976
(made retroactive to 2 April 1976) and was placed under house arrest, where he remained until
1979, and the Khmer Rouge remained in sole control.[9]

Organisation of Democratic Kampuchea[edit]

In January 1976, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) promulgated the Constitution of
Democratic Kampuchea. The Constitution provided for a Kampuchean People's Representative
Assembly (KPRA) to be elected by secret ballot in direct general elections and a State Praesidium to
be selected and appointed every five years by the KPRA. The KPRA met only once, a three-day
session in April 1976. However, members of the KPRA were never elected, as the Central
Committee of the CPK appointed the chairman and other high officials both to it and to the State
Praesidium. Plans for elections of members were discussed, but the 250 members of the KPRA
were in fact appointed by the upper echelon of CPK.
Democratic Kampuchea was an atheist state, but Buddhist influences still persisted.[10] All religions
were banned and the repression of adherents of Islam,[11] Christianity,[12] and Buddhism was
extensive. Nearly 25,000 Buddhist monks were massacred by the regime.[13]
In actual fact, all power belonged to the Standing Committee of CPK, the membership of which
comprised the Secretary and Prime Minister Pol Pot, his Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea and seven
others. It was known also as the "Centre", the "Organisation" or "Angkar", and its daily work was
conducted from Office 870 in Phnom Penh. For almost two years after the takeover, the Khmer
Rouge continued to refer to itself as simply Angkar. It was only in a March 1977 speech that Pol Pot
revealed the CPK's existence. It was also around that time that it was confirmed that Pol Pot was the
same person as Saloth Sar, who had long been cited as the CPK's general secretary.

Administrative[edit]

Administrative zones of Democratic Kampuchea

The Khmer Rouge government did away with all former Cambodian traditional administrative
divisions. Instead of provinces, Democratic Kampuchea was divided into geographic zones, derived
from divisions established by the Khmer Rouge when they fought against the ill-fated Khmer
Republic led by General Lon Nol.[14] There were seven zones, namely the Northwest, the North, the
Northeast, the East, the Southwest, the West and the Center, plus two Special Regions, i.e.
the Kratie Special Region no 505 and (before mid-1977) the Siemreap Special Region no 106.[15] The
regions were subdivided into smaller areas or damban. These were known by numbers, which were
assigned without a seemingly coherent pattern. Villages were also subdivided into 'groups' (krom) of
15–20 households who were led by a group leader (Meh Krom).

Legal[edit]
The Khmer Rouge destroyed the legal and judicial structures of the Khmer Republic. There were no
courts, judges, laws or trials in Democratic Kampuchea. The "people’s courts" stipulated in Article 9
of the Constitution were never established. The old legal structures were replaced by re-education,
interrogation and security centres where former Khmer Republic officials and supporters as well as
others were detained and executed.[16]

International relations[edit]
The Democratic Kampuchea regime maintained close ties with China (its main backer) and to a
lesser extent with North Korea. In 1977, in a message congratulating the Cambodian comrades on
the 17th anniversary of the CKP, Kim Jong-il congratulated the Cambodian people for having "wiped
out [...] counterrevolutionary group of spies who had committed subversive activities and
sabotage".[17] Only China, North Korea, Egypt, Albania, Cuba, Laos, Vietnam (until December
1977), Romania and Yugoslavia had diplomatic missions in Phnom Penh.[18]
Military[edit]

Aircraft roundel of the RAK from 1975 to 1979

During the Democratic Kampuchea days, the 68,000-member Khmer Rouge-

dominated CPNLAF (Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces) force, which
completed its conquest of Phnom Penh, Cambodia in April 1975, was renamed the RAK
(Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea). This name dated back to the peasant uprising that broke out in
the Samlot district of Battambang Province in 1967. Under its long-time commander and then
Minister of Defense Son Sen, the RAK had 230 battalions in 35 to 40 regiments and in 12 to 14
brigades. The command structure in units was based on three-person committees in which the
political commissar ranked higher than the military commander and his deputy.
Cambodia was divided into zones and special sectors by the RAK, the boundaries of which changed
slightly over the years. Within these areas, the RAK's first task was the peremptory execution of
former Khmer National Armed Forces (FANK) officers and of their families, without trial or fanfare to
eliminate KR enemies. The RAK's next priority was to consolidate into a national army the separate
forces that were operating more or less autonomously in the various zones. The Khmer Rouge units
were commanded by zonal secretaries who were simultaneously party and military officers, some of
whom were said to have manifested "warlord characteristics". Troops from one zone were frequently
sent to another zone to enforce discipline. These efforts to discipline zonal secretaries and their
dissident or ideologically impure cadres gave rise to the purges that were to decimate RAK ranks, to
undermine the morale of the victorious army, and to generate the seeds of rebellion.[19] In this way,
the KR used the RAK to sustain and fuel its violent campaign.

Khmer Rouge ideology and its relationship to violence[edit]

Ideological influences[edit]
Pol Pot in 1978

Khieu Samphan in 1978

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The Khmer Rouge were heavily influenced by Maoism,[20] the French Communist Party and the
writings of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin[21] as well as ideas of Khmer racial superiority.[22] Turning to
look at the roots of the ideology which guided the KR intellectuals behind the revolution, it becomes
evident that the roots of such radical thought can be traced to an education in France which started
many of the top KR officials on the road to thinking that communism demanded
violence.[23][24] Influences from the French Revolution led many who studied in Paris to believe that
Marxist political theory which was based on class struggle could be applied to the national cause in
Cambodia.[25] The premise of class struggle sowed the ideological seeds for violence and made
violence appear all the more necessary for the revolution to succeed. In addition, because many of
the top KR officials such as Pol Pot, Khieu Samphan and Kang Kek Iew (also known as Duch) were
educators and intellectuals, they were being unable to connect with the masses and were alienated
upon their return to Cambodia, further fuelling their radical thought.[26] However, it is important to note
that Vickery downplays the importance of personalities in explaining the DK phenomenon, noting
that DK leaders were never considered evil by prewar contemporaries. Nonetheless, this view is
challenged by some including Rithy Phan, who after interviewing Duch, the head of Tuol Sleng,
seems to suggest that Duch was a fearsome individual who preyed on and seized upon the
weaknesses of others.[27][28] All in all, the historical context of civil war, coupled with the ideological
ferment in Cambodian intellectuals returning from France, set the stage for the KR revolution and the
violence that it would propagate.

Kang Kek Iew (Kaing Guek Eav or Duch) before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

Operationalising ideology through violence[edit]

The Khmer Rouge was determined to turn the country into a nation of peasants in which
the corruption and "parasitism" of city life would be completely uprooted. Communalisation was
implemented by putting men, women and children to work in the fields, which disrupted family life.
The regime claimed to have "liberated" women through this process and according to Zal Karkaria
"appeared to have implemented Engels's doctrine in its purest form: women produced, therefore
they had been freed".[5] On the surface, society in Democratic Kampuchea was strictly egalitarian.
However, this was not the case in practice as members and candidate members of the CPK, local-
level leaders of poor peasant background who collaborated with the Angkar and members of the
armed forces had a higher standard of living than the rest of the population.[citation needed]
Under the leadership of Pol Pot, cities were emptied, organised religion was abolished, and private
property, money and markets were eliminated.[29] An unprecedented genocide campaign ensued that
led to annihilation of about 25% of the country's population, with much of the killing being motivated
by Khmer Rouge ideology which urged "disproportionate revenge" against rich and powerful
oppressors.[30][31][32] Victims included such class enemies as rich capitalists, professionals,
intellectuals, police and government employees (including most of Lon Nol's leadership),[33] along
with ethnic minorities such as Chinese, Vietnamese, Lao and Cham.[34]
The Khmer Rouge regime was one of the most brutal in recorded history, especially considering how
briefly it ruled the country. Based on an analysis of mass grave sites, the DC-Cam Mapping Program
and Yale University estimated that the Khmer Rouge executed over 1.38 million people.[35][36] If
deaths from disease and starvation are counted, as many as 2.5 million people died as a result of
Khmer Rouge rule.[37] This included most of the country's minority populations. For instance, the
country's ethnic Vietnamese population was almost completely wiped out; nearly all ethnic
Vietnamese who did not flee immediately after the takeover were exterminated. One prison, Security
Prison 21 (now the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum), held 17,000 people at one time or another, of
whom only seven adults survived.

Explaining the violence[edit]

Violence as a collective action[edit]
While the historical context and ideological underpinnings of the KR regime provide reasons for why
the Cambodian genocide occurred, more explanations must be had for the widespread violence that
was carried out by Cambodians against Cambodians. Anthropologist Alexander Hinton's research
project to interview perpetrators of violence during the KR regime sheds some light on the question
of collective violence. Hinton's analysis of top-down initiatives shows that perpetrators in the KR
were motivated to kill because KR leaders were effectively able to "localize their ideologies" to
appeal to their followers.[38] Specifically, Hinton spoke to two ideological palimpsests that the KR
used. First, the KR tapped on the Khmer notion of disproportionate revenge to motivate a resonant
equivalent—class rage against previous oppressors.[39] Hinton uses the example of revenge in the
Cambodian context to illustrate how closely violence can be tied to and explained by the Buddhist
notion of karma, which dictates that there is a cycle of cause and effect in which one's past actions
will affect one's future life. Next, KR leadership built on local notions of power and patronage vis-à-
vis Wolters’ mandala polity to establish their authority as a potent centre.[40] In so doing, the KR
escalated the suspicion and instability inherent within such patronage networks, setting the stage for
distrust and competition on which political purges were based.

Violence as an individual action[edit]

After establishing the historical and ideological context as the backdrop, Hinton delves deeper into
the complexities of perpetrator motivation through using both macro- and micro-level analyses to
uncover how ideology is linked to psychocultural processes. Under the KR, the encroachment of the
public sphere into that which was once private space made constant group-level interactions. Within
these spaces, cultural models such as face, shame, and honour were adapted to KR notions of
social status and bound up with revolutionary consciousness.[41] Thus, individuals were judged and
their social status was based on these adapted KR conceptions of hierarchy which were
predominantly political in nature. Within this framework, the KR constructed essentialised categories
of identity which crystallised difference and inscribed these differences on victim's bodies, providing
the logic and impetus for violence. To save face and preserve one's social status within the KR
hierarchy, Hinton argues that first, violence was practised by cadres to avoid shame or loss of face;
and second, that shamed cadres could restore their face through perpetrating violence.[42] At the level
of individuals, the need for social approval and belonging to a community, even one as twisted as
the KR, contributed to obedience, motivating violence within Cambodia.

Memorialisation in Cambodia[edit]

Skulls at Tuol Sleng

Choeung Ek genocidal centre

The violent legacy of the KR regime and its aftermath continue to haunt Cambodia today. In recent
years, increasing attention has been paid by the world to the atrocities of the KR, especially in light
of the Cambodia Tribunal. In Cambodia, the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum and the Choeung
Ek Killing Fields are two major sites open to the public which are preserved from the KR years and
serve as sites of memory of the Cambodian genocide. The Tuol Sleng was a high school building
that was transformed into an interrogation and torture centre called S-21 during the KR regime;
today the site still contains many of the torture and prison cells which were created during the KR
years. Choeng Ek was a mass grave site outside Phnom Penh where prisoners were taken to be
killed; today the site is a memorial for those who died there.
However, beyond these two public sites, there has not been much activity promoted by the
Cambodian government to remember the genocide that occurred. This, in part, is due to numerous
KR cadres remaining in political power in the wake of the collapse of the KR regime. The continued
influence of KR cadres in Cambodia's politics has led to a neglect of the teaching of KR history to
 Cambodian children. The lack of a strong mandate to teach KR history despite international pressure
has led to a proliferation of literary and visual production to memorialise the genocide and create
sites through which the past can be remembered by future generations.

In literature[edit]
Like the Holocaust, the Cambodian genocide has spawned a host of literary publications in the wake
of the KR regime's fall. Most significant to the history of the KR are the numerous survivor memoirs
published in English as a way to remember the past. The first wave of KR memoirs began appearing
in the late 1970s and 1980s. Soon after the first wave of survivors escaped or were rescued from
Cambodia, survivor accounts in English and French began to be published. These memoirs tended
to be authored either by foreigners or adult Cambodian males. Written to generate more awareness
about the KR regime, these adult memoirs take into account the political climate in Cambodia before
the regime and tend to call for justice to be served to the perpetrators of the regime. Being the first
survivor accounts to reach global audiences, memoirs such as Haing Ngor's A Cambodian
Odyssey (published 1987), Pin Yathay's L'Utopie meurtrière (Murderous Utopia) (1979), Laurence
Picq's Au-delà du ciel (Beyond the Horizon) (1984) and Francois Ponchaud's Cambodge, annee
zero (Cambodia Year Zero) (1977) were instrumental in bringing to the world the story of life under
the KR regime.
The second wave of memoirs, published in the 21st century, is distinctly different from the first wave.
Memoirs from the second wave include Chanrithy Him's When Broken Glass Floats (published
2000), Loung Ung's First They Killed My Father (2000), Oni Vitandham's On the Wings of a White
Horse (2005) and Kilong Ung's Golden Leaf (2009). Published in large part by Cambodian survivors
who were children during the period, these memoirs trace their journey from a war-torn Cambodia to
their new lives in other parts of the world. To a larger extent than memoirs from the first wave, these
memoirs reconstruct the significance of their authors' experiences before they left Cambodia. Having
grown up away from Cambodia, these individuals use their memoirs predominantly as a platform to
come to terms with their lost childhood years, reconnect with their cultural roots which they cannot
forget despite residing outside of Cambodia and tell this story for their children. Noticeably, many of
the authors of second wave memoirs draw out extended family trees in the beginning of their
accounts in an attempt to document their family history. Additionally, some authors also note that
despite them remembering events vividly, their memories were augmented by their relatives
recounting those events to them as they grew up. Most significantly, the publication of the second
wave of memoirs coincides with the Cambodia Tribunal and could be a response to the increased
international attention paid to the atrocities of the KR.

In media[edit]
As in literature, there has been a proliferation of films on the Cambodian genocide. Most of the films
are produced in documentary style, frequently with the aim to reveal what really happened during the
KR years and to memorialise those who lived through the genocide. Film director Rithy Panh is a
survivor of the KR's killing fields and is the most prolific producer of documentaries on the KR years.
He has produced Cambodia: Between War and Peace and The Land of the Wandering Souls among
other documentary films. In S-21: The Khmer Rouge Killing Machine, two survivors of S-21 confront
their former captors. In 2013, Panh released another documentary about the KR years titled The
Missing Picture. The film uses clay figures and archival footage to re-create the atrocities of the KR
regime. Beyond Panh, many other individuals (both Cambodians and non-Cambodians) have made
films about the KR years. Year Zero: The Silent Death of Cambodia is a British documentary
directed by David Munro in 1979 which managed to raise 45 million pounds for Cambodians.

See also[edit]
• Cambodia portal
• Communism portal

• Agrarian socialism
• Cambodian genocide
• First Indochina War
• First They Killed My Father (film)
• French Indochina
• History of Cambodia
• The Killing Fields (film)
• People's Republic of Kampuchea (Vietnamese occupation, 1979–1989)
• Vietnam War (Second Indochina War)
• List of socialist states

References[edit]
1. ^ Jackson, Karl D. Cambodia, 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death. Princeton University Press.
p. 219. ISBN 0-691-02541-X.
2. ^ "Khmer Rouge's Slaughter in Cambodia Is Ruled a Genocide". The New York Times. 15 November
2018. Archived from the original on 13 April 2019. Retrieved 13 April 2019.
3. ^ Kiernan, B. (2004) How Pol Pot came to Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. xix
4. ^ "Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea". countrystudies.us. Archived from the original on
5 August 2011. Retrieved 16 November 2007.
5. ^ Jump up to:a b Karkaria, Zal. Failure "Through Neglect: The Women's Policies of the Khmer Rouge in
Comparative Perspective". Concordia University Department of History. Archived 26 July 2011 at
the Wayback Machine.
6. ^ Kiernan, Ben. "The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer
Rouge, 1975-79." New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2002. p. 19.
7. ^ Jackson, Karl D (ed.). "Cambodia, 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death." Princeton, N.J: Princeton
University Press, 1992, p215.
8. ^ Press Staff (18 April 1975). "Cambodians Designate Sihanouk as Chief for Life". The New York
Times. Archived from the original on 27 August 2017. Retrieved 28 October2015.
9. ^ Osborne, Milton E (1994). Sihanouk Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness. Honolulu, Hawaii, United
States of America: University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 978-0-8248-1639-1.
10. ^ Wessinger, Catherine (2000). Millennialism, Persecution, and Violence: Historical Cases. Syracuse
University Press. p. 282. ISBN 9780815628095. Democratic Kampuchea was officially an atheist
state, and the persecution of religion by the Khmer Rouge was matched in severity only by the
persecution of religion in the communist states of Albania and North Korea, so there were no direct
historical continuities with Buddhism into the Democratic Kampuchean era.
11. ^ Juergensmeyer, Mark. The Oxford Handbook of Global Religions. Oxford University Press. p. 495.
12. ^ Quinn-Judge, Westad, Odd Arne, Sophie. The Third Indochina War: Conflict Between China,
Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79. Routledge. p. 189.
13. ^ Philip Shenon, Phnom Penh Journal; Lord Buddha Returns, With Artists His SoldiersArchived 15
June 2018 at the Wayback Machine The New York Times - January 2, 1992
14. ^ Tyner, James A. (2008). The Killing of Cambodia: Geopolitics, Genocide, and the Unmaking of
Space. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. ISBN 978-0-7546-7096-4.
15. ^ Vickery, Michael (1984). Cambodia : 1975–1982. Boston: South End Press. ISBN 0-89608-189-3.
16. ^ Judgement of the Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia[permanent dead
link]

17. ^ Jackson, Karl D. Cambodia 1977: gone to Pot – Asian Survey, 1978. p 81
18. ^ Jackson, Karl D. Cambodia 1977: gone to Pot – Asian Survey, 1978. p 82
19. ^ Becker, Elizabeth (1986). When the War Was over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution.
New York: Simon and Schuster. ISBN 0-671-41787-8.
 20. ^ Jackson, Karl D. Cambodia, 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death. Princeton University Press.
p. 219. ISBN 0-691-02541-X.
21. ^ Ervin Staub. The roots of evil: the origins of genocide and other group violence.Cambridge
University Press, 1989. p. 202 Archived 3 June 2016 at the Wayback Machine
22. ^ David Chandler & Ben Kiernan, ed. (1983). Revolution and its Aftermath. New Haven.
23. ^ Kiernan, Ben. "The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer
Rouge, 1975-79." New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2002. p11.
24. ^ Jackson, Karl D (ed.). "Cambodia, 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death." Princeton, N.J: Princeton
University Press, 1992, p231.
25. ^ Etcheson, Craig. "The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea." Boulder, Colo: Westview,
1984. p27.
26. ^ Jackson, Karl D (ed.). "Cambodia, 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death." Princeton, N.J: Princeton
University Press, 1992, p232.
27. ^ Phan, Rithy and Bataille, Christopher. "The Elimination: a Survivor of the Khmer Rouge Confronts
His Past." Clerkenwell Press, 2012. p34.
28. ^ Vickery, Michael. "Cambodia, 1975-1982." Boston, MA: South End Press, 1984. p152.
29. ^ Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century Cornell University Press,
2004. ISBN 0-8014-3965-5 p. 127 Archived 4 May 2016 at the Wayback Machine.
30. ^ Locard, Henri, State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) and Retribution (1979-
2004) Archived 30 October 2013 at the Wayback Machine, European Review of History, Vol. 12, No.
1, March 2005, pp.121–143.
31. ^ Nicholas A. Robins, Adam Jones. Genocides by the oppressed: subaltern genocide in theory and
practice. Indiana University Press, 2009. p. 98 Archived 25 April 2016 at the Wayback Machine
32. ^ Alexander Laban Hinton. A Head for an Eye: Revenge in the Cambodian Genocide. American
Ethnologist, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Aug. 1998), pp. 352–377
33. ^ Nicholas A. Robins, Adam Jones. Genocides by the oppressed: subaltern genocide in theory and
practice. Indiana University Press, 2009. p. 97 Archived 27 April 2016 at the Wayback Machine
34. ^ Helen Fein. Revolutionary and Antirevolutionary Genocides: A Comparison of State Murders in
Democratic Kampuchea, 1975 to 1979, and in Indonesia, 1965 to 1966. Comparative Studies in
Society and History, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Oct. 1993), pp. 796–823
35. ^ Documentation Center of Cambodia Archived 28 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine
36. ^ "Yale Cambodian Genocide Program". Archived from the original on 16 September 2013.
Retrieved 19 September 2013.
37. ^ Bruce Sharp, Counting Hell: The Death Toll of the Khmer Rouge Regime in CambodiaArchived 15
November 2013 at the Wayback Machine, Mekong.net, 2008.
38. ^ Hinton, Alexander Laban. "Why did they Kill? : Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide." Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005. p287.
39. ^ Hinton, Alexander Laban. "Why did they Kill? : Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide." Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005. p46.
40. ^ Hinton, Alexander Laban. "Why did they Kill? : Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide." Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005. p97.
41. ^ Hinton, Alexander Laban. "Why did they Kill? : Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide." Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005. p260, 288.
42. ^ Hinton, Alexander Laban. "Why did they Kill? : Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide." Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005. p275.

Further reading[edit]
• Beang, Pivoine, and Wynne Cougill. Vanished Stories from Cambodia's New People Under Democratic
Kampuchea. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2006. ISBN 99950-60-07-8.
• Chandler, David P. "A History of Cambodia." Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
• Dy, Khamboly. A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979). Phnom Penh, Cambodia:
Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2007. ISBN 99950-60-04-3. Foreword.
• Etcheson, Craig. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. Westview special studies on South
and Southeast Asia. Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1984. ISBN 0-86531-650-3.
• Hinton, Alexander Laban. "Why did they Kill? : Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide." Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005.
• Kiernan, Ben. "The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge,
1975-79." New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2002.
• Vickery, Michael. "Cambodia, 1975-1982." Boston, MA: South End Press, 1984.
• Piergiorgio Pescali: "S-21 Nella prigione di Pol Pot". La Ponga Edizioni, Milan, 2015. ISBN 978-
8897823308.