[Handwritten] Please quickly dispatch to Party Secretaries of various local

Political and Legal Affairs Commissions so they can arrange examinations

Confidential Zhu Hailun 16/6

"Integrated Joint Operation Platform" Daily Essentials

Bulletin
No. 2

Autonomous Regional Party Committee Command for Cracking Down and Assaulting on the
Front Lines June 16, 2017

"Backflow prevention, dispatching" Situation Clues

I. "Integrated Platform" [IJOP] screening found that there are currently 1,535 people
from Xinjiang who obtained foreign nationality and also applied for Chinese visas (including 344
in Turkey, see attachment), including 979 people in Urumqi, 34 in Hotan, 9 in Hami, 14 in Altay,
20 in Changji, 167 in Yili, 10 in Bozhou, 23 in Turpan, 50 in Aksu, 68 in Kashgar, 26 in Tacheng,
65 in Karamay, 22 in Bazhou, 47 in Kezhou, and 1 in Shihezi. Among the above-mentioned
personnel, 637 people have recorded entries into the country since June 1, 2016 (see
attachment), of which 75 are determined to be inside the country (1 person is a fugitive. Some
people have close ties with key people, see attachment), and for 562 people, because of the
possibility of multiple identities and other issues, it cannot be ruled out that they are still active
in the country. Of the 75 people, 26 are Turkish, 23 are Australian, 3 are American, 5 are
Swedish, 2 from New Zealand, 1 from the Netherlands, 3 from Uzbekistan, 2 from the United
Kingdom, 5 are Canadian, 3 are Finnish, 1 is French, and 1 is from Kyrgyzstan.
All prefectures should fully draw on grassroots stability maintenance forces and ten
households joint defense [note: this is a kind of grassroots unit where the CPP organizes ten
households together into a defensive unit] and combine it with "Integrated" platform in series
to analyze these 1,535 people who have obtained foreign nationality and have applied for
Chinese visas, especially the 637 people who have recorded entry in the past one year and the
75 people who have determined to be active in the country. Personal identification verification
should be inspected one by one, for those who have already cancelled their citizenship and for
whom suspected terrorism cannot be ruled out, they should be deported; for those who
haven’t cancelled their citizenship yet and for whom for whom suspected terrorism cannot be
ruled out, they should first be placed into concentrated education and training and examined.
II. The "integrated platform" screening found that there are 4,341 Xinjiang people
abroad who have obtained valid certificates in our embassies and consulates (including 607 in
Turkey, see attachment), including 1409 people in Urumqi, 65 in Turpan, 67 in Bazhou, 486 in
Kashgar, 400 in Yili, 109 in Altay, 62 in Karamay, 34 in Hami, 61 in Changji, 71 in Aksu, 337 in
Hotan, 23 in Bozhou, 1088 in Kezhou, 122 in Tacheng, 7 in the Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps. Among the above-mentioned personnel, 1707 people have not yet left the
country (including 187 valid documents obtained in Turkey, see attachment), including 354
people in Urumqi, 23 in Turpan, 31 in Bazhou, 205 in Kashgar, 148 in Ili, 14 in Altay, 17 in
Karamay, 17 in Hami, 11 in Changji, 15 in Aksu, 178 in Hotan, 9 in Bozhou, 662 in Kezhou, 21 in
Tacheng and 2 in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.
All prefectures should fully draw on grassroots stability maintenance forces and ten
households joint defense and combine it with "Integrated" platform in series to analyze these
4,341 people who have obtained valid certificates in our embassies and consulates abroad,
especially the 1707 people who have not yet left the country. Personal identification
verification should be inspected one by one. For those still outside the country for whom
suspected terrorism cannot be ruled out, the border control reading will be carried out by hand
to ensure that they are arrested the moment they cross the border. For those who have
entered the country and for whom suspected terrorism cannot be ruled out, they should first
be placed into concentrated education and training for examination.
III. In the future, apart from those verified by public security organs, for any person
originally from Xinjiang who obtains foreign nationality or a foreign passport, applies for a visa
at our Chinese embassies or consulates abroad, or for any Xinjiang people who applies for
replacements of valid documents at our Chinese embassies or consulates abroad, the local
party committee political and legal committee should take the lead, fully take advantage of
grassroots stability maintenance forces, the ten household joint defense and the "integrated"
platform in series to analyze them, strengthen research and judgment, and for those whom
suspected terrorism cannot be ruled out, border control should be implemented to carry out
arrest or to refuse approval.
 [Handwritten] Please quickly dispatch to Party Secretaries of various local
Political and Legal Affairs Commissions so they can arrange examinations
Confidential Zhu Hailun 21/6

"Integrated Joint Operation Platform" Daily Essentials

Bulletin
No. 9

Autonomous Regional Party Committee Command for Cracking Down and Assaulting on the
Front Lines June 21, 2017

"Disconnect" Situation Clues

I. Found that from September 2015 to June 19 of this year, at least 4,122 people have
used the same ID card to open an account and shut it down at least three times. Details are as
follows:
The household registration is 1,324 people in Kashgar, 1,110 in Hotan, 730 in Aksu, 255
in Ili, 192 in Turpan, 138 in Kezhou, 135 in Urumqi, 103 in the Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps, 74 in Bazhou, 21 in Hami, 17 in Changji, 10 in Bozhou, 10 in Karamay, and 3
in Tacheng. (See Annex 1 for details)
II. Since January 1 this year, through the strengthening of network blocks, the removal
of harmful software, the adjustment of identification models and the strengthening of strict
measures, etc., we have effectively curbed the momentum of domestic and foreign
communication, daily domestic and foreign communication has dropped to less than 10 people.
Up to now, "9.13" has been shut down for a total of 1552 people. Details are as follows:
The household registration is 363 people in Aksu, 345 in Kashgar, 290 in Hotan, 143 in
Urumqi, 104 in Yili, 76 in Turpan, 73 in Kezhou, 58 in Bazhou, 35 in the Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps, 15 in Hami, 15 in Karamay, 10 in Bozhou, 10 in Tacheng, 9 in Changji, 5 in
Altay, and 1 in Shihezi. (See Annex 2 for details)
All localities should immediately accept the above-mentioned personnel and review
them one by one. If any are suspected of terrorism, it is necessary to fix the evidence and strike
according to law in a timely manner. Be sure to report feedback on detention (custody) within
three days of issuing the notification.
Ka(shgar?) (secret) No 1487
[Handwritten] Please pass this on to the four Southern Xinjiang prefecture Party
Secretaries, secretaries of Political and Legal Affairs Commissions and heads of
police. Please quickly follow the requirements of this report to increase the
intensity of examinations and report back the results.
Zhu Hailun 25/6

Confidential

"Integrated Joint Operation Platform" Daily Essentials

Bulletin
No. 14

Autonomous Regional Party Committee Command for Cracking Down and Assaulting on the
Front Lines June 25, 2017

Four southern Xinjiang states "integrated" platform

Data notification and check situation
According to Comrade Zhu Lulun’s research and investigation of the “integration” [IJOP]
platform construction in Kezhou on June 19, “the autonomous region should actively and
quantitatively push data to the prefectures, and follow the whole process to track the
effectiveness. It can be promoted in the southern Xinjiang the operation” requirements, the
four local state party committees pay attention to it and conscientiously implement it.
From June 19th to 25th, the “integrated platform” of the four states of southern
Xinjiang notified the county and city (governments) of 24,412 suspicious persons, including
16,354 in Kashgar, 3,282 in Hotan, 2,596 in Kezhou and 2,380 in Aksu. After conducting
verification and handling work, 706 were criminally detained, including 542 in Hotan, 85 in
Kezhou and 79 in Aksu. 15,683 were sent to education and training, including 11165 in Kashgar,
2475 in Hotan, 737 in Kezhou and 1306 in Aksu, 2,096 were put under preventative
surveillance, including 825 in Kezhou, 1,033 in Kashgar, and 290 in Aksu; 5,508 were
temporarily unable to be detained, including 4,156 in Kashgar, 825 in Kashgar, 290 in Aksu, and
237 in Hotan. (See Annex 1 for details)
The results of the verification feedback reflected six problems: First, there is the
problem of those who are long-term residents elsewhere, those who have moved household
registration, or individuals who have left; second, there are problems with cellphones that
aren’t registered with real names and people who don’t match with their identification; third,
there are problems with people using other’s identification documents, and their ID being
inconsistent; Fourth, there is the problem that the person is dead and unsearchable, but their
documents are still being used by other people; Fifth, there is the problem that public officials,
university students etc. are difficult to handle; Sixth, there is the problem of those who are
unknown and unable to be checked. The above-mentioned problems have caused the
verification work to both be ignored, and a fearful mood to be serious, with no tackling and
checking, mediocre handling, and with real hidden risks that still cannot be eliminated.
Requirements for the next working step: First, attach great importance to it and
overcome difficulties. The problematic people and clues identified by the “integrated” platform
are major hidden risk that affect stability. Persons or clues that are difficult to check are risks
within risks, hidden dangers in hidden dangers, all prefectures and cities must attach great
importance to them, be vigilant, and do a good job of implementation in strict accordance with
the requirements of the Autonomous Regional Party Committee Command for Cracking Down
and Assaulting on the Front Lines, and must especially put effort in the hard work of tackling
difficulties, personally research and deploy, personally study the treatment measures, and
personally supervise the inspection feedback.
Second, combine special groups with detailed verification. All prefectures should adhere
to the combination of special groups, give full play to the role of the grassroots security forces
such as public security organs, grassroots organizations, visiting and working groups and ten
household joint defense, and must work according to the notice released by the "integrated"
platform technology to enter households, visit, inquire, and investigate thoroughly. At the same
time, it is necessary to enter the information of the unsatisfactory and unreliable people into
the "integrated" platform for technical control, and periodically complete and update, so that
the five senses systems can be warned in a timely manner, and the social stability maintenance
forces will be linked together to effectively bring into play functions such as inspections,
prevention and control, data collection, etc., to prevent problems before they happen. At the
same time, it is necessary to clarify situations in which the household registrations have been
moved, the special situation of public officials and college students, and destination details, and
feed back detailed verification results through text and data forms. (See Annex 2 for details)
Third, handle things and put measures in place according to classifications. With the
data of people with different types of tags pushed out by the “integrated” platform, different
prefectures should, according to the qualitative and quantitative harmful weights, handle
according to the different degrees of methods such as "criminal detention, education and
training, retain and interrogate, and prevention and control". There are many different types of
tags for one person, especially when people form gangs, and many people in the gang have tags
that raise the hazardous risk level, and raise the disposal measures. For problematic people
who are in the area, it is necessary to give feedback on the measures taken; for problematic
people who aren’t in the area, they should be explained where they are, concretely whether
they are overseas, outside Xinjiang (but inside China) or inside Xinjiang, as well as the
management and control measures being taken against them; If the households have moved ,
people have left, or the cellphones aren’t registered with real names or the name and
identification documents don’t match, the place of origin and the destination location should
both conduct searches, and both manage matters, and control measures should be clearly
determined. If a person has died, if there is no such person, if the person does not match their
identity documents, etc., if the person is using another’s identification or if their whereabouts is
unknown, a comprehensive policy must be undertaken, and pursuit must be initiated to locate
and examine the person; If the target of the work is a public official, and if there is a problem
with the verification, and according to the rules and regulations there is no problem, the person
themselves should clear up matters with their work unit and write a guarantee; if the target is a
student, they should conduct criticism and education guidance, and if they have problems, they
must also be dealt with according to law.
Fourth, pay attention to preserving and fixing evidence of crimes. In order to facilitate
crackdowns, local public security organs should preserve evidence data in a timely manner, and
digitize in a timely manner. In particular, data on the suspect's behavior and relationships
should be combined to form a chain of evidence and transferred to the prosecutors and courts.
At the same time, while carrying out reconnaissance and investigation work, grassroots stability
maintenance forces should pay attention to the search for illegal propaganda materials, violent
audio and videos, explosive materials, and other criminal evidence.
Ka(shgar?) (secret) No 1522
[Handwritten] Please pass this on to the various prefecture party secretaries of
Political and Legal Affairs Commission for their verification and investigation, and
in case of any odd situations the various city party committee secretaries.
Zhu Hailun
Confidential

"Integrated Joint Operation Platform" Daily Essentials

Bulletin

New Organ No. 2860 No. 20

Autonomous Regional Party Committee Command for Cracking Down and Assaulting on the
Front Lines June 29, 2017

“Excavation numbers, reduction numbers, shoveling soil” Situation

Clues
According to the deployment requirements of the Party Committee of the Autonomous Region
on the "excavation numbers, reduction numbers, shoveling soil”, targeting violent terrorist and
extremist elements who used "Kuai Ya" software to spread audio and video with violent
terroristic characteristics, the autonomous region’s "integrated" platform conducted screening
and analysis of “Kuai Ya” software users and discovered that from July 7, 2016 to present, the
total number of "Kuai Ya" software users in Xinjiang is 1,869,100 (Uygur), among which there
were 3,925 unauthorized imams (In the four states of Kashgar, Hotan, Aksu, Kezhou), 5,576
people associated with the unauthorized imams, 124 “Hijrat”, 72 people associated with the
“Hijrat”, and 594 people associated with those who have left the country and haven’t returned
for a long time. Among related people there are 298 fugitives, 26,602 criminal detainees, 2,783
unauthorized imams, 38 unidentified persons, 214 people who left the country illegally, 301
people who have left the country and haven’t returned for a long time, 1,597 who are
“disconnected” targets who have shut down more than three times, and 32 people who have
joined terrorist organizations such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.
There are a total of 40,557 people who have used the “Kuai Ya” software in the above-
mentioned groups and have many harmful tags (for details see Annex 1), mainly involving
15635 people in Kashgar, 8008 in Aksu, 5740 in Hotan, 3526 people in Yili, 1865 in Kezhou, 1449
in Urumqi, 1086 in Bazhou, 300 in Bozhou, 1611 in Turpan, 434 in Changji, 268 in Hami, 149 in
Tacheng, 95 in Karamay, 51 in Altay, 340 in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (11
in Shihezi, 36 in the agricultural first division, 4 in the agricultural second division, 150 in the
agricultural third division, 38 in the agricultural fourth division, 13 in the agricultural five
division, 2 in the agricultural six division, 1 in the agricultural seven division, 15 in the
agricultural twelfth division, 18 in the agricultural thirteenth division, 52 in the agricultural
fourteenth division).
All localities should make full use of grassroots stability maintenance forces, ten
household joint defense and the "integrated" platform to carry out investigation and
verification one by one, and for those suspected of terrorism, it is necessary to fix evidence and
crack down according to the law in a timely manner; if it is not possible at the moment to
eliminate suspicion, it is necessary to put in concentrated training and further screen and
review. The verification situation should be reported within 3 days, and the attached table
should be reported on a case-by-case basis. We also ask all localities to report lists of
“unauthorized imams”, people in education and training, and those suspected of joining the
“East Turkistan Islamic Movement”, “IS”, and other terrorist organizations within three days.
 请速传各地政法委书记安排核查。
机密 朱海仑 16/6

“一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情
通报
第2期

自治区党委严打攻坚会战前方指挥部 2017 年 6 月 16 曰

“防回流、打派遣” 要情线索

一 、“一体化平台” 筛查发现，目前原新疆籍取得外国国籍并巳申领中国签证人
员共 1535 人（其中土耳其 344 人，详见附件）户箱地涉乌鲁木齐 979 人，和田 34 人、
哈密 9 人、阿勒泰 14 人，昌吉 20 人，伊犁 167 人，博州 10 人，吐鲁番 23 人、阿克苏
50 人，喀什 68 人，塔城 26 人，克拉玛依 65 人、巴州 22 人，克州 47 人，石河子 1 人。
上述人员中自 2016 年 6 月 1 日以来有入境活动记录 637 人 (详见附件) ，其中 75 人确定
在境内（1 人系逃犯。部分人员与重点人关系密切，详见附件)，562 人因可能存在多重身
份等问題不能排除其仍在境内活动。75 人中，土耳其 26 人、澳大利亚 23 人，美国 3
人，瑞典 5 人，新西兰 2 人，荷 兰 1 人，乌兹別克斯坦 3 人，英国 2 人，加拿大 5 人，
芬兰 3 人，法国 1 人、吉尔吉斯斯坦 1 人.
各地要对取得外国国籍并已申领中国签证人员的 1535 人，特别是対近 1 年来有入
境活动记录的 637 人 、确定在境内活动的 75 人，充分借助基层维稳力量，十户联防，结
合“一体化“平台串并分析。人证核验，逐一开展摸排核查，对已注销国箱但不能排除涉
恐嫌疑的，则驱逐出境; 对未注销国籍但不能排除涉恐嫌疑的，则先进行集中教育培训并
审查。
二，“一体化平台” 筛査发现，目前境外在我使领馆已取得有效证件的新疆籍人
员 4341 人(其中土耳其 607 人，详见附件 )，户籍地涉乌鲁木齐 1409 人，吐鲁番 65 人，
巴州 67 人、喀什 486 人，伊犁 400 人，阿勒泰 109 人，克拉玛依 62 人，哈密 34 人、昌
吉 61 人，阿克苏 71 人，和田 337 人，博州 23 人、克州 1088 人，塔城 122 人 ，兵团 7
名。上述人员中已入境现仍未离境的 1707 人（其中在土耳其取得有效证件 187 人，详见
附件)，户籍地涉乌鲁木齐 354 人、吐鲁番 23 人，巴州 31 人，喀什 205 人，伊犁 148
人、阿勒泰 14 人，克拉玛依 17 人，哈密 17 人，昌吉 11 人，阿克苏 15 人，和田 178
人，博州 9 人，克州 662 人，塔城 21 人，兵团 2 人。
各地要对境外在我使领馆已取得有效证件的 4341 人，特別是巳入境现仍未离境的
1707 人，充分借助基层维稳力量、十户联防，结合“一体化” 平台串并分祈。人证核
验，逐一开展摸排核查，对仍在境外但不能排除涉恐嫌疑的，则办理边控手读，确保入境
即捕; 对已入境但不能排除涉恐嫌疑的，则先进行集中教育培训并审查。
三、今后凡取得外国国籍或护照，向我驻外使领馆申请签证的原新疆籍人员，以及
在境外向我使领馆申请补换发有效证件的新疆籍人员，除公安机关审核外，当地党委政法
委要牵头，充分借助基层维稳力量、十户联防及“一 体化”平台串并分析，加大研判审
核力度，对不能排除涉恐嫌疑的，实施边控抓捕或拒签。
机密 请速传各地政法委书记
安排核查。 朱海仑
21/6

“一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情
通报
第9期

自治区党委严打攻坚会战前方指挥部 2017 年 6 月 21 日

“断通联”要情线索

一 、发现 2015 年 9 月至今年 6 月 19 日，使用同一身份证件开户且至少被关停三

次以上共计 4122 人。具体情况如下:
户籍地涉喀什地区 1324 人、和田地区 1110 人、阿克苏地区 730 人、伊犁州 255
人、吐鲁番市 192 的人、克州 138 人、乌鲁木齐市 135 人、新疆兵团 103 人、巴州 74
人、哈密市 21 人、昌吉州 17 人、博州 10 人、克拉玛依市 10 人、塔城地区 3 人。(详见
附件 1)
二，今年 1 月 1 日以来通过加强网络封堵，下架有害软件，调整识别模型以及强
化严打措施等，有效遏制了境内外通联势头，每日境内外通联增量降到 10 人以下。截止
目前，“9.13“ 被关停对象累计 1552 人。具体情况如下:
户籍地涉阿克苏地区 363 人、喀什地区 345 人、和田地区 290 人、乌鲁木齐 143
人，伊犁地区 104 人、吐鲁番地区 76 人、 克州 73 人、巴州 58 人、新疆兵团 35 人、哈
密地区 15 人、克拉玛依 15 人、博州 10 人、塔城地区 10 人、昌吉州 9 人、阿勒泰 地区
5 人、石河子 1 人。(详见附件 2)
各地要对上述人员立即收押，逐一审查， 对有涉恐嫌疑的，要及时固定证据依法
打击。务必于通报下发 3 日内全部收押反馈。
喀机随 1487 号
请传南疆四地方书记, 政法委
机密 书记, 公安局长问。请按速报要求
加大侦查力度安时反馈核查结果
朱海仑 25/6

“一体化联合作战平台”每日要情
通报
第 14 期

自治区党委严打攻坚会战前方指挥部 2017 年 6 月 25 日

南疆四地州 “一体化” 平台
数据推送该查情况

根据朱诲仑同志 6 月 19 日在克州调研 “一体化”平台建设时提出“自治区层面要

主动、定量向地州推送数据，并全流程跟踪问效，可先行在南疆四地州推动运行” 的要
求，四地州党委髙度重视，认真贯彻落实，
6 月 19 日至 25 日，南疆四地州“一体化平台“向县市推送可疑人员 24612 名，其
中喀什 16354 名、和田 3282 名、克州 2596 名、阿克苏 2380 名。经开展核查处理工作，
刑事拘留 706 名，其中和田 542 名、克州 85 名、阿克苏 79 名; 教育培训 15683 人，其中
喀什 11165 名、和田 2475 名、克州 737 名、阿克苏 1306 名; 防范布控 2096 名，其中克
州 825 名、喀什 1033 名，阿克苏 290 名; 已核暂无法收押人员 5508 名，其中喀什 4156
名、克州 825 名、阿克苏 290 名、和田 237 名。(详见附件 1)
核查反馈的结果反映出六个方面的问题: 一是存在常驻外地或户籍迁出、人户分离
的问题; 二是存在手机不实名登记、号证不符的问题; 三是存在使用他人证件、人证不符的
问题; 四是存在人已死亡、查无此人，但证件仍被人使用的问题; 五是存在公职人员、在校
大学生等难处理的冋题; 六是存在去向不明无法落查的问题。上述问题造成核查工作双不
管，畏难情绪严重，不攻坚落查、一般化处理，现实风险隐患仍不能消除。
下步工作要求: 一 是高度重视，攻坚克难。“ 一 体化”平台推送的问题人员或线
索，是影响稳定的重大风险隐患。难以落查的人员或线索更是风险中的风险、隐患中的隐
患，各地州市务必高度重视，提高警惕，严格按照自治区党委严打攻坚会战前方指挥部要
求抓好落实，特别是要在攻坚克难上下功夫，亲自研究部署，亲自研究处理措施，亲自督
导检查反馈。
 二是专群结合，详细核查。各地要坚持专群结合，充分发挥公安机关、基层组织、
访惠聚工作组、十户联防等基层维稳力量的作用，务必对“ 一体化”平台运用技术手段
推出的工作对象入家入户，逐人走访、询问、调查，彻底摸排。同时，要将不好落查和不
放心人员信息全量录入“ 一体化“平台进行技术布控, 并定期补全、更新，使五大感知系
统及时预警，将社会面维稳力量联动起来，有效发挥其检查、防控、数据釆集等方面的作
用，防患于未然。同时，要明确户籍迁出落户情况，公职人员、大学生等身份特殊的情
况，以及活动地等去向的详实情况，并通过文字和数据表格的形式反馈详细的核查结果。
(详见附件 2)
三是分类处理、措施到位。对“一体化”平台推送的带有不同类型标签的人员数
据，各地要按照有害权重进行定性、量化，并按“刑事拘留、教育培训、留置审查、防范
布控”等措施分级处理。对一人具有多种不同类型标签，特别是人员形成团伙，且团伙中
多人具有标签的要提高危害风险等级，提升处置措施。对问题人员在当地，要反馈对其采
取的措施; 问题人员不在当地要说明其去向，具体是在境外、在疆外还是在疆内, 以及对其
采取的管控处理措施等； 户籍迁出、人户分离的，以及手机不实名登记、号证不符的，
原籍地和流入地要双向查、双向管，并明确管控处理措施。人已死亡、查无此人、人证不
符等使用他人证件活动以及去向不明的，要综合施策，采取追逃方式落地查人; 推送的工
作对象是公职人员的，经核实有问题的, 要依纪依规严肃查处，没有问题的，由其本人向
所在单位说清楚、写保证; 工作对象是学生的，要进行批评教育引导，有问题的也要依法
处理。
四是注意保存固定犯罪证据。为便于打击处理，各地公安机关要及时保全证据类数
据，并及时将其转化为电子物证，尤其是要将嫌疑人员的行为数据和关系数据结合起来，
形成证据链，移送检察院和法院。同时，基层维稳力量在侦察调查工作中，要注意搜查非
法宣传品、暴恐音视频、制爆原材料等犯罪物证。
喀机随 1522 号
请速传各地方市政法委书记安
机密 排核实查处、异情报各地方市
委书记.
朱海仑
29/6
“一体化联合作战平台“每日要情
通报
新机随 2860 号 第 20 期

自治区党委严打攻坚会战前方指挥部 2017 年 6 月 29 日

“挖存量、减增量、铲土壤”要情线索

按照自治区党委关于“挖存量、减增量、铲土壌”的部署要求，针对暴恐极端分子
多使用“快牙”软件传播暴恐音视频的特点，自治区“一体化”平台对曾使用“快牙”软
件人员进行筛查分析发现，自 2016 年 7 月 7 日至今，全疆曾使用“快牙”软件人员共计
186.931 万 (维吾尔族)，其中，野阿訇 (喀什、和田、 阿克苏、克州四地州) 人员 3925
名，野阿訇的关系人 5576 名，“伊吉拉特” 人员 124 名，“伊吉拉特” 人员的关系人
72 名，出境长期未归人员的关系人 594 名。其关系人中，在逃人员 298 名，曾被刑事拘
留人员 26602 名，野阿訇 2783 名，下落不明人员 38 名，非法出境人员 214 名，出境长
期未归人员 301 名，“断通联” 对象曾被关停三次以上人员 1597 名，加入境外“东伊
运”等恐怖组织成员 32 名。
上述群体中曾使用过“快牙” 软件并具有多个有害标签人员共计 40557 名 (详见附
件 1 )，现实危害极大，主要涉及喀什 15635 人、阿克苏 8008 人、和田 5740、伊犁 3526
人、克州 1865 人、乌鲁木齐 1449 人、巴州 1086 人、博州 300 人、吐鲁番 1611 人、昌
吉 434 人、哈密 268 人、塔城 149 人、克拉玛依 95 人、阿勒泰 51 人、兵团 340 人 (石河
子 11 名、农一师 36 人、农二师 4 人、农三师 150 人、农四师 38 人、农五师 13 人、农
六师 2 人、农七师 1 人、农十二师 15 人、农十三师 18 人、农十四师 52 人)。
各地要充分借助基层维稳力量、十户联防及“一体化”平台，逐一开展调查核查，
对有涉恐嫌疑的，要及时固定证据依法打击；暂不能排除嫌疑的，要集中培训并进一步甄
别审查。核查情况要在 3 日内反馈，并附表逐人详实上报。并请各地在 3 日内上报“野
阿訇”、教育培训人员及涉嫌加入“东伊运”“IS”等恐怖组织成员名单。