Political Law; Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Powers; Diplomatic

Powers

The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with
the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to
the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed
by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of
increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law. [Sec. 20, Art. VII,
1987 Constitution]

The provision is clear, it allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no
prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments
are more onerous than others. This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and restrictions
that would unduly burden the powers of the President. [Constantino v. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064,
October 13, 2005]

As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the
sole authority to negotiate with other states. [Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July
6, 2005]

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. [Sec. 21, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution]

A treaty is defined as “an international instrument concluded between States in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments, and whatever its particular” [Bayan v. Executive Secretry, G.R. No. 138570, October 10,
2000]

International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international
agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and
traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of
executive agreement. [Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, G.R. No. L-14279,
October 31, 1961]“Treaties” as “international agreements entered into by the Philippines which require
legislative concurrence after executive ratification,” while “executive agreements” are “similar to treaties
except that they do not require legislative concurrence.” [Executive Order No. 459, section 2 (b) and (c)]
Having this distinction in mind, an agreement not between states is neither a treaty nor an executive
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agreement. Thus, a contract for the construction of a railway system between the North Luzon Railways
Corporation (NLRC) and China National Machinery and Equipment Corporation (CNMEC) is not an
executive agreement. The contract was not concluded between the Philippines and China. The NLRC
and CNMEC entered into the contract as entities with personalities separate from their governments. [
China National Machinery and Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012]

The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its citizens against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is committed by the Constitution to the
political branches. The Treaty of Peace with Japan barred future claims such as those asserted by
petitioners. The Executive Department has determined that taking up the cause of petitioners will be
inimical to the foreign policy interests of the country. [Vinuya v. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, April 28,
2010]

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Political Law; Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Powers; Military Powers

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. [Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution]

The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which
begins with the simple declaration that “[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines x x x” Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5,
Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute
authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the
ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which
may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. [Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006]
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The reason for this rule was best explained by the Court in another case, there it held that, “[I]t cannot be
gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be
circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed,
because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on
the maintenance of discipline within its ranks.” [Kapunan v. Villa, G.R. No. 83177, December 6, 1988]

The President also has the power of calling-out the military. In one case, President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 proclaiming a state of national emergency, this was supported by the
Solicitor General’s comment and Memorandum showing a detailed narration of the events leading to the
declaration. The Court held that absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the
President was justified in issuing the proclamation, calling for military aid. Indeed, judging from the
seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing
to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However,
Presidential Proclamatton1017 as declared unconstitutional insofar as it grants the President the
authority to promulgate decrees, because legislative power is peculiarly within the province of Congress.
[David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006]

When the President calls out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. The Court cannot overrule the
President’s discretion or substitute its own. The only criterion is that, “whenever it becomes necessary”,
the President may call out the armed forces. [Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No.
141284, August 15, 2000] In essence, the President has discretionary authority to declare a state of
rebellion. The Court may only look into the suffieciency of the factual basis for the exercise of the power.
However, mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected
rights. [Sanlakas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004]

The President also has the power to organize courts martial for the discipline of the members of the
armed forces, create military commissions for the punishment of war criminals. [Ruffy v. Chief of Staff,
G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946] But military tribunals cannot try civilians when civil courts are open
and functioning. [Olaguer v. Military Commision No. 34, G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987]

[see Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658 and G.R.No. 231771 and G.R. No. 231774, July 4,
2017]

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Judicial Review

Constitutional Basis

The power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article
VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)

[Francisco vs House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003]

Theory, Rationale, and Restrictions of Judicial Review

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because
the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the government. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936 cited in Francisco
vs House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003]

By virtue of this prerogative, the Supreme Court either checks or legitimates the acts of a coordinate
department, challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The decision rendered then, whether one of
approval or of rejection, of validity or of unconstitutionality, is controlling. [Mitra vs Comelec, G.R. No.
L-56503, April 4, 1981]

Requisites of Judicial Review

The Court's power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following
requisites are complied with, namely:

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(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

[See Montesclaros vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002]

A. Actual Case or Controversy

An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal
or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Stated otherwise, it is not the mere
existence of a conflict or controversy that will authorize the exercise by the courts of its power of review;
more importantly, the issue involved must be susceptible of judicial determination. Excluded from these
are questions of policy or wisdom, otherwise referred to as political questions. [Garcia v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009]

A justiciable controversy has been defined as, a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the
application of a law. Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and as a
rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in
cases that has become moot. Subject to certain well-defined exceptions courts will not touch an issue
involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that
has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity. [Cutaran vs DENR,
G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001]

Prematurity

In PACU vs. Secretary of Education [G.R. No. L-5279, October 31, 1955] the petition contesting the
validity of a regulation issued by the Secretary of Education requiring private schools to secure a permit
to operate was dismissed on the ground that all the petitioners have permits and are actually operating
under the same. The petitioners questioned the regulation because of the possibility that the permit
might be denied them in the future. The Court held that there was no justiciable controversy because the
petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation of the questioned regulation and therefore, they are
not entitled to relief. A mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education will withdraw the permit does
not amount to a justiciable controversy.

In Montesclaros vs. Comelec [G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002], the prayer to prevent Congress from
enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual
justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A
proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. There can be no
justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power
of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.

Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from
setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress
in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members
of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral
Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber
of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of
private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or
| Page 2 of 5
procedures of Congress.

Exceptions to mootness

As an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. [Pimentel vs Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005; Tolentino v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004 citing Acop vs. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July
2, 2002]

As a general rule, courts decline jurisdiction over cases rendered moot. However, courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, in the following situations:
(i) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(ii) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
(iii) when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public;
(iv) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
[see David vs Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006]

B. Proper Party

"Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. xxx Thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action. [Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004]

The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a person's
constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing.
[Jumamil vs.Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005]

[see also Joya vs PCGG, G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993; Agan vs PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May
5, 2003, CHR Employee's Association vs CHR, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004]

Citizen Standing

The mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right. [Chavez vs PEA AMARI, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002]

When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement
of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation
the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. [Tanada
vs Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985]

Voter's Standing

The Court has relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised its discretion to give due course to
voters' suits involving the right of suffrage. [Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004]

| Page 3 of 5
Taxpayer's Standing

Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds...A taxpayer need not be a
party to the contract to challenge its validity. [Jumamil vs. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005]

Association's standing

The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view
fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An association has standing to file suit
for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization
has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. x x x The [association] is the appropriate party to
assert the rights of its members, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. The
[association] is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. [Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines vs. (DOH) Health Secretary Francisco T. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034,
October 9, 2007]

An association has legal standing to to represent its members because the results of the case will affect
their vital interests. [Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco, G.R. No. 135092, May 4, 2006]

Exception to locus standi requirement: Transcendental importance

In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue
of transcendental significance or paramount importance to the people.

Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are procedural
matters. Considering the importance to the public of a suit assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, and
in keeping with the Court's duty, specially explicated in the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or
not the other branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the suit.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following determinants formulated
by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the
lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.
[Jumamil vs. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005][ see also David vs Arroyo, G.R. No.
171396, May 3, 2006]

C. Lis Mota of the case

The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question
is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case,
i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. [National Economic
Protectionism Association et al. vs. Ongpin, G.R. No. 67752, April 10, 1989]

Lis mota - the fourth requirement to satisfy before [the] Court will undertake judicial review - means that
the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case
| Page 4 of 5
can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The
petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional
question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. [Garcia v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009]

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Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Concepts; Judicial Review

Judicial review is the power of the Courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of
their conformity with the Constitution. The power is inherent in the Judicial Department, by virtue of the
doctrine of separation of powers. [Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political law (2009)] This is not an
assertion of superiority by the Courts over the other departments, but merely an expression of the
supremacy of the Constitution. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936].

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to
be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon. [Sec. 4 (2), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution]

Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts. [Sec. 5 (2), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution] Such
implies that lower courts can also exercise such power. In one case, the Supreme Court said that the
lower courts should not shy away from the task of deciding constitutional questions when properly raised
before them. [Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987] This was later
on affirmed in another case, where the Court held that, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review
not only in the Supreme Court but also in Regional Trial Courts. Furthermore, B.P. 129 grants RTCs the
authority to rule on the conformity of laws and treaties with the Constitution. [Mirasol v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001]

Requisites of Judicial Review

1. Actual case or controversy

2. Locus Standi
3. Question is raised at the earliest opportunity
4. Lis Mota of the case

Actual case or controversy means a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims which
can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. [Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 125532, July 10, 1998]. The controversy must be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal
relations of the parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interest. [John Hay
People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003] The issues raised in the
case must not be moot and academic, or because of subsequent developments, have become moot and
academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events. [Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004]

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Locus standi is defined as the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. [Black’s Law
Dictionary, 6th ed., 1991] In private suits, real party in interest rule governs. [Sec. 2, Rule 3, 1997
Rules of Court] A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefitted or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. [Salonga v. Warner Barnes, G.R. No.
L-2246, January 31, 1951]. The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits where the
plaintiff asserts a public right in assailing the validity of an official act, and he does so as a representative
of the general public. To establish legal standing, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and securing relief as a citizen or taxpayer. [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006]

A person has standing to challenge the validity of governmental act only if he has a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. [People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937] To put it differently, a citizen can
raise a constitutional question only if he can show the following: (1) that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998] Note, however, that when the subject in issue is of
transcendental interest to the public, the Court entertains the suit even if those suing do not have
personal and direct interest such that they stand to suffer harm. [Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No.
113375, May 5, 1994] The following maybe parties (a) Taxpayers, when public funds are involved [
Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004]; (b) Government of the Philippines, when
questioning the validity of its own laws [People v. Vera, supra]; (c) Legislators, when the powers of
Congress are being impaired [PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]; (d)
Citizens, when the enforcement of a public right is involved [Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April
24, 1985]. Thus, when a citizen questions the circulars issued by the Commission on Audit lifting the
pre-audit of government transactions of the national government agencies, government-owned and
controlled corporations, and local governments, he has standing to file the case since he would be
adversely affected by the illegal use of public money. [De la Llana v. Commission on Audit, G. R. No.
180989, 7 February 2012]

The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent
court that can resolve the same, such that, if not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the
trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. [Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No.
149036, April 2, 2002] However, in criminal cases, the question can be raised at any time at the
discretion of the court; in civil cases, the question can be raised at any stage of the proceedings if
necessary for the determination of the case itself; and in every case, except when there is estoppel, it
can be raised at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court. [Zandueta v. De la Costa, G.R. No.
L-46267, November 28, 1938]

The doctrine of separation of powers demand that proper respect be accorded to the other departments,
courts are loathe to decide constitutional questions as long as there is some other basis that can be
used for a decision. The constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the case. [De la Llana v. Alba, G.R.
No. L-57883, March 12, 1982] As an example, in a case where Fertiphil Corporation sought the refund
of the capital recovery component it had paid to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority levied under LOI
| Page 2 of 3
No. 1465 by challenging the validity of the LOI, the Supreme Court held that the issue of constitutionality
of the LOI was adequately pleaded in the complaint; it is the lis mota of the case because the trial court
cannot determine the claim without resolving the issue of constitutionality.[Planters Products v.
Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008] Note, however, that the Court will not pass
upon the question of constitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on
some other ground, such as the application of the statute or general law. [Ty v. Trampe, G.R. No.
117577, December 1, 1995] Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative. [Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004]

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Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Supreme Court; Procedural
Rule-Making

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. [Sec. 5 (5), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution]

The 1987 Constitution gave the Supreme Court, for the first time, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. More importantly, it took away the
power of the Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
Thus, for instance, the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by the Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled by Congress. [Baguio Market
Vendors v. Judge, G.R. No. 165922, February 26, 2010]

The rules must provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases; they
must be uniform for all courts of the same grade; and must not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. [Primicias v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953] Thus, a Supreme Court circular which
orders that appeals from decision of administrative agencies shall be filed with the Court of Appeals,
does not diminish, increase or modify the substantive right to appeal. It merely transferred the venue of
appeal and its period, which are procedural in character. [First Lepanto Ceramics, v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]

Because of this constitutional grant, it was held that it is within the competence of the Supreme Court, in
the exercise of its power to promulgate rules governing the enforcement and protection of Constitutional
rights and rules governing pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, to create a Special Division in
the Sandiganbayan which will hear and decide the plunder case of former President Estrada. [Re:
Request for creation of a special division, A.M. No. 02-1-09-SC, January 21, 2002].

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