REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMMAN
ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P.
INOCENCIO
FACTS:
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc.
(respondent), filed an application with the RTC for judicial
confirmation of title over two parcels of land, Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077 situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig,
Metro Manila.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC granted respondent's
application for registration. Thereafter, following the
required publication and posting, a scheduled hearing
was set. However, on May 30, 2002, only the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as
oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general
default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit
its comment/opposition to the respondent's application
for registration.
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the
respondent's application for registration, asserting that
the lots are not part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of
the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise
filed its Opposition,alleging that the respondent failed to
prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Respondent's witnesses showed that the respondent and
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The
respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from
Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares),
respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were
originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime
(Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of
crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired
farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the
said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who
continued to cultivate the lots until the same were
purchased by the respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject
properties are within the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the
respondent's application for registration should be denied
since the subject parcels of land are not part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it
pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic
Act No. 4850(R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the
Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary
elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form
part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga,
testifying for the oppositor LLDA, he found out that the
elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m.
That upon actual area verification of the subject
properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga
confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties
range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes,
who claimed that, based on the actual topographic
survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the
request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject
properties, contrary to LLDA's claim, are above 12.50 m.
The RTC granted the respondent's application for
registration of title to the subject properties. The RTC
found that the respondent was able to prove that the
subject properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject
properties are very much higher than the reglementary
elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of
Laguna Lake.
The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to
prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the subject properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. The CA likewise pointed out that the
respondent was able to present certifications issued by
the DENR, attesting that the subject properties form part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the RTC Decision
which granted the application for registration filed by
the respondent?
HELD:
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public
land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by
P.D. No. 1073.Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
second, that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To
prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, the
respondent presented two certifications issued by
Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. However, the said certifications presented by the
respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable.
In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,
578 Phil. 441 (2008).The Court clarified that, in addition
to the certification issued by the proper government
agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable,
applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of public domain as alienable and
disposable. They must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
records.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications
presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove
that the land is alienable and disposable.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds
that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence
to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject properties
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Cerquena testified for the respondents that the subject
properties were originally owned by Jaime who
supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since
1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject
properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold the
same to the respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving
assertions of the possession and occupation of the
subject properties by the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and
occupation of the subject properties required by Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must
be presented to substantiate the claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject of the application.
Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than
factual evidence of possession. Actual possession
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his
own property. Valiao v. Republic, G.R. No. 170757,
November 28, 2011.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute possession under claim of
ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from
the state. The possession of public land, however long
the period thereof may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the state, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years." Del Rosario
v. Republic of the Philippines, 432 Phil. 824.
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the
subject properties presented by the respondent were only
for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite
its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as
1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only
in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of
taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
ownership." Aide v. Bernal, G.R. No. 169336, March 18,
2010.
Republic v Sin
 G.R. No. 157485, March 16, 2014
Facts:
Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of the
late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel
of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington,
Aklan. On August 26, 1991, they respondent heirs
instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against
Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF) for recovery
of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of
ownership with damages claiming that the latter usurped
their rights over the property.
ANCF countered that the subject land was the subject of
Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos allocating the area of said property as civil
reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. The
ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the
subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not
susceptible of private ownership.
The respondents presented evidence that they inherited
a bigger parcel of land from their mother who acquired it
by virtue of a deed of sale. That in 1988 a potion thereof
was occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond for
educational purpose. Respondent heirs asserted that
they were previously in possession of the disputed land
in the concept of an owner. To prove possession,
respondents presented several tax declarations, the
earliest of which was in the year 1945.
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals
unanimously held that respondents retain private rights
to the disputed property by virtue of their and their
predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession amounts to an imperfect title, which should
be respected and protected.
Issue: Whether or not the claim of the respondents
amounts to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Held:
No. At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have
not filed an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property
Registration Decree. Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree provide the requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
by himself or through his predecessors–in–interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land
as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of
the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the
public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not
susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner
no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondent who
bears the burden to identify a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents
failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by
their predecessors–in–interest is inconsequential and
could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly,
respondents cannot be considered to have private rights
within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to
prevent the application of said proclamation to the
subject property.
NICOMEDES J. LOZADA, petitioner vs. EULALIA
BRACEWELL ET AL., respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner Nicomedes Lozada filed an application for
registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land
covered by Plan PSU-129514, which was granted by the
RTC-Makati City, acting as a land registration court. The
Land
Registration Authority (LRA) consequently issued a Decr
ee in the name of petitioner, who later obtained Original
Certificate of Titlecovering said parcel of land.
Subsequently, respondent James Bracewell filed a
petition for review of the decree ofregistration under
Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the “Property Registration Decree” before the
RTC-Las Pinas City, claiming that a portion of the
aforementioned Plan of which he is the absolute owner
and possessor, is fraudulently included in the earlier
mentioned Decree.
The RTC-Las Pinas City rendered a Decision finding that
petitioner obtained the Decree in bad faith. Accordingly,
it directed the LRA to set aside said Decree and ordered
petitioner to cause the amendment of the said Plan.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal before
the CA arguing mainly that the RTC-Las Pinas City had
no jurisdiction over a petition for review of a decree of
registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, which should
be filed in the same branch of the court that rendered the
decision and ordered the issuance of the decree.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC-Las Pinas,
finding that respondents were able to substantiate their
claim of actual fraud in the procurement of said Decree,
which is the only ground that may be invoked in a petition
for review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of
PDNo. 1529. It likewise held that, since the petition for
review was filed within one (1) year from the issuance of
the questioned decree and considering that the subject
lot is located in Las Pinas City, the RTC of said city had
jurisdiction over the case. With the motion for
reconsideration denied, petitioner thus sought relief
via the instant petition for review challenging primarily
the jurisdiction of the RTC-Las Pinas City.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC of Las Pinas City has jurisdiction over
the petition for review of the Decree.
RULING:
Yes, the RTC of Las Pinas City has jurisdiction over the
petition for review of the Decree. Under Act No. 496 or
the Land Registration Act, as amended, which was the
governing law at the time of the commencement by both
parties of their respective registration proceedings,
jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title
was conferred upon the RTCs of their respective
provinces in which the land sought to be registered is
situated. The land registration laws were updated and
codified under PD NO. 1529 and under Section 17
thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registrati
on is still vested on the RTC of the province or city wher
e the land is situated.
Basically, Section 32 of PD No. 1529 provides that any
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud may file in the proper Court of
First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and
after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration. As the land subject of this case is clearly
situated in Las Pinas City, the application for its original
registration should have been filed before the RTC-Las
Pinas City.
VALIAO vs REPUBLIC
PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in behalf of his
co-heirs LODOVICO, RICARDO, BIENVENIDO, all
Surnamed VALIAO and NEMESIO M. GRANDEA,
Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
MACARIO ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY, Respondents.
FACTS: On August 11, 1987, petitioners filed with the
RTC an application for registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros
Occidental.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors filed their Motion to
Dismiss the application on the following grounds: (1) the
land applied for has not been declared alienable and
disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the
application for registration; and (3) the application has no
factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application for registration.
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors'
Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.
In support of their application for registration, petitioners
alleged that they acquired the subject property in 1947,
upon the death of their uncle Basilio who purchased the
land from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed
of Sale dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in
Spanish language. Basilio possessed the land in
question from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947.
Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful,
adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the concept of
an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants as
co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966,
whenoppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently
dispossessed them of their property, which compelled
them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified
Theft against Zafra.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995,
granted petitioners' application for registration of the
subject property.
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the
Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin,
filed an appeal with the CA, which reversed the trial
court's findings in its Decision dated June 23, 2005.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Is the piece of land in question alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
HELD: Under Rule 45, the principle is well-established
that this Court is not a trier of facts and that only
questions of law may be raised. This rule, however, is
subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the
findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the
trial court. Due to the divergence of the findings of the CA
and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts and
evidence adduced before the lower courts.
Under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land forms
part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show
that the land in question has been classified as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain. In the absence
of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject
property is already classified as alienable and
disposable, we must consider the same as still
inalienable public domain. Verily, the rules on the
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and
until the land subject thereof is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
Heirs of Palanca vs Republic
Facts:
Petitioners acquired 2 pieces of lands by inheritance and
in a court decision they were declared as owners in fee
simple. 23 years later the Republic filed a petition to
annul the judgment and cancel the decree of registration
and title and to reverse the property to the State as
unclassified forest lands.
Issue:
The court ruled that the Executive Proclamation No. 219
classified these lands as a national reserve and it
appears that the said property was never released for
public disposition. At the time of the petitioner’s
predecessor’s occupancy, the land remained inalienable.
For a public dominion to be subject for a registration
proceeding, the government should exercise a positive
act to re-classify inalienable land to alienable for proper
disposition. In an application for a land registration of a
property of public domain, the applicant for land
registration must secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed (1) has been
possessed in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years and (2) alienable and disposable. Moreover,
action to recover property of public domain never
prescribes.
Secretary of DENR vs Yap
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian
Doctrine
GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008
FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the
petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and
ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a
tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No.
1801 precluded them from filing an application for a
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) opposed the petition countering that Boracay
Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public
forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant
to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore making
these lands alienable.
HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau
of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable
is required. In keeping with the presumption of state
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
that there must be a positive act of the government, such
as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
State as part of the inalienable public domain.
Borromeo v. Descallar
Facts:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met Antonietta Descallar
(respondent), a Filipina, while the former was working in
the Philippines sometime in 1983. The two became
sweetheart, and later cohabited as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
During their cohabitation, the two acquired some real
properties in the Philippines composed of several houses
and lots which they bought from Agro-Macro
Development Corporation. The deed of sale of said real
properties were placed in the name of both Jambrich and
Descallar as buyers, but were registered under the
Torrens system in the name of Descallar alone as
Jambrich is disqualified to own real properties in the
country. It is sufficiently established though that the funds
used to buy said properties came solely from Jambrich,
as Descallar has no sufficient source of income.
After their relationship has turned sour and the two went
their separate ways, Jambrich sold his rights and
interests in the Agro-Macro properties to Camilo
Borromeo (the petitioner), a Filipino, evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment. When Borromeo, the
buyer, tried to register the properties in his name, he
discovered that it is registered in the name of Descallar,
and that it has already been mortgaged.
Borromeo filed a complaint for recovery of real property
against Descallar.
Issues:
1. Having established that the true buyer of the disputed
properties was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what is
the effect of registration of the properties in the name of
respondent Descallar?
2. Whether the sale or assignment made by Jambrich to
Borromeo valid considering that the former as alien is
disqualified to own real properties in the Philippines?
Held:
1. The registration of the properties in question in the
name of Descallar does not make her the owner of the
said properties. “It is settled that registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of
confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world
at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The
mere possession of a title does not make one the true
owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that
respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her
name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely
make her the owner.” (Borromeo vs. Descallar, ibid.)
2. Given that aliens are disqualified to own real properties
in the country, “[t]herefore, in the instant case, the
transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development
Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have
been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich
conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino
citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v.
Sebastian (G.R. No. L-34672, March 30, 1988, 159
SCRA 446), the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a
number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or
transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction
is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid.”
Benin v. Tuason
Facts:
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and
possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands,
described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the
barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the
municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal,
that they inherited said parcels of land from their
ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same
from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their
predecessors in interest had possessed these three
parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully,
cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits
harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's
grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March
4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the
Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933
Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership
over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands
for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No.
2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or
sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter,
evacuees from Manila and other places, after having
secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their
houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually
served with summons. The other defendants were
ordered summoned by publication in accordance with
Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only
defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other
defendants were all declared in default.
HELD:
It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs
base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land
described in the complaint on their being heirs or
successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In
Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of
ownership over the two parcels of land described in their
complaint on their being the heirs and successors in
interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil
Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of
ownership of the one parcel of land described in their
complaint on their being the heirs and successors in
interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931. It will be noted
that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim
of ownership of the three parcels of land described in the
complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest of
Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the
plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two
parcels of land described in their complaint on their being
the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara
who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs
base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land
described in their complaint on their being the heirs and
successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.
Therefore, that the decision of this Court, which affirmed
the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin
and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) should
apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin, against
Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, respectively, but
also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We
find that the plaintiffs do not claim a right which is
different from that claimed by Elias Benin. Likewise, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 do not claim a right
different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil
Case No Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3623 do not claim a right different from that claimed by
Pascual Pili.
The court sited the Santiago case which states that,
(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not
personally notified of the registration proceedings that
resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of the
Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of
fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration
proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as against
the whole world and the decree issued therein is
conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands
registered, not only against those parties who appeared
in such proceedings but also against parties who were
summoned by publication but did not appear. The
registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest
freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever
character that existed against the lands prior to the
issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted in
the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law
(Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases
cited therein). In addition, there being no allegation that
the registered owners procured the non-appearance of
appellants at the registration proceedings, and very
much more than one year having elapsed from the
issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither
revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance
are obtainable any more.
The joint decision of the Court of First Instance,
appealed from, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Cayanan v. delos Santos
21 scra 1348
FaCTS:
On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to
Lot No. 56 of the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the
Hon. Arsenio Santos, then Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga. On December 16, 1958, a
petition for review was filed in the same proceeding
alleging that the said lot was registered in the name of
appellee De los Santos "through actual fraud, through
deceit and through intentional omission of facts" as a
result of which the aforesaid decision was rendered and
a decree of registration obtained on August 8, 1958.
Moreover, it was stated further that a simulated Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other
respondent, appellee Felix L. Camaya, on October 26,
1958, covering the said lot. The prayer was for the
opening of the decree of registration, the cancellation of
the Original Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer
Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor
of petitioners, now appellant Cayanan and others.
This petition was denied in the order of February 9,
1959, which is on appeal. It was the view of the lower
court: "Such being the case, as admitted by the
petitioners, even [if] the petition has been filed within one
(1) year after entry of final decree, the same cannot be
favorably acted upon for the reason that the questioned
lot has already been transferred to Felix L. [Camaya] in
accordance with section 38 of the Land Registration Act.
While it is true that the petition states that such transfer is
fictitious and, therefore, not for value and that Felix L.
[Camaya] is not an innocent purchaser, this question can
be properly threshed out in an ordinary civil action and
not in a simple petition, like the one at bar."
ISSUE:
whether or not the cadastral court acting as such could
likewise inquire into an allegation that the lot subject of
the decree was transferred in a simulated sale intended
to avoid such a review.
HELD:
It can and accordingly reverse the appealed order.
The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded by
Section 38 of Act 496 may be sought in 'the competent
Court of First Instance' is no sufficient indication that the
petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance,
exercising its general jurisdiction, considering the fact
that it is also the Court of First Instance that acts on land
registration cases. Upon the other hand, it has been held
that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral
case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and
that as long as the final decree is not issued and the
period of one year within which it may be reviewed has
not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which
court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or
decree and adjudicate the land to another."
As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office in accordance with
the law, and the period of one year fixed for the review
thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated
and the decision therein rendered continues to be under
the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
In Capio v. Capio, the ruling being to the effect "that the
adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case
does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree;
that as long as the final decree is not issued and the
period of one year within which it may be reviewed has
not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which
court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree
and adjudicate the land to another party."
The order was SET ASIDE and the case remanded to the
Court of First Instance for a hearing on the merits of the
petition of appellants for the reopening of the decree of
registration in favor of appellee Leon de los Santos.
Bautista-Borja vs Bautista
Facts:
The spouses Pablo Bautista (Pablo) and
Segundina Tadiaman Bautista (spouses Bautista) died
intestate in July 1980 and April 1990,
respectively. Pablo was the registered owner of several
agricultural lands situated in Ramon, Isabela totaling
around 30 hectares and in Llanera, Nueva Ecija totalling
17 hectares. They had five children,
namely: respondents Iluminada and Aurea, Francisco
(who died in 1981), Simplicio (who died in 1986), and
Natividad (petitioner).
Francisco was survived by six children,
namely: respondents Clarita, Florentino, Diosdado,
Francisco II, and Francisco III, and the now deceased
Arsenio, all surnamed Bautista.
Simplicio was survived by five children,
namely: respondents Danilo, Lorna, Luzviminda, Luz,
and Paulino, all surnamed Bautista.
By petitioner’s claim, respondents, through
fraud and deception, convinced her to take possession
and cultivate the above-stated parcels of land which
would eventually be partitioned; and that unknown to her,
however, the titles to the lands were cancelled by virtue
of Deeds of Sale purportedly executed on different dates
by her parents in favor of her siblings Simplicio and
Francisco, a fact which she came to know about only in
1994.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the deed of Sale is valid.
HELD:
The appellate court went on to hold that
petitioner was guilty of laches, and assuming that the
transfer of the properties in favor of respondents was
procured through fraud, still, her action should have been
filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
Hence, this petition, petitioner insisting that
since her cause of action is for annulment or declaration
of inexistent contracts, the provisions on void contracts,
specifically Arts. 1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code, apply,
hence, her cause of action had not prescribed, for under
Article 1410 of the Civil Code, “the action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.”
Further, petitioner contends that even if there be
implied trust, her cause of action has not prescribed
because it is anchored on the annulment of a void or
inexistent contract. Corollarily, she argues that if at all, a
“resulting trust” and not a “constructive trust” was
established in the case at bar, considering that she only
gave her consent to respondents upon their
representation that they were going to take possession
and cultivate the properties with the understanding that
they would later partition them among the legal
heirs. She thus contends that the rule on
imprescriptibility of actions to recover property held in
trust apply to resulting trusts, as in this case, so long as
the trustee has not repudiated the trust.
Petitioner furthermore alleges that the continued
assurances of respondents that partition proceedings
were just dragging on, despite their having already
transferred the titles in their names, is a clear indication
that they have not repudiated the resulting trust, the
requisites for which, as enunciated in Huang v. Court of
Appeals, not having been met. And she maintains that
while the registration of land under the Torrens system
operates as a constructive notice to the whole world, it
cannot be construed as being equivalent to a notice of
repudiation, for the same cannot be used as a shield for
fraud.
From the allegations in petitioner’s complaint, it
is clear that her action is one for declaration of the nullity
of the Deeds of Sale which she claims to be either
falsified ─ because at the time of the execution thereof,
Pablo was already gravely ill and bedridden, hence he
could not have gone and appeared before the Notary
Public, much less understood the significance and legal
deeds ─ and/or because there was no consideration
therefor. Clearly, following Article 1410 of the Civil Code,
petitioner’s action is imprescriptible.
But even if petitioner’s complaint were to be
taken as one for reconveyance, given that it is based on
an alleged void contract, it is just the same as
imprescriptible.
The petition was GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court
dismissing the case was REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987 April 29, 2009 en banc
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an
application for land registration before the RTC of
Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in
Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the
land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that
the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino
Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s
grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited
the property and divided it among themselves. But by
1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of
Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded
them in administering the properties, including Lot
9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo
Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during
trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by
the Community Environment & Natural Resources
Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the
subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable
or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as
such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3
December 2002, the RTC approved the application for
registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that
the property belonged to the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed
the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, should the land be
classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12,
1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at
any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in
character either because of its use or because its slope
is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to
the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject
land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands
based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession
since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands
should have been alienable and disposable during the
entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as
it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not only
with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable.
There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or
no longer retained for public service or the development
of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.
And only when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code
is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which
patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and
other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten
(10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to
establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over
the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish
that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to
their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they
presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they
cannot avail themselves of registration under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as
basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The classification of the subject property as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Manotok v. Barque
FACTS:
Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs
of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for
administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT
No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer L. Barque,
which was destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon
City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, sometime in 1988. In support of the
petition, petitioners submitted the owner’s duplicate copy
of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax receipts, tax
decla-rations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the
property.
Upon being notified of the petition for administrative
recon-stitution, private respondents (petitioners herein)
filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered
by the title under reconstitution forms part of the land
covered by their reconsti-tuted title TCT No. RT-22481,
and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of
petitioners’ predeces-sors-in-interest is spurious.
ISSUE:
Whether or not irregularly issued titles can be cancelled
by the LRA.
Held:
Respondents levied on a portion of the MAGRA to satisfy
the tax delinquency of PNOC-EDC. However, the land
being levied is classified as inalienable. It is owned by
the government and thus, cannot be sold at public
auction. Likewise, the machineries, equipment and other
infrastructures in the MAGRA cannot be levied and sold
at public auction because it is not the property that is
subject to the tax.
The personal liability for the tax delinquency, is generally
on whoever is the owner of the real property at the time
the tax accrues; where, however, the tax liability is
imposed on the beneficial use of the real property such
as those owned but leased to private persons or entities
by the government, or when the assessment is made on
the basis of the actual use thereof, the personal liability
is on any person who has such beneficial or actual use at
the time of the accrual of the tax.
In the case at bar, PNOC-EDC is the beneficial user,
however, since respondents cannot avail of the
administrative remedy through levy, they can only
enforce the collection of real property tax through civil
action.
PNOC-EDC also claims that the real property tax
assessment is not yet final and executory. It avers that
prior resort to administrative remedies before seeking
judicial remedies is not necessary considering that the
issue raised is purely a question of law. Consequently, it
need not appeal the assessment to the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals or to the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals as provided under Sections 22627
and 22928 of the LGC.
We disagree. It is well-settled in Systems Plus Computer
College of Caloocan City v. Local Government of
Caloocan City29 that all adminis-trative remedies must
be exhausted before availing of the judicial remedies.
Thus:
The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the
concerned administrative agencies and directly seek
redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a
supposedly pure question of law without violating the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Hence, when the law provides for remedies against the
action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in
the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only
after exhausting all remedies provided therein.
Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of the
courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail
of all the means afforded by the administrative
processes.
If PNOC-EDC was not satisfied with the assessment of
its property, it should have appealed to the Local Board
of Assessment Appeals within 60 days from receipt of
the written notice of assessment. Instead, it waited until
the issuance of a warrant of levy before it filed a petition
for injunction in the regional trial court, which was not in
accordance with the remedies provided in the LGC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court are
AFFIRMED insofar as it declared PNOC-EDC liable to
pay the real property tax accruing from its use of the
MAGRA. Respondents however are DIRECTED to
refrain from levying on the buildings, infrastructures and
machineries of PNOC-EDC to satisfy the payment of the
real property tax delinquency.
HERMOSILLA V. REMOQUILLO
FACTS:
Petitioners Heirs of Salvador Hermosilla, assail
the Court of Appeals’ Decision which reversed the trial
court’s decision in their favor and accordingly dismissed
their complaint.
On August 31, 1931, the Republic of the
Philippines acquired through purchase the San Pedro
Tunasan Homesite.
Apolinario Hermosilla (Apolinario), who was
occupying a lot in San Pedro Tunasan Homesite until his
death in 1964, caused the subdivision of the lot into two.
On April 30, 1962, Apolinario executed a Deed of
Assignment transferring possession of Lot 19 in favor of
his grandson, herein respondent Jaime Remoquillo
(Jaime). As the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) later
found that Lot 19 was still available for disposition to
qualified applicants, Jaime, being its actual occupant,
applied for its acquisition before the LTA on May 10,
1963.
On July 8, 1963, Apolinario conveyed Lot 12 to
his son Salvador Hermosilla (Salvador), Jaime’s uncle.
Salvador later filed an application to purchase
Lot 12 which was awarded to him by the defunct Land
Authority on December 16, 1971.
On February 10, 1972, Jaime and his uncle
Salvador forged a "Kasunduan ng Paglipat Ng Karapatan
sa Isang Lagay na Lupang Solar" (Kasunduan) whereby
Jaime transferred ownership (the questioned property) in
favor of Salvador.
After Apolinario died, his daughter Angela
Hermosilla filed a protest before the Land Authority,
which became the National Housing Authority (NHA),
contending that as an heir of the deceased, she is also
entitled to Lots 12 and 19. By Resolution of June 10,
1981, the NHA dismissed the protest.
The NHA later awarded on March 16, 1986 Lot
19 to Jaime for which he and his wife were issued a title,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-156296, on September
15, 1987.6
On May 25, 1992, petitioners filed an action for
Annulment of Title on the ground of fraud with damages
against Jaime and his spouse, together with the Register
of Deeds, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
alleging that by virtue of the Kasunduan executed in
1972, Jaime had conveyed to his uncle Salvador the
questioned property–part of Lot 19 covered by TCT No.
T-156296 which was issued in 1987.
The RTC found the Kasunduan a perfected
contract of sale, there being a meeting of the minds upon
an identified object and upon a specific price, and that
ownership over the questioned property had already
been transferred and delivered to Salvador.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
HELD:
An action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust prescribes in ten years. The ten-year prescriptive
period applies only if there is an actual need to
reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as
the real owner of the property also remains in possession
of the property, the prescriptive period to recover the title
and possession of the property does not run against him.
In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if
nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.11
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is undisputed that petitioners’ houses occupy
the questioned property and that respondents have not
been in possession thereof.12 Since there was no actual
need to reconvey the property as petitioners remained in
possession thereof, the action took the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, it having been filed to enforce an alleged
implied trust after Jaime refused to segregate title over
Lot 19. One who is in actual possession of a piece of
land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right.13 From the body of the
complaint, this type of action denotes imprescriptibility.
The Petition is Denied.
Ching v. Enrile
FACTS:
On September 5, 1985, petitioners purchased from a
certain Raymunda La Fuente a 370-square meter lot. La
Fuente delivered to petitioners a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale. with the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of
Title and thereafter, petitioners took physical possession
of the subject property.
For reasons known only to petitioners, the conveyance
was not registered in the Register of Deeds as prescribed
by Section 51 of PD 1529. Instead, on November 20,
1986, petitioners executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim
which was 8 reflected in the Memorandum of
Encumbrances
In the meantime, petitioners peacefully and continuously
possessed the subject property.
On August 19, 1988, three years after they purchased the
disputed property, petitioners received a Notice of Levy
on Attachment and Writ of Execution issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig in favor of
respondents, in Civil Case No. 54617 entitled Sps. Adolfo
Enrile and Arsenia Enrile v. Raymunda La Fuente.
On January 8, 1990, petitioners filed a Petition to
Remove Cloud on or Quiet Title to Real Property
asserting ownership of the disputed property.
On May 11, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment in favored
of petitioners
HELD:
Good faith, or the want of it, is capable of being
ascertained only from the acts of one claiming its
presence, for it is a condition of the mind which can only
be judged by actual or fancied token or signs.
It is beyond dispute that the property in question had
already been sold by La Fuente to petitioners on
September 5, 1985. Petitioners immediately took
possession thereof. When the Notice of Levy on
Attachment and when the Writ of Execution and
Certificate of Sale were inscribed in favor of
respondents, petitioners have been, since September 5,
1985, in actual, physical, continuous and uninterrupted
possession.
The law does not require a person dealing with the
owner of registered land to go beyond the certificate of
title as he may rely on the notices of the encumbrances
on the property annotated on the certificate of title or
absence of any annotation. Here, petitioners' adverse
claim is annotated at the back of the title coupled with the
fact that they are in possession of the disputed property.
To us, these circumstances should have put
respondents on guard and required them to ascertain the
property being offered to them has already been sold to
another to prevent injury to prior innocent buyers. A
person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which
would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man
is not an innocent purchaser for value. It is a well-settled
rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts
which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and
then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief
that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
Respondents were not purchasers in good faith and, as
such, could not acquire good title to the property as
against the former transferee.
The petition is GRANTED.
REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT
G. R. No.144057 January 17, 2005
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of
title which seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect
title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged
that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have
occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even
the government until she filed her application for
registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming
the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico
Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal
opposition to the petition.
The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of
the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on the
grounds that the property which is in open, continuous
and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit
could not have maintained a bona fide claim of
ownership since the subject land was declared as
alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980. The
alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree that the subject land be
first classified as alienable and disposable before the
applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.
RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed.
There are three requirements for registration of title,
(1) that the subject property is alienable and disposable;
(2) that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, and exclusive
possession and occupation, and; (3) that the possession
is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945.
There must be a positive act of the government
through a statute or proclamation stating the intention of
the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and
disposable. However, if there has been none, it is
presumed that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property and the possession of the land no
matter how long would not ripen into ownership through
acquisitive prescription.
To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the
construction of Section 14 (1) would render the
paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would
mean that all lands of public domain which were not
declared as alienable and disposable before June 12,
1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from
enforcing the said provision as it decides to reclassify
lands as alienable and disposable.
The land in question was found to be cocal in
nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now
over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but
confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence
agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the
continuous possession by her and her
predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.
AYOG VS. CUSI
No. L-46729 November 19, 1982
Aquino, J.
FACTS:
The Director of Lands, after a bidding, awarded to
Binan Development Co., Inc. a parcel of land situated in
Davao City with an area of 250 hectares on the basis of
its 1951 Sales Application. The occupants of the said
land were then ordered to vacate the same and remove
the improvements constructed thereon. Upon the refusal
of the occupants of the land, the corporation filed an
ejectment suit against them. The Director found that the
occupants entered the land only after it was awarded to
the corporation and could not be regarded as bona fide
occupants. On July 18, 1961, the corporation fully paid
the purchase price for the land. More than thirteen years
later, August 14, 1975, the Sales Patent was issued to
the corporation with a reduced area of 175.3 hectares.
The occupants, herein petitioners, contested that
the adoption of the Constitution, which took effect on
January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which render it
legally impossible to execute the trial court’s judgment of
awarding the land in question to the corporation. The
constitutional prohibition only allows lease of alienable
lands of public domain by private corporation or
organization which should not exceed to 1000 hectares
in area.
The Director of Lands pointed out that the
corporation had complied with the said requirements
long before the effectivity of the Constitution and that the
applicant had acquired a vested right to its issuance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to
the implementation of the trial court’s 1964 final and
executory judgment ejecting the petitioners.
RULING:
The constitutional prohibition has no retroactive
application to the sales application of Binan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a
vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
Constitution took effect.
A right is vested when the right to the enjoyment
has become the property of some particular person or
persons as a present interest, which has become fixed
and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy.
A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent
repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the
constitution of the State, except in the legitimate exercise
of the police power.
In Opinion No. 140, series of 1974, where the
applicant, before the Constitution took effect, had fully
complied with all his obligations under the Public Land
Act in order to entitle him to a sales patent, there would
seem to be no legal or equitable justification for refusing
to issue or release the sales patent. He should be
deemed to have acquired by purchase the particular
tract of land and to him the area limitation in the new
Constitution would not apply.
The corporation’s compliance with the
requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of
a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from
the public domain. The corporation’s right to obtain a
patent is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that
right without the due process.
Spouses ABRIGO vs. DE VERA
G.R. No. 154409
FACTS: Villafania sold a house and lot located
Pangasinan and Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go covered by
a tax declaration. ‘Unknown, however to Tigno-Salazar
and a Cave-Go, Villafania obtained a free patent over the
parcel of land involved.The said free patent was later on
cancelled by a TCT.
‘On Oct 16, 1997, Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, sold the
house and lot to the Spouses Abrigo.
‘On Oct 23, 1997, Villafania sold the same house and lot
to de Vera. De Vera registered the sale and as a
consequence a TCT was issued in her name.
De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages
against Spouses Abrigo before the MTC.
Spouses Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the
annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary
injunction, restraining order and damages Villafania.
The parties submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of
their agreement in the instant (RTC) case that neither of
them can physically take possession of the property in
question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the
ejectment case was dismissed.
The RTC rendered judgment approving the Compromise
Agreement submitted by the parties. In the said Decision,
Villafania was given one year from the date of the
Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and lot,
and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in
favor of Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go shall remain valid
and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the
premises without need of any demand. Villafania failed to
buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared
the lot in their name
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision awarding the
properties to Spouses Abrigo as well as damages.
Moreover, Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners and
private respondent] damages and attorney’s fees.
Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties
[appealed to the CA].
In its original Decision, the CA held that a void title could
not give rise to a valid one and hence dismissed the
appeal of Private Respondent de Vera. Since Villafania
had already transferred ownership to Rosenda
Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale
to De Vera was deemed void.The CA also dismissed the
appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no
sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.
On reconsideration found Respondent De Vera to be a
purchaser in good faith and for value. The appellate court
ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title
of her vendor and must thus be protected.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and
respondent has a better right to the property.
HELD: DE VERA
The petition is denied, and the assailed decision
affirmed.The present case involves what in legal
contemplation was a double sale. Gloria Villafania first
sold the disputed property to Tigno-Salazar and
Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn, derived their
right. Subsequently a second sale was executed by
Villafania with Respondent de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double
sale thus:
“Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to
the person who may have first taken possession thereof
in good faith, if it should be movable property.
“Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
“Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.”
There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with
respect to lands registered under the Torrens system.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and
respondent registered the sale of the property. Since
neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar
and Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the
Torrens system, they registered their respective sales
under Act 3344 For her part, respondent registered the
transaction under the Torrens system because, during
the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate
of title (TCT) covering the property.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must
be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land.
Since the property in dispute in the present case was
already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners’
registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective
for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v.
Court of Appeals,24 the Court upheld the right of a party
who had registered the sale of land under the Property
Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had
registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344. In
that case, the “priority in time” principle was not applied,
because the land was already covered by the Torrens
system at the time the conveyance was registered under
Act 3344. For the same reason, inasmuch as the
registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the
Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be
upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to
Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.
NAAWAN COMMUNITY RURAL BANK INC., vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 128573 | 2003-01-13
FACTS: How did the bank acquire the property?
On February 7, 1983, Guillermo Comayas obtained a
P15,000 loan from petitioner Bank using the subject
property as security. At the time said contract of
mortgage was entered into, the subject property was
then an unregistered parcel of residential land,
tax-declared in the name of a certain Sergio A. Balibay
while the residential one-storey house was tax-declared
in the name of Comayas.
Balibay executed a special power of attorney authorizing
Comayas to borrow money and use the subject lot as
security. For failure of Comayas to pay, the real estate
mortgage was foreclosed and the subject property sold
at a public auction to the mortgagee Naawan Community
Rural Bank as the highest bidder in the amount of
P16,031.35.
Meanwhile, on September 5, 1986, the period for
redemption of the foreclosed subject property lapsed and
the MTCC Deputy Sheriff of Cagayan de Oro City issued
and delivered to petitioner bank the sheriff's deed of final
conveyance. This time, the deed was registered under
Act 3344 and recorded in the registration book of the
Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
By virtue of said deed, petitioner Bank obtained a tax
declaration for the subject house and lot.
How did the Spouses Lumo acquire the property?
On April 30, 1988, a certain Guillermo Comayas offered
to sell to private respondent-spouses Alfredo and
Annabelle Lumo, a house and lot measuring 340 square
meters located at Pinikitan, Camaman-an, Cagayan de
Oro City.
Wanting to buy said house and lot, private respondents
made inquiries at the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City where the property is located and
the Bureau of Lands on the legal status of the vendor's
title. They found out that the property was mortgaged for
P8,000 to a certain Mrs. Galupo and that the owner's
copy of the Certificate of Title to said property was in her
possession.
Private respondents directed Guillermo Comayas to
redeem the property from Galupo at their expense,
giving the amount of P10,000 to Comayas for that
purpose. In the meantime, on May 17, 1988, even before
the release of Galupo's adverse claim, private
respondents and Guillermo Comayas, executed a deed
of absolute sale. On June 9, 1988, the deed of absolute
sale was registered and inscribed on TCT No. T-41499
and, on even date, TCT No. T-50134 was issued in favor
of private respondents.
After obtaining their TCT, private respondents requested
the issuance of a new tax declaration certificate in their
names. However, they were surprised to learn from the
City Assessor's Office that the property was also
declared for tax purposes in the name of petitioner
Naawan Community Rural Bank Inc.
The controversy
When the property was foreclosed by the Bank it
instituted an action for ejectment against Comayas
before the MTCC which decided in its favor. On appeal,
the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the
MTCC in a decision dated April 13, 1988.
On January 27, 1989, the Regional Trial Court issued an
order for the issuance of a writ of execution of its
judgment. The MTCC, being the court of origin, promptly
issued said writ.
However, when the writ was served, the property was no
longer occupied by Comayas but herein private
respondents, the spouses Lumo who had, as earlier
mentioned, bought it from Comayas on May 17, 1988
Alarmed by the prospect of being ejected from their
home, private respondents filed an action for quieting of
title which was docketed as Civil Case No. 89-138. After
trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision
declaring private respondents as purchasers for value
and in good faith, and consequently declaring them as
the absolute owners and possessors of the subject
house and lot.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn
affirmed the trial court's decision.
ISSUES:
1.) Who between the Bank and the Spouses Lumo has a
better right over the subject property in view of the
successive transactions executed by Comayas?
2.) Whether or not Spouses Lumo could be considered
as buyers in good faith?
The Ruling of the Court
Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides:
"…. Should it be immovable property, the ownership
shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property."
Private Respondents are buyers in good faith
The "priority in time" principle being invoked by petitioner
bank is misplaced because its registration referred to
land not within the Torrens System but under Act 3344.
On the other hand, when private respondents bought the
subject property, the same was already registered under
the Torrens System. It is a well-known rule in this
jurisdiction that persons dealing with registered land
have the legal right to rely on the face of the Torrens
Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need to
inquire further, except when the party concerned has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry.
Private respondents exercise the required diligence in
ascertaining the legal condition of the title to the subject
property so as to be considered as innocent purchasers
for value and in good faith.
Before private respondents bought the subject property
from Guillermo Comayas, inquiries were made with the
Registry of Deeds and the Bureau of Lands regarding
the status of the vendor's title. No liens or encumbrances
were found to have been annotated on the certificate of
title. Neither were private respondents aware of any
adverse claim or lien on the property other than the
adverse claim of a certain Geneva Galupo to whom
Guillermo Comayas had mortgaged the subject property.
But, as already mentioned, the claim of Galupo was
eventually settled and the adverse claim previously
annotated on the title cancelled. Thus, having made the
necessary inquiries, private respondents did not have to
go beyond the certificate of title. Otherwise, the efficacy
and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate of Title
would be rendered futile and nugatory.
Considering therefore that private respondents exercised
the diligence required by law in ascertaining the legal
status of the Torrens title of Guillermo Comayas over the
subject property and found no flaws therein, they should
be considered as innocent purchasers for value and in
good faith.
Held: Accordingly, the appealed judgment of the
appellate court upholding private respondents Alfredo
and Annabelle Lumo as the true and rightful owners of
the disputed property is affirmed.
GUARANTEED HOMES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARIA P. VALDEZ, (EMILIA V. YUMUL and
VICTORIA V. MOLINO), HEIRS OF SEVERINA P.
TUGADE (ILUMINADA and LEONORA P. TUGADE,
HEIRS OF ETANG P. GATMIN (LUDIVINA G. DELA
CRUZ (by and through ALFONSO G. DELA CRUZ),
HILARIA G. COBERO and ALFREDO G. COBERO)
and SIONY G. TEPOL (by and through ELENA T.
RIVAS and ELESIO TEPOL, JR.), AS HEIRS OF
DECEDENT PABLO PASCUA, Respondents.
Facts:
The descendants of Pablo Pascua filed a complaint (in
their complaint respondents alleged that Pablo died
intestate sometime in June 1945 and was survived by his
four children, one of whom was the deceased Cipriano)
seeking reconveyance of a parcel of land with an area of
23.7229 hectares situated in Cabitaugan, Subic,
Zambales with Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 404
in the name of Pablo. In the alternative, the heirs of
Valdez prayed that damages be awarded in their favor.
OCT No. 404 was attached as one of the annexes of
respondents’ complaint. It contained several annotations
in the memorandum of encumbrances which showed
that the property had already been sold by Pablo during
his lifetime to Alejandria Marquinez and Restituto
Morales.
It was further averred in the complaint that Jorge
Pascua, Sr., son of Cipriano, filed a petition before the
RTC of Olongapo City for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate of OCT No. 404. However, the RTC denied the
petition and held that petitioner was already the owner of
the land, noting that the failure to annotate the
subsequent transfer of the property to it at the back of
OCT No. 404 did not affect its title to the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the action is barred by the Statute of
Limitations, more than 28 years having elapsed from the
issuance of TCT No. T-10863 up to the filing of the
complaint, and that the complaint states no cause of
action as it is an innocent purchaser for value, it having
relied on the clean title of the spouses Rodolfo.
The RTC granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
The appellate court further held that the ruling of the
RTC that petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value is
contrary to the allegations in respondents’ complaint.
Hence, the present petition for review.
Issue:
The sole issue before this Court revolves around the
propriety of the RTC’s granting of the motion to dismiss
and conversely the tenability of the Court of Appeals’
reversal of the RTC’s ruling.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
It is well-settled that to sustain a dismissal on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action, the
insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the
face of the complaint, and the test of the sufficiency of
the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of
action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
Firstly, the complaint does not allege any defect with
TCT No. T-8242 in the name of the spouses Rodolfo,
who were petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest, or any
circumstance from which it could reasonably be inferred
that petitioner had any actual knowledge of facts that
would impel it to make further inquiry into the title of the
spouses Rodolfo.
Secondly, while the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole
Heir and Confirmation of Sales executed by Cipriano
alone despite the existence of the other heirs of Pablo, is
not binding on such other heirs, nevertheless, it has
operative effect under Section 44 of the Property
Registration Decree (SEC. 44. Statutory Liens Affecting
Title).
Lastly, respondents’ claim against the Assurance Fund
also cannot prosper. Section 101 of P.D. No. 1529
clearly provides that the Assurance Fund shall not be
liable for any loss, damage or deprivation of any right or
interest in land which may have been caused by a
breach of trust, whether express, implied or constructive.
Even assuming arguendo that they are entitled to claim
against the Assurance Fund, the respondents’ claim has
already prescribed since any action for compensation
against the Assurance Fund must be brought within a
period of six (6) years from the time the right to bring
such action first occurred, which in this case was in
1967.
The petition is GRANTED.