01 CUADRA VS MONFORT
FACTS:
Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort
were both classmates in Mabini Elementary School
Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned the
class to weed the school premises. While they were
doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and she
jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter
tossed it at MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT
Cuadra’s eye got infected. She was brought to the
hospital; her eyes were attempted to be surgically
repaired but she nevertheless got blind in her right
eye. MT Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT
Monfort’s dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort should
pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization),
moral damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under
Article 2180.
HELD:
No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of
his incapacity or death, the mother, is responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company. The basis of this vicarious,
although primary, liability is fault or negligence,
which is presumed from that which accompanied
the causative act or omission. The presumption is
merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted.
This is the clear and logical inference that may be
drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180,
which states “that the responsibility treated of in
this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.”
In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may
be inferred that Alfonso Monfort could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due
care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise
of his parental authority in failing to foresee such
damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary,
his child was at school, where it was his duty to send
her and where she was, as he had the right to expect
her to be, under the care and supervision of the
teacher. And as far as the act which caused the
injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not
unusual among children at play and which no
parent, however careful, would have any special
reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor
did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed
any trait in the child’s character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the
blame could be attributed to her parents.
JUSTICE BARREDO Dissenting;
MT Monfort is already 13 years old and should have
known that by jokingly saying “aloud that she had
found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the
Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her,” it was likely
that something would happen to her friend, as in
fact, she was hurt. There is nothing in the record
that would indicate that Alfonso had properly
advised his daughter to behave properly and not to
play dangerous jokes on her classmate and
playmates, he can be liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to show
that he had done anything at all to even try to
minimize the damage caused upon by his child.
02 AMADORA ET AL VS. CA ET AL
G.R. No. L-47745; April 15, 1988
Cruz, J:
FACTS: Alfredo Amadora was shot by a gun fired by
his classmate Daffon while in the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos Auditorium at a date after the
semester ended. He was there to submit a
graduation requirement in Physics.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence . Additionally, the herein petitioners, as
the victim’s parents, filed a civil action for damages
under Article 2180 of the CC against the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher,
together with Daffon and two other students,
through their respective parents.
The complaint against the students was later
dropped. After trial, the CFI of Cebu held the
remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs,
representing death compensation, loss of earning
capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, MD,
ED and AF.
On appeal to the respondent court, however, the
decision was reversed and all the defendants were
completely absolved. Hence this petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In its decision the respondent court found that
Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and
trades but an academic institution of learning. It also
held that the students were not in the custody of the
school at the time of the incident as the semester
had already ended.
ISSUE: how should Art. 2180 be applied in this case
HELD: the petition is DENIED. The rector, the high
school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held
liable because none of them was the teacher-in-
charge as previously defined. Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the
article because only the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice;

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the
Court has come to the conclusion that the provision
in question should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where the school is academic
rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student
will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,
following the first part of the provision. This is the
general rule. In the case of establishments of arts
and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general
rule.
As stated in the dissent of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the
Exconde Case, under Art. 2180, he said, was
imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of
schools of arts and trades in particular. The
modifying clause “of establishments of arts and
trades” should apply only to “heads” and not
“teachers.”
But of course, as long as the defendant can show
that he had taken the necessary precautions to
prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate
himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, as
stated in its last paragraph.
In this connection, it should be observed that the
teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting
in loco parentis for the law does not require that the
offending student be of minority age. Unlike the
parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a
minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for
the act of the student under him regardless of the
student’s age
In any event, it should be noted that the liability
imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on
the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the
school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer
for the acts of its teachers or even of the head
thereof under the general principle of respondeat
superior, but then it may exculpate itself from
liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence
of a bonus paterfamilias.The school can show that it
exercised proper measures in selecting the head or
its teachers and the appropriate supervision over
them in the custody and instruction of the pupils
pursuant to its rules and regulations for the
maintenance of discipline among them.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of
the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades over the students. Is such
responsibility co-extensive with the period when
the student is actually undergoing studies during the
school term, as contended by the respondents and
impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
This does not necessarily mean that such, custody
be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with
the start of classes and ending upon the close
thereof, and excluding the time before or after such
period, such as the period of registration, and in the
case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises [During such periods, the
student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of
the school and cannot consider himself released
altogether from observance of its rules.]In the view
of the Court, the student is in the custody of the
school authorities as long as he is under the control
and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has
already ended.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the
school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment
of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility
of the school authorities over the student continues.
Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing
more than relaxing in the campus in the company of
his classmates and friends and enjoying the
ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still
within the custody and subject to the discipline of
the school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
NOTES:
The reason for the disparity [distinction of who
should be responsible for students between
academic and arts and trades schools] can be traced
to the fact that historically the head of the school of
arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his
pupils than the head of the academic school. The old
schools of arts and trades were engaged in the
training of artisans apprenticed to their master who
personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft. By contrast, the
head of the academic school was not as involved
with his students and exercised only administrative
duties over the teachers who were the persons
directly dealing with the students. The head of the
academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious
relationship with the students. Consequently, while
he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the
students, the head of the school of arts and trades,
because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains
at present in view of the expansion of the schools of
arts and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of
the direct and personal contract of their heads with
the students. Article 2180, however, remains
unchanged. In its present state, the provision must
be interpreted by the Court according to its clear
and original mandate until the legislature, taking
into account the charges in the situation subject to
be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary
amendment.
03 MENDOZA VS ARRIETA
Facts: On October 22, 1969, at around 4pm, a 3-way
vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur
Highway Bulacan, involving a Mercedez Benz owned
and driven by petitioner, a private jeep owned and
driven by respondent Salazar and a gravel and sand
truck owned by respondent Timbol and driven by
Montoya. As a consequence, separate informations
were filed against Salazar and Montoya.
At the trial, petitioner testified that Salazar overtook
the truck, swerved to the left and hit his car. He
further testified that before impact, Salazar jumped
from the jeep not knowing that Salazar was hit by
the truck of Montoya. Montoya affirmed this. On
the other hand, Salazar tried to show that after
overtaking the truck, he flashed a signal showing his
intention to turn left but was stopped at by a
policeman directing traffic at the intersection which
he contends to be the time he was hit by the truck
causing his jeep to hit petitioner’s car.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the damages ensued to the
vehicle of petitioner shall be the liability of the
driver of the jeep or of the truck.
(2) Whether or not the truck’s owner may be held
liable for damages caused by him employee.
Held: Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-
driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in
view of its findings that the collision between
Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of
the former having been bumped from behind by the
truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner
awarded damages as he was not a complainant
against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-
owner-driver Salazar.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in
the civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident from
the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while
petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur
Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and
driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his
(petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the
sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either
by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie
Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving
a gravel and sand truck iii the same direction as
Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the
collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive
damages. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a
cause of action must consist of, namely: (1)
plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of
aMercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or
wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's
primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill
either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's
employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing
Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's
car, were alleged in the Complaint.
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being
based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed
reversible error when he dismissed the civil
suit against the truck-owner, as said case may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
In view of what has been proven and established
during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be
held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion
of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar.
Considering that the collision between the jeep
driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and
driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the
hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by
Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused
Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held able for the damages
sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car.
04 PADUA v. ROBLES
GR No. L-40486; August 29, 1975
FACTS
 On the early morning of New Year ’s Day of 1969,
a taxicab driven by Romeo Punzalan (operated
by Bay Taxi Cab owned by Gregorio Robles)
struck 10-yr old Normandy Padua on the
national road, as a result of which he died.
 The parents of Normandy (Paduas) filed with the
RTC a civil case for damages against Punzalan
and Bay Taxi Cab. Likewise, the fiscal also filed a
criminal case with same RTC against Punzalan
for homicide with reckless imprudence
 Two decisions were rendered by the RTC:
 FIRST DECISION: on the civil case: Punzalan
was ordered to pay the Paduas damages
however the complaint is dismissed insofar
as the Bay Taxicab company is concerned;
 SECOND DECISION: on the criminal case:
Punzalan is guilty of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence and the civil
liability of accused has already been
determined and assessed in the prior civil
case;
 Upon finality of the civil case, the Paduas
sought the execution of the judgment
however the writ of execution was returned
unsatisfied. Hence, the Paduas instituted in
the same court against Gregorio Robles
(taxicab operator) to enforce the latter’s
subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the RPC
(bale maoniang enforcement of the CIVIL
LIABILITY EX DELICTO);
 Robles filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground (1) barred by res judicataand (2)
failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action (NB: Robles was exonerated of his
civil liability in the prior civil case filed by
the Paduas).
 RTC granted the motion to dismiss by Robles
on the ground that Paduas’ complaint states
no cause of action.
 Hence, the Paduas appealed the decision.
ISSUES:
1. WON the judgment in the criminal case (refer to
second decision) included a determination and
adjudication of Punzalan’s civil liability ex delicto
upon which Robles’s subsidiary civil responsibility
may be based?
2. WON Robles is subsidiarily liable to the Paduas?
RULING:
1. YES. The judgment in the criminal case
recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to
the civil liability ex delicto committed by Punzalan.
It would appear that a plain reading, on its face, of
the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly
its decretal portion, easily results in the same
conclusion reached by the court a quo: that the said
judgment no civil liability arising from the offense
charged against Punzalan. However, a careful study
of the judgment in question, the situation to which
it applies, and the attendant circumstances, would
yield the conclusion that the court a quo, on the
contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the
Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense
committed by Punzalanand awarded the
corresponding indemnity therefor.
Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In
negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs)
has the option between an action for enforcement
of civil liability based on culpa criminal under
article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action
for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil Code. The
action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminal section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court deems simultaneously instituted with the
criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved
for a separate application by the offended party.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes
recovery of damages twice for the same negligent
act or omission.
In this case, Court held that it is immaterial that the
Paduas chose to file first an action for recovery of
damages based on culpa aquiliana. The court also
noted of the absence of any inconsistency between
the first civil action filed by the Paduas and the
subsequent application for enforcement of civil
liability ex delicto against Robles.
Hence, there was violation of the proscription
against double recovery of damages for the same
negligent act by the allowance of the subsequent
application to enforce the subsidiary civil liability
of Robles. For, as hereinbefore stated, the
corresponding officer of the court a quo returned
unsatisfied the writ of execution issued against
Punzalan to satisfy the amount of indemnity
awarded to the Paduas in civil case 427-O. Article
2177 of the Civil Code forbids actual double
recovery of damages for the same negligent act or
omission.
In view of the above considerations, it cannot
reasonably be contended that the court a
quo intended, in its judgment in criminal case
1158-O, to omit recognition of the right of the
Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense
of which Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the
corollary award of the corresponding indemnity
therefor. Surely, it cannot be said that the court
intended the statement in the decretal portion of
the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to
the determination and assessment of Punzalan's
civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure jargonor
"gobbledygook" and to be absolutely of no meaning
and effect whatever. The substance of such
statement, taken in the light of the situation to
which it applies and the attendant circumstances,
makes unmistakably clear the intention of the
court to accord affirmation to the Paduas' right to
the civil liability arising from the judgment against
Punzalan in criminal case 1158-O. Indeed, by
including such statement in the decretal portion of
the said judgment, the court intended to adopt the
same adjudication and award it made in civil case
427-O as Punzalan's civil liability in criminal case
1158-O.
There is indeed much to be desired in the
formulation by Judge Amores of that part of the
decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case
1158-O referring to the civil liability of Punzalan
resulting from his criminal conviction. The judge
could have been forthright and direct instead of
circuitous and ambiguous. But, as we have
explained, the statement on the civil liability of
Punzalan must surely have a meaning and even if
the statement were reasonably susceptible of two
or more interpretations, that which achieves moral
justice should be adopted, eschewing the other
interpretations which in effect would negate moral
justice.
2. Padua’s subsequent civil case to enforce the
subsidiary liability against Robles states a cause of
action since the subsidiary liability of Robles, per
judgment of the criminal case, subsists.
RULING:
Hence, there was NO violation of the proscription
against double recovery of damages for the same
negligent act by the allowance of the subsequent
application to enforce the subsidiary civil liability of
Robles.
05 BERMUDEZ V MELENCIO-HERRERA
G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988
Facts: A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and
owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on
which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-
appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries
which caused his death. As a result, Criminal Case
No. 92944 for Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino.
Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27, 1969 in the said
criminal case “A Reservation to File Separate Civil
Action.”
On July 28, 1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil
case for damages against Domingo Pontino y
Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan. Finding that the
plaintiffs instituted the action “on the assumption
that defendant Pontino’s negligence in the accident
of May 10, 1969 constituted aquasi-delict,” the trial
court stated that plaintiffs had already elected to
treat the accident as a “crime” by reserving in the
criminal case their right to file a separate civil action.
That being so, the trial court decided to order the
dismissal of the complaint against defendant
Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of
the case against Domingo Pontino until after the
criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence is finally terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the present action is based on
quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore
could proceed independently of the criminal case
for homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Ruling: In cases of negligence, the injured party or
his heirs has the choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under
Article100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action
for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil
Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the
employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his
employee, subject to the employer’s defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the
family. In the case at bar, the action filed by
appellant was an action for damages based on
quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their
right in the criminal case to file an independent civil
action did not preclude them from choosing to file a
civil action for quasi¬delict. The appellant precisely
made a reservation to file an independent civil
action. In fact, even without such a reservation, the
Court allowed the injured party in the criminal case
which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to
recover damages based on quasi-delict. It does not
follow that a person who is not criminally liable is
also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the
accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability
of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.
06 REYES vs. SEMPIO-DIY,
G.R. No. L-71914 January 29, 1986
FACTS:
This petition arises from the case filed by the
petitioner Zenaida Reyes against Cristina Malicsi for
the crime of intriguing against honor. In said case,
Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor Atty.
Barayang. Malicsi pleaded guilty and was sentenced
by the court to a fine of 50 PHP. However, Reyes
failed to present evidence to prove damages as well
as to make a reservation of her right to file a
separate action for damages. Instead, she filed a
new action for damages due to defamatory words
uttered by Malicsi against her.
Reyes admitted the said failure and that the purpose
of appearance of the private prosecutor was to
prove damages against Malicsi. The court ruled in
favor of the defendants by dismissing the separate
case. The court also made no award of damages to
Reyes by such failure
ISSUE: After the admission, whether or not Reyes,
by being represented by a private prosecutor in the
criminal case and for failure to make a reservation
in the said case, was barred from filing a separate
civil action for damages against Malicsi. Hence, this
direct appeal.

HELD:
No, Reyes’ failure to make a reservation did not
foreclose her right to file a separate civil action for
damages against the accused. Article 33 of the Civil
Code provides that there is no requirement that as
a condition to the filing of a separate civil action for
damages, a reservation to file said civil action be first
made in the criminal case and such reservation is
not necessary.

The appeal was granted and ordered the court to

proceed with the hearing of the separate civil case
filed by Reyes.