TITLE: FABIAN V.

DESIERTO
G.R. NO. 129742 DATE: September 16, 1998
PONENTE: REGALADO, J TOPIC: SEC. 30 - OMB TO CA
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent
Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED)
when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office of the
Ombudsman. Respondent Agustin reportedly took advantage of his official position, charming the petitioner into
an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which the respondent gifted PROMAT
with projects and interceded for it concerning the same using his office.

However, Fabian and Agustin had a falling out, leading to an unpleasant and harsh relationship between
the two. When Petitioner tried to end the relationship, Agustin resisted and harassed and then threatened
petitioner with words of threat and violence.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Fabian then filed complaint seeking the dismissal of the respondent for violation of Sec. 19, RA No 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Sec. 36 of PD No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), charges referred to may be
subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.

Graft Investigator Benitez issued a resolution finding Agustin guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his
dismissal from his post and service. Respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved
the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the
penalty of suspension without pay for one year. When Agustin entered into a Motion of Reconsideration,
however, Ombudsman Desierto discovered that the former’s new counsel was his "classmate and close
associate" and inhibited himself. The case was the transferred to Respondent Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero who
eventually ruled in favour or Agustin.

Petitioner avers that the resolution initially issued while the respondents argue that the Office of the
Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution to promulgate its own rules or procedure. Fabian eventually
elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that as per Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the SC through a petition of certiorari.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or Not the Supreme Court may take cognizance of administrative disciplinary cases,
orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman.
HOLDING
NO. It is clear with Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated
therein is to be exercised over “final judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts composing
the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.

Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of
Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court.

The Constitution intended to vest in the Supreme Court a measure of control but strictly only over cases
under its appellate jurisdiction. To act otherwise would be a total disregard of the Constitutional provision
1
 and the spirit of legislation, enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, unnecessarily burdening the
same.
notes, if any:
SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.