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GERONIMO VS.

SANTOS

FACTS:

Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a document declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their
names.

Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the
annulment of document and recovery of the possession against the defendants, brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of
her parents, the property belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of intestacy.

The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother stating that the deceased Rufino and
Caridad were childless and took in as their ward Karen, the child of Caridad’s sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed that the
birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. The birth certificate had alterations as confirmed by an NSO representative.

They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they never lived or
sojourned in that place. Also, Caridad, an elementary teacher in Bulacan, never filed a maternity leave during the period of her service,
as supported by a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent.

The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. The trial court found that respondent’s filiation was duly
established by the certificate of live birth which was presented in evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate was
tampered. It further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is questionable, the filiation of respondent has already
been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the
Family Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either
of these two dates: the date the child was born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded
in the civil registry. The appellate court found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date.

It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register
because it was not signed by the physician or midwife in attendance at the child’s birth or the parents of the newborn child, contrary to
what the law required. However, the CA ultimately ruled that the respondent was able to prove her filiation via open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child as supported by secondary evidence presented.

The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they
supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits
of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property
of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the introduction of secondary evidence and rendered judgement notwithstanding
the existence of primary evidence of birth certificate.

RULING:

NO! Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article 172 because the said provision of law is meant to be
instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for
annulment of document and recovery of possession. However, this rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child is at issue.

In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What petitioner alleges is that the respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses at all.
Thus, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Art. 172 of the
Family Code.

However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s declaration that the respondent is a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased
spouses is based on misapprehension of facts. The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name
of the informant made the document questionable, as supported by the corroborating testimony of the NSO representative. In addition,
even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities. These irregularities and the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to the
respondent’s birth.

With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity ruled then the respondent is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not
entitled to inherit from the estate.

SSC VS. AZOTE


FACTS:

On June 19, 1992, Edna and Edgardo, a member of the SSS, were married in civil rites. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-
4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older children as designated beneficiaries.

Thereafter, Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger children as additional beneficiaries. On
January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a
deceased-member.

It appeared, however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 with a different set of beneficiaries,
namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer),as dependent. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied.
Her children were adjudged as beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor children. Edna filed a petition
with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the legitimate wife of
Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting information in the forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was
published in a newspaper of general circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer.

Despite the publication, no answer was filed and Rosemarie was subsequently declared in default. SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for
lack of merit. The SSC further wrote that the National Statistics Office (NSO) records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo to one
Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on July 28, 1982. Consequently, it opined that Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as
there was no showing that his first marriage had been annulled or dissolved.

ISSUE:

W/N Edna should be adjudged as the widow of the deceased, thus, entitled to the benefits

RULING:

NO! The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the
legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof
that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Edgardo even acknowledged
his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his spouse.

It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time when the Family Code was already in force.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt, failed to establish that there was no impediment or
that the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule that "whoever
claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence." Edna could not adduce
evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s
presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that
Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary
of the death benefits of Edgardo.

BARTOLOME VS. SSS

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’
Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and
unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted
by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. According to the records, Cornelio
died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the parental authority to the biological
parents of the latter.

2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

RULING:
1. YES! The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left
to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption
wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor
or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights
and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological
parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the
subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted
child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those
by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest
it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3)
years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission – If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological
parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.

2. YES! The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption
already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole
remaining beneficiary.

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the
entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984
of the New Civil Code, which provides: Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents
and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the provisions, it is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject
of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child,
the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing
of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

Thus, the Court rules that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over
the adopted child.

NOVERAS VS. NOVERAS

FACTS:

David and Leticia are US citizens who acquired properties and in the Philippines during the marriage. They have two children.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.The California
court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA.

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC-Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3
December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer
all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the
declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia
from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation expenses.

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be
liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.

David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the
Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties
in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property should be granted.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the children are entitled to presupmtive legitimes upon the grant of judicial separation of absolute community of property.

RULING:

YES! Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half
of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net
assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective
shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of
P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes
therefrom.

HEIRS OF YPON VS. RICAFORTE

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent. In their
complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless, leaving behind parcels of land. Cla iming to be
the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso, Respondent executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s
collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.

In his Answer, Respondent alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2)
letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a)
petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by
the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.

The RTC issued an order, finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the
plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso
satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence he
submitted.

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied.

Aggrieved, petitioners sought direct recourse to the SC through the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

RULING:

YES! Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over
the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court c annot
disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since
a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case
was altogether proper.

VITUG VS. CA

FACTS:

Spouses Dolores and Romarico Vitug entered into a survivorship agreement with the Bank of American National Trust and Savings
Association. The said agreement contained the following stipulations:

(1) All money deposited and to be deposited with the Bank in their joint savings current account shall be both their property and shall be
payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of them during their lifetime; and

(2) After the death of one of them, the same shall belong to and be the sole property of the surviving spouse and payable to and collectible
or withdrawable by such survivor

Dolores died naming Rowena Corona in her wills as executrix. Romarico later filed a motion asking authority to sell certain shares of
stock and real property belonging to the estate to cover his advances to the estate which he claimed were personal funds withdrawn from
their savings account. Rowena opposed on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from the savings account were conjugal partnership
properties and part of the estate. Hence, there should be no reimbursement. On the other hand, Romarico insists that the same are his
exclusive property acquired through the survivorship agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the funds of the savings account subject of the survivorship agreement were conjugal partnership properties and part of
the estate

RULING:

NO! The Court ruled that a Survivorship Agreement is neither a donation mortis causa nor a donation inter vivos. It is in the nature of an
aleatory contract whereby one or both of the parties reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the
other shall give or do upon the happening of an event which is to occur at an indeterminate time or is uncertain, such as death.

The Court further ruled that a survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law and thus is valid unless its operation or effect may be
violative of a law such as in the following instances:

(1) it is used as a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation;


(2) it is used to transfer property in fraud of creditors; or
(3) it is used to defeat the legitime of a compulsory heir.

In the instant case, none of the foregoing instances were present. Consequently, the Court upheld the validity of the survivorship
agreement entered into by the spouses Vitug. As such, Romarico, being the surviving spouse, acquired a vested right over the amounts
under the savings account, which became his exclusive property upon the death of his wife pursuant to the survivorship agreement. Thus,
the funds of the savings account are not conjugal partnership properties and not part of the estate of the deceased Dolores.

ALMEDA VS. HEIRS OF ALMEDA

FACTS:

Spouses Venancio and Leonila Almeda were the parents of nine children: Ponciano, Rafael, Emerlina, Alodia, Leticia, Norma, Benjamin
Almeda and Severina and Rosalina Almeda-Tibi, Publio's deceased wife.

On May 19, 1976, a Power of Attorney was executed by the spouse, who were then 80 and 81 years old, granting Ponciano the authority
to sell the parcels of land in Tagaytay City, which Leonila inherited from her parents.

Venancio died at the age of 90 on February 27, 1985; Leonila died eight years later on April 3, 1993, aged 97.11 Within the year of
Leonila's death on April 17, 1993, Rafael, Emerlina, Alodia, Leticia and Norma filed a notice of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds
of Tagaytay City over their parents' properties.

On October 10, 1996, a Complaint for Nullity of Contracts, Partition of Properties and Reconveyance of Titles with Damages was filed
before the RTC of Tagaytay City by them against Ponciano and his wife Eufemia. Petitioners alleged that the parties were the only heirs
of the late spouses Venancio and Leonila who died without leaving any will and without any legal obligation.

In support of their Complaint, petitioners claimed that Ponciano, taking advantage of his being the eldest child and his close relationship
with their parents, caused the simulation and forgery of the documents.
In their Answer,27 Ponciano and his wife, Eufemia, denied that the 1978 Deed was simulated or forged, asserting its genuineness and
execution for valuable consideration from which some of the petitioners, including Rafael, received substantial pecuniary benefits.

Ponciano died on October 16, 1997 and was substituted by his wife and children.

On September 2, 2004, the RTC dismiised the case. The case was denied on appeal by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the spouses were competent when they executed the Deed in favor of Ponciano.

RULING:

YES! "The law presumes that every person is fully competent to enter into a contract until satisfactory proof to the contrary is presented."
The party claiming absence of capacity to contract has the burden of proof and discharging this burden requires that clear and convincing
evidence be adduced.

Petitioners assert that their parents were "uliyanin" or forgetful, of advanced age and "at times" sickly during the time of the execution of
the 1978 Deed in favor of Ponciano.71

Mere forgetfulness, however, without evidence that the same has removed from a person the ability to intelligently and firmly protect his
property rights, will not by itself incapacitate a person from entering into contracts.

In this case, petitioners' claim that Venancio and Leonila were forgetful and at times sickly was not even supported by medical evidence.
It was based solely on Emerlina's testimony, which failed to demonstrate that Venancio and Leonila's mental state had prevented them
from freely giving their consent to the 1978 Deed or from understanding the nature and effects of their disposition.

It is settled that a person is not incapacitated to enter into a contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities,
unless such age and infirmities impair his mental faculties to the extent that he is unable to properly, intelligently and fairly understand
the provisions of said contract, or to protect his property rights.74

Petitioners' reliance on the case of Domingo v. CA is misplaced. There, the Court declared a deed of sale null and void given that the
seller was already of advanced age and senile at the time of its execution, thus:

The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already
incapacitated physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances,
there is in our view sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land.

No similar circumstances, indicating senility and clear incapacity to contract, have been alleged or proved in the instant case.

"A person is presumed to be of sound mind at any particular time and the condition is presumed to exist, in the absence of proof to the
contrary."77 In this case, petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that their parents were
mentally incompetent to execute the 1978 Deed in favor of Ponciano.

PERALTA VS. HEIRS OF ABALON

FACTS:

The subject parcel of land, described as Lot 1679 of the Cadastral Survey of Legaspi, consisting of 8,571 square meters, was originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (O) 16 and registered in the name of Bernardina Abalon (Abalon). It appears that a
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed over the subject property in favor of Restituto M. Rellama (Rellama) on June 10, 1975. By virtue of
such conveyance OCT No. (O) 16 was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42108 was issued in the name
of Rellama. The subject property was then subdivided into three (3) portions: Lot 1679-A, Lot 1679-B, Lot 1679-C. Lot 1679-A was sold
to Spouses Dominador P. Peralta, Jr. and Ofelia M. Peralta (Spouses Peralta) for which reason TCT No. 42254 was issued in their
names. Lot 1679-B, on the other hand, was first sold to Eduardo Lotivio (Lotivio) who thereafter transferred his ownership thereto to
Marissa Andal, Arnel Andal, and Leonil Andal (the Andals) through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 9, 1995. On even date, TCT
No. 42482 was issued in the name of the Andals. The Andals likewise acquired Lot 1679-C as evidenced by the issuance of TCT No.
42821 in their favor on December 27, 1995.

Claiming that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama was a forged document, and claiming further that they
acquired the subject property by succession, they being the nephew and niece of Abalon who died without issue, plaintiff-appellees
Mansueta Abalon and Amelia Abalon filed the case below against Rellama, Spouses Peralta, and the Andals, the herein defendants-
appellants and the Bank of the Philippines [sic] Islands which was later dropped as a party defendant.

It was alleged in their Complaint and subsequent Amended Complaint, under five separate causes of action, that Rellama was able to
cause the cancellation of OCT No. (O) 16, and in lieu thereof the issuance of TCT No. 42108 in his own name from which the defendants-
appellants derived their own titles, upon presentation of a xerox copy of the alleged forged deed of absolute sale and the order granting
the issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in his favor in Miscellaneous Cadastral Case No. 10648, which he
had filed on the pretext that Lot 1679 covered by OCT No. (O) 16 was sold to him and that the owner's duplicate copy of the said title got
lost in 1976 after the same was delivered to him. They averred that the owner's duplicate copy of Oct NO. (O) 16 had always been with
Abalon and that upon her death, it was delivered to them. Likewise, they alleged that Abalon had always been in possession of the subject
property through her tenant Pedro Bellen who was thereafter succeeded by his wife, Ruperta Bellen, and then his son, Godofredo Bellen.
On the other hand, they said that Rellama had never set foot on the land he was claiming. They further alleged that after the ownership
over the subject property was transferred to them upon the death of Abalon, they took possession thereof and retained Godofredo as
their own tenant. However, they averred that in 1995 the defendants-appellants were able to wrest possession of the subject property
from Godofredo Bellen. They alleged that the defendants-appellants are not buyers in good faith as they were aware that the subject land
was in the possession of the plaintiffs-appellees at the time they made the purchase. They thus claim that the titles issued to the
defendants-appellants are null and void.

In his answer, Rellama alleged that the deed of absolute sale executed by Abalon is genuine and that the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O)
16 had been delivered to him upon the execution of the said deed of transfer.

As for Spouses Peralta and the Andals, who filed their separate answers to the complaint, they mainly alleged that they are buyers in
good faith and for value.

During the trial, Rellama passed away. He was substituted by his heirs.

After the plaintiffs-appellees rested their case, instead of presenting their own evidence, the defendants-appellants and the Heirs of
Restituto Rellama, on different occasions, filed a demurrer to evidence.

On April 14, 2005, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees and ordered the restoration of title in the name
of Abalon and the cancellation of the titles issued to the defendants-appellants.

Spouses Peralta and the Andals filed their separate Notices of Appeal and thereafter, upon approval, filed their respective Defendants-
Appellants' Briefs. The Heirs of Rellama, on the other hand, opted not to challenge the ruling of the lower court.[3]

The Andals and Spouses Peralta appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 raised several issues, which the CA summarized as follows:

Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama was spurious

Whether the Andals and Spouses Peralta were buyers in good faith and for value

Who among the parties were entitled to their claims for damages.[4]

On 30 May 2007, the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed judgment setting aside the RTC Decision.
The CA ruled that the circumstances surrounding the sale of the subject property showed badges of fraud or forgery against Rellama. It
found that Abalon had not parted with her ownership over the subject property despite the claim of Rellama that they both executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale. As proof, the CA pointed out the existence of a notarized contract of leasehold executed by Abalon with Ruperta
Bellen on 11 June 1976. The genuineness and due execution of the said leasehold agreement was uncontroverted by the parties. On
this basis, the appellate court concluded that Abalon could not have leased the subject parcel of land to Bellen if the former had parted
with her ownership thereof.[5]

The CA also found no evidence to show that Rellama exercised dominion over the subject property, because he had not introduced
improvements on the property, despite claiming to have acquired it in 1975.[6] Further, the CA noted that he did not cause the annotation
of the Deed of Sale, which he had executed with Abalon, on OCT No. (O) 16. It observed that when the original copy of OCT No. (O) 16
was allegedly lost in 1976, while Rellama was on his way to Legaspi City to register the title to his name, it took him almost 20 years to
take steps to judicially reconstitute a copy thereof. To the appellate court, these circumstances cast doubt on the veracity of Rellama's
claim of ownership over such a significant property, which was almost a hectare.[7]

The CA also ruled that the heirs of Bernardina Abalon had the legal standing to question the sale transaction between Rellama and their
predecessor-in-interest. It concluded that the heirs of Abalon had acquired the subject property by ordinary acquisitive prescription and
thus had every right to attack every document that intended to divest them of ownership thereof,[8] which in this case was the Deed of
Sale that Bernardina executed in favor of Rellama. Lastly, the appellate court considered the Spouses Peralta as buyers in bad faith for
relying on a mere photocopy of TCT No. 42108 when they bought the property from Rellama.[9] On the other hand, it accorded the Andals
the presumption of good faith, finding no evidence that would rebut this presumption.[10]

The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 is as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE and a new judgment is rendered as follows:

1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42482 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42821, both in the names of Andals, are held legal and valid.

2. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42254 registered in the names of Spouses Peralta is cancelled for being null and void. Hence, they are
ordered to vacate the land covered thereby and to surrender possession thereof in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees.

SO ORDERED.[11]
The heirs of Abalon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 May 2007 Decision, insofar as the CA declared the Andals to be buyers
in good faith of the subject property and, thus, that the land title issued in their favor was valid. Spouses Peralta, for their part, filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the said CA Decision pertaining to the portion that declared them as buyers in bad faith which
accordingly nullified the title issued to them.

On 10 June 2008, the CA denied the Motions for Partial Reconsideration of the movants for lack of merit.[12]

On 11 August 2008, Spouses Peralta filed with this Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 30 May
2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542.[13] On the same day, the heirs of Bernardina Abalon, represented by Mansueto Abalon, filed
a similar Petition questioning the portion of the mentioned CA Decision declaring the validity of the title issued to the Andals, who were
adjudged by the appellate court as buyers in good faith.[14]

THE ISSUES

The Petition filed by Spouses Peralta, docketed as G.R. No. 183448, lists the following issues:

a) The case for annulment should have been dismissed because the purported Deed of Sale executed by Abalon and Rellama was not
introduced in evidence and thus, forgery was not proven.

b) The heirs of Abalon are not forced heirs of Bernardina Abalon; hence, they do not have the legal personality to file the action to annul
the subject Deed of Sale.

c) The heirs of Abalon failed to prove that they had inherited the subject property.

d) Spouses Peralta are buyers in good faith and, thus title to their portion of the subject property must be upheld[15]

As for the heirs of Abalon, their Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183464, raises the following issues:

a) The Andals cannot be considered as buyers in good faith by simply applying the ordinary presumption in the absence of evidence
showing the contrary.

b) The CA erred in applying in favor of the Andals, the doctrine that a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value, because Abalon never parted with her possession of the valid and uncancelled title over the subject
property

c) The CA erred in declaring the validity of the title issued in the names of the Andals, because Rellama was bereft of any transmissible
right over the portion of the property he had sold to them.[16]

RULING:

We deny the Petitions and affirm the ruling of the CA.

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, even if the true owner thereof has been in possession of the genuine title, which is valid and has not been cancelled.

It is well-settled that "a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land and put a stop
forever to any question as to the legality of the title."[17]

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, [18] we explained the purpose of the Torrens system and its legal implications to third persons
dealing with registered land, as follows:

The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto
by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation
would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system
would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing
with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.

The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of
land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of
land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual
after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded
and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership.
The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also
more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept
the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.

The Torrens system was intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, but the system cannot
be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered land. The system merely confirms ownership and does not
create it. It cannot be used to divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose of transferring it to another one who has not acquired it by
any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. Thus, the Torrens system cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or to
shield the commission of fraud or to enrich oneself at the expense of another.[19]

It is well-established in our laws and jurisprudence that a person who is dealing with a registered parcel of land need not go beyond the
face of the title. A person is only charged with notice of the burdens and claims that are annotated on the title.[20] This rule, however,
admits of exceptions, which we explained in Clemente v. Razo:[21]

Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title, in the absence of any suspicion, is not obligated to look beyond
the certificate to investigate the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate. And, he is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.

We do acknowledge that the rule thus enunciated is not cast in stone. For, indeed, there are exceptions thereto. Thus, in Sandoval vs.
CA, we made clear the following:
The aforesaid principle admits of an unchallenged exception: that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in
his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The
presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate
the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent
purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.[22]

Thus, the determination whether one is a buyer in good faith or can be considered an innocent purchaser for value becomes imperative.
Section 55 of the Land Registration Act provides protection to an innocent purchaser for value[23] by allowing him to retain the parcel of
land bought and his title is considered valid. Otherwise, the title would be cancelled and the original owner of the parcel of land is allowed
to repossess it.

Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before receiving a notice
of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Buyers in good faith buy a property with the belief that the person from
whom they receive the thing is the owner who can convey title to the property. Such buyers do not close their eyes to facts that should
put a reasonable person on guard and still claim that they are acting in good faith.[24]

The assailed Decision of the CA held that the Andals were buyers in good faith, while Spouses Peralta were not. Despite its determination
that fraud marred the sale between Bernardina Abalon and Rellama, a fraudulent or forged document of sale may still give rise to a valid
title. The appellate court reasoned that if the certificate of title had already been transferred from the name of the true owner to that which
was indicated by the forger and remained as such, the land is considered to have been subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser,
whose title is thus considered valid.[25] The CA concluded that this was the case for the Andals.

The appellate court cited Fule v. Legare[26] as basis for its ruling. In the said case, the Court made an exception to the general rule that
a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. A fraudulent document may then become the root of a valid title, as it held in
Fule:

Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to secure a registered title to the
house and lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners. We have indeed ruled that a forged or fraudulent
deed is a nullity and conveys no title (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 49 Phil., 19). However, we have also laid down the doctrine that
there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. One such instance is where the certificate of
title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently
sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate (Inquimboy vs. Cruz, G.R.
No. L-13953, July 28, 1960).

We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because under the Torrens system, "registration is the operative act
that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land (Secs. 50 and 51, Land Registration Act). Consequently, where there was
nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser
is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that
may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the
Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory. (Reynes vs. Barrera, 68 Phil., 656; De Lara and De Guzman vs.
Ayroso, 50 O.G. No 10, 4838). The public shall then be denied of its foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Land
Registration Act. In the end, the business community stands to be inconvenienced and prejudiced immeasurably.

Furthermore, when the Register of Deeds issued a certificate of title in the name of John W. Legare, and thereafter registered the same,
John W. Legare, insofar as third parties were concerned, acquired valid title to the house and lot here disputed. When, therefore, he
transferred this title to the herein petitioners, third persons, the entire transaction fell within the purview of Article 1434 of the Civil Code.
The registration in John W. Legare's name effectively operated to convey the properties to him.
After executing the Deed of Sale with Bernardina Abalon under fraudulent circumstances, Rellama succeeded in obtaining a title in his
name and selling a portion of the property to the Andals, who had no knowledge of the fraudulent circumstances involving the transfer
from Abalon to Rellama. In fact, the Decisions of the RTC and the CA show no factual findings or proof that would rebut the presumption
in favor of the Andals as buyers in good faith. Thus, the CA correctly considered them as buyers in good faith and upheld their title.

The Abalons counter this ruling and allege that the CA erred in relying on Fule to justify its assailed Decision. They argue that Torres v.
Court of Appeals[27] is the applicable ruling, because the facts therein are on all fours with the instant case.[28]

In Torres, the subject property was covered by TCT No. 53628 registered in the name of Mariano Torres. His brother-in-law Francisco
Fernandez, misrepresenting that the copy of the title had been lost, succeeded in obtaining a court Order for the issuance of another copy
of TCT No. 53628. He then forged a simulated deed of sale purportedly showing that Torres had sold the property to him and caused the
cancellation of TCT No. 53628, as well as the issuance of TCT No. 86018 in his name. Soon, Fernandez mortgaged the property to Mota.
Upon learning of the fraud committed by Fernandez, Torres caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the former's copy and
succeeded in having Fernandez's title declared null and void. Meanwhile, Mota was able to foreclose on Fernandez's real estate
mortgage, as well as to cause the cancellation of TCT No. 86018 and the issuance of a new one TCT No. 105953 in her name.

The issue to be resolved in Torres was whether Mota can be considered an innocent mortgagee for value, and whether her title can be
deemed valid. Ruling in the negative, the Court explained:

There is nothing on the records which shows that Torres performed any act or omission which could have jeopardized his peaceful
dominion over his realties. The decision under review, however, in considering Mota an innocent mortgagee protected under Section 65
of the Land Registration Law, held that Torres was bound by the mortgage. Inevitably, it pronounced that the foreclosure sale, where
Mota was the highest bidder, also bound Torres and concluded that the certificate of title issued in the name of Mota prevails over that of
Torres'. As correctly pointed out by Torres, however, his properties were sold on execution, and not on foreclosure sale, and hence, the
purchaser thereof was bound by his notice of adverse claim and lis pendens annotated at the back of Fernandez' TCT. Moreover, even
if We grant Mota the status of an innocent mortgagee, the doctrine relied upon by the appellate court that a forged instrument may become
the root of a valid title, cannot be applied where the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title covering the same interest in a
realty. The doctrine would apply rather when, as in the cases for example of De la Cruz v. Fabie, 35 Phil. 144 [1916], Fule v. De Legare,
No. L-17951, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 351, and Republic v. Umali, G.R. No. 80687, April 10, 1989, the forger thru insidious means
obtains the owner's duplicate certificate of title, converts it in his name, and subsequently sells or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent
holder for value, for in such a case the new certificate is binding upon the owner (Sec. 55, Act 496; Sec. 53, P.D. No. 1529). But if the
owner holds a valid and existing certificate of title, his would be indefeasible as against the whole world, and not that of the innocent
holder's. "Prior tempore potior jure" as We have said in Register of Deeds v. Philippine National Bank, No. L-17641, January 30, 1965,
13 SCRA 46, citing Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, Roman Catholic Bishop v. Philippine Railway, 49 Phil. 546, Reyes v. Borbon, 50
Phil. 791.[29] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

We do not agree with the contention of the Abalons that the ruling in Torres is controlling in this case. They quoted a portion in the said
case that is clearly an obiter. In Torres, it was shown that Mariano had annotated an adverse claim on the title procured by Fernandez
prior to the execution sale, in which Mota was the highest bidder. This Court declared her as a mortgagee in bad faith because, at the
back of Fernandez's title, Torres made an annotation of the adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens. The annotation of the adverse
claim was made while the forged document was still in the name of the forger, who in this case is Fernandez. That situation does not
obtain in the instant case.

The records of the RTC and the CA have a finding that when Rellama sold the properties to the Andals, it was still in his name; and there
was no annotation that would blight his clean title. To the Andals, there was no doubt that Rellama was the owner of the property being
sold to them, and that he had transmissible rights of ownership over the said property. Thus, they had every right to rely on the face of
his title alone.

The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the
Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here
is that there must be a complete chain of registered titles. [30] This means that all the transfers starting from the original rightful owner to
the innocent holder for value and that includes the transfer to the forger must be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to
the transferee.

Contrary to what the Abalons would like to impress on us, Fule and Torres do not present clashing views. In Fule, the original owner
relinquished physical possession of her title and thus enabled the perpetrator to commit the fraud, which resulted in the cancellation of
her title and the issuance of a new one. The forged instrument eventually became the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value. The new title under the name of the forger was registered and relied upon by the innocent purchaser for value.
Hence, it was clear that there was a complete chain of registered titles.

On the other hand in Torres, the original owner retained possession of the title, but through fraud, his brother-in-law secured a court order
for the issuance of a copy thereof. While the title was in the name of the forger, the original owner annotated the adverse claim on the
forged instrument. Thus, before the new title in the name of the forger could be transferred to a third person, a lien had already been
annotated on its back. The chain of registered titles was broken and sullied by the original owner's annotation of the adverse claim. By
this act, the mortgagee was shown to be in bad faith.

In the instant case, there is no evidence that the chain of registered titles was broken in the case of the Andals. Neither were they proven
to have knowledge of anything that would make them suspicious of the nature of Rellama's ownership over the subject parcel of land.
Hence, we sustain the CA's ruling that the Andals were buyers in good faith. Consequently, the validity of their title to the parcel of the
land bought from Rellama must be upheld.

As for Spouses Peralta, we sustain the ruling of the CA that they are indeed buyers in bad faith. The appellate court made a factual finding
that in purchasing the subject property, they merely relied on the photocopy of the title provided by Rellama. The CA concluded that a
mere photocopy of the title should have made Spouses Peralta suspicious that there was some flaw in the title of Rellama, because he
was not in possession of the original copy. This factual finding was supported by evidence.

The CA pointed out Spouses Peralta's Answer to the Complaint of the Abalons in Case No. 9243 in the RTC of Legaspi City, Branch 5.
In their Answer, they specifically alleged as follows:

2- These defendants [Spouses Peralta] acquired lot No. 1679-A by purchase in good faith and for value from Restituto Rellama under
Doc. No. 11212, page No. 26, Book No. 60, Series of 1996 of Notary Public Atty. Otilio Bongon, Legaspi City on March 2, 1995 copy of
which is attached as and made part of this answer as Exhibit "1;"

3- That these defendants were handed over by Rellama xerox [sic] copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42103 issued by the
Register of Deed of Legaspi City on the 2nd day of August 1995 copy attached and made integral part as Exhibit "1-A" and also Original
Certificate of Title No. (O) 16 as Exhibit "1-B"[31]

We have no reason to disturb this factual finding of the CA because it is supported by the evidence on record. Spouses Peralta filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, which allows only questions of law to be raised. It is a settled rule that questions of fact
are not reviewable in this kind of appeal. Under Rule 45, Section 1, "petitions for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth."[32] A question of fact arises when there is "as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when there is a need
to calibrate the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation."[33] It is further pointed out
that "the determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue, which generally is outside the province of this Court to
determine in a petition for review."[34]

Whether or not Spouses Peralta are buyers in good faith, is without a doubt, a factual issue. Although this rule admits of exceptions,[35]
none of these applies to their case. There is no conflict between the factual findings and legal conclusions of the RTC and those of the
CA, both of which found them to be buyers in bad faith. The fact that they did not participate in the proceedings before the lower court
does not help their case either.

On the issue of the legal standing of the Abalons to file this case, we find that the CA correctly upheld their standing as heirs of the
deceased Bernardina Abalon. The appellate court ruled that during her lifetime, Bernardina Abalon had promised her heirs siblings
Mansueto and Amelia that she would give them the subject property. A duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 was delivered to them upon
her death. Thus, the CA concluded that the two siblings acquired the subject property by ordinary prescription. Further, it deduced that
the mode of transmission of the property from Bernardina to her nephew and niece was a form of donation mortis causa, though without
the benefit of a will.[36] Despite this omission, it still held that Mansueto and Amelia acquired the subject property through ordinary
acquisitive prescription because, since the death of their aunt Bernardina, they had been in possession of the property for more than 10
years that ripened into full ownership.

Under Article 975[38] of the Civil Code, siblings Mansueto and Amelia Abalon are the legal heirs of Bernardina, the latter having had no
issue during her marriage. As such, they succeeded to her estate when she passed away. While we agree with the CA that the donation
mortis causa was invalid in the absence of a will, it erred in concluding that the heirs acquired the subject property through ordinary
acquisitive prescription. The subject parcel of land is a titled property; thus, acquisitive prescription is not applicable.[39] Upon the death
of Bernardina, Mansueto and Amelia, being her legal heirs, acquired the subject property by virtue of succession, and not by ordinary
acquisitive prescription.

ALUAD VS. ALUAD

FACTS:

Petitioner’s mother, Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin
was the owner of six lots of Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After his death, Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself and thereafter, she executed a
Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor of Maria covering all the six lots. The Deed provided that such will become effective
upon the death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the Donor, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded.
Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or
even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land.

Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising four (4) of the lots to Maria
and the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few months after Matilde’s death. Thereafter, Maria’s heirs (herein petitioners) filed before
the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido, alleging
that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because such lots have been previously alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of
Donation. The lower court decided in favor of the petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon appeal of Zenaido which held that
the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities
of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the present Petition for Review has been filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos and whether or not such deed is valid.

If so, whether or not Matilde Aluad has the right to convey the lots in question to Zenaido Aluad.

RULING:

The Court finds the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioner’s mother) one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:

It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the transferor at will, ad nutum, but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

That the transfer should be void of the transferor should survive the transferee.

The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation
than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioner’s mother during the former’s lifetime. Further
the statement, “anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even
dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated,” means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the
right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership.
The phrase, “anyone of them who should survive” is out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon
the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor.

The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only
two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and transmitted no right to petitioner’s mother. But even
assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to the two lots was transmitted to Maria. Matilde
thus validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by her last will and testament, subject to the qualification that her will must be probated. With
respect to the conveyed lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.

GANUELAS VS. CAWED

FACTS:

Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution
may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the
donor-testator.

Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property in favor of petitioner Ursulina Ganuelas. The pertinent
portion of the Deed of Donation reads: ―That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE,
and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey,
by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the
event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect.‖

However, more than a month before Celestina died, she executed a document revoking such donation. After her death, Ursulina claimed
ownership over the donated properties and refused to give private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., niece of Celestina any share
in the produce of the properties despite repeated demands. Thus, prompting Flores, et al. to file a complaint before the San Fernando,
La Union Regional Trial Court (RTC), challenging the validity of the Deed of Donation. They alleged that such donation is void for failure
to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments, which is necessary in a disposition mortis causa.

On the other hand, Ursulina maintains that there is no need to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments because such donation
was inter vivos.

The RTC ruled that the Deed of Donation is a disposition mortis causa, thus, void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and
testaments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa

RULING:

Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon
the execution of the deed. Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately operative
even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the
donee until the death of the donor-testator.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass
to the donee only because of the donor‘s death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa
which should be embodied in a last will and testament.

But if the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked ownership
(nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of
the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.

The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its
nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil
Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of
a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.

The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties
was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖ admits
of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her
lifetime.

More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded
and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition.

As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered
void if the donor should survive the donee. More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis
causa: To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the
donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance
in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In other
words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.

As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should
have been complied with, failing which the donation is void and produces no effect.

MAGLASANG VS. CABATINGAN

FACTS:

On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of
Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half (½) portion of the former's house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu.
Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon petitioners
Nicolas, Merly S. Cabatingan and Estela C. Maglasang for two parcels of land. One of the provisions in the deeds are as follows:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, the DONOR does hereby, by these presents,
transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements
existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should
die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect."

When Conchita died in May 9, 1995, and upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed an action to annul
the said four (4) deeds of donation. Respondents allege that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking
advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void
for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations
mortis causa. Petitioners deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused
the preparation of the instruments.

RTC ruled that the donation was mortis causa thus void for not following the requisite forms.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation was mortis causa.

RULING:
Mortis Causa. In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." In
determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:

(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear
provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death
of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners
during her lifetime.

For a donation mortis causa to be valid it must conform with the following requisites:

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be
required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.

GARCIA-QUIAZON VS. BELEN

Facts:

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo, filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo's common-
law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her
children, Jenneth Quiazon and Maria Jennifer. Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise, represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before
RTC-Las Piñas.

Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated
to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of

Eliseo's marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter's marriage
with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters... of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth[4] signed by Eliseo as her father.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance
of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.[5] The petitioners asserted that as... shown by his Death
Certificate,[6] Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court,[7] the petition for settlement of... decedent's estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Piñas City.

In a Decision[8] dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting... the position taken by
the petitioners that Eliseo's last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision[10] rendered by the Court of Appeals

In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able... to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up
to the time of Eliseo's death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement... of Eliseo's estate, the Court of Appeals upheld
the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.

ISSUES:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND
THEREFORE[,] THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE [RTC] OF LAS PIÑAS

THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION[.]

RULING:

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the
RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death

Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the... terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."[15] In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or... place of abode.

As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for
the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime,... Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners' contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the... decedent
is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.[28]

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding...
on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings
of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good... grounds. It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.[29]
Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural... children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested
party within the purview of the law.

TIGGANGAY VS. WACAS

FACTS:

Before Us is a letter-complaint charging respondent Judge Marcelino K. Wacas (Judge Wacas) with Impropriety and Partiality for not
inhibiting himself, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, from hearing an electoral protest case pending before him and for attending
the victory party of a party-litigant in said electoral case.

Judge Wacas is the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25 in Tabuk City, Kalinga. Complainant Johnwell W.
Tiggangay (Tiggangay) was the losing protestant in an electoral protest case before the sala of Judge Wacas, docketed as Election Case
No. 40, entitled Johnwell W Tiggangay v. Rhustom L. Dagadag.

Tiggangay ran for the mayoralty position of Tanudan, Kalinga in the May 14, 2007 election but lost to Rhustom L. Dagadag (Dagadag)
by a slim margin of 158 votes. Following Dagadag's proclamation, Tiggangay filed an electoral protest which was raffled to the sala of
Judge Wacas.

On August 8, 2008, Judge Wacas rendered a Decision finding Dagadag to have won the protested election but at a reduced winning
margin of 97 votes. Tiggangay appealed the RTC Decision before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division which
dismissed the appeal through an Order issued on November 4, 2008. Tiggangay's motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC Second
Division's dismissal of his appeal was likewise rejected by the COMELEC En Banc on January 12, 2011 on the ground of mootness.
On July 31, 2009, Tiggangay filed his verified letter-complaint charging Judge Wacas with Impropriety and Partiality. Tiggangay alleged
that, during the course of the proceedings in Election Case No. 40, he learned that Judge Wacas is Dagadag's second cousin by affinity,
the former's aunt is married to an uncle of Dagadag. The relationship notwithstanding, Judge Wacas did not inhibit himself from hearing
said electoral case in violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, after ruling
in favor of Dagadag, so Tiggangay alleged, Judge Wacas and his wife attended the victory party of Dagadag held on August 23, 2008 at
Dagadag's ranch in Spring, Tabuk City. To bolster his allegation, Tiggangay submitted the affidavit of his driver, Fidel Gayudan
(Gayudan),1 who attested Judge Wacas and wife were fetched by a red Toyota Surf owned by Dagadag and were brought to the victory
party. Further, Tiggangay alleged citing the affidavit of Corazon Somera2 (Somera), an alleged close friend of Judge Wacas and his
spouse that Judge Wacas' sister-in-law, Rebecca Magwaki Alunday (Alunday), allegedly said in the presence of Somera and Judge
Wacas and wife that Tiggangay will win the protest if he has much money. Tiggangay stated that "Judge Wacas never bothered x x x to
rebuke his sister-in-law for such uncalled for statement, or to outrightly deny or affirm such statement x x x."3chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In his Comment, Judge Wacas denied being related by affinity to Dagadag, adding that Tiggangay made the allegation on the basis of
"some reliable sources," not from his personal knowledge. Moreover, Judge Wacas maintained, Tiggangay never moved for his inhibition
during the entire proceedings in Election Case No. 40 if, indeed, Tiggangay doubted his fairness, integrity and independence. Judge
Wacas vehemently denied his alleged attendance in the victory party of Dagadag on August 23, 2008 and asserted that he was with his
family in a clan gathering on that day in the house of Rafael Maduli at Purok 5, Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, where he stayed from about
8:00 a.m. until about 3:00 p.m. Thus, he submitted the affidavits of Blezilda Maduli Palicpic4 (Palicpic) and Alunday5 attesting to such
fact aside from his own affidavit6 and the affidavit of his wife, Rosalina Magwaki Wacas (Mrs. Wacas).7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On June 13, 2011, acting on the recommendation8 of the Court Administrator, the Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA),
through Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting (Justice Inting), for investigation and report with appropriate recommendations.

Justice Inting held a preliminary conference on October 3, 2011, where the parties stipulated, inter alia, that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

11) During the proceedings of the protest case, complainant did not file a motion to inhibit Judge Marcelino Wacas.

12) No written Motion to Inhibit was filed in Court during the proceedings of the protest case.

13) The letter-complaint dated February 19, 2009 was filed only after the decision dated August 8, 2008 was rendered by the RTC and
after the Comelec in its Order dated November 4, 2008 dismissed the appeal.

14) That Fidel Gayudan, one of the witnesses, is a constant companion of the complainant.

15) That Corazon Somera is the sister of the mother of the complainant.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Thereafter, Justice Inting conducted hearings on December 9, 2011,10 January 27, 2012,11 March 2, 2012,12 and June 22, 2012.13 For
the prosecution of the instant case, only Tiggangay and Gayudan testified on December 9, 2011. As Somera did not appear to testify,
her affidavit appended to the complaint was expunged from the records. On the other hand, for the defense, Palicpic testified on March
12, 2012, while Sarado Aggal (Aggal), Mrs. Wacas and Judge Wacas testified on June 22, 2012.

Submission of Memoranda followed.

On October 18, 2012, Justice Inting transmitted to the Court her Report, recommending the dismissal of the instant complaint for lack of
substantial evidence.14chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

We adopt the findings of Justice Inting supportive of her recommendations and accordingly dismiss the instant administrative complaint.

When the issue is administrative liability, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.15 In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that
respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant.16 In the instant case, Tiggangay failed to present substantial
evidence to prove his allegations. One who alleges a fact has the burden of proof and mere allegation is not
evidence.17chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The supposed relationship between Judge Wacas and Dagadag, unsubstantiated as it were by the required substantial relevant evidence,
remains a mere allegation of Tiggangay. In his testimony on December 9, 2011, Tiggangay tried to assert that Judge Wacas and Dagadag
are related within the sixth degree by affinity in that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of Dagadag. Tiggangay even drew
a sketch to show the affinity. The fact, however, is that no substantial evidence was presented to prove the relationship angle.

We can grant arguendo that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of Dagadag. But such reality is not a ground for the mandatory
inhibition of a Judge as required under Sec. 118 of Rule 137, Revised Rules of Procedure, since there is actually no relation of affinity
between Judge Wacas and Dagadag.

Affinity denotes "the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse."19 It is a relationship by marriage or a familial
relation resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and family
relations.20chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity, therefore, are those commonly
referred to as "in-laws," or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like.21chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Affinity may also be defined as "the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection
existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows
out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife's blood
relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa."22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity
to his wife's brother, but not to the wife of his wife's brother. There is no affinity between the husband's brother and the wife's sister; this
is called affinitas affinitatis."23chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the
marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by
affinity in the third degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-
laws and, thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of Judge Wacas but is
not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge Wacas' aunt, like Judge Wacas. In short, there is no relationship by affinity between
Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to
hear Election Case No. 40.

It cannot be overemphasized that Tiggangay, for all his protestations against Judge Wacas' impartiality arising out of the perceived
relationship by affinity between Dagadag and Judge Wacas, never moved for the inhibition of Judge Wacas from hearing Election Case
No. 40. We view this fact as a belated attempt by Tiggangay to get back at Judge Wacas for the latter's adverse ruling in Tiggangay's
electoral protest. Besides, as aptly put by Justice Inting, "a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the court and to
raise objections only after an unfavorable decision has already been rendered."24chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

We find no reason to disturb Justice Inting's succinct observation that the affidavit and uncorroborated testimony of Tiggangay's driver,
Gayudan, is incredulous and not worthy of credence. Gayudan supposedly followed Judge Wacas and wife to the ranch of Dagadag
where the alleged victory party was celebrated on August 23, 2008 and observed for four hours the comings and goings of the people
attending the party. Yet, Gayudan could not even name one attendee, aside from Judge Wacas and his wife, despite admitting that the
people who allegedly attended the party are from his place.

Notably, the affidavit and testimony of Aggal belies and demolishes the affidavit and testimony of Gayudan. Aggal was the driver of
Congressman Tagayo from 2007 to 2011 and was staying in the place of said Congressman which is just beside the ranch of Dagadag
in Spring, Tabuk City, Kalinga. Aggal attested and testified that there was no party in the place of Dagadag on August 23, 2008. Besides,
the unrebutted testimony of Palicpic places the whereabouts of Judge Wacas and his wife on August 23, 2008 not in Dagadag's place
but in the place of their relative, .which is just walking distance from their residence, to attend a clan gathering.

In sum, We find nothing in the records to support a case of impropriety, much less manifest bias and partiality against Tiggangay.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against Judge Marcelino K. Wacas, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 25 in Tabuk
City, Kalinga, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

INING VS. VEGA

FACTS:

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a... parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-630[5] (OCT RO-630).

Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.

Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both
deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto
and Lenard Vega, the... substituted respondents.

Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores),
Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo

Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon
Cordero. Antipolo is survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo),
Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo),... Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco
(Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear
from the records if he was made... party to the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.

In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria's grandchildren or
spouses thereof (Gregoria's heirs).

acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana's surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan... recovery of ownership and possession, with... damages, against Gregoria's heirs.
Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria's heirs refused to heed his demands...
that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be collated and included as part of the... portion
to be awarded to Gregoria's heirs

Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property;... that the same be partitioned after collation and
determination of the portion to which he is entitled; that Gregoria's heirs be ordered to execute the necessary documents or agreements

Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become
the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in... good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez),
who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious
and exclusive possession of the property with a just title; that they have been paying the... taxes on the property; that Leonardo's claim
is barred by estoppel and laches

As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the
property.

the trial court rendered a Decision

Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' right of action has long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;

Declaring Lot 1786... to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071)
is ordered cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to issue a transfer certificate... of title to the heirs of
Natividad Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; and
Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share.

trial court found... deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never
sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leon's estate at the... time of his death in 1962. Leon's
siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to
Romana's share as the latter's successors.

the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon's death in 1962 or up to 1992 within which to file the partition case. Since
Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription

In addition, the trial court held that for his long inaction, Leonardo was... guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the property should go to
Gregoria's heirs exclusively.

Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA... the appeal questioned the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of Civil Case No.
5275, its application of Article 1141, and the award of the property to Gregoria's heirs exclusively.

this appeal is GRANTED

CA held that the trial court's declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and
Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners' failure to appeal the same. Proceeding from the premise that no...
valid prior disposition of the property was made by its owner Leon and that the property which remained part of his estate at the time of
his death passed on by succession to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria, which thus makes the parties herein who are Romana's
and

Gregoria's heirs co-owners of the property in equal shares, the appellate court held that only the issues of prescription and laches were
needed to be resolved.

CA declared that prescription began to run not from Leon's death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.'s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership
of Land in 1979,... which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of
Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
heirs so long as he... expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the
Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a
repudiation of his co-ownership with

Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-year prescriptive period under Article 1141.

The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.'s sole possession of the property for more than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo and the
respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership either, stating that his exclusive possession of the property and appropriation of
its fruits... even his continuous payment of the taxes thereon while adverse as against strangers, may not be deemed so as against
Leonardo in the absence of clear and conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted or deprived of his rights as co-owner
with the intention of... assuming exclusive ownership over the property, and absent a showing that this was effectively made known to
Leonardo.

CA granted respondents' prayer for partition, directing that the manner of partitioning the property shall be governed by the
Commissioner's Report and Sketch and the Supplementary Commissioner's Report which the parties did not... contest.
ISSUES:

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON
THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES

RULING:

The Court denies the Petition.

The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal.
Thus, the property remained part of Leon's estate.

The trial court, examining the two deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It then concluded
that no such sale from

Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal. Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter should
be considered settled. Thus, petitioners' insistence on Lucimo Sr.'s 1943 purchase of the property to reinforce their claim over the...
property must be ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly remained part of Leon's
estate upon his passing in 1962.

Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.

Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares.

Gregoria's and Romana's heirs are co-owners of the subject property.

Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As
co-owners, they may use the property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and
in such a way as... not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights.

For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the...
co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.

it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon in
1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that prescription shall begin to run in... favor of a co-owner and against the
other co-owners only from the time he positively renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the other co-owners.

What escaped the trial and appellate courts' notice, however, is that while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be
characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria;...
he is merely Antipolo's son-in-law, being married to Antipolo's daughter Teodora.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation
of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to
seek... a partition of the property has not been lost.

Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this... very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a
nephew of Leon. More significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon's
name. Leon's ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the property passed... on to his heirs by operation of law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

Principles:

One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent's
property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the... decedent's heirs.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the...
co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.

SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS


FACTS:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province
of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993,
she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. But
the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters
of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

RULING:

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary
that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven.

Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from
her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

MAYOR VS. TIU

FACTS:

On May 25, 2008, Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan (Rosario), the widow of the late Primo Villasin (Primo), passed away and left a
holographic Last Will and Testament,5 wherein she named her sister, Remedios Tiu (Remedios), and her niece, Manuela Azucena Mayor
(Manuela), as executors. Immediately thereafter, Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for the probate of Rosario's holographic will6
with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary (probate proceedings). The petition was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 9) and docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30. They averred that Rosario left properties valued at approximately
P2.5 million.

On May 29, 2008, respondent Damiana Charito Marty (Marty) claiming to be the adopted daughter of Rosario, filed a petition for letters
of administration before the RTC, Branch 34, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 34), docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-32, but it was not given
due course because of the probate proceedings. Per records, this dismissal is subject of a separate proceeding filed by Marty with the
CA Cebu City, docketed as CA- G.R. SP No. 04003.7

On June 12, 2008, in its Order,8 the RTC-Br. 9 found the petition for probate of will filed by Remedios and Manuela as sufficient in form
and substance and set the case for hearing.

Consequently, Marty filed her Verified Urgent Manifestation and Motion,9 dated June 23, 2008, stating that Remedios kept the decedent
Rosario a virtual hostage for the past ten (10) years and her family was financially dependent on her which led to the wastage and disposal
of the properties owned by her and her husband, Primo. Marty averred that until the alleged will of the decedent could be probated and
admitted, Remedios

and her ten (10) children had no standing to either possess or control the properties comprising the estate of the Villasins. She prayed
for the probate court to: 1) order an immediate inventory of all the properties subject of the proceedings; 2) direct the tenants of the estate,
namely, Mercury Drug and Chowking, located at Primrose Hotel, to deposit their rentals with the court; 3) direct Metrobank, P. Burgos
Branch, to freeze the accounts in the name of Rosario, Primrose Development Corporation (Primrose) or Remedios; and 4) lock up the
Primrose Hotel in order to preserve the property until final disposition by the court.

On July 8, 2008, Remedios and Manuela filed their Comment/Opposition10 to the urgent manifestation averring that Marty was not an
adopted child of the Villasins based on a certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tacloban City, attesting that no record
of any adoption proceedings involving Marty existed in their records. They also argued that the probate court had no jurisdiction over the
properties mistakenly claimed by Marty as part of Rosario's estate because these properties were actually owned by, and titled in the
name of, Primrose. Anent the prayer to direct the tenants to deposit the rentals to the probate court, Remedios and Manuela countered
that the probate court had no jurisdiction over properties owned by third persons, particularly by Primrose, the latter having a separate
and distinct personality from the decedent's estate.

In her Reply,11 dated July 15, 2008, Marty cited an order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte (CFI Leyte) in SP No. 1239,12 claiming
that as early as March 3, 1981, the veil of corporate entity of Primrose was pierced on the ground that it was a closed family corporation
controlled by Rosario after Primo's death. Thus, Marty alleged that "piercing" was proper in the case of Rosario's estate because the
incorporation of Primrose was founded on a fraudulent consideration, having been done in contemplation of Primo's death.

Further, on July 22, 2008, in her Opposition to the Petition for the Approval of the Will of the Late Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan,13
Marty impugned the authenticity of her holographic will.

Meanwhile, Edwin Tiu (Edwin), a son of Remedios, also filed his Opposition,14 dated June 13, 2008.

After a protracted exchange of pleadings, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.

The January 14, 2009 Order

In its January 14, 2009 Order,15 the RTC-Br. 9 granted the motion of Marty and appointed the OIC Clerk of Court as special administrator
of the Estate. The Probate Court also ordered Mercury Drug and Chowking to deposit the rental income to the court and Metrobank to
freeze the bank accounts mentioned in the motion of Marty. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was applied in the case considering
that Rosario had no other properties that comprised her estate other than Primrose. According to the probate court, for the best interest
of whoever would be adjudged as the legal heirs of the Estate, it was best to preserve the properties from dissipation.

On January 22, 2009, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion for Inhibition16 on the ground of their loss of trust and confidence in RTC-
Br. 9 Presiding Judge Rogelio C. Sescon (Judge Sescon) to dispense justice. Later, they also filed their Motion for Reconsideration Ad
Cautelam,17 dated February 3, 2009, arguing that Rosario's estate consisted only of shares of stock in Primrose and not the corporation
itself. Thus, the probate court could not order the lessees of the corporation to remit the rentals to the Estate's administrator. With regard
to the appointment of a special administrator, Remedios and Manuela insisted that it be recalled. They claimed that if ever there was a
need to appoint one, it should be the two of them because it was the desire of the decedent in the will subject of the probation proceedings.

In its Order,18 dated March 27, 2009, the RTC-Br. 9 denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed its January 14,
2009 Order. The presiding judge, Judge Sescon, also granted the motion for inhibition and ordered that the records of the case be referred
to the RTC Executive Judge for reraffling. The case was later re-raffled to RTC-Br.6, Judge Alphinor C. Serrano, presiding judge.

Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for certiorari with the CA in Cebu City,
docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 04254, assailing the January 14, 2009 and March 27, 2009 Orders of the RTC-Br. 9.19

Ruling of the CA

In its October 16, 2009 Decision,20 the CA reversed the assailed orders of the RTC Br. 9, except as to the appointment of a special
administrator insofar as this relates to properties specifically belonging to the "Estate." It held that Primrose had a personality separate
and distinct from the estate of the decedent and that the probate court had no jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil.

According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed orders of the probate court was it stated that its determination of the title of the questioned
properties was only for the purpose of determining whether such properties ought to be included in the inventory. When the probate court
applied the doctrine of "piercing," in effect, it adjudicated with finality the ownership of the properties in favor of the Estate. The CA stated
that RTC-Br. 9 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of a property claimed by another based on adverse title; and that questions
like this must be submitted to a court of general jurisdiction and not to a probate court.

The CA added that assuming that the probate court's determination on the issue of ownership was merely intended to be provisional,
Marty's contentions still had no merit. The properties, which she claimed to be part of the estate of Rosario and over which she claimed
co-ownership, comprised of real properties registered under the Torrens system. As such, Primrose was considered the owner until the
titles to those properties were nullified in an appropriate ordinary action. The CA further stated that the RTC erroneously relied on the
order issued by the CFI Leyte in 1981, in the probate proceedings involving the estate of Primo. Whatever determination the CFI made
at the time regarding the title of the properties was merely provisional, hence, not conclusive as to the ownership.

By reason of the favorable decision by the CA, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion to Partially Revoke the Writ of Execution
Enforcing the January 14, 2009 Order of the Honorable Court and Manifestation in Compliance with the October 21, 2009 Order (Ad
Cautelam),21 dated October 27, 2009.
In its Order,22 dated November 17, 2009, the RTC-Br. 6 partially granted the motion as it revoked the power of the special administrator
to oversee the day-to-day operations of Primrose. It also revoked the order with respect to Mercury Drug and Chowking, reasoning out
that the said establishments dealt with Primrose, which had a personality distinct and separate from the estate of the decedent. In the
said order, Atty. Blanche A. Sa1ino nominated by oppositors Marty and Edwin, was appointed special administrator to oversee the day-
to-day operations of the estate. The same order also upheld the January 14, 2009 Order, as to the conduct and inventory of all the
properties comprising the estate.

This order was not questioned or appealed by the parties.

Omnibus Motion

On September 24, 2010, or almost ten (10) months after the November 17, 2009 Order of the probate court was issued, Marty, together
with her new counsel, filed her Omnibus Motion,23 praying for the probate court to: 1) order Remedios and Manuela to render an
accounting of all the properties and assets comprising the estate of the decedent; 2) deposit or consign all rental payments or other
passive income derived from the properties comprising the estate; and 3) prohibit the disbursement of funds comprising the estate of the
decedent without formal motion and approval by the probate court.

Ruling of the RTC-Br. 6

In its January 20, 2011 Order, the RTC-Br. 6 granted Marty's Omnibus Motion. Although it agreed with the October 16, 2009 CA Decision
reversing the January 14, 2009 Order of the RTC-Br. 9, nonetheless, it acknowledged the urgency and necessity of appointing a special
administrator. According to the probate court, considering that there was clear evidence of a significant decrease of Rosario's shares in
the outstanding capital stock of Primrose,24 prudence dictated that an inquiry into the validity of the transfers should be made. A final
determination of this matter would be outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court, but it was likewise settled that the power to
institute an action for the recovery of a property claimed to be part of the estate was normally lodged with the executor or administrator.
Thus, the probate court disposed:

WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforestated, and so as not to render moot any action that the special administrator, or the regular
administrator upon the latter's qualification and appointment, may deem appropriate to take on the matter (i.e. Whether or not to institute
in the name of the estate the appropriate action for the recovery of the shares of stock), this Court hereby GRANTS Oppositor Marty's
Omnibus Motion, dated September 24, 2010, and thus hereby:

1. DIRECTS petitioners, either individually or jointly, to: (a) RENDER AN ACCOUNTING of all the properties and assets comprising the
estate of the decedent that may have come into their possession; and, (b) DEPOSIT OR CONSIGN all the rentals payments or such
other passive incomes from the properties and assets registered in the name of Primrose Development Corporation, including all income
derived from the Primrose Hotel and the lease contracts with Mercury Drug and Chowking Restaurant, both within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this Order;

2. DIRECTS the Special Administrator to take possession and charge of the properties comprising the decedent's estate, specially those
pertaining to the sharesholding of the decedent in Primrose Development Corporation, to determine whether or not action for the recovery
of the shares of stock supposedly transferred from the decedent to petitioners Remedios Tiu, Manuela Azucena Mayor should be instituted
in the name of the estate against the said transferees and to submit a Report on the foregoing matters to this Court, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this Order; and,

3. ORDERS that no funds comprising the estate of the decedent shall be disbursed without formal Motion therefor, with the conformity of
the Special Administrator, duly approved by this Court.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary25cralawred [Underscoring supplied]


The partial motion for reconsideration of the above order filed by Remedios and Manuela was denied in the other assailed order of the
RTC--Br. 6, dated June 10, 2011.26

Dissatisfied, Remedios and Manuela availed of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, and filed a petition before the CA.

Action by the CA

The CA, however, in its October 5, 2011 Resolution,27 dismissed the same based on the following infirmities: 1) there was no proper
proof of service of a copy of the petition on the respondents which was sent by registered mail; 2) petitioners failed to indicate on the
petition the material date when the motion for reconsideration was filed; 3) the copy of the assailed order was not certified true and correct
by the officer having custody of the original copy; and 4) the serial number of the commission of the notary public, the province-city where
he was commissioned, the office address of the notary public and the roll of attorney's number were not properly indicated on the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

Remedios and Manuela moved for reconsideration of the assailed CA resolution, but to no avail, as the appellate court denied the motion
in its September 24, 2012 Resolution.

Hence, this petition before the Court, filed only by Manuela as Remedios had also passed away, and anchored on the following
GROUNDS

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED SECTION 13, RULE 13 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND DECLARED
THAT THERE WAS NO PROPER PROOF OF SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED JURISPRUDENCE AND RULE 65 AND IT HELD THAT PETITIONER
MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE MATERIAL DATE RULE.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER MAYOR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1, RULE 65 FOR FAILING TO ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL
COURT.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENT OF VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.

V.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT ALLOWED TECHNICALITIES TO BE USED TO DEFEAT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF
THE PARTIES.

VI.

PETITIONERS HAVE GOOD CAUSE AND A MERITORIOUS CASE AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENTS AS PARAGRAPH 1(B) OF
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE FIRST ASSAILED ORDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVERSED BECAUSE IT OVERTURNS
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED 16 OCTOBER 2009 WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.28
Petitioner Manuela argued that:
1)
There was actual compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The CA petition was accompanied by a notarized affidavit
of service and filing of registered mail. At the time the petition was filed, this was the best evidence of the service. The other registry
receipts for the other parties were also attached to the petition. Further, the available registry return card was furnished the CA in the
motion for reconsideration.29
2)
The failure of the petition to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates could be excused because the dates were evident from
the records.30
3)
The petitioner went to the RTC of Tacloban to secure certified true copies of the assailed orders. Only the stamped name of the Clerk of
Court, however, appeared thereon, because the particular branch had no stamp pad which had the phrase for certification. The branch
did not even have a typewriter in order to affix the phrase on the copies. These inadequacies could not be attributed to the petitioners.31
4)
The lack of information pertaining to the notary public in the verification and certification against forum-shopping should not invalidate the
same because, again, it was not attributable to the parties.32
5)
Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of a party.33
In its January 23, 2013 Resolution34 the Court ordered the respondents to file their respective comments. Marty, in her Comment, insisted
that the petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements as stated by the CA.35

In her Reply to Comment,36 petitioner Manuela clarified that the affidavit of service was executed on August 31, 2011, which was after
the petition was signed by the lawyers and after it was verified by the petitioner herself. After contesting Marty's arguments on the alleged
procedural infirmities of the petitions with the CA and this Court, Manuela asserted that the final and executory October 16, 2009 Decision
of the CA already held that Primrose had a personality separate and distinct from the estate of decedent Rosario.

Meanwhile, in his Manifestation,37 dated May 29, 2013, Edwin affirmed that he and Manuela decided to patch up their differences and
agreed to settle amicably. Accordingly, he manifested that he was withdrawing from the case pursuant to their agreement.

On June 18, 2014, Manuela filed her Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction38 on the
ground that a flurry of orders had been issued by the RTC-Br. 6 in the implementation of the assailed January 20, 2011 Order, such as
the Order,39 dated May 27, 2013, wherein the probate court vaguely ordered "the inventory of the exact extent of the 'decedent's estate.'"
Then another order was issued appointing an auditing firm to conduct an inventory/audit of the Estate including the rentals and earnings
derived from the lease of Mercury Drug and Chowking Restaurant, as tenants of Primrose.40 According to petitioner Manuela, although
an inventory of the assets of the decedent was proper, the probate court ordered an inventory of the assets of Primrose, a separate and
distinct entity. Manuela asserts that it was clearly in error.

In her Supplement to the Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,41 dated June 17, 2013,
Manuela informed the Court that the inventory and accounting of Primrose would already commence on June 19, 2013.

Marty filed her Opposition,42 dated July 3, 2013, stating that the petition of Manuela had been rendered moot and academic as the
probate court had declared her as the sole heir of Rosario and appointed her administrator of the estate. She argued that an injunctive
relief would work injustice to the estate because of the total assimilation by petitioner of the shareholdings of the decedent in Primrose
and her share in the corporation's income corresponding to her shareholdings.

Finding that the requisites for preliminary injunctive relief were present,43 the Court issued the TRO44 in favor of Manuela on October
14, 2013. At the outset, the Court was convinced that the rights of Primrose sought to be protected by the grant of injunctive relief were
material and substantial and the TRO was issued in order to prevent any irreparable damage to a corporate entity that could arise from
the conduct of an accounting by the court-appointed inventory.

The Court's Ruling

The Court now resolves the subject case by the issuance of a permanent injunction, as prayed for by petitioner Manuela. This position is
supported by law and jurisprudence, as follows:

First. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; and (2) a collection of property to
which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. This class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in
our law. Example is the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.45 From this pronouncement, it can be gleaned that the estate of the
deceased person is a juridical person separate and distinct from the person of the decedent and any other corporation. This status of an
estate comes about by operation of law. This is in consonance with the basic tenet under corporation law that a corporation has a separate
personality distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be connected.46

Second. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no relevant application in this case. Under this doctrine, the court looks at the
corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an aggregation of persons undertaking business as a group, disregarding the separate
juridical personality of the corporation unifying the group. Another formulation of this doctrine is that when two business enterprises are
owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties,
disregard the legal fiction that two corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical or as one and the same.47 The purpose
behind piercing a corporation's identity is to remove the barrier between the corporation and the persons comprising it to thwart the
fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use the corporate personality as a shield for undertaking certain proscribed activities.48

Here, instead of holding the decedent's interest in the corporation separately as a stockholder, the situation was reversed. Instead, the
probate court ordered the lessees of the corporation to remit rentals to the estate's administrator without taking note of the fact that the
decedent was not the absolute owner of Primrose but only an owner of shares thereof. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by
another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of
separate corporate personalities.49 Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing cannot be
presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly established.50

Third. A probate court is not without limits in the determination of the scope of property covered in probate proceedings. In a litany of
cases, the Court had defined the parameters by which a probate court may extend its probing arms in the determination of the question
of title in probate proceedings. In Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,51 the Court explained that, as a rule, the question of ownership was
an extraneous matter which the probate court could not resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should, or should not, be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. It is a well-settled
rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be part of the estate but which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. It can only determine whether they should, or
should not, be included in the inventory or list of properties to be overseen by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but
if there is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.52

In this case, respondent Marty argues that the subject properties and the parcel of land on which these were erected should be included
in the inventory of Rosario's estate. More so, the arrears from the rental of these properties were later on ordered to be remitted to the
administrator of the estate grounded on the allegation that Rosario had no other properties other than her interests in Primrose. To the
Court's mind, this holding of the probate court was in utter disregard of the undisputed fact the subject land is registered under the Torrens
system in the name of Primrose, a third person who may be prejudiced by the orders of the probate court. In Valera vs. Inserto:53 the
Court stated:
x x x, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction,
and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the
decedent, unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason
for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence
of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived.
xxxx

x x x These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedent's names but
in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule.54 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Thus, the probate court should have recognized the incontestability accorded to the Torrens title of Primrose over Marty's arguments of
possible dissipation of properties. In fact, in the given setting, even evidence purporting to support a claim of ownership has to yield to
the incontestability of a Torrens title, until after the same has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself. In other words, the
existence of a Torrens title may not be discounted as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. Put clearly, if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, "the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due
weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the
property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar,
possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title."55

Additionally, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152956 proscribes a collateral attack on a Torrens title:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In Cuizon vs. Ramolete,57 the property subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system. To this, Court
categorically stated:
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such
third persons of their possession and ownership of the property.58 x x x [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
A perusal of the records of this case would show that that no compelling evidence was ever presented to substantiate the position of
Marty that Rosario and Primrose were one and the same, justifying the inclusion of the latter's properties in the inventory of the decedent's
properties. This has remained a vacant assertion. At most, what Rosario owned were shares of stock in Primrose. In turn, this boldly
underscores the fact that Primrose is a separate and distinct personality from the estate of the decedent. Inasmuch as the real properties
included in the inventory of the estate of Rosario are in the possession of, and are registered in the name of, Primrose, Marty's claims
are bereft of any logical reason and conclusion to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.

Fourth. The probate court in this case has not acquired jurisdiction over Primrose and its properties. Piercing the veil of corporate entity
applies to determination of liability not of jurisdiction; it is basically applied only to determine established liability. It is not available to
confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in a case.59 This is so because the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only during the trial of the case after the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over the corporation. Hence, before this doctrine can be even applied, based on the evidence presented, it is imperative that
the court must first have jurisdiction over the corporation.60

Hence, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the court's process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction. Resultantly,
any proceedings taken against the corporation and its properties would infringe on its right to due process.

In the case at bench, the probate court applied the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil ratiocinating that Rosario had no other properties
that comprise her estate other than her shares in Primrose. Although the probate court's intention to protect the decedent's shares of
stock in Primrose from dissipation is laudable, it is still.an error to order the corporation's tenants to remit their rental payments to the
estate of Rosario.

Considering the above disquisition, the Court holds that a permanent and final injunction is in order in accordance with Section 9, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[i]f after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts
complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the
commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction." Undoubtedly, Primrose stands to suffer
an irreparable injury from the subject order of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

HACBANG VS. ALO

FACTS:

Facts:

A petition for the probate of Bishop Sofronio's will and the settlement of his estate was filed and was admitted thereafter to probate.
Petitioner however filed a petition to cancel the registration of the subject lot of the case because it was found out that it was registered
in the name of respondent.

The RTC dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to prosecute the case on the subject lot and noted that B ishop
Sofronio's will had already been admitted into probate; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in question. Though the settlement
proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio already designated his heirs; thus, the petitioners, who are neither compulsory nor
testamentary heirs, are not real parties in interest.
The CA in turn, affirmed the RTC's order of dismissal and held that the admission of Bishop Sofronio's will to probate precluded intestate
succession unless the will was intrinsically invalid or failed to completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the
settlement proceedings were not dismissed but archived; the will did not lose its validity merely because the proceedings were archived,
undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. The CA denied the petitioners' claim to a right of inheritance by representation and
cannot represent those who are hot entitled to succeed, thus, the denial paved the way for the petitioners to file the present petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. WON the lower court erroneously applied the provision of the present civil code to the will and estate of Bishop Sofronio. - YES

2. WON Bishop Sofronio died intestate. - NO

RULING:

1. At the outset, this Court observes that the parties and even the lower courts erroneously applied the provisions of the present Civil
Code to the will and the estate of Bishop Sofronio. The law in force at the time of the decedent's death determines the applicable law
over the settlement of his estate. Bishop Sofronio died in 1937 before the enactment of the Civil Code in 1949. Therefore, the correct
applicable laws to the settlement of his estate are the 1889 Spanish Civil Code and the 1901 Code of Civil Procedure.

In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are vested at the precise moment of the death of the
decedent. In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are vested at the precise moment of the
death of the decedent. Section 657 of the Spanish code provides:

Art. 657. Los derechos a la sucesion de una persona se transmiten desde el momento de su muerte. (Rights to the estate of a person
are transmitted from the time of his death.

The inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent's death without a moment's interruption. This provision was later on translated and
adopted as Article 777 of our Civil Code.

As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at the precise moment of death - not at the time
the heirs are declared, nor at the time of the partition, nor at the distribution of the properties. There is no interruption between the end of
the decedent's ownership and the start of the heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.

2. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937. He left half of his properties to his parents
and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due
execution and extrinsic validity.

Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of his estate, whether under the Spanish Civil Code or under the
present Civil Code.

This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone
capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes.
This provision was later translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil Code.

Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate succession has always been preferred over
intestacy. As much as possible, a testator's will is treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative. Hence,
there is no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.

CALALANG-PARULAN VS. GARCIA

PRINCIPLE:

It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we
proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles.
Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same
moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are
valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed
to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

FACTS:

In a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property, the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora
Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio,
through succession as the latter’s compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage was with their
mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this marriage, their parents acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from
their maternal grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to
register the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion Silverio.

On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who then gave birth to Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the respondents, it was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an
application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands.

On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
283321 was issued in the name of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. On December 27, 1989,7 Pedro Calalang died.

The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 arguing that the sale of the land was void because Pedro Calalang failed to
obtain the consent of the respondents who were co- owners of the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents were deprived of their respective shares by reason of the sale.

RULING:

NO! It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that
"[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we
proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles.
Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same
moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are
valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed
to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling
them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not
yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly
supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right to question the sale of
the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established
by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.20 The Complaint for Annulment
of Sale and Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.

Bar-type Question:

A, is the child of B and C. During the subsistence of B and C’s marriage, they acquired a parcel of land from C’s mother. Despite enjoying
the continued possession of the said land, B and C failed to register the same until the marriage was dissolved by reason of C’s death.
After some time, B contracted a second marriage with D. It was only during this time that B filed an application for free patent over the
parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Thereafter, B sold the land to Z. A new TCT was issued by reason of the sale to Z. A now filed
a case for the annulment of sale and reconveyance of the said property on the ground that his father deprived him of his respective share.
If you are the judge, would you grant the petition?

Suggested Answer:

No. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that
"[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we
proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles.
Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same
moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are
valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed
to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

Thus, it is only upon B’s death that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole
estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of B. And absent
clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious
donation inter vivos), A has no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of their
respective shares.

GARCIA-QUIAZON VS. BELEN


FACTS:

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are
Eliseo's common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom
Eliseo... was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.

Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated
to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of

Eliseo's marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter's marriage
with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters... of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth[4] signed by Eliseo as her father.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance
of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.[5] The petitioners asserted that as... shown by his Death
Certificate,[6] Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court,[7] the petition for settlement of... decedent's estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Piñas City.

In a Decision[8] dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting... the position taken by
the petitioners that Eliseo's last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision[10] rendered by the Court of Appeals

In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able... to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up
to the time of Eliseo's death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement... of Eliseo's estate, the Court of Appeals upheld
the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.

ISSUES:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND
THEREFORE[,] THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE [RTC] OF LAS PIÑAS

THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION[.]

RULING:

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the
RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death

Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the... terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."[15] In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or... place of abode.

As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for
the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime,... Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners' contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the... decedent
is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.[28]

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding...
on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings
of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good... grounds. It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.[29]
Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural... children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested
party within the purview of the law.

DE BELEN VDA. DE CABALU VS. TABU

FACTS:

Faustina Maslum (Faustina) was the original owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 16776. The land had a total area of 140,211
square meters. On December 8, 1941, Faustina died without any children. She left a holographic will, assigning and distributing her
property to her nephews and nieces. The said holographic will, however, was not probated.

Benjamin Laxamana was one of Faustinas heirs. He died in 1960. He had two heirs: his wife and his son, Domingo Laxamana (Domingo).
On March 5, 1975, Domingo executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Laureano Cabalu covering 9,000 square meters of the land inherited by
his father from Faustina.

On August 1, 1994, the legitimate heirs of Faustina executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession with Partition. The said deed imparted
9,000 square meters of the land covered by TCT No. 16776 to Domingo.

Thereafter, Domingo sold 4,500 square meters of the 9,000 square meters of the land to his nephew, Eleazar Tabamo. The remaining
portion was registered in Domingos name under TCT No. 281353.

On August 4, 1996, Domingo died. On October 8, 1996, or two (2) months after Domingos death, Domingo purportedly executed a Deed
of Sale of TCT No. 281353 in favor of Renato Tabu (Tabu). Tabu and his wife Dolores Laxamana subdivided the lot into two which
resulted to TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339.

Consequently, petitioners Milagros de Belen Vda. De Cabalu, Meliton Cabalu, Spouses Angela Cabalu and Rodolfo Talavera, and Patricio
Abus filed a complaint before the RTC seeking to declare TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339 as null and void. They averred that they were
the lawful owners of the subject property because it was sold to their father, Laureano Cabalu, by Domingo, through a Deed of Absolute
Sale, dated March 5, 1975.

The RTC declared the deeds dated March 5, 1975 and October 8, 1996 null and void. On appeal, the CA partially granted the petition
and deleted the RTCs decision declaring the October 8, 1996 null and void.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land covering the 9,000 square meter property executed by Domingo in favor
of Laureano Cabalu on March 5, 1975, is valid?
II. Whether or not the Deed of Sale dated October 8, 1996, covering the 4,500 square meter portion of the 9,000 square meter property,
executed by Domingo in favor of Renato Tabu, is null and void?

RULING:

Petition is partially granted.

CIVIL LAW: future inheritance; contractual capacity

FIRST ISSUE:

The CA did not err in declaring the March 5, 1975 Deed of Sale null and void.

Thus, and as correctly found by the RTC, even if Benjamin died sometime in 1960, Domingo in 1975 could not yet validly dispose of the
whole or even a portion thereof for the reason that he was not the sole heir of Benjamin, as his mother only died sometime in 1980.
Besides, under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law." Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. The law applies
when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract forms part of the
inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

In this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustinas will was not yet probated; the object of the contract, the 9,000 square meter
property, still formed part of the inheritance of his father from the estate of Faustina; and Domingo had a mere inchoate hereditary right
therein.
Domingo became the owner of the said property only on August 1, 1994, the time of execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Succession
with Partition by the heirs of Faustina, when the 9,000 square meter lot was adjudicated to him.

SECOND ISSUE:

The CA erred in deleting that portion in the RTC decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, null and void.

Regarding the deed of sale covering the remaining 4,500 square meters of the subject property executed in favor of Renato Tabu, it is
evidently null and void.The document itself, the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, readily shows that it was executed on
August 4, 1996 more than two months after the death of Domingo. Contracting parties must be juristic entities at the time of the
consummation of the contract. Stated otherwise, to form a valid and legal agreement it is necessary that there be a party capable of
contracting and a party capable of being contracted with. Hence, if any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of
its execution, such contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and, therefore, null and void by reason of its having been made after the
death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein. The death of a person terminates contractual capacity.

The contract being null and void, the sale to Renato Tabu produced no legal effects and transmitted no rights whatsoever. Consequently,
TCT No. 286484 issued to Tabu by virtue of the October 8, 1996 Deed of Sale, as well as its derivative titles, TCT Nos. 291338 and
291339, both registered in the name of Rena to Tabu, married to Dolores Laxamana, are likewise void.

MEDINA VS. CA

FACTS:

A decision was rendered against Arles Castares (Arles), now deceased and represented by his heirs, to pay damages for running over
and causing injuries to four-year old Wenceslao Mahilum, Jr. Petitioner Jose Medina (Medina) was the representative of the victim in the
said case. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied Arles two parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 and Tax Declaration
No. 1106.

When the heirs of Arles failed to settle their obligation, the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 was sold at public auction wherein
Medina emerged as the highest bidder. Medina applied for the registration of the said lot. However, Andres Castares (Andres), brother
of Arles and representing the heirs of the late Abundio Castares (Abundio), filed an opposition thereto. Andres claimed that after the death
of his father Abundio, Tax Declaration No. 1107 was cancelled and consequently, a tax declaration was issued in his favor. He insisted
that he is the rightful owner of the said portion of the land.

The RTC ruled in favor of Medina. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and it also noted that there has been no settlement yet of the
estate of Abundio and it was premature for Arles to have allocated unto himself a distinct portion of the lot as his share in the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Abundios heirs have an actual right over the lot in dispute?

RULING:

The petition is denied.

CIVIL LAW: heirs right of ownership over the properties of the decedent; tax declaration not sufficient proof of ownership

The appellate court is correct in stating that there was no settlement of the estate of Abundio. There is no showing that Lot 224 has
already been partitioned despite the demise of Abundio. It has been held that an heirs right of ownership over the properties of the
decedent is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. This means that the impending heir has yet
no absolute dominion over any specific property in the decedents estate that could be specifically levied upon and sold at public auction.
Any encumbrance of attachment over the heirs interests in the estate, therefore, remains a mere probability, and cannot summarily be
satisfied without the final distribution of the properties in the estate. Therefore, the public auction sale of the property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1107 is void because the subject property is still covered by the Estate of Abundio, which up to now, remains
unpartitioned. Arles was not proven to be the owner of the lot under Tax Declaration No. 1107. It may not be amiss to state that a tax
declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership.

CRUZ VS. CRUZ

FACTS:

On October 18, 1993, Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court in Manila a Complaint against her son, defendant-appellee
Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for "Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages."

Memoracion claimed that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased) Architect Guido M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of
land located at Tabora corner Limay Streets, Bo. Obrero, Tondo Manila; that sometime in July 1992, she discovered that the title to the
said property was transferred by appellee and the latter's wife in their names in August 1991 by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February
12, 1973; that the said deed was executed through fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void.
After Memoracion x x x finished presenting her evidence in chief, she died on October 30, 1996. Through a Manifestation, Memoracion's
counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court on January 13, 1997 of the fact of such death, evidenced by a certificate thereof.

For his part, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff's reconveyance action is a personal action which does
not survive a party's death, pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, and (2) to allow the case to continue would
result in legal absurdity whereby one heir is representing the defendant [and is a] co-plaintiff in this case.

On June 2, 1997, the trial court dismissed the case. The appeal of Memoracion, represented by Edgardo, was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Memoracion Z. Cruz's Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and
Damages is a purely personal action which did not survive her death; and

RULING:

NO! The Petition for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages survived the death of petitioner.

The criterion for determining whether an action survives the death of a petitioner was elucidated in Bonilla v. Barcena,[7] to wit:

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of
action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person
being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental.[8]

If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or petitioner. In Sumaljag
v. Literato,[9] we held that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to property and property
rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits
survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.

When a party dies during the pendency of a case, Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily applies:

Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall
be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address
of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days
from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified
period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the
estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

x x x Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations
of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is
the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the
heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings. When [plaintiff], therefore, died[,] her claim or right to the parcels of land x x x was not extinguished by her death but was
transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest
in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased
plaintiff.[10]

If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative fails to appear within a specified period, it
is the duty of the court where the case is pending to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator
for the estate of the deceased. The reason for this rule is to protect all concerned who may be affected by the intervening death,
particularly the deceased and his estate.

BALUS VS. BALUS

FACTS:

Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978,
while Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo,
Lanao del Norte (Bank). The said property was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788)

Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder
at a public auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale[3] was executed by the sheriff in... favor of the
Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984,
the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale[4] in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the... name of the Bank.

On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate[5] adjudicating to each of them a
specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also... contained
provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they
intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.

Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October
12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land[6] was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-39,484 was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.

On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had
already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still... refused to surrender
possession of the same to them.

The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the
provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from
the Bank.

The CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision, reversing and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to
immediately surrender possession of the subject property to the respondents. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did...
not redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title
in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished.

ISSUES:

Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank
and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.

RULING:

The Court is not persuaded.

Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject
property formed part of the estate of their deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by
petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing...
conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996.[12] Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale[13] was issued in favor of the Bank
on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new... title was issued in the Bank's name
before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the
lifetime of Rufo.

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.[14] In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of
the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have... accrued thereto since
the opening of the succession.[15] In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows
that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his... estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated
differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.

Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising
from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the...
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.

there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to continue with
their supposed co-ownership of the contested lot.

On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement would not, in any way, support petitioner's contention
that it was his and his sibling's intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and continue what they believed to be co-ownership...
thereof.
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between him and his siblings to continue what they thought was
their ownership of the subject property, even after the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of the said
Extrajudicial Settlement too far.

In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed
part of the estate of their deceased father.

Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of continuing with their supposed co-ownership is negated by no
less than his assertions in the present petition that on several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject property back, but
he refused to do so. In fact, he claims that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the same to him but he ignored
such offer.

In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the time of the execution thereof, the parties were not yet
aware that the subject property was already exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge on the part of petitioner...
and respondents that the mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the property was already transferred to the Bank does not give
them the right or the authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners of the disputed property

Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property
contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject
property... divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls
for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual
interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate
without supervision or interference from the other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective
which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.

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