Case Digest. Recent Jurisprudence. Republic of the Philippines vs. Espinosa, G.R. No. 186603, No.
No. The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the grant of
April 5, 2017
Land Registration Proceedings. In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of State ownership.
Reversion of property. Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine,
seeks to revert land back to the mass of the public domain. 34 It is proper when public land is
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations. 35 There are also instances
when we granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a “person obtains a title under
the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens
system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is of the
public domain
Remedial Law. The rules require that documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence after
the presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in
writing.4
Facts
A cadastral decree was issued in favor of Espinosa. The Original Certificate of Title was issued in the
name of Espinosa who later sold to Caliston which a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued.
The Sated through Regional Executive Director of the DENR filed a Complaint for annulment of title
and reversion of land with the RTC claiming the property is inalienable public land because it fell
within the timberland area.
RTC ruled in favor of the State and ordered reversion of the property.
CA ruled in favor of Espinosa and found that the State failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation when
she was issued the Original Certificate of Title. It further ruled that the State failed to prove that the
property is forest land. The lone piece of evidence consisting of LC Map No, 2978 was not
authenticated pursuant to Section 24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It noted that the parties stipulated
only as to the existence of the map, but not as to genuineness of truthfulness of its content. Assuming
that the map is admitted in evidence, Espinosa’s rights over the property, which accrued in 1962,
should not be prejudiced by a subsequent classification by the State done in 1986, or after 24 years.
Issue
Whether or not the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest land at
the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a title.
Held
the cadastral decree and issuance of title to Espinosa.
In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State
ownership. It must establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered is
alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government. 30 Since cadastral proceedings are
governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of
title are issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled
to the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is considered. 31 As such, the cadastral
decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership after proving these jurisdictional facts. 32
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently issued OCT
No. 191-N, the predecessor title of Caliston’s TCT No. 91117. Having been granted a decree in a
cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 33 This means that Espinosa, as the applicant,
was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and disposable property in
the cadastral proceedings.
This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the property if indeed it is part of
the inalienable lands of the public domain. The State may still do so through an action for reversion, as
in the present case.
Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to
the mass of the public domain.34 It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of
to private individuals or corporations.35 There are also instances when we granted reversion on grounds
other than fraud, such as when a “person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by
oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands
did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is of the public domain.” 36
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the
cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa’s favor. The argument for the State is
merely that the property was unlawfully included in the certificate of title because it is of the public
domain.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the State to prove
that the property was classified as timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa.37 To
reiterate, there is no burden on Caliston to prove that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land.38 At this stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston derived
her title, had already established that the property is alienable and disposable land considering that she
succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it. 39 In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there
was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the property in Espinosa’s title because it was of public
dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. 40
Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of evidence, the land classification map
prepared in 1986. The records show, however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not formally offered in
evidence. The rules require that documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence after the
presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing. 41
Due process requires a formal offer of evidence for the benefit of the adverse party, the trial court, and
the appellate courts.42 This gives the adverse party the opportunity to examine and oppose the
admissibility of the evidence.43 When evidence has notbeen formally offered, it should not be
considered by the court in arriving at its decision.44 Not having been offered formally, it was error for
the trial court to have considered the survey map. Consequently, it also erred in ordering the reversion
of the property to the mass of the public domain on the basis of the same.
Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted in evidence, this will not help to further the
State’s cause. This is because the only fact proved by the map is one already admitted by the State, that
is, that the land was reclassified in 1986. 45 This fact does not address the presumption/ conclusion that
Espinosa has, at the time of the cadastral proceedings conducted in 1955, proved that the land is
alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the decree issued in his favor in 1962.
At this juncture, we agree with the CA’s application of SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc.,50 which involved a
complaint for annulment of title and reversion of a lot covered by a free patent and original title. To
support its claim that the lot was part of the timberland and forest reserve, the State submitted as
evidence a photocopy of a land classification map. This map also became the basis of the testimonies
of City Environment and Natural Resources Office officers declaring that the lot falls within the
timberland or forest reserve. The State, however, failed to submit either a certified true copy or an
official publication of the map, prompting the trial court to deny its admission in evidence. After
proceedings, the trial court dismissed the complaint due to the State’s failure to show that the subject
lot therein is part of the timberland or forest reserve or has been classified as such before the issuance
of the free patent and the original title. The CA, relying on the map, reversed the trial court.
When the case was brought before this court, we reinstated the trial court’s decision. We held that the
photocopy of the land classification map cannot be considered in evidence because it is excluded under
the best evidence rule. We emphasized that all parties, including the Government, are bound by the
rules of admissibility and must comply with it-
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds true when the Government
is one of the parties. The Government, when it comes to court to litigate with one of its citizens, must
submit to the rules of procedure and its rights and privileges at every stage of the proceedings are
substantially in every respect the same as those of its citizens; it cannot have a superior advantage. This
is so because when a [sovereign] submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court and participates therein,
its claims and rights are justiciable by every other principle and rule applicable to the claims and rights
of the private parties under similar circumstances. Failure to abide by the rules on admissibility renders
the L.C. Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to show that the subject lot is part of the
forest reserve.51
he result would have been different had the State proved that the property was already classified as part
of forest land at the time of the cadastral proceedings and when title was decreed to Espinosa in 1962.
However, it failed to discharge this burden; the grant of title which carries with it the presumption that
Espinosa had already proved the alienable character of the property in the cadastral proceedings stands.
To grant the reversion based on a subsequent reclassification, more so on lack of evidence, would
amount to taking of private property without just compensation and due process of law. 53 This,
however, is not what our Constitution envisions; fairness and due process are paramount considerations
that must still be observed.54
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ July 25, 2008
Decision and February 4, 2009 Resolution are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Secretary of DENR vs Yap GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008
FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed
by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a
tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an
application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No.
705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore
making these lands alienable.
HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption
of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
Republic v. Munoz G.R No. 151910 October 15, 2007
FACTS: Respondent filed an application for registration of title of a parcel of land of 1,986 sq. Meters
before RTC of Albay. The application for registration, respondent averred that no mortgage or
encumberance of any kind affects the property that no other person has an interest, legal, on the subject
lot. The property was acquired by donation inter vivos, executed by spouses Apolonio Muñoz and
Anastacia Vitero on Nov. 1956 and the spouses and predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
thereof since time immemorial for more than 70 years.
On Nov. 1996, petitioner through the OSG opposed the application. Alleging that 1) the applicant nor
the predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto 2) the muniment/s of title and/or
the tax payment/s receipts of application, if any, attached to or alleged in the application do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bonafide acquisition of the lands, 3)that the claim of
ownership in gee simple on the basis of Spanish titleor grant can no loner be availed because it failed
to file for a period of 6 mos. from Feb. 1976 as required by PD 892 4) the parcel applied for is part of
public domain 4) filed beyond Dec. 31, 1987, which is filed out of time.
Respondent Answer to opposition, the said lot was originally owned and possessed by Puvinar and
Lozada. In April 1917, Pulvinar sold his share of the unregistered land to Sps. Muñoz and Vitero to
respondent’s parents. In June 1920, Lozada likewise sold his remaining part to the parents of
respondent. Ownership and possession of the property were consolidated by the spouses and declared
for taxation purposes in the name of Muñoz in 1920.It was stated that during cadastral survey
conducted in Lingao, Albay in 1928 the land was designated as Lot 2276 as per Survey Notification
Card issued to Muñoz dated Oct. 2, 1928. Finally, respondent contended that from 1920 up to 1996, the
time of application, the land taxes for the property had been fully paid.
During the trial, respondent, as sole witness, who was 81 years old,testified that he acquired the
property in 1956 when his parents donated the same to him. He presented the tax declaration for
payment of realty tax. A certification from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer was showed for
payment of real estate taxes from 1956 up to 1997. Declared that the property is residential with
improvements such as a house and fruit bearing trees. In 1957, he also constructed a concrete fence
surrounding the entire property and narrated that his childhood days. Also non of his sibling were
claiming interests over the property.
The trial court noted the report of the Director of Lands, the land in question was covered by Free
Patent application no. 10-2-664 of Anastacia Vitero. The RTC granted the application for registration.
On appeal, the petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject lot: 1)
the notice of initial hearing was not timely filed; 2) the applicant failed to present the original tracing
cloth plan of the property sought to be registered during the trial; and 3) the applicant failed to present
evidence that the land is alienable and disposable. The CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo, that
there was conclusive proof that the jurisdictional requirement of due notice had been complied with
under Sec. 24 PD 1529. Further the failure to present in evidence the tracing cloth plan of the subject
property did not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to act on the application in question. Lastly
CA ruled that respondent need not adduce document proof that the disputed property had been declared
alienableand disposable for the simple reason that the lot had once been covered by free patent
application; hence, this alone is conclusive evidence that the property was already declared by the
government as open for public dominion.Hence this petition.
ISSUE: (a) Whether or not, failure to present the original tracing cloth plan is a fatal omission? NO.
(b) Whether or not, that in proving the alienable and disposable nature of the property, there has to be a
certification from the DENR and CENRO (Community Environment and Natural Resources Office)?
YES
(a)The court has recognized instances of substantial compliance with this rule. It is true that the best
evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from the
Bureau of Lands, but blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification.
In the present application for registration, respondent submitted the supporting documents: 1) blueprint
copy of the survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands 2) technical description duly verified and
approved by the Director of Lands.
In Recto v. Republic, the blueprint copy of the cloth plan together with the lot’s description
duly certified as to their correctness by the Bureau of Lands are adequate to identify the land applied
for registration.
If the survey plan is approved by the Director of Lands and its correctness has not been overcome by
clear, strong and convince evidence, the presentation of the tracing cloth plan may be dispensed with.
All the evidence on record sufficiently identified the property as the one applied for by respondent and
containing the corresponding metes and bounds as well as area. Original tracing cloth plan need not be
presented in evidence.
(b)The CA said that the respondent need not to adduce documentary proof over the disputed property
since it has been declared alienable and disposable because it is covered by Free Patent Application
No. 10-2-664 in the name of respondent’s mother. It is proof enough that the property was declared by
the government as open for public disposition, the court cannot sustain the argument of respondent that
subject property was declared alienable and disposable land.
The court also noted that neither the Director of Lands nor the LRA attested that the land subject of
this proceeding is alienable or disposable.
Application for confirmation of imperfect title must be able to prove the following:
1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of public domain; 2)
that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
The Public Land Act remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, embodied in the Constitution, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the alienable public domain.
Under the jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express
or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land
should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by
law. In the present case, respondent failed to submit a certification from proper government agency to
prove that the land subject of registration is indeed alienable and disposable. A CENRO certificate,
which respondent failed to secure, could have evidence the alienability of the land involved.
Respondent failed to convince the court that the land applied for is alienable and disposable character.
The Court cannot approve the application
HELD: The instant petition is granted. Accordingly, the decision dated August 29, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58170, as reiterated in its resolution of January 29, 2002, is
reversed and set aside, and the application for registration filed by respondent Ludolfo V. Muñoz is
denied.
1. RURAL BANK OF ANDA INC V ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF LINGAYEN
DAGUPAN
FACTS:
The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley, Pangasinan.
Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot
739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imelda’s Park, while on Lot 739 is a
waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south
by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of Christians Seminary
(seminary) which is on Lot 1.
Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT
6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both
respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley
In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736
from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure was
already bothering the priests living in the seminary. The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings
in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day
In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was
being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of Binmaley,
Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the situation. Mayor
Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the Rural Bank of Anda
should be stopped.
On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and
restore the concrete fence. On20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the
construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to discuss
with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736.
On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction
and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan.
On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are valid.
HELD:
 The petition has no merit. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not
have title over Lot 736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management
Services in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to their
office. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736.
Since Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of
acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state
RATIO:
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and
waters of the public domain. Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: “All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
state.”
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior
grant from the government. Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley
exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are
void and consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank
of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void
Republic vs Naguiat
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
Facts:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan,
Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having
acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been
in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots
suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal
or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in
question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the
lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable
property.
Issue: Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain?
Held:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land. The issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land
in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or
possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like.
LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., ET AL. V. RAMOS
G.R. No. 127882 27 January 2004 Ponente: Carpio-Morales
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279
authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon
appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the
exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines
the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and
approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern
financial or technical assistance agreements.
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila
Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity
of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP
covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative
Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20,
1996.
 On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding
that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR
fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners'
letter.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and
null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in
DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as
unconstitutional and null and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining
Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
In January 2001, MMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold its whole
stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is
owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of
the FTAA in Sagittarius’ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. WMCP contends that the
annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides
for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned
corporations to exploit Philippine mineral resources. – YES.
ISSUE: W/N the FTAA between WMCP and the Philippines is a service contract. – YES.
RATIO:
First Issue:
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned
corporations to exploit Philippine natural resources. Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
retained the Regalian doctrine which states that “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State.” The same section also states that, “exploration and development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.”
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation,
development or utilization of natural resources. Y such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of
public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the
purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to
complete control by the concessionaire over the country’s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and
plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase “management or other forms of
assistance” in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only “technical and financial
assistance.” The management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary
feature of service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the
rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly
such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore RA 7942
is invalid insofar as said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
“financial and technical agreements” in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign
contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages
the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign
contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has in effect
conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation’s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the
State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the
constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged
in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus
dependent, conditional or connected must fall with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only
to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
2nd Issue:
The FTAA between WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the
agreement itself is a device contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP, a fully foreign owned corporation, the “exclusive
right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from
the contract area.” Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that WMCP shall provide “all
financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.”
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant
WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended
for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are
precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress.
Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that
these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing
in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely
gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession
by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the
right to alienate the same.
Alba vs. Dela Cruz G.R. No. 5246Posts Sept. 16, 1910
FACTS: The petitioners herein are the he only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato
Grey. The four petitioners, as co-owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have registered a parcel of
agricultural land in Bulacan. The petition was accompanied by a plan and technical description of the
said lot. After hearing the court, on Feb. 12, 1908, entered a decree directing that described in the
petition be registered in the names of the 4 petitioners.
On Jun, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR)
asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner
of the 2 parcels of land described in said motion and which he alleges to be included in the lands
decreed to the petitioners. He alleges that the decree of Feb. 12, 1908 was obtained maliciously and
fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands. For him, The petitioners
deliberately omitted to include in their registration his name as one of the occupants of the land so as to
be given notice of registration. He further alleged having inherited the 2 lots from his father,
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same (was duly inscribed in the old register of
property in Bulacan on April 6, 1895.)
He therefore asked a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two
parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after
hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties, rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its decision
modifying the former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto
Ratilla de la Cruz.
From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed.
The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee
in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No.
496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The
trial court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of
purchase of 1864.
ISSUE:
1. Did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had
been entered in February of the same year?
2. Whether or not,the petitioners did obtain the decree of Feb 12, 1908, by means of fraud.
HELD: The judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered
in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908.
1. The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the
ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud.
2. The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by
some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain, among other things, the names and
addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known.
The subject land was first rented to Baldomero de la Cruz by petitioners’ uncle Jose Grey and this
contract was duly executed in writing. (While the appellee admits that his father and brother entered
into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners’ land, nevertheless he insists that the
two small parcels in question were not included in these contracts)
The subsequent State grant was obtained by Baldomero after the death of the petitioners’ parents and
while he petitioners were minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee
was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented their application for
registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include
in their application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it
was not necessary nor required that they include in their application the names of their tenants.
Indeed, the Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice
by registered mail. However, this did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was
made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication “to all whom it may
concern.”Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the
[given] exceptions. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description “to all whom it may concern.”
As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections
101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.
NOTES:
1. The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible.
1. The element of intention to deprive another of just rights constitutes the essential
characteristics of actual – as distinguished from legal-fraud
1. Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice,
a proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not
encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over
the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would
do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who
were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
1. action in rem vs. action in personam:
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment
which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that
only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may
concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if
true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
5. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a
case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in
some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as
distinguished from constructive fraud
6. Advantages of the Torrens System:
1. It has substituted security for insecurity. law library
2. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from
months to days. law library
3. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage. law library
4. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the “three R’s” can transact his own
conveyancing. law library
5. It affords protection against fraud.
6. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding titles, but depreciated in ISSUE:
consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults.
(Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.) W/N Laura’s title over the disputed property is indefeasible since she has validly registered the
property under her name as evidenced by a Torrens title
G.R. No. 175485 July 27, 2011 CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT V. MATEO
FACTS: HELD:

The subject of this case is a registered parcel of land located in Barrio Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas City, Yes, Laura’s title is indefeasible and hence, the transfer of title in the name of Casimiro Development
that was originally owned by Isaias Lara, the respondent’s maternal grandfather. Upon the death of Corporation is valid and subsisting.
Isaias Lara in 1930, the property passed on to his children. In 1962, the co-heirs effected the transfer
The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title (OCT No. 6386 in the name of
of the full and exclusive ownership to Felicidad Lara-Mateo, one of the children of Isaias, under an
Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC became the registered owner by purchase from
agreement denominated as Pagaayos Na Gawa Sa Labas Ng Hukuman. Felicidad had five children,
China Bank. In all that time, neither the respondent nor his siblings opposed the transactions causing
namely: Laura, respondent Renato, Cesar, Candido, Jr. and Leonardo. With the agreement of the entire
the various transfers. In fact, the respondent admitted in his complaint that the registration of the land
Lara-Mateo family, a deed of sale covering the property was executed in favor of Laura, who, in 1967,
in the name of Laura alone had been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of the entire Lara-
applied for land registration. After the application was granted, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
Mateo family. It is unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully aware of the exclusive registration
6386 was issued in Laura’s sole name.
in her sister Laura’s name, allowed more than 20 years to pass before asserting his claim of ownership
In due course, the property now covered by OCT No. 6386 was used as collateral to secure a for the first time through this case in mid-1994. Making it worse for him is that he did so only after
succession of loans. The first loan was obtained from Bacoor Rural Bank (Bacoor Bank) which was CDC had commenced the ejectment case against his own siblings.
repaid by Laura. Laura later executed a deed of sale in favor of Pe, leading to the issuance of a new
There is no doubt that the land in question, although once a part of the public domain, has already been
title in the name of Pe, who in turn constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of China Banking
placed under the Torrens system of land registration. The Government is required under the Torrens
Corporation (China Bank) as security for a loan. In the end, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage, and
system of registration to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named in
consolidated its ownership of the property in 1985 after Pe failed to redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-
the certificate is the owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as
11749-A was issued in the name of China Bank. On March 4, 1993, CDC and China Bank executed a
thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. The Torrens system gives the registered owner
deed of absolute sale over the property. Resultantly, on March 29, 1993, CDC was issued TCT No. T-
complete peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not
34640 in its own name. On June 6, 1991, CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer in the MeTC
voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land. Yet, registration under the Torrens system, not
in Las Piñas City against the respondent’s siblings, namely: Cesar, Candido, Jr., and Leonardo, and the
being a mode of acquiring ownership, does not create or vest title. The Torrens certificate of title is
other occupants of the property. Therein, the defendants maintained that the MeTC did not have
merely an evidence of ownership or title in the particular property described therein. In that sense, the
jurisdiction over the action because the land was classified as agricultural; that the jurisdiction
issuance of the certificate of title to a particular person does not preclude the possibility that persons
belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). MeTC ruled in favour
not named in the certificate may be co-owners of the real property therein described with the person
of CDC. The RTC resolved against CDC, and held that the MeTC had acted without jurisdiction
named therein, or that the registered owner may be holding the property in trust for another person.
because the land, being a fishpond, was agricultural; hence, the dispute was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DARAB. On appeal, CA found in favour of CDC, declaring that the MeTC had The respondent’s suit is exposed as being, in reality, a collateral attack on the title in the name of
jurisdiction. This decision became final. Laura, and for that reason should not prosper. Registration of land under the Torrens System, aside
from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also
Nonetheless, on June 29, 1994, the respondent brought an action for quieting of title, reconveyance of
renders the title immune from collateral attack. A collateral attack occurs when, in another action to
four-fifths of the land, and damages against CDC and Laura in the RTC in Las Piñas City. On May 9,
obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action, an attack is made against the judgment
2001, the RTC held in favor of CDC. CA affirmed. The CA ruled that the decree of registration over
granting the title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment
the property is incontrovertible and no longer open to review or attack after the lapse of one (1) year
granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the
from entry of such decree of registration in favor of Laura.
enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under
the judgment had been disposed of.
Legarda vs. Saleeby G.R. No. 8936 October 2, 1915
FACTS: The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in
the city of Manila. There exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots.
Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, March 2, 1906, presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot, which decreed that the title of the plaintiffs
should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system.
Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
registration of the lot now occupied by him. On March 25, 1912, the court decreed the registration of
said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. The description of
the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
On December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate
granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately
presented a petitionin the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error
committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties.
The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that,
during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant’s land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
ISSUE: Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
HELD: The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of
the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all
parties who did not appear and oppose it
Granting that theory to be correct one , then the same theory should be applied to the defendant
himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting
the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost
hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration?
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) provides for the registration of titles
under the Torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties
relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the
owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the
earliest certificate is the owner of the land. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the
owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered,
transfers his original certificate to an “innocent purchaser.” The general rule is that the vendee of land
has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had,
only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of
the owner of the later certificate.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the
law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower courtshould be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises
as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued
in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Legarda vs Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; GR No. 8936, October 2, 1915
(Land Titles and Deeds – Purpose of the Torrens System of Registration)
Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the
strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six
years after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of
his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone
wall and the strip of land where it stands.
Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the
name of two persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can
be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the
earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to
any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in
the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.
CASE DIGEST: Borromeo vs Descallar
G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009
CAMILLO F. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O DESCALLAR, respondent.
FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love and live
together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names.
However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it was refused on the ground
that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently,
his name was erased but his signature remained and the property was issued on the name of the
Respondent alone. However their relationship did not last long and they found new love.
Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum
of money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of
assignment it found out that said land was registered in the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent for recovery of real property.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not transfer and assign
any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make his the owner
thereof.
RULINGS:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of
the properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to
construct the house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but his name was deleted in
the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in the
deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights,
interest and participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment.
Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation does
not help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to
marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to another
when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists
between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.
2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of
confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere possession of a title does not make
one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.
G.R. No. 202414 : June 4, 2014
JOSEPHINE WEE, Petitioner v. FELICIDAD MARDO, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent FelicidadMardo was granted a registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284, dated April 26,
1979, covering the Lot No. 8348, situated in Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite.
On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner Josephine Wee, through a Deed of
Absolute Sale a portion of the said lot known as Lot No. 8348-B, for a consideration of P250,000.00
which was fully paid. Respondent however refused to vacate and turnover the subject property
claiming that the alleged sale was falsified.
Petitioner file an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land claiming that she is the
owner of said unregistered land by virtue of a deed of absolute sale.
Respondent filed a Motion to dismiss the application alleging that the land described in the application
was different from the land being claimed for titling. The motion was however, denied. A motion for
reconsideration and second urgent motion for reconsideration were subsequently filed by respondent,
but both were denied by the RTC.
Upon presentation of evidence by the parties, the RTC granted the application of the petitioner.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC, hence, respondent
appealed to the CA.
The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the requirement of possession
and occupation under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her admission that the subject lot was not
physically turned over to her due to some objections and oppositions to her title suggested that she was
not exercising any acts of dominion over the subject property, an essential element in the requirement
and occupation contemplated under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.
Hence, this petition
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner is entitled to the subject property. Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the public auction sale of
the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002. Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled public auction
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained. sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and

CIVIL LAW: registration of title

Based on the legal paramaters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must sufficiently
establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Republic v. Manimtim, G.R. No. 169599, March 16, 2011

The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land. It was of the view that she could not have complied with the
requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 considering that she
admitted that it was not physically turned over to her.

A more important consideration, however, is that the subject land is already registered under OCT No.
OP-1840 (Patent No. 042118-03-6111) of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, under the name of
respondent Felicidad Mardo.

The Petition is DENIED.

DINAH C. CASTILLO v. ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, GR No. 171056, 2009-03-13

Facts:

Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel

Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner
discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla K.

Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters, situated at
Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.

Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to secure an Order[6] dated 4
March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
approving the application of Summit Point Golf &

Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by
"Perla K. Mortilla, et al." and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential, commercial, and
recreational uses.