1. G.R. No.

152133 February 9, 2006

ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents

Facts:
While petitioner Calimutan and his 15-year old boy helper and companion, Bulalacao
were walking down the street, they encountered the victim Canter and his friend.

Victim Cantre was harbouring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the
culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night. Thus, upon
seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner
Calimutan dashed towards the back of victim Cantre and picked up a stone, as big as a man’s
fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back. The victim died the
following day due to a spleen’s laceration caused by the stoning.

Petitioner Calimutan was found guilty and charged with the intentional crime of homicide
by RTC as sustained and affirmed by the CA. The petitioner filed a review for certiorari before
the Supreme Court contending that it was not his intention to kill Cantre by mere throwing a
stone at him.

Issue:
WON the petitioner is guilty of an intentional felony?

Ruling:
No. Under the Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, intentional felonies, the act or
omission of the offender is malicious. The act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice).
The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an
injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The
injury caused by the offender to another person is "unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.

Thus, in the absence of the intent to kill, the act done was a mere result of reckless
imprudence, which is a culpable felony.
2. G.R. No. 209464, July 01, 2015

DANDY L. DUNGO AND GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,

v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
Dungo and Sibal, members of the Alpha Phi Omega fraternity, brought and transported victim
Marlon Villanueva to the venue of their final initiation rites for their admission in the said fraternity.
Twenty more unknown members of the said fraternity were present during the initiation rites. Along the
process of the said initiation rites, Villanueva, after taking the multiple blows of physical harm induced
upon him by the members of the fraternity, was rushed to hospital and immediately declared dead.
Petitioners were charged of a crime in conspiracy in relation to Anti-Hazing law
.
Petitioners contended, among others, that they could not commit a crime of conspiracy as there
was no act or circumstance that was proved pointing to a joint purpose and design between and among
the petitioners and the other twenty accused.

Issue: WON the petitioners are guilty of conspiracy as defined in the Anti-Hazing law?

Ruling:
Yes. In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to
the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses
incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.

(R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof
provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as
principal, unless he prevented the commission of the punishable acts.) (you have option to add this or
not)
3. G.R. No. 204659, September 19, 2016

JESTER MABUNOT, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner Mabunot, boxed Shiva Baguiwan, a minor who was 14 years and 5 months old, on the
left side below her ribs, which caused the latter to lose consciousness. He was charged with the violation
of R.A. No. 7610 or the law on Anti-Child abuse.

The petitioner “claimed” that the injury inflicted on Shiva was not intentional or deliberate. He
insisted that he could not have adopted a deliberate design to injure Shiva since he was trading punches
with Dennis, a fellow student. Further, Article 265 of RPC, and not R.A. No. 7610, should be the
applicable provision. A single and unintended act of shoving Shiva while the petitioner was engaged in a
fist fight with Dennis can hardly be considered as within the definition of child abuse under R.A. No.
7610.
Without intent to harm Shiva, the petitioner insisted that he deserved an acquittal.

Issue: Whether or not the intent is material in the violation of a special law?

Ruling:
Under the general principle of criminal law, "When the acts complained of are inherently
immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal
intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed."

The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a special
law. However, physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the existence of a
criminal intent on the part of the offender.

In the petitioner's case, criminal intent is not wanting. Even if the Court were to consider for
argument's sake the petitioner's claim that he had no design to harm Shiva, when he swang his arms, he
was not performing a lawful act. He clearly intended to injure another person.

Nonetheless, the petitioner cannot escape liability for his error. Indeed, criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
4.G.R. Nos. 120744-46 June 25, 2012

SALVADOR YAPYUCO et al., Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

Facts:
On one evening, in Barangay Quebiawan, Villanueva, while driving his jeepney at the speed of 10-
15kph, in a dark alley of the road, with Licup seated on the passenger-seat and other passengers on
board the jeepney, were directly fired at by Yapyuco and his co-accused causing Villanueva’s non-fatal
injuries and Licup’s death.

Yapyuco, in his testimony explained that their presence at the scene was in response to the
information relayed by his co-accused, that armed NPA rebel elements on board a vehicle described to
be that occupied by the victims were reportedly spotted in the said barangay. It is on the basis of this
suspicion that petitioners now appeal to justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and
under the concept of mistake of fact.

Issue:
1. WON the accused acts were justified under Article 11 (5) of RPC
2. WON the accused were correct in invoking ‘mistake of fact’ as defense?

Ruling:
1. No. The requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not
obtain in this case. The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfilment of duty or lawful exercise
of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused
acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury
caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or
the lawful exercise of such right or office. The justification is based on the complete absence of intent
and negligence on the part of the accused, in as much as guilt of a felony connotes that it was
committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.

2. No. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and
reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the
crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of
the offense.

The crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without malice.
 #6
MELBA QUINTO vs. DANTE ANDRES AND RANDYVER PACHECO
G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005. 453 SCRA 511 (2005)
Facts:
Respondents Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage
culvert. After a while, Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left
without saying a word. Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying
Wilson who was already dead.
The respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. The respondents filed a demurer to
evidence which the trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
In an a post-mortem done, it showed that there could be two possibilities on the cause of the
wounds or injury sustained by the victim, either: (a) that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt
object or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his
head hit a hard object.
The petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review.
Issue: WON the proximate cause of death of the victim was established to incur criminal liability on
the part of the accused.
Held:
A person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. "Natural"
refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there
is a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony
committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury.
Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor.
The petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both the respondents
hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently, any blunt object or instrument
that might have been used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the deceased.
 #8
SABINIANO DUMAYAG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 172778. November 26, 2012 686 SCRA 347 (2012)
Facts:
On one morning, along the national highway in Cebu, a passenger bus driven by petitioner,
collided with a tricycle driven by Genayas, resulting in the death of four persons and causing physical
injuries to five others, who were all passengers of the tricycle. At the time of the mishap, the tricycle
was overtaking a Mitsubishi pick-up when it collided with a passenger bus coming from the opposite
direction. Petitioner was charged before the MTC with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and with reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries sustained
Issue: WON the proximate cause of the accident was the tricycle driver’s or the bus driver’s
negligence?
Held:
The evidence shows that the proximate cause of the collision was the reckless negligence of the
tricycle driver, who hastily overtook another vehicle while approaching a blind curve, in violation of
traffic laws and the bus driver’s negligence was only contributory.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
 #7
ANTHONY L. NG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 173905. April 23, 2010. 619 SCRA 219 (2010)
Facts:
Petitioner Anthony Ng, then engaged in the business of building and fabricating
telecommunication towers under the trade name "Capitol Blacksmith and Builders," applied for a credit
line with Asiatrust. Submitted the required documents for loan, Asiatrust approved petitioner’s loan
application. Petitioner was then required to sign several documents, among which are the Credit Line
Agreement, Application and Agreement for Irrevocable L/C, Trust Receipt Agreements,4 and Promissory
Notes. Though the Promissory Notes matured on September 18, 1997, the two (2) aforementioned Trust
Receipt Agreements did not bear any maturity dates as they were left unfilled or in blank by Asiatrust.
After petitioner received the goods, consisting of chemicals and metal plates from his suppliers, he
utilized them to fabricate the communication towers ordered from him by his clients which were
installed in three project sites, namely: Isabel, Leyte; Panabo, Davao; and Tongonan. As petitioner
realized difficulty in collecting from his client Islacom, he failed to pay his loan to Asiatrust. Asiatrust
then conducted a surprise ocular inspection of petitioner’s business through Villarva S. Linga, Asiatrust’s
representative appraiser. Asiatrust then endorsed petitioner’s account to its Account Management
Division for the possible restructuring of his loan. The parties thereafter held a series of conferences to
work out the problem and to determine a way for petitioner to pay his debts. However, efforts towards
a settlement failed to be reached. On March 16, 1999, Remedial Account Officer Ma. Girlie C. Bernardez
filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The above-named
petitioner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud Ma. Girlie C. Bernardez by
entering into a Trust Receipt Agreement.
Issue:
 Whether or not the petitioner is liable for Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC in relation
to PD 115.

Held:
ART. 315. Sec 1 (b) provides, Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by
misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property x x x.
Based on the definition and elements provided when committing estafa, the prosecution failed
to adduce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy the 2nd essential element that there was
misappropriation or conversion of subject money or property by petitioner, perhaps, there was no
misappropriation or conversion on his part, because his liability for the amount of the goods subject of
the trust receipts arises and becomes due only upon receipt of the proceeds of the sale and not prior to
the receipt of the full price of the goods. The state also was unable to prove the 3rd essential element
of the crime that the alleged misappropriation or conversion is to the prejudice of the real offended
property. And the absence of a demand (4th essential element) on petitioner necessarily results to the
dismissal of the criminal case. Thus, of the facts obtaining in the instant case, however, reveals that the
transaction between petitioner and Asiatrust is not a trust receipt transaction but one of simple loan.
Section 13. Penalty Clause.—The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to
the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or instruments if they
were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime
of estafa, punishable under the provisions of Article Three hundred fifteen, paragraph one (b) of Act
Numbered Three thousand eight hundred and fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised
Penal Code. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
While petitioner admits to his civil liability to Asiatrust, he nevertheless does not have criminal
liability. It is a well-established principle that person is presumed innocent until proved guilty. To
overcome the presumption, his guilt must be shown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
 #11
GRACIANO SANTOS OLALIA, JR., et.al v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 177276 August 2008, 2008 562 SCRA 723 (2008)
Facts:
While Rommel was squatting along a street, trying to disentangle the warped chain of the
tribike he was driving, a tricycle driven by petitioner Graciano, and which had as passengers, the accused
Jeffrey and Pedro, came by and stopped at the other side of the street. Jeffrey told Rommel to move the
tribike to the far side of the road. Rommel replied that the road was wide enough for the tricycle to pass
through. The three men on board the tricycle alighted. Without warning, Jeffrey punched Rommel's
face. Graciano and Pedro lost no time and joined in the onslaught by punching the victim until he fell in
the muddy canal at the side of the road. Pedro continued the attack by kicking the victim several times.
As Rommel was trying to lift himself out of the canal, Pedro ordered Graciano and Jeffrey to kill the
victim. Jeffrey right away drew a knife and lunged the same at Rommel's back several times. Rommel
tried to dodge the attack, but his effort did not totally spare him from harm as he absorbed some
wounds at his back and on the eyebrow. Feeling helpless, Rommel raised his two hands and pleaded his
attackers to stop. He was nonetheless stabbed on the left side of his armpit and fell to the ground on his
butt. The three assailants boarded the tricycle and sped off. The victim sustained non-penetrating
injuries.
The respondents where charged of frustrated murder with treachery in conspiracy to which they
all contended against to.
Issue:
 Whether or not the accused should be convicted on crime of frustrated murder or attempted
murder
 WON they acted in conspiracy
 WON there was a treachery in the commission of the crime

Court Ruling:
 The rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the
crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that
would have brought about death. By commencing their criminal design by overt acts but failing
to perform all acts of execution as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other than
their own desistance, petitioner and his cohorts committed an attempted felony.
 In the case under consideration, unity of design or objective can easily be drawn from the
concerted acts of the three assailants.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime,
which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and
community of interest. It is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all the accused
manifested by their acts a common intent or desire to attack, so that the act of one accused
becomes the act of all.
 #12
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CABALLERO et al.
G.R. NO. 149028400 SCRA 424, APRIL 2, 2003
Callejo, Sr. J.:
FACTS:
The accused Caballero brothers Armando, Robito, Marciano and Ricardo helped one
another in attacking, assaulting, and using personal violence upon the victims, Eugene Tayactac,
Arnold Bracuma and Leonilo Broce. Eugene and Leonilo died from the sustained wounds while
Arnold was alive after having timely medical intervention. Three offenses were charged
Armando, Ricardo, and Marciano; meanwhile, Robito Caballero remained at-large. However,
they aver that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt their respective guilt
for the deaths of Eugene and Leonilo and for injuries sustained by Arnold. Hence, the accused
now appellants assail the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the appellants are criminally liable for the deaths of Eugene and
Leonilo.
2. Whether or not the appellants are guilty of frustrated murder for injuries of Arnold.
RULING:
1. The trial court correctly found that all the appellants conspired to kill Eugene and
assault Arnold; hence, they are criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the injuries
sustained by Arnold. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when
two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of a
person in agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the time of the
commission of a crime, all the malefactors had the same purpose and was united in their
execution. In this case, patently, all the appellants by their simultaneous collective acts before
and after the commission of the crimes were united in one common objective, to kill Eugene,
and cause injuries to Arnold for trying to intervene and prevent bloodshed. However, for the
death of Leonilo, the Court believes that the appellants are not criminally liable.

2. The court based its judgement in consideration of the Article 248 in relation to Article
6 par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code that the appellants are found guilty of the Crime Frustrated
Murder. In this case, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole. Appellant Ricardo and
accused Robito used knives. Dr. Quisumbing, who attended to and operated on Arnold, testified
that the stab wound sustained by Arnold on the left side of his body was mortal and could have
caused his death were it not for the timely and effective medical intervention. Hence, all the
appellants are criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold.
 #10
GEMMA T. JACINTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162540, July 03, 2009
Peralta, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle conspired together and mutually helped one another, being then all
employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., Reposed upon them with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check
No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of ₱10,000.00, representing payment made by
customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
the aforesaid stated amount of ₱10,000.00. A case was filed to the three accused. However,
they denied having taken the subject check. The RTC rendered a decision that petitioner, Anita
and Jacquilene were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified theft. The
three appealed to the Court of Appeals, and a decision was promulgated which left the
petitioner alone in facing the charges against them. Hence, the petitioner filed for a petition for
review on certiorari and prays for the reversal of the decision of the court of Appeals. She
contends that there was no crime committed because according to her, a worthless check
cannot be an object of theft.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an impossible crime was committed.

RULING:

Yes. There was an impossible crime committed. Article 4, par.2 of the Revised Penal
code provides, in part, that Criminal liability shall be incurred: (2) By any person performing an
act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate means.
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere
act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be
unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the
face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out
to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check. All told, there can be no
question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam,
she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case.

#13
ETINO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 206632, February 14, 2018

Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS:

On the afternoon of November 5, 2001, the accused Eden Etino shot the victim, Jessierel
Leyble with an unlicensed firearm, hitting and inflicting upon the victim gunshot wounds on the
back of his left shoulder. The victim was immediately brought to the hospital and was rendered
timely medical assistance in which it prevented his death. Upon arraignment, petitioner
entered a plea of Not guilty, then, however, court charged him with the crime of frustrated
homicide. Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration, insisting that the court has erred in
holding that his guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The motion for reconsideration was
denied. As a consequence, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari, assailing
the court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed is Frustrated or Attempted Homicide.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that, when the intent to kill is lacking but wounds are shown
to have been inflicted upon the victim, the crime committed is not Frustrated or attempted
Homicide but serious physical injuries under article 263, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code. The
assailant's intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries
from the crime of homicide. The crime can only be homicide if the intent to kill is proven. The
intent to kill must be proven "in a clear and evident manner [so as] to exclude every possible
doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor." In this case, although it was sufficiently
shown that petitioner fired a 12 gauge shotgun at the victim, there was simply no other
evidence on record that tended to prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or intent to kill
the victim. On the contrary, none of the prosecution's witnesses testified that petitioner had
indeed aimed and fired the shotgun to kill the victim.
 Case No. 15

People of the Philippines, plaintiff

Vs.
Decoroso Aca-ac Y Cepson, accused
G.R. No. 142500 April 20, 2001 357 SCRA 373

Facts:

11-year-old Fritzie was asked by her mother Felipa to buy cooked fish for dinner. On her
way home, she met accused, 57-year old Aca-ac, who held her by the hand and forced her to go
with him to the vacant house. Once inside, removed complainant’s shorts and panty and made
her lie down on the floor. Complainant claimed the accused fondled her breasts and licked her
private part and made “push and pull movements”.

Accused, Decoroso, denied the charges and claimed that Felipa had instigated
complainant to file the charges because he told to Felipa’s husband that Felipa was having an
affair with another man. Accused alleged that at 57, he was already old and that he could no
longer have an erection.

Issue

Whether or not the accused was guilty of frustrated rape

Ruling

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that accused was guilty of consummated rape and
accordingly sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. In People vs. Orita, the court explained that
rape is either attempted or consummated. There can be no frustrated rape. In the crime of rape,
from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose
and all essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Any penetration of the female
organ by the male organ is sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Entry of the labia of the
female organ, without rupture of the hymen is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Case No. 16

Aristotel Valenzuela y Natividad, petitioner

Vs
People of the Philippines and Hon. Court of Appeals Nachura, respondents
G.R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007 525 SCRA 306

Facts
While the security guard of the supermarket, Lago, was manning his post the open
parking area, he saw the accued, Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent
and unloaded them where his co-accused ,Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned
inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela
hailed a taxi and started loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about to leave
Lago asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise. The accused reacted by fleeing on
foot, nut were subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela
and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of
Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to
freely dispose of the articles stolen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus
the petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft

Ruling
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code that a felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following
elements should be present. (1) That there be taking of personal property (2) That said property
belongs to another (3) That the taking be done with intent to gain (4) That the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against intimidating of persons or force upon things.
The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by
one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose
the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation
from the owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated
stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.