A.M. No. RTJ-11-2283. November 16, 2011.
*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3478-RTJ)
ATTY. LETICIA E. ALA, complainant, vs .JUDGE SOLIVER C. PERAS,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Cebu City; JUDGE
SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Cebu City; JUDGE GENEROSA C. LABRA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, Cebu City; JEOFFREY S. JOAQUINO, Clerk of Court VII,
Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Cebu City; EL CID R.
CABALLES, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Cebu City, and FORTUNATO T. VIOVICENTE, JR., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 10, Cebu City, respondents.
Administrative Complaints; It is an established doctrine that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions against a judge are not alternative or cumulative,
complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for, judicial remedies.—The
availability of these judicial remedies precludes resort to criminal, civil or
administrative proceedings against a judge. It is an established doctrine that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against a judge are not alternative or
cumulative, complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for, judicial remedies.
Exhaustion of judicial remedies and the entry of judgment in the corresponding
action or proceedings, are pre-requisites for the taking of civil, administrative, or
criminal cases against the judge concerned.
Same; An administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for every act of
a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is
available.—Until and unless there is an authoritative pronouncement that the
questioned orders of the respondent Judges were indeed tainted by anomaly,
there would be no ground to prosecute the respondent Judges, either
administratively or criminally, for rendering them. Thus, an administrative
complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant
or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is available, for if subsequent
developments prove the judge’s challenged act to be correct, there would be no
occasion to proceed against him at all.
Same; Judges are generally not liable for acts done within the scope of their
jurisdiction and in good faith.—Judges are generally not liable for acts done within
the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith. Complainant failed to prove that
the respondent Judges acted with malice, bad faith, ignorance, or inexcusable
negligence in rendering their questioned orders.
Same; Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors; they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of
civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do in the performance
of their duties and functions.—Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or
influence from external forces or factors; they should not be subject to intimidation,
the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do in the
performance of their duties and functions. For complainant’s failure to exhaust
judicial remedies, to prove malice and bad faith, and to substantiate her other
allegations by substantial evidence, the administrative complaint against
respondent Judges should be dismissed.
Administrative Proceedings; Burden of Proof; In administrative proceedings,
the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his complaint with
substantial evidence, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presumption is that respondent has regularly performed his duties.—It is a settled
rule that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving
the allegations in his complaint with substantial evidence, and in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that respondent has regularly
performed his duties. In this case, respondent Sheriff Caballes showed that he
acted promptly in the implementation of the writ. Nevertheless, he failed in his duty
to furnish the complainant a copy of the Sheriff’s Report in accordance with Section
14 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In accordance with Rule IV, Section 52(B)(1)
of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, he should be
held liable for Simple Neglect of Duty. Considering, however, that it is his first
administrative offense and that such was unintentional, respondent Sheriff
Caballes should be admonished and sternly warned that the same or similar act of
negligence shall be dealt with more severely in the Supreme Court.
Insubordination, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Discretion,
Dereliction of Duty, Bias and Partiality, Refusal to dissolve the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, Pre-judging the Outcome of the Injunction Case, Gross Ignorance of
the Law, Dishonesty, Gross Incompetence, Dereliction of Duty, Usurpation of the
Duties, Gross Dishonesty, Condoning the Inefficiencies of a Subordinate Sheriff,
Dereliction of Duty and, Gross Dishonesty.
x--------------------------------------------------x
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is the Verified Complaint[1] with an Urgent Prayer for
Transfer of Venue dated July 27, 2010 filed by Atty. Leticia E. Ala
(complainant) charging all respondents with various violations relative to
Civil Case No. CEB 32893, entitled VTL Realty Corporation v. Atty. Leticia E.
Ala and docketed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City.
The Facts
In May 2000, complainant was the counsel of Adelaida Alba-Chua (Mrs.
Chua) in Civil Case No. Q-00-40681, entitled Adelaida Alba-Chua v. Benson Go
Chua, for declaration of nullity of marriage at the RTC, Branch 107, Quezon
City (QC), presided by then Judge Rosalina L. Luna-Pison (Judge Pison). In 2002,
complainant was replaced as counsel but recognized as Intervenor in the said
case.
On August 12, 2003, Judge Pison issued a Partial Judgment [2] based on
a compromise agreement regarding the property matters of the spouses. It was
agreed that Benson Go Chua (Chua) would assume the payment of complainants
professional fee as Mrs. Chuas counsel, as follows:
6. The attorneys fees of Atty. Ala although computed
on the basis of her 10-percent claim against the 30% share of
petitioner shall be paid, assumed and collected from the share
exclusively belonging to Mr. Benson Chua, but the manner of
payment of which shall be subject to further discussion between
Atty. Ala and respondent, Benson Chua.[3]
Complainant filed her Motion for Execution of the Partial Judgment, which
was granted by the Court in its Resolution[4] dated March 29, 2004, which ordered
the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of complainant for the amount of
₱3,015,203.67. In the same resolution, the court cashier was also ordered to
deliver to complainant the amount of ₱164,000.00, which had been earlier
deposited by Chua. Accordingly, the Writ of Execution was issued and was partially
implemented with the delivery of the amount of ₱164,000.00 to complainant as
partial payment of her professional fee.
Meanwhile, upon motion by Chua, Judge Pison inhibited herself from the
case. In June 2004, the case was re-raffled to RTC, Branch 94, QC, presided by
Judge Romeo F. Zamora (Judge Zamora). In his Resolution[5] dated July 11, 2005,
Judge Zamora reiterated the finality of the Partial Judgment and the Resolution
granting the Motion for Execution issued by Judge Pison, and directed the
issuance of another Writ of Execution for the balance of ₱2,851,203.67 in favor of
complainant. Accordingly, an alias Writ of Execution [6] was issued on July 14,
2005.
On September 7, 2005, Sheriff Fernando Regino of the RTC, Branch 94,
QC made a levy on three motor vehicles owned by Chua in Cebu City. The three
vehicles were later left with the CIDG, Cebu City, for safekeeping and were
eventually released to the effective possession of Chua.
Earlier, on July 18, 2005, the alias Writ of Execution was implemented by
the Office of the Ex-Oficio Sheriff of the RTC of Cebu City. The implementing
sheriff, respondent El Cid Caballes (respondent Sheriff Caballes), however, failed
in his first attempt to make a levy. Subsequent attempts at implementation of the
writ also produced negative results. Later, upon a tip that Chua was attempting to
sell the conjugal home of the spouses in Cebu City, respondent Sheriff Caballes
was able to levy an execution on the conjugal home covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 110723, registered in the name of Chua. The levy was annotated
on the title. The property was then scheduled to be sold by public auction
on November 9, 2006.
On November 3, 2006, before the scheduled public auction of the
conjugal home, an independent action was instituted, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-32893, entitled VTL Realty Corporation v. Atty. Leticia E. Ala, et al. for
Injunction and Damages with an Application for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO). The case was filed to enjoin the public auction set on November 9,
2006 on the ground that the conjugal home was no longer owned by Chua but by
VTL Realty Corporation (VTL), as it had been the subject of a foreclosed mortgage
sold by Metrobank to VTL on November 26, 2002. The case was first raffled to
RTC, Branch 7, Cebu City, presided over by respondent Judge Simeon P.
Dumdum, Jr. (respondent Judge Dumdum). On November 3, 2006, respondent
Judge Dumdum issued a 72-hour TRO enjoining the execution sale by public
auction.
On November 9, 2006, after the lapse of the 72-hour TRO and pursuant
to the Writ of Execution issued in the nullity case, the subject property was sold
and awarded to complainant as the highest bidder. On November 17, 2006, the
sale was registered with the Register of Deeds in Cebu City.
In the meantime, Civil Case No. CEB-32893 was re-raffled to RTC,
Branch 23, Cebu City, presided by respondent Judge Generosa G.
Labra (respondent Judge Labra). Complainant filed her Motion to Dismiss
dated November 13, 2006 on the grounds that the Certificate of Sale of the
foreclosure was falsified and that the alleged foreclosure was only registered with
the Register of Deeds after the levy of execution in favor of complainant. VTL filed
its Amended Complaint dated November 18, 2006 for Declaration of Nullity of the
Execution Sale. In response, complainant filed her Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint for forum-shopping, interference in the processes of a co-equal court,
and for lack of cause of action. Respondent Judge Labra denied the complainants
motion in the Order[7] dated April 12, 2007.
In May 2007, respondent Judge Labra inhibited herself upon motion by
complainant. The case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 10, Cebu City, presided
by respondent Judge Soliver C. Peras (respondent Judge Peras). In his Order
dated November 16, 2007, respondent Judge Peras directed the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin the issuance of a new TCT in favor of
complainant. It was later issued on December 3, 2007. Complainant filed motions
and manifestations questioning whether the injunction bond was paid, which
remained pending before the said court.
The marriage nullity case, in the meantime, had been re-raffled from one
sala to another since then. After Judge Zamora inhibited himself from the case,
Judge Ma. Elisa Sempio-Dy of RTC, Branch 225, QC, took over until she was
made to recuse herself upon motion by Chua. Thereafter, the case was re-raffled
to RTC, Branch 89, QC presided over by Judge Elsa A. De Guzman, and
eventually to RTC, Branch 102, QC, whose presiding judge, Judge Lourdes A.
Giron (Judge Giron), directed the consolidation of ownership of the property under
TCT No. 110723 in favor of complainant.
In an Order[8] also dated December 3, 2007, the same day the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was issued by respondent Judge Peras, as more than one
year had elapsed from the execution sale without redemption, Judge Giron
directed the issuance of the Sheriffs Final Certificate of Sale and a Writ of
Possession in favor of complainant, and directed the Register of Deeds to cancel
TCT No. 110723 and issue a new title in complainants name. Accordingly, the
Sheriffs Final Certificate of Sale[9] and the Writ of Possession[10] were issued on
December 7 and 10, 2007, respectively.
On December 11, 2007, Chua was served the Notice to
Vacate.[11] On December 27, 2007, Chua was removed from the subject property
and a turnover of possession was effected.[12]
As a result, Chua filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA) docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 98597, questioning the execution sale
conducted on November 9, 2006. The CA dismissed the petition, which impelled
Chua to file a petition for review with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 183791. The
Court, in its October 6, 2008 Resolution, denied the petition, which became final
and executory with an Entry of Judgment[13] dated April 17, 2009.
On the basis of the said resolution, complainant filed another Motion to
Dismiss in the injunction case, which was denied by respondent Judge Peras in
his Order[14] dated July 7, 2010.
In view of the above factual background, complainant filed the present
complaint against the respondents on the following grounds:
1. Respondent Judge Peras, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch
10, Cebu City for:
a. Insubordination in flagrantly disobeying the heirarchy
of courts doctrine and trivializing this Courts judicial
review powers in failing to recognize its ruling in G.R.
No. 183791 affirming the execution sale in favor of
complainant;
b. Gross Ignorance of the Law in exercising jurisdiction
over a case for declaration of nullity of execution sale
conducted under the direction of the RTC of Quezon
City, which is a court of concurrent jurisdiction;
c. Grave Abuse of Discretion and Gross Ignorance of the
Law in enjoining the RTC QC Order which directed the
Register of Deeds of Cebu City to cancel TCT No.
 110723 and to issue a new title in the name of
complainant;
d. Dereliction of Duty in not resolving pending incidents
within the regulatory period, and in not resolving the
many inquiries of complainant in relation to the non-
payment of the injunction bond;
e. Bias and Partiality in insulating respondent Clerk of
Court Atty. Jeoffrey S. Joaquino (respondent Clerk of
Court Joaquino), respondent Sheriff Fortunato S.
Viovicente (respondent Sheriff Viovicente), and VTL,
from inquiries made by complainant as to lack of
service of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and the
non-payment of the injunction bond and the clerks
commissions in relation to the trumped-up foreclosure
sale;
f. Refusing to dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
despite non-payment of injunction bond, breach of
injunctive relief by surreptitiously filing for consolidation
of title by VTL, and in recognizing a patently trumped-
up foreclosure sale based on three falsified certificates
of sale where the clerks commissions were not paid;
and
g. Pre-judging the outcome of the injunction case in the
Order dated July 7, 2010, which stated:
Although the Court commiserate[s]
with defendant Alas predicament, it
cannot likewise totally disregard
plaintiffs rights as a purchaser of a
property in the extra-judicial
foreclosure sale.[15]
2. Respondent Judge Dumdum, Presiding Judge of RTC,
Branch 7, Cebu City for:
a. Gross Ignorance of the Law in exercising jurisdiction
over the case for injunction, and issuing a TRO dated
November 6, 2006 enjoining the execution sale
directed by the RTC of Quezon City, which is a court of
concurrent jurisdiction;
b. Bias and Partiality in allowing the use of his official
stamp pad by Chua and Peter Po on a falsified
certificate of sale dated November 26, 2002 to give it a
semblance of regularity; and
c. Dishonesty in approving another version of a falsified
certificate of sale dated January 3, 2003 under the
rubric Executive Judge while he was not yet the
executive judge of the RTC of Cebu City.
3. Respondent Judge Labra, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch
23, Cebu City for:
a. Gross Ignorance of the Law in exercising jurisdiction
in the injunction case that was later amended to a case
for declaration of nullity of execution sale which was
directed by the RTC of Quezon City, which is a court of
concurrent jurisdiction;
b. Gross Ignorance of the Law and rules on amendment
of complaints, formal offer of evidence and crafting of
orders, and in failing to rule on the admissibility of
complainants formal offer of evidence on the motion to
dismiss; and
c. Bias and Partiality in flagrantly glossing over the
falsified certificates of sale and falsified annotations on
TCT No. 110723 that were brought to her attention,
and for copying the arguments and authorities of
adverse counsel to deny complainants motion to
dismiss.
4. Joeffrey S. Joaquino (Respondent Clerk of Court
Joaquino), Executive Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of the RTC
of Cebu City for:
a. Gross Incompetence, Dereliction of Duty, and
Dishonesty in recommending the approval of an
injunction bond, issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
without the payment of the injunction bond, and
ignoring all formal inquiries in relation thereto;
b. Usurpation of the duties of the regular Branch Clerk of
Court of RTC, Branch 10 of Cebu City in the processing
and issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction;
c. Gross Dishonesty in recommending for approval a
falsified certificate of sale dated January 6, 2003 to
Executive Judge Dumdum who was not yet an
executive judge at the time, without the payment of the
clerks commissions under the rules, and refusing to
answer all inquiries thereto; and
d. Condoning the inefficiencies of a subordinate sheriff,
respondent Sheriff Caballes, in the implementation of
the writ of execution endorsed to his office sometime in
July 2005 by the RTC, Branch 94 of Quezon City.
5. Respondent Sheriff Caballes, Sheriff IV, Office of the Ex-
Oficio Sheriff of the RTC of Cebu City for:
a. Dereliction of Duty in not making a levy on July 18,
2005 during the implementation of the Writ dated July
14, 2005 issued by the RTC, Branch 94 of Quezon City;
and
b. Gross Dishonesty in surreptitiously submitting the
Sheriffs Progress Report dated October 23, 2006,
before the RTC of Quezon City, which was intended to
stop the execution sale, knowing that he was no longer
the implementing sheriff, and without furnishing a copy
thereof to the complainant.
6. Fortunato T. Viovicente, Jr. (Respondent Sheriff
Viovicente), Sheriff IV, Branch Sheriff of the RTC, Branch
10, Cebu City for:
a. Dereliction of Duty in not furnishing complainant a
copy of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction; and
b. Gross Dishonesty in making a Return to the RTC,
Branch 10 of Cebu City to the effect that complainant
was furnished a copy of the writ of preliminary
injunction on December 4, 2007, knowing such to be
false since it was mailed to complainant only
on December 28, 2007.
Lastly, complainant asserts that she has been going through much
physical, emotional and financial stress from being forced to litigate
in Cebu City since the filing of the injunction case in November 2006. She, thus,
requests for the transfer of venue to prevent further miscarriage of justice.
In his Comment[16] dated September 21, 2010, respondent Judge
Dumdum denied the charges against him. On the charge of Gross Ignorance of
the Law, he explained that he issued the assailed 72-hour TRO because he saw
the pressing need for its issuance. Under the Rules of Court, he averred that third
party claimants to levied property have the right to vindicate their claims in a
separate action. His issuance of the TRO is an exception to the rule that a court
has no power to restrain by means of injunction the execution of a judgment of
another court of concurrent jurisdiction because VTL is a third party claimant to the
subject property.
On the charge of Bias and Partiality by allowing the use of his official stamp pad,
respondent Judge Dumdum averred that he never gave Chua or Peter Po the
authority to use his official stamp pad. He explained that his official stamp pad was
kept by a clerk in an open box on her table which was accessible to court
employees, and that he gave specific instructions to the clerk to keep it under lock
and key. He also pointed out that although the questioned certificate of sale
contains his stamp, such does not show his or the clerk of courts signatures.

Anent the charge of Dishonesty for approving a falsified certificate of sale
dated January 6, 2003 before he was appointed Executive Judge on March 12,
2004, respondent Judge Dumdum maintained that he approved it when he was
already the Executive Judge. He explained that he only signed it because it
contained the signature of respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino who had the duty
of ensuring that it had complied with all the legal requirements. He further stated
that the date of the certificate was not necessarily the same as the date of its
approval, as there were times when an appreciable period might have gone by
between its preparation and approval. Moreover, he asserted that it was highly
improbable and irrational for him to have an Executive Judge stamp prepared for
himself prior to his appointment as such and during the incumbency of another
Executive Judge, for the sole purpose of approving a certificate of sale.
In his Supplemental Comment[17] dated October 20, 2010, respondent Judge
Dumdum appended certified true copies of Official Receipt Nos. 5104637A and
5109389A dated November 16, 2006, issued to VTL, to support his claim that he
signed the certificate of sale not on January 6, 2003, but at about November 16,
2006, when he was already Executive Judge.
In his Comment[18] dated September 23, 2010, respondent Sheriff
Caballes denied the charge of Dereliction of Duty. He averred that he could not
be considered negligent of his duties because he immediately acted on the alias
writ of execution issued on July 14, 2005. He explained that he received the RTC
Order on July 18, 2005, on which date he prepared a Notice of Demand to Satisfy
the Writ of Execution and proceeded to Chuas place of business where he served
the notice to Chuas staff as he was not around. On July 19, 2005, he proceeded
to Chuas residence and served the notice to a househelper as Chua was again
not around. On July 20, 2005, he conducted a property check and proceeded to
the Register of Deeds of Cebu City where he was able to procure a photocopy of
TCT No. 110723. On July 21, 2005, a notice of levy was filed and annotated in the
Register of Deeds. He, however, did not proceed with the auction sale because of
the existence of prior liens. On October 23, 2006, he submitted a Progress Report
to the court of origin.
As to the charge of Gross Dishonesty in failing to furnish complainant with
a copy of the Progress Report, respondent Sheriff Caballes explained that it was
a mere unintentional oversight.
In his Comment[19] dated September 15, 2010, respondent Sheriff
Viovicente denied the charges of Dereliction of Duty and Dishonesty in preparing
the Sheriffs Returns. He explained that complainant was furnished a copy of the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction together with copies of the plaintiffs application and
bond through registered mail on December 28, 2007, which was received
on January 4, 2008. Copies of the registry return receipt and rubber stamp imprint
on the Writ of Preliminary Injunction were appended to support his claims.
Regarding the discrepancy in the dates of the mailing of the Sheriffs
Return, respondent Sheriff Viovicente explained that he prepared the mailing
envelope containing a copy of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, evaluation of
application for surety bond and injunction bond addressed to the complainant, and
left it on the table of the clerk-in-charge for mailing on December 4, 2007. When
he prepared the Sheriffs Return, he believed that the envelope would be mailed
on the same day but the clerk-in-charge only mailed the envelope on December
28, 2007.
In his Comment[20] dated September 23, 2010, respondent Clerk of
Court Joaquino denied the charges against him. He averred that as far as he
could remember, he saw to it that all the requirements had been complied with
before indorsing the injunction bond. In his Manifestation[21] dated October 27,
2010, he appended copies of the official receipts as evidence of payments made
by VTL for the clerks commissions.
With regard to the allegation that he ignored all formal inquiries made by
complainant, respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino claimed that complainant went
to his office to inquire about the injunction case, and he answered all her queries
and pointed out to her that some of the answers to her questions could be found
in the case record. He thought that he had given sufficient explanation and that a
formal answer to complainants letters was no longer necessary.
As regards the charge of Usurpation of the Duties of the Branch Clerk of
the RTC, Branch 10, Cebu City, respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino stated that
whenever the Office of the Clerk of Court would receive an order directing the
issuance of a writ, he would issue the writ then forward it to the Branch Sheriff of
the issuing court. He added that it was the practice in their Office that all writs were
issued and signed by him, except for one or two branches.
 Anent his condonation of the inefficiencies of respondent Sheriff
Caballes, respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino pointed out that complainant never
raised the matter with him. He added that because of his workload and the fact
that the RTC of Cebu City had 28 sheriffs, he could not monitor all their activities.
Consequently, he relied on reports of the parties and their counsels regarding the
implementation of the writs assigned to him.
In his Comment[22] dated October 30, 2010, respondent Judge
Peras denied the charges against him. As to the complaint that he interfered with
the judgment of a co-equal court in ordering the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction on November 16, 2007, he averred that it was done in good faith and in
accordance to his assessment of the evidence presented. He cited jurisprudence
in arguing that the issuance of a preliminary injunction against an execution of
judgment could not be considered an interference of a co-equal court when third
parties were involved, and that third party claimants may vindicate their claim by
an independent action, which may stop the execution of a judgment on property
not belonging to the judgment debtor. Further jurisprudence was cited to explain
that a money judgment was enforceable only against property unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor. He contended that complainant was aware that
the subject property did not belong to Chua because such was acknowledged to
have been foreclosed in the Partial Judgment, to wit:
The conjugal home of the parties in
Sto. Nino Village has been previously foreclosed by
Metrobank, Cebu. Should the respondent decide to redeem the
property, the petitioner and the children hereby forever waive
their claims on the said property.[23]
Respondent Judge Peras also denied the charge that he deliberately
stalled the proceedings of the injunction case with respect to the issuance of
a subpoena duces tecum against respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino regarding
the alleged non-payment of the injunction bond. He averred that when the
injunction case was raffled to him, he promptly acted on all pending incidents,
conducted hearings, received evidence, and required the submission of pleadings
on VTLs application for the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He
explained that the proceedings in the injunction case were held in abeyance
pending the resolution of complainants Motion for Summary Judgment, which was
filed on July 29, 2008 and eventually denied on March 26, 2009. Complainants
motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum against respondent Clerk of
Court Joaquino was promptly acted upon and set for hearing on May 22, 2009.
On May 18, 2009, complainant manifested that she had prayed to the
Supreme Court for a transfer of venue of the case as she did not want respondent
Judge Peras to conduct the trial. Complainant insisted that he should not continue
with the proceedings until such time that the issue of transfer of venue is resolved.
Respondent Judge Peras averred that notwithstanding complainants preference
to wait for the resolution of her request, he directed the parties to appear before
the Mediation Office to explore the possibility of amicable settlement. He was of
the opinion that it was complainants actions which slowed the proceedings of the
injunction case.
In her Comment[24] dated November 3, 2010, respondent Judge
Labra denied the charges against her and adopted the Comment submitted by
respondent Judge Peras in response to the charge of interference with the
judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction. She explained that she admitted the
amended complaint of VTL without leave of court since such was a matter of right
as no responsive pleading had yet been filed. Anent the allegation that she did not
act on complainants formal offer of documentary evidence, she pointed out that
complainant had previously orally offered the same and all the exhibits had been
admitted.
Complainant filed her Reply[25] dated November 2, 2010, to the
Comments of respondents Judge Peras, Judge Dumdum, Clerk of Court Joaquino,
Sheriff Caballes, and Sheriff Viovicente.
As regards respondent Judge Peras Comment, complainant reiterated
the impropriety of the interference with the processes of the RTC, Quezon City.
Complainant insisted that the application for the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction should not have been granted because in G.R. No. 1837981, this Court
denied the Petition for Review questioning the CA Decision which affirmed the
execution sale of the subject property in her favor. She also pointed out that
respondent Judge Peras did not comment on the charge of bias and partiality in
insulating respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino; his refusal to dissolve the writ; on
pre-judging the outcome of the injunction case; and on his failure to resolve the
matter of whether the injunction bond was paid or not.
 Anent the Comment of respondent Judge Dumdum, complainant argued
that had he thoroughly examined the documents presented, he would have seen
that VTL should have filed the injunction case before the RTC of Quezon City and
not Cebu City. Regarding allowing unauthorized persons to have access to his
official stamp, the complainant countered that respondent Judge Dumdum should
have kept it under lock and key. With respect to the claim of respondent Judge
Dumdum that the date of the certificate of sale was not necessarily its date of
approval, complainant stressed that the date of the amended certificate of sale that
respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino wanted approved in 2007 was January 6,
2003. Complainant averred that the superimpositions on the document were
plainly noticeable.
In his Rejoinder,[26] respondent Judge Dumdum explained that the
certificate of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds in 2007, which was
distinct from the date he approved it in November 2006.
With regard to the Comment of respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino,
complainant asserted that he was lying because when she went to his office, he
required her to put all her queries in writing. She did as instructed and never
received a reply. Complainant disagreed with respondent Clerk of Court Joaquinos
practice of issuing all the writs for most of the branches of the RTCs in Cebu City.
Regarding his condonation of the inefficiencies of his subordinates, complainant
claimed that during the implementation of writ on July 18, 2005, she had provided
trucks, laborers, a bodega, escorts, and law enforcers, yet they all returned empty-
handed.
With respect to the Comment of respondent Sheriff Caballes,
complainant asserted that the representative she sent during the implementation
of the writ on July 18, 2005 reported to her that respondent Sheriff Caballes did
not levy on any of the properties in Chuas store but simply kept himself busy talking
to Chua and his lawyers over the phone. Moreover, when she sent an adverse
claim over TCT No. 110723 with the Register of Deeds of Cebu City, it was only
then that she was informed that there was a levy of execution conducted on July
22, 2005 by respondent Sheriff Caballes. Complainant alleged that she was not
informed of the levy and did not receive a copy of the Sheriffs Return, which was
done intentionally to derail the execution sale of the subject property.
On the Comment submitted by respondent Sheriff Viovicente,
complainant averred that when she inadvertently found out that the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction had been issued and asked for a copy of the Sheriffs Return
signed by respondent Sheriff Viovicente, she was informed that it had already been
mailed to her on December 4, 2007.
In complainants Supplemental Reply[27] to the belated Comment of
respondent Judge Labra, she expressed her frustration over the mere adoption of
the Comment of respondent Judge Peras. Complainant further averred that she
had no idea why respondent Judge Labra exercised jurisdiction over the injunction
case and insisted that her formal offer of evidence was never ruled upon. She
reiterated her claim of impropriety of the interference in the judgment and
processes of the RTC, QC by the RTC, Cebu City, and her allegations regarding
the falsified certificate of sale. She also questioned the veracity of the copy of the
official receipts submitted by respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino, and
recommended the audit of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC, Cebu City.
On March 17, 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that the administrative complaints against
respondent Judges Peras, Dumdum, and Labra be dismissed for being judicial in
nature; that respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino be suspended for 30 days without
pay for neglect of duty and for failure to promptly act on letters and requests, and
sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely; the adiministrative complaints against respondent Sheriffs Caballes and
Viovicente be dismissed but they be reminded to be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties; and that the request for transfer of venue for Civil Case
No. CEB-32893 be denied for lack of merit.
The Courts Ruling
The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the OCA with
modification.
Respondents
Judge Peras,
Judge Dumdum
and Judge Labra
Complainant charges respondent Judges Peras, Dumdum, and Labra
with Insubordination, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Discretion, and
Bias and Partiality with respect to their acts of taking cognizance of the injunction
case and issuing orders thereto in violation of the basic principle of law that once
a court acquires jurisdiction, it maintains the same until the controversy is finally
disposed of. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders of a co-equal court is cited as an insurmountable barrier to the competence
of another co-equal court to entertain a motion or order relative to property which
is in custodia legis of another court by virtue of a prior writ of attachment. It is
painstakingly argued and reiterated by complainant that the orders issued in the
injunction case filed in Cebu City interfered with the order for execution of the
partial judgment in the nullity case filed in Quezon City, and as such, the injunction
case should have been dismissed.
The Court disagrees.
In order to find merit in complainants allegations, a review on the merits
of the respondent Judges orders would be imperative. This task, however, is not
the proper subject of an administrative case but for a court of justice to determine
in an appropriate case. The law provides for ample judicial remedies against errors
or irregularities committed by the RTC in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as
normal in nature include a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial, and
an appeal. The extraordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may
be deemed extraordinary in character are the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, or a petition for change of
venue, as the case may be.[28]
The availability of these judicial remedies precludes resort to criminal, civil
or administrative proceedings against a judge. It is an established doctrine that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against a judge are not alternative or
cumulative, complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for, judicial remedies.
Exhaustion of judicial remedies and the entry of judgment in the corresponding
action or proceedings, are pre-requisites for the taking of civil, administrative, or
criminal cases against the judge concerned.[29]
A review of the records shows that complainant failed to timely raise her
concerns in an appropriate judicial proceeding. Until and unless there is an
authoritative pronouncement that the questioned orders of the respondent Judges
were indeed tainted by anomaly, there would be no ground to prosecute the
respondent Judges, either administratively or criminally, for rendering
them. [30]Thus, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every
act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is
available, for if subsequent developments prove the judges challenged act to be
correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all. [31] Thus, the
charges being judicial in nature, the remedy of the complainant should have been
with the proper court for the appropriate judicial action and not with the OCA by
means of an administrative complaint.[32]
In addition to the requirements of exhaustion of judicial remedies, and
a final declaration by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding of the
manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, there must also
be evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the
part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order. [33] Judges are generally not
liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith.
Complainant failed to prove that the respondent Judges acted with malice, bad
faith, ignorance, or inexcusable negligence in rendering their questioned orders.
With respect to the other charges which are non-judicial in nature, they
were satisfactorily rebutted by the respondent judges in their respective
Comments. Complainant also failed to show that their actions or inaction pertaining
to their judicial functions were tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, and bad
faith, as is required for a disciplinary action to prosper.[34]
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors; they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal
or administrative sanctions for acts they may do in the performance of their duties
and functions.[35] For complainants failure to exhaust judicial remedies, to prove
malice and bad faith, and to substantiate her other allegations by substantial
evidence, the administrative complaint against respondent Judges should be
dismissed.
Respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino
Complainant questioned the act of respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino in
recommending the approval of the injunction bond and issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction without payment of the injunction bond, and in ignoring all
formal inquiries in relation thereto. In his defense, respondent Clerk of Court
Joaquino averred that as far as he could remember, all the requirements of the
injunction bond were complied with before he indorsed it. The Court finds
respondent Clerk of Court Joaquinos mere denial to be insufficient. Considering
that proof of payment of the injunction bond should have been presented to him
prior to its approval, it should have been in his possession, and should have been
presented to prove that the injunction bond was, in fact, paid.
On his failure to officially respond to complainants various formal inquiries
regarding the injunction bond, respondent Clerk of Court Joaquinos claim to have
orally answered the complainants formal queries when she visited the Office of the
Clerk of Court (OCC) cannot exonerate him, as a verbal reply to a formal and
written inquiry is not sufficient.[36] Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known
as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
enunciates the States policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. Section 5 (a) thereof provides that all public
officials and employees shall, within 15 working days from receipt thereof, respond
to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public. The
reply must contain the action taken on the request. [37] In fact, Administrative
Circular No. 8-99 was issued to remind all employees in the Judiciary to strictly
observe Section 5 (a).
Complainant also assails respondent Clerk of Court Joaquinos act of
recommending the approval of an allegedly falsified certificate of sale to
respondent Judge Dumdum who was not yet the Executive Judge at the time and
without the payment of the clerks commissions as required. In administrative
proceedings, complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in their complaint.[38] In the present case, complainant failed to
substantiate her allegations as she failed to prove that the certificates of sale were
falsified. On the contrary, it has been sufficiently shown in respondent Judge
Dumdums Comment that he was already the Executive Judge at the time he
approved the certificate of sale. Furthermore, respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino
presented official receipts[39] to prove payment of the clerks commissions.
Anent the charge of condoning the inefficiencies of respondent Sheriff
Caballes, respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino admitted that he could not monitor
all 28 sheriffs of the RTC of Cebu City, thus, he relied on reports from the parties
or their counsels regarding each sheriffs performance. This cannot excuse him
from the duty of supervising his personnel at the OCC. [40] As Clerk of Court, it is
his duty to plan, direct, supervise, and coordinate sheriffs activities of all
division/sections/units in the OCC.[41]
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino was remiss
in the performance of his duties. The Court, thus, finds the penalty of reprimand to
be appropriate under the circumstances. Respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino,
however, should be sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar
foregoing acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent Sheriff Caballes
Complainant alleged that respondent Sheriff Caballes was remiss in his duty to
implement the Writ of Execution dated July 14, 2005. In response, respondent
Sheriff Caballes presented evidence to prove that upon receipt of that order he
immediately prepared a Notice of Demand to Satisfy Writ of Execution and
proceeded to Chuas place of business and residence. He, however, admitted that
complainant was not furnished a copy of the Sheriffs Progress Report but his
failure was not intentional.
It is a settled rule that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving the allegations in his complaint with substantial evidence, and in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that respondent has
regularly performed his duties.[42] In this case, respondent Sheriff Caballes showed
that he acted promptly in the implementation of the writ. Nevertheless, he failed in
his duty to furnish the complainant a copy of the Sheriffs Report in accordance with
Section 14[43] of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In accordance with Rule IV, Section
52(B)(1)[44] of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[45] he
should be held liable for Simple Neglect of Duty. Considering, however, that it is
his first administrative offense and that such was unintentional, respondent Sheriff
Caballes should be admonished and sternly warned that the same or similar act of
negligence shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent Sheriff Viovicente
Complainant charged respondent Sheriff Viovicente with Dereliction of
Duty for not furnishing her with a copy of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Gross Dishonesty in stating in the Sheriffs Return that she was furnished a copy
of the writ of December 4, 2007 while the truth was that it was mailed only
on December 28, 2007. Respondent Sheriff Viovicente faulted the clerk-in-charge
for having failed to mail the prepared envelope on the same day he left it on the 1. The administrative complaint against Judge Soliver C. Peras,
clerks desk for mailing. Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
10, Cebu City; Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr., Presiding Judge,
Instead of ensuring that the copy of the writ was indeed mailed, respondent Sheriff Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City; and Judge Generosa
Viovicente simply assumed so. For this, he should be reminded to be more G. Labra, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu
circumspect in the performance of his duties as the conduct and behavior of every City, are DISMISSED for being judicial in nature and for lack of
one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the merit;
presiding judge to the lowest clerk, are circumscribed with the heavy burden of 2. Atty. Jeoffrey S. Joaquino, Clerk of Court VII, Regional Trial Court,
responsibility. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by Office of the Clerk of Court, Cebu City,
propriety and decorum, but above all, be beyond suspicion. [46] is REPRIMANDED and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely;
Transfer of Venue
3. El Cid R. Caballes, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Office of the
Clerk of Court, Cebu City, is ADMONISHED and STERNLY
Complainant coupled her present administrative complaint with a prayer for WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act of negligence
transfer of venue of Civil Case No. CEB 32893, grounded on her charges against shall be dealt with more severely;
the respondents. She alleged that the collective actions of respondents have dove-
tailed with one another, resulting in an extremely biased dispensation of justice to 4. The administrative complaint against Fortunato T. Viovicente,
her prejudice. She contended that she has been forced to litigate in CebuCity since Jr., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Cebu City,
November 2006 and prays that the case be transferred to any RTC in Metro is DISMISSED, but he is REMINDED to be more circumspect in
Manila. the performance of his duties; and

5. The request for transfer of venue of Civil Case No. CEB-32893

Section 5 (4),[47] Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that this Court has is DENIED for lack of merit.
the power to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. Consequently, where there are serious and weighty reasons present, SO ORDERED.
which would prevent the court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and
impartial trial, this Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.[48]

Considering that the administrative charges against the respondents, on

which her request for transfer of venue is based, have been discussed and
disposed of above, and further considering that the real property involved in the
case, covered by TCT No. 110723, is situated in Cebu City, the Court finds no
serious and weighty reasons to prevent the RTC of Cebu City from conducting a
fair and impartial trial. Accordingly, the prayer to transfer venue must be denied.
WHEREFORE,
 A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197. April 13, 2011.*
[Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-3026-RTJ]
ANTONINO MONTICALBO, complainant, vs. JUDGE CRESCENTE F.
MARAYA, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Bribery; Grave Misconduct; In cases where a
judge is charged with bribery or grave misconduct, bias or partiality cannot be
presumed.—In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave misconduct,
bias or partiality cannot be presumed. Neither can bad faith or malice be inferred
just because the judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to
complainant.
Administrative Proceedings; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Well-established is
the rule in administrative proceedings that the burden of proof rests on the
complainant, who must be able to support and prove by substantial evidence his
accusations against respondent.—Before a judge can be held liable for
deliberately rendering an unjust judgment or order, one must be able to show that
such judgment or order is unjust and that it was issued with malicious intent to
cause injustice to the aggrieved party. Well-established is the rule in administrative
proceedings that the burden of proof rests on the complainant, who must be able
to support and prove by substantial evidence his accusations against respondent.
Same; Judges; As a matter of policy, a judge cannot be subject to
disciplinary action for his erroneous actions, unless it can be shown that they were
accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives, or improper considerations.—
A judge is not required to be faultless because to demand otherwise would make
the judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the administration of justice can be infallible. As a matter of policy, a judge
cannot be subject to disciplinary action for his erroneous actions, unless it can be
shown that they were accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives, or
improper considerations.
Same; Same; The filing of an administrative case against the judge is not an
alternative to the other judicial remedies provided by law, neither is it
complementary or supplementary to such actions.—The complainant should have
elevated his grievance to the higher courts. The filing of an administrative case
against the judge is not an alternative to the other judicial remedies provided by
law, neither is it complementary or supplementary to such actions.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197 April 13, 2011
[Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-3026-RTJ]
ANTONINO MONTICALBO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CRESCENTE F. MARAYA, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Calubian, Leyte, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a verified Complaint dated September
24, 2008 filed by complainant Antonino Monticalbo charging respondent Judge
Crescente F. Maraya, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte,
with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and grave abuse of
authority thru false representation.1
Complainant Monticalbo is one of the defendants in a civil case for collection of a
sum of money filed by Fatima Credit Cooperative against him and his wife before
the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte (MCTC).2
The case was dismissed by the said court in its February 1, 2008 Order on the
ground that the representative of Fatima Credit Cooperative had no authority to
prosecute the case.3 The MCTC, however, did not rule on the counterclaim of
complainant Monticalbo for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. For said
reason, he filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the
court.4
Aggrieved, complainant elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Calubian, Leyte (RTC), where his appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. CN-
89.5 He then filed a motion for extension of time to file a memorandum on appeal,
which was granted by respondent judge in his Order dated June 25, 2008. 6
In his August 26, 2008 Order, respondent judge dismissed the appeal for having
been filed out of time. He stated that:
Under the rules on Summary Procedure which was applied to govern the
proceedings of this case, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.
Being a prohibited pleading, it will not suspend the period of appeal. (Jaravata vs.
CA G.R. No. 85467, April 25, 1990, 3rd Division). Since the appealed Order was
received by counsel for the defendants-appellants on February 13, 2008, the
notice of appeal, not a motion for reconsideration, should have been filed within a
period of 15 days which lapsed on February 29, 2008. As the Notice of Appeal
was filed on March 31, 2008, the appeal was, therefore, filed out of time and the
appealed Order has become final and executory. The lapse of the appeal period
deprives the courts of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment (Delgado vs.
Republic, 164 SCRA 347).7
Complainant Monticalbo imputes the following errors on the part of respondent
judge: (1) respondent erred in ruling that Civil Case No. CN-89 is covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, considering that the total claim of the plaintiff in
the said case exceeded ₱10,000.00; (2) respondent, motivated by bad faith and
corruption, cited the non-existent case of Jaravata v. Court of Appeals in his
questioned Order; and (3) respondent accepted bribes in the form of food from
plaintiff cooperative in Civil Case No. CN-89, through Margarito Costelo, Jr., then
Sheriff of the trial court presided over by respondent judge, and Chairman of the
Board and President of the said cooperative.8Complainant further avers that he
personally witnessed the respondent judge enjoying a drinking spree with
Costelo and his other male staff members in a nipa hut annexed to the building of
the trial court during office hours in the afternoons of July 9, 2008, August 6,
2008 and September 10, 2008.9
In his Comment and Manifestations dated December 29, 2008, respondent judge
refutes all the accusations hurled by complainant against him. He explains that
he decided to dismiss complainant’s appeal because it was filed out of time
under the Rules on Summary Procedure. This decision was made in the exercise
of the appellate jurisdiction of the MCTC and of his sound discretion. 10 Secondly,
he argues that complainant’s accusation of bad faith and corruption is baseless
and that the complaint was filed upon the urging of Atty. Alexander Lacaba, his
counsel, in an attempt to get even with him (respondent judge) for having lost the
appeal in the case.11 Lastly, respondent denies having participated in any
drinking spree with his staff members or Costelo, who has been prohibited by his
doctor from drinking alcoholic beverages. He claims that he only eats his meals
in the nipa hut because he has to refrain from eating in public eateries for
security reasons.12
The administrative complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter
and referred to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City Station,
for raffle among the justices thereat for investigation, report and
recommendation.13
On April 13, 2010, Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon issued his Report and
Recommendation, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
In sum, it is recommended that respondent Judge be ABSOLVED from the
charge of grave misconduct and corruption. However, the citation of a non-
existent case by the respondent Judge in his assailed order of dismissal is
tantamount to a misrepresentation and therefore reflect poorly on his esteemed
position as a public officer in a court of justice, it is therefore recommended that
he be ADMONISHED AND STRICTLY WARNED that a repetition thereof will be
more severely dealt with.14
The Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating Justice.
Grave Misconduct and Bribery
In order to merit disciplinary action, it must be established that respondent’s
actions were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred or were attended by
fraud, dishonesty or corruption.15 In the absence of such proof, the decision or
order in question is presumed to have been issued in good faith by respondent
judge.16 This was emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan,17 where
the Court explained:
The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being
biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in
bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. 181avvphi1
In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave misconduct, bias or
partiality cannot be presumed. Neither can bad faith or malice be inferred just
because the judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to
complainant.19 What constitutes bad faith has been expounded on in the case of
Sampiano v. Judge Indar:20
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a
breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the
nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad
faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong
or cause damage.21
Before a judge can be held liable for deliberately rendering an unjust judgment or
order, one must be able to show that such judgment or order is unjust and that it
was issued with malicious intent to cause injustice to the aggrieved party. 22 Well-
established is the rule in administrative proceedings that the burden of proof
rests on the complainant, who must be able to support and prove by substantial
evidence his accusations against respondent.23 Substantial evidence, the
quantum of proof required in administrative cases, is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.24 Failure of the complainant to substantiate his claims will lead to the
dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack of merit because, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that a judge has regularly
performed his duties will prevail.25
In this case, complainant has nothing but mere assertions and conjectures to
buttress his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery on the part of
respondent who, if complainant is to be believed, accepted bribes of food and
engaged in drinking sprees with court employees during office hours. Contrary to
complainant’s statement, the Investigating Justice found that respondent was
attending to his cases during the dates when he allegedly had those drinking
sessions.
Time and again, this Court has held that charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence.26 Complainant miserably failed to
substantiate his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery. He merely alleged
hollow suppositions to shore up his Complaint. Consequently, this Court has no
other option except to dismiss the administrative complaint for lack of merit.
Although the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission
that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people’s faith
in the judiciary, it will not hesitate to protect an innocent court employee against
any groundless accusation or administrative charge which has no basis in fact or
law.27 As succinctly put by Justice Quisumbing in the case of Francisco v.
Leyva,28
This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon
employees of the Judiciary. At the same time, however, neither will we hesitate to
shield the same employees from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather
than promote the orderly administration of justice.29
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Respondent judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be
shown that he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an
inference of bad faith.30 In addition to this, the acts complained of must not only
be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.31
Complainant Monticalbo insists that respondent judge erred in ruling that his
counterclaim for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses was covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure which provides that a motion for reconsideration is
a prohibited pleading and will not toll the running of the period to appeal. To
support his argument, complainant points out that his claim exceeds the
₱10,000.00 limit set in the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Complainant is mistaken.
A cursory reading of Section 1 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
clearly shows that complainant’s claim is covered by the said rule which reads:
Section 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within
their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases
xxx
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the
plaintiff’s claim does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) or
Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) in Metropolitan Manila, exclusive of
interest and costs.
Evidently, the complainant has been consulting old books. The rule now, as
amended by A.M. No. 02-11-09-SC, effective November 25, 2002, has placed
the ceiling at ₱100,000.00. As such, the complainant has no basis in charging
that respondent’s "knowledge of law fell so short" and that he was remiss in his
obligation to be familiar with the law which "even law students these days know
such x x x."32
For this reason, counsel for complainant is reminded to choose his words
carefully and refrain from hurling insults at respondent judge especially if, as in
this instance, he is obviously mistaken in his reading of the law. His use of
insulting language and unfair criticism is a violation of his duty as a lawyer to
accord due respect to the courts. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires that "a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others."
administration of justice can be infallible.34 As a matter of policy, a judge cannot
be subject to disciplinary action for his erroneous actions, unless it can be shown
that they were accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives, or improper
considerations.35
The complainant should have elevated his grievance to the higher courts. The
filing of an administrative case against the judge is not an alternative to the other
judicial remedies provided by law, neither is it complementary or supplementary
to such actions.36 With regard to this matter, the case of Flores v. Abesamis37 is
instructive:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as
normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in
construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle)
include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final
order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against
error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e.,
whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are
inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a
motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort
to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in
the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other
measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that
the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said
to have opened, or closed.38

Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge erred
Citation of non-existent case
in issuing the questioned order, he cannot be held liable for his official acts, no
matter how erroneous, for as long as he acted in good faith. 33 A judge is not
required to be faultless because to demand otherwise would make the judicial
office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
The Court now deals with the charge that respondent judge cited a non-existent
case – Jaravata v. Court of Appeals with case number CA G.R. No. 85467
supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 – in his questioned Order.
A search of available legal resources reveals that no such decision has been
promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Besides, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, "CA G.R." And,
it cannot be considered a CA case because the respondent is the "Court of
Appeals." This undoubtedly runs counter to the standard of competence and
integrity expected of those occupying respondent’s judicial position. A judge must
be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence."39 The Code of
Judicial Conduct also demands that he "be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence."40
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment without proof that it
was made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he is required to
observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official
duties.41 As such, he should always strive to live up to the strict standards of
competence, integrity and diligence in public service necessary for one in his
position.42 The case of Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete appropriately states that: "A
judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself
in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. Integrity, in a
judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity." 43
It is important to note that respondent did not offer any explanation for the
incorrect citation of the said case in his Comment to the complaint against him.
He should be admonished for his failure to address this issue, especially as it
pertains to the proper execution of his office.
Nonetheless, considering that this is the first time that respondent has been
reported to have committed such carelessness, the Court will accord him
leniency.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for Grave Misconduct and Corruption is hereby
DISMISSED. For citing a non-existent case, however, respondent judge
is ADMONISHED to observe due care in the performance of his functions and
duties and WARNED that a repetition thereof would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2188. January 10, 2011.*
(Formerly A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-2995-RTJ)
PROSECUTOR HILARIO RONSON H. TILAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE ESTER
PISCOSO-FLOR, RTC, BRANCH 34, BANAUE, IFUGAO, respondent.
Judges; Speedy Disposition of Cases; The Court may grant extension of
time to file memoranda, but the ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall
not be interrupted thereby.—We find the OCA evaluation in order. Although Judge
Piscoso-Flor claimed that she had requested for an extension of time to decide
Criminal Case No. 127, there was no showing that the request was ever granted.
Over and above this consideration, she allowed the parties to control the period of
disposition of the case through their lukewarm response to her call for the
submission of memoranda, which she had to do twice.
She could have acted more firmly, considering, as she said, that she only
inherited the case, which implies that it had been on the docket for quite some
time. In any event, Judge Piscoso-Flor should have known that “[t]he Court may
grant extension of time to file memoranda, but the ninety (90) day period for
deciding the case shall not be interrupted thereby.”
Same; Same; Gross Inefficiency; Judges are required to decide cases and
resolve motions with dispatch within the reglementary period, and failure to comply
constitutes gross inefficiency.—It cannot be over emphasized that judges need to
decide cases promptly and expeditiously. Delay in the disposition of cases, it must
again be stated, is a major cause in the erosion of public faith and confidence in
the justice system. For this fundamental and compelling reason, judges are
required to decide cases and resolve motions with dispatch within the
reglementary period. Failure to comply constitutes gross inefficiency, a lapse that
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against the erring magistrate.
The Antecedents
The case arose from the verified complaint, dated September 1,
2008,[1] filed by Public Prosecutor Hilario Ronson H. Tilan, charging Judge
Piscoso-Flor with gross inefficiency, gross negligence and dishonesty.
 The records show that the prosecutor was then handling Criminal Case
No. 127, People of the Philippines v. Juanito Baguilat, for Falsification of Public
Document, and Criminal Case No. 140, People of the Philippines v. Wihlis
Talanay, for Violation of RA 7610, pending promulgation before Judge Piscoso-
Flor. He was also handling Criminal Case No. 221, People of the Philippines v.
Macario Tenefrancia, for Libel, pending arraignment in the same court.
In People v. Baguilat, Judge Piscoso-Flor issued an order dated October
20, 2007[2] directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the order. The complainant alleged that the judge failed
to render a decision within the ninety (90)-day reglementary period; instead, she
issued an order, dated April 8, 2008,[3] reiterating her earlier directive for the parties
to submit their respective memoranda.
In People v. Talanay, Judge Piscoso-Flor issued an order
dated September 25, 2007[4] giving the accused fifteen (15) days to file his formal
offer of evidence, and five (5) days for the prosecution to file its
comment/objections. Allegedly, Judge Piscoso-Flor again failed to resolve the
case within the 90-day reglementary period; instead, she issued another order
dated May 21, 2008[5] giving the parties fifteen (15) days within which to file their
memoranda.
Prosecutor Tilan claimed that in both cases, Judge Piscoso-Flor resorted
to the issuance of an order requiring the submission of the parties memoranda to
circumvent the statutory period for the resolution of cases. Prosecutor Tilan
pointed out that the father of the victim (a minor) in People v. Talanay sought the
assistance of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) regarding the slow process
of resolving the case,[6] and the CHR even called his attention on the matter.[7]
In People v. Tenefrancia, Prosecutor Tilan alleged that the accused filed
a Petition for Suspension of Trial, prompting Judge Piscoso-Flor to call a hearing
on the petition. Despite the parties submission of the matter for resolution, Judge
Piscoso-Flor failed to resolve the petition within the required period.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)[8] required Judge Piscoso-
Flor to submit her comment, and she complied on November 7,
2008.[9] She offered the following explanation: in the courts monthly
report for January 2008,[10] Criminal Case No. 127, People v. Baguilat, was
submitted for decision on January 31, 2008, and was due for decision on May 1,
2008; the reason for this was the parties failure to submit their memoranda as
required in her order dated October 20, 2007; on April 8, 2008, she issued another
order reiterating her directive for the parties to file their memoranda because the
case had been heard previously by her two predecessors.
Judge Piscoso-Flor further explained that on April 28, 2008, accused
Baguilat moved for extension of time to submit his memorandum. [11] She herself
requested for an extension of time to decide the case up to July 2, 2008.[12] She
promulgated the decision on September 29, 2008,[13] after several postponements
due to the absence of Prosecutor Tilan, the counsel for the accused, and of the
accused himself.
In conclusion, she stated that Prosecutor Tilan filed the present complaint
after she personally went to Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales to complain about
the formers actuations towards her,[14]and after she cited him for direct
contempt.[15]
On November 19, 2008, Prosecutor Tilan filed a reply, [16]reiterating the
allegations in his complaint, and adding that he filed a Motion for Inhibition of Judge
Piscoso-Flor in Criminal Case No. 228, People of the Philippines v. Eddie
Immongor and Senando Bannog, which was deemed submitted for resolution on
July 18, 2008.
In a rejoinder dated November 25, 2008,[17] Judge Piscoso-Flor
explained that in Criminal Case No. 142, People of the Philippines v. Myleen
Dimpatan, for Estafa, which Prosecutor Tilan mentioned in his reply, she received
the accuseds memorandum on April 20, 2007, and that of the prosecution on April
17, 2007. She added that on July 24, 2007, the court received a joint manifestation
by Prosecutor Tilan, Private Prosecutor Rufino Lamase, and the accuseds
counsel (Atty. Gerald Tabayan) asking that the promulgation of the decision be
deferred pending a possible settlement of the case. It was only on October 8,
2008 that Prosecutor Lamase moved to have the case resolved for failure of the
accused to settle the civil aspect of the case. She immediately finalized the
decision and scheduled its promulgation on November 14, 2008, but this was reset
to November 24, 2008 upon motion of the counsel for the accused.
Judge Piscoso-Flor further explained that the motion for inhibition in
Criminal Case No. 228 had been the subject of a contempt case which reached
the Court of Appeals and gave rise to numerous complaints filed by Prosecutor
Tilan against her. One of the cases had been considered closed and terminated
by Deputy Court Administrator Reuben P. de la Cruz in a letter dated November
4, 2008.[18]
Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court issued a Resolution on July
6, 2009:[19] (1) re-docketing the case as a regular administrative matter; (2)
directing Judge Piscoso-Flor to conduct an inventory of cases pending in her court
and find out whether there were cases submitted for decision that had not been
decided within the required period, and to decide these cases within thirty (30)
days; and (3) requiring the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the records.
Judge Piscoso-Flor and Prosecutor Tilan submitted the case for
resolution on August 27, 2009 and October 8, 2009, respectively.
The Courts Ruling
In his Memorandum dated March 19, 2009,[20] Court Administrator Jose
P. Perez (now a member of the Court) found Judge Piscoso-Flor to have
been remiss in her duty to decide cases within the period required by law. He
recommended that the judge be merely admonished considering that this is her
first infraction and that she inherited most of the cases that
gave rise to the complaint. At the same time, he recommended that a stern
warning be given against the commission of a similar offense in the future.
The OCA evaluation tells us that Judge Piscoso-Flor is guilty of failing to
decide cases within the required periods, citing Criminal Case No. 127 (People v.
Juanito Baguilat) as the principal basis of its conclusion. In this case, the OCA
faulted Judge Piscoso-Flor for using as justification for her inaction the parties
failure to submit their respective memoranda. The OCA opined that this is not a
valid reason for not deciding the case; if she believed she would not be able to
decide the case on time, she could have asked the Court for an extension of the
required period. The OCA acknowledged though that Judge Piscoso-Flor
requested for an extension to decide the case in her monthly report of cases and
certificate of service.[21]
We find the OCA evaluation in order. Although Judge Piscoso-Flor
claimed that she had requested for an extension of time to decide Criminal Case
No. 127, there was no showing that the request was ever granted. Over and above
this consideration, she allowed the parties to control the period of disposition of the
case through their lukewarm response to her call for the submission of
memoranda, which she had to do twice. She could have acted more firmly,
considering, as she said, that she only inherited the case, which implies that it had
been on the docket for quite some time. In any event, Judge Piscoso-Flor should
have known that [t]he Court may grant extension of time to file memoranda, but
the ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall not be interrupted thereby.[22]
The same is true with Criminal Case No. 140 (People v. Talanay). As
early as March 6, 2006,[23] the CHR Office in the Cordillera Administrative Region
relayed to Judge Piscoso-Flor the concern of the parent of the victim of the child
abuse regarding the delay in the resolution of the case. It was only on May 21,
2008 when Judge Piscoso-Flor called for the submission of memoranda.
Judge Piscoso-Flor had no comment on Criminal Case No. 221 (People
v. Tenefrancia). On the other hand, the Motion for Inhibition in Criminal Case No.
228, filed by Prosecutor Tilan, was deemed submitted for resolution on July 18,
2008,[24] but Judge Piscoso-Flor herself admitted that she resolved the motion
on November 10, 2008 or beyond the required 90-day period.
Judge Piscoso-Flor, however, cannot be held liable for delay in the
disposition of Criminal Case No. 142 (People v. Dimpatan), which Prosecutor Tilan
cited in his reply.[25] While he claimed that the case was deemed submitted for
decision on March 12, 2007, it appears from the records that he, Private
Prosecutor Rufino Lamase, and the accuseds counsel (Atty. Gerald
Tabayan) executed a joint manifestation[26] praying that the promulgation of the
decision be deferred pending negotiations among them on the civil aspect of the
case. When the negotiations bogged down and upon motion of Prosecutor Lamase
(dated October 8, 2008),[27] Judge Piscoso-Flor promulgated the decision
on November 24, 2008.
On the whole, we find Judge Piscoso-Flor guilty of undue delay in the
disposition of cases. Except for People v. Dimpatan, Judge Piscoso-Flor failed to
resolve the other cases within the required period, in violation of the law and the
rules. No less than the Constitution sets the limits on this all-important aspect in
the administration of justice. It mandates that lower courts have three (3) months
or ninety (90) days within which to decide cases or matters submitted to them for
resolution.[28] Also, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to dispose of the
Courts business promptly and decide cases within the prescribed period. [29]
 It cannot be over emphasized that judges need to decide cases promptly
and expeditiously. Delay in the disposition of cases, it must again be stated, is a
major cause in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the justice
system.[30] For this fundamental and compelling reason, judges are required to
decide cases and resolve motions with dispatch within the reglementary
period. Failure to comply constitutes gross inefficiency, a lapse that warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions against the erring magistrate.[31]

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court defines undue delay in

rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge, punishable under Section
11(b) of the same Rule and imposes a penalty of suspension from office, without
salary and other benefits, for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months,
or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. In light, however,
of the fact that this is Judge Piscoso-Flors first infraction and considering that most
of the cases involved were inherited cases, we deem a fine in its minimum range
an appropriate penalty for Judge Piscoso-Flor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Ester Piscoso-Flor is
declared liable for delay in the disposition of cases. Accordingly, she
is FINED P10,000.00, with a stern warning against the commission of a similar
offense in the future. SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734. January 19, 2011.*
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-1933-MTJ]
FLORENDA V. TOBIAS, complainant, vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR.,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Valladolid-San Enrique-
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; The conduct of a judge should be beyond
reproach and reflective of the integrity of his office.—The investigation revealed
that respondent committed acts unbecoming of a judge, in particular, talking to a
prospective litigant in his court, recommending a lawyer to the litigant, and
preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo, which
pleading was filed in his court and was acted upon by him. The conduct of a judge
should be beyond reproach and reflective of the integrity of his office.
Same; Same; Aforementioned acts of respondent constitute gross
misconduct.—The aforementioned acts of respondent constitute gross
misconduct. “Misconduct” means a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior. “Gross” has been
defined as “out of all measure, beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct
as is not to be excused.” Respondent’s act of preparing the Motion to Withdraw
the Appearance of Atty. Juanillo as counsel of complainant is inexcusable. In so
doing, respondent exhibited improper conduct that tarnished the integrity and
impartiality of his court, considering that the said motion was filed in his own sala
and was acted upon by him.
Same; Same; Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct is a serious charge.—Gross misconduct constituting violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by
complainant Florenda V. Tobias against respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco,
Jr., Presiding Judge of the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. Complainant charged
respondent with corruption for allegedly offering package deals to litigants who
plan to file cases in his court.
In her verified Complaint[1] dated June 6, 2007, complainant alleged that
respondent Judge Limsiaco, Jr. offers package deals for cases filed in the court
where he presides. She stated that sometime in June 2006, she requested her
sister, Lorna V. Vollmer, to inquire from the Fourth MCTC of Valladolid-San
Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental about the requirements needed in filing
an ejectment case. Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero[2] allegedly proposed
to Vollmer that for the sum of P30,000.00, respondent would provide the lawyer,
prepare the necessary pleadings, and ensure a favorable decision in the ejectment
case which they contemplated to file against the spouses Raymundo and
Francisca Batalla. Fegidero allegedly required them to pay the initial amount
of P10,000.00 and the remaining balance would be paid in the course of the
proceedings. It was made clear that they would not get any judicial relief from their
squatter problem unless they accepted the package deal.
Further, complainant alleged that on June 23, 2006, Lorna Vollmer,
accompanied by Salvacion Fegidero, delivered the amount of P10,000.00 to
respondent at his residence. Subsequently, an ejectment case was filed in
respondents court, entitled Reynold V. Tobias, represented by his Attorneyin-fact
Lorna V. Vollmer v. Spouses Raymundo Batalla and Francisca Batalla, docketed
as Civil Case No. 06-007-V.[3] Respondent allegedly assigned a certain Atty.
Robert G. Juanillo to represent the complainant in the ejectment
case. Complainant stated that respondent, however, immediately demanded for
an additional payment of P10,000.00. She allegedly refused to give the additional
amount and earned the ire of respondent. She asked her sister, Lorna Vollmer, to
request Atty. RobertJuanillo to voluntarily withdraw as counsel,[4] which he did
on April 16, 2007. Complainant also asked Vollmer to withdraw the
case.[5] Respondent granted the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on April 23,
2007 and the Motion to Withdraw Case on May 3, 2007.[6]
 In his Comment,[7] respondent denounced the allegation that he offers
package deals to prospective litigants as malicious, baseless and a lie. He denied
that he demanded from complainant the additional payment of P10,000.00. He
alleged that he does not know complainant and she is a total stranger to him.
Respondent attached to his Comment the Affidavit [8] dated September
29, 2007 of Atty. Robert G. Juanillo, who stated therein that he received as counsel
of the complainant in the ejectment case the sum of P10,000.00 from complainants
sister, Lorna Vollmer. From the P10,000.00, he paid filing fees and miscellaneous
fees in the amount of P3,707.00, while the remaining balance of P6,293.00 was
paid to him for his services, consisting of the preparation and filing of the complaint
for ejectment, including acceptance fee.
Respondent also attached to his Comment the
Affidavit[9] dated September 29, 2007 of Court Stenographer Salvacion B.
Fegidero, denying the allegation that she offered a package deal to complainants
sister, Lorna Vollmer. She declared that the allegations of complainant were
malicious and unfair, and that complainant and her sister could have been misled
by some people who lost cases in the said court.
Meanwhile, the ejectment case was assigned to Judge Herminigildo S.
Octaviano, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, Negros Occidental, in view
of respondents inhibition on July 30, 2007.[10]
On February 20, 2008, the Court issued a Resolution,[11] which noted the
Report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the complaint against
respondent. Due to the conflicting allegations of the parties, the OCA opined that
a formal investigation was necessary to afford the parties opportunity to
substantiate their respective claims and to determine the alleged participation of
court employee Salvacion Fegidero. Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court
referred the complaint to Executive Judge Frances V. Guanzon, Regional Trial
Court, Bago City, Negros Occidental for investigation, report and recommendation
within 60 days from receipt thereof.
On May 20, 2008, the parties were summoned for a formal investigation
before Investigating Judge Frances V. Guanzon. Those who appeared before the
Investigating Judge were complainant Florenda V. Tobias, respondent Judge
Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero and respondents
witness, Atty. Robert Juanillo. Complainants witness, Lorna Vollmer, did not attend
the investigation, because per information of complainant, Vollmer was
in Germany and she was expected to be back in the country in December 2008.
In his Report dated June 2, 2008, Investigating Judge Guanzon stated
that complainant testified that it was her sister, Lorna Vollmer, who informed her
about the alleged package deal through long distance telephone call. Complainant
testified that she met Salvacion Fegidero only after the filing of the instant
administrative complaint and that she did not talk with her even
once.[12]Complainant further claimed that she had no personal dealings with
respondent or with Salvacion Fegidero, and that she met respondent only after the
filing of the ejectment case.[13]
Moreover, complainant testified that respondent neither personally
received from her the initial payment of P10,000.00 for the alleged package deal
nor personally asked from her for an additional payment of P10,000.00.[14] It was
her sister, Lorna Vollmer, who told her through telephone about the demand for an
additional P10,000.00, but she (complainant) did not send the money.[15]
Complainant testified that she was the one who went to the house of Atty.
Robert Juanillo, bringing with her the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel prepared by
respondent for Atty. Juanillo to sign.[16]
Respondent and Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero categorically
denied the accusation that they had a package deal with Lorna Vollmer.
Respondent testified that he met and talked with Vollmer when she went to his
court to inquire about the filing of an ejectment case against the spouses
Raymundo and Francisca Batalla. Respondent advised Vollmer that since there
was no lawyer in Valladolid, Negros Occidental, she had to choose the nearest
town lawyer as it would lessen expenses in transportation and appearance fee,
and respondent mentioned the name of Atty. Robert Juanillo. [17] Moreover,
respondent testified that Vollmer, together with her husband and Salvacion
Fegidero, went to his house once to ask him for the direction to the house of Atty.
Robert Juanillo. Respondent denied that he received the amount of P10,000.00
from Vollmer.[18]
Further, respondent testified that he met with complainant after the
ejectment case was filed, when she went to his court and told him that she was
withdrawing the services of Atty. Robert Juanillo. Respondent admitted that he
prepared the motion for the withdrawal of appearance of Atty. Juanillo, since
respondent wanted to help complainant as she said it was urgent, but respondent
did not charge her.[19]
Atty. Robert Juanillo testified that he received the amount of P10,000.00
from Lorna Vollmer at the Municipal Court of Valladolid, Negros Occidental. From
the amount, he paid filing fees amounting to P3,707.00 to the Clerk of Court of the
Municipal Circuit Court of Valladolid-Pulupandan and San Enrique, which payment
was evidenced by five official receipts. Atty. Juanillo testified that the balance
of P6,293.00 was payment for his legal services.
Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero denied that she was involved in
the alleged package deal complained of by Florenda Tobias. She testified that she
met Lorna Vollmer for the first time when Vollmer went to the court in Villadolid and
asked if there was a lawyer in Valladolid, because she was intending to file an
ejectment suit. She referred Vollmer to respondent Judge Limsiaco, since there
was no lawyer in the Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental. The courtroom
of Valladolid, Negros Occidental consists only of one room where everybody holds
office, including respondent. She saw respondent talk with Vollmer for 15 minutes,
but she did not hear what they were talking about. [20]
Investigating Judge Guanzon found that the complainant did not have
personal knowledge of the alleged package deals to litigants who file cases in the
court of respondent. The allegations in the Complaint were all based on the
information relayed to complainant though telephone by her sister, Lorna Vollmer.
During the investigation, complainant admitted that respondent did not personally
receive from her the amount of P10,000.00 as payment for the alleged package
deal, and respondent did not ask from her an additional P10,000.00.
According to Investigating Judge Guanzon, the only person who could
have shed light on the alleged offer of package deals to litigants was Lorna
Vollmer, complainants sister. Unfortunately, Vollmer was not present during the
investigation. Per manifestation of complainant, Vollmer was then in Germany and
she was expected to return to the Philippines in December 2008. Hence, the
complaint of corruption was unsubstantiated.
Nevertheless, Investigating Judge Guanzon stated that although the
alleged offer of package deals by respondent to litigants was unsubstantiated, it
was improper for respondent to talk to prospective litigants in his court and to
recommend lawyers to handle cases. Likewise, Judge Guanzon found
respondents act of preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty.
Robert Juanillo to be improper and unethical.
Investigating Judge Guanzon recommended the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against respondent as regards the alleged offer of
package deals to litigants who plan to file cases in his court. However, Judge
Guanzon recommended that respondent be reprimanded for talking to a
prospective litigant in his court, recommending the counsel to handle the case, and
preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo, which
pleading was filed in respondents court and was acted upon by him.
In a Resolution dated August 4, 2008, the Court referred the Report of
Investigating Judge Guanzon to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation within 30 days from notice.
The OCA found respondents acts, consisting of (1) advising Lorna
Vollmer about the ejectment case she was about to file before his court; (2)
recommending Atty. Robert Juanillo as counsel of the complainant in the ejectment
case; and (3) helping complainant to prepare the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel,
to be violative of the rules on integrity,[21] impartiality,[22] and propriety[23]contained
in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA
recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and
that respondent be found guilty of gross misconduct constituting violations of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct and be fined in the amount of P20,000.00.
 In a Resolution dated February 25, 2009, the Court required the parties
to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision, on the basis
of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted, within 10 days from notice.
On August 18, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution resolving to inform
the parties that they are deemed to have submitted the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted, considering that they
have not submitted their respective manifestations required in the Resolution
dated February 25, 2009, despite receipt thereof on April 1, 2010.
The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Judge Guanzon that
complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence her allegation that respondent
offers package deals to prospective litigants in his court.
However, the investigation revealed that respondent committed acts
unbecoming of a judge, in particular, talking to a prospective litigant in his court,
recommending a lawyer to the litigant, and preparing the Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo, which pleading was filed in his court and was
acted upon by him. The conduct of a judge should be beyond reproach and
reflective of the integrity of his office. Indeed, as stated by the OCA, the said acts
of respondent violate Section 1 of Canon 2 (Integrity), Section 2 of Canon 3
(Impartiality), and Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,[24] thus:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of
the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer.
xxxx
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the
judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to
the process by which the decision is made.
xxxx
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct,
both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence
of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality
of the judge and of the judiciary.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential
to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges
must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
 willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way
that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
The aforementioned acts of respondent constitute gross
misconduct. Misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior. [25] Gross has been
defined as out of all measure, beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct
as is not to be excused.[26] Respondents act of preparing the Motion to Withdraw
the Appearance of Atty. Juanillo as counsel of complainant is inexcusable. In so
doing, respondent exhibited improper conduct that tarnished the integrity and
impartiality of his court, considering that the said motion was filed in his own sala
and was acted upon by him.
In imposing the proper sanction against respondent, the Court takes note
that respondent had been found guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. MTJ-03-
1509[28] and was fined P20,000.00, with a warning against repetition of the same
or similar act. Moreover, per verification from court records, respondent
compulsorily retired from the service on May 17, 2009.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., former
Presiding Judge of the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valladolid-San
Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct
for which he is FINED in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00). The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to deduct the
fine of P25,000.00 from the retirement benefits due to Judge Limsiaco, Jr.

No costs.

Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct

is a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. [27] Under
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the sanctions against a respondent SO ORDERED.
guilty of a serious charge may be any of the following:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the

benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations; Provided, however, That the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits

for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not

exceeding P40,000.00.
 A.M. No. RTJ-12-2320. September 2, 2013.*
COL. DANILO E. LUBATON (Retired, PNP), complainant, vs. JUDGE MARY
JOSEPHINE P. LAZARO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 74, ANTIPOLO
CITY, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Three (3) Modes of Instituting Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Sitting Judges and Justices.—Based on the rule, the three
modes of instituting disciplinary proceedings against sitting Judges and Justices
are, namely: (a) motu proprio, by the Court itself; (b) upon verified complaint,
supported by the affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts
alleged therein, or by the documents substantiating the allegations; or (c) upon
anonymous complaint but supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
Same; Same; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; The 90-day period
within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter
is mandatory.—The 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge should decide
a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. The period is reckoned from the
date of the filing of the last pleading. If the Judge cannot decide or resolve within
the period, she can be allowed additional time to do so, provided she files a written
request for the extension of her time to decide the case or resolve the pending
matter. Only a valid reason may excuse a delay.
Same; Same; Burden of Proof; With her good faith being presumed, the
accuser bore the burden of proving respondent Judge’s indolence, neglect, or bad
faith.—With her good faith being presumed, the accuser bore the burden of proving
respondent Judge’s indolence, neglect, or bad faith. But Lubaton did not come
forward with that proof. He ignored the notices for him to take part, apparently
sitting back after having filed his several letters-complaint and the verified
complaint. The ensuing investigation did not also unearth and determine whether
she was guilty of, or that the inadvertence or oversight emanated from indolence,
neglect, or bad faith. The Court is then bereft of anything by which to hold her
administratively liable for the failure to resolve the Motion to Dismiss within the
prescribed period. For us to still hold her guilty nonetheless would be speculative,
if not also whimsical.
Same; Court Personnel; The Supreme Court is not an uncaring overlord that
would be unmindful of their fealty to their oaths and of their dedication to their
work.—We deem it timely to reiterate what we once pronounced in an
administrative case involving a sitting judicial official, viz.: x x x as always, the
Court is not only a court of Law and Justice, but also a court of compassion. The
Court would be a mindless tyrant otherwise. The Court does not also sit on a throne
of vindictiveness, for its seat is always placed under the inspiring aegis of that
grand lady in a flowing robe who wears the mythical blindfold that has symbolized
through the ages of man that enduring quality of objectivity and fairness, and who
wields the balance that has evinced the highest sense of justice for all regardless
of their station in life. It is that Court that now considers and favorably resolves the
reiterative plea of Justice Ong. This reiteration is our way of assuring all judicial
officials and personnel that the Court is not an uncaring overlord that would be
unmindful of their fealty to their oaths and of their dedication to their work. For as
long as they act efficiently to the best of their human abilities, and for as long as
they conduct themselves well in the service of our Country and People, the Court
shall always be considerate and compassionate towards them.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For consideration and resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration dated June
25, 2012 filed by respondent Hon. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Presiding
Judge of Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court in Antipolo City, whereby she
seeks to undo the resolution promulgated on April 16, 2012 fining her in the
amount of ₱5,000.00 for her undue delay in resolving a Motion to Dismiss in a
pending civil case.
Antecedents
Through the aforecited resolution, the Court adopted and approved the following
recommendations contained in the Report dated February 6, 2012 of the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA), to wit:
(1)
[T]he instant administrative complaint against Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Antipolo City, Rizal, is REDOCKETED as a
regular administrative case; and
(2)
Judge Lazaro is FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) and
is REMINDED to be more circumspect in the performance of her duties
particularly in the prompt disposition of cases pending and/or submitted for
decision before her court.1
Thereby, the Court declared respondent Judge administratively liable for undue
delay in the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss of the defendants in Civil Case
No. 10-9049 entitled Heirs of Lorenzo Gregorio y De Guzman, et al. v. SM
Development Corporation, et al.,2 considering that she had resolved the Motion
to Dismiss beyond the 90-day period prescribed for the purpose without filing any
request for the extension of the period.
In her Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge alleges that:
She had not been furnished copies of the supplemental complaints dated June
13, 2011, June 17, 2011 and July 5, 2011 (with enclosures) mentioned in item
no. 2 of the resolution of April 16, 2012, thereby denying her right to due process;
and
The delay had been only of a few days beyond the period for resolving the
Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 10- 9049, but such delay was necessary and
not undue, and did not constitute gross inefficiency on her part in the manner that
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary would consider to
be the subject of a sanction.
On July 16, 2012, the Court directed Lubaton to comment on respondent Judge's
Motion for Reconsideration within 10 days from notice, but he did not comment
despite receiving the notice on September 17, 2012.
Ruling
The Motion for Reconsideration is meritorious.
1.
Respondent Judge's right to due process should be respected
It appears that Lubaton actually filed five complaints, four of them being the
letters-complaint he had addressed to Chief Justice Corona (specifically: (1) that
dated May 18, 2011;3 (2) that dated June 13, 2011;4 (3) that dated June 17,
2011;5 and (4) that dated July 5, 20116), and the fifth being the verified complaint
he had filed in the OCA.7 All the five complaints prayed that respondent Judge be
held administratively liable: (a) for gross ignorance of the law for ruling that her
court did not have jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 10-9049 because of the failure
of the plaintiffs to aver in their complaint the assessed value of the 37,098.34
square meter parcel of land involved the action; and (b) for undue delay in
resolving the Motion to Dismiss of the defendants.
In its directive issued on July 27, 2011, however, the OCA required respondent
Judge to comment only on the verified complaint dated July 20, 2011. 8 Thus, she
was not notified about the four letters-complaint, nor furnished copies of them.
Despite the lack of notice to her, the OCA considered the four letters-complaint
as "supplemental complaints" in its Report dated February 6, 2012, 9 a sure
indication that the four letters-complaint were taken into serious consideration in
arriving at the adverse recommendation against her.
Respondent Judge now complains about being deprived of her right to due
process of law for not being furnished the four letters-complaint before the OCA
completed its administrative investigation.
Respondent Judge's complaint is justified.
It cannot be denied that the statements contained in the four letters-complaint
were a factor in the OCA's adverse outcome of its administrative investigation.
Being given the copies would have forewarned respondent Judge about every
aspect of what she was being made to account for, and thus be afforded the
reasonable opportunity to respond to them, or at least to prepare to fend off their
prejudicial influence on the investigation. In that context, her right to be informed
of the charges against her, and to be heard thereon was traversed and denied.
Verily, while the requirement of due process in administrative proceedings meant
only the opportunity to explain one's side,10elementary fairness still dictated that,
at the very least, she should have been first made aware of the allegations
contained in the letters-complaint before the OCA considered them at all in its
adverse recommendation and report. This is no less true despite the similarity of
the statements contained in the four letters-complaint, on the one hand, and of
the statements contained in the verified complaint, on the other, simply because
the number of the complaints could easily produce a negative impact in the mind
of even the most objective fact finder.
Moreover, the OCA's treatment of the four letters-complaint as "supplemental
complaints" was legally unsustainable. The requirements for a valid
administrative charge against a sitting Judge or Justice are found in Section 1,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, which prescribes as follows:
Section 1. How instituted. - Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular
and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified
complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of
the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said
allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of
indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and
concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct
prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Based on the rule, the three modes of instituting disciplinary proceedings against
sitting Judges and Justices are, namely: (a) motu proprio, by the Court itself; (b)
upon verified complaint, supported by the affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein, or by the documents substantiating the
allegations; or (c) upon anonymous complaint but supported by public records of
indubitable integrity.11
Only the verified complaint dated July 20, 2011 met the requirements of Section
1, supra. The four letters-complaint did not include sworn affidavits or public
records of indubitable integrity. Instead, they came only with a mere photocopy of
the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, which was not even certified. The OCA's
reliance on them as "supplemental complaints" thus exposed the unfairness of
the administrative investigation.
Although the denial of respondent Judge's right to be informed of the charges
against her and to be heard thereon weakened the integrity of the investigation, it
was not enough ground to annul the investigation and its outcome in view of her
admission of not having filed a motion for extension of the 90-day period to
resolve the Motion to Dismiss.
Consequently, the Court should still determine whether she was administratively
liable or not.
2.
Respondent Judge's delay in resolving the Motion to Dismiss was not undue
The 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case or
resolve a pending matter is mandatory. The period is reckoned from the date of
the filing of the last pleading. If the Judge cannot decide or resolve within the
period, she can be allowed additional time to do so, provided she files a written
request for the extension of her time to decide the case or resolve the pending
matter.12 Only a valid reason may excuse a delay.
Regarding the Motion to Dismiss filed in Civil Case No. 10-9049, the last
submission was the Sur-Rejoinder submitted on December 16, 2010 by
defendants-movants SM Development Corporation, et al. As such, the 90th day
fell on March 16, 2011. Respondent Judge resolved the Motion to Dismiss only
on May 6, 2011, the 51st day beyond the end of the period to resolve.
Concededly, she did not file a written request for additional time to resolve the
pending Motion to Dismiss. Nor did she tender any explanation for not filing any
such request for time.
To be clear, the rule, albeit mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness
of the limitations that may prevent a Judge from being efficient. In respondent
Judge's case, the foremost limitation was the situation in Antipolo City as a
docket-heavy judicial station. She has explained her delay through various
submissions to the Court (i.e., the Comment dated August 25, 2011, the
Rejoinder dated January 20, 2012, and the Motion for Reconsideration), stating
that her Branch, being one of only two branches of the RTC in Antipolo City at
the time, then had an unusually high docket of around 3,500 cases; that about
1,800 of such cases involved accused who were detained; that her Branch could
try criminal cases numbering from 60 to 80 on Mondays and Tuesdays, and civil
cases with an average of 20 cases/day on Wednesdays and Thursdays; that
despite its existing heavy caseload, her Branch still received an average number
from 90 to 100 newly filed cases each month; that the four newly-created
Branches of the RTC in Antipolo City were added only in early 2011, but they did
not immediately become operational until much later; that she had devoted only
Fridays to the study, consideration and resolution of pending motions and other
incidents, to the drafting and signing of resolutions and decisions, and to other
tasks; that she had spent the afternoons of weekdays drafting and signing
decisions and extended orders, issuing warrants of arrest and commitment
orders, approving bail, and performing additional duties like the raffle of cases
and the solemnization of marriages.
Under the circumstances specific to this case, it would be unkind and
inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard respondent Judge's limitations
and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule. With her undeniably heavy
inherited docket and the large volume of her official workload, she most probably
failed to note the need for her to apply for the extension of the 90-day period to
resolve the Motion to Dismiss.
This failure does happen frequently when one is too preoccupied with too much
work and is faced with more deadlines that can be humanly met. Most men call
this failure inadvertence. A few characterize it as oversight. In either case, it is
excusable except if it emanated from indolence, neglect, or bad faith.
With her good faith being presumed, the accuser bore the burden of proving
respondent Judge's indolence, neglect, or bad faith. But Lubaton did not come
forward with that proof. He ignored the notices for him to take part, apparently
sitting back after having filed his several letters-complaint and the verified
complaint. The ensuing investigation did not also unearth and determine whether
she was guilty of, or that the inadvertence or oversight emanated from indolence,
neglect, or bad faith. The Court is then bereft of anything by which to hold her
administratively liable for the failure to resolve the Motion to Dismiss within the
prescribed period. For us to still hold her guilty nonetheless would be speculative,
if not also whimsical.
The timing and the motivation for the administrative complaint of Lubaton do not
escape our attention.1âwphi1 The date of his first letter-complaint - May 18, 2011
- is significant because it indicated that Lubaton had already received or had
been notified about the adverse resolution of the Motion to Dismiss. If he was
sincerely concerned about the excessive length of time it had taken respondent
Judge to resolve the Motion to Dismiss, he would have sooner brought his
complaint against her. The fact that he did not clearly manifested that he had
filed the complaint to harass respondent Judge as his way of getting even with
her for dismissing the suit filed by his principals.
In conclusion, we deem it timely to reiterate what we once pronounced in an
administrative case involving a sitting judicial official, viz:
x x x as always, the Court is not only a court of Law and Justice, but also a court
of compassion. The Court would be a mindless tyrant otherwise. The Court does
not also sit on a throne of vindictiveness, for its seat is always placed under the
inspiring aegis of that grand lady in a flowing robe who wears the mythical
blindfold that has symbolized through the ages of man that enduring quality of
objectivity and fairness, and who wields the balance that has evinced the highest
sense of justice for all regardless of their station in life. It is that Court that now
considers and htvorably resolves the reiterative plea of Justice Ong. 13
This reiteration is our way of assuring all judicial officials and personnel that the
Cout1 is not an uncaring overlord that would be unmindful of their fealty to their
oaths and of their dedication to their work. For as long as they act efficiently to
the best of their human abilities, and for as long as they conduct themselves well
in the service of our Country and People, the Court shall always be considerate
and compassionate towards them.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration;
RECONSIDERS AND SETS ASIDE the Resolution promulgated on April 16,
2012; ABSOLVES Hon. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro from her administrative
tine of ₱5,000.00 for undue delay in resolving a Motion to Dismiss in a pending
civil case, but nonetheless REMINDS her to apply for the extension of the period
should she be unable to decide or resolve within the prescribed period; and
DISMISSES this administrative matter for being devoid of substance.
SO ORDERED.