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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 110017. January 2, 1997]

RODOLFO FUENTES, RAINERIO DURON, JULIET VISTAL, ELENA DELLOMES, LEODEGARIO BALHINON,
ROGELIO MALINAO, LILY BASANEZ, MALIZA ELLO, VILMA NOQUERA, JESSICA CASTILLO, ROGELIO
TABLADILLO, REMELDA VISCAYA, MELANIA VISCAYA, CELIA LUBRICO, EDITH LLACUNA, ELPIDIO
FERRER, NORBERTO MIRANDA, FERNANDO MIRANDA, CORDIO DUMAY, LEONARDO DELA VEGA,
ISIDRO ALIDO, AQUINO MACABEHA, LEOPOLDO ABAA, PAULINO ASIS, JR., REYNALDO BLANCO,
MADILYN FABON, MARCIANA OSOK, BEBIANO OSOK, FRANCISCO SEMULTA, MARCIA LLAMES,
PRINCIPE DANIEL, MARIA BAYA, NENITA RASONABLY, SORIANO PENALOSA, JOSE PENALOSA,
RODOLFO VILLAR, REMEGIAS DEMINGOY, TEODORO TUGOGON, DIONISIO APOLINARIO, EDYING
DE LA CRUZ, RODOLFO BUTAUAN, CRISPIN FABON, ARCADIO FABON, NENITA SARDINOLA, ALEX
LICAYAN, MARIO DAL, BADON EDUARDO, FELISA VILLAREL, EMILY GARAN, ROGELIO GARAN,
RODOLFO COLITE, RODOLFO MENIANO, ROMERO TERRY, ZOILO VALLEJOS, VIRGINIA BANDERA,
BLANDINA LUNA, FLAXIANA CARLON, CRESENCIO CARLON, NOTARTE LEONARDA, EFREN
CANTERE, ROWENA CAGUMAY, ALFONSO PARAJES, VIOLETA MONTECLAR, NESTOR ALLADO, JR.,
APOLONIO CULATAS, LANNIE CAPARAS, ANGELICO NUNEZ, JR., NICOLAS CANAL, HERMOGENA
TAGLOCOP, ALEJO BAUMBAD, CARLITO DE LA PENA, AMANCIO ABOYLO, JERRY PARALES, LYDIA
ALLADO, AGAPITO ODAL, MAGNO BARIOS, FLORENDO MARIANO, SOLATORIO BONIFACIO,
RENE DEMINGOY, FELIMON ADORNO, VIRGILLO INOCENCIO, RUEL INOCENCIO, AVELINO LUNA,
ALLAN MARCELLANA, FELIX SANCHEZ, AVELINO PANDI, VILLA SORIO, NOEL LAS PENAS,
FRANCISCO GARDO, ROGELIO CULLABA, GEORGE RAGAR, CARMELITO CABRIADAS, ANANIAS
MELLORIA, ALFONSO ALLADO, MARLINO MARTINEZ, LINO MARTINEZ, ERNESTO OLARAN, JOHNNY
JOSAYAN, ANECITO SOBIONO, MARGARITO DUMALAGAN, FRANCISCO CABALES, FELIX
ROCERO, PABLITO DAPAR, FRANCISCA CABALHIN, FORTUNATA BAUMBAD, CARMEN RADAY,
NICOLAS TAMON, REYNALDO CANTORIA, ELMER NAPONE, ANTONIO VALLAR, BERNADITH
TOLOZA, EMETERIA FERRER, CLANICA CABALES, CLAUDIO OJUYLAN, ERLINDA BLANCO, ROSITA
DURON, FRANCISCA ADLAWON, CARDINAL MAGLISANG, JOVEN ASIS, JOSE FLORES, ALICIA
FLORES, JULIETO ADORNO, LORENZO CANINES, ISAAC CELLASAY, ANDRES INDIABLE, ARSENIO
DURON, NARCISA MALASPINA, ROQUE SUBAAN, GRACE DURON, JAIME BALMORIA, PEDRO
PECASALES, PRIMITORAGAS and GRACE GOMA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AGUSAN PLANTATION INC., AND/OR
CHANG CHEE KONG, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

The State is bound under the Constitution to afford full protection to labor and when conflicting
interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice the heavier influence
of the latter should be counterbalanced with the sympathy and compassion the law accords the less
privileged workingman. This is only fair if the worker is to be given the opportunity and the right to
assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as part of management with which he can
negotiate on even plane. Thus labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal
partner.[1]
Petitioners, numbering seventy-five (75) in all, seek to set aside the decision of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated 27 November 1992 reversing that of the Labor Arbiter
which granted their claims, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioners were regular employees of private respondent Agusan Plantations, Inc., which was
engaged in the operation of a palm tree plantation in Trento, Agusan del Sur, since September 1982.
Claiming that it was suffering business losses which resulted in the decision of the head office in
Singapore to undertake retrenchment measures, private respondent sent notices of termination to
petitioners and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
On 31 October 1990 petitioners filed with the DOLE office in Cagayan de Oro City a complaint
for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, backwages and damages against private
respondent Agusan Plantation, Inc., and/or Chang Chee Kong. In their answer respondents denied
the allegations of petitioners and contended that upon receipt of instructions from the head office in
Singapore to implement retrenchment, private respondents conducted grievance conferences or
meetings with petitioners' representative labor organization, the Association of Trade Unions through
its national president Jorge Alegarbes, its local president and its board of directors. Private
respondents also contended that the 30-day notices of termination were duly sent to petitioners.
After both parties submitted their position papers articulating their respective theses, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision on 27 May 1992 in favor of petitioners ordering private respondents to
pay the former separation pay equivalent to fifteen (15) days pay for every year of service plus salary
differentials and attorney's fees.
On appeal by respondents to the National Labor Relations Commission, the decision of the Labor
Arbiter was reversed on 27 November 1992.
Petitioners elevated their plight to this Court on a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court alleging that respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioners were legally terminated from their employment. They
argued that their dismissal or retrenchment did not comply with the requirements of Art. 283 of the
Labor Code.
We sustain petitioners. The ruling of the Labor Arbiter that there was no valid retrenchment is
correct. Article 283 of the Labor Code clearly states:

Art 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of the title, by serving
a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving
devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent
to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in case of closure or cessation of operations
of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation
pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole
year.

Under Art. 283 therefore retrenchment may be valid only when the following requisites are met:
(a) it is to prevent losses; (b) written notices were served on the workers and the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) at least one (1) month before the effective date of retrenchment; and, (c)
separation pay is paid to the affected workers.
The closure of a business establishment is a ground for the termination of the services of an
employee unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing pertinent provisions of the Labor
Code. But while business reverses can be a just cause for terminating employees, they must be
sufficiently proved by the employer.[2]
In the case before us, private respondents merely alleged in their answer and position paper that
after their officials from the head office had visited the plantation respondent manager Chang Chee
Kong received a letter from the head office directing him to proceed immediately with the
termination of redundant workers and staff, and change the operations to contract system against
direct employment. They also alleged that after five (5) years of operations, the return of investments
of respondent company was meager; that the coup attempt in August 1987 as well as that of
December 1989 aggravated the floundering financial state of respondent company; that the
financial losses due to lack of capital funding resulted in the non-payment of long-overdue accounts;
that the untimely cut in the supply of fertilizers and manuring materials and equipment parts delayed
the payment of salaries and the implementation of weekly job rotations by the workers. Except for
these allegations, private respondents did not present any other documentary proof of their alleged
losses which could have been easily proven in the financial statements which unfortunately were not
shown.
There is no question that an employer may reduce its work force to prevent losses. However,
these losses must be serious, actual and real.[3] Otherwise, this ground for termination of employment
would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might be merely feigning losses in their
business ventures in order to ease out employees.[4]
Indeed, private respondents failed to prove their claim of business losses. What they submitted to
the Labor Arbiter were mere self-serving documents and allegations. Private respondents never
adduced evidence which would show clearly the extent of losses they suffered as a result of lack of
capital funding, which failure is fatal to their cause.
As regards the requirement of notices of termination to the employees, it is undisputed that the
Notice of Retrenchment was submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment on 12
September 1990.[5] The findings of both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC show that petitioners were
terminated on the following dates in 1990 after they received their notices of termination, to wit:

Name of Employee Date of Notice of Effectivity of


Termination Termination
1.Noquera, Vilma 22 Sept. 25 Sept.
2.Dumalagan, 22 Sept. 30 Sept.
Margarito
3.Osok, Marciano 20 Sept. 30 Sept.
4.Abaa, Leopoldo 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
5.Aboylo, Amancio 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
6.Allado, Nestor Jr. 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
7.Bandera, Verginia 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
8.Basanez, Lily 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
9.Baumbad, Alejo 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
10.Blanco, Myrna 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
11.Blanco, Reynaldo 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
12.Canal, Marieto 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
13.Fabon, Madilyn 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
14.Ferrer, Elpidio 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
15.Meniano, Rodolfo 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
16.Nunez, Angelico 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
17.Osok, Bebiano 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
18.Penaloga, Jose Jr. 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
19.Taglocop, Hermogena 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
20.Allado, Lydio 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
21.Baya, Maria 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
22.Carlon, Flaviana 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
23.Carlon, Cresencio 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
24.Culaba, Rogelio 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
25.Cabriades, 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
Carmelito
26.Dellomes, Elma 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
27.Fabon, Arcadio 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
28.Gordo, Francisco 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
29.Inocencio, Virgilio 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
30.Inocencio, Ruel 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
31.Luna, Blandina 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
32.Luna, Avelino 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
33.Lubrico, Celia 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
34.Monteclar, Violeta 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
35.Macabecha, 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
Aquino
36.Melloria, Ananian 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
37.Malinao, Rogelio 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
38.Leonarda, Notarte 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
39.Parejas, Jerry 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
40.Parejas, Alfonso 22 Aug. 25 Sept.

41.Sardinola, Alfonso 22 Aug. 25 Sept.


42.Solaterio, Bonifacio 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
Culled from the above data, the termination of petitioners could not have validly taken effect
either on 25 or 30 September 1990. The one-month notice of retrenchment filed with the DOLE and
served on the workers before the intended date thereof is mandatory. Private respondents failed to
comply with this requisite. The earliest possible date of termination should be 12 October 1990 or one
(1) month after notice was sent to DOLE unless the notice of termination was sent to the workers later
than the notice to DOLE on 12 September 1990, in which case, the date of termination should be at
least one (1) month from the date of notice to the workers. Petitioners were terminated less than a
month after notice was sent to DOLE and to each of the workers.
We agree with the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter that the termination of the services of
petitioners was illegal as there was no valid retrenchment. Respondent NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter and ruling that there was substantial
compliance with the law. This Court firmly holds that measures should be strictly implemented to
ensure that such constitutional mandate on protection to labor is not rendered meaningless by an
erroneous interpretation of applicable laws.
We uphold the monetary award of the Labor Arbiter for: (a) the balance of the separation pay
benefits of petitioners equivalent to fifteen (15) days for every year of service after finding that
reinstatement is no longer feasible under the circumstances, and (b) the salary differentials for
complainants who were relieved during the pendency of the case before the Labor Arbiter and full
back wages for the rest of the complainants. This is in accord with Art. 279 of the Labor Code as
amended by R.A. 6715 under which petitioners who were unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to full back wages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time their compensation was withheld up to the date of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Labor Arbiter of 27 March 1992 granting
petitioners their claim for the balance of their separation pay benefits equivalent to fifteen (15) days
for every year of service, and salary differentials for complainants who were relieved during the
pendency of the case before the Labor Arbiter, and full back wages for the rest of the complainants
is REINSTATED. Consequently, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 27
September 1992 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 119243. April 17, 1997]

BREW MASTER INTERNATIONAL INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU),
ANTONIO D. ESTRADA and HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third
Division), respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking the reversal of the 7 October 1994 decision[1] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 00-06-04136-93 (CA No. L-007370-
94), which modified the 11 July 1994 decision[2] of the Labor Arbiter by directing the reinstatement of
private respondent Antonio D. Estrada, the complainant, without loss of seniority rights and benefits.
Private respondent National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), a co-complainant in the labor
case, is a labor union of which complainant is a member.
The factual and procedural antecedents are summarized in the decision of the Labor Arbiter
which we quote verbatim:

Complainant was first employed by respondent on 16 September 1991 as route helper with the latest
daily wage of P119.00. From 19 April 1993 up to 19 May 1993, for a period of one (1) month,
complainant went on absent without permission (AWOP). On 20 May 1993, respondent thru Mr.
Rodolfo Valentin, sent a Memo to complainant, to wit:

Please explain in writing within 24 hours of your receipt of this memo why no disciplinary action should
be taken against you for the following offense:

You were absent since April 19, 1993 up to May 19, 1993.

For your strict compliance.

In answer to the aforesaid memo, complainant explained:

Sa dahilan po na ako ay hindi nakapagpaalam sainyo [sic] dahil inuwi ko ang mga anak ko sa
Samar dahil ang asawa ko ay lumayas at walang mag-aalaga sa mga anak ko. Kaya naman hindi
ako naka long distance or telegrama dahil wala akong pera at ibinili ko ng gamot ay puro utang pa.

Finding said explanation unsatisfactory, on 16 June 1993, respondent thru its Sales Manager, Mr.
Henry A. Chongco issued a Notice of Termination which reads:

We received your letter of explanation dated May 21, 1993 but we regret to inform you that we do
not consider it valid. You are aware of the company Rules and Regulations that absence without
permission for six (6) consecutive working days is considered abandonment of work.

In view of the foregoing, the company has decided to terminate your employment effective June 17,
1993 for abandonment of work.

Hence, this complaint.

Complainants contend that individual complainants dismissal was done without just cause; that it
was not sufficiently established that individual complainants absence from April 19, 1993 to June 16,
1993 are unjustified; that the penalty of dismissal for such violation is too severe; that in imposing such
penalty, respondent should have taken into consideration complainants length of service and as a
first offender, a penalty less punitive will suffice such as suspension for a definite period, (Position
Paper, complainants).
Upon the other hand, respondent contends that individual complainant was dismissed for cause
allowed by the company Rules and Regulations and the Labor Code; that the act of complainant in
absenting from work for one (1) month without official leave is deleterious to the business of
respondent; that it will result to stoppage of production which will not only destructive to respondents
interests but also to the interest of its employees in general; that the dismissal of complainant from the
service is legal, (Position Paper, respondent).[3]

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, citing the principle of managerial
control, which recognizes the employers prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations to
govern the conduct of his employees. The principle allows the imposition of disciplinary measures
which are necessary for the efficiency of both the employer and the employees. In complainant's
case, he persisted in not reporting for work until 16 June 1993 notwithstanding his receipt of the
memorandum requiring him to explain his absence without approval. The Labor Arbiter, relying
on Shoemart, Inc. vs. NLRC,[4] thus concluded:

Verily, it is crystal clear that individual complainant has indeed abandoned his work. The filing of the
complaint on 25 June 1993 or almost two (2) months from the date complainant failed to report for
work affirms the findings of this Office and therefore, under the law and jurisprudence which upholds
the right of an employer to discharge an employee who incurs frequent, prolonged and unexplained
absences as being grossly remiss in his duties to the employer and is therefore, dismissed for cause,
(Shoemart, Inc. vs. NLRC, 176 SCRA 385). An employee is deemed to have abandoned his position or
to have resigned from the same, whenever he has been absent therefrom without previous
permission of the employer for three consecutive days or more. This justification is the obvious harm to
employers interest, resulting from [sic] the non-availability of the workers services,
(Supra). (underscoring supplied)[5]

and ruled that complainants termination from his employment was legal, the same with just or
authorized cause and due process.[6]
Complainant appealed to the NLRC, alleging that the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal verily indicated that he never intended to abandon his work, then citedPolicarpio v. Vicente
Dy Sun, Jr.,[7] where the NLRC ruled that prolonged absence does not, by itself, necessarily mean
abandonment. Accordingly, there must be a concurrence of intention and overt acts from which it
can be inferred that the employee is no longer interested in working. Complainant likewise invoked
compassion in the application of sanctions, as dismissal from employment brings untold hardship and
sorrows on the dependents of the wage earners. In his case, a penalty less punitive than dismissal
could have sufficed.
In the assailed decision[8] of 7 October 1994, the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's decision and
held that complainants dismissal was invalid for the following reasons:

Complainant-appellants prolonged absences, although unauthorized, may not amount to gross


neglect or abandonment of work to warrant outright termination of employment. Dismissal is too
severe a penalty. For one, the mere fact that complainant-appellant is a first offender must be
considered in his favor. Besides, it is generally impossible for an employee to anticipate when he
would be ill or compelled to attend to some family problems or emergency like in the case at bar.

Reliance on the ruling enunciated in the cited case of Shoemart Inc. vs. National Labor Relations, 176
SCRA 385, is quite misplaced because of the obvious dissimilarities of the attendant circumstances in
the said case vis-a-vis those obtaining in the case at bar. Unlike in the aforecited Shoemart Case,
herein complainant-appellant was not dismissed for unauthorized absences and eventually
reinstated anterior to his second dismissal for the same offense nor was he given a second chance
which he could have ignored.

Otherwise stated, the difference between the two cases greatly lies [in] the fact that complainant in
the Shoemart Case in the language of the Supreme Court was an inveterate absentee who does not
deserve reinstatement compared to herein complainant-appellant who is a first offender[9]

The NLRC then decreed as follows:


PREMISES CONSIDERED, and [sic] the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 11 July 1994 is hereby
MODIFIED, by directing the reinstatement of complainant-appellant to his former position without loss
of seniority rights and other benefits, but without backwages. The other findings in the appealed
decision stand AFFIRMED.[10]

Petitioners motion for the reconsideration[11] was denied by the NLRC in its 7 December 1994
resolution.[12] Petitioner thus filed this special civil action contending that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in ordering complainant's reinstatement, which in effect countenances the
reinstatement of an employee who is found guilty of excessive absences without prior approval. It
further argued that the NLRC failed to consider the rationale behind petitioners Rules and
Regulations; that it was deprived of its prerogative to enforce them; and that complainant's
reinstatement would adversely affect its business and send the wrong signals to its employees.
In its comment[13] for public respondent NLRC, the Office of the Solicitor General maintained that
dismissal from employment was too severe a penalty for a first time offender like
complainant. Although he violated petitioners rules and regulations, his absences were justified: he
had to bring his children to Samar, his home province, as his wife deserted him. While that by itself
might not excuse the failure to seek permission, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted,
however, that it would be at [sic] the height of callousness if one, considering his plight under the
circumstance[s], would not give due consideration to [complainants] explanation. There has to be
an exception.[14]
Applying Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC,[15] the Office of the Solicitor General recommended
complainants reinstatement, which would be more harmonious to the dictates of social justice and
equity. It further emphasized that the reinstatement should not be considered a condonation of
complainants irresponsible behavior, rather, it must be viewed as a mitigation of the severity of the
penalty of dismissal. Accordingly, it prays that this petition be dismissed.
In its reply,[16] petitioner disputed the application of Itogon-Suyoc because: (1) the employee
involved therein had been in the service for twenty-three years while complainant herein had served
petitioner for only two years; and (2) the offense in Itogon-Suyoc was limited to a single act of high
grading while complainant herein committed a series of unexcused absences.
We gave due course to the petition and dispensed with complainants comment.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
modifying the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The answer must be in the negative.
A scrutiny of the facts discloses that complainants absence was precipitated by a grave family
problem as his wife unexpectedly deserted him and abandoned the family. Considering that he had
a full-time job, there was no one to whom he could entrust the children and he was thus compelled
to bring them to the province. It would have been extremely difficult for him to have been husband
and wife/father and mother at the same time to the children in the metropolis. He was then under
emotional, psychological, spiritual and physical stress and strain. The reason for his absence is, under
these circumstances, justified. While his failure to inform and seek petitioner's approval was an
omission which must be corrected and chastised, he did not merit the severest penalty of dismissal
from the service.
Petitioners finding that complainant was guilty of abandonment is misplaced. Abandonment as
a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment. Two elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship. The second element is the more determinative factor and must be evinced by overt
acts.[17] Likewise, the burden of proof is on the employer to show the employees clear and deliberate
intent to discontinue his employment without any intention of returning,[18] mere absence is not
sufficient.[19] These elements are not present here. First, as held above, complainant's absence was
justified under the circumstances. As to the second requisite, we are not convinced that complainant
ever intended to sever the employer-employee relationship. Complainant immediately complied
with the memo requiring him to explain his absence, and upon knowledge of his termination,
immediately sued for illegal dismissal. These plainly refuted any claim that he was no longer
interested in returning to work.[20] Without doubt, the intention is lacking.
Moreover, petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof that complainant was guilty of
abandonment. No evidence other than complainants letter explaining his absence was
presented. Needless to state, the letter did not indicate, in the least, that complainant was no longer
interested in returning to work. On the contrary, complainant sought petitioners understanding. In
declaring him guilty of abandonment, petitioner merely relied on its Rules and Regulations which
limited its application to a six-day continuous absence, contrary to the purpose of the law. While the
employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his
employees, these rules and their implementation must be fair, just and reasonable. It must be
underscored that no less than our Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and
protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state policy,[21] but under the Article on
Social Justice and Human Rights,[22] thus placing labor contracts on a higher plane and with greater
safeguards. Verily, relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are
impressed with public interest and labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.[23]
We then conclude that complainants "prolonged" absence without approval does not fall within
the definition of abandonment and that his dismissal was unjustified. While we do not decide here
the validity of petitioner's Rules and Regulations on continuous, unauthorized absences, what is plain
is that it was wielded with undue haste resulting in a deprivation of due process, thus not allowing for
a determination of just cause or abandonment. In this light, petitioner's dismissal was illegal. This is not
to say that his absence should go unpunished, as impliedly noted by the NLRC in declining to award
back wages. In the absence of the appropriate offense which defines complainants infraction in the
companys Rules and Regulations, equity dictates that a penalty commensurate to the infraction be
imposed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC Case No. 06-04136-93 is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000]


INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B.
TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in
his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL,
INC., respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent
School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their
colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be
given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a
principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.

Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree
732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents.[1] To enable the School to continue carrying out its
educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree
authorizes the School to

employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or
abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from
otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws
that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.

Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying
the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine
whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:

a.....What is one's domicile?

b.....Where is one's home economy?

c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?

d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the
School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?[2]

Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as
a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a
salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two
"significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation
factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:

A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his
family and friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path-all for the
purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The
new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for
one's family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's
children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary
benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.

Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same
economic reality after his term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home
country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable
employment after a long period in a foreign land.

The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain


competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in
the field of international education.[3]

When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner
International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining
representative of all faculty members"[4] of the School, contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be
included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting
Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in
favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.

Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all,
with nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires. [5]The
Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the
Filipino local-hires:

The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race.
Truth to tell, there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino
local hires.[6]

The Acting Secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:

The principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find application in the present case.
The international character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal
with different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.

We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits


accorded to foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree
that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to
render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the
international market.

Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of
employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity
therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and
conditions of employment which include the employment contract.

A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for
salary and professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:

All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in


accordance with Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of
the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from
abroad, under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted
international practice.

Appendix C of said CBA further provides:


The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited
Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed
value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as
differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).

To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in
the status of two types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.

The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is
an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of
the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable
classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and
apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between
foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no
amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation
package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.[7]

We cannot agree.

That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and
laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution[8] in the Article on Social Justice and
Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."

International law, which springs from general principles of law,[9] likewise proscribes discrimination.
General principles of law include principles of equity,[10] i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice, based on the test of what is reasonable.[11] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[12] the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,[13] the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,[14] the Convention against Discrimination in
Education,[15] the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation[16] - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness
and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.

In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of
capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.

The Constitution[17] specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These
conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but
include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

The Constitution[18] also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code[19] provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless
of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the
State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities,
closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.[20]

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for
example, prohibits and penalizes[21] the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as
against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization.

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7
thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:

a.....Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

i.....Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions
of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work;

x x x.

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of
"equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.[22] This rule applies to the School,
its "international character" notwithstanding.

The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal
to that of foreign-hires.[23] The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords
employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work.
This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less
than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive
more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it
is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-
hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar
functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the
distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.

"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services
performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid
at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[24] we said that:

"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or


industry in another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more
fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea
of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an
enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires
and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation
factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in
salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately
compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," [25] "to
afford labor full protection."[26] The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital.[27] These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the
common good.[28] Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy,
courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of
the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does
not deserve the sympathy of this Court.

We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to
serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law."[29] The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. [30] The
basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights.[31]

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with
local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also
shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires
enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working
conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires.
These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel
allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the
former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure
either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according
foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
[G.R. No. 112630. September 5, 1997]

CORAZON JAMER and CRISTINA AMORTIZADO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE and/or JOHN GO, respondents.

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

The decision[1] of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)[2] in NLRC NCR
CA 002074-91,[3] promulgated on November 12 1993, is herein sought to be annulled for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion, it having reversed and set aside the decision[4] of Labor
Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. by dismissing the petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal against private
respondent Isetann Department Store (Isetann, for brevity). The decretal part of the NLRC decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby set aside and new one
promulgated declaring that the dismissal from the service of complainants Corazon Jamer and
Cristina Amortizado was valid and for cause. Consequently, the order of reinstatement with
backwages and attorneys fees are likewise vacated and set aside.[5]

Although the Labor Arbiter[6] and the NLRC reached contrary conclusions, both agree on the
following facts:

Complainant, Corazon Jamer was employed on February 10, 1976 as a Cashier at Joy Mart, a sister
company of Isetann. After two (2) years, she was later on promoted to the position of counter
supervisor. She was transferred to Isetann, Carriedo Branch, as a money changer. In 1982 she was
transferred to the Cubao Branch of Isetann, as a money changer, till her dismissal on August 31, 1990.

Complainant Cristina Amortizado, on the other hand, was employed also at Joy Mart in May, 1977 as
a sales clerk. In 1980 she was promoted to the position as counter cashier. Thereafter, she was
transferred to Young Un Department Store as an assistant to the money changer. Later on, or in 1985,
she transferred to Isetann, Cubao Branch where she worked as a Store Cashier till her dismissal on
August 31, 1990.

Both complainants were receiving a salary of P4,182.00 for eight (8) hours work at the time of their
dismissal.

Respondent Isetann Department Store on the other hand, is a corporation duly organized and
existing under laws of the Philippines and is engaged in retail trade and the department store
business. Individual respondent, John Go is the President/General (Manager) of respondent
Department Store.

This complaint arose from the dismissal of the complainants by the respondents. They were both
dismissed on August 31, 1990 on the alleged ground of dishonesty in their work as Store Cashiers.

Complainants (sic) function as Store Cashiers is to accumulate, at the end of daily operations, the
cash sales receipts of the selling floor cash register clerks. At the close of business hours, all the cash
sales of the floor cash register clerks are turned over by them to the Store Cashiers, complainants
herein, together with the tally sheets prepared by the cash register clerks. Thereafter, complainants
will reconcile the cash sales with the tally sheets to determine shortages or coverages(sic) and
deposit the same with the bank depositor(sic) of respondents company. Thereafter, the recorded
transactions are forwarded to the main branch of respondents company at Carriedo for counter-
checking.

On July 16, 1990, complainants discovered a shortage of P15,353.78. It was complainant Corazon
Jamer who first discovered the shortage. In fact at first, she thought that it was merely a P1,000.00
shortage but when she reconciled the cash receipts, from the cash register counters, with the tally
sheets and the actual money on hand, the shortage amounted to P15,353.78. She informed her co-
store cashier, complainant Cristina Amortizado, about the shortage. Cristina Amortizado also
reconciled and re-counted the sale previous to July 16, 1990 and she also confirmed that there was a
discrepancy or a shortage of P15,353.78.. They did not, (sic) immediately report the shortage to
management hoping to find the cause of the shortage but to no avail they failed to reconcile the
same. Hence, they had no other alternative but to report the same to the management on July 17,
1990.

Complainants, together with another Store Cashier, Lutgarda Inducta, were asked to explain and
they submitted their respective written explanations for the shortage of P15,353.78. and the P450.00
under deposit last July 14, 1990.

Respondents placed both complainants and their co-store cashier Lutgarda Inducta under
preventive suspension for the alleged shortages. Thereafter, respondents conducted an
administrative investigation. Finding the explanation of the complainants to be unsatisfactory,
respondent dismissed the complainants from the service on August 31, 1990. Aggrieved and not
satisfied with the decision of management terminating their services, complainant instituted this
present action on September 26, 1990 for illegal dismissal praying for reinstatement with payment of
backwages and other benefits. [7]

In justifying complainants dismissal from their employment, respondents alleged:

When the transactions for July 15, 1990 were being reconciled, a shortage of P15,353.78 was
discovered. Also uncovered was an under-deposit of P450.00 of cash receipts for July 14, 1990.

Considering that the foregoing deficits were attributable to herein appellees and to another store
cashier, Mrs. Lutgarda Inducta, who were the ones on duty those days respondent Isetanns Human
Resources Division Manager, Teresita A. Villanueva, issued letters (Exh. 1 and 5) individually addressed
to herein appellees and Mrs. Inducta requiring them to submit written explanations in regard to their
above malfeasance within 48 hours from receipt thereof. Pursuant to said letters, they were likewise
placed under preventive suspension.

Thereafter, the Committee o Discipline of appellant Isetann conducted a series of investigations


probing appellees and Mrs. Inductas aforestated shortages. In addition to the shortage
of P15,353.78(sic) and underdeposit of P450.00, said investigation also included the following sums
which appellees failed to turnover or account for:

a) P1,000.00- amount borrowed by Lutgarda Inducta from Corazon Jamer;

b) P 70.00- over replenishment of petty cash expenses incurred by Cristina Amortizado.

After the administrative investigation, the Committee on Discipline rendered its decision (Exhs. 3, 3-A,
to 3-D) dated August 23, 1990 duly approved by the General Manager of respondent Isetann, finding
the appellees and Mrs. Inducta responsible for said shortages and consequently requiring them to
restitute the same to respondent Isetann. This Decision and the notices of termination were sent by
respondent Isetann to the appellees, and which the latter admittedly received.

On the other hand, the complainants account of the factual antecedents that let (sic) to their
dismissal is as follows:

Aside from the foregoing persons, Alex Mejia had and was allowed by management to have
uncontrolled access to the said room including the vault. Ostensibly, the purpose was to assist in the
bringing in or taking out of coin bags, monies, etc.

There were therefore, at a minimum at least six (6) persons who could have had access to the
company funds. To ascribe liability to the store cashiers alone, in the absence of a clear proof of any
wrongdoing is not only unfair and discriminatory but is likewise illegal.
Parenthetically, and within the parameters of their assigned tasks, herein complainants could not be
faulted in any way for the said shortage as there is no showing that the loss occurred at the time they
were in control of the funds concerned.

Complainants do not dispute the fact that there appeared to be a shortage of P15.373.78(sic) for the
July 15, 1990 (a Sunday) sales and which were tallied and the loss discovered on the following day,
July 16, 1990. They however vehemently deny any culpability or participation in any kind, directly or
indirectly, in regard to the said loss or shortage. Given the kind of trust reposed upon them by
respondents for fourteen and thirteen years respectively they were not about, although they could
have done so before given the negligence and laxity of management in regard to the control and
handling of funds of the store, to break said trust.

At the time the persons who had access either to the vault the money and/or the keys aside from
herein complainants, were: 1) Lutgarda Inducta, also a store cashier on duty at the time; 2) the SOM
Mrs. Samonte, the supervisor in charge; 3) Alex Mejia, an employee assigned as utility man; and 4)
Boy Cabatuando.

There were (sic) three (3) keys to the money changers room, and these keys were assigned and
distributed to: a) master key is or was with the SOMs (Mrs. Samonte) room at the 3 rd floor of the
building; b) another key is or was in the possession of the keeper of the keys, i.e. Boy Cabatuando;
and c) the third and last key is any of the store cashiers depending on who is on duty at the time.

Likewise, there were four (4) persons who were aware and knew of the vault combination. These
were the three store cashiers, i.e. herein complainants, Lutgarda Inducta and their SOM, Mrs.
Samonte.[8]

On July 23, 1991, Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro, to whom the instant contoversy was originally
assigned, rendered a decision[9] in favor of herein petitioners, finding that petitioners had been
illegally dismissed, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby directed to reinstate complainants to service effective August
1, 1991 with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Expectedly, respondents Isetann and John Go appealed the aforesaid decision to the NLRC. On
January 31, 1992, the NLRC issued a resolution[11] remanding this case to the NLRC National Capital
Region Arbitrattion Branch for further proceedings in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged decision is hereby SET ASIDE and VACATED.

The entire records of this case is hereby remanded to the NLRC National Capital Region Arbitration
Branch for further proceedings.

Considering that the Labor Arbiter a quo rendered a decision in this case and in order to dispel any
suspicion of pre-judgment of this case, the Executive Labor Arbiter is hereby directed to have this
case re-raffled to another Labor Arbiter.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Consequently, the present case was then re-raffled to Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. After a
full-blown trial, the said Labor Arbiter found for the petitioners and declared that there was no
justification, whether in fact or in law, for their dismissal. The decretal part of the decision[13] dated
March 31, 1993, states:

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgement(sic) is hereby rendered finding the dismissal of
complainants, Cristina Amortizado and Corazon Jamer to be illegal and concomitantly,
(r)espondents are hereby ordered to pay complainants, Corazon Jamer the amount of P125,460.00
and Cristina Amortizado the amount of P125,460.00, representing full backwages from the time of
their dismissal (August 31, 1990) till actual or payroll reinstatement at the option of the respondent
(computed until promulgation only). Respondents are also hereby further ordered to reinstate the
complainants to their former position as Store Cashiers without loss of seniority rights, privileges and
benefits, failure to do so backwages shall continue to run but in no case to exceed three (3) years.

Respondents are also ordered to pay complainants the amount of P25,092.00 representing 10%
attorneys fees based in the total judgement(sic) award of P250,920.00.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Dissatisfied over the decision of the Labor Arbiter which struck private respondents as grossly
contrary to the evidence presented, the herein private respondents once again appealed to the
NLRC. And, as earlier stated, the NLRC rendered the challenged decision[15] on November 12, 1993,
vacating the decision of the Labor Arbiter and entering a new one dismissing the petitioners
complaint.
Hence, this petition wherein the main issue to be resolved is whether NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in finding that petitioners were validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.
At the outset, the Court notes petitioners inexcusable failure to move for the reconsideration of
respondent NLRCs decision. Thus, the present petition suffers from a procedural defect that warrants
its outright dismissal. While in some exceptional cases we allowed the immediate recourse to this
Court, we find nothing herein that could warrant an exceptional treatment to this petition which will
justify the omission. This premature action of petitioners constitutes a fatal infirmity as ruled in a long
line of decisions,[16] most recently in the case of Building Care Corporation vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al.:[17]

the filing of such a motion is intended to afford public respondent an opportunity to correct any
actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of
the case. Petitioners inaction or negligence under the circumstances is tantamount to a deprivation
of the right and opportunity of the respondent Commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly
committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. xxx

xxx And for failure to avail of the correct remedy expressly provided by law, petitioner has permitted
the subject Resolution to become final and executory after the lapse of the ten day period within
which to file such motion for reconsideration.

Likewise, a motion for reconsideration is an adequate remedy; hence certiorari proceedings,as in


this case, will not prosper.[18] Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, clearly
provides that:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, xxx

The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of
respondent.[19] In the case at bench, the plain and adequate remedy referred to in Rule 65, Section
1, is a motion for reconsideration of the challenged decision and the resolution thereof, which was
expected to provide an adequate and a more speedy remedy than the present petition
for certiorari.
Petitioners asseverate that respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
reversed the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter.
We find said submissions untenable.
In asserting that there was a grave abuse of discretion, petitioners advert to alleged variances in
the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the respondent NLRC. This is inept and erroneous. Firstly,
errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special
civil action for certiorari.[20] Secondly, a careful reading of the records of this case would readily show
that there is any error by public respondent in its analysis of the facts and its evaluation of the
evidence, it is not of such a degree as may be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion does not
necessarily follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary assessment of the NLRC and that of the Labor
Arbiter would, as a matter of course, so warrant another full review of the facts. The NLRCs decision,
so long as it is not bereft of support from the records, deserves respect from the Court.[21]
We must once more reiterate our much repeated but not well-heeded rule that the special civil
action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. The rationale for this rule is simple. When a court exercises its jurisdiction being exercised
when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The
administration of justice would not countenance such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment
that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original
special civil action of certiorari.[22]
On the merits, we find and so hold that substantial evidence exists to warrant the finding that
petitioners were validly dismissed for just cause and after observance of due process.
Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee by
his employer are two-fold: the substantive and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a
valid or authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 282, 283 and 284, of the Labor Code, as
amended), but the rudimentary requirements of due process, basic of which are the opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself, must be observed before an employee may be dismissed.[23]
With respect to the first requisite, Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

ART. 282. Termination by Employer.- An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. (Italics supplied)

In the instant case, we find no difficulty in agreeing with the findings of the public respondent
that the herein petitioners were guilty of acts of dishonesty by incurring several occurrences of
shortages in the amounts of P15,353.78, P1,000.00, P450.00 and P70.00 which they failed to turnover
and account for/and in behalf of respondent Isetann. Fittingly, the findings of the NLRC are worth
stressing at this point, to wit:

With regard to the several occurrences of shortages of the amounts of P15,353.78, P1,000.00, P450.00
and P70.00 , the Labor Arbiter has failed to consider the fact that complainants-appellees were
accorded the chance to explain their side as to the shortages and that they have utterly failed to do
so providing basis for their valid dismissal. This fact has been established by the respondents-
appellants in the findings of the Committee on Discipline on Exhibits 3, 3-A to 3-D, as follows:

a) On the Shortage of P15,353.78:


The 3 respondents, Lutgarda Inducta, Cristy Amortizado and Corazon Jamer denied any involvement
in the loss of P15,353.78. Although the money, is under their responsibility, not one of them gave any
explanation about the shortage or loss.

b) On the amount of P1,000.00 borrowed by Inducta from Jamer:

On July 18, 1990, Lutgarda Inducta borrowed money from respondents (sic) Jamer amounting
to P1,000.00 to cover her shortage.

Ms. Jamer said that Ms. Inducta paid the amount on that day. But Ms. Jamer did not report the
shortage.

c) On the Underdeposit of Cash = P450.00.

The computation of Ms. Amortizado s sales collections last July 14, 1990 resulted to an overage
of P350.00. Amortizado turned over the amount of P350.00, to cover up a shortage incurred by her
and Mrs. Inducta.

Jamer used the money given to her by Amortizado (P350.00), and borrowed (P150.00) from the
change fund to cover the total shortage amounting to P500.00 which she had then.

Jamer cannot trace how the shortage came about. Inducta and Jamer shouldered the total
shortage amounting to P500.00, P330.00 for Jamer and P200.00 for Inducta. Jamer claimed that she
returned theP350.00 in the box. However, the claim of respondent was further verified from the payroll
section which revealed that a value slip was issued last July 1990. Jamer and Inducta were charged
for P200.00 each. A value slip was issued last August 10, 1990 charging P100.00 to Amortizado.

Jamer admitted that she failed to inform the Audit Staff regarding the P350.00 overage which she
received from Amortizado. A(s) per report of Ms. Agnes Gonzales dated 26 July 1990, there was a
total under deposit of cash amounting to P450.00.

Total cash admitted P65,428.05

(cash in drawer)

Total cash remitted P64,978.05

(per tally sheet) _________

Overage P 450.00

d) On the P70.00 Replenishment of Petty Cash Expenses:

During the 3rd Administrative hearing, the Committee informed Ms. Amortizado regarding the over
replenishment of petty cash expenses as revealed by the Finance Manager last August 10, 1990.

Mrs. Amortizado readily admitted and explained that she forgot to inform Mrs. Inducta regarding
the P70.00. She admitted her failure to correct the amount from P100.00 to P30.00 (total expenses
spent for the taxi fair).

She added that she previously incurred a shortage amounting to P100.00. Then she used the P70.00
to cover for the shortage. The remaining balance of P30.00 was paid by Amortizado.

Amortizado informed the Committee that she is willing to refund the P70.00 shortage. (Underscoring
supplied).[24]

From the foregoing premises, it is crystal clear that the failure of petitioners to report the
aforequoted shortages and overages to management as soon as they arose resulted in the breach
of the fiduciary trust reposed in them by respondent company, thereby causing the latter to lose
confidence in them. This warrants their dismissal. Moreover, it must be pointed out that herein
petitioners have in fact admitted the underpayment of P450.00 not only in their Sinumpaang
Salaysay but also during the hearing conducted before Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu. [25] And, the
record shows that the petitioners in fact made a last ditch effort to conceal the same. Were it not for
its timely discovery by private respondents trusted employees, the incident could not have been
discovered at all. Furthermore, it is worth stressing at this juncture that the petitioners have also
expressly admitted the shortage of P15,353.78a substantial amountin their respective sworn
statements, and they were not able to satisfactorily explain such shortage.[26] The Court is convinced
that these particular acts or omissions provided Isetann with enough basis to forfeit its trust and
confidence over herein petitioners.
The NLRC, therefore, did not act with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that petitioners were
legally dismissed from employment. The failure of petitioners to report to management the
aforementioned irregularities constitute fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by their
employer or duly authorized representative one of the just causes in terminating employment as
provided for by paragraph (c), Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended.
In other words, petitioners admissions in their sworn statements, together with the other
documentary evidences on record, constituted breach of trust on their part which justifies their
dismissal. Private respondents Isetann Department Store and Mr. John Go cannot be compelled to
retain employees who are clearly guilty of malfeasance as their continued employment will be
prejudicial to the formers best interest.[27] The law, I protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes
neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.[28]
The cause of social justice is not served by upholding the interest of petitioners in disregard of the
right of private respondents. Social justice ceases to be an effective instrument for the equalization of
the social and economic forces by the State when it is used to shield wrongdoing. [29] While it is true
that compassion and human consideration should guide the disposition of cases involving
termination of employment since it affects ones source or means of livelihood, it should not be
overlooked that the benefits accorded to labor do not include compelling an employer to retain the
services of an employee who has been shown to be a gross liability to the employer. It should be
made clear that when the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of labor, it is but a recognition of the
inherent economic inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scale of
justice; to put up the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases where the
circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never should the scale
be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer, Justicia remini regarda est (Justice is to be
denied to none).[30]
Thus, this Court has held time and again, in a number of decisions,[31] that:

Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee and proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the employees misconduct is not required to dismiss him on this charge. It is sufficient if there is
some basis for such loss of confidence or if the employer has reasonable ground to believe or to
entertain the moral conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and
that the nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position.[32]

Parenthetically, the fact that petitioners Jamer and Amortizado had worked for respondent
company for fourteen (14) and thirteen (13) years, respectively, should be taken against them. The
infractions that they committed, notwithstanding their long years of service with the company,
reflects a regrettable lack of loyaltyloyalty that they should have shouldered instead of betrayed. If
the petitioners length of service is to be regarded as a justifying circumstance in moderating the
dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and
undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.[33]
Petitioners also maintain that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
consider the fact that, other than petitioners themselves, there were four (4) other persons who had
access to the company vaults, and hence, could have been responsible for the aforesaid cash
shortages imputed to them. They aver therefore, that there was a serious flaw and laxity in the
supervision and handling of company funds by respondent Isetann.[34]
We also find this contention devoid of merit.
First, it must pointed out that the petitioners remark that there was laxity in the accounting
procedures of the company is a matter addressed to the respondent employer. However, this does
not excuse dishonesty of employees and should not in any case hamper the right of the employer to
terminate the employment of petitioners on the ground of loss of confidence or breach of trust.
Precisely, the accounting procedure which called for improvements was based primarily on trust and
confidence.[35]
Secondly, it must be noted that the herein petitioners were store cashiers and as such, a special
and unique employment relationship exists between them and the respondent company. More than
most key positions, that of cashier calls for the utmost trust and confidence because their primary
function involves basically the handling of a highly essential property of the respondent employer ---
the sales and revenues of the store. Employers are consequently given wider latitude of discretion in
terminating the employment of managerial employees or other personnel occupying positions of
responsibility, such as in the instant case, than in the case of ordinary rank-and-file employees, whose
termination on the basis of these same grounds requires proof of involvement in the malfeasance in
question. Mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not suffice.[36] In that
respect , we quote with approval the observations of the NLRC:

To expound further, for the position of a cashier, the honesty and integrity of the persons assuming
said position are the primary considerations for the nature of her work requires that her actuations
should be beyond suspicion as they are accorded the responsibility of handling money and
whatever they would do to such property of the employer largely depend on their trustworthiness.
Hence, the right of the employer to dismiss a cashier guilty of breach and trust and confidence
should be recognized. In a case decided by the Supreme Court it has been ruled that:

Honesty and integrity are the primary considerations in petitioners position. The nature of his work
requires that the actuations should be beyond suspicion, our empathy with the cause of labor should
not blind us to the rights of management. As we have held, this Court should help stamp out, rather
than tolerate, the commission of irregular acts whenever these are noted. Malpractices should not
be allowed to continue but should be rebuked. (Del Carmen vs. NLRC, 203 SCRA 245)[37]

Finally, we are convinced that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in evaluating
the evidence. Petitioners merely denied the charges against them. Denials are weak forms of
defenses, particularly when they are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. [38] The
petitioners failure to satisfactorily explain the cash shortages, for which sums they are responsible,
given their respective positions in respondent company, is enough reason to warrant their dismissal
on the ground of loss of confidence. They cannot place the burden on somebody else given the
factual circumstances of this case. As succinctly put by the NLRC:

That there were other persons who had access to the vaults of the appellant company implying that
these other persons could have been responsible for the loss of the P15,353.78 is of no moment
inasmuch as the appellees were the ones who took first custody of the possession of said collections.
As store cashiers, it is expected of them to exercise ordinary prudence to count the collection and
record the same in the tally sheet before depositing to said vault to avoid a slightest suspicion of
having pocketed part of it should a shortage arise. They did not exert efforts to exercise such
prudence demanded of their positions hence, appellants should not be blamed when they were
called for an investigation when said shortage was discovered.

xxx xxx xxx

That the occurrence of shortages is merely an isolated one and therefore should not be taken
against the complainant-appellees as a ground for loss of trust and confidence that would cause
their termination cannot be given any credence. The shortages having been established and
admitted has provided the employer sufficient basis for loss of confidence and whether such
occurrence is merely an isolated one or has been repeatedly committed is no longer material. The
bone of contention here is whether there is some basis for such loss of trust and confidence and if the
employer has reasonable ground to believe or to entertain the moral conviction that the employee
concerned is responsible for the misconduct which in the instant case has been established.[39]
We reiterate the rule that in cases of dismissal for breach of trust and confidence, proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the employees misconduct is not required. It is sufficient that the employer had
reasonable ground to believe that the employees are responsible for the misconduct which renders
him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by their position.[40] In the case at hand, it
cannot be doubted that respondents succeeded in discharging its burden of proof.
As regards to the second requisite, the law requires that the employer must furnish the worker
sought to be dismissed with two (2) written notices before termination may be validly effected: first, a
notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omission for which his dismissal is sought and,
second, a subsequent notice informing the employee of the decision to dismiss him.[41]
In accordance with this requirement, petitioners were given the required notices, on August 2,
1990 and then on August 23, 1990. The Court finds that petitioners were accorded due process
before they were dismissed on August 31, 1990. It is a well-established rule that the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[42] It is evident from the records , that herein petitioners were given all the
opportunities to defend themselves and air their side before the Committee on Discipline, having
been notified by respondent Isetanns Human Resources Division Manager, Teresita A. Villanueva, on
August 2, 1990 through letters individually sent to them. However, offered no explanation or theory
which could account for money lost in their possession. Hence, the company had no other
alternative but to terminate their employment. As we elucidated in the case of Philippine Savings
Bank vs. National Labor Relations Commission,[43] to wit:

xxx the requirement of due process is satisfied when a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his
side of the controversy is afforded the party. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
circumstances essential, especially when the employee chooses not to speak,

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA
002074-91 is hereby AFFIRMED. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
[G.R. NO. 154213 - August 23, 2012]

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. AND AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY, INC.,Petitioners, v. EST
ANISLAO SURIO, FREDDIE PALGUIRAN, GRACIANO MORALES, HENRY CASTILLO, ARISTOTLE ARREOLA,
ALEXANDER YGOT, ANRIQUE BA TTUNG, GREGORIO ALDOVINO, NARCISO FRIAS, VICTOR FLORES,
SAMUEL MARCIAL, CARLITO PALGUIRAN, DUQUE VINLUAN, .JESUS MENDEGORIN, NEIL FLORES, ROMEO
MANGALIAG, JOE GARFIN and SALESTINO SUSA, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

On appeal is the decision the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on December 21, 2001 affirming
the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring itself to be without
appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) involving petitioners complaint for disciplinary action against respondents.1

Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by petitioner Eastern


Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and manned and operated by petitioner Agemar Manning Agency,
Inc. While respondents were still on board the vessel, they experienced delays in the payment of their
wages and in the remittance of allotments, and were not paid for extra work and extra overtime
work. They complained about the vessel s inadequate equipment, and about the failure of the
petitioners to heed their repeated requests for the improvement of their working conditions. On
December 19, 1993, when MT Seadance docked at the port of Brofjorden, Sweden to discharge oil,
representatives of the International Transport Federation (ITF) boarded the vessel and found the
wages of the respondents to be below the prevailing rates. The ensuing negotiations between the ITF
and the vessel owner on the increase in respondents wages resulted in the payment by the vessel
owner of wage differentials and the immediate repatriation of respondents to the Philippines.

Subsequently, on December 23, 1993, the petitioners filed against the newly-repatriated respondents
a complaint for disciplinary action based on breach of discipline and for the reimbursement of the
wage increases in the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA.

During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995. Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042 vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over all money claims arising out of employer-
employee relationships involving overseas Filipino workers in the Labor Arbiters, to wit:

Section 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

chanrobles virtual law library

The jurisdiction over such claims was previously exercised by the POEA under the POEA Rules and
Regulations of 1991 (1991 POEA Rules).

On May 23, 1996, the POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Petitioners received the
order of dismissal on July 24, 1996.

Relying on Section 1, Rule V, Book VII of the 1991 POEA Rules, petitioners filed a partial appeal on
August 2, 1996 in the NLRC, still maintaining that respondents should be administratively sanctioned
for their conduct while they were on board MT Seadance.

On March 21, 1997, the NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction,3 thus:

We dismiss the partial appeal.


The Commission has no jurisdiction to review cases decided by the POEA Administrator involving
disciplinary actions. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the Labor Arbiter
shall have jurisdiction over money claims involving employer-employee relationship (sec. 10, R.A.
8042). Said law does not provide that appeals from decisions arising from complaint for disciplinary
action rest in the Commission.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, instant appeal from the Order of May 23, 1996 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

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Not satisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied their motion. They received
the denial on July 8, 1997.

Petitioners then commenced in this Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus . Citing
St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission,5 however, the Court referred the
petition to the CA on November 25, 1998.

Petitioners contended in their petition that:

THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND/OR GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS
APPEAL AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHEN IT REFUSED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
PETITIONERS APPEAL DESPITE BEING EMPOWERED TO DO SO UNDER THE LAW.

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On December 21, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus, holding that the
inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers from the POEA blacklist/watchlist were within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of the NLRC, and that the NLRC had no appellate
jurisdiction to review the matter, viz:

Section 10 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
provides that:

"Money Claims Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of
an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

xxxx

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Likewise, the Rules and Regulations implementing RA 8042 reiterate the jurisdiction of POEA, thus:

"Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. The POEA shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide:

a) All cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations of rules and
regulations relating to licensing and registration of recruitment and employment agencies or entities;
and

b) Disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in character, involving
employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers."

Further, Sections 6 and 7 Rule VII, Book VII of the POEA Rules & Regulations (1991) provide:
"Sec. 6. Disqualification of Contract Workers. Contract workers, including seamen, against whom
have been imposed or with pending obligations imposed upon them through an order, decision or
resolution shall be included in the POEA Blacklist Workers shall be disqualified from overseas
employment unless properly cleared by the Administration or until their suspension is served or lifted.

Sec. 7. Delisting of the Contract Worker s Name from the POEA Watchlist. The name of an overseas
worker may be excluded, deleted and removed from the POEA Watchlist only after disposition of the
case by the Administration."

Thus, it can be concluded from the afore-quoted law and rules that, public respondent has no
jurisdiction to review disciplinary cases decided by the POEA involving contract workers. Clearly, the
matter of inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers in the POEA Blacklist/Watchlist is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of the public respondent. Nor has the latter
appellate jurisdiction to review the findings of the POEA involving such cases.

xxx

In fine, we find and so hold, that, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public
respondent when it issued the assailed Decision and Order, dated March 21, 1997 and June 13, 1997,
respectively, dismissing petitioners appeal from the decision of the POEA.

WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition not impressed with merit, the same is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Issue

Petitioners still appeal, submitting to the Court the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW ON APPEAL CASES DECIDED BY THE POEA
ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

They contend that both the CA and the NLRC had no basis to rule that the NLRC had no jurisdiction
to entertain the appeal only because Republic Act No. 8042 had not provided for its retroactive
application.

Respondents counter that the appeal should have been filed with the Secretary of Labor who had
exclusive jurisdiction to review cases involving administrative matters decided by the POEA.

Ruling

The Petition for Review lacks merit.

Petitioners adamant insistence that the NLRC should have appellate authority over the POEA s
decision in the disciplinary action because their complaint against respondents was filed in 1993 was
unwarranted. Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino workers from the
POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in
character involving such workers. The obvious intent of Republic Act No. 8042 was to have the POEA
focus its efforts in resolving all administrative matters affecting and involving such workers. This intent
was even expressly recognized in the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 promulgated on February 29, 1996, viz:

Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. The POEA shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide:
(a) all cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations or rules and
regulations relating to licensing and registration of recruitment and employment agencies or entities;
andcralawlibrary

(b) disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in character, involving
employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers.

Section 29. Venue The cases mentioned in Section 28(a) of this Rule, may be filed with the POEA
Adjudication Office or the DOLE/POEA regional office of the place where the complainant applied
or was recruited, at the option of the complainant. The office with which the complaint was first filed
shall take cognizance of the case.

Disciplinary action cases and other special cases, as mentioned in the preceding Section, shall be
filed with the POEA Adjudication Office.

It is clear to us, therefore, that the NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the
POEA in disciplinary cases involving overseas contract workers.

Petitioners position that Republic Act No. 8042 should not be applied retroactively to the review of
the POEA s decision dismissing their complaint against respondents has no support in jurisprudence.
Although, as a rule, all laws are prospective in application unless the contrary is expressly provided, 8or
unless the law is procedural or curative in nature,9 there is no serious question about the retroactive
applicability of Republic Act No. 8042 to the appeal of the POEA s decision on petitioners disciplinary
action against respondents. In a way, Republic Act No. 8042 was a procedural law due to its
providing or omitting guidelines on appeal. A law is procedural, according to De Los Santos v. Vda.
De Mangubat,10 when it

Refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be
able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given
retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no
vested rights in rules of procedure.

Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners complaint by virtue of the case being then still pending
or undetermined at the time of the law s passage, there being no vested rights in rules of
procedure.11They could not validly insist that the reckoning period to ascertain which law or rule
should apply was the time when the disciplinary complaint was originally filed in the POEA in 1993.
Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042 and its implementing rules and regulations were already in effect
when petitioners took their appeal. A statute that eliminates the right to appeal and considers the
judgment rendered final and unappealable only destroys the right to appeal, but not the right to
prosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the right to
appeal has already vested and cannot be impaired.12 Conversely and by analogy, an appeal that is
perfected when a new statute affecting appellate jurisdiction comes into effect should comply with
the provisions of the new law, unless otherwise provided by the new law. Relevantly, petitioners need
to be reminded that the right to appeal from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws,
which, upon authorizing the taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it is proper to present
the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and the courts by which the appeal is to be proceeded
with and resolved.13 This is why we consistently hold that the right to appeal is statutory in character,
and is available only if granted by law or statute.

When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect of cases
decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of Labor in accordance
with his power of supervision and control under Section 38(1), Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, to wit:

Section 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship. Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or
in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall
be categorized and defined as follows:
Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty;
restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs. Unless a different
meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies,
the word "control" shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. xxx.

Thus, Section 1, Part VII, Rule V of the 2003 POEA Rules and Regulations specifically provides, as
follows:

Section 1. Jurisdiction. The Secretary shall have the exclusive and original jurisdiction to act on
appeals or Petition for Review of disciplinary action cases decided by the Administration.

In conclusion, we hold that petitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of the POEA to
the Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC. Consequently, the CA, being correct on its
conclusions, committed no error in upholding the NLRC.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on December 21, 2001 by the Court of Appeals;
and ORDER the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195668 June 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO, MARISSA DIALA, and BERNA M.
PAULINO,Accused,

MARICAR B. INOVERO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION BERSAMIN, J.:

The several accused in illegal recruitment committed in large scale against whom the State
establishes a conspiracy are each equally criminally and civilly liable. It follows, therefore, that as far
as civil liability is concerned each is solidarily liable to the victims of the illegal recruitment for the
reimbursement of the sums collected from them, regardless of the extent of the participation of the
accused in the illegal recruitment.

The Case

Accused-appellant Maricar B. Inovero seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on
August 26, 2010,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed her conviction for illegal recruitment
committed in large scale amounting to economic sabotage under the judgment rendered on
January 14, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 133, in Makati City.2

Antecedents

On March 17, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed in the RTC two
informations3 charging Inovero, Ma. Harleta Velasco y Briones, Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino with
illegal recruitment as defined and penalized under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Worker’s Act of 1995), and 11 informations4charging the same accused with estafa as defined and
penalized under Article315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Only Inovero was arrested
and prosecuted, the other accused having remained at large.

Six cases charging estafa (Criminal Case No. 04-1565, Criminal Case No. 1568, Criminal Case No.
1570, Criminal Case No. 1571 and Criminal Case No. 1572 and Criminal Case No. 1573) and one of
the two charging illegal recruitment (Criminal Case No. 04-1563) were provisionally dismissed
because of the failure of the complainants to prosecute.5 The seven cases were later permanently
dismissed after the complainants did not revive them within two years, as provided in Section 8, 6 Rule
117 of the Rules of Court.

Trial on the merits ensued as to the remaining cases (Criminal Case No. 04-1562, for illegal
recruitment; and Criminal Case No. 04-1564; Criminal Case No. 04-1566; Criminal Case No. 04-1567;
Criminal Case No. 1569 and Criminal Case No. 04-1574, for estafa).7

The CA recounted the transactions between the complainants and the accused, including Inovero,
in the following manner:

Regarding Criminal Case No. 04-1562, the prosecution presented the five (5) private complainants as
witnesses to prove the crime of Illegal Recruitment, namely: Novesa Baful ("Baful"), Danilo Brizuela
("Brizuela"), Rosanna Aguirre ("Aguirre"), Annaliza Amoyo ("Amoyo"), and Teresa Marbella ("Marbella"),
and Mildred Versoza ("Versoza") from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA").

Baful testified that on May 20, 2003 she, together with her sister-in-law, went to Harvel International
Talent Management and Promotion ("HARVEL") at Unit 509 Cityland Condominium, Makati City upon
learning that recruitment for caregivers to Japan was on-going there. On said date, she allegedly
met Inovero; Velasco, and Diala, and saw Inovero conducting a briefing on the applicants. She also
testified that Diala, the alleged talent manager, directed her to submit certain documents, and to
pay Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) as training fee, as well as Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as placement and processing fees. Diala also advised her to undergo physical
examination.

On June 6, 2003, after complying with the aforesaid requirements and after paying Diala the
amounts of Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) and Ten Thousand pesos (P10,000.00), Baful was
promised deployment within two (2) to three (3) months. She likewise testified that Inovero briefed her
and her co-applicants on what to wear on the day of their departure. However, she was never
deployed. Finally, she testified that she found out that HARVEL was not licensed to deploy workers for
overseas employment.

Brizuela, another complainant, testified that he went to HARVEL’s office in Makati on February 7, 2003
to inquire on the requirements and hiring procedure for a caregiver in Japan. There, Diala told him
the amount required as processing fee and the documents to be submitted. And when he submitted
on March 7, 2003 the required documents and payments, it was, this time, Paulino who received
them. He claimed that he underwent training and medical examination; he likewise attended an
orientation conducted by Inovero at which time, he and his batchmates were advised what clothes
to wear on the day of their departure; he was assured of deployment on the first week of June 2003,
however, on the eve of his supposed "pre-departure orientation seminar," Paulino texted him that the
seminar was cancelled because Inovero, who had the applicants’ money, did not show up. He
testified that he was not deployed. Neither was his money returned, as promised.

On cross-examination, Brizuela testified that Inovero was the one who conducted the orientation,
and represented to all the applicants that most of the time, she was in the Japanese Embassy
expediting the applicants’ visa.

Aguirre, the third complainant to testify, alleged that she went to HARVEL on May 22, 2003, to apply
as caregiver in Japan; there, Diala informed her that Inovero was oneof the owners of HARVEL and
Velasco was its President; she paid Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00), and submitted her
documents, receipt of which was acknowledged by Diala; despite her undergoing medical
examination and several training seminars, she was however not deployed to Japan. Worse, she
found out that HARVEL was not licensed to recruit workers.

Amoyo, the fourth complainant, testified that she went to HARVEL’s office on May 28, 2003 to apply
as caregiver in Japan, and Diala required her to submit certain documents, to undergo training and
medical examination, and to pay Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) as placement and
processing fees. However, after complying with said requirements, she was never deployed as
promised.

Marbella was the last complainant to testify. She alleged that she applied for the position of janitress
at HARVEL sometime in December 2002; just like the rest of the complainants, she was required to
submit certain documents and to pay a total amount of Twenty Thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
processing fee; after paying said fee, Diala and Inovero promised her and the other applicants that
they will be deployed in three (3) months or in June 2003; however, the promised deployment never
materialized; she later found out that HARVEL was not even licensed to recruit workers.

[Mildred] Versoza, on the other hand, is a Labor and Employment Officer at the POEA Licensing
Branch. She testified that she prepared a Certification certifying that neither HARVEL nor Inovero was
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment as per records at their office.

In her defense, Inovero denied the allegations hurled against her. As summarized in the assailed
Decision, she claimed that she is the niece of accused Velasco, the owner of HARVEL, but denied
working there. Explaining her presence in HARVEL, she alleged that she worked for her uncle,
Velasco’s husband, as an office assistant, hence, for at least two or three times a week, she had to
go to HARVEL on alleged errands for her uncle. She also testified that her alleged errands mainly
consisted of serving food and refreshments during orientations at HARVEL. Inovero likewise denied
receiving any money from the complainants, nor issuing receipts therefor.8

Judgment of the RTC


On January 14, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Inovero of five counts of estafabut
convicting her in Criminal Case No. 04-1562 of illegal recruitment committed in large scale as defined
and penalized by Section 6 and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995), disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the aforestated cases as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 04-1562, accused Maricar Inovero is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale defined and penalized under Sections 6 and 7, II, of
Republic Act No. 8042 otherwise known as the ‘Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995’,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. She is likewise ordered to pay a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

Criminal Case No. 04-1563 also for illegal recruitment in large scale is hereby ordered dismissed to its
finality for failure of complainants Alvin De Leon, Roderick Acuna, Agosto Vale and Marina Viernes to
revive said case despite the lapse of two years from its provisional dismissal.

Criminal Cases No. 04-1564, 1566, 1567, 1569, 1571 and 1574 are hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure
of the prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence to prove all the elements of the said offense.

Criminal Cases Nos. 1565, 1568, 1570, 1572 and 1573 also for estafa [are] hereby ordered dismissed to
its finality for failure of complainants Agosto Vale, Alvin De Leon, Roselyn Saruyda, Roderick Acuna
and Marina Viernes to revive said cases despite the lapse of two (2) years from its provisional
dismissal.

Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, she shall be credited in the service of her
sentence with the full time during which she has undergone preventive imprisonment if she agrees
voluntarily to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, with
four-fifths thereof.

Meanwhile, considering that the accused Ma. Harleta B. Velasco, Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino
are still at large, let alias warrants of arrest be issued against them. In the meantime, let the cases filed
against them be archived, which shall be revived upon their apprehension.

SO ORDERED.9

Decision of the CA

Inovero appealed, contending that:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH [HER] GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.10

On August 26, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction, viz:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The January 14, 2008 Decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.11

Issue

In this appeal, Inovero insists that the CA erred in affirming her conviction by the RTC because she
had not been an employee of Harvel at any time; that she could be faulted only for her association
with the supposed illegal recruiters; that in all stages of the complainants’ recruitment for overseas
employment by Harvel, they had transacted only and directly with Diala; and that the certification
from the POEA to the effect she was not a licensed recruiter was not a positive proof that she
engaged in illegal recruitment.
Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the entire findings of fact of the RTC, stating:

The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1) that the accused
engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the same Code; (2) that the accused
had not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment with respect
to the requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and (3) that the
accused committed the unlawful acts against 3 or more persons. In simplest terms, illegal recruitment
is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they
have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. In Our view, despite Inovero’s
protestations that she did not commit illegal recruitment, the following circumstances contrarily
convince Us that she was into illegal recruitment.

First, private complainants Baful and Brizuela commonly testified that Inovero was the one who
conducted orientations/briefings on them; informed them, among others, on how much their salary
would be as caregivers in Japan; and what to wear when they finally will be deployed. Second,
when Diala introduced her (Inovero) to private complainant Amoyo as one of the owners of HARVEL,
Inovero did not bother to correct said representation. Inovero’s silence is clearly an implied
acquiescence to said representation.

Third, Inovero, while conducting orientation on private complainant Brizuela, represented herself as
the one expediting the release of applicants’ working visa for Japan.

Fourth, in a Certification issued and attested to by POEA’s Versoza – Inovero had no license nor
authority to recruit for overseas employment.

Based on the foregoing, there is therefore no doubt that the RTC correctly found that Inovero
committed illegal recruitment in large scale by giving private complainants the impression that she
can send them abroad for employment purposes, despite the fact that she had no license or
authority to do so.12

It is basic that the Court, not being a trier of facts, must of necessity rely on the findings of fact by the
trial court which are conclusive and binding once affirmed by the CA on intermediate review. The
bindingness of the trial court’s factual findings is by virtue of its direct access to the evidence. The
direct access affords the trial court the unique advantage to observe the witnesses’ demeanor while
testifying, and the personal opportunity to test the accuracy and reliability of their recollections of
past events, both of which are very decisive in a litigation like this criminal prosecution for the serious
crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale where the parties have disagreed on the
material facts. The Court leaves its confined precinct of dealing only with legal issues in order to deal
with factual ones only when the appellant persuasively demonstrates a clear error in the
appreciation of the evidence by both the trial and the appellate courts. This demonstration was not
done herein by the appellant. Hence, the Court upholds the CA’s affirmance of the factual findings
by the trial court.

All that Inovero’s appeal has offered was her denial of complicity in the illegal recruitment of the
complainants. But the complainants credibly described and affirmed her specific acts during the
commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. Their positive assertions were far trustworthier than her
mere denial.

Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the
fact.1âwphi1 Thus, courts – both trial and appellate – have generally viewed the defense of denial in
criminal cases with considerable caution, if not with outright rejection. Such judicial attitude comes
from the recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being an excuse too
easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy of consideration at all, denial should be
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative
and self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no greater evidentiary value
than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.13 It is no different here.

We concur with the RTC and the CA that Inovero was criminally liable for the illegal recruitment
charged against her. Strong and positive evidence demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt her
having conspired with her co-accused in the recruitment of the complainants. The decision of the
CA amply recounted her overt part in the conspiracy. Under the law, there is a conspiracy when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to
commit it.14

The complainants paid varying sums for placement, training and processing fees, respectively as
follows: (a) Baful – P28,500.00; (b) Brizuela – P38,600.00; (c) Aguirre – P38,600.00; (d) Amoyo –
P39,000.00; and (e) Marbella – P20,250.00. However, the RTC and the CA did not adjudicate
Inovero’s personal liability for them in their judgments. Their omission needs to be corrected,
notwithstanding that the complainants did not appeal, for not doing so would be patently unjust and
contrary to law. The Court, being the ultimate reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also
the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. It is, indeed, a basic tenet of our criminal
law that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.15 Civil liability includes restitution, reparation
of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.16 To enforce the civil
liability, the Rules of Court has deemed to be instituted with the criminal action the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged unless the offended party waives the civil
action, or reserves the right to institute the civil action separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.17 Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment, when it involves the transfer of
funds from the victims to the accused, is inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability should include
the return of the amounts paid as placement, training and processing fees.18 Hence, Inovero and her
co-accused were liable to indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid.

That the civil liability should be made part of the judgment by the RTC and the CA was not
disputable. The Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People19 that it was "imperative that the courts
prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be
imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or
a waiver of its recovery," because:

It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the
legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the
accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty
imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their
disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their
omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an
appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only
the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are
properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy
of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be
otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to the
judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in
their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the
wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil
liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always
entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.20

What was the extent of Inovero’s civil liability?


The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime requires solidarity,
and each debtor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation.21 As a co-conspirator, then,
Inovero’s civil liability was similar to that of a joint tortfeasor under the rules of the civil law. Joint
tortfeasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for
their benefit.22 They are also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose
acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury.23 Under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors
are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed
the wrongful act themselves. As regards the extent of their respective liabilities, the Court expressed in
Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals:24

x x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty
owed by them to the injured person was not same. No actor’s negligence ceases to be a proximate
cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other acts. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of
a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to
the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. x x x

It would not be an excuse for any of the joint tortfeasors to assert that her individual participation in
the wrong was insignificant as compared to those of the others.25 Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro
rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except by themse g and processing fees,
respectively as follows:

(a) Noveza Baful - P28,500.00;

(b) Danilo Brizuela - P38,600.00;

(c) Rosanna Aguirre - P38,600.00;

(d) Annaliza Amoyo - P39,000.00; and

(e) Teresa Marbella - P20,250.00.

plus interest lves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an
aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount.26 Hence, Inovero’s liability
towards the victims of their illegal recruitment was solidary, regardless of whether she actually
received the amounts paid or not, and notwithstanding that her co-accused, having escaped arrest
until now, have remained untried.

Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, interest as part of the damages may be adjudicated in criminal
proceedings in the discretion of the court. The Court believes and holds that such liability for interest
attached to Inovero as a measure of fairness to the complainants. Thus, Inovero should pay interest
of 6% per annum on the sums paid by the complainants to be reckoned from the finality of this
judgment until full payment.27

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 26, 2010, subject to the
MODIFICATION that appellant Maricar B. Inovero is ordered to pay by way of actual damages to
each of the complainants the amounts paid by them for placement, training on such amounts at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

Inovero shall further pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 178774


Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,


BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
MARLYN P. BACOS,
Appellant. December 8, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

For review is the decision,[1] dated April 18, 2007, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01713 which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 79, Quezon City, in
Criminal Case No. Q-96-65212 finding Marlyn P. Bacos (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal recruitment in large scale. The RTC sentenced her to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P100,000.00.

This is not the first time we have passed upon this case as we previously disposed of the
appellants appeal in our Resolutions dated April 14, 2010 and August 23, 2010. We are once more
passing upon this case as we committed an oversight in our previous Resolutions; one of the justices
of the Court who then participated and voted for the denial of the present appeal was also a
member of the Division that handled the case at the CA. Hence, the need to resubmit this case for
another consideration and decision, with a new Member replacing the Justice who should not have
participated in resolving this case before this Court.
The Facts

Together with her common law husband Efren Dimayuga, the appellant was charged of illegal
recruitment in large scale before the RTC, based on the complaints filed by ten (10) individuals. The
appellant and Dimayuga pleaded not guilty, and a joint trial ensued. Dimayuga died during the
pendency of the trial, leaving the appellant to face the charges.

Of the ten (10) complainants, only three (3) testified, namely: Cynthia Deza, Elizabeth Paculan and
Ramelo Gualvez (complainants). The complainants claimed that within the period of December 1993
to September 1994, they met Dimayuga and the appellant at their house. Dimayuga represented
that he was a recruiter who could send them to work in Japan. The appellant likewise assured the
complainants that they (she and Dimayuga) could send them abroad. Believing that Dimayuga was
a legitimate recruiter, the complainants parted with their money to be used as placement and
processing fees. The money was given by the complainants either to Dimayuga while in the presence
of the appellant, or handed to the appellant who gave it to Dimayuga. Dimayuga issued receipts for
the money received.

The complainants were not deployed within the period promised by Dimayuga. The
complainants also discovered that Dimayuga and the appellant moved to another house. Believing
that they had been duped, the complainants and the other applicants filed complaints for illegal
recruitment against Dimayuga and the appellant before the authorities.

The prosecution presented documentary evidence consisting of two (2) Certifications (dated
December 1, 1999 and January 19, 2000) from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
stating that Efren Dimayuga, Marlyn P. Bacos and Marlyn Reyes y Bacos are not authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment.
In her defense, the appellant testified that she had no participation in the transactions
between her husband and the complainants. She denied having received any money from the
complainants, and likewise denied signing any receipt for payments made. The appellant claimed
that she only served the complainants snacks whenever they came to where she and Dimayuga
then resided.

The defense presented Pulina Luching who testified that Dimayuga and the appellant were both
known to her, having lived with them for a time. The witness denied having any knowledge of the
nature of Dimayugas business.
The RTC Ruling

The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the complainants, which it found to be straightforward
and consistent. The RTC observed that the appellant did not refute the allegation that Dimayuga
was engaged in the recruitment and placement business. The RTC ruled that sufficient evidence
existed establishing that the two accused conspired in engaging in illegal recruitment activities. The
RTC found that the appellant gave indispensable assistance to Dimayuga in perpetrating the fraud
by receiving the amounts of money for placement fees and assuring the complainants that
Dimayuga can deploy them for employment abroad. Under the circumstances, the RTC ruled that
the appellants denial deserved little credence in light of the positive testimony coming from credible
prosecution witnesses.

The CA Ruling

The CA upheld the factual findings of the RTC on appeal. The CA ruled that all the elements of illegal
recruitment, as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code in relation to Article 34 of the same
Code, were sufficiently proven by the prosecution evidence. The CA held that the appellant is liable
as principal, considering that she actively participated in the recruitment process by giving the
victims the assurance that Dimayuga could deploy them for employment abroad. The CA declared
that the appellants acts fall within the legal definition by enumeration of what constitutes
recruitment.

The Issues

The appellant assigns the following errors for the Courts consideration:

(1) In finding the appellant as principal in the crime charged absent any direct and clear
evidence of her active participation in the illegal recruitment; and

(2) In the alternative, the appellant is only liable as an accomplice under the circumstances.

The Courts Ruling


We deny the appeal and affirm the appellants conviction, with modification on the award of
damages.

Together with Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), the
law governing illegal recruitment is the Labor Code which defines recruitment and placement as any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not.[3] The same Code also defines and punishes Illegal recruitment. Its Articles 38
and 39 state:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment.
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority
shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x x
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against
three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
Art. 39. Penalties. -
(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein[.]

Applying these legal provisions to the facts, no doubt exists in our mind that the appellant committed
illegal recruitment activities together with Dimayuga. The prosecution evidence clearly showed that
despite the lack of license or authority to engage in recruitment, the appellant admitted that she
gave the complainants assurances that she and Dimayuga could deploy them for employment in
Japan. The complainants, in this regard, were categorical in saying that they relied not only on the
representations of Dimayuga but also on the assurances of the appellant that they would be
deployed for work in Japan.

We arrive at this conclusion after additionally considering the following established acts of the
appellant: (a) her acceptance of the placement fee given by the complainants; (b) the fact that
she communicated to the complainants the date of their departure; and (c) her information on how
the balance of the placement fee should be paid.These acts indubitably show that she was
engaged in illegal recruitment activities together with Dimayuga. Thus, the appellants liability under
the circumstances cannot be considered as that of a mere accomplice, but rather as a principal
directly and actively engaged in illegal recruitment activities.

Lastly, the appellants argument that she did not derive any consideration from the
transactions or that she made the assurances after Dimayugas representations were made to the
complainants cannot serve to exonerate her from the crime. We emphasize that the absence of a
consideration or misrepresentations employed by the appellant is not material in the prosecution for
illegal recruitment. By its very definition, illegal recruitment is deemed committed by the mere act of
promising employment without a license or authority and whether for profit or not. Moreover, we
previously held that the time when the misrepresentation was made, whether prior or simultaneous to
the delivery of the money of the complainants, is only material in the crime of estafa under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and not in the crime of illegal recruitment.[4]

For all these reasons, we affirm the CAs finding that the appellant committed illegal recruitment in
large scale.

The Penalty

The illegal recruitment having been committed against three victims is illegal recruitment in large
scale, as provided under the aforequoted Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code.We, thus, likewise
affirm the CAs ruling imposing the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00, pursuant to
the first paragraph of Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended. Committed in large scale, the
illegal recruitment is deemed to constitute economic sabotage.
We find as well that the CA decision should be modified by adding an award of legal interest
with respect to the complainants civil indemnity. The amounts of civil indemnity represent the amount
of placement fees that the complainants paid to Dimayuga and the appellant. The legal interest
of twelve percent (12%) per annum shall be imposed, reckoned from the filing of the information until
the finality of the judgment, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.[5]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) RECALL the Resolutions dated April 14, 2010 and August 23, 2010.

(2) DENY the appeal for failure to sufficiently show that a reversible error was committed by the
Court of Appeals in the assailed decision; and

(3) AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01713 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Quezon City, in
Criminal Case No. Q-96-65212, finding Marlyn P. Bacos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal recruitment in large scale. Appellant is ordered to indemnify the complainants the
following amounts:

(a) Cynthia Deza - P20,000;


(b) Elizabeth Paculan - P10,000; and
(c) Ramelo Gualvez - P5,000

representing the amounts paid by the complainants as placement fees, plus 12% legal
interest per annum that shall be reckoned from the filing of the information until the finality
of the judgment.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 119160 January 30, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,


vs.
EDITHA SEÑORON Y LIMORA, accused-appellant.

FRANCISCO, J.:

Appellant Editha L. Señoron and her co-accused Aquilino Ilano and one John Doe, both at large,
were charged in four separate informations with one count of illegal recruitment in large scale 1 and
three counts of estafa 2 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. 3 When arraigned, appellant
pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued. On October 25, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting appellant as charged and sentencing her "to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00)" 4 for illegal recruitment, and "to suffer a
penalty of three (3) times of arresto mayor in its maximum period as minimum (or two (2) years ten
(10) months and twenty one (21) days) to prision mayor in its minimum period as maximum (or to
eight (8) years) and to compensate the private complainants the sum of fifty nine thousand pesos
(P59,000.00)" 5 for the three counts of estafa. Dissatisfied, appellant interposed the instant appeal with
the following assignment of errors, thus:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT EDITHA SEÑORON BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN
THE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, (LARGE SCALE) CASE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT EDITHA SEÑORON OF


THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, (LARGE SCALE) AND SENTENCING HER TO SUFFER A
PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P100,000.00). 6

Aptly narrated in the People's brief and supported by the evidence on record are the following facts:

At the consolidated hearing of the cases filed against appellant, complainants Cesar
Virtucio, Ronilo Bueno and Greg Corsega testified for the prosecution.

Cesar Virtucio testified that sometime in October 1991, he met appellant at accused
Aquilino Ilano's house in Malibay, Pasay City, when he (Virtucio) and other applicants
applied for jobs abroad (tsn, May 27, 1993, p. 6). During the meeting at Ilano's
residence, Virtucio and his companions were given job application forms which they
filled up as told (ibid, p. 9). Thereafter, Virtucio paid Ilano, in the presence of appellant,
the amount of P20,000.00 as placement fee (Exhibit "B"). After paying the placement
fee, Virtucio and his companions were told by appellant to follow-up their applications
at her office or at Padre Faura, Manila (ibid, p. 14). Appellant failed to send Virtucio
and his companions abroad, hence, he (Virtucio), together with applicants Ronilo
Bueno and Greg Corsega, filed a complaint for illegal Recruitment and Estafa against
appellant, a certain John Doe and Aquilino Ilano before the National Bureau of
Investigation (ibid, p. 18).

"Greg Corsega, one of the three (3) complainants, testified that accused Aquilino Ilano
introduced him to appellant as the person who will process his papers for employment
abroad (tsn, June 30, 1993, pp. 8 to 9). Thereafter, Ilano demanded from Corsega the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as placement fee (ibid). The amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) was given to Ilano in the presence of appellant
and it was at this juncture that appellant promised Corsega and his companions
(Virtucio and Bueno) that they will be called as a group to sign a contract. However,
appellant's promise to deploy Corsega, Virtucio and Bueno for employment abroad
never materialized, prompting him (Corsega), Virtucio and Bueno to file a complaint for
Illegal Recruitment and Estafa against appellant, John Doe and Aquilino Ilano before
the National Bureau of Investigation.

Ronilo Bueno testified that he was initially referred by Aquilino Ilano to his (Ilano's)
secretary in order to sign papers for employment abroad (August 31, 1993, p. 4). After
signing some papers, Bueno was required by Ilano to pay the amount of P19,000.00 for
the processing of his passport and visa (ibid, p. 5).

The amount of P19,000.00 was immediately paid to Ilano in the presence of appellant
(ibid, p. 7). Whereupon, Ilano told Bueno that the money will be given to appellant who
will be responsible in the processing of their papers for employment abroad (ibid, p. 9).
The promise to deploy Bueno, Virtucio and Corsega abroad did not materialize, hence,
the three (Bueno, Virtucio and Corcega) went to appellant, who showed them the list
of the money paid by them. At the same time, appellant advised the three to wait for
notice of their employment abroad (ibid., pp. 9 to 10). Again, nothing happened to
their applications and this prompted Bueno and his companions (Virtucio and
Corcega) to file charges of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa against Aquilino Ilano, John
Doe and appellant before the National Bureau of Investigation.

Bueno, Virtucio and Corcega uniformly testified that before the filing of Illegal
Recruitment and Estafa cases against Aquilino Ilano, John Doe and appellant before
the National Bureau of Investigation, they (Bueno, Virtucio and Corcega) asked for the
return of their money. Consequently, appellant issued Interbank Check No. 05263108 in
the amount of P135,000.00 in words but P130,000.00 in figures. They also testified that the
amount covers the payment given by nine (9) applicants including complainants (tsn,
May 27, 1993, p. 16 and tsn, June 30, 1993, pp. 33 to 34). However, Interbank Check No.
05263108 was never encashed as an inquiry from the bank revealed that the check
was not sufficiently funded (ibid., p. 38).

The prosecution presented as its last witness Socorro Landas, an employee of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), who testified that appellant is
not licensed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration to be a recruiter
(tsn, February 11, 1993, pp. 2 to 5).7

On the other hand, as lone witness for her defense, accused EDITHA SEÑORON, testified
that she only met the private complainants at the National Bureau of Investigation on
September 1993, that she has nothing to do with the receipts of payment to Greg
Corsega; and Cesar Virtucio which receipts were signed by Aquilino Ilano. She
admitted having issued check No. 05263108 (Exh. C) just to accommodate co-accused
Aquilino Ilano who promised that he will be the one to put funds on said check. 8

At the outset, the Court observes that appellant confines her appeal to her conviction for illegal
recruitment as she neither questioned nor assailed her convictions for the three (3) counts of estafa.
The failure to appeal therefrom rendered the estafa convictions final and executory; hence, this
review shall be limited to the illegal recruitment case.

In essence, the centerpiece of appellant's defense dwells on the alleged insufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence to prove her guilt as "[t]here is nothing on record . . . which says that
placement fees received by Aquilino Ilano from the three (3) private complainants was turned over
to [her]". 9 Appellant asserts that she never issued or signed any receipts and that as a matter of fact
"[t]he receipts of payment of alleged placement fees were received and receipted by accused
Aquilino Ilano." 10 Appellant also harps on her being a mere accommodation party in the issuance of
the Interbank Check in the amount of P135,000.00 and "that after the check bounced", she contends
that "no notice whatsoever was given to [her]". 11 Thus, appellant concludes that the prosecution
failed to discharge its burden of proof thereby necessitating her acquittal.

We are not persuaded.

Illegal recruitment is defined under Article 38 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, as "(a)ny
recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to
be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority." Article 13 (b) of the Code defines
"recruitment and placement" as

[A]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring


workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad,whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or
entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

To prove illegal recruitment, two elements must be shown namely: (1) the person charged with the
crime must have undertaken recruitment activities, or any of the activities enumerated in Article 34 of
the Labor Code, as amended; and (2) said person does not have a license 12 or authority 13 to do
so. 14 Contrary to appellant's mistaken notion, therefore, it is not the issuance or signing of receipts for
the placement fees that makes a case for illegal recruitment, but rather the undertaking of
recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority. And in this case, evidence on record
belie appellant's assertion that she did not engage in any recruitment activity and that the fees paid
by the applicants were not turned over to her possession as shown by the following testimony of
private complainant Virtucio, thus:

Fiscal Untalan:

Q: Now, you said that you together with your co-complainant were
recruited by the accused at Malibay, Pasay City, now, in connection with
that recruitment of applicant, do you remember when was your
transaction if there was any?

A: Before we were recruited she gave us an application paper which we


filled up and she told us to file (sic) it up.

Q: And did you comply?

A: Yes, sir."

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, after having paid that placement fee of P20,000.00 to the


accused, what happened next?

A: She told us to follow it up at her residence and also at her office in


Padre Faura.

Q: And what happened to your follow up?

A: Nothing, sir." (tsn, May 27, 1993, pp. 9-10, 13-14.) 15

which testimony was corroborated by prosecution witness Ronilo Bueno. Thus:


Fiscal Untalan:

Q: Is this promised of Ilano materialized? (sic)

A: No, sir.

Q: Do you know the reason why?

A: Ilano told us that our money will be paid to Edith and that Edith would
be the one to attend to our papers.

Q: After knowing that information what did you do?

A: We went to Edith.

Q: You said, we, who are your companions?

A: Corsega and Virtucio.

Q: What happened when you together with Corsega and Virtucio went to
Editha Señoron?

A: She showed to us the list of the money that we paid and told us to wait.

Q: And then what did you do, did you wait?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened?

A: Nothing happened and "tumagal"

Q: You said nothing happened and "tumagal" for how long?

A: Almost a year.

Q: After that period of time what did you do together with the others?

A: We filed a complaint before the NBI.

Q: Before you filed this complaint did you ask the return of your money
before the accused?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was the answer?

A: Edith issued a check.

Q: What check?

A: Interbank check.

xxx xxx xxx

Fiscal Untalan:
Q: Now, when you filed your application to the accused for a job abroad
particularly in Taiwan and you were failed to be deployed together with
your companions, what did you do? (sic)

A: We asked for the refund of the money we have paid.

Q: Now, what else aside from that?

A: When the check she issued to us bounced we filed the complaint


before the NBI.

Q: Before filing any case with the NBI did you make any investigation as to
the capacity of the agency whether they are authorized?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where did you verify its authority?

A: POEA.

Q: What happened there?

A: That they were not legitimate to recruit (sic)." (tsn, August 31, 1993, pp
9-12) 16

Appellant made a distinct impression that she had the ability to send applicants for work abroad.
She, however, does not possess any license or authority to recruit which fact was confirmed by the
duly authenticated certification 17 issued by the Manager of the Licensing Branch of the POEA, and
by the testimony of Ms. Socorro Landas representing the Licensing Division of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). It is the lack of necessary license or authority that renders the
recruitment activity, as in this case, unlawful or criminal. 18

Appellant's residual arguments that she was just an accommodation maker in the issuance of the
check and that private complainants failed to notify her after the check bounced do not merit
serious consideration. It has to be emphasized that appellant is not being prosecuted for violation of
the anti-bouncing check law 19 where the foregoing contentions may have an impact, but for illegal
recruitment which the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 121179. July 2, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONINE B. SALEY a.k.a. ANNIE B. SALEY, accused-
appellant.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

The case before the Court focuses on the practice of some "illegal recruiters" who would even go
to the extent of issuing forged tourist visas to aspiring overseas contract workers.These unsuspecting
job applicants are made to pay exorbitant "placement" fees for nothing really since, almost
invariably, they find themselves unable to leave for their purported country of employment or, if they
are able to, soon find themselves unceremoniously repatriated. This Court once described their plight
in a local proverb as being naghangad ng kagitna, isang salop ang nawala.[1]
In this appeal from the 3rd March 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet, Branch 10,[2] appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the
verdict finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the
Revised Penal Code and six counts of illegal recruitment, one committed in large scale, proscribed
by the Labor Code.
Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations for estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(1), of the Revised Penal Code. The cases (naming the complainants and stating the amounts
therein involved) include: (1) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397[3] (Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00); (2)
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 (Victoria Asil P33,000.00); (3) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 (Cherry Pi-
ay P18,000.00); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 (Corazon del Rosario P40,000.00); (5) Criminal Case
No. 92-CR-1428 (Arthur Juan P24,200.00); (6) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644 (Alfredo C.
Arcega P25,000.00); (7) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646 (Brando B. Salbino P25,000.00); (8) Criminal
Case No. 93-CR-1647 (Mariano DamologP25,000.00); (9) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649 (Lorenzo
Belino P25,000.00); (10) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651 (Peter Arcega P25,000.00) and (11) Criminal
Case No. 93-CR-1652 (Adeline Tiangge P18,500.00).
Except for the name of the offended party, the amount involved and the date of the commission
of the crime, the following information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 typified the other informations
for the crime of estafa:
That in or about the month of December, 1991, and sometime prior to or subsequent thereto,
at Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud
ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS and by means of deceit through false representations and
pretenses made by her prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud said ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS, by
then and there representing herself as a duly authorized or licensed recruiter for overseas
employment, when in truth and in fact she was not, thereby inducing the said ADELINE
TIANGGE y MARCOS to give and deliver to her the total amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P18,500.00), Philippine Currency, for placement abroad and after having
received it, she appropriated and misappropriated the same for her own use and benefit
and despite repeated demands made upon (her) to return the same, she refused, failed,
neglected, and still refuses, fails and neglects to comply therewith, all to the damage and
prejudice of ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS in the total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to law.[4]
For the violation of Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code, five separate
informations were also instituted against appellant on various dates. These cases (with the names of
the complainants) include: (1) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396 (Francisco T. Labadchan); (2) Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1413 (Cherry Pi-ay); (3) Criminal Case No. 92- CR-1416 (Victoria Asil); (4) Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1425 (Corazon del Rosario) and (5) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 (Arthur Juan). The
typical information in these indictments read:
That sometime in the month of April, 1991 and subsequent thereto at Buyagan, Municipality
of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
recruit one ARTHUR JUAN for overseas employment, by then and there ably misrepresenting
herself as a duly authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she fully knew it to
be false but by reason of her said misrepresentations which were completely relied upon by
Arthur Juan, she was able to obtain from the latter the total amount of TWENTY FOUR
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P24,200.00), Philippine Currency, all to the damage and
prejudice of Arthur Juan in the total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to Law.[5]
The information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale under Article
38, paragraph 1, of Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended, filed on 16 April 1993,
read:
That in or about the months of August and September, 1992, in the Municipality of La Trinidad,
Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit the
following: PETER ARCEGA, LORENZO BELINO, MARIANO DAMOLOG, FIDEL OPDAS, BRANDO B.
SALBINO, DEMBER LEON and ALFREDO C. ARCEGA for overseas employment, by then and
there misrepresenting herself as a duly authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in
fact she was not and by reason of her said misrepresentation which was completely relied
upon by the said complainants whom she recruited, either individually or as a group
amounting to illegal recruitment in large scale causing economic sabotage, she was able to
obtain and received from them the aggregate total amount of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P175,000.00), Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of the
foregoing complainants in the total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to law.[6]
Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal recruitment and estafa. The criminal
cases filed were raffled off to two (2) branches of the Regional Trial Court of Benguet; later, however,
the cases were consolidated at the instance of the prosecution.
Parenthetically, appellant jumped bail pending trial but she was soon arrested by agents of the
Criminal Investigation Service ("CIS").

The Evidence for the Prosecution. -

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396

Francisco Labadchan, a 25-year-old employee in the Navy Base in Pacdal, Baguio City, was
introduced to appellant by Crispin Perez. In September 1991, the two went to the house of Conchita
Tagle at Kilometer 3, La Trinidad, Benguet, who was known to be recruiting workers for abroad. After
Labadchan had expressed interest in applying for a job in Korea, Tagle told Labadchan to
prepare P45,000.00, P30,000.00 of which was to be paid that month and the balance of P15,000.00
before his departure for abroad. Labadchan paid Tagle the amount ofP30,000.00 on 23 September
1991. Appellant, in turn, received that amount when she went to La Trinidad to "brief" him. She told
Labadchan that his flight would be on the 9th of October 1991 and that he should have paid by then
the balance of P15,000.00 of the fees. He paid Tagle the P15,000.00 balance on 05 October 1991.
When he requested her to make a receipt, Tagle included the amount in the old receipt for
the P30,000.00 previously given. Appellant handed over to Labadchan some papers to fill up and
gave last-minute instructions before she boarded a green-colored aircraft.
On 08 October 1991, Labadchan and his wife went to Manila and stayed, as so instructed by
Tagle, at the Prince Hotel near the terminal of the Dangwa bus company in Dimasalang, Manila.
There, he met other people, among them, his co-complainant Arthur Juan. In the morning of 09
October 1991, Labadchan and the others were told to go to the airport with Tagle, where appellant
was supposed to give the travel papers including passports and plane tickets for Korea. At the
airport, however, appellant told the group that their flight had been re-scheduled for 11 October
1991. Labadchan returned to Baguio City.
On 11 October 1991, Labadchan returned to the airport only to be told this time, however, that
his passport was still with the Department of Foreign Affairs. Appellant told her husband to
accompany Labadchan to the Foreign Affairs office. When Labadchan received the passport, he
saw that while his picture appeared on it, the passport was made out in the name of a person from
Negros Occidental. Labadchan had to imitate the signature on the passport just so he could get
it. Back at the airport, he was allowed inside the terminal but only to be later sent out because the
ticket he had was one intended for passage from Korea and not to Korea. Asserting that he and
company were mere "chance passengers," appellant sent them all home with a promise that
another departure date would be set. She also took back the show money of US$1,000.00.
Appellant would repeatedly schedule a departure date but nothing tangible came out of her
assurances. Finally, Labadchan was able to get appellant to promise that the money he had given
her would be refunded. When this promise neither materialized, Labadchan finally reported the
matter to the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"). In that office, appellant executed a promissory
note stating that she would return the amount of P46,500.00, which included the amount of P1,500.00
allegedly used for getting a passport, to Labadchan.[7]

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416

Victoria Asil, a 40-year-old housewife from Imelda Village, Roxas Street, Baguio City, heard from
her elder sister, Feling Derecto, that appellant was recruiting workers for abroad.During the second
week of January 1992, she, along with her husband Gabriel, went to appellants house in Buyagan, La
Trinidad. Appellant assured her that she could have a job in a factory in Korea. Appellant asked for
an advance fee of P25,000.00 of the P40,000.00 agreed fee. Victoria gave appellant the "advance
fee" on 13 January 1992 at her (Victorias) shop in Shoppers Lane, Baguio City which appellant
acknowledged by issuing a receipt for the amount. She told Victoria to be at appellant's house in
Buyagan after three weeks.
When Victoria went to appellants house as so directed, appellant told her that her flight had
been postponed supposedly because prior applicants had to be accommodated first. Victoria met
appellant seven more times only to be ultimately told that the latter had been allegedly fooled by
the main office in Manila. Appellant, nevertheless, demanded an additionalP5,000.00 from Victoria
so that she could leave on 18 April 1992. Victoria gave appellant the amount of P5,000.00 at her shop
on 31 March 1992 for which appellant gave a corresponding receipt.
When on 18 April 1992 still nothing happened, Victoria demanded from appellant a
refund. Appellant gave her an advance of P15,000.00. An acknowledgment receipt with appellants
signature affixed thereon would evidence that payment. Appellant, however, failed to return the rest
of the promised refund.[8]

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415

Cherry Pi-ay, a 26-year-old nursing student from Acop, Tublay, Benguet, was visited once in
March 1991 by appellant who encouraged Cherry to apply for work in a textile or a plastic factory in
Korea with a monthly salary of US$800.00. Appellant told Cherry that the moment she would pay the
amount of P45,000.00, she could be deployed in Korea. Cherry prepared her bio-data and gave it to
appellant at the latter's residence during the first week of April 1991.
Cherry was able to leave the country on 04 July 1991 after having paid the total amount
of P45,000.00. Appellant told her that a certain Ramil would meet her at the airport in Korea. When
she arrived, a Filipina, named Marlyn, instead met her. Marlyn introduced herself as appellants friend
and accompanied Cherry to a certain house owned by a Korean. There, Cherry met, among other
compatriots, Corazon del Rosario and Jane Kipas. Cherry soon realized that she was not going to
have a job in the factory promised by appellant. Instead, she was made to work for the Korean
applying rugby on and folding leather jackets. About a month later, men from the Korean
Immigration accosted her and the others. Brought in for questioning by Immigration officials, Cherry
and her companions were informed that they were illegal workers. After the investigation, Cherry and
her group were allowed to go but on 08 August 1991, all were deported.
Back to the Philippines, the deportees were assured by appellant that they would get a refund of
their money. Cherry executed a sworn statement narrating her experience in Korea.[9]
Ayson Acbaya-an, Cherrys "boyfriend" who later was to become her husband, corroborated
Cherrys testimony that appellant first received P18,000.00 from Cherry. Thereafter, appellant also
received P27,000.00 from Cherry, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) of which amount came from
him. In both instances, appellant signed receipts for the payments. The receipts were among Cherry's
papers confiscated in Korea.[10]

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426

Corazon del Rosario, a 34-year-old housemaid from 48 Happy Homes, Baguio City, had known
appellant, an acquaintance, since 1980. One day in December 1990, she happened to chance
upon appellant at a PLDT telephone booth in Kilometer 4, La Trinidad, Baguio City. Appellant,
representing herself to be an authorized recruiter, tried to persuade Corazon to work
abroad. Corazon showed interest. From then on, appellant would visit Corazon in her brothers house
in Kilometer 4. Ultimately, appellant was able to convince Corazon that, for a fee ofP40,000.00, she
could be sent to Korea. Corazon gave appellant the amount of P15,000.00. She paid the balance
of P25,000.00 in May 1991. The payments were both made in the presence of Cherry Pi-ay and Jane
Kipas. Appellant issued the corresponding receipts for these amounts.
Corazon took the flight for Korea on 28 June 1991. Appellant had instructed Corazon, upon
landing in Korea, to call up a certain Ramil. At the airport, Corazon, including her companions
among them Jane Kipas, kept on dialing the number but each time only a Korean woman would
answer the call. Later, that evening, a certain Marlyn, who introduced herself as appellants friend,
took them to a hotel. There, Marlyn took their show money of US$1,000.00. The group stayed
overnight in the hotel and the following morning, a Korean took them to a house proximately two
hours away by car from the airport. For about a month, they did nothing but apply rugby on leather
jackets, for which they were not paid, until a policeman arrived and took all ten of them to the
airport. All that the immigration and airport personnel would tell them was that they should be
thankful they were only being repatriated home. Immigration and airport authorities confiscated
everything that they had.
At home, appellant promised to return Corazons money. Not having received the promised
refund, Corazon went to the CIS stationed at Camp Dangwa where, on 28 July 1992, she executed
her sworn statement.[11]
Avelina Velasco Samidan, a friend of Corazon and in whose house the latter would stay
whenever she was in Baguio, corroborated the testimony of Corazon that she gave to appellant the
amount of P15,000.00, ten thousand pesos of which amount Corazon borrowed from Avelina, and
that some time in April 1991, Corazon withdrew P25,000.00 from the bank which she likewise paid to
appellant.[12]

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428

Arthur Juan, a 30-year-old farmer from Dumulpot, Tublay, Benguet, first met appellant in her
house at Buyagan, La Trinidad, Benguet, when he, together with Maxima Gomez, Tirso Gomez and
Francisco Labadchan, went to see appellant who was said to be recruiting workers for Korea. Juan
promptly submitted his bio-data form after being told that he could work in a factory in Korea at
US$400.00 a month. Appellant quoted a processing fee of P40,000.00. Juan initially paid the amount
of P6,500.00 in April 1991. On 09 October 1991, the scheduled date of the flight, Juan went to the
airport and gave appellant another P15,000.00; the final balance of the fees were, by their
agreement, to be remitted to appellant on a salary deduction basis. Appellant then told Juan that
he could not leave on that day (09 October 1991) because the airplane was already full. Appellant
took back Juans passport, telling Juan that he should be able to depart in a few days. Appellant,
however, kept on rescheduling the flight for about five more times until it became clear to Juan that
he had been deceived. Juan paid out a total amount of P24,200.00, including the US$100.00 that
would have been his pocket money, to appellant. The latter executed receipts for the amounts.
Juan executed a sworn statement narrating the unfortunate incident.[13]

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652

Adeline Tiangge, a 43-year-old housekeeper from Bangao, Buguias, Benguet, learned that
appellant was recruiting workers for abroad. Adeline, accompanied by her sister, went to see
appellant at her house in Buyagan some time in December 1991. There were others, like her, who
also went to see appellant. When she produced the required identification pictures andP1,500.00 for
passport processing, appellant told Adeline that she could be a factory worker in Korea with a
monthly salary of US$350.00. Appellant agreed to be paid by Adeline the additional P35,000.00
balance by installment. The first installment of P17,000.00 was paid on 15 February 1992, evidenced
by a receipt signed by Antonine Saley, with the remainingP18,000.00 being payable before getting
on her flight for abroad.
Adeline waited in Baguio City for word on her departure. Adeline, together with some other
applicants, thrice went to appellants office at the Shoppers Lane to check. She also went to
Dimasalang, Manila, in front of the Dangwa terminal, for a like purpose. Appellant informed her that
she just had to wait for her flight. Adeline, exasperated, finally demanded a refund of the amount she
had paid but appellant merely gave her P100.00 for her fare back to Benguet.[14]
-0-
The sum of the evidence, infra., in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large
scale had been submitted to likewise constitute the evidence to establish the People's case,
respectively, in -

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644

Alfredo Arcega, a 42-year-old hotel employee from 16 Q.M. Subdivision, Baguio City, heard from
a former co-worker, Fidel Opdas, that appellant was recruiting workers for overseas
employment. Interested, he, in the company of his nephew, Peter Arcega, went to appellants house
in Buyagan, La Trinidad. There, he met job applicants Dembert Leon, Mariano Damolog and Brando
Salbino. Appellant assured the group that they could get employed in Taiwan for a monthly salary
of P12,000.00 to P15,000.00. She told them that the processing and placement fees would amount
to P40,000.00 each. Arcega and his companions agreed.
On 17 August 1992, Arcega paid appellant P10,000.00 in Dimasalang, Manila. Appellant issued a
cash voucher for the amount. She told Arcega to just wait for the results. On 30 September 1992,
appellant asked Arcega for another P15,000.00 which amount he paid. With him at the time were his
nephew Peter Arcega, as well as Dembert Leon, Mariano Damolog, Lorenzo Belino and Brando
Salbino. Appellant issued a receipt and affixed thereon her signature. Appellant told Arcega that
with the payment, his employment abroad was assured. She stressed, however, that the balance
of P15,000.00 should be paid before his departure for Taiwan. After following up the matter with
appellant in October 1992 and then in December 1992, he finally gave up. Arcega went to the POEA
office in Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, and when he learned that appellant had pending cases
for illegal recruitment, he also filed his own complaint and executed an affidavit before Atty.
Justinian Licnachan.[15]

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646

Brando Salbino, a 36-year-old resident of East Quirino Hill, Baguio City, used to be a "forester" of
the DENR. In July 1992, he met appellant at her Buyagan residence after his brother-in-law, Fidel
Opdas, had said that she was recruiting workers for abroad. Appellant told him that she could help
him get employed in Taiwan with a P12,000.00 monthly salary. Salbino submitted various documents
required by appellant. On 11 August 1992, Salbino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her
Dimasalang "temporary office" so that, according to her, his travel papers could be processed. The
payment was receipted. On 30 September 1992, he paid her another P15,000.00, for which appellant
again issued an acknowledgment receipt.
Appellant told Salbino to merely wait in Baguio City. When she failed to show up, he went to
appellants house in Buyagan to verify. She was not there. The following week, he went to Manila with
Fidel Opdas hoping to see her. Appellant's whereabouts could not be determined. Having failed to
locate her, Salbino and his companions went to the POEA office in Magsaysay, Baguio City. It was at
the POEA office that they were to learn that appellant was not in the list of licensed recruiters. He,
along with the others, then executed an affidavit-complaint before Atty. Licnachan.[16]

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647

Mariano Damolog, a 33 year-old farmer from 26 P. Burgos Street, Baguio City, went to appellants
residence in Buyagan in July 1992 when informed by Fidel Opdas, his co-worker at the MIDO
Restaurant, that appellant was recruiting workers for Taiwan. Appellant herself later told Damolog
that she was licensed to recruit workers. He forthwith applied for a position at a factory in Taiwan with
a salary of between US$400.00 and US$500.00 a month. He, after being required to pay a processing
fee, paid the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant at her Manila office. Appellant gave him a cash
voucher. Damolog was then supposed to just wait in Baguio City for a telegram.
When he did not receive word from appellant, Damolog went to Manila to see what had
happened to his application. Appellant was again told to simply stand by in Baguio City. After
several days, Opdas, who had meanwhile gone to Manila, told Damolog to see appellant in
Manila. In Manila, appellant told Damolog to sign a bio-data form for screening purposes. Like Peter
Arcega, Fred Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino, he was also asked to pay
another P15,000.00. The group went back to Baguio City to raise the amount of P15,000.00 each. On
30 September 1992, he, together with Fred and Peter Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino,
returned to Manila. Damolog handed over his P15,000.00 to appellant who issued an
acknowledgment receipt, signed by Annie Saley which, according to appellant, was her
name. Appellant assured him that he would be among the first to go to Taiwan by December 1992.
December 1992 came but no word was received prompting Damolog and his companions to
repair to appellants house in Buyagan. She was not home. Damolog proceeded to Manila where
appellant told him to wait a few more days. When still nothing happened, Damolog and his
companions went to the POEA office where Atty. Licnachan issued a certification stating that
appellant was not authorized to recruit workers. Damolog and his companions filed a joint affidavit-
complaint executed before Atty. Licnachan[17] against appellant.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649

Lorenzo Belino, a 37-year-old farmer from Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet, was in Manila in August
1992 looking for employment. Fidel Opdas, a companion in his trip to Manila, mentioned that
perhaps appellant could help. Belino saw appellant who then told him about the prospect of getting
employed in Taiwan. Appellant invited him to see her on 20 September 1992 in Buyagan.
On the appointed date, Belino found Mariano Damolog, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert
Leon, Alfredo Arcega and Peter Arcega already in appellants residence in Buyagan.Appellant
asked P10,000.00 from each of them if they wanted her to be responsible for representing them to
get themselves employed in Taiwan with a monthly income of P15,000.00.When the group agreed,
appellant made them fill up and sign a bio-data form. Appellant also made them understand that
they would each have to pay her the total amount of P40,000.00,P10,000.00 of which was to be
forthwith paid and the balance to be paid as and when everything would have been arranged for
their flight to Taiwan.
On 23 September 1992, Belino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang
office. Appellant issued a cash voucher therefor. Belino returned to Baguio City. Five days later,
Belino went down to Manila after appellant had sent word that he had to come to Manila. On 30
September 1992, Belino paid in Manila the amount of P15,000.00 demanded by appellant. Appellant
signed her name as Annie Saley on the receipt. Appellant informed Belino that he should wait for her
telephone call regarding the schedule of his flight. He waited but when no calls came, Belino and
Opdas decided to visit appellant in her house in Buyagan. Appellant asked to be given until January
to deploy them in Taiwan. February 1993 came, and still there was no news from appellant. In March
1993, Belino and others, namely, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo
Arcega,[18] decided to file a complaint against appellant with the POEA in Magsaysay Avenue,
Baguio City, where their sworn statements were taken.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651

Peter Arcega, a 27-year-old cashier from 317 Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, also paid the
amount of P10,000.00 to appellant for a promised job overseas. A cash voucher was signed by
appellant to acknowledge the payment. Peter, subsequently, also paid the amount of P15,000.00 to
appellant for which the latter issued a receipt signed by Annie Saley. He was among those who
signed the affidavit-complaint before the POEA.
Testifying in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645,[19] as a corroborative witness, Dembert Leon, a 25-
year-old unemployed from 52-F Tandang Sora Street, Baguio City, said that he, desiring to get an
employment abroad, likewise went to see appellant at her residence in Buyagan. Accompanied by
Fidel Opdas, Leon was told by appellant to complete the necessary papers, including his bio-
data, barangay clearance, ID and NBI clearance. Leon applied to be a factory worker in Taiwan. He
was assured a monthly salary of P12,000.00, but first, appellant told him, he should commit to pay a
placement fee of P40,000.00 of which amount P10,000.00 had to be paid forthwith. Leon paid and a
cash voucher, dated 08 September 1992, was issued by appellant. On 30 September 1992, he paid
appellant another P15,000.00 for which another acknowledgment receipt was issued. The
remaining P15,000.00 was agreed to be paid at the airport before his flight to Taiwan. No further word
came from appellant. Finally, in December 1992, when he and the others called her up, appellant
informed them to wait until January 1993. January came and still nothing happened. In March 1993,
Leon and the others went to the POEA office to lodge a complaint against appellant.[20]
Jose B. Matias, an Attorney II at the POEA Regional Station Unit in Baguio City, received a request
for verification on whether or not appellant was a licensed recruiter. In response, he advised that
appellant was not authorized to recruit in the City of Baguio and in the region from 1989 to the
present. Atty. Matias issued a certification to that effect.
-0-

The Case for the Defense. -

The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the complainants in applying for
overseas employment with duly accredited travel agencies for and from which she derived a
commission.[21]
According to the 37-year-old appellant, she used to be the liaison officer of the Friendship
Recruitment Agency from 1983 to 1986. In that capacity, she would submit to the POEA contracts for
processing job orders for applicants and assist applicants prior to their departure at the airport. When
the licensed agency closed in 1986, she went to Baguio where she engaged in the purchase and
sale of vegetables and flowers. Even then, however, she would not hesitate extending help to
applicants for overseas employment by recommending licensed agencies which could assist said
applicants in going abroad. She named the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings International
as such licensed agencies. She had, in the process, been able to help workers, like Cherry Pi-ay,
Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan and Francisco Labadchan to name some, sent abroad.[22]
Cherry Pi-ay was able to leave for Kuwait. In 1991, Cherry went to see her again, this time asking
for assistance in getting an employment in Korea. She accompanied Cherry to the Dynasty Travel
and Tours in Manila that enabled her to get a tourist visa to Korea. Appellant herself later gave
Cherry her tourist visa. For Cherrys visa and plane ticket, appellant received from Cherry P15,000.00
and US$250.00. Appellant issued a receipt therefor and delivered the amounts to the Dynasty Travel
and Tours which, in turn, issued her a receipt. The CIS men who arrested her in Manila confiscated
that receipt. In August 1991, Cherry came back and asked her to look for another travel agency
saying she did not like the work she had in Korea.[23]
Norma Bao-idang, a former client of the Friendship Recruitment Agency, introduced Corazon del
Rosario to appellant. Since the agency had already been closed, appellant referred Corazon to
Mannings International in Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila. Corazon was able to leave for Abu Dhabi
where she worked as a domestic helper. In 1991, Corazon again sought appellant's assistance in
getting an employment in Korea. Appellant introduced her to Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn,
helped Corazon get a tourist visa for Korea. She did ask forP15,000.00 and US$250.00 from Corazon
but these amounts, being for Corazons ticket and hotel accommodation, were turned over to
Dynasty Travel and Tours. She also knew that Corazon was able to leave for Korea because she
herself handed over to Corazon her tourist visa and ticket. Appellant received P2,000.00 from Dynasty
Travel and Tours by way of commission. She was also issued a receipt by that travel agency showing
that she had turned over to it the amounts received from Corazon but the CIS men took
the receipts and otherdocuments from her. When Corazon returned home in 1991 after going to
Korea, she again sought appellants help in looking for a travel agency that could assist her in going
back to that country.[24]
Appellant came to know Arthur Juan through a vegetable vendor named Maxima Gomez. He
asked her for help in securing a tourist visa. Appellant was able to assist him and others, like Francisco
Labadchan, Tirso Gomez and Romeo Balao, by referring them to the Dynasty Travel and Tours.
Appellant asked from them the amounts of P15,000.00 and US$250.00 which she turned over to the
travel agency. Again, she was issued a receipt by that agency but that, too, was confiscated by the
CIS agents who arrested her. Of the men who sought her help in going abroad, seven "were able to
leave. The others had been re-scheduled to leave but they failed to arrive at the airport.
Labadchan and Juan met appellant during the first week of January 1993. She gave them back
the plane ticket and the amount of US$250.00 so that they could ask for a refund from the travel
agency. The next time she saw Labadchan was at the NBI office when NBI Director Limmayog invited
her for questioning. Appellant tried her best to look for a job for Labadchan but the transaction she
had with Fast International failed to push through.[25]
Appellant helped Victoria Asil secure a tourist visa. The latters sister was a former client at the
Friendship Recruitment Agency who was able to work in Saudi Arabia in 1985. She introduced
Victoria to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked Victoria to advance P15,000.00 and
US$250.00 for her ticket and hotel accommodation. Victoria gave appellant the amount, and the
latter issued corresponding receipts. She turned over the amount to the travel agency which, in turn,
issued a receipt to appellant. The CIS, however, confiscated all the documents in
her attache case.[26] Appellant was able to process Victorias visa for Korea but when someone
informed the latter that she could have a visa for Taiwan, Victoria opted to change her
destination. Appellant told Victoria that her visa and ticket for Korea had already been obtained but
Victoria insisted on a refund of her money. Appellant returned to herP15,000.00 that was supposed to
be the amount to be exchanged into dollars for her show money. Victoria issued a receipt for the
amount but appellant entrusted it to her former lawyer.Appellant handed over the plane ticket to
Victoria.[27]
Mercedes Quimson (Kimson) introduced appellant to Adeline Tiangge. When Adeline said that
she was interested in securing a tourist visa for Korea, appellant took her to the Dynasty Travel and
Tours. Appellant asked from Adeline the amount of P17,000.00 for her plane ticket. Appellant was
able to buy a plane ticket and to get a passport for Adeline. The latter, however, later said that she
was no longer interested in going to Korea and that her passport application should, instead, be
diverted to Hongkong. In fact, Adeline was able to leave for Hongkong. Adeline filed a case against
appellant because when Adeline sought a refund from Dynasty Travel and Tours, the agency only
gave her P5,000.00 or just a half of theP10,000.00 she wanted.[28]
Fidel Opdas was appellants client at the Friendship Agency who was able to leave for Saudi
Arabia. He asked her if she could find a job for him in Taiwan. When appellant told him that she knew
someone who could help, Opdas brought along Mariano Damolog. Appellant introduced them to
Marites Tapia and Carol Cornelio of Dynasty Travel and Tours who told Opdas and Damolog to
submit the necessary documents for their application for work in Taiwan. In May 1993, Opdas
returned with Brando Salbino who also talked to Marites and Carol. Opdas submitted to appellant
the documents required by Marites and Carol. Appellant, in turn, gave the papers to Marites and
Carol. When, later, Opdas went to see appellant, he brought along Dembert Leon and Lorenzo
Belino. Appellant requested Opdas to accompany the two to Marites and Carol with whom they
discussed what would be necessary "for their application for Taiwan. Still later when Opdas came
back with Peter and Alfredo Arcega to see appellant, she again referred them to Marites and
Carol. The job applicants each gave appellant P10,000.00 which the latter turned over to Marites
and Carol. The two gave her receipts but these were in the same attache case that was seized by
the CIS agents and never returned. The group subsequently withdrew their applications although it
was only Opdas who received a P15,000.00 refund.[29]
In a bid to prove that CIS agents indeed took away her attache case containing documents
that could bail her out of the charges, appellant presented Danilo A. Deladia, one of the three
policemen who arrested her. Equipped with a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Luis Dictado of
Branch 8, the policemen went to the house of appellants cousin at 2320-B San Antonio, Sampaloc,
Manila at 3:00 p.m. of 25 August 1993. According to Deladia, however, they did not get anything
from appellant because their mission was only to arrest her. At the counter intelligence branch of the
CIS, he did not even hear appellant requesting for the return of a brief case. [30] Apparently because
of what had turned out to be Deladias adverse testimony, the defense presented George Santiago
who claimed to be at the boarding house when appellant was arrested. Santiago said that he had
allowed the CIS agents to enter the boarding house.Santiago did not see what might have
happened in appellant's room but what he did see was that when the agents all came out, they had
with them an attache case. Santiago, accompanied by his cousin Atty. Lomboan, went to the CIS in
Camp Crame where one of the men asked P50,000.00 for the release of appellant. Santiago did not
see any brief case in the office but one of the men told them that they would "produce" appellant
and the attache case if they could "produce" the amount of P50,000.00.[31]
On cross-examination, however, Santiago admitted that the P50,000.00 was meant for bonding
purposes and that they did not make a formal request for the release of the brief case.[32]
The defense next attempted to shift, albeit unsuccessfully, the responsibility for the crime from
appellant to Maritess and Carol. Presented at the witness stand was Oscar Gaoyen, a 30-year-old
farmer, who testified that appellant had failed to assist him in going to Korea to work because it was
difficult. While following up his application in Manila, he met Marites and Carol in front of the Dangwa
station in Dimasalang and he was told that they knew someone who could "transfer his application to
Taiwan." He said that even after he had paid appellantP50,000.00, nothing happened constraining
him to file charges against her. Appellant returned P15,000.00 of the money to him.[33]
Appellant filed, before the trial court could promulgate its decision, a Motion to Reopen Trial with
an urgent motion to defer promulgation on the ground of newly discovered evidence.[34]In its order
of 03 March 1995, the trial court, noting that the newly discovered evidence consisted of affidavits of
desistance of seven complainants, found no merit in the motion. It held that presentation of the same
does not give valid ground for possible amendment of the decision as the private complainants had
already testified. It agreed with the prosecutor that the affidavits of desistance only (had) the effect
of satisfying the civil liability.[35]

The Judgment of the Trial Court. -

On 03 March 1995, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. It found implausible appellants claim that she was merely
an agent of Dynasty Travel and Tours and/or Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio. If what she claimed
were true, said the court, appellant could have presented her principals; instead, that failure
exposed her to the adverse inference and legal presumption that evidence suppressed would be
adverse if produced. It also found hard to believe, the "self-serving" claim of appellant that her brief
case, supposedly containing receipts of her remittances to the travel agencies, was confiscated by
the CIS and remained unaccounted for. The trial court concluded:
In fine, accused gave the distinct assurance, albeit false, that she had the ability to send the
complainants abroad for work deployment, thereby employing false pretenses to defraud
them. This was despite her knowing very well that she was not legally authorized. The
complainants willingly parted with their money in the hope of overseas employment
deceitfully promised them by the accused. What makes matters worse is that these amounts
given to the accused come from hard-earned money, or worse, could have been borrowed
from money lenders who have no qualms about collecting usurious interest rates.
Complainants who faithfully relied on the accused did not hesitate to painstakingly raise or
even beg or borrow money just so they could give a decent future to their families even to
the extent of leaving them for far-off lands. But now, all their dreams are gone, their hopes
shattered. Some may not have even been able to pay back what they borrowed nor recoup
their losses. Now, more than ever, their future appears bleaker. But this time, a glimmering light
appears at the end of the tunnel as the Court steps in to lay down the iron fist of the law so as
to serve the accused a lesson, a bitter one, with the hope that those who are trekking or
those who are about to trek the same pilfered path that the accused took will reconsider
their pursuits before it would be too late, and in the end, this form of fraud which invariably
victimizes the poor will forever be stopped.[36]
All given, the trial court then decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in all the above-mentioned cases, the Court finds accused Antonine B. Saley,
also known as Annie B. Saley, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the corresponding crime
as charged in the informations and hereby sentences her in each case, except in Criminal
Case NO. 93-CR-1645 where an indeterminate sentence is not applicable, to suffer an
indeterminate sentence for the duration hereunder given, and to pay the costs, as well as the
damages due the private complainants, to wit:

"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396

"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay
Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397

"Imprisonment from Three (3) Years, Six (6) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Seven (7) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00 for
actual damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413

"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay
Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414

"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for actual
damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415

"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for moral
damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416

"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay
Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425


"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay
Corazon del Rosario P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426

"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Seven (7) Months and Eleven (11) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Corazon del Rosario P20,000.00 for moral
damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427

"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay
the costs.

"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428

"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay the costs.

"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644

"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo C. Arcega P25,000.00 for
actual damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645

"To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. She shall also pay Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each to Peter
Arcega, Lorenzo Belino, Mariano Damolog, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo
Arcega for actual damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646

"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando B. Salbino P25,000.00 for actual
damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647

"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano Damolog P25,000.00 for
actual damages, plus costs.

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649

"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino P25,000.00 for actual
damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651


"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega P25,000.00 for actual
damages, plus costs.

"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652

"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline Tiangge y Marcos P17,000.00
for actual damages, plus costs.
"With respect to accused Conchita Tagle in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-CR-1396 and 92-CR-1397,
let these cases be sent to the files without prejudice to their revival as soon as she shall have
been arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.
"In order that Conchita Tagle may not escape the clutches of the law, let Alias Warrants of
Arrest issue addressed to the PNP Chief of Police, La Trinidad, Benguet and the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila and in Baguio City. Further, the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID), Manila is ordered to include her name in the its Hold-
Departure List.
"SO ORDERED.[37]
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting that the trial court had
erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding her guilty of
the crimes charged despite the "failure" of the prosecution to fully establish the elements of the
crimes beyond reasonable doubt.[38] Finding no merit in the motion, the trial court, on 03 April 1995,
denied a reconsideration of its decision.[39] The following day, appellant filed a notice of
appeal.[40] The trial court gave due course to the appeal on 17 April 1995.[41]

The Instant Appeal. -

Appellant continues to profess before this Court her innocence of the accusation. She reiterates
her assertion that the trial court has erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the complaining
witnesses and in finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the various offenses she has been
charged with by the prosecution.[42] She avers that her transactions with the complainants have
been limited to her assisting them secure their respective travel visa specifically for tourist and that
her assistance to them (has been) only to refer them to travel agencies such as the Dynasty Travel
and Tours and the Mannings International. She insists that she has remitted the amounts solicited from
the complainants to the travel agencies, or to Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio, earning only the
commissions for bringing in clients interested in getting tourist visas.[43]
At the outset, it might be explained that this appeal involves the conviction of appellant not only
for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale for which the penalty of life imprisonment is imposed
but also for other offenses for which lesser penalties have been meted by the trial court upon
appellant. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over ordinary appeals in criminal cases directly from
the Regional Trial Courts when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.[44] The Rules of
Court, allows, however, the appeal of criminal casesinvolving penalties lower than reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment under the circumstances stated in Section 3, Rule 122, of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus -
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment,
or where a lesser penalty is imposed but involving offenses committed on the same occasion
or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the
penalty of death or life imprisonment is imposed shall be by filing a notice of appeal in
accordance with paragraph (a) of this Section.
In giving due course to the notice of appeal filed by appellant, the trial court has directed that the
entire records of the seventeen cases should be forwarded to this Court.[45] It might be observed that
this appeal, which has been assigned only one docket number, involves cases, although spawned
under different circumstances could be said to somehow be linked to the incident giving rise to the
case for illegal recruitment in large scale. The cases have thus been correctly consolidated and
heard jointly below. The appeal made directly to this Court of the seventeen cases, each of which
incidentally should have been assigned a separate docket number in this Court, is properly taken.
Article 38(a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any recruitment activity undertaken by non-
licensees or non-holders of authority. Recruitment is defined by Article 13, paragraph (b), of the same
Code as referring -
x x x to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur:
1) That the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and
2) That the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and
placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34.[46]
Any person who commits the prohibited acts enumerated in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code shall be
liable under Article 38(a) thereof.[47] The proviso in Article 13(b) lays down a rule of evidence that
where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more
prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in
the act of recruitment and placement.[48] The article also provides that recruitment includes the act
of referral or the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial
interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or
bureau.[49]
The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant, indeed, violated the law against illegal
recruitment.
The prosecution was able to prove by overwhelming evidence that appellant did represent
herself as being in a position to get for the aspiring overseas contract workers good-paying jobs
abroad. Appellant was thus able to demand and receive various amounts from the applicants. The
latter would then be briefed by appellant on the requirements for employment overseas. Appellant
herself testified, thus:
Q From 1986 when separated from Friendship Recruitment Agency and before you were put to
jail did you have any occupation?
"A Yes, sometimes we brought vegetables and flowers to Manila for resale.
"Q Aside from buying and selling vegetables down in Manila did you have any other source of
income?
"A Sometimes I helped some applicants who are interested to go abroad and asked if I know
some agencies who can assist them to go abroad.
"Q Were you able to assist some people to look for an agency to assist them to go abroad?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Were you being paid when you assist these people applying for overseas employment?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q By whom?
"A The travel agencies give me some amount of commission.
"Q What are the names of these agencies which you know?
"A Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Q Do you know also if this Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International is duly licensed
by the government to recruit applicants abroad?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Do you have any document to prove that it is registered?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Where is that?
"A Mannings International is a licensed agency and Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue
tickets for applicants to go abroad.
"Q You said that Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue tickets for applicants going abroad
what do you mean by applicants going abroad?
"A Those applicants to work as a contract worker and who are ready to leave for abroad and
they are being issued tickets.
"Q Were you actually able to help or assist some overseas worker-applicants?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Do you remember some of them?
"A Cherry Piay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan, Francisco Labadchan and others.
(Underscoring supplied.)[50]
Appellant at one point claimed that she had helped complainants only in acquiring for them plane
tickets and tourist visas. On cross-examination, however, she admitted that she had made referrals of
job applicants to recruitment agencies.[51] She evidently knew all along that the persons she was
dealing with were applicants for employment abroad.
The law requires that the above activities of appellant should have first been authorized by the
POEA.[52] Rule II, Book II, of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment
provides:
SEC. 11. Appointment of Representatives. Every appointment of representatives or agents of
licensed agency shall be subject to prior approval or authority of the Administration.
"The approval may be issued upon submission of or compliance with the following
requirements:

"a. Proposed appointment or special power of attorney;

"b. Clearances of the proposed representative or agent from NBI;

"c. A sworn or verified statement by the designating or appointing person or company


assuming full responsibility for all acts of the agent or representative done in connection
with the recruitment and placement of workers.

"Approval by the Administration of the appointment or designation does not authorize the
agent or representative to establish a branch or extension office of the licensed agency
represented.
"Any revocation or amendment in the appointment should be communicated to the
Administration. Otherwise, the designation or appointment shall be deemed as not revoked
or amended.
The claim that appellant did not categorically represent herself as a licensed recruiter, or that she
merely helped the complainants secure tourist visas, could not make her less guilty of illegal
recruitment,[53] it being enough that he or she gave the impression of having had the authority to
recruit workers for deployment abroad.[54]
The fact that, with the exception of the cases involving Cherry Pi-ay and Corazon del Rosario,
only the complainant in each of the cases, have testified against appellant in the illegal recruitment
cases does not thereby make the case for the prosecution weak. The rule has always been that the
testimony of witnesses is to be weighed, not that the witnesses be numbered, and it is not an
uncommon experience to have a conclusion of guilt reached on the basis of the testimony of a
single witness.[55] Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the
suspicion that the witness has perjured himself or that his observations have veered from the truth.[56]
The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an indictee in a criminal case for illegal
recruitment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecution's cause. As long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial
evidence that the accused has involved himself in an act of illegal recruitment, a conviction for the
offense can very well be justified.[57]
Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established beyond any discernible shadow of
doubt that appellant is indeed guilty of illegal recruitment on various counts. Being neither a licensee
nor a holder of authority to recruit, appellant must suffer under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less
than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of
the court. In imposing the penalty, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the application of the
circumstances that could modify the criminal liability of an accused cannot be considered, these
provisions being inapplicable to special laws.[58]
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[59] whenever the offense is punishable by a special law,
the court shall impose on the accused an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same."[60] Accordingly, in imposing the penalty of four (4) years to six (6) years
on appellant for each of the five cases of illegal recruitment, the trial court has acted correctly.
Illegal recruitment is committed in large scale if it is perpetrated against three or more persons
"individually or as a group." Its requisites are that: (1) the person charged with the crime must have
undertaken recruitment activities as so defined by law, (2) the same person does not have a license
or authority to do that, and (3) the questioned act is committed against three or more persons. [61] The
prosecution has been able to successfully show that, for a fee, appellant, not being authorized to
recruit workers for abroad, did so in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 against seven complainants. For
this offense, Article 39(a) of the Labor Code imposes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). This penalty was thus likewise aptly meted out upon
appellant by the trial court.
Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of the
offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to
warrant conviction.[62] Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a),[63] of the Revised Penal Code, the elements
of the offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or
by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.[64] Clearly, these elements have sufficiently been shown in the cases
under review.
The penalty for the crime is prescribed by Article 315, first to fourth paragraphs, of the Revised
Penal Code as follows:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of
the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
"4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos,
provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following
means: x x x."
In the case of People vs. Gabres,[65] the Court has had occasion to so state that -
"Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be `that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed' under the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum shall be `within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed' for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left
by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
"The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be
considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter
should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords with
the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty
prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then
be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
(2) months x x x."[66]
The Court reiterates the above rule; however, in fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty
of prision correccional maximum period to prision mayor minimum period should be divided into
"three equal portions of time," each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period; hence -

Minimum Period Medium Period Maximum Period

From 4 years, 2 months From 5 years, 5 months From 6 years, 8 months


and 1 day to 5 years, and 11 days to 6 years, and 21 days to 8 years
5 months and 10 days 8 months and 20 days -
in consonance with Article 65,[67] in relation to Article 64,[68] of the Revised Penal Code.
When the amount involved in the offense exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty prescribed in Article
315 of the Code "shall be imposed in its maximum period," adding one year for each
additional P10,000.00 although the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20
years. The maximum penalty should then be termed as prision mayor or reclusion temporal as the
case may be. In fine, the one year period, whenever applicable, shall be added to the maximum
period of the principal penalty of anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.
Accordingly, with respect to the cases of estafa filed by the complainants who individually
charged appellant with illegal recruitment, the applicable penalties would, respectively, be, as
follows:
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 where appellant defrauded Francisco T. Labadchan in the
amount of P45,000.00, two years for the additional amount of P23,000.00 in excess ofP22,000.00
provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and
21 days to 8 years). As such, aside from paying Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way of
actual damages, the Court deems it proper to sentence appellant to the indeterminate penalty of
three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium to eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor medium.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, appellant defrauded Victoria Asil in the amount
of P15,000.00. Hence, aside from paying Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual
damages, appellant shall also suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 where appellant defrauded Cherry Pi-ay in the amount
of P18,000.00, appellant, besides paying Cherry Pi-ay that amount by way of actual damages, shall
also suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 where appellant defrauded Corazon del Rosario in the amount
of P40,000.00, appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional medium to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 where appellant fraudulently solicited the amount of P24,200.00
from Arthur Juan, appellant shall pay him actual damages in that amount and shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days (imposed by
the court a quo) of prision correccional minimum period to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-
one (21) days of prision mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652 where appellant defrauded Adeline Tiangge the amount
of P18,500.00, appellant shall pay her the same amount as actual damages and shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645, the prosecution has successfully established its case against
appellant for illegal recruitment in large scale. Evidently banking on her reputation in the community
as a job recruiter, appellant was able to make the seven complainants believe that they could land
various jobs in Taiwan. Confident of her assurances, each complainant parted with P25,000.00 for
supposed processing and placement fees.
It would appear that of the seven complainants for illegal recruitment in large scale, only
five[69]of them filed separate charges of estafa against appellant. Accordingly, appellant was only
and could only be held liable for five counts of estafa arising from the charge of illegal recruitment in
large scale. Since appellant collected the amount of P25,000.00 from each of the five (5) victims, she
must be held subject to the penalty in its maximum period or prision mayor in its minimum period (not
any higher on account of the fact that the amount in excess ofP22,000.00 provided for by Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code is less than P10,000.00).[70] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and
there being no attending circumstances, appellant shall bear, the indeterminate penalty of one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium as minimum penalty
to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum
penalty for each offense. In addition, appellant should pay the five (5) victims the amount
of P25,000.00 each as actual damages.
The actual damages awarded here shall be subject to diminution or cancellation should it be
shown that appellant had already paid the complainants.
WHEREFORE, the Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
illegal recruitment, illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modifications hereunder specified, and only to the extent thereof, in the following cases:

1) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of


imprisonment of from three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccionalmedium period as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor medium period as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan the amount
of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages.

2) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of


from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period
as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual damages.
3) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period
as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum
period as MAXIMUM.

4) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of


imprisonment of from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium
period as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.

5) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of


from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period
as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM.

6) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of


from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period
as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual
damages.

7) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of


from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period
as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando Salbino the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual
damages.

8) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of


from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period
as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano Damolog the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual
damages.

9) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of


from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period
as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

10) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of


from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period
as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

11) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of


from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period
as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline Tiangge the amount of P17,000.00 by way of actual
damages.

The awards of damages in Criminal Cases No. 92-CR-1396, No. 92-CR-1413, No. 92-CR-1416, No.
92-CR-1425, and No. 92-CR-1427, all for illegal recruitment, as well as No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal
recruitment in large scale, except for the award of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages to Dember
Leon (no estafa case having been instituted), are DELETED, either because similar awards have
already been provided for by the trial court, or for insufficiency of proof, in the estafa cases
aforenumbered.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 142981. August 20, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CARMELITA ALVAREZ, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In illegal recruitment, mere failure of the complainant to present written receipts for money paid
for acts constituting recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution, provided the payment can
be proved by clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses.

The Case

Before us is an appeal from the January 28, 2000 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 93, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-58179. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises, the court finds the accused CARMELITA ALVAREZ guilty of Illegal
Recruitment committed in large scale constituting economic sabotage. Accordingly, the court
sentences her to serve [the] penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine [of] P100,000.00. She is
further ordered to indemnify the following complaining witnesses in the amounts indicated opposite
their names:

Arnel Damian P 16,500.00


Joel Serna P 18,575 plus US$50.00
Antonio Damian P 6,975.00 plus US$50.00
Roberto Alejandro P 47,320.00[2]

The July 18, 1994 Information[3] was filed by State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim. It charged Carmelita
Alvarez with illegal recruitment committed in large scale, under Article 13(b) in relation to Articles
38(a), 34 and 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as follows:

That sometime between the period from November, 1993 to March, 1994, in Quezon City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit the herein complainants, namely: JESUS
G. ESMA, JR., JOEL G. SERNA, ARNEL C. DAMIAN, ANTONIO C. DAMIAN, RUBEN F. RIOLA, LORETA S.
BOLOTAOLA, EDGAR R. BARCENAS, DENO A. MANACAP, JERRY NEIL D. ABANILLA, ROBERTO
ALEJANDRO, ESTER S. BONDOC and JOSEPHINE LOMOCSO as contractworkers in Taiwan for and in
consideration of the sum ranging from P12,300.00 to P48,600.00, as placement and processing fees,
and x x x which the complainants delivered and paid to herein accused the said amount, without
said accused first having secured the necessary license or authority from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration.[4]

On arraignment, appellant, assisted by Atty. Donato Mallabo, pleaded not guilty.[5] After trial in
due course, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as
follows:

Arnel Damian is one of the complainants in the case at bar. He testified that he was introduced to
appellant by Reynaldo Abrigo, who was then the boyfriend of Teresita Gonzales (daughter of
appellant Carmelita Alvarez) at appellants house in 25-B West Santiago St., San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City. During said meeting, appellant convinced complainant that if he could produce
[t]wenty-[f]ive [t]housand [p]esos (P25,000.00), he would be deployed to Taiwan as a factory worker
and would be receiving a salary of $600.00.

On December 27, 1993, complainant gave appellant [t]welve [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred [p]esos
(P12,500) for which he was issued a receipt (Exhibit A) with the words FOR PROCESSING FEE written
therein by appellant herself. Aside from the processing fee, complainant also gave appellant [t]wo
[t]housand [f]ive [h]undred [p]esos ([P]2,500.00) for medical expenses and one thousand five
hundred pesos (P1,500.00) for the passport, but was not issued a receipt for said payments.

According to complainant, while waiting for the results of his medical examination, he received a
call informing him that appellant was arrested. Becoming suspicious, complainant then went to the
Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration (POEA) to verify whether appellant had a
license to recruit. As per Certification issued by the POEA on June 1, 1994, he found out that
appellant was not licensed to recruit. Realizing that appellant would never be able to send
complainant to Taiwan, he filed a complaint against appellant with the POEA.

On cross-examination, complainant clarified that Reynaldo Abrigo did not actually introduce him to
appellant, but merely gave appellants address and telephone number. Thereafter, complainant
went to appellants house together with Ruben Riola and Michael Lumahan. In addition, complainant
stated under cross-examination that appellant told him that according to the medical examination
results, complainant was unfit to work. Consequently, he demanded the return of his money but
appellant failed to do so.

Antonio Damian is also one of the complainants in the case at bar. He testified that he is the brother
of Arnel Damian and that when his brother failed the medical examination, his brother Arnel
immediately demanded from appellant the return of the processing fee. However, appellant could
not return the money to him anymore. Instead, appellant asked Arnel to look for another applicant in
order to save the processing fee. For which reason, Arnel asked his brother Antonio to apply in his
stead. During his first meeting with appellant on January 4, 1994, complainant Antonio Damian was
asked to pay [t]wo [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred [p]esos (P2,500.00) for medical
examination. Subsequently, he also gave [n]ine [h]undred [p]esos (P900.00) for insurance; [s]eventy-
[f]ive [p]esos (P75.00) for Pre-departure Orientation Seminar; [f]ifty [d]ollars ($50.00) as part of the
processing fee; and [t]hree [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred [p]esos (P3,500.00) for the birth certificate. All
of these were personally given to appellant but no receipts were issued by appellant. As with all the
other complainants, appellant promised Antonio that he would work as factory worker in Taiwan and
that he would receive a salary of [t]wenty-[f]ive [t]housand [p]esos (P25,000.00). After waiting for two
(2) months, Antonio learned that appellant was arrested. Hence, he filed his complaint with the POEA
against appellant.

Joel Serna came to know of appellant also through Reynaldo Abrigo. He met appellant at her house
at 25-B West Santiago St., San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City on February 8, 1994. Like the others,
Joel was promised employment in Taiwan as factory worker and was also asked to pay various
fees. Appellant gave him a list of the fees to be paid which included: Processing fee P12,500.00;
Medical examination P2,395.00; Passport P1,500.00; Visa fee - $50.00; and
Insurance P900.00. Appellants telephone number was also included in said list. According to
complainant Joel, said list was personally prepared by appellant in his presence. Complainant Joel
paid the various fees but was never issued any receipt for said payment despite demands from
appellant. Upon learning that appellant was arrested for illegal recruitment, he went to the POEA
and filed his complaint against appellant.

Roberto Alejandro testified that Onofre Ferrer, a provincemate, informed him that there were
applicants needed for the job in Taiwan. On March 6, 1994, both of them went to appellants house
where complainant Roberto was told by appellant that she had the capacity to send him to Taiwan
but he must first undergo medical examination.

Later, when Roberto was informed that he passed the medical examination, appellant told him to
bring [f]orty [t]housand [p]esos (P40,000) as processing fee and other documentary requirements. A
receipt was issued by appellant for the payment of said amount.
On March 9, 1994 appellant advised him to pay an additional [f]ive [t]housand (P5,000.00) which he
personally delivered to appellant on March 11, 1994. A receipt was also issued by appellant for said
amount.

After three (3) months of waiting and follow-up without any positive results, complainant filed his
complaint against appellant with the POEA.

David Umbao was presented on rebuttal by the prosecution and testified that on June 1, 1994, an
entrapment operation was conducted against Carmelita Alvarez where Jerry Neil Abadilla and an
agent by the name of Conchita Samones gave appellant the amount of P5,000.00 with a P500.00 bill
marked as payment for the renewal of the promise of deployment. After appellant took the money,
she was immediately apprehended. Two witnesses were present during the entrapment operations,
one from the barangay and one from the homeowners association. The affidavit of arrest setting out
the details of the entrapment operation and the arrest was collectively executed by the entrapment
team.[6] (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

In her Brief,[7] appellant submits her own version of the facts as follows:

CARMELITA ALVAREZ testified that sometime in 1991, she met Director Angeles Wong at the Office of
the Deputy Administrator of the POEA, Manuel Quimson, who happened to be her
compadre.Sometime in November 1993, Director Wong called her about a direct-hire scheme from
Taiwan which is a job order whereby people who want to work abroad can apply directly with the
POEA. The said director told her that there were six (6) approved job orders from Labor Attache Ellen
Canasa. Seeing this as a good opportunity for her son, Edelito Gonzales, who was then a new
graduate, she recommended him and his sons friends, namely, Reynaldo Abrigo, Renato Abrigo and
two others surnamed Lucena, for employment. Unfortunately, Director Wong called off the
scheduled departure because the quota of workers for deployment was not met. To remedy the
situation, she approached Josephine Lomocso and a certain recruiter named Romeo Dabilbil, who
also recommends people to Director Wong with ready passports. When the thirty (30) slots needed
for the direct-hiring scheme were filed up, Director Wong set the tentative schedule of departure on
February 23, 1994. In view of the said development, Mr. Dabilbil contacted the recruits from Cebu
who even stayed at her (Conchitas) place in Capiz Street, Del Monte, Quezon City for three (3) days
to one (1) week while waiting to be deployed. On the night of their scheduled departure and while
they were having their despidida party, Director Wong sent a certain Ross to inform them that a telex
was received by him informing him (Director Wong) that the factory where the recruits were
supposed to work was gutted by a fire. She was later advised by Director Wong to wait for the
deployment order to come from Taiwan. While the people from Cebu were staying in her house
waiting for development, the accused even advised them to file a complaint against Mr. Dabilbil
before the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission at Camp Crame. Surprisingly, she was also arrested for
illegal recruitment on May 31, 1994 and thereafter learned that on June 1, 1994, the Damian brothers
filed a complaint against her before the POEA. After her apprehension, the accused further testified
that there was some sort of negotiation between her lawyer, Atty. Orlando Salutandre, and the
apprehending officer, Major Umbao, regarding her release. According to her, if she [would] be able
to raise the amount of [t]hirty [t]housand [p]esos (P30,000.00), Major Umbao [would] not anymore
refer her for inquest, but would only recommend her case for further investigation and then she
would be released.Since she failed to raise the said amount, she was brought to the inquest fiscal.

REYNALDO ABRIGO testified that it was Director Angeles Wong who was actually recruiting workers for
deployment abroad because of a certain document which Alvarez showed to them bearing the
name of the said POEA Official.

EDELITO GONZALES testimony merely corroborated the testimony of defense witnesses Carmencita
Alvarez and Reynaldo Abrigo.

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SUR-REBUTTAL EVIDENCE:

MARITES ABRIGO testified that while she was in the living room and her mother, accused Carmelita
Alvarez, was in her room inside their house on May 31, 1994, a group of persons arrived and asked
where her mother was. After telling them that her mother was inside her room resting, a certain Major
Umbao, together with some other persons, went straight to her mothers room and knocked on the
door.When her mother opened it and peeped through the opening of the door, they immediately
grabbed her. She was not able to do anything also, other than to tell them that she has to consult first
her lawyer.When her mother was brought to the POEA office she was told that they have to
produce P30,000.00.[8] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court accorded full credibility to the prosecution witnesses. It held that complainants had
not been impelled by ill motives in filing the case against appellant. They all positively identified her as
the person who, without the requisite license from the government, had collected from them
processing and placement fees in consideration of jobs in Taiwan.
The trial court was convinced that appellant had deceived complainants by making them
believe that she could deploy them abroad to work, and that she was thus able to milk them of their
precious savings. The lack of receipts for some amounts that she received from them did not discredit
their testimonies. Besides, her precise role in the illegal recruitment was adequately demonstrated
through other means.
Further affirming her illegal recruitment activities was the entrapment conducted, in which she
was caught receiving marked money from a certain Jerry Neil Abadilla, to whom she had promised a
job abroad.
Her defense that she merely wanted to provide jobs for her son-in-law and his friends was
rejected, because she had subsequently retracted her allegation implicating Director Wong of the
POEA in her illegal recruitment activities. As she victimized more than three (3) persons, the RTC
convicted her of illegal recruitment committed in large scale.
Hence, this appeal.[9]

Issue

Appellant submits this lone assignment of error:

The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellant Carmelita Alvarez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for illegal recruitment in large scale.[10]

More specifically, appellant questions the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence showing the
following: (1) that she engaged in acts of illegal recruitment enumerated in Article 38 of the Labor
Code, (2) that she was not licensed to recruit, (3) that she received money from complainants
despite the absence of receipts, and (4) that her acts constituted illegal recruitment in large scale.

This Courts Ruling

The appeal has no merit.


Main Issue:
Bases for Her Conviction

Appellant denies that she engaged in any act of illegal recruitment and claims that she only
recommended, through Director Wong of the POEA, her son-in-law and his friends for a direct-hire job
in Taiwan.
We disagree. Prior to the enactment of RA No. 8042, the crime of illegal recruitment was defined
under Article 38(a) in relation to Articles 13(b) and 34 and penalized under Article 39 of the Labor
Code. It consisted of any recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of the Code, undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.It is committed when
two elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid license or authority required by law to enable
them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the offenders
undertake either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under
Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34.[11]
Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers[;] and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. In the
simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed when a person, who is not authorized by the
government, gives the impression that he or she has the power to send workers abroad.[12]
It is clear from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellant recruited them. On
direct examination, Arnel Damian testified thus:
Q When was that when Reynaldo Abondo introduced you to the accused?
A Last week of November. I cannot remember the exact date.
Q Where were you when you were introduced to the accused?
A At 25 V. West Santiago St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, in the house of Mrs. Alvarez.
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Q When you arrived at that place, whom did you see?
A Mrs. Alvarez.
Q What happened during your first meeting.
A We were recruited by her.
Q What did she tell you?
A That if we could come up with the amount of P25,000.00 but she was only asking for P12,500.00
as processing fee.
Q What else did she tell you?
A That we were to act as replacement of three persons who backed out.
Q Did she tell you where were you going?
A We were told to go to Taiwan as factory worker.
Q Did she tell you how much salary will you receive?
A $600.00.[13]
Appellant had also recruited for a similar job in Taiwan, Joel Serna who testified as follows:
Q Will you please inform the Hon. Court why do you know Carmelita Alvarez?
A I came to know her when her daughter became the girlfriend of my friend and I was told that
she is recruiting workers for Taiwan.
Q After knowing that she was recruiting workers for Taiwan, what did you do, if any?
A I inquired from her and I was assured that the employment was not fake and I was told to pay a
processing fee.
Q When you said kanya or her to whom are you referring to?
A Carmelita Alvarez.
Q Do you still remember when was that?
A February 8, 1994.
Q Where did you meet?
A In her house at No. 25-B West Santiago St., SFDM, Quezon City.
Q What other things did she told you, if there was any?
A I would subject myself to a medical examination and after this, I would give her a processing
fee.
Q What was the purpose of that processing fee?
A So I could leave immediately for Taiwan.
Q Why are you going to Taiwan?
A I need a job.
Q If you give Mrs. Alvarez the processing fee, she will help you to go to Taiwan?
A Yes, sir.[14]
Antonio Damian, brother of Arnel, also testified to the same effect.
ATTY. DIGNADICE:
Q Will you please tell this Hon. Court the circumstances why you came to know Carmelita Alvarez?
A I met Carmelita Alvarez on January 4, 1994.
COURT: (to the witness)
Under what circumstances did you happen to know her?
A I went to her house.
ATTY. DIGNADICE:
Q Why did you go to her house?
A Because I applied to her for work abroad.
Q Why did you apply for work abroad to her?
A Because of a brother who applied to her but failed the medical examination.
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Q Arnel Damian applied for work abroad with Carmelita Alvarez?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was he able to leave for abroad?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A Because he failed the medical examination.
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Q What happened next after that?
A Because my brother failed with the medical examination, Carmelita Alvarez cannot return the
processing fee in the amount of P12,000.00 so she told my brother to look for another
applicant.
ATTY. DIGNADICE:
Q Did your brother look for another applicant as his replacement?
A He asked me to take my place to save the P12,000.00.[15]
Roberto Alejandro testified that appellant had also told him she could send him to Taiwan to
work.
Q When you reached that place whom did you see there?
A Mrs. Alvarez.
Q And what happened during that first meeting?
A She told me that she has the capacity of sending to Taiwan.[16]
More telling is Ruben Riolas testimony on appellants specific acts constituting illegal recruitment.
Q Can you tell the Hon. Court what transpired with that first meeting of yours with Carmelita
Alvarez at Capiz District?
A When I got there, I was with two companions, because we were replacements of the three
others who backed out. We were asked by the mother if we were the friends of her daughter
and son-in-law who is from the church?
Q What was your answer?
A I said yes.
Q Was there anything that transpired during that meeting?
A We were asked by her if we were interested to work as Factory workers in Taiwan.
Q What was your answer, if any?
A We said we are interested if it is true.
Q After knowing that you are interested to work as factory worker in Taiwan, what did Carmelita
Alvarez do if there was any?
A We were shown a document stating that such person was receiving $600.00 salary.
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Q After knowing that you will be receiving the same amount if you work as factory worker in
Taiwan, what did you do, if any?
A We were told to immediately pay the processing fee.
Q Who told you to pay the processing fee?
A Mrs. Carmelita Alvarez.
Q This processing fee is for what?
A So that she could process the papers with the POEA, for the facilitation with the POEA[,] so that
we could be included in the first batch.[17]
Q What happened on that date after paying the tax of P1,500.00.
A We were promised to leave on February 23, 1993.
Q Will you please elaborate more on the promise, what kind of promise was it, if you could
remember?
A That would be the latest date that we could leave for Taiwan.
Q Would you somehow remember the words of Carmelita Alvarez?
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A Na papaalisin niya kami.
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Q Why did you celebrate a dispededa?
A Because we were about to leave.
Q Who told you?
A Carmelita Alvarez.
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Q Why were you celebrating this party?
A Because we will be leaving the following day.[18]
Furthermore, appellant committed other acts showing that she was engaged in illegal
recruitment. Enumerated in People v. Manungas Jr.[19] as acts constituting recruitment within the
meaning of the law were collecting pictures, birth certificates, NBI clearances and other necessary
documents for the processing of employment applications in Saudi Arabia; and collecting payments
for passport, training fees, placement fees, medical tests and other sundry expenses.[20]
In this case, the prosecution proved that appellant had received varying amounts of money from
complainants for the processing of their employment applications for Taiwan. Arnel Damian paid to
appellant P12,500 for the processing fee,[21] P2,500 for the medical fee and P1,500 for his
passport.[22] Serna paid P12,000 for the processing fee,[23] P3,000 for his birth certificate and
passport,[24] P75 for a Departure and Orientation Seminar,[25] P900 for the insurance fee and $50 for his
visa.[26] Antonio Damian paid P2,500 for the medical fee,[27] P900 for the insurance, P75 for the Pre-
Departure and Orientation Seminar (PDOS) fee, $50 for the processing fee and P3,500 for his birth
certificate.[28] Roberto Alejandro paid P40,000 for the processing fee[29] and P5,000 for the
insurance.[30] Riola paid P1,900 for his passport, P12,500 for the processing fee, P900 for the insurance
fee, P75 for the PDOS fee, P1,500 for the insurance and $50 for travel tax.[31]
The trial court found complainants to be credible and convincing witnesses. We are inclined to
give their testimonies due consideration. The best arbiter of the issue of the credibility of the witnesses
and their testimonies is the trial court. When the inquiry is on that issue, appellate courts will generally
not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter was in a better position to decide
the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. Its finding thereon will not be disturbed, unless it plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value which, if considered, may affect the result of the case.[32] We find no
cogent reason to overrule the trial court in this case.
No License
Appellant denies that she engaged in acts of recruitment and placement without first complying
with the guidelines issued by the Department of Labor and Employment. She contends that she did
not possess any license for recruitment, because she never engaged in such activity.
We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory declarations and statements, greater weight
must be given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the
defendant.[33] Article 38(a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment is an offense that is essentially
committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. A non-licensee means any person,
corporation or entity to which the labor secretary has not issued a valid license or authority to
engage in recruitment and placement; or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked
or cancelled by the POEA or the labor secretary.[34] A license authorizes a person or an entity to
operate a private employment agency, while authority is given to those engaged in recruitment and
placement activities.[35]
Likewise constituting illegal recruitment and placement activities are agents or representatives
whose appointments by a licensee or holder of authority have not been previously authorized by the
POEA.[36]
That appellant in this case had been neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment was certified by Veneranda C. Guerrero, officer-in-charge of the Licensing
and Regulation Office; and Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, manager of the Licensing Branch -- both of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.[37] Yet, as complainants convincingly proved, she
recruited them for jobs in Taiwan.
Absence of Receipts
Appellant contends that the RTC erred when it did not appreciate in her favor the failure of
Complainants Serna and Antonio Damian to present, as proofs that she had illegally recruited them,
receipts that she had allegedly issued to them.
We disagree. The Court has already ruled that the absence of receipts in a case for illegal
recruitment is not fatal, as long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial
evidence that accused-appellant has engaged in illegal recruitment.[38] Such case is made, not by
the issuance or the signing of receipts for placement fees, but by engagement in recruitment
activities without the necessary license or authority.[39]
In People v. Pabalan,[40] the Court held that the absence of receipts for some of the amounts
delivered to the accused did not mean that the appellant did not accept or receive such
payments. Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of evidence is the presentation of receipts
required in order to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in
illegal recruitment cases. Such proof may come from the testimonies of witnesses.[41]
Besides, the receipts issued by petitioner to Arnel Damian and Roberto Alejandro already suffice
to prove her guilt.[42]
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
Since only two complainants were able to show receipts issued by appellant, petitioner claims
that the prosecution failed to prove illegal recruitment in large scale.
We disagree. The finding of illegal recruitment in large scale is justified wherever the elements
previously mentioned concur with this additional element: the offender commits the crime against
three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.[43] Appellant recruited at least three persons. All
the witnesses for the prosecution categorically testified that it was she who had promised them that
she could arrange for and facilitate their employment in Taiwan as factory workers.
As for the defense that appellant had only referred complainants to Director Wong, her public
apology and retraction[44] belied her denials. After examining the transcripts, we concur with the RTC
that her averment that she was being prosecuted for her refusal to give grease money to Major
Umbao in exchange for her freedom does not disprove the fact that she was caught in flagrante
delicto in an entrapment operation.
We find appellants conviction for the crime charged sufficiently supported by evidence;
therefore, it should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

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