CASE DIGEST

GSIS vs Pacific Airways Corporation

629 SCRA 219 (2010)

Facts:
On 2 April 1996, the Twin Otter aircraft of Philippine Airways Corporation (PAC) arrived at
the Manila International Airport from El Nido, Palawan. Upon touchdown, the Twin Otter
taxied along the runway and proceeded to the Soriano Hangar to disembark its passengers.
After the last passenger disembarked, PACs pilots started the engine of the Twin Otter in
order to proceed to the PAC Hangar located at the other end of the airport.

The Twin Otter was still 350 meters away from runway 13. Upon reaching runway 13, PACs
pilots did not make a full stop at the holding point to request clearance right before crossing
runway 13. Without such clearance, PACs pilots proceeded to cross runway 13.

Meanwhile, the Philippine Airlines (PAL) Boeing 737, was preparing for take-off along
runway 13. The PAL pilots requested clearance to push and start on runway 13 and the
ATO issued the clearance. While already on take-off roll, one of the pilots caught a glimpse
of the Twin Otter on the left side of the Boeing 737 about to cross runway 13.The PAL pilots
attempted to abort the take-off by reversing the thrust of the aircraft. However, the Boeing
737 still collided with the Twin Otter.

Issue:

Who among the parties is liable for negligence.

Held:

To ascertain who among the parties is liable for negligence, the Rules of the Air of the Air
Transportation Office apply to all aircraft registered in the Philippines.

ATO for issuing clearances that turn out to be unsuitable, cannot be blame, because the
pilots-in-command have the final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft. It remained
the primary responsibility of the pilots-in-command to see to it that the respective
clearances given were suitable.

PALs aircraft had the right of way at the time of collision, because under the Rules of the
Air, being on take-off roll undisputedly had the right of way. The fact that PACs pilots
disregarded PALs right of way and did not ask for updated clearance right before crossing
an active runway was the proximate cause of the collision. Were it not for such gross
negligence on the part of PACs pilots, the collision would not have happened.

Gross negligence is one that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may
be affected.
 PCIB V. CA
350 SCRA 446

FACTS:
Ford Philippines filed actions to recover from the drawee bank Citibank and collecting bank PCIB the
value of several checks payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue which were embezzled
allegedly by an organized syndicate. What prompted this action was the drawing of a check by
Ford, which it deposited to PCIB as payment and was debited from their Citibank account. It later
on found out that the payment wasn’t received by the Commissioner. Meanwhile, according to the
NBI report, one of the checks issued by petitioner was withdrawn from PCIB for alleged mistake in the
amount to be paid. This was replaced with manager’s check by PCIB, which were allegedly stolen by
the syndicate and deposited in their own account.

The trial court decided in favor of Ford.

ISSUE:
Has Ford the right to recover the value of the checks intended as payment to CIR?

HELD:
The checks were drawn against the drawee bank but the title of the person negotiating the same was
allegedly defective because the instrument was obtained by fraud and unlawful means, and the
proceeds of the checks were not remitted to the payee. It was established that instead paying the
Commissioner, the checks were diverted and encashed for the eventual distribution among
members of the syndicate.

Pursuant to this, it is vital to show that the negotiation is made by the perpetrator in breach of
faith amounting to fraud. The person negotiating the checks must have gone beyond the authority given
by his principal. If the principal could prove that there was no negligence in the performance of his
duties, he may set up the personal defense to escape liability and recover from other parties who,
through their own negligence, allowed the commission of the crime.

It should be resolved if Ford is guilty of the imputed contributory negligence that would defeat its
claim for reimbursement, bearing in mind that its employees were among the members of the syndicate.
It appears although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions attributable to the organized
syndicate, their actions were not the proximate cause of encashing the checks payable to CIR.
The degree of Ford’s negligence couldn’t be characterized as the proximate cause of the injury
to parties. The mere fact that the forgery was committed by a drawer-payor’s confidential
employee or agent, who by virtue of his position had unusual facilities for perpetrating the fraud and
imposing the forged paper upon the bank, doesn’t entitle the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in
the absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer.

Note: not only PCIB but also Citibank is responsible for negligence. Citibank was negligent in the
performance of its duties as a drawee bank. It failed to establish its payments of Ford’s checks
were made in due course and legally in order.

Ramos vs. C.O.L. Realty Corporation

G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Ramos is the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo. While Rodel was driving the Ford
Expedition of petitioner an accident ensued, wherein it bumped with a Corrolla Altis driven by
Aquilino Larin and owned by Respondent COL Realty. Due to the impact of the vehicular
mishap, the passenger of the sedan was injured.

A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his driver. Ramos in his
opposition argued that he cannot be held solidarily liable since it is Aquilnio's negligence that is
the proximate cause of the accident. He further argued that when the accident happened,
Aquilino violated an MMDA order, i.e. prohibiting the crossing is the place where the accident
happened.
Issue:
Whether or not Ramos may be held liable since the proximate cause of the accident is his
employee's negligence.

Ruling:
No. There is no doubt that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition against crossing
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what
the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides
within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that
the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such
crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the
ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code,
that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages.
 As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it unnecessary to delve
into it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the event
that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered
as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor.
JONAS AÑONUEVO v. CA, GR No. 130003, 2004-10-20
Facts:
the accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, at the
intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city). Villagracia
was traveling along Boni Avenue on his... bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the opposite
lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter
and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo's brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the
course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when... the collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization
several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and
Añonuevo before the RTC.
Trial on the civil action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered
judgment against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia the
amounts... of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150, 000.00). for actual damages, Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) for attorney's fees, as well as legal costs.
the Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto
Issues:
whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle
negligent if he was violating a traffic... regulation at the time of the mishap, should apply by
analogy to non-motorized vehicles.
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting from his violation of
an ordinance? It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be
equipped with headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the occurrence
of... road accidents involving bicycles.
Ruling:
Añonuevo points out that Villagracia's bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell,
or headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance.
Nor was it duly registered... with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the
same ordinance.
Villagracia does not dispute these allegations, which he admitted during the... trial, but
directs our attention instead to the findings of Añonuevo's own negligence.
Villagracia also contends that, assuming there was contributory negligence on his part, such
would not exonerate Añonuevo from payment of damages.
What Añonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit command of the legislature, as
embodied in Article 2185, a task beyond the pale of judicial power. The Court interprets,
and not creates, the law. However, since the Court is being asked to consider the matter, it
might... as well examine whether Article 2185 could be interpreted to include non-motorized
vehicles.
If Añonuevo seriously contends that... the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to
the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts historical
experience.
The more pertinent basis for the segregate... classification is the difference in type of these
vehicles.
A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by... the limitations in physical exertion. is capable of
greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles.
At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage
in the event of an accident or collision.
Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and
regulations.
While the legal argument as formulated by Añonuevo is erroneous, his core contention that
Villagracia was negligent for... failure to comply with traffic regulations warrants serious
consideration, especially since the imputed negligent acts were admitted by Villagracia
himself.
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence,
negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per se.
At face value, Villagracia's mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded against
by the ordinance he violated. Añonuevo argues that Villagracia's violation should bar the
latter's recovery of damages, and a simplistic interpretation of... negligence per se might
vindicate such an argument.
There is the fact which we consider as proven, that Añonuevo was speeding as he made
the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This reckless
behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the... path of Añonuevo's car
as it turned into the intersection, whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists.
Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not
equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist's part would not have acquitted the
driver of his duty... to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical
consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that
matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to... impute
culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a
legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact
there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury... sustained.
Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in
fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm
suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of... others.
Principles:
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized
vehicles, even if by analogy. There is factual and legal basis that necessitates the
distinction under Art. 2185
The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such
violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has
happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that...
violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury
Sanitary Steam[42] is controlling in this case. The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a
municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have sufficiently established some
degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without... legal consequence
unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury.
The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not
imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a
causal connection is established between such failure... and the injury sustained. The
principle likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation
of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially
contributed thereto.