Freedom and Partition.

Chapter 37 of Bipin Chandra’s book India’s Struggle for Independence is a poignant account
of the events leading up to a bittersweet culmination, embodied by India’s independence
and partition, that came with it. Through his account and commentary of these events, Bipin
Chandra seeks to answer two questions that still trouble most people. “Why did the British
finally quit?” and “Why was the partition accepted by the Congress?” Both of these
questions still invite great debate among people subscribing to different ideologies and they
still largely inhabit the core of contemporary political conflict in the country. Bipin Chandra
begins by addressing two opposing perspectives on the matter and tries to evaluate them
with a degree of assumed objectivity. The imperialist answer to these questions is a simple
one. The independence was merely the fulfilment of Britain’s self-appointed mission to
assist the Indian people to self-govern. Partition was the unfortunate consequence of the
age-old Hindu-Muslim rift and of the two communities’ failure to reach common ground.
The radical answer is that independence was wrestled out by mass movements of 1946-47
in which mainly Communist leaders participated while the bourgeois leaders of the
congress, frightened by the revolutionary upsurge struck a deal with the imperialist power
by which power was transferred to them and the nation paid the price in the form of
partition. Bipin Chandra claims that both of these answers are too convenient to be truthful.
They disregard the somber realities of the times and blur facts. In Chandra’s opinion, the
Independence-partition represents the success-failure dichotomy in the anti-imperialist
movement led by Congress. He argues that the struggle for independence wasn’t a singular
unilateral task. It was a two-fold task. They had to, first of all structure the diverse classes,
communities, groups and regions into a nation and then secure independence for this
emerging nation from the British rulers. The success-failure dichotomy was that while the
congress managed to build up sufficient nationalist consciousness to put pressure on the
British to quit, they failed to weld the nation and particularly, failed in integrating Muslims
into this new nation. This as the chapter progress will turn out to be the cardinal flaw that
led to partition. Bipin Chandra claims that the success of the nationalist forces had become
very evident by the end of the second world war. The British had won the war with Hitler,
but lost one in India. The hegemony of the British over Indian society was weakening as
bureaucrats and officials (Indian) were openly supporting the nationalist movement, going
to nationalist meeting and even making donations in favor of the movement. What hurt
Britain’s position in India was the changing loyalties of the officials and the loyalists.
Chandra here draws our attention to the fundamental mechanics of British rule. The British
Rule relied heavily on the consent and loyalty of certain sections of Indian society. The social
base for the colonial regime was among Zamindars and other upper classes who enjoyed
favors and positions from the British. Indians in charge of the administrative machinery
were also part of this section. The British also relied heavily on getting people of believe in
British Justice and fairplay. They were to accept the British as their Mai-baap. It was pretty
clear when this class of people began jumping overboard that the British Rule’s ship was
sinking. Another aspect was the disparity in the ratio of European recruits and Indian
recruits in the Indian Civil Services. The rate of recruitment was cut to address this but the
balance still tipped in favor of the Indian recruits. New recruits were no longer Oxbridge
graduates who believed it was their duty to govern the “child people” of India. They were
Grammar School Graduates for whom ICS was a career, not a mission. The position of the
British Weakened as the old guard of the ICS retired. Britian was war-weary, vastly depleted
and battered by the 1942 Quit India Movement.
The British Strategy for counter nationalism was a contradictory one. It was that of
conciliation and repression. This became a much bigger problem after the failure of the
Cripps Offer of 1942. The prospect of Congress leaders taking office in provincial ministries
put the loyalists and the ICS in crisis. The crisis was that the Congress leaders they repress
might become their masters eventually. And this indeed did happen. British rule was put in
a tight spot because when it retaliated to peaceful, non-violent protests with violence, its
naked force stood exposed and if it did not clamp down on sedition or if it effected truce
with Congress leaders, it would appear weak. British rule in India was fighting wars on all
fronts. The INA trials, refusal to release Gandhi even when he was on the verge of dying and
the repression of the 1942 movement, did not sit well with the loyalists. Pride in loyalty to
the “British aura” was fast being replaced by patriotism among the loyalists.
The British began to doubt the reliability of the civil services and the army in dealing with
Congress’ movements since the Conciliation-Repression paradox led these people to act
half-heartedly in repressing those that might become their masters soon.
Once it became clear that the British rule in India could not survive, they aimed for a
graceful retreat since they wanted to maintain future relations with India. The cabinet
Mission went out to India and Unlike the Cripps offer, it wasn’t an empty gesture.
The prospect of a post imperialistic future almost coming true, the tensions became clear
among the Congress and the Muslim League. Congress wanted the transfer of power to
occur to one center and then they would work out the demands of the minorities, whatever
they might be, but after the British left. Britain hoped, at this point for a united India since
as a part of the commonwealth defense, it would be a better ally than both, a divided India,
and Pakistan. The Cabinet Mission was convinced that Pakistan was not viable and the
minorities’ autonomy must somehow be safeguarded within the framework of a united
India. Three sections were conceived by the Mission Plan. A – Comprising Madras, Bombay,
Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, C.P. and Orissa. B – consisting of Punjab, NWFP and Sind. And C –
Bengal and Assam. Congress felt that the provinces should have a choice to not enter one of
these groups and not wait 10 years to leave it as suggested by the Mission Plan. Clearly,
there was ambiguity pertaining to whether the grouping was optional or compulsory. Both
Congress and the League interpreted this in their own way. And yet based on wildly
different understandings of the plan, both decided to accept it and enter the constituent
assembly. League promptly then backed out of the plan once it realized that there was a
difference in interpretation. After great dilemma, the British decided to go ahead and form
an interim government without the league, essentially making Nehru the de facto head.
Jinnah, unwilling to let the British have their way, wrote a thinly veiled letter threatening
Attlee that there will be bloodshed if all power was surrendered to the congress. Calcutta
was thrown into a communal frenzy with the battle cry lekar rahenge Pakistan. Hindu
groups retaliated in equal measure and 5000 lives were lost. The British felt like they had
lost control of the Frankenstein monster and were forced into appeasing the League due to
Jinnah’s ability to cause civil unrest. The league enters the Interim government but for
Jinnah, this was just another means to cause civil unrest. League members questioned every
decision made by the congress and the interim government came to a standstill. Unable to
act. A letter was written to His Majesty’s government demanding the resignation of league
members. A direct bid for Pakistan, rather than through the Mission plan was now priority
for the league. A new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten was announced with the date of
independence pushed back even further to 30 th June 1948. The British hoped to shock the
Indian leaders into cooperation. The whole idea of a final date was accepted by Atlee’s
government because it had become clear that an irreversible damage had been made to
British authority in India. The anticipation of freedom from imperial rule lifted the gloom
that had set in and the statement was enthusiastically received by the congress as a gesture
of sincerity of the British to quit. It was clear that if the constituent assembly was not
representative of all provinces (Muslim especially) then the transfer of power would occur
to two centers, basically implying partition. Congress was okay with this since it meant that
the current constituent assembly could go ahead and draft a constitution for the areas it
represented. The league not only refused to join the constituent assembly but also
demanded that it be dissolved. Nehru reached out to Liaqat Ali Khan in hopes to make some
compromise but it did not work. The league launched a civil disobedience movement in
Punjab and took down the Unionist Akali-Congress Coalition ministry led by Khizr Hayat,
who promptly resigned. Amid all this, Mountbatten came to India as the new Viceroy.
Within two months, Mountbatten found out that Jinnah was obdurate and couldn’t be
convinced. He wanted his Pakistan. Bipin Chandra claims here that India could be kept
united if the British gave up their role as mediators. They didn’t do that. They took the easy
way out and were not trying to figure out how to establish a three-way friendship for the
future between Britain, India and Pakistan. Mountbatten’s formula was to divide India and
yet somehow maintain the most unity. Since Congresses main point of a United India was
thrown out, all its other points would be agreed on. Pakistan would be as small as possible.
The Mountbatten plan, as it came to be known as of 3rd June 1947, sought to effect the
transfer of power on dominion basis to two successor states, India and Pakistan. Congress
promptly accepted this because of the explosive civil conditions. As Nehru said, “Murder
stalks the streets and the most amazing cruelties are indulged in by both the individual and
the mob.”
The partition saw acute confusion and cruelty on both sides, flags of both India and Pakistan
were hoisted simultaneously as people insisted that they were on the correct side of the
border. No one had actually anticipated the partition to be such a quick paced tragedy.
People were in denial till the last minute which led to a frenzied escape from either sides
once it became clear. An unreal hope was that the communalism grew due to the British
and once they left, everything would be alright again. This belief underestimated the
autonomy of communalism at this point. It no longer needed to be fanned by the British. It
was independent. The most unreal belief was that once Pakistan was conceded, there
would be nothing to fight about and the partition would be a peaceful affair. No riots were
anticipated, no transfer plans were made and no personnel were stationed along the newly
formed borders. And thus, 15th August 1947 dawned revealing the dual reality of
independence and partition. A prospect of a bright future according to Nehru, but stained
with the blood of many who died in the riots that ensued.