Criminologists On Terrorism and Homeland Security

CR IMINOLOGISTS ON TER ROR ISM
A ND HOMEL A ND SECUR IT Y
This volume presents eighteen original essays addressing what is widely

regarded as the most serious problem confronting America today and
for years to come – terrorism – from the unique perspective of criminol-
ogy. The chapters collected here address such issues as the prevention
of terrorism, the applicability of community policing and routine activi-
ties models of crime to the problem of terrorism, how to balance liberty
and security, and how to think about and manage the fear of terrorism,
as well as the coordination of federal and local efforts to prevent and
counter terrorism. Criminologists on Terrorism and Homeland Security will
interest anyone concerned about violence prevention in general and ter-
rorism in particular, as well as policing, prosecution, adjudication, sen-
tencing, and restorative justice.
Brian Forst joined the American University faculty after twenty years in
nonprofit research, including positions as research director at the Insti-
tute for Law and Social Research and the Police Foundation. He is the
author, most recently, of Terrorism, Crime, and Public Policy (Cambridge,
2009); After Terror (with Akbar Ahmed, 2005); Errors of Justice: Nature,
Sources, and Remedies (Cambridge, 2004); and The Privatization of
Policing: Two Views (with Peter Manning, 1999). He is a member of the
American University Senate and chairs the Department of Justice, Law,
and Society’s doctoral program. He is also a voting member of the
Sentencing Commission for the District of Columbia.
Jack R. Greene is Professor and former Dean of the College of Criminal

Justice at Northeastern University, where he led academic and research
programs focused on matters of criminology and justice policy (1999–
2008). He is one of the country’s leading scholars in the field of policing.
Greene has published five books, the two-volume Encyclopedia of Police
Science , and more than 100 research articles, book chapters, research
reports, and policy papers on matters of policing in the United States
and internationally. Professor Greene has consulted for various agencies
and organizations and is a Fellow of the Academy of Criminal Justice
Sciences.
James P. Lynch is Director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, on leave

from his position as Distinguished Professor at John Jay College in New
York. He is the coauthor of Understanding Crime Statistics (Cambridge,
with Lynn A. Addington); Understanding Crime Incidence Statistics: Why the
UCR Diverges from the NCS (with Albert D. Biderman); and Immigration the
World Over: Statutes, Policies, and Practices (with Rita J. Simon). Professor
Lynch has published in many journals, including Criminology, Journal of
Quantitative Criminology, and Justice Quarterly.
C A MBR IDGE STUDIES IN CR IMINOLOGY
Editors
Alfred Blumstein H. John Heinz School of Public Policy and Management,
Carnegie Mellon University
David Farrington Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge
Recent books in the series:

Legacies of Crime: A Follow-Up of the Children of Highly Delinquent Girls and Boys ,
by Peggy C. Giordano
Errors of Justice , by Brian Forst
Violent Crime , by Darnell F. Hawkins
Rethinking Homicide: Exploring the Structure and Process Underlying Deadly Situations ,
by Terance D. Miethe and Wendy C. Regoeczi
Situational Prison Control: Crime Prevention in Correctional Institutions , by Richard
Wortley
Prisoner Reentry and Crime in America , edited by Jeremy Travis and Christy Visher
Choosing White-Collar Crime , by Neal Shover and Andrew Hochstetler
Marking Time in the Golden State: Women’s Imprisonment in California , by Candace
Kruttschnitt and Rosemary Gartner
The Crime Drop in America (revised edition), edited by Alfred Blumstein and Joel
Wallman
Policing Gangs in America , by Charles M. Katz and Vincent J. Webb
Street Justice: Retaliation in the Criminal Underworld , by Bruce Jacobs and
Richard Wright
Race and Policing in America: Conflict and Reform , by Ronald Weitzer and
Steven Tuch
What Works in Corrections: Reducing Recidivism , by Doris Layton MacKenzie
Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives , edited by David Weisburd and Anthony
A. Braga
The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America , by Marie
Gottschalk
Understanding Crime Statistics: Revisiting the Divergence of the NCVS and UCR ,
edited by James P. Lynch and Lynn A. Addington
Key Issues in Criminal Career Research: New Analyses of the Cambridge Study of
Delinquent Development , by Alex R. Piquero, David P. Farrington, and Alfred
Blumstein
Drug-Crime Connections, by Trevor Bennett and Katy Holloway
The editors dedicate this book to the late Jean-Paul Brodeur, one of the
contributors who made the book possible. He was an extraordinary
scholar and friend, and a delight to work with: effective yet considerate,
profound yet accessible, responsive and prompt yet thorough. He was
an inspiring leader and a patient, reliable team player. A philosopher,
J.P. had the rare capacity to make serious points with a light touch. His
chapter is foundational, about how to reason in the face of complexity.
He has contributed significantly to this work; he has contributed more
fundamentally to our ability to think clearly.
Criminologists on
Terrorism and Homeland
Security
Edited by
Brian Forst
American University
Jack R. Greene
Northeastern University
James P. Lynch
John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
City University of New York
Cambridge University Press
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,
São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo, Mexico City
Cambridge University Press

32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, ny 10013-2473, usa
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521899451
© Cambridge University Press 2011
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2011
Printed in the United States of America
A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data

Criminologists on terrorism and homeland security / [edited by] Brian
Forst, Jack R. Greene, James P. Lynch.
p. cm. – (Cambridge studies in criminology)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 978-0-521-89945-1 (hardback)
1. Terrorism. 2. Terrorism – Prevention. 3. Internal security.
4. National security. I. Forst, Brian. II. Greene, Jack R.
III. Lynch, James P. (James Patrick), 1949– IV. Title. V. Series.
hv6431.c7624 2011
363.325–dc22 2010039405
isbn 978-0-521-89945-1 Hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or

accuracy of urls for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in
this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is,
or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Contents
About the Authors page ix

Preface xix
1. Introduction and Overview – Brian Forst,

Jack R. Greene, and James P. Lynch 1
part i nature of the problem
2. Manifestations of Aggression: Terrorism, Crime,

and War – David Klinger and Charles “Sid” Heal 17
3. The Etiology of Terrorism: Identifying, Defining,

and Studying Terrorists – Wayman C. Mullins
and Quint C. Thurman 40
4. Balancing Counterterrorism Strategies: Lessons

from Evolutionary Ecology – Bryan Vila and
Joanne Savage 66
5. Gangs, Crime, and Terrorism – G. David Curry 97
6. Women Terrorists – Rita J. Simon and Adrienne

Tranel 113
part ii strategies for intervention
7. Is Crime Prevention Relevant to Counterterrorism?

– Cynthia Lum and Christopher S. Koper 129
vii
viii contents
8. Implications of Opportunity Theory for Combating

Terrorism – James P. Lynch 151
9. Soldiers and Spies, Police and Detectives – Tomas

C. Mijares and Jay D. Jamieson 183
10. Community Policing and Terrorism: Problems

and Prospects for Local Community
Security – Jack R. Greene 208
11. Go Analyze! (Connecting the Dots) – Jean-Paul

Brodeur 245
12. Managing the Fear of Terrorism – Brian Forst 273
13. Should Profiling Be Used to Prevent

Terrorism? – A. Daktari Alexander 300
14. Federal-Local Coordination in Homeland

Security – Edward R. Maguire and William R. King 322
15. Liberty and Security in an Era of Terrorism – John

Kleinig 357
16. Regulating Terrorism – John Braithwaite 383
part iii thinking about tomorrow
17. Using Open Source Data to Counter Common

Myths about Terrorism – Gary LaFree 411
18. Criminal Justice and Terrorism: A Research

Agenda – Brian Forst 443
Index 461
About the Authors
A. Daktari Alexander is Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at

Seattle University. His primary research interests are in the fields
of juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice, police-juvenile interac-
tion, race, crime and justice, prisoner rehabilitation, and crimino-
logical theory (especially special and general strain theory and social
disorganization theory, and how these theories apply specifically to
race). Dr. Alexander earned his PhD in crime, law, and justice from
Pennsylvania State University in 2004 and was on the faculty of the
American University Department of Justice, Law, and Society from
2004 through 2006. Before attending graduate school, Dr. Alexander
worked as a legislative aide and was a political fundraiser for several
local, statewide, and national campaigns.
John Braithwaite is Federation Fellow with the Regulatory Institutions

Network, Australian National University, Canberra. He is the author
of numerous books and articles on restorative justice and on regu-
lation. The latest is Regulatory Capitalism (Edward Elgar, 2008). He
is also editor of the journal Regulation and Governance . He received
his PhD from Queensland University. His other works include
“Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry” (1984); Not Just
Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (1990); Crime, Shame and
Reintegration (1989); Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (2002);
Global Business Regulation (2000); Information Feudalism (2002); and
Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue (2005). His chapter in this volume is
a substantially revised and updated version of a 2005 essay published
in Current Issues in Criminal Justice.
ix
x about the authors
Jean-Paul Brodeur was Professor of Criminology and Director of the

International Center for Comparative Criminology at the University
of Montreal at the time of his untimely death on April 26, 2010. He
received degrees in philosophy from the Universities of Paris and
Montreal. In 1978, he was director of research for the Commission of
Inquiry into police operations in Québec. Since then he led numerous
other government research projects. He wrote several books and arti-
cles on the sociology of policing, including Comparisons in Policing: An
International Perspective (1995), Violence and Racial Prejudice in the Context
of Peacekeeping (1997), and How to Recognize Good Policing: Problems and
Issues (1998). He also published a frequently cited article on the study
of informants.
G. David Curry is Professor in the Department of Criminology

and Criminal Justice at the University of Missouri in St. Louis. He
earned his PhD in sociology from the University of Chicago in 1976.
He has focused extensively on organized violence over the course
of more than thirty years of research. His books include Confronting
Gangs: Crime and the Community (2002, with Scott Decker) and Sunshine
Patriots: Vietnam and the Vietnam Offender (1985). His articles and book
chapters deal with gangs and delinquency, military service, hate
crime, and domestic violence. Most recently he has been studying
programs that aim to reduce youth violence.
Brian Forst is Professor of Justice, Law, and Society at American

University’s School of Public Affairs, in Washington, DC. He came to
American University in 1992, after three years on the faculty at the
George Washington University. Prior to that, he was research director
at the Institute for Law and Social Research (1974–1985) and research
director at the Police Foundation (1985–1989). His research on polic-
ing, prosecution, and sentencing, the deterrent effect of the death
penalty, errors of justice, and terrorism is widely cited by scholars and
criminal justice practitioners. Recent books include Terrorism, Crime,
and Public Policy (Cambridge, 2009); Errors of Justice: Nature, Sources
and Remedies, named book of the year for 2006 by the Academy of
Criminal Justice Sciences (Cambridge, 2004); After Terror: Promoting
Dialogue Among Civilizations, coedited with Akbar Ahmed (Polity
about the authors xi
Press, 2005); and The Privatization of Policing: Two Views, coauthored

with Peter Manning (Georgetown University Press, 1999). He has BS
(statistics) and MBA (quantitative methods) degrees from UCLA,
and a PhD (information and decision systems) from the George
Washington University.
Jack R. Greene is Professor and former Dean of Northeastern

University’s College of Criminal Justice in Boston. He became dean
in 1999, having served as chair of graduate and undergraduate pro-
grams at Temple University’s Department of Criminal Justice and
director of Temple’s Public Service Management Institute. A 1973
magna cum laude graduate of Northeastern’s College of Criminal
Justice, Professor Greene is today recognized as one of the country’s
leading scholars of policing. He has published four books, five mono-
graphs, and dozens of journal articles and book chapters, and he has
consulted for numerous organizations, including the Philadelphia
and Los Angeles police departments, the Justice Department, the
National Institute of Justice, and the RAND Corporation.
Charles “Sid” Heal is a retired commander of the Los Angeles

Sheriff’s Department, with more than thirty years of service with
the department. Most of his law enforcement experience was in spe-
cial and emergency operations. He served also for thirty-five years
in the Marine Corps Reserve, including four combat tours. He is
the author of Sound Doctrine (Lantern Books, 2000) and more than
100 articles on various law enforcement topics. He holds a bach-
elor’s degree in police science from California State University,
Los Angeles; a master’s degree in public administration from the
University of Southern California; and a master’s degree in man-
agement from California Polytechnic University, Pomona. He is
also a graduate of the FBI’s National Academy and the California
Command College.
Jay D. Jamieson teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in the

Department of Criminal Justice at Southwest Texas State University.
He served in the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps and has law
enforcement and corrections experience in the states of Texas and
xii about the authors
Louisiana. Dr. Jamieson holds a BA degree in economics from the

University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee; and MA and PhD
degrees in criminal justice from Sam Houston State University in
Huntsville, Texas. Dr. Jamieson’s current research and publishing
interests include deviant behavior, comparative criminal justice, and
police problem solving.
William R. King is an Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at Sam

Houston State University in Texas. He received his PhD in crimi-
nal justice from the University of Cincinnati in 1998. His research
focuses on the application of organization theory to criminal jus-
tice. His published research has examined structure, innovation, and
inertia in criminal justice organizations.
John Kleinig is Professor of Philosophy at John Jay College of

Criminal Justice in New York and director of the Institute for
Criminal Justice Ethics there. He teaches also in the doctoral pro-
grams in philosophy and criminal justice at the City University of
New York Graduate Center. He received his PhD in philosophy in
1968 from the Australian National University. In 2004 he accepted
appointments in policing ethics at Charles Sturt University,
Australia, and in criminal justice ethics at the Centre for Applied
Philosophy and Public Ethics in Canberra, where he spends six
months each year. Since 1987 he has been editor of Criminal Justice
Ethics . He has authored six books, edited several others, and writ-
ten more than 100 articles and book chapters. Among his books
are Punishment and Desert (Nijhoff, 1973); Paternalism (Rowman &
Allanheld/Manchester University Press, 1984), which received the
1984 Annual Book Award from the Institute for Criminal Justice
Ethics, New York; Valuing Life (Princeton University Press, 1991);
and The Ethics of Policing (Cambridge, 1996). In 1990–1991, he was a
Fellow in professional ethics, in what was then called the Program in
Ethics and the Professions at Harvard University. In 1997–1998, he
was Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Fellow at The University Center
for Human Values of Princeton University. Support for his essay
in this volume was provided by the National Science Foundation
(Research Grant #0619226).
about the authors xiii
David Klinger is Senior Research Scientist at the Police Foundation

in Washington, DC, and Associate Professor of Criminology and
Criminal Justice at the University of Missouri in St. Louis. Professor
Klinger worked as a patrol officer for the Los Angeles and Redmond
(WA) police departments. He received his BA in history from Seattle
Pacific University, an MS in Justice from American University, and a
PhD in sociology from the University of Washington. He has written
numerous scholarly articles, book chapters, and encyclopedia entries
that address arrest practices, the use of force, how features of com-
munities affect the actions of patrol officers, and terrorism. His book
on police shootings, Into the Kill Zone: A Cop’s Eye View of Deadly Force ,
was published by Jossey-Bass in 2004.
Christopher S. Koper is Director of Research at the Police Executive

Research Forum, a police membership and research organization
based in Washington, DC. He holds a PhD in criminology and crim-
inal justice from the University of Maryland and has worked for
several universities and research organizations, including PERF,
the University of Pennsylvania, the Urban Institute, the RAND
Corporation, and the Police Foundation. He has directed or codi-
rected numerous projects for the U.S. Department of Justice and
written extensively on issues related to policing, firearms, research
methods, and federal crime prevention. Dr. Koper is also a research
associate of the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George
Mason University and a former scholar in residence of the Firearm
and Injury Center at the University of Pennsylvania.
Gary LaFree is Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice and

Director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. He received his
PhD in sociology from Indiana University in 1979. Before joining the
faculty at Maryland, Dr. LaFree served as the Chair of the Sociology
and Criminology Department at the University of New Mexico and
as the Director of the New Mexico Criminal Justice Statistics Analysis
Center. He was appointed by the governor of New Mexico to chair the
State Crime and Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council. Dr. LaFree
received the G. Paul Sylvestre Award for outstanding achievements
xiv about the authors
in advancing criminal justice statistics in 1994, and the Phillip Hoke

Award for excellence in applied research in 1994 and 1998 from the
Justice Research Statistics Association. LaFree has written more than
sixty articles and book chapters and three books, including Losing
Legitimacy: Street Crime and the Decline of Social Institutions in the United
States (1999).
Cynthia Lum is Deputy Director, Center for Evidence-Based Crime

Policy in the Department of Criminology, Law and Society at George
Mason University. Within the center, she directs its Evidence-Based
Policing Research Program. She has published numerous articles and
book chapters on policing, evidence-based crime prevention, evalua-
tion research and methods, democratization and justice systems, crime
and place, and counterterrorism. She received her PhD in criminol-
ogy and criminal justice from the University of Maryland in 2003.
James P. Lynch is Distinguished Professor at the John Jay College of

Criminal Justice in New York City. He came to John Jay after twenty
years on the faculty at American University’s Department of Justice,
Law, and Society in Washington, DC. Professor Lynch received his
master’s and PhD degrees from the University of Chicago and his
bachelor’s degree from Wesleyan University in Connecticut. He
has written extensively on the measurement of crime, including
Understanding Crime Incidence Statistics: Why the UCR Diverges from the
NCS , coauthored with Albert Biderman (Springer), and Understanding
Crime Incidence Statistics: Revisiting the Divergence of the UCR and NCVS ,
coedited with Lynn Addington (Cambridge). He is also author of
numerous articles and book chapters on theories of victimization risk,
international comparisons of crime and sentencing, immigration,
and the role of coercion in social control.
Edward R. Maguire is an Associate Professor in the Department of

Justice, Law, and Society at American University in Washington, DC.
He received his PhD in criminal justice from the University at Albany
in 1997. His professional interests cover a wide range, but most of his
work focuses on three topics: police organizations, violent crime, and
social science measurement. He has written or edited three books
About the authors xv
and more than thirty articles and chapters on these and related
themes. He has been on the faculty at George Mason University and
the University of Nebraska and held positions at the U.S. Department
of Justice and the United Nations.
Tomas C. Mijares is Professor of Criminal Justice at Texas State

University. He joined the university in 1991, after retiring from the
Detroit Police Department. He earned his PhD from the University
of Michigan and a master’s degree from the University of Detroit
while serving as a full-time police officer assigned to tactical opera-
tions. He has also served as a member of the training advisory com-
mittee for the Texas Tactical Police Officers Association. He is the
lead author of The Management of Police Specialized Tactical Units (C.C.
Thomas, 2000). His research has been published in more than thirty
articles in professional and academic journals. He was a commenta-
tor for The History Channel and appeared as an expert witness on
law enforcement tactics in the Branch Davidian civil trial.
Wayman C. Mullins is Professor of Criminal Justice and director of

graduate studies at Texas State University. He has published many
books, book chapters, and articles on criminal justice policy and
research methods, and several on terrorism and crisis manage-
ment, including Crisis Negotiations: Managing Critical Incidents and
Hostage Situations in Law Enforcement and Correctional Settings (with
M. J. McMains, Anderson Press, 1996, 2001); Terrorist Organizations
in the United States: An Analysis of Issues, Organizations, Tactics, and
Responses (Charles C. Thomas, 1988); and “Prosecuting Domestic
Terrorists: Some Recommendations” (with T. C. Mijares) in H. W.
Kushner (editor), The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium
(Sage, 1998). Professor Mullins received his PhD from the University
of Arkansas in 1983.
Joanne Savage is Associate Professor in the Department of Justice, Law,

and Society at American University, where she teaches courses on the
history and philosophy of criminology and justice research methods.
She has published numerous articles and book chapters, as well as two
recent books: The Development of Persistent Criminality (Oxford, 2009)
xvi About the authors
and Sentencing Handbook: Sentencing Guidelines in the Criminal Courts

(coedited with Anthony Edwards, The Law Society, 2009). Professor
Savage is an authority on a variety of criminological topics, in partic-
ular, violent crime (cross-national variation in crime rates, gun con-
trol, the role of the family in the development of violent behavior, the
impact of violent television and film viewing on violent crime rates,
etc.). Her interest in interdisciplinary integrational theory and empiri-
cal research has drawn her to collaborate in the development of Bryan
Vila’s general evolutionary-ecological paradigm and in the empirical
evaluation of its consequent lagged nurturance hypothesis.
Rita J. Simon is University Professor at American University, with joint

appointments in the Department of Justice, Law, and Society in the
School of Public Affairs and at the Washington College of Law. She
received her PhD in sociology from the University of Chicago in 1957.
Professor Simon has been on the faculty of the University of Chicago
and the University of Illinois. She has also taught as a visiting Professor
at Hebrew University. Professor Simon is the author or editor of sixty-
five books covering topics as diverse as immigration, law, women’s
issues, and transracial and intercountry adoption. She has edited the
American Sociological Review and Justice Quarterly and is currently edi-
tor of Gender Issues. In 1968, she received a Guggenheim Fellowship.
Professor Simon is President of Women’s Freedom Network. In 2000,
she established The Shula Ankary Foundation.
Quint C. Thurman is Professor of Criminal Justice and Department

Chair at Texas State University–San Marcos. He was previously on
the faculty at Washington State University–Spokane and Wichita
State University. His publications include seven books and more than
thirty-five refereed articles. His recent book credits include Police
Problem Solving (2005, with Jay Jamieson) and Community Policing in a
Rural Setting (2005, with Edmund McGarrell). He earned his PhD in
sociology from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in 1987.
Adrienne Tranel is an attorney with the law firm of Kator, Parks

and Weiser in Washington, DC, and a member of the Maryland and
District of Columbia bars. Her areas of practice are civil rights, civil
About the authors xvii
service, employment, and general litigation at the administrative,

trial, and appellate levels. Ms. Tranel clerked in the Superior Court for
the District of Columbia upon graduating cum laude from American
University Washington College of Law. Ms. Tranel has published
articles on international law in the American University International
Law Review.
Bryan Vila is a professor of criminal justice at Washington State

University and director of the Operational Tasks Simulation Lab in
its Sleep and Performance Research Center. Prior to joining WSU,
he directed Crime Control and Prevention Research for the U.S.
Department of Justice for three years and was an associate professor
at the University of Wyoming and the University of California. Before
he became an academic, Dr. Vila served in Vietnam as a U.S. Marine,
then as a law enforcement officer for seventeen years – including
nine years as a street cop and supervisor with the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department, six years as a police chief helping the emerging
nations of Micronesia develop innovative law enforcement strate-
gies, and two years in Washington, DC, as a federal law enforcement
officer. He has published three books – Tired Cops: The Importance of
Managing Police Fatigue, The Role of Police in American Society, and Capital
Punishment in the United States – and several dozen research articles.
His fourth book, Micronesian Blues, was published in fall 2009.
Preface
DESCR IPTION, R ATIONA LE , A ND SCOPE
This is a book of original essays addressing what is widely regarded

as the most serious problem confronting America today and for years
to come – terrorism – from a unique perspective: that of criminol-
ogy. The literature on terrorism is framed typically from a geo-
political perspective and using ethnographic narratives, based on
case studies that provide essential information about specific terror-
ist groups, their agendas, how they operate, and how they arise from
and influence external political forces. Although scholarly and use-
ful, these conventional approaches to thinking about terrorism over-
look a well-developed body of knowledge on the nature and sources
of aggression generally and crime in particular, and what can be
done to prevent both. The criminological perspective thus provides
a potentially useful complement to the standard literature on terror-
ism. Criminology has amassed a rich body of literature ranging from
individual motivations toward crime and antisocial behavior, small-
group dynamics in cultivating and reinforcing deviant subgroups,
organized and networked crime syndicates and their use of technol-
ogy to create and exploit criminal opportunities, and more broadly
defined cultural orientations toward the social order. Criminology
has also studied policies and programs to prevent and respond to
crime, as well as ones aimed at mitigating the consequences of crimi-
nal behavior. This book explores the prospect of putting this alterna-
tive perspective to service to help understand terrorism and develop
policies to prevent or mitigate its effects.
xix
xx preface
Terrorism is, to be sure, an extraordinary manifestation of aggres-

sion and crime. Still, it has more in common with conventional forms
of crime than is widely acknowledged. Like crime generally, terrorism
is produced predominantly by young, alienated males with little stake
in legitimate society, operating typically in small groups. It is geo-
political, but it is also a crime in the jurisdictions in which it occurs.
It is no coincidence that the burden of protecting the public against
hostile aggressors has shifted from the Department of Defense and
the military to the Department of Homeland Security and the police.
In important ways all terrorism is local in terms of impact. The cen-
tral organizing principle of the book follows this essential logic:
Effective programs have been developed to prevent acts of crime

based on our understanding of its sources, and we have done lit-
tle to ask the extent to which this body of knowledge is relevant to
the problem of terrorism and, to the extent that it is not relevant,
what is needed to fill the information gaps so that terrorism can
be prevented and, when acts of terrorism do penetrate the shield
of prevention, societies can respond to and recover from it more
effectively.
This book aims to fill that void. Its chapters are organized in three
parts. The first part focuses on the nature of terrorism and what it
has in common with, and how it differs from, aggression generally
and crime in particular. The second part addresses strategies and
policies for intervening against terrorism, with a focus on means of
preventing it by protecting targets and intervening against aspiring
terrorists. The third part looks forward, asking what sort of data and
thought are needed to advance our body of knowledge on the prob-
lem of terrorism.
HOW THIS BOOK A DVA NCES THINK ING

A BOUT TER ROR ISM
Although this anthology takes a distinctly criminological perspec-

tive, it is nonetheless fairly broad and applied, with the intent of mak-
ing the material accessible to students of criminology and criminal
justice. It is directed at students and teachers, scholars and practitio-
ners alike interested in such issues as the prevention of terrorism, the
preface xxi
applicability of community policing and routine activities models of

crime to the problem of terrorism, how to balance liberty and secu-
rity, and how to think about and manage the fear of terrorism, as
well as the coordination of federal and local efforts to prevent and
counter terrorism.
It is a collection of readings by some of the world’s most respected
criminologists, designed for the classroom, for scholars, and for prac-
titioners and policy makers. It can serve as a primary or complemen-
tary text for undergraduate and graduate courses in criminology and
criminal justice policy and administration, and as an academic contri-
bution to criminology and the already large and rapidly growing field
of terrorism studies. It should also be of interest to researchers on
violence prevention, policing, prosecution, adjudication, sentencing,
and restorative justice.
The Editors
chapter one
Introduction and Overview

brian forst, jack r. greene, and james p. lynch
INTRODUCTION
The spectacular attack on the United States on September 11, 2001

brought with it an explosion of books and articles on terrorism in
both the academic and popular print media. These writings have
focused on political and religious aspects of terrorism; the vulnerabil-
ity of domestic targets; intangibles like the ethics of preemptive wars
to remove governments that support terrorism and ethical aspects
of conducting the War on Terror and defending the homeland; and
sensational tangibles: dominant figures like Osama bin Laden and
Saddam Hussein; bombings of buildings, trains, buses, places of wor-
ship, and public markets; assassinations, videotaped beheadings, and
other carnage. These vivid images and narratives on terrorism occu-
pied center stage in the presidential election campaigns of 2004 and
2008 and have dominated discussions at the United Nations and other
international forums, as well as in major news media venues.
Vivid images and sensational narratives capture the public’s atten-
tion, but they stifle the objective, comprehensive discussion essential
to the process of informed democratic choice and the preservation
of legitimacy of governmental action. The accumulated writings and
discussions on terrorism have been strikingly deficient in one impor-
tant respect: Although often acknowledging that acts of terror are
acts of crime in most places where they occur, most writings overlook
the substantial body of pertinent knowledge that has been produced
over the past several decades by criminologists and criminal justice
scholars on the nature and sources of crime and aggression, and what
1
2 introduction and overview
works to prevent crime and intervene effectively against it. This book
aims to help address that deficit.
Terrorism – the use of force against innocent people, usually with
a political or religious motive, and typically aimed at producing
widespread fear – is fundamentally an extreme form of aggression.
Criminologists may not speak with the same authority as political
scientists on political aspects of terrorism, but terrorism manifests
in every civil society as crime. We would do well to attempt to under-
stand how assessments of policies aimed at preventing terrorism and
responding to it can benefit from the substantial body of knowledge
that has accumulated on the causes of aggression and crime – and
how terrorism differs from other expressions of aggression and types
of crime. In doing so, we can be aware of the limits of knowledge
about aggression generally and establish programs for building a
coherent and comprehensive base of knowledge about terrorism. The
more fundamental aspects of terrorism related to aggression may in
fact be more powerful and useful in helping us understand terrorism
and terrorists than the political and religious explanations that have
dominated the discussion to date.
OVERVIEW
The book is organized in three sections. The first addresses the nature
of terrorism and what it has in common with – and how it differs
from – aggression generally and crime in particular. The second
section addresses strategies and policies for intervening against ter-
rorism, with a focus on means of preventing it by protecting targets
and intervening against aspiring terrorists. The third section takes a
forward-looking perspective, asking: What sorts of data and thinking
are needed to advance what we currently know about the problem of
terrorism?
Any discussion of terrorism cannot escape the vexing definitional
question: Precisely what is terrorism? The simple fact is that there is no
single universally agreed-upon definition of “terrorism” or “terrorist”.
We have provided a fairly general definition – again, the use of force
against innocent people with a political or religious motive, typically
aimed at producing widespread fear – but we must emphasize that
introduction and overview 3
this does not settle the matter. Indeed, several of the chapters that
follow consider alternative definitions of terrorism, and each arrives
at a slightly different place. This might be unsatisfactory for an agency
with a particular responsibility for terrorism, but the consideration of
alternative definitions is a question of central interest to any thought-
ful inquiry into terrorism, same as with crime in general. Thorough
understanding of terrorism and the effects of responses to it must
include an inquiry into how agents responsible for protecting against
terrorism choose among alternative definitions of terrorism, how
those choices affect agency behavior, and how alternative interven-
tion strategies affect terrorism in different ways. Several of the chap-
ters address these questions, and it is both interesting and useful to
see what results from the various approaches.
In the next chapter, David Klinger and Charles “Sid” Heal set a
foundation for the volume by noting fundamental commonalities and
distinctions among various forms of aggression: crime, terrorism, and
warfare. They observe that indiscriminate use of the term “terrorism”
obfuscates meaningful discussion and jeopardizes the prospects for
effective policy. Klinger and Heal then draw on a range of examples –
from interpersonal conflict to conflicts between nation states – to
examine how different manifestations of aggression pose different
challenges for scholars who seek to better understand the nature of
aggression and for policy makers who aim to find ways of preventing
the various forms of aggression and minimizing its social harm when
it does occur. They recognize that terrorism has morphed into a form
of aggression that defies conventional frameworks for dealing with it,
and suggest that a serviceable old international framework for dealing
with violence be revitalized.
In Chapter 3, Wayman Mullins and Quint Thurman address the
meaning and causes of the pathology of terrorism and how to identify
it, which, they argue, are the first steps in assessing, predicting, and
ultimately intervening effectively against terrorists – much as the suc-
cessful physician treats medical pathologies by first identifying them
and understanding their sources. The problems in thinking about
terrorism begin with disagreement on definition; with variation as to
whether threats without actual violence should be included; whether
the emphasis should be on motives or behaviors, the selection of targets
or the nature of offenders; whether an act in question is a crime or

an international political matter; and many other factors. Most defini-
tions agree that terrorism involves violence against noncombatants,
committed by nongovernmental actors, operating in groups or indi-
vidually, usually with an intention to intimidate whole communities or
societies with the threat of more violence to follow, to serve a political
agenda. The authors argue that the choice of definition can drive
the implications for how to intervene, and different agencies with dif-
ferent roles and strengths will settle on different definitions to serve
their own agendas. This creates conceptual confusion, but it also cre-
ates institutional flexibility that may bring more than compensating
benefits. Some distinctions are without a substantive difference, but
not all. The key is to ensure that important decisions, ones that alter
policy or commit resources, are mindful of the distinctions among
terrorism definitions, especially when those are substantive.
In Chapter 4, Bryan Vila and Joanne Savage use an ecological
perspective to help understand terrorism. Noting that terrorism is
often portrayed as fundamentally different from other crimes, they
observe that such a distinction is unwarranted from the perspective of
the evolutionary ecological school of criminology, which treats all crime
as the use of behavioral strategies involving force, fraud, or stealth to
obtain valued resources. They hold that characterizing terrorism as
beyond crime is even dangerous: It may foster the mistaken belief that
only the most drastic measures can counter terrorism. The evolution-
ary ecological perspective deals systematically with biological, social,
and cognitive factors that influence human development over the
life course at both micro and macro levels. It also explains why effec-
tive long-term crime control strategies must strike a balance between
opportunity reduction, deterrence, and developmental interventions.
Vila and Savage use this framework as a basis for developing an array
of theory-driven counterterrorism policies. Using a game-theoretic
model, they argue that terrorism can be effectively controlled using
the same balanced approach that works for countering other types of
crime. The approach considers the sources of the terrorist’s motiva-
tion, how the costs and consequences of employing terrorist strategies
are assessed, and the dynamics that create opportunities for commit-
ting terrorist acts. The authors argue that overdramatizing terrorist
threats and overemphasizing punitive and protective counterstrate-

gies without addressing the root causes of terrorism is counterproduc-
tive; that wars on terror, like wars on crime and drugs, are likely to fail
because the metaphor is inconsistent with human behavior and with
human nature.
Chapter 5, written by gangs authority David Curry, considers the
similarities and differences between gangs and terrorist cells. Noting
the long academic tradition of research on gangs, Curry observes that
gang crime is situated somewhere between terrorism and crime more
generally defined, and that social control theories on the formation
of terrorist groups and gangs reveal an etiological kinship. Both types
of groups spring from social settings where personal ties dominate
instrumental ties. Distinctions are no less significant. Terrorist organi-
zations and street gangs are not equivalent in their respective capaci-
ties for collective action. Gang organizational resources do not make
them desirable allies for terrorist groups. An “alliance” model envis-
ages a formal or functional link between terrorist groups and street
gangs as groups. An alternative model for links between terrorist orga-
nizations and gangs is a “recruitment” model, in which street gang
members constitute a pool of potential recruits for terrorist organiza-
tions or networks. The typical law enforcement response to gangs has
been founded on an overestimate of the organizational capacity of
gangs. Curry recommends an alternative to the related tendency to
overreact to benign groups: create institutional structures that induce
more positive, less punitive intervention strategies.
Chapter 6, by Rita Simon and Adrienne Tranel, addresses the role
of women in terrorism in light of the dramatic changes that have
occurred globally in the status of women in legitimate affairs and
in the technology and politics of terrorism. Considering contempo-
rary research, aggregate data, and individual stories and accounts
of female terrorists, Simon and Tranel find women active in terror-
ist groups and with more reasons than in earlier times to join these
organizations. They examine the roles that women play in terrorist
groups today and their common demographic characteristics. They
find a myriad of reasons for this participation, including societal mar-
ginalization, individual choice, the need to avenge the deaths of loved
ones, and active recruitment by terrorist organizations, among other
factors. Although research on the role of women in terrorism is scant,

Simon and Tranel provide case study insight into how women adopt
roles in terrorism. Their analysis points to the need for research and
policy specialization on women in terrorism.
Part II of the anthology, discussing intervention strategies against
terrorism, opens with Chapter 7, on the applicability of crime-
prevention strategies to terrorism, by Cynthia Lum and Christopher
Koper. They consider the similarities and differences between crime
and terrorism, and between crime prevention techniques and terror-
ism intervention, as well as the legal and constitutional concerns about
applying preventive techniques to counterterrorism and the costs and
benefits of such endeavors. They identify a major barrier to the appli-
cation of conventional crime prevention strategies to terrorism: the
extreme rarity of terrorist events and enormous social consequences
of successful attacks, which distort the cost-benefit calculus and ren-
der many of those strategies inappropriate for the development and
deployment of counterterrorism efforts.
In spite of these limitations, Lum and Koper see a sufficiently large
overlap between terrorism and crime – terrorism, after all, involves
serious crimes – to regard many crime prevention approaches to be
applicable to the problem of terrorism. They go about this search for
relevance by organizing the primary aspects of crime prevention in a
matrix, categorizing the wide array of programs that qualify as crime
prevention, and then exploring whether, where, and when counter-
terrorism efforts might correspond and what sort of guidelines should
be used to determine the appropriateness of the fit.
Chapter 8, by James P. Lynch, describes opportunity theory – an
important model for crime and crime prevention programs – and its
relevance to the problem of terrorism. He begins by noting that oppor-
tunity theory is a framework for thinking about crime that is more
applicable to crime prevention than prior criminological theories,
which focused more narrowly on the motives and behaviors of offend-
ers. Opportunity theory expands the analysis of crime by addressing
targets of opportunity over time and place. Lynch sees opportunity
theory as limited in preventing ordinary crime, and to have even
more limited applicability for preventing terrorism, largely because of
greater difficulties in predicting individual acts of terrorism.
Noting the centrality of fear to terrorism while being an unin-

tended consequence of most street crime, Lynch sees prospects for
using opportunity theory to make terrorist targets less attractive by
making greater use of fear-reduction strategies, to study more care-
fully the relationship between opportunity reduction and the fear of
terrorism. These prospects are enriched by discontinuities between
fear and risk of victimization, namely the fact that fear is often high
where risk of victimization is low. Unlike acts of terrorism, the relative
rarity of which limits research opportunities, there is an abundance of
fear, more than enough to study using opportunity theory and other
frameworks of analysis.
Chapter 9, by Tomas Mijares and Jay Jamieson, focuses on fun-
damental distinctions and similarities between domestic police and
military forces in terms of both their intelligence and enforcement
operations. They observe that domestic policing has been designed
constitutionally to be distinct from the military and subject to differ-
ent systems of accountability, but that historically, external pressures –
legal, cultural, technological, political, and other – have induced
adjustments to make each institution more responsive to new and
emerging threats. Vietnam brought changes in security institutions
and policies in the 1960s and 1970s, and terrorism is doing the same
today. Mijares and Jamieson describe the dominant influences that
are inducing changes in policing and the military, and how each is
responding. They observe that increasing mutual dependencies
necessitated by terrorism can be fruitfully managed without damag-
ing the firewall that separates domestic responsibilities for security
from military ones.
In Chapter 10, Jack Greene discusses developments in policing
initiated in the 1980s and 1990s, especially community-oriented
policing (COP) and problem-oriented policing (POP), and how these
developments intersect with the era of terrorism that burst forth on
September 11, 2001. Noting that, like politics, all terrorism is ulti-
mately local, he observes that COP and POP may help relieve some
of the new burdens that have fallen on municipal police departments
as they have added to already unreasonable expectations – imposed
by notions of zero tolerance, wars on drugs and crime, and so on –
new responsibilities for protecting the homeland against terrorists.
In the process, police now must attempt to reconcile the dilemmas

of the means and ends of community- and problem-oriented policing
with the new challenges posed by terrorism: local versus federal core
interests, security versus liberty, crime versus extra-criminal aspects of
terrorism, and intelligence gathering and analysis, among others.
Greene observes that the greatest threat of terrorism to policing in
America may be to police legitimacy. He concludes that the opportu-
nities for COP and POP to relieve this constellation of burdens and
elusive goals are limited, but that prospects for productive applications
of enlightened, democratic policing are nonetheless viable and more
than worthwhile pursuing. Especially pertinent is the need to clearly
specify federal versus state and local roles in policing for terrorism.
Whereas federal agencies have the mandate for and general accep-
tance of an intelligence role, local police do not, and exercising such
a role has implications for local police civic legitimacy. Alternatively,
local police have important roles to play in responding to federal
intelligence and in mitigating terrorism events once they happen.
In Chapter 11, Jean-Paul Brodeur lays bare the problems, both
conceptual and institutional, of “connecting the dots” of security intel-
ligence data. He observes that in the domain of terrorism prevention,
the dot-connection metaphor is both apt and misleading. Security
intelligence – much like the information gathered by criminal inves-
tigators – is derived from bits of disparate data, not homogeneous
dots, often collected from a myriad of sources. It is then analyzed so
that the signals of relevant information can be separated from the
noise of the erroneous and irrelevant, and so that sense can then be
made of the remaining signals about particular threats. The chal-
lenge is to establish which dots are pertinent, how they relate to one
another, and the implications of these associations. The intelligence
process involves the collection of the data and establishment of its
reliability, the analysis needed to make connections between related
items of information and assess the threats, and then the sharing of
these assessments with the people on the ground who need to and can
act on the information.
Brodeur recognizes the 20–20 hindsight fallacy: Even under an
ideal intelligence system, using perfect logic and the best informa-
tion available, retrospective analysis of intelligence failures tends to
overlook the impossibility of protecting all targets, that with a virtu-

ally infinite array of vulnerable targets, a sufficiently large number of
carefully planned attempts to attack them will guarantee that a few
will succeed under “perfect storm” conditions. He goes on to argue
that some major intelligence failures of recent years are different,
including 9/11. Intelligence lapses that have allowed for calamitous
terrorist attacks derive first from failures in basic problem formula-
tion and logic skills, as well as differences in the cultures and respec-
tive roles of policing and national security intelligence. The former
is a public process that prizes transparency, and the latter is a secret
process that prizes security. The result is unwillingness of federal intel-
ligence authorities to share essential intelligence information with
other agencies, including guardians on the ground who need the
information. The problem is exacerbated by failures to make effective
use of the information that is shared.
Chapter 12, by Brian Forst, addresses the “demand” side of terrorism:
fear. He observes that most of the public attention and policies on
terrorism are directed at terrorists and extremists – how dangerous
and evil they are and how vulnerable we are to attack. Little atten-
tion is paid to the prospect that we may attract terrorist attacks, first
by fearing terrorism well beyond the extent to which we fear other,
more dangerous hazards, and then by behaving in ways that provoke
previously benign groups to be inclined to support or participate in
terrorism against the United States. Criminologists have learned that
fear of crime may impose costs on society that exceed those of crime
itself, and that this fear is manageable. Fear is a goal of terrorism and
may, when provoked, stimulate incentives for extremists to commit
further acts of terrorism. This aspect of terrorism makes the manage-
ment of fear more critical than in the case of other crimes. Hence it
is essential that we understand the anatomy of fear and develop tools
for managing the public’s fear of terrorism.
Forst reviews the literature on our understanding of the nature and
sources of fear. Noting that fear may be excessive or insufficient, he
considers its relationship to objective and subjective risks, how sub-
jective assessments of risk can become greatly misaligned with objec-
tive assessments, and the social costs of the misalignments. He then
considers the role of media and politics in creating and perpetuating
the misalignments and explores the prospect of a public policy focus

on fear that might satisfy both liberals (by reducing overemphasis on
hard power, which may create more terrorists than it destroys) and
conservatives (by reducing misallocations of scarce resources induced
by fear). He concludes by speculating as to how public and private
institutions may be induced to better manage public fear through
revamped systems of accountability and data, and what research is
needed to support such systems.
In Chapter 13, A. Daktari Alexander raises critical questions about
ethnic profiling associated with the war on terror: What are the bases
for racial and ethnic profiling? Are they legitimate? How does profil-
ing work? What can be said about its effectiveness? Its fairness? How
does it affect the persons profiled? He identifies a set of important
hypotheses that are testable and very much in need of scrutiny. He
concludes by noting the disturbing lack of transparency associated
with racial and ethnic profiling, and the need to learn more about the
full effects of racial and ethnic profiling on the well-being of minori-
ties and on our collective security.
In Chapter 14, Edward Maguire and William King address the
daunting challenges of coordinating some 700,000 local police
officers with 12,000 FBI agents and several thousand more federal
law enforcement agents within the Department of Homeland Security
umbrella. Noting the considerable differences in culture, role, train-
ing, skills, and experience between federal and local law enforcement
agents, the authors address the practical administrative and logistical
realities that interfere with the goals of effective communication and
cooperation among counterterrorism networks.
Maguire and King observe that the job of homeland security gets
done through a complex mix of networks – horizontal and vertical;
local, national, and international; public and private. They offer frame-
works of organization theory and social network theory to help sort out
and overcome the barriers to effective interagency coordination. They
conjecture that the explosion of interagency and intergovernmental
task forces in law enforcement since 9/11 could represent a funda-
mental shift in the structure of American law enforcement, especially
as local police are siphoned off to participate in joint counterterror-
ism task forces and indoctrinated away from local community needs.
The authors conclude that this shift may nonetheless be essential

to preventing terrorism, that an effective terrorism network can be
defeated with a more effective network of counter-deterrent agents.
In Chapter 15, John Kleinig takes on one of the most contentious
issues of the “war on terrorism”: the declared need to balance the
interests of security with those of liberty. He begins by noting that
the attack of 9/11 set off a wave of measures to restrict liberty in
the name of national security that are as draconian as any since the
wholesale internment of American citizens of Japanese heritage dur-
ing World War II: the torture of detainees, surveillance of suspected
terrorists, ethnic profiling, and further restrictions under provisions
of the Patriot Act. He observes that ordinarily, there need be no con-
flict between liberty and security: Security protects our freedom, and
freedom enlightens our security. Still, circumstances occasionally arise
presenting a moral necessity to give one precedence over the other.
Indeed, he notes, security is essential for ensuring the social condi-
tions of liberty and fostering “human flourishing” both individually
and collectively, and a lack of security can breed fear and, in turn,
a loss of freedom. But the restrictions that have followed 9/11 have
fallen disproportionately on selected minorities for the sake of giving
the majority a false sense of security. He speculates that the result may
well be the opposite of the claim – in fact, to diminish security over
the long haul by alienating the very people most needed to change
the climate that breeds incentives to commit acts of terrorism. He
notes that the 9/11 attacks were a product of mismanaged security,
not too much liberty.
Kleinig maintains that the real war may be over the metaphors
we use and the question of whose metaphor will prevail in the public
rhetoric on terrorism. Security cannot be balanced against liberty, as
the two are incommensurable. The metaphor of a tradeoff is prefer-
able, for it recognizes that when we act to increase security, we often
sacrifice liberty. Both, however, obscure the risk that enhanced secu-
rity will not come with constrained liberty unless the mechanisms
of security are themselves efficiently managed. Like the rhetorical
wars on drugs, crime, and terrorism – and like a proclaimed “era of
terrorism” – these metaphors may do more to obfuscate than to illu-
minate, to divert our attention from failures of management. And if
we do need to make hard choices, we are better served by developing

a theory of sound judgment.
Next, in Chapter 16, John Braithwaite offers an antidote to several
of the problems raised in previous chapters. Rather than think of ter-
rorism as a matter that calls for retaliative deterrent force, he argues
that we might do better to think of terrorism as a public health prob-
lem and to respond to it based on a model that offers prospects for
reducing the threat of terrorism by cooling the flames of emotion
that feed it in the first place, by containing it rather than retaliating
with overwhelming force. He begins by observing that the problem
of terrorism does not lend itself neatly to either the war model or
the criminal justice model. Policy makers are inclined to establish
counterterrorism policies based on the theory of deterrence, but this
model makes dubious assumptions about the incentives of people
who commit acts of terrorism, ignoring the prospect that retaliatory
strikes done in the name of deterrence are likely to have an oppo-
site effect by stimulating defiance in the group targeted, especially if
they feel that their way of life is under attack. An alternative, regula-
tory model is advanced that overlays the public health concepts of
primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention with other, older ideas of
containment (of injustice) and enlargement (of justice).
Braithwaite argues that support for pre-emptive wars on terrorism
is grounded not in evidence-based principles, but rather in other
public philosophies, notably retribution. He proposes instead that an
interconnected web of controls might enable an overdetermined pre-
vention of terrorism that, in spite of its redundancy, could be more
cost-effective than the war model, because the principle of responsive-
ness means parsimony in resort to expensive coercion. He raises the
possibility of an empirically based approach to regulating rare events
like 9/11 terrorism by applying the principles of evidence-based regu-
lation to micro-elements that are constitutive of macro-disasters.
Part III of the book begins with Chapter 17, by Gary LaFree, on the
START Project and the lessons learned from the research sponsored
under that project. Observing that too much of the literature on ter-
rorism is based on conjecture and too little on empirically valid infor-
mation, he provides some important glimpses of what can be learned
from the Global Terrorism Database, a data resource consisting of
over 80,000 terrorist incidents reported in the open-source media

from 1998 to 2006. LaFree offers a rare analysis of terrorism based on
real data, one of the first by a criminologist. Especially noteworthy are
statistics and graphs revealing considerable skewing effects in several
important variables: the number of people killed per attack, number
of attacks per country, and years of operation per terrorist group. The
chapter is cast around the idea that misconceptions about terrorism
are important. They can lead not just to bad policy, but to policies that
leave us less secure – ironically, in the name of security.
The book concludes with Chapter 18, by Brian Forst. He reviews
the collection of perspectives of the contributors to the anthology,
together with information from other sources, to identify research
needed to further advance our understanding of terrorism and how
best to prevent it and respond to it. He observes that despite formida-
ble barriers to the empirical analysis of terrorism, which he describes
in some detail, there are generic dimensions that distinguish cer-
tain types of terrorists, terrorist groups, and terrorist acts from oth-
ers. These dimensions can help to inform policies to prevent and
respond to terrorism. He then identifies specific problems that lend
themselves to analysis, emphasizing the importance of multiple per-
spectives for a more thorough understanding and effective preven-
tion of terrorism.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The vast majority of scholarly work on terrorism has been written by

political scientists who have examined the role of political institutions
and power in generating the motivation to engage in terrorist acts.
Meanwhile, the official response to terrorism has focused more imme-
diately on the prevention of violent acts and the reduction in damage
resulting from those acts: enhanced security in airports and public
buildings, limitations on the availability of materials that can be used
to perpetrate violence, and restrictions on the movement of violence-
prone populations. There is, then, a disjuncture between conventional
scholarly discourse and public policy regarding terrorism. This book
attempts to improve the fit between theory and practice by drawing
on theories found in criminology and criminal justice research.
By making explicit the criminological theories that underlie our

most prevalent antiterrorism policies and reviewing the criminological
literature on the appropriateness of these theories, we may be able to
make more informed judgments about the ultimate wisdom of these
policies. Moreover, we believe that the range of criminological theory
that can be brought to bear on understanding terrorism and the
prospects for developing policies that show promise in its prevention
or mitigation are broader than those currently in use. Crime theories
have evolved from the individual to the life course, small groups and
communities, and multilevel explanations of criminal behavior, and
crime policies have similarly ranged from emphasizing individual
deterrence to reintegration and the mitigation of social harm and
fear. By having a wider theoretical and policy field of vision for terror-
ism, future efforts aimed at prevention, response, and mitigation can
be more clearly focused, as has been the case with crime.
The reader will note that a wider field of scholarly vision brings
diversity with it. The authors do not agree on all issues. Many suggest
that the war metaphor is inapplicable to the problem of terrorism
(a few, including John Braithwaite, Joanne Savage, and Bryan Vila, say
so quite explicitly) whereas others do not (Klinger and Heal embrace
the concept of fourth-generation warfare as a key to successful coun-
terterrorism policy). Some are clearly concerned that counterterror-
ism interests could erode the Constitutional firewall between policing
and military operations (e.g., John Kleinig); others see terrorism as
a problem that requires convergence of these two distinct systems of
security (e.g., Tomas Mijares and Jay Jamieson). These are healthy
debates, and they will continue.
The assessments and prescriptions contained in these chapters
do not resolve the problem of terrorism, but they may offer a set of
perspectives for thinking about it that complement more orthodox
perspectives. This conversation will move forward as empirical evi-
dence comes to light that supports, contradicts, and otherwise refines
the ideas put forth here. We will watch this conversation unfold and
change as events change too. One can only hope that they will change
for the better.
Part one
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

chapter two
Manifestations of Aggression
Terrorism, Crime, and War
David Klinger and Charles “Sid” Heal
INTRODUCTION
One of the key challenges of our time is dealing with the threat
posed by terrorism, and a key challenge when it comes to dealing
with terrorism is the absence of a single, widely agreed-upon defini-
tion of the term. All definitions of terrorism include some mention
of violence and the desire of those perpetrating the violence to influ-
ence the behavior of those they target,1 but there is limited agreement
beyond these points of commonality. The lack of clarity on the mean-
ing of the term is exemplified by Schmidt and Jongman (1988) report
that a survey of academics who studied terrorism disclosed more than
one hundred different definitions of it. The definitional problem
extends beyond the academic realm and into the realm of govern-
mental and international bodies, as exemplified by the following two
official definitions of terrorism, by the United States and the United
Nations, respectively:
“[T]errorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence

perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents. (Title 22 USC)2
[A]ny action … that is intended to cause death or serious bodily
harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such
1
Some commentators argue for a definition of terrorism that would include violence
directed at destroying entire populations (and even all of humanity) with weapons
of mass destruction (e.g., Laqueur, 1999).
2
This legal definition is not the only one used by the U.S. government, as many
different departments and entities within the federal government have different
definitions (see, e.g., Thomas, 2004: 92 for a discussion).
17
18 nature of the problem
an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to

compel a Government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act. (Untitled Document, 2005)
Consideration of these two definitions indicates that, beyond the idea

that terrorism involves violence intended to influence the behavior of
others, conceptions of terrorism are often explicit about aggregates –
that the violence is perpetrated by groups that seek to influence large
segments of a population or specific social institutions. However,
some conceptions of terrorism address actors and intentions of a
much smaller scale, as the term is sometimes used in reference to
situations in which a single individual uses or threatens to use vio-
lence to alter the behavior of another individual, as in the case of an
abusive husband who beats his wife in order to prevent her from leav-
ing (Johnson and Leone, 2005). Finally, some definitions of terrorism
include acts of violence by single actors who hope to affect large-scale
social changes, as with the explosive packages sent by Unabomber
Theodore Kaczynski over the course of nearly two decades (Chase,
2003) and the string of bombings perpetrated by Eric Rudolph in
Georgia and Alabama in the late 1990s (Mattingly and Schuster,
2005). In sum, terrorism is an amorphous term that has been (and is)
used to refer to a wide variety of sorts of aggressive action by human
beings against others.
The lack of conceptual clarity about what constitutes terrorism is a
challenge both to scholars who study the phenomenon and to police,
military, and other practitioners whose job descriptions include the
mandate to deal with it. In the academic arena, the definitional issue
makes it difficult to circumscribe the sorts of actions that constitute
the subject matter that scholars seek to study, which hinders the devel-
opment of a cogent body of terrorism scholarship. In the public policy
arena, the fact that there exists no clear-cut agreement about what
constitutes terrorism has profound ramifications for how societies
organize to deal with terrorism, the sorts of means societies employ
in hopes of preventing terrorist attacks, and how societies respond to
attacks that are not thwarted.
One of the reasons for the conceptual fog surrounding terrorism
is that the concept is tied closely with two other terms whose subject
manifestations of aggression 19
matter includes violent conflict between humans: crime and war.

The term “crime” refers to the commission of acts that are forbid-
den, or the omission of acts required, by law and for which offenders
are liable to be punished if convicted in a court of law (e.g., Adler,
Meuller, and Laufer, 1998). Thus, the concept of crime presupposes
the existence of an organized state in which laws have been enacted
and some apparatus for enforcement has been instituted. Among
the numerous sorts of acts forbidden by various legal codes are those
that involve the infliction or threatened infliction of physical harm
against human beings – assault and murder, for example – which are
commonly known as “violent crimes.” Because acts of terrorism by def-
inition involve violence (though not always directed against people;
see later), and because the violence involved often (but not always;
again, see discussion later) violates legal statutes, the overlap between
crime and terrorism is evident.
Where violent crimes are acts of aggression by individuals that orga-
nized states forbid via their legal code and respond to with their criminal
justice systems, war is violence in which the state itself is a belligerent,
either as an aggressor or as the object of attack by some other party.
Wars in the modern era come in two basic varieties or forms: (a) conflict
between two or more states; and (b) conflicts between a state (or states)
and a nonstate collective enterprise of some sort. The first of these is
the classic notion of modern war in which nation-states use armies to
project violence against another state to attain some political objective –
Hitler’s Germany seeking to expand its territory at the expense of other
nations and the other nations resisting the Reich’s efforts, for example.
War of the second sort involves either violence between the military of
a nation-state and members of its own citizenry – insurrection or civil
war – or violence between a state’s military and some collective that
emanates from outside its borders – the U.S. Marines and the Barbary
pirates doing battle in and around North Africa two centuries ago, for
example (Forester, 1953).3 In either of these types of conflict, the vio-
lent acts undertaken against a nation-state might violate the laws of the
country so attacked, but the legal status of the violence is incidental to
3
See the discussion of the four generations of modern war.
the fact that it is motivated by a larger design to impose the political

will of the attacking party on the nation so attacked. Of course, because
nonstate actors cannot have laws as the term is commonly used, attacks
on them that could be understood as criminal acts within the legal
framework of a nation-state would not constitute crimes within the
common understanding of the term.
Consideration of the various sorts of violence that have been
dubbed terrorism indicates that some of them clearly bear no relation
to the concept of war. Take “terroristic” domestic violence (Johnson
and Leone, 2005) for example. When one partner physically attacks
the other, it is an act of personal aggression that in no way involves
actions by or against a nation-state. It is thus clear that such behavior
is not warfare. As one moves away from the individualistic aggression
of domestic violence and into forms of group-based violence that have
been labeled as terrorism, however, the use of the term “war” becomes
an increasingly apt descriptor. When small bands of radicals seek
to alter their nation’s political landscape by sowing fear among the
population at large through kidnappings, bombings, and assassina-
tions, for example, their actions bear more than a passing resemblance
to war (indeed, the term “guerilla warfare is often used to describe
this sort of violent activity; e.g., Joes, 1996). And the use of the term
war would seem to be even more appropriate when nonstate actors
carry out mass-casualty attacks such as al Qaeda’s airborne assaults on
New York and the Washington, DC area on September 11, 2001; the
2004 school takeover and massacre in Beslan, Russia perpetrated by
Chechen rebels; and the ongoing missile salvos, sapper incursions,
and suicide bombings by various Palestinian groups against Israelis in
the most recent Intifada.
Not everyone would agree with the notion that mass-casualty attacks
by nonstate actors are acts of war, however. Some people prefer to view
such incidents through the prism of crime, for, as noted, such actions
do violate the laws of the targeted nations (e.g., those forbidding
murder; see discussion later). In the wake of the September 11
attacks by nineteen members of the al Qaeda organization, consid-
eration of what to call terrorist attacks – particularly those intended
to create large numbers of casualties – has become an increasingly
salient concern in the United States. The labels applied to them have
considerable ramifications for how our nation has (and will) respond
to these sorts of attacks, approach the threat posed by future attacks
by Islamist terrorists, and treat combatants (and their sponsors and
supporters) that we capture. The rest of this chapter is devoted to a
discussion of the competing perspectives of mass-casualty attacks such
as military-style assaults, suicide bombings, and other aggressions as
criminal incidents and as acts of war, and the implications of these
labels for both how scholars might approach terrorism as a topic of
study and how our nation might deal with the threat posed by Islamo-
fascist terrorism.
TERRORISM AS CRIME
The idea that mass-casualty terrorist attacks are crimes fits well with the
zeitgeist of Western industrial democracies such as the United States
because the rule of law is a pillar of the modern social order. As a mod-
ern nation-state, the United States has a well-developed legal system
that defines criminal conduct in written statutes, prescribes rules of
procedure for enforcing criminal codes, and dictates the treatment
of those adjudicated guilty of law violations. In our system of gover-
nance, the core actions involved in mass-casualty terrorist attacks –
such as killing, maiming, destroying property – have been forbidden
by various statutes since the dawn of the republic (and before that in
common law) and would currently violate both federal law and long-
standing provisions of the legal code of any state in which an attack
might take place.
State Laws
Each of the fifty states has numerous laws that could be violated in the
course of a terrorist attack within its borders. Given the scope of the
relevant law across fifty sets of law books, it is not possible to present a
comprehensive discussion of state law vis-à-vis terrorism. For simplic-
ity’s sake, we will limit our discussion of the criminal face of terrorism
to the statutes of a single state: California. The reader should keep in
mind, however, that the general legal principles involved are addressed
in the criminal codes of other states, and that we could have just as
easily chosen some other state as our exemplar.
We begin our discussion of the state statutes with consideration of

how state law would view any deaths resulting from a successful mass-
casualty attack carried out by a terrorist cell. The legal codes in each
of the fifty states have always made murder a crime. Although each
state takes a slightly different approach, they all forbid premeditated
murder. California, for example, codifies this prohibition in sections
187 through 189 of the state penal code, stating in Section 187 that
“[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human being … with malice
aforethought.” Section 188 explains what constitutes the mental state
of malice, and Section 189 specifies that murders occurring in cer-
tain types of circumstances constitute first-degree murder, whereas all
other murders constitute second-degree murder. Among the sorts of
circumstances that make unlawful killings in California first-degree
murder are perpetration “by means of a destructive device or explo-
sive, a weapon of mass destruction … or by any other kind of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing.”
The California homicide statutes include the two core elements of
any crime: the act itself and the mental state of the perpetrator – or
in legal parlance, actus reus and mens rae. In the case of murder, the
first element is, of course, the killing of a human being that is not
otherwise permitted by law (e.g., justifiable or excusable homicide),
the “unlawful killing” mentioned in Section 187. With regard to the
perpetrator’s mental state, Section 188 specifies that the “malice
aforethought” mentioned in Section 187
may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a

deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow crea-
ture. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or
when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned
and malignant heart. When it is shown that the killing resulted from
the intentional doing of an act with express or implied malice as
defined above, no other mental state need be shown to establish the
mental state of malice aforethought.
Given that the al Qaeda organization has clearly stated its intentions
to use mass-casualty attacks as a means to influence the foreign policy
of the United States (and other nation-states),4 it should be apparent
4
A collection of statements from al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden that lay out the
organization’s terrorist philosophy – including his “Declaration of War Against
that any attacks by al Qaeda would be done with what California law
calls “express” malice. Should some other group that has not declared
its purposes carry out a mass-casualty attack (and does not do so after-
ward), the lack of concern for the welfare of the victims manifest in
the nature of the assault would, on its face, be sufficient to “show
an abandoned and malignant heart.” Thus, if anyone were to die in
a mass-casualty terrorist attack in California, both the actus reus and
mens rae requirements of the crime of murder would be present.
Further consideration of a hypothetical mass-casualty attack by al
Qaeda (or similar) terrorists in California indicates that any resulting
deaths would be considered instances of first-degree murder under
the relevant state statutes. First, it should be apparent, given al Qaeda’s
repeated declarations that they wish to kill people, that the deaths
would be instances of the general category of “willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killings” mentioned in Section 189. Second, the
fact that a mass-casualty attack would require some amount of plan-
ning means that an attack of this sort by any group would also meet
this standard. Finally, should the attackers utilize explosives (which
al Qaeda has done on numerous occasions)5 or a weapon of mass
destruction (which al Qaeda has threatened to use),6 the specific pro-
visions of Section 189 regarding such devices would obtain. In sum,
deaths from a mass-casualty terrorist attack – whether they resulted
from explosive devices, gunfire, weapons of mass destruction, or any
other instruments – would be considered first-degree murders under
California law.
Beyond the ultimate crime of murder, mass-casualty terrorist attacks
could involve several other crimes, such as assault, battery, and prop-
erty destruction. Sections 240, 242, and 245 of the California Penal
Code, for example, cover the crimes of assault, battery, and assault
with deadly weapons, respectively. Penal Code Section 240 reads, “[a]
n assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to
the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy Mosques” can be found at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/edicts.html.
5
Perhaps the most notable of these attacks were the twin bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7th, 1998. See, e.g., http://www.
globalsecurity.org/security/ops/98emb.htm.
6
See, e.g., again, Bin Laden’s statements at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front-
line/shows/ binladen/who/edicts.html.
commit a violent injury on the person of another.” Section 242 reads,

“[a] battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon
the person of another.” Section 245 includes a laundry list of specific
circumstances in which an assault might be carried out with a deadly
weapon or the victim might otherwise be subject to great bodily injury.
These laws (especially Section 245) could apply to terrorist attacks in
two instances. First, in any attack in which no one died, they would
likely serve as the basis for specifying the most serious crimes that
occurred. Second, the assault laws would identify the crimes commit-
ted against survivors of attacks in which some victims perished.
With regard to property destruction, two likely sources of damage
in a mass-casualty attack are explosions and fire (which may or may
not be the result of an explosion). Two California laws that would
obtain here are Penal Code Section 12303.3, which outlaws the use of
destructive devices or explosives to “wrongfully injure or destroy any
property,” and Section 451, which states that “[a] person is guilty of
arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or
causes to be burned … any structure … or property.” These laws could
be used to bring criminal charges in two sorts of instances: first, as
additional crimes in attacks that resulted in deaths, injuries, or both;
and second, as the primary crimes in an attack that did not kill or
injure someone, for example, in a bombing attack in which the tar-
get location was successfully evacuated prior to detonation. In sum,
because the actions that terrorists would take during mass-casualty
attacks would create many violations of state law, it is clear that one
could view such attacks as criminal conduct.
The things that terrorists might do that could be considered
criminal acts under state law are not limited to what occurs during
an attack, however, as states have numerous laws forbidding various
actions that would be necessary prior to carrying out many sorts of
terrorist acts. One crime that would be relevant to any attack involv-
ing more than a single terrorist would be conspiracy. Staying with
our California example, Penal Code Section 182 states that it is ille-
gal for “two or more persons to conspire to commit any crime,” with
Section 184 of the Penal Code specifying that an act must be carried
out that somehow furthers the ultimate commission of the agreed-
upon illegal act. Given that most mass-casualty attacks involve two or
more principals (i.e., attackers) and support personnel, some sort

of planning to commit a crime(s) that involves both the principals
and support personnel (e.g., the selection of target[s], the selection
of means of attack, and the selection of a means of reaching the
target[s]), and acts that further the achievement of the agreed-upon
plan (e.g., obtaining explosives, scouting of targets, training of princi-
pals), state conspiracy laws would clearly obtain in California.
Beyond this are a variety of state laws forbidding specific things that
terrorists might do in preparation for an attack. California law, for
example, forbids the possession of “any substance, material, or any
combination of substances or materials, with the intent to make any
destructive device or any explosive without first obtaining a valid per-
mit to make such destructive device or explosive” (Penal Code Section
12312). Because it is quite doubtful that terrorists who desired to build
an explosive device for an attack in California would seek the neces-
sary permit before obtaining the needed materials, the mere posses-
sion of said materials would quite likely constitute a crime. Similar laws
forbid the possession of other sorts of weapons that terrorists might
use in mass-casualty attacks (e.g., automatic weapons [Section 12220]
and booby traps [Section 12355]). Finally, in recent years many states
have added to their statutes laws specifically devoted to preventing the
most dangerous sort of mass-casualty attacks, those involving weapons
of mass destruction. California’s primary contribution to this body of
state law is the Hertzberg-Alarcon California Prevention of Terrorism Act,
passed in 1999, which, among other things, forbids the possession,
development, manufacture, production, transfer, acquisition, or
retention of a variety of specific sorts of weapons of mass destruction
(e.g., certain chemical, radiological, and nuclear agents).7
Federal Law
In terms of federal law, recent decades have seen a massive increase
in federal criminal jurisdiction over the core behaviors involved in
mass-casualty attacks. During the first two centuries of our republic,
jurisdiction over crimes such as murder, assault, and property destruc-
tion were almost the exclusive province of the states. For a variety of
7
The act also forbids the use of these weapons.
reasons, however, the federal government has exerted more and more
dominion over these (and other) so-called “common law” crimes
since the 1970s (e.g., Richman, 2000). Within the current federal
legal corpus are a variety of homicide statues that could be relevant in
a mass-casualty attack in which people died. In addition to the general
federal murder provision found in 18 USC 1111, there are specific
federal homicide laws covering murders during hostage incidents (18
USC 1203), as the result of purposeful train wrecks (18 USC 1992), as
the result of purposely destroying aircraft (18 USC 32–34), and many
other specific circumstances. And there are federal laws forbidding
other core crimes that might be involved in mass-casualty attacks, such
as assault (18 USC 113) and arson (18 USC 81).
As was the case with state law, the federal criminal code outlaws
a variety of actions that would be needed to carry out mass-casualty
attacks and has specific provisions that deal with terrorism. Federal
law, for example, includes both a general conspiracy statute (18 USC
371) and specific statutes forbidding the planning of particular acts
(e.g., murder, 18 USC 1117). Federal law criminalizes the possession
of specific weapons such as machine guns (18 USC 922) and certain
explosive materials and devices (18 USC 842) when the person in pos-
session is not among those few persons statutorily permitted to have
them. Where specific terrorism statutes go, the U.S. Code includes an
entire chapter (113B) that addresses a variety of matters including
the use of weapons of mass destruction (section 2332a), bombings
of public venues (section 2332f), harboring and concealing terror-
ists (section 2339), providing material support to terrorists (sections
2339a and b), and financing terrorism (section 2339c).
Chapter 113b of the U.S. Code has been in effect since the 1990s,
reflecting the fact that the federal government was concerned about
the threat of terrorism, and viewed it (at least partially) as a crimi-
nal justice problem long before the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Federal interest in anti-terror legislation peaked notably in the wake of
the attacks. Just over a month after the 9/11 attacks Congress passed
and President Bush signed into law H.R. 3162 – the USA PATRIOT
Act8 – a sweeping bill that revised many sections of federal law regarding
8
Officially titled “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.”
terrorism and added fresh anti-terror provisions. The language of the

PATRIOT Act that most clearly demonstrates Congress’s perspective
that terrorism should still be viewed as a form of criminal behav-
ior after 9/11 can be found in the title of Title VIII, which reads,
“Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism.”
The forgoing overview of the state and federal law indicates that
there is a strong basis for the perspective that mass-casualty attacks
by terrorists can properly be viewed as criminal activity. From the
common-law crimes forbidden by state statutes, to state law provisions
that specifically criminalize terrorist attacks, to federal statutes that
address the common-law crimes that were originally the purview of
the states, to federal anti-terror laws that antedated the 9/11 attacks,
to the strengthening and expansion of these laws in the wake of
the attack, criminal codes in the United States are replete with laws
that identify as criminal behavior the various actions that would be
involved in mass-casualty attacks. The existence of these laws does
not mean that terrorist acts are just crimes, however. For as the next
section shows, there are strong reasons also to view the mass-casualty
attacks that are the focus of this chapter as acts of war.
TERRORISM AS WAR
The same modern mind-set that makes it easy for those in the West
to understand acts of terrorism as crimes can be a roadblock to
understanding terrorism as a form of warfare. Traditional Western
conceptions of warfare are rooted in the modern notion of national
militaries doing battle with one another as an application of foreign
policy. In this framework, war is something that uniformed soldiers
do on behalf of their nation in an international system that includes
a set of largely agreed-upon rules of combat (e.g., Clausewitz, 1976).
Suicide bombings, commandeering and then flying commercial
aircraft into buildings, taking over schools and slaughtering children,
and various other forms of mass-casualty attacks carried out by indi-
viduals and groups who do not don the uniform of any nation do not
fit well within this framework.
However, students of warfare have a well-developed framework
for viewing acts of terrorism such as these as acts of war (e.g., Lind
et al., 1989; Lind, 2004). The starting point for this framework is a
recognition that the modern conception of war that animates most
Americans’ approach to the matter is a fairly recent development,
something less than four centuries old. Commonly referred to as the
“first generation” of modern war, it came into being in 1648 with the
Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War and marked the
advent of state monopoly on war fighting (at least in Europe). Warfare
of this sort was carried out by uniformed armies with strong and rigid
hierarchies, who faced one another in formation with individual
weapons (primarily crude firearms) on clearly defined battlefields.
First-generation warfare dominated armed conflict until the mid-
nineteenth century, when technological advances in small arms such
as the mini-ball, rifled barrels, and breech-loading firearms used in
the U.S. Civil War led to a level of carnage theretofore unseen, a result
that showed the inherent weakness of the first-generation approach to
warfare in the face of changes in the instruments of conflict.9 The full
implications of the problem of fighting wars with the first-generation
framework were not realized, however, until the First World War, when
the French used mass fire from artillery batteries to attack specific
points from afar, policed the battlefield with ground troops, and then
occupied the area that had been cleared of enemy troops. Although
this “second-generation” sort of war fighting represented a major step
toward the accommodation of new technologies into the tactics of
war, the tactics of massing fire, policing the battlefield, and occupy-
ing space require a high degree of coordination. It consequently left
largely intact the first generation’s emphasis on rigid hierarchy and
centralization of command.
Hints of a third generation of modern war were also observed dur-
ing the First World War. The German army, drawing on their Prussian
roots, moved away from the static firing platforms evident in second-
generation warfare and used mobility to try to out-maneuver their
adversaries. Maneuver warfare required a move away from a strong,
centralized command hierarchy that was characteristic of first- and
second-generation warfare, because officers and troops had to be
9
Some commentators date the unveiling of the weakness in first-generation war to
the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century (e.g., Hammes, 2005).
flexible and use initiative in order to successfully adapt to the changes

that maneuvers wrought in the battlefield. This third generation of
warfare was not fully realized in the First World War, as Germany was
defeated before they could fully implement it. Third-generation war
came into full blossom, however, during World War Two in the form
of the German blitzkrieg that rolled over Poland, France, and much
of the rest of Europe in the opening months of the conflict.
Second- and third-generation war represent evolutionary shifts
from first-generation war. Fourth-generation war represents a radical
departure from it. One of the biggest points of departure is that the
first three generations of war are all rooted in the political system
of nation-states and represent conflicts between such states, whereas
fourth-generation war is a form of warfare that can and does exist
outside the nation-state system. According to Lind, fourth-generation
warfare can (and often does) involve nonstate actors such as crimi-
nal cartels, radical religious groups, and ideological confederates, in
addition to nation-states. Nonstate actors do not have the same power
as states to impose their will on others, so they seek to leverage what
power they do have through organizational structure and combat tac-
tics that will work to their advantage. Terrorism thus consists of smaller
groups using unconventional means to wage war against opponents
who would otherwise destroy them in any sort of first-, second-, or
third-generation confrontation (e.g., Lind, 2004).
Among the unconventional means such groups will use to wage
war are mass-casualty attacks such as suicide bombings, hijackings,
and military-style assaults by small groups – in other words, terrorism.
Though no modern nation has ever been defeated solely by terrorists,
terrorism provides an effective means for a small faction to have a
major impact. In this respect, it is easy to understand acts of terror-
ism as a “poor man’s battle.” This is because terrorism is the most
economical mode of political violence ever devised. It requires no
standing army, no large arsenal, and no expensive military hardware.
Because it is entirely offensive in nature, it requires almost no fixed
installations and nearly no vulnerable supply dumps. Neither does it
look for decisive engagements, but rather protracted campaigns that
seek to weaken an adversary’s will to persevere. Because terrorists lack
the traditional destructive combat power of nation-states, they rely on
disruption of the supporting systems and infrastructure that provide

the quality of life that the populace has grown accustomed to expect.
Thus, “high value targets” are not an adversary’s military power,
but rather the infrastructure that “makes life worth living,” such as
communications, transportation, fuel and power, water supplies, the
economy, and most of all, a sense of safety and well-being.
An understanding of these basic factors reveals the first of four
underpinning strategies upon which terrorism is based, called “bond
relationship targeting” (Bunker, 2006). In its simplest terms, bond
relationship targeting can be understood as an attempt to degrade,
disrupt, alter, or separate the bonds and relationships that exist
between a populace and its government. Though this is oversim-
plified and the concepts and applications are far richer, this basic
definition will serve for this chapter. Because terrorists cannot win
a “stand up” battle, these vulnerable targets are not only appealing
on a tactical level, but they gain strategic importance when a popula-
tion that depends upon their government to protect them becomes
increasingly frustrated and dissatisfied with failures. When consider-
ing that the most fundamental reason of existence for any govern-
ment is the protection of its people, it is easy to see how quickly this
bond can be degraded.
Likewise, terrorism provides another advantage over more tra-
ditional modes of warfare in that it is far more economical. Consider
the implications in a scenario where a terrorist spends twenty-five cents
to phone in a false bomb threat that results in a $100,000 response!
Though this may sound like an exaggeration, consider the responses
to the anthrax scares after September 11 or the many times airports
have shutdown while investigating a potential breach in security. So
successful are these threats, and so lopsided are the responses to them,
that even without specific intelligence there is a global “ripple effect,”
as when the U.S. mass transit systems were put on a higher alert after
the July 2005 bombings in London, England. Long after a threat has
dissipated, increased security measures continue to add to the target’s
cost of “doing battle.” It goes without saying that in any protracted
engagement, the most frugal gains a decided advantage.
The third underpinning is that by nature and necessity, terrorism
relies on asymmetric strategies, because disruption is far easier to
achieve and far more difficult to defend against than destruction.

Because terrorists are incapable of surviving, much less succeeding,
in a pitched battle, they refuse battle with conventional forces; rather,
they concentrate on the vulnerable targets that provide an infinite
number of opportunities for attack and whose numbers make them
impossible to completely defend. Most often, these are civilian targets
such as mass transportation, public gatherings, economic and com-
munication nodes, and so forth.
Finally, because winning decisively is unattainable, terrorists must
rely on a protracted campaign that erodes the will of the people to
continue to resist. Indeed, members of al Qaeda describe an ideol-
ogy that has identified objectives out to the year 2020 (Musharbash,
2005). When considered in this light, even small concessions are seen
by terrorists as enabling objectives in a continuing successful strug-
gle. The concessions thus bolster the morale and determination of
terrorists, while eroding and discouraging the people. Furthermore,
though terrorists expect setbacks, the people – especially Americans –
are extremely intolerant of them, often demanding redirection or
even withdrawal.
Given all this, it is clear that the Islamic terrorists who threaten us
view mass-casualty attacks (as well as other forms of terrorism) as a
war-fighting tactic – as a means to further specific political objectives
as part of their broader geostrategic goals.
IMPLICATIONS OF CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

FOR DEALING WITH TERRORISM
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that terrorism can legiti-

mately be viewed through prisms that call for both military and crimi-
nal responses. The intentional infliction of deaths, injuries, and other
forms of destruction through mass-casualty attacks are clearly crimes
according to both federal and state law (as well as the common-law
tradition from which our legal order flows). At the same time, when
foreign entities seek to alter the policies of our nation through the
force of arms, the actions clearly constitute acts of war in the common
meaning of the term, although not the formal meaning. One could
thus simply say that terrorism calls for both criminal sanctions and
military responses. From this perspective, members of the crimino-

logical community might be satisfied to stop the definitional exegesis
and say that because terrorism is a form of crime, it is, by definition,
something that fits squarely within the purview of the discipline of
criminology. It can thus simply be studied with an eye toward under-
standing the forces that give rise to terrorist attacks.
Although embracing terrorism as a dependent variable worthy of
criminological attention is a sound idea, stopping there would be a
mistake for two related reasons. The first is that such an approach
would unnecessarily limit the scope of criminological inquiry into
terrorism. As one of the founding fathers of the discipline (Sutherland,
1934) noted, criminology is not merely the study of rule breaking, but
of rule making and reactions to rule breaking as well. Given that the
proper purview of criminology includes how societies define things
as criminal and respond to criminal actions, criminologists would
do well to count these two matters among those things worthy of
attention when it comes to the study of terrorism. As the foregoing
discussion of the state of the law regarding terrorism makes abun-
dantly clear, the rules applicable to terrorist actions (and planning,
support, etc.) have evolved in recent years to move beyond the classic
common-law crimes of murder, assault, and so on, to include specific
provisions that directly address terrorism. It is a virtual certainty that
the laws regarding terrorism are not now set in stone, that we will see
additional changes in legal codes as our society seeks to use the law
as a tool to address the threat posed by terrorism. Given this, it would
behoove the criminological community to keep an eye on the evolu-
tion of terrorism law so that we might be able to shed empirical light
on these processes, and thus enhance the level of understanding of
how the rules governing terrorism are made.
With respect to reactions to rule breaking, we are in a state of flux
similar to that evident in the arena of rule making. Among the key
issues that have already received prominent attention since 9/11
regarding the matter of reactions to terrorism are the proper role
of the military in dealing with terrorist attacks (e.g., Klinger and
Grossman, 2002), how individuals who are suspected of engaging in
terrorism should be treated when captured (e.g., Feldman, 2001),
and how much force the police should use to stop suspected terror-
ists (e.g., Bunker, 2005). Different people and groups have different
perspectives on each of these matters (as well as many others in the
realm of counterterrorism), so it is not at all clear how various institu-
tions of social control will react to terrorist activity. Given this state
of affairs, criminologists would do well to count social reactions to
terrorist activity as a topic worthy of study.
The second reason we should consider the definitional issue is that
how we define terrorism has substantial implications for public policy.
This matter is closely tied to the criminological issue of rule break-
ing, for among the key public policy issues are matters such as how to
deal with attacks when they occur, how to respond in the aftermath of
attacks, how to treat individuals that we capture (either in the wake of
attacks or when they are discovered in the planning stage), and the
methods to be used to try to prevent attacks in the first place.
How we define terror has major implications for which institutions
of government might be called upon to prevent attacks, deal with
attacks as they unfold, and seek out those responsible in the wake of
attacks. As a legal matter, if one were to view terrorist attacks on U.S.
soil as purely criminal matters, then only law enforcement entities such
as state and local police departments and the FBI could be involved
in attempting to interdict, take action against, and seek the capture
of those perpetrating mass-casualty attacks. A Reconstruction-era law
known as the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385) generally forbids
the use of U.S. armed forces to enforce domestic laws, subjecting those
who violate it to both monetary fines and imprisonment for up to two
years.10 Investigating crimes in their incipient stages, responding to
them as they occur, and arresting perpetrators are all aspects of law
enforcement. It follows under the “terror as crime” conceptual rubric,
therefore, that under current federal law, military personnel are not
permitted to be involved in investigating terrorist plots, directly engag-
ing terrorists during unfolding attacks, or pursuing attackers (and/or
10
The law (18 USC 1385) specifies the Army and Air Force. Defense department policy
extends the prohibition to the Navy and Marines. There are some exceptions to
Act’s prohibition on military involvement in domestic law enforcement, but there is
presently no terrorism exception (Klinger and Grossman; Schmidt and Klinger).
those who supported them) in the wake of attacks.11 Only civilian law
enforcement can legally do these things.
If one were to view mass-casualty attacks as acts of war, on the other
hand, the Posse Comitatus Act would not apply, and military assets
could be brought to bear to deal with terrorist attacks in the United
States. The U.S. Constitution and various federal statutes give the pres-
ident and military commanders a good deal of latitude when it comes
to using the military to deal with armed incursions, insurrections, and
other emergency situations that threaten life and limb (Schmidt and
Klinger, 2006). Under the “terror as a federal and military matter”
framework, both the military and civilian law enforcement could be
brought to bear to investigate, engage, and pursue terrorists.
A second key policy consideration concerns what to do with sus-
pected terrorists upon capture. The terrorism-as-crime model would
require that suspected terrorists be handled by the relevant (state or,
most likely, federal) criminal justice apparatus. The detention of the
suspected terrorist would be defined as an arrest, and the purpose of
the arrest would be to enable the state to prosecute the suspected ter-
rorist for the crimes allegedly committed and, ultimately, to mete out
a punishment consistent with the statute(s) that the state asserts were
violated. It would follow, therefore, that suspected terrorists taken
into custody would be granted all of the rights afforded any other
criminal suspect. They would have to be read their Miranda rights
prior to questioning about the acts they were suspected of having per-
petrated, they would be entitled to legal counsel, and their captors
would have to cease questioning if they invoked their right to remain
silent. They would have access to civilian courts, knowledge of the
crimes for which they are being held, trial by jury, the right to appeal
convictions, and all of the other rights all other defendants have in
U.S. courts. In short, the logical result of defining terrorist attacks as
crimes would be to treat those suspected of committing such crimes as
common criminals who are subject to sanction, but with all the rights
and privileges any other criminal suspect would enjoy before, during,
and after trial.
11
In Tennessee v. Garner (1985) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that shooting a suspect
constituted a “seizure,” subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
If terrorism is defined as war, on the other hand, then an entirely

different sort of protocol for dealing with captured terrorists would
obtain. Suspected terrorists would be viewed not as criminal suspects,
but as prisoners of war. They would not be charged with crimes. They
would not be subject to criminal sanction for their actions. And they
would not have access to U.S. courts. The key reason for this differ-
ential treatment is that the purposes of detention in the contexts of
criminal conduct and war are quite different. Within the rubric of
the criminal law, detention serves first to ensure that defendants will
appear for adjudication of the charges leveled against them, and sec-
ond, as a form of punishment following a guilty verdict. Within the
rubric of war, detention of combatants is simply to ensure that those
captured do not return to the battlefield against the forces that seized
them. Because there is no intent to prosecute and punish, prison-
ers of war are not questioned to develop evidence against them. And
because the purpose of civilian courts is to adjudicate guilt or inno-
cence within the framework of enumerated rights, access to such
courts is moot where prisoners of war are concerned.
Although the legal differences between criminal suspects who are
arrested and individuals who are prisoners of war are quite clear, the
modalities of terrorism blur the distinctions and have given rise to
considerable debate since the attacks of September 11, 2001, about
how to treat suspected terrorists upon capture (Feldman). The key
issue is that the international agreements that govern the treatment
of prisoners of war – most notably the Geneva Conventions12 – were
developed to deal with warfare between nation-states carried out by
uniformed members of national militaries. As noted earlier, however,
with the advent of fourth-generation warfare, combatants and their
sponsors are not so clearly delineated. It is unlikely that terrorists
bent on carrying out mass-casualty attacks will be acting clearly on the
behalf of any specific nation-state, and they will almost certainly not
be wearing the uniform of any nation. Given all this, the dictates of
the Geneva Conventions and other international protocols relevant
to the treatment of prisoners of war do not automatically apply to
captured terrorists.
12
See, e.g., “Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War”
adopted August 12, 1949, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm.
One of the more visible aspects of the ongoing controversy regard-

ing the treatment of individuals apprehended in anti-terror opera-
tions concerns the legal process to which they are subject. President
Bush claimed that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Joint
Resolution enacted by Congress following the attacks of September
11, 2001, gives the president sweeping authority to, among other
things, designate individuals (including U.S. citizens) who have taken
up arms against the United States as “enemy combatants,” and have
them detained indefinitely in military custody. Individuals who have
been detained pursuant this purported presidential prerogative
have challenged their detention, claiming in federal court that they
should either be charged with specific crimes or released from cus-
tody. The courts, however, have so far upheld the president’s power to
designate and detain enemy combatants (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld; Padilla
v. Hanft). Wrangling regarding the legal status of those suspected of
being involved in terrorist activities is by no means over, however, as
there are many issues regarding enemy combatants and other defini-
tional concerns that have yet to be resolved in our courts.13 With the
arrival of the Obama administration, some changes in how the execu-
tive branch views the role of the courts when dealing with suspected
terrorists are emerging.
CONCLUSION
The legal state of affairs is emblematic of the larger conceptual

confusion about how best to define terrorism in the modern world, in
which law is a dominant institution. The rubric of crime frames much
understanding of aggressive action, and the face of military action is
moving from clear battles between nations to murky fights between
and among a wide variety of actors. As criminologists, practitioners,
13
In November of 2001, for example, President Bush issued a Military Order regu-
lating the “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism,” which holds that noncitizens whom the president has “reason
to believe” are involved in terrorism may be subject to military detention and tried
by military tribunals for violations of “applicable law.” This order was quickly con-
demned by various individuals and groups as running counter to long-standing
American (and international) legal tradition. U.S. Courts have yet to rule on the
legality of the order.
and the public at large cast about seeking a way out of the conceptual
fog, we believe that it is appropriate to think outside the somewhat
narrow war/crime framework that has dominated consideration of
this matter.
One of the more creative treatments we have seen can be found
in Doug Burgess’s intriguing 2005 essay, “The Dread Pirate Bin
Laden: How Thinking of Terrorists as Pirates can Help Win the War
on Terror.” In it, Burgess argues that rather than trying to develop a
fresh framework for terrorism, we should look back into history where
we will find a well-developed legal framework for both defining and
dealing with terrorists: international law regarding piracy on the high
seas. We did not address international law in our discussion of terror
as crime for the simple reason that international law does not clearly
define terrorism as a crime. Burgess asserts that this situation should
be rectified, because international law is the place to properly legislate
against terror, as it truly is an international phenomenon.
In his argument for such law, he notes (a) that piracy was outlawed
under Roman law, with pirates defined as hostis humani generis, or
“enemies of the human race”; (b) that after the fall of Rome, piracy –
which by definition is carried out by nonstate actors – flourished for
several centuries as both a tool to express the political desires of pirate
groups and as an instrument of foreign policy by nations who spon-
sored pirates to act against their enemies; and (c) that it was outlawed
by the European powers in the Treaty of Paris in 1856 when they
realized that pirates presented a grave threat to international order.
He goes on to note that the international consensus against piracy has
driven the practice into the shadows to the point where it no longer
poses a major threat to international order. If international law were
similarly to forbid terrorism and hold to account nations who sponsor
it, Burgess argues, we would see the threat posed by terrorism abate
in a similar fashion.
It is an open question whether an international consensus against
terrorism can be developed and used to declare terrorists “enemies of
the human race,” and then to give rise to an international regime to
move against terrorists. Whatever the case, Burgess’s argument shows
that creative thinking can help us view terrorism beyond the narrow
confines of the war/crime box, and thus arrive at potential solutions
to it. It is our hope that this chapter prompts others to engage in cre-
ative thought that will help us better understand the manifestation of
aggression known as terrorism, and ultimately to develop means to
massively reduce the threat that it poses to our way of life.
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August 2005).
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and Peter Paret, introductory essays by Peter Paret, Michael
Howard, and Bernard Brodie, with commentatry by Bernard
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CASES CITED
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004.

Padilla v. Hanft, 2005.
Tennessee v. Garner, 1985.
chapter three
The Etiology of Terrorism

Identifying, Defining, and Studying Terrorists
Wayman C. Mullins and Quint C. Thurman
Identification is the first step in assessing, predicting, and ultimately

intervening effectively in terrorist actions. To date, there has been
limited success in identifying who terrorists are and where they can
be found, tracking their activities, and then preventing them from
engaging in attacks in the future. Despite successes by law-enforce-
ment authorities at intercepting terrorists, whether reported to the
public or not, a single unrestrained terrorist group or individual who
succeeds in an attack can render devastating consequences. Just as
Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City and al Qaeda in New York dem-
onstrated, even overlooking one terrorist or terrorist cell can have
significant, deadly societal and political ramifications.
But how were terrorists in the Oklahoma bombing and 9/11
allowed to slip through the cracks? Sophisticated intelligence-
gathering capabilities, state-of-the-art investigative procedures, and
other threat-analysis techniques seemingly failed in these instances.
What specifically went wrong? Or did anything go wrong that was pre-
ventable? Why were we not able to identify these terrorists? Had they
been identified, could we have stopped them from committing acts of
mass murder against a helpless civilian population? This chapter will
address the fundamental issues of defining terrorism and terrorists,
and examine our ability to understand these phenomena. It will fur-
ther examine the challenge of collecting data concerning the threat
terrorism poses to public safety.
40
the etiology of terrorism 41
DEFINING TERRORISM
One of the most significant difficulties in the identification of ter-

rorism and terrorist individuals or groups is that of multiple defini-
tions of basic terms. There seem to be nearly as many definitions of
terrorism – ranging from simplistic to overly complex – as there are
authorities studying them and agencies responsible for defending the
country against them. Defining terrorism is a challenge that precludes
a unified approach for combating terrorism. If agencies, law enforce-
ment, researchers, and others cannot reach agreement on what ter-
rorism is or is not, there can be little hope of establishing an adequate
data base from which to study and effectively defend against it.
One of the oldest definitions still used today is Thornton’s: “Terrorism
is a symbolic action designed to influence political behavior by extra-
normal means entailing the use or threat of violence.” Approximately
a decade later, Sobel (1975) defined terrorism as “almost all illegal acts
of violence committed for political purposes by clandestine groups.”
According to Krieger (1977): “Terrorism is nongovernmental pub-
lic violence or a threat performed by an individual or small group
and aimed at achieving social or political goals that may be subna-
tional, national, or international.” Lodge (1981) wrote that terrorism
was “an organized pattern of violent behavior designed to influence
government policy or intimidate the population for the purpose of
influencing government policy.” Friedlander (1981) defined terror-
ism as “the use of force, violence, or threats thereof to attain political
goals through fear, intimidation, or coercion.”
Wardlaw emphasized the political dimension in his definition. For
him, “political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence by an
individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to estab-
lished authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety
and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the imme-
diate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to
the political demands of the perpetrators.” Similarly, Combs (2000)
defined terrorism as “a synthesis of war and theater, a dramatization
of the most proscribed kind of violence – that which is perpetrated on
innocent victims – played before an audience in the hope of creating

a mood of fear, for political purposes.” But Combs’s is one of the few
definitions that require actual violence to be committed, rather than
either actual or threatened violence.
Howard and Sawyer defined terrorism as the “deliberate creation
and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in
the pursuit of political change.” Cooper’s (2004) definition treats ter-
rorism as “the intentional generation of massive fear by human beings
for the purpose of securing or maintaining control over other human
beings.” In Poland’s view, terrorism is “the premeditated, deliberate,
systematic murder, mayhem, and threatening of the innocent to create
fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage,
usually to influence an audience.”
One of the most frequently cited definitions of terrorism has been
posited by Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation: “the use or
threatened use of force designed to bring about political change.”
According to Jenkins (1975), terrorism is a unique form of combat
because it identifies noncombatants and then directs attacks against
them, whereas the true victims are the people watching the act. Along
with actual violence, the threat of further violence was considered an
essential aspect of terrorism.
Federal agencies have developed their own definitions of terrorism.
In some cases, even units within the same agencies (e.g., branches
of the military within the Defense Department, or the ATF and FBI
in the Department of Justice) have different definitions of terrorism.
The U.S. Air Force has defined terrorism as “the culturally unaccept-
able use or threat of violence directed toward symbolic targets to
influence political behavior either directly through fear, intimidation,
or coercion, or indirectly by affecting attitudes, emotions, or opinions”
(1985). The Department of Defense definition of terrorism focuses
on the goals of the terrorist. They claim terrorism is “the unlawful
use – or threatened use of – force or violence against individuals or
property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to
achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives” (Howard and
Sawyer).
In 1986, a U.S. vice-presidential task force defined terrorism as
“the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property
to further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to intim-

idate or coerce a government, individuals, or groups, or to modify
their behavior or politics” (Simonson and Spindlove, 2004). The
U.S. State Department (2002) uses a legalist definition of terror-
ism, using the definition in Title 22, United States Code, Section
2656f(d): “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”
Within government and law-enforcement circles, the FBI defini-
tion of terrorism appears to be the one most often used. The 1986
FBI definition of terrorism is still in use today: “the unlawful use of
force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce
a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives” (2005). Though this def-
inition has received some widespread use, it is not universal. Even
when terrorists commit acts that fit the definition, local police agen-
cies may classify the act as criminal rather than terroristic (White,
1991). Also, even the FBI does not classify an act unless a specific
group claims responsibility (Smith).
Some argue that of the governmental definitions of terrorism, the
Department of Defense definition is preferable to any of the others,
as it deals with the threat of terrorism as well as acts of violence. It
includes a focus on targeting societies as will as governments, and it
considers religious and ideological acts as terrorism (Howard and
Sawyer). Unlike the FBI definition, however, it does not consider the
social aspects of the act.
The previous paragraphs have provided merely a sampling of defi-
nitions. The most comprehensive listing of definitions, which has
grown substantially since 9/11, was provided by Schmid. Even over a
decade ago, Schmid discovered over one hundred definitions for ter-
rorism. An analysis of those definitions revealed twenty-two repeated
dimensions. Some of the most common dimensions included in
the covered definitions was the use of violence or force (83.5 per-
cent of the definitions), political goals or outcomes (65 percent),
fear or terror in a population (51 percent), the threat of violence
(47 percent), produce psychological reactions (41.5 percent), dif-
ferentiation between victim and target (37.5 percent), and the act
being organized, planned, systematic, and one with a purpose (32

percent). Other dimensions mentioned in approximately one-third
of the definitions were the methods of action (strategy, tactic – 30.5
percent), outside of normal human constraints and outside accepted
rules of combat (30 percent), and use of coercion or extortion (28
percent). Less common were dimensions of publicity (21.5 percent),
indiscriminate attacks (21 percent), civilians and noncombatants as
victims (17.5 percent), use of intimidation (17 percent), innocence of
victims (15.5 percent), group of terrorists rather than individuals (14
percent), and attack as demonstration or symbolism (13.5 percent).
A few definitions mentioned unpredictability and unexpectedness (9
percent), covertness (9 percent), ongoing or serial campaign of vio-
lence (7 percent), criminality of act (6 percent), and demands made
to third parties present (4 percent).
Simonson and Spindlove identified five categories of definitions.
According to their schema, terrorist definitions could include a simple
definition (“Violence or threatened violence intended to produce fear
or change”), a legal definition (“Criminal violence violating legal codes
and punishable by the state”), an analytical definition (“Specific politi-
cal and social factors behind individual violent acts”), a state-sponsored
definition (“National or other groups used to attack Western or other
interests”), and a state terrorism definition (“Power of the government
used to repress its people to the point of submission”).
Whittaker summed up the various definitions of terrorism as includ-
ing illegitimate force for a political objective used against innocent
civilians, a strategy of violence to produce fear in the public, and use
of force or threatened force to cause political change. Martin summa-
rized the common features of formal definitions as illegal use of force,
subnational terrorists, unconventional methods, political motives,
targeting of civilians or passive military, and acts to affect a watch-
ing audience. The elements listed by Whittaker and Martin do not
seem to have wide consensus. In the world of terrorism today, some
elements may not be applicable, most notably those dealing with
targets. As has been seen in Iraq, terrorists are not hesitant to attack
an active, well-prepared, and heavily armed military to attempt to sway
public opinion against the war, thus falling outside the passive military
parameters listed by Martin.
In examining the listed definitions (and the summary of Schmid,

1988), a few common threads emerge, but these tendencies are
far from universal (Mullins). First, violence is a tool used by terror-
ists, not a goal of terrorism. Second, terrorism involves violence or
threatened violence. Third, terrorism is political. Even when terror-
ists profess a religious basis, their ultimate aims are political. The
Christian Identity movement in the United States, for example, wants
to remove what they believe is a Zionist Occupational Government
(ZOG) because it is a government preventing the second coming of
Christ. This religious belief translates into a political goal. Special-
interest or single-issue terrorists are similar. Rallying around the goal
of saving animals, animal-rights activists that resort to terrorism want
the laws dealing with animal-human interactions changed. Fourth,
inducing fear in the audience is the goal of terrorism. Fifth, violence
is directed at those who might be watching. Victims are chosen for
the impact they might have on the target population (Weinzierl).
Governments and laws are changed by the people (at least in the
United States). Producing fear in a population ultimately leads to
political change.
Trying to avoid some of these definitional problems, Bolz, Dudonis,
and Schulz have tried to identify common elements that were shared
by all terrorists rather than developing a specific definition. To them,
terrorism is a form of theater that (1) uses violence to persuade, (2)
selects targets for their maximum propaganda value, (3) engages in
unprovoked attacks, (4) conducts attacks that provide maximum pub-
licity with minimum risk, (5) uses surprise to foil countermeasures,
(6) uses threat, harassment, and violence merely as tools rather than
means to an end, (7) has no regard for women and children as vic-
tims, (8) uses propaganda to maximize the effects of violence, and (9)
sanctions loyalty to no one but the group itself.
Recognizing and identifying these threads, however, does not bring
closure to the definitional problem, and does not get us any closer to
answering the question of what terrorism is or is not. With any defi-
nition one wishes to use, many acts of terrorism can be omitted, and
many nonterrorist acts can be included. As Simonson and Spindlove
point out, terrorism is a special type of violence that is also a crimi-
nal offense. They argue that moral beliefs and “sociological-political
mumbo-jumbo” is not necessary to understanding the term. Histo-

rically in the United States, terrorism has not been illegal per se.
Individuals engaging in terrorism have been tried under criminal
statutes for the criminality of their acts. Timothy McVeigh and Terry
Nichols (Oklahoma Federal Building bombers) were charged fed-
erally with violation of civil rights for each person they killed, and
with multiple counts of murder by the State of Oklahoma. Only since
9/11 has there been federal legislation making terrorism an illegal
act (sedition has always been illegal under federal statutes, but prov-
ing a person’s intent to overthrow the government because of what
he or she believes or talks about has, in several cases, proven impossi-
ble). Even classifying certain acts as terrorism, however, does little to
resolve these issues. Even recognizing certain acts as “terrorism,” the
FBI still classifies these acts in the Uniform Crime Report as criminal
(White, 2006). Likewise, most law-enforcement agencies do not con-
sider such acts as terrorist, preferring instead to place them under the
rubric of criminal activity.
The inability to adequately define the phenomenon sets the stage
for our inability to understand anything that follows. If one cannot
define a phenomenon, how then can one understand it, identify the
actors, or engage in meaningful analysis, threat assessment, plan-
ning and prediction, or successful intervention? Those researchers
and government agencies that adopt a specific definition and try to
categorize and provide a chronology of terrorist acts have to make a
subjective judgment about every single act they examine for inclusion
or exclusion. Chronologies vary by completeness and tend to have a
moderate degree of overlap.
The problem has become so acute that the U.S. Department of State
discontinued publishing their annual Patterns of Global Terrorism
report amid controversy over incidents reported. Their last report fea-
tured incidents occurring in 2003 (U.S. Department of State, 2005).
In it, they listed 190 cases, thus laying claim to the lowest total since
1969. Officials later said the report was full of methodological errors
(caused by its definitional problems) and that the department had
greatly underestimated the total number of terrorist attacks (Reid).
The National Counterterrorism Center data set, discussed in a later
section, has replaced the Department of State report.
Another issue concerning our ability to define terrorism concerns

the changing nature of terrorism over time. To take just the United
States as an example, there are major shifts in terrorist groups every
couple of decades. In recent history, the 1960s and 1970s were char-
acterized by activities of the so called Marxist-leftist groups such as
the SDS (Students for a Democratic Society), Weather Underground,
United Freedom Front, and M-19 (to name only a few). The black
power movement was loosely allied with that movement. Groups like
the Black Panthers, Black Liberation Army, and New Afrikan Freedom
Fighters shared resources, intelligence, membership, and tactics with
the other leftist groups. In the 1980s, as we saw those groups recede
from policy space (primarily due to arrest by law enforcement), the
far-right extremist movement took center-stage and grabbed the head-
lines with their violence. Race-hater groups, neo-Nazis, compound
dwellers/survivalists, skinheads, and the Christian Identity movement
became part of the terrorist vernacular and held sway. The Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), United Klans of America, American Nazi
Party, Elohim City, and Aryan Nations were at the forefront of ter-
rorism in America (Freilich, 2003). Within that movement, terror-
ists come from so many varied backgrounds and conduct such varied
actions that development of a predictive model is virtually impossi-
ble, even with adequate data. Just as our law-enforcement efforts at
controlling their violence began to pay dividends (along with Father
Time – several of the key leaders like Richard Butler, Rick Redfairn,
and William Pierce died of natural causes, and they were pretty much
the glue that held the movement together), America was attacked by
al Qaeda. Since that time, the major domestic terrorist threat has been
special-interest or single-issue terrorism. Groups like ALF (Animal
Liberation Front) and ELF (Environmental Liberation Front) have
become the most violent domestic terrorists in America, and are con-
sidered by the FBI to be the number-one domestic terrorist threat
in our country (Richardson, 2005). Since 1996, AFL and ELF have
engaged in over six hundred terrorist acts, resulting in over $43 mil-
lion in damages. But, it is worth noting, that prior to 9/11, the FBI (by
their definition) did not consider these groups terroristic. Because of
the concern with international terrorism, the activities of these single-
issue groups has been virtually ignored.
Throughout American history, instances of terrorism have been

evident in the maturational development of the country. From the
founding militia groups that fought the British (Sons of Liberty) to
the range wars of the 1800s, and from the anarchist/socialist move-
ment of the early 1900s to the labor movement of the 1910s and
1920s, terrorism has played a role in our history and ethos. The U.S.
government resorted to terrorism (depending on how broadly one
defines it) to eliminate the American Indian threat in its efforts to
expand westward. As early as the 1810s, the government was supply-
ing smallpox- and influenza-infected blankets to the Missouri Valley,
Ozark Mountain American Indian tribes (and some believe as many
as 12 million were killed by disease). General George Armstrong
Custer was reviled by American Indians for his tactics of terrorism
against their tribes (and also for using disease-infected blankets). In
the 1960s, it could be argued that Operation Phoenix in Vietnam
was a government-sponsored terrorist operation against the North
Vietnamese.
The point of this discussion is not to confess guilt or assign fault,
but to point out that terrorism has many manifestations that must be
understood in the context of time, social variables, political factors,
economic conditions, and other group/societal dynamics. Would an
American Indian of 1812 equate the actions of the federal govern-
ment passing out smallpox-infected blankets to those of al Qaeda on
9/11?
As in the United States, the international nature of terrorism is
changing. The breakup of the Soviet Union, proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction, technological advances, and centralization
of American infrastructures all have contributed to changes in inter-
national terrorism (Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz, 2002). These changes
affect our ability to adequately define terrorism.
TERRORIST ACTORS
Given the problem of defining what terrorism is, it should be no sur-

prise that there also is a lack of consensus concerning what a terrorist
is. A common typology of terrorism has proven to be as elusive as an
adequate definition of terrorism. In part, a typology might be useful
for understanding what motivates terrorists to commit acts of ter-

rorism. Given a motivation, we can begin to predict future activities,
types of targets, types of attacks, and then ultimately the development
of counter- and anti-terrorism strategies. For example, classifying a
terrorist as an eco-terrorist allows some degree of prediction and
planning about what types of targets will be selected, what types of
operations will be conducted, and what needs to be done to prevent
those operations. But, even when a typology is this clear and straight-
forward, some ambiguity, uncertainty, and unpredictability remains.
Consider that many eco-terrorists also might be involved in animal-
rights terrorism. In addition, this overlap in typology increases the
difficulty in understanding and researching these groups. Far-right
terrorists can be identified as Christian Identity, compound dwellers/
survivalists, neo-Nazis, race haters, and militias (Mullins, 1997).
Many of the groups on the far right reflect several or all of these
types. Even the largest, most violent, and most well-known group,
the Aryan Nations, has elements of all these typologies. Primarily a
Christian Identity movement, they also teach and practice neo-Nazi
beliefs (their uniforms and “salute” reflect a Nazi influence), they are
compound dwellers and survivalists (apocalyptic beliefs), race haters
(KKK influence and element), and militia-oriented. This is part of
the reason that each type of group has no common methodology.
Members within the Christian Identity movement, for example, have
engaged in acts ranging from simple assaults on minorities to long-
term standoffs with federal authorities (Ruby Ridge siege in Idaho,
but not the Branch Davidians in Waco, who were a cult), and from
mass murder (Buford Furrow in California) to bombing attacks, mak-
ing plans to conduct widespread chemical-agent attacks (The Order),
and disrupting social and political order. It could be asked what kind
of terrorist was Timothy McVeigh? According to the media, he was
associated with the militia movement. Among his belongings, a large
body of KKK and Christian Identity literature was found. In interviews,
he professed beliefs in neo-Nazism.
Typologies of international terrorists have not been overly helpful.
Most have been subjective in nature, too broad in descriptive power,
and less than helpful in explaining terrorist behavior and actions.
This is not surprising given the lack of definitional consistency. Many
typologies are little more than loose descriptors that could apply to
a wide range of groups and people, terrorist or not. The problem
becomes even more acute when considering the individual as terrorist
(Arena and Arrigo, 2005; Corley, Smith, and Damphousse, 2005).
Thornton (1964) classified terrorists as enforcement (governmen-
tal terror) or agitational (organized group against a government).
Agitational terrorists conducted operations to right some perceived
wrong or to arouse a population against their government. May’s typol-
ogy (1974) considered terrorists as regime- (government conducted)
or siege-oriented (similar to Thornton’s agitational form). A typology
used by Hacker (1978) classified terrorists as crusaders (idealistic,
wanting political change), criminals (persons who commit terrorist acts
for personal gain), and crazies (emotionally disturbed). Schmid and
deGraaf (1982) considered terrorists as insurgents (terrorism against
a state), as having repressive or state origins (government terrorism),
or vigilantes (terrorism directed against nonstate persons). Further,
they distinguished insurgent terrorism according to social revolution-
ary (terrorism to cause worldwide revolution), separatist/nationalis-
tic/ethnic (terrorism against one part of society, not government as a
whole), and single-issue groups (terrorism to grant privilege to a spe-
cific group). Gregor (1983) argued that terrorists are instrumental
(impair functioning of state), demonstrative (fear in entire popula-
tions), prophylactic (preparatory for resistance or rebellion), or inci-
dental (criminal incidents that effect innocents). Wilkinson (1977,
2000) classified terrorists as criminal (for financial or material gain),
psychic (magic beliefs, superstitions, myths fed by fanatical religious
beliefs), oriented toward war (elimination of enemy by any means),
or political (political goals); and political terrorists could be subclas-
sified as revolutionaries (causing revolution), subrevolutionaries
(political motives other than government overthrow), and repressive
(directed against a specific group to suppress or restrain). Bolz et al.
(2002) developed a typology that included minority nationalists,
Marxist revolutionaries, anarchists, neo-fascists/right-wing extremists,
pathological groups/individuals, religious groups, and ideological
mercenaries. Poland (2005) classified terrorists as political, criminal,
pathological (motivated by some psychological aberration or other
emotional state), labor (workers against bosses or companies), and
war (military use of terrorism). Post, Ruby, and Shaw (2002) expanded
on a typology proposed by Schmid and Jongman (1988). They
classified terrorists as national-separatist or ethno-nationalist (estab-
lish state based on ethnicity), social revolutionary (left-wing), religious
fundamentalist (apocalyptic), religious extremist (closed cults), and
right-wing (racial supremacist). These represent only a fraction of
the typologies listed in the literature (see Mullins, 1997 for a more
comprehensive listing).
Many of the categories of terrorists in these typologies make little
sense in the abstract, and may even serve to obscure terrorist moti-
vations rather than illuminate them. Typologies are dependent in
large part on the definition of terrorism the writer has chosen. As
do terrorists, motivations change over time, which means even the
best of typologies are time limited. As terrorists change, the names we
use to identify them and the names they use to describe themselves
changes over time. Some names are chosen to signify a military affili-
ation (Army of God or 1st Brigade, Texas Militia), some to denote a
freedom or liberation movement (United Freedom Front), some to
signify a self-defense movement (White Aryan Resistance), some to
show a cause of righteous vengeance (Covenant, Sword, and Army
of the Lord), or some a neutral name (Shining Path) (Howard and
Sawyer, 2003). Some chose names to signify several “unified move-
ments” (Symbionese Liberation Army), some to show separation from
established states or governments (Aryan Nations), and some select
a name because of the fear it induces in future victims or the popu-
lation watching. Any group who adopts the KKK as part or all of its
name likely does so in part because of the violent historical connota-
tions the Klan name carries. The very name, even in the absence of
any violence, produces fear and panic.
Many of the typologies that have been developed are ones that indi-
cate the typology creator’s moral viewpoint. Terrorist and terrorism
are terms we give to enemies that do not fit a clear categorization of
criminal or war opponent. We label people and groups as terrorists
to simplify a complex problem and disparate group of enemies of the
United States. We use the term to understand a behavior that can-
not be understood, a set of motivations that are alien to our sense of
order, and a hatred of a way of life that we enjoy and take for granted.
At some level, our inability to define terrorism, understand the moti-

vations and causes of terrorism, or psychoanalyze terrorists becomes
an academic exercise.
MYTHS BROUGHT ABOUT FROM PROBLEMS

WITH DEFINITION AND TYPOLOGY
First and foremost, it should be recognized that, as a general rule, the

media gets it wrong. The media often does not understand terrorism,
terrorists, or the actual threat that terrorists pose. Read virtually any
media report (or listen to any news report) about a terrorist act and
within that one article, the term “terrorist” or “terrorism” will be freely
interchanged with terms like fundamentalist, extremist, guerrilla,
resistance fighter, reactionary, commando, and insurgent. Terrorists
are terrorists. They are not fundamentalists, extremists, insurgents,
or any other term they are labeled. The oft-described “insurgents”
in Iraq and Afghanistan that have placed IEDs that killed American
military personnel and local civilians are terrorists who are trying to
create fear and sway public opinion in the United States. They may
hold fundamentalist or extremist beliefs, have those motivations, and
may perceive themselves as guerrilla fighters waging war. But it is their
behavior rather than their beliefs or perceptions that define them. By
focusing on what may or may not be their motivations for violence
rather than the destructive nature of their attacks, the media makes
it easier for terrorists to operate and harder for us to defend against
them.
From an academic perspective, there have been an incredible
number of books, published articles, and other research analyses by
terrorism “experts” and researchers. Prior to 9/11, terrorism sources
were rare, hard to find, and out of the mainstream. Since 9/11, a
flood of information has been published relating to terrorism, and
the number of “experts” who have appeared on the scene have pro-
liferated. Some of the information contained in these sources will be
explored in this chapter. However, we choose not to reference the
specific source of these myths so as not to embarrass anyone working
in earnest to better understand this phenomenon. Suffice it to say,
that we, like any researcher, scientist, data analyst, have had our share
of mistakes when trying to learn about a relatively rarely studied sub-

ject. Rather, our intent in this section is to help the reader avoid past
mistakes and advance the learning curve. It is our intent to explore
some of the mythology that has been published concerning terrorism
to illustrate the difficulty in studying and analyzing terrorism.
One author has attributed the beginning of terrorism to the
hashashin (assassins) of the Middle Ages. Actually, terrorism is much
older. Terrorism has been around as long as societies have been
around. Moses used terrorism against the Pharaoh of Egypt to free
the Israelites. Regardless of the definition used, terrorism has been a
tool of governments, autonomous groups, and individuals since the
earliest days of civilization. Individuals, tribes and clans, societies, and
almost all governments ever in existence have used terrorism to fur-
ther political goals. Terrorism is not a Middle Ages, Near-east, Asian,
African, or Western European phenomenon.
Several accounts have characterized 9/11 as the first time Americans
have experienced terrorism on the home front. Earlier, mention
was made of several historical antecedents of terrorist activity in the
United States. A chronology of all terrorist activity in this country since
discovery by Columbus would fill several volumes. International ter-
rorists have conducted actions and have been arrested in the United
States prior to 9/11. One author even stated that 9/11 was the first
instance of terrorism in the nation. We suspect he simply forgot about
the Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing that killed 169 inno-
cent people.
Terms such as “horrifying,” and “terrifying” are routinely used to
describe “weapons of mass destruction” and their use by terrorists.
Apocalyptic scenarios are presented that would suggest the end of
civilization as we know it. The use of any of the chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBN) weapons is presented as a doomsday
scenario that is unsurvivable. In the mid-1990s, the descriptor NBC for
these weapons began to be replaced with weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The assumption was that the release of any of these weapons
would result in massive casualties. Researchers and writers spoke of
casualty rates in the tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and
millions. These weapons were believed to be true doomsday weapons.
Many readers, in fact, may remember in spring of 2004 when the
government elevated the threat level due to fears of a chemical or

biological weapon being released. Many home supply stores saw a sig-
nificant increase in the sale of plastic sheeting and duct tape. Not only
were these fears fueled by the media, they were also fed by “experts”
selected by the media to present mass-casualty scenarios and pro-
duce unnecessary and unreasonable fear in the public. Even before
this, however, the reality of these weapons was proven different. The
anthrax mailings in fall 2001 clearly demonstrated the reality of NBC
weapons (nuclear, biological, chemical – or CBNR, chemical, bio-
logical, nuclear, radiological – various acronyms are used and all are
acceptable). They are not necessarily “weapons of mass destruction.”
They are difficult to prepare, difficult to deploy, and once deployed,
have limiting effect (the detonation of a nuclear device would be the
exception). Preparedness scenarios and exercises being conducted
by the government and law-enforcement agencies stress the limiting
nature of destruction, and contain plans to deal with the mass panic
that would ensue with the release of a chemical, biological, or radio-
logical agent. There is a responsibility by the “experts” to inform of
the true nature of these weapons. Language today is reverting back to
the NBC descriptor.
It has been frequently stated that one man’s terrorist is another
man’s patriot or freedom fighter. Although both are involved in
destructive activity, terrorists are distinguishable in terms of their
respective purposes, targets, motivations, and goals. Nor are terrorists
guerrillas. Guerrilla groups are larger, operate more as a military unit
or army, operate in the open, attempt to take and hold territory, and
maintain political control over captured territory or people (Howard
and Sawyer, 2003). This myth (and use of interchangeable terms)
continues to exist and to be published as some “Holy Grail mantra”
to cover a host of sins against humanity. In a similar vein, hate crime
is often referred to as terrorism. Hate crime can be committed by
terrorists (either deliberately or as a consequence), but it is a specific
type of crime, not a type of terrorism. Hate crime is a legal term and
specific legal violation (White, 2002).
Another author presented a chronology of terrorist incidents against
Americans in the decade of the 1980s. It was not entirely clear whether
or not this was intended to be a complete chronology or a sample, but
it appeared the intent of the author was to provide a complete chro-

nology. The author listed seventeen incidents! A quick perusal of any
one of the yearly U.S. Department of State annual reports (Patterns
of Global Terrorism) or any other chronology would quickly show the
inaccuracy and gross underreporting of this chronology.
One author stated that terrorism is more effective today than ever
before. We would argue that the opposite is the case, that the empha-
sis given by government agencies, the military, and local law enforce-
ment has made terrorism less effective than ever before. Fewer terrorist
acts are being committed than in past years, more terrorists are being
identified and arrested than ever before, and more plots uncovered
and halted than in the past. Public awareness is higher than it has
ever been, and people are aware of the threat and are cognizant of
their role in preventing terrorism and taking action to help the gov-
ernment and law enforcement prevent terrorism. It is much more
difficult today to engage in terrorism than at any point in our nation’s
history. This is true regardless of whether one is an international or
domestic terrorist.
Still another author wrote that terrorism is not a random or
impulsive act of violence, but well planned and organized. Terrorists
routinely engage in random and impulsive acts. One of the more
noteworthy and notorious examples of this was the 1987 case of
Michael Donald, a Mobile, Alabama teenager who was abducted,
beaten, killed, and mutilated by two members of the United Klans of
America (Kornbluth, 1987). Another spur-of-the-moment attack that
illustrates the randomness of terrorism was evidenced in the drag-
ging death of James Byrd in Jasper, Texas. James Byrd was walking
home one evening when three white supremacists, who had been
drinking heavily and were cruising around looking for trouble, saw
him and dragged him behind their truck until his head separated
from his body.
It has been written that the military is ineffective against terror-
ists. Similarly, the same author suggested that terrorists avoid attack-
ing military forces. Our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq should
be sufficient to lay this myth to rest. Terrorists routinely attack our
military forces, especially in Iraq. The favored tactic is the use of
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as booby-traps. For every IED
that does explode, killing or wounding soldiers, hundreds are found

and defused. The terrorists responsible are being discovered and neu-
tralized. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, leftist terrorists in Europe
routinely selected military personnel and military bases for attack.
Puerto Rican terrorists have been targeting the American military in
Puerto Rico even longer.
DATA ISSUES
The claim has been made by some that terrorism does not follow
any behavioral pattern. Accordingly, this unpredictability is the lim-
iting factor in our ability to analyze, plan, predict, and intervene in
terrorist activities. Though specific terrorist events are not predict-
able, absent reliable intelligence, they do tend to follow behavioral
patterns, and their actions can be analyzed and predicted to some
extent. The issue becomes one of how the analyzer defines terrorism
and the terrorist. This has been a significant, limiting factor in our
analysis of terrorist activity rather than our inability to analyze data. As
with definitional issues, the question of what exactly to analyze is a core issue.
For any of the published analyses of terrorist activities, the definition
adopted and subjective interpretations made by the researcher have
been the limiting factors in effectively organizing data. For exam-
ple, in an early chronology by Marcia McKnight Trick covering the
years 1965–76 (Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism [NACCJSG],
1976), she omitted any acts committed by individuals not associated
with a group and any acts where a group did not claim responsibility.
One of the better nongovernment chronologies produced by Hewitt
(2003) used various data sources, including Trick’s chronology, the
FBI Annual Reports, Annual of Power and Conflict, newspaper reports,
magazine articles covering terrorist and criminal activity, and other
published reports. He omitted acts of spontaneous mob violence and
trivial attacks of vandalism and arson of less than $1,000. His chronol-
ogy included acts committed by foreign and domestic groups. Foreign
groups were subdivided into international and émigré. Domestic
groups were classified by ideological type into antiabortion extrem-
ists, black militants, the Jewish Defense League, revolutionary leftists,
and white supremacists. He did not include acts by eco-terrorists or
animal-rights terrorists.
Chronologies prepared by the Southern Poverty Law Center

(SPLC) include hate crime, bias crime, and other criminal activity,
while ignoring all other types of terrorism. They classify abortion-
clinic bombings as hate crime, not as single-issue terrorism. Many
of the activities they list, in fact, are more criminally oriented than
they are terroristic. This is not to say the SPLC chronology is bad or
flawed, but is a product of their definition, motivations, and interests
(as are all others).
Federally, the FBI and Department of State have published annual
chronologies of terrorist activity. The FBI Annual Reports includes
all acts of terrorism occurring in the United States, regardless of
whether the perpetrators are international or domestic terrorists. The
Department of State’s data set cover international events outside of
the United States that in anyway might threaten the security of U.S.
nationals or national security. With both data sets, however, incidents
for inclusion or exclusion depends upon the definition used by the
agency. Although the FBI began publishing their terrorist chronology
in 1980, many acts of political violence were not included. Abortion
clinics bombings were not part of the FBI data set (Ross, 1993). It was
not until after 9/11 that ecological or animal-rights terrorist activities
were included.
These datasets are not inherently wrong or misleading, but their
incompleteness can be harmful. They may force us to expend man-
power and effort in “looking under the wrong rocks” for terrorists,
while the real threat goes unnoticed. Resources often are not allocated
or are misallocated. Faulty data collection, analysis, and dissemina-
tion allowed the 9/11 terrorists to remain virtually undetected until
it was too late (and to further illustrate an earlier point, many writ-
ers, researchers, and analysts still refer to them as “hijackers”). All
are aware of the stories of the eighty-five-year-old, wheelchair-bound
airline passenger subjected to a full body search because of the pur-
chase of a one-way ticket, or whose name was pulled randomly by a
computer; all have heard of the infant prevented from flying because
his or her name came up on a watch list. Financial resources may be
misspent and expended in low-threat areas or arenas. In a striking
example of the cart leading the horse, AIR Worldwide Corporation
developed a computer model that identified potential terrorist tar-
gets nationwide (over 300,000 targets). For each target selected,
an assessment was made as to what might be the result if the target

was actually attacked by various means. Finally, they had a group of
counterterrorist subject-matter experts rate each target by type of
attack and make a probability model. Using this target-probability
model, they matched homeland security monies spent in the area by
target-attack probability. What AIR Worldwide discovered was that the
least-populated areas in the United States were receiving dispropor-
tionate shares of homeland security money. Wyoming, for example,
was identified as one of the least likely target areas in the United
States, but had been one of the states receiving the most homeland
security money per capita. Conversely, New York was one of the most
likely targeted areas, but had received the least money on a per capita
basis (Ripley, 2004).
Efforts have been under way and are ongoing to significantly
improve the identification and reporting of terrorist incidents that
affect Americans, both domestically and internationally. Formed in
2003, the Central Intelligence Agency manages the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC). Representatives from various govern-
ment agencies and the military daily sift through 5,000–6,000 pieces
of incoming intelligence daily, analyzing the data to identify and dis-
seminate terrorist intelligence (Burger, 2004). Their data is used for
the Presidential Daily Briefing on terrorist activity.
The most comprehensive and complete effort to date is a new
(2005) government database, the Worldwide Incidents Tracking
System (WITS) maintained by the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC). Now online and available for use by any researcher, the
NCTC data set is the most comprehensive database for terrorism,
both international and domestic, ever developed. More significantly,
it is a database that is fluid and can be changed to reflect problems,
biases, and changes in the nature of terrorism. According to the NCTC
(2005), they will adjust and improve their methodology, and main-
tain an “ongoing dialogue with experts inside and outside the gov-
ernment to further our collective goal of a meaningful compilation
of terrorism incident data.” For example, initially the Department of
State listed only one of two Russian airliners destroyed in flight by
Chechen rebels in 2004, because on one plane (the unlisted plane)
all of the passengers were Russian (the other was listed because one of
the passengers was Israeli) and did not meet the currently used defi-
nition of international terrorism. Because the other plane had at least
one foreign national on board, it did meet the criteria for reporting.
NCTC changed their definition of terrorism and then included the
other plane (Reid, 2005). Under the old definition, the Department
of State reported 651 international terrorist incidents for 2004, with
over 9,000 victims. Using their definition, the NCTC counted 3,192
worldwide attacks that injured, killed, or kidnapped 28,433 peo-
ple. The definitional change the NCTC made was to include politi-
cally motivated attacks conducted by an extremist group carried out
against citizens of their own country, and aimed at producing political
change in their own government’s policies (the Department of State
definition required at least one victim to be a citizen of another coun-
try). They also dropped a requirement that the act cause more than
$10,000 in damage or cause serious injury.
Each potential incident for inclusion in the NCTC database must
get approval from an Incident Adjudication Board, which is com-
posed of terrorism experts from the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, the Department of State, and
the Department of Homeland Security. This methodology reduces
the importance and impact of any specific definition of terrorism
or specific motivation or typology of the terrorist. A panel of review
eliminates any individual biases arising from definitional issues and
should make the resulting dataset the most useful and complete to
date. Using the NCTC database, researchers can search by region,
country, state/province, city, event type (i.e., armed attack, bombing,
hijacking, sabotage, etc.), perpetrator (Christian extremist, neo-Nazi/
fascist/white supremacist, tribal/clan, etc.), target, and/or victim
statistics (total victims, fatalities, wounded, hostages), or any combi-
nation of multiple variables. In a target search, the researcher can
specify facility type (aircraft, bus, checkpoint, etc.), facility character-
istics (Buddhist, Jewish, Western, American, etc.), facility nationality,
facility damage, victim type (ambassador, clergy, educator, etc.), victim
characteristic (Buddhist, Muslim, Sunni, not American, Western,
etc.), and victim nationality.
In sum, the NCTC database of terrorist incidents promises to
overcome many of the problems discussed previously. It is the most
comprehensive and complete data set ever developed, maintained,

and shared. Using this data set, the researcher or analyst can select
incidents that fit their criteria and definition, and isolate types of inci-
dents for study.
CONCLUSION
Our difficulty in building an adequate predictive model for terrorism

largely centers on our inability to adequately define terrorism and to
understand who is a terrorist. We lack a usable, basic definition for
terrorism upon which we can agree. Furthermore, we seemingly can-
not develop an accepted typology for identifying terrorists and cannot
agree on who the actors are. It is then not surprising that we have
inadequate predictive models in place that can be used by anti- and
counterterrorist agencies to help prevent terrorism.
Hoffman (2004) suggested that we may be asking the wrong ques-
tions and looking for the “nuclear bomb in the haystack” instead of
looking for the most common attack pattern. According to Hoffman,
“Many academic terrorism analyses – when they venture into the realm
of future possibilities if at all – do so only tepidly. In the main, they are
self-limited to mostly lurid hypotheses of worst-case scenarios, almost
exclusively involving CBRN weapons as opposed to trying to under-
stand why – with the exception of September 11 – terrorists have only
rarely realized their true killing potential.” Hoffman argues that we
should be looking at what has not happened; that the middle group is
where the United States is most vulnerable and where our predictive
efforts should focus. He suggests that some attack possibilities that
need consideration include (1) SAM (surface-to-air missile) attacks
against airplanes (which the British SAS regularly prepares for); (2)
simple weapons like RPGs (rocket propelled grenade launchers)
used to attack planes while landing or taking off; (3) use of ultra-light
planes or unmanned drone aircraft to attack heavily defended targets
(an FAA scenario and ongoing concern); (4) mass-coordinated attacks
using conventional weapons (as seen in the London bombings in July
2005); (5) disruptive attacks on mass-transit systems or cyberspace
(a scenario that became reality in June 2005 in London when terror-
ists attacked the subway system and a bus); (6) marine attacks against
passenger liners or explosive ships such as liquid natural gas (LNG)

ships (one domestic terrorist group in the United States, The Order,
planned to conduct such an attack in the mid-1980s on an LNG ship
in Seattle’s harbor – an attack some experts said would be equivalent
to the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima in World War II);
(7) agricultural or livestock attacks using biological or chemical
weapons (Texas A&M University has established a center to research
agricultural or livestock terrorist attacks); (8) using the threat of
CBNR to produce panic, or conducting a limited attack using those
weapons for the purpose of producing mass panic; and (9) conven-
tional weapon attacks on industrial or chemical plants to produce a
Bhopal-type incident. We would add the scenario of the lone suicide
bomber entering a mall, crowded shop, restaurant, or other public
gathering and detonating an explosive device.
Laqueur (1977, 1987, 1999) believes we have been looking at the
wrong groups. Instead of terrorists, Laqueur argued that we should
examine extremist movements that are larger, provide a more ade-
quate database, and provide the fuel that keeps terrorists operating.
He has argued that terrorist groups are too small for social scientists
and historians to systematically observe, that they do not represent
mass movements that easily lend themselves to explanation. Although
we might agree that terrorists are a difficult group to study, we dis-
agree that they are not a fruitful source of study whose activities can
be analyzed, better understood, and predicted. The fact that many
terrorists operate outside of the support network of extremist move-
ments suggests the need to study the full spectra of terrorist groups.
Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda are the perfect example of this kind
of isolation. Terrorist belief structures are at the end of larger contin-
uums and can be analyzed attitudinally and statistically (George and
Wilcox, 1992).
Ellis (2005) has suggested that an analytical framework for under-
standing and predicting terrorism would examine the nature of their
motivation, level of organization, and level of technical sophistication.
He believes the problem with our ability to collect data and study ter-
rorism is the changing nature of terrorism itself. Terrorists today are
more network-oriented, more complex and fluid, and have less organi-
zational structure. Though we agree with Ellis in part, an analysis using
his framework would not account for the “lone wolf cell,” the model
Timothy McVeigh and many of the Middle Eastern suicide bombers
follow. It certainly is true that terrorist networks of communication
have become more sophisticated and less prone to intelligence inter-
ception. Communications via computers have presented their own set
of challenges for intelligence agencies. However, it is not necessarily
the case that terrorists have gotten more technologically sophisticated
(as individuals).
On one hand, defining terrorism remains problematic and just as
elusive as terrorists themselves. On the other, it may be that our lack
of ability to reach consensus on a common definition or typology of
terrorism may prove somewhat beneficial if this discourse eventu-
ally leads to a clear, usable, and common definition. Having a lot of
people approach the problem from a variety of viewpoints may ulti-
mately even produce a more comprehensive database than having
one “correct” data source that everyone can access. In addition, there
now is a much larger number of researchers interested in exploring
the problem of terrorism. After all, prior to 9/11 terrorism was not a
significant concern in research, military, or government circles, and
as a result, not much effort was expended on this topic. This lack of
interest and limited intelligence gathering contributed to our unpre-
paredness for 9/11 and its immediate aftermath. For a time since, we
have been involved with playing “catch-up” because initially there were
too few researchers involved in the game. Now that we are catching up
a bit, part of the solution to terrorism is to build an adequate database,
engage in accurate analyses, and establish predictive models. Doing
so requires getting more of the most talented players onto the field.
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chapter four
Balancing Counterterrorism Strategies

Lessons from Evolutionary Ecology
Bryan Vila and Joanne Savage
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism often is portrayed as fundamentally different from more

mundane types of crime. This distinction is understandable, but
unwarranted and counterproductive because it encourages over-
reliance on aggressive measures to combat terrorism. We believe that
a true understanding of the causes of terrorism can occur only if we
apply the same systematic, scientific approach to the problem that is
used to study other forms of behavior, and that an understanding of
the root causes of terrorism is necessary for the development of effec-
tive counterterrorism policies.
In this chapter, we discuss terrorism using the same evolutionary-
ecological perspective on human behavior that has proved useful
for understanding crime and developing novel approaches to crime
control and prevention. Unlike more traditional approaches to these
social problems, the evolutionary-ecological perspective deals system-
atically with biological, social, and cognitive factors that influence
human development over the life course at both micro and macro
levels. It also explains why effective long-term crime control strategies
must strike a balance between opportunity reduction, deterrence,
and developmental interventions. The following discussion places ter-
rorism within an evolutionary-ecological framework and proposes a
suite of theoretically driven counterterrorism policies. Using a game-
theoretic model, we demonstrate that terrorism can best be controlled
The authors thank Cynthia Morris and Lieutenant Stephen M. James of the Royal
Irish Rangers for helping us evolve this essay in rapidly changing times.
66
balancing counterterrorism strategies 67
using the same balanced approach that is most effective for countering
other types of crime. We argue that over-dramatizing terrorist threats
and over-emphasizing punitive and protective counter-strategies with-
out addressing the root causes of terrorism is counterproductive and
cannot succeed in the long run.
In particular, we argue that defining a contest as a “war” limits one’s
counter-strategic options to reducing the vulnerability of potential tar-
gets or deterrence. War is a short-term, destructive construct. In war,
one fights coherent enemies, protecting important assets from them,
denying them access to the resources they need to survive and thrive,
and punishing them mercilessly in order to destroy their motivation to
attack and, thus, to prompt surrender. Terrorism is a tactic, like amphib-
ious landing or airborne assault or carpet bombing; one does not war
against tactics – one counters them. One of the key insights that emerges
from our analysis is that choosing to war against terrorism prevents a
nation from employing a vital set of counterterror strategies.
THE EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
The evolutionary-ecological perspective (Cohen and Machalek 1988;

Vila 1994; Vila and Cohen 1993) holds that humans, like other spe-
cies, are behavioral strategists who strive to obtain valued resources.
Individuals acquire behavioral strategies through a complex set of
interactions between (a) innate characteristics common to all humans
(e.g., hunger, thirst, sex drive); (b) innate biological characteristics
that vary between humans (e.g., personality, intelligence, body size);
and (c) sociocultural factors (e.g., the beliefs and skills learned from
family, school, religion, and community). From conception onward,
this developmental process affects the skills, values, beliefs, and
instrumental strategies that individuals acquire as they interact with
physical and social environments. During this learning process, they
develop strategic styles – sets of compatible strategic behaviors – that
have produced successful outcomes in past efforts to acquire mate-
rial, hedonistic, economic, or political resources (see Table 4.1). Such
resources can be acquired only if a suitably motivated and equipped
individual converges with them in a time and space in the absence of
effective barriers to acquisition (Cohen and Felson, 1979).
Table 4.1. Types of crimes
Type Example Primary resource sought

and method used
Expropriative Theft To obtain material resources
Fraud such as property from
Embezzlement another person without
his/her knowing and/or
willing cooperation
Expressive Sexual assault To obtain hedonistic resources
Nonexpropriative assault that increase pleasurable
Illicit drug use feelings or decrease
unpleasant feelings
Economic Narcotics trafficking To obtain monetary resources
Prostitution through profitable illegal
Gambling cooperative activities
Political Terrorism To obtain political resources by
Election Fraud using a wide variety of tactics
Source: Vila, 1994, p. 317
From this perspective, “criminality” can be described as a pattern

of behavior where “a person’s strategic style emphasizes the use of
force, fraud, or stealth to obtain valued resources” (Vila, 1994, p.
324). Because crime is often risky, even individuals with strong crim-
inal habits tend to require special motivation to act criminally in
most situations.1 Figure 4.1 illustrates the way this paradigm applies
to criminal behavior and crime control. Motivation at a particular
point in a person’s life is a function of interactions between biolog-
ical, sociocultural, and developmental factors across the life course.
1
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to cover human motivation in detail.
We note here that the concept of natural selection is central to the evolutionary
perspective on behavior. The genes of individuals who behave in ways that are
consistent with survival, mating, and the promotion of offspring are passed on to
subsequent generations. Thus, characteristics associated with those behaviors are
selected by this process. It is believed that hunger, thirst, and libido evolved this
way. But it is also believed by many that the desire for resources, greed, and avidity
in learning methods for finding mates, sociability, and so on also evolved this way
because of their association with survival, mating, and promotion of offspring.
Thus, there may be genes related to delight or pleasure attained in sociable conver-
sation (Savage and Kanazawa, 2004) or annoyance at paying taxes. Such emotions
may occasion preferences for doing some things and not others – and motivations
for making money, dating, or confronting an antagonist.
Biology
Temptation
+ Development Motivation Opportunity Crime
Social and Protection

cultural Deterrence Counter
influences Development strategy
Figure 4.1. The general paradigm for understanding crime and crime control
(Vila, 1994).
Those interactions provide people with the values, preferences, and

resources that shape their choices. They also provide the skills, abil-
ities, and resources that constrain the behavioral strategies they can
bring to bear when an opportunity emerges for acquiring material,
hedonistic, economic, or political resources. Behavioral ecologists
refer to these attributes as, respectively, “resource valuation” (RV) and
“resource holding potential” (RHP) (Cohen and Machalek, 1988;
Maynard Smith, 1982; Parker, 1974). A crime can occur only when
a suitably motivated person armed with an effective behavioral strat-
egy converges with an opportunity for crime – a suitable target and
the absence of an effective guardian. (Note how the presence of an
opportunity can increase motivation via temptation.) In turn, crimi-
nal acts provoke responses from victims and from society as a whole.
As the feedbacks in Figure 4.1 show, counter-strategies can either
attempt to (1) reduce opportunities (e.g., by incapacitating offend-
ers, increasing guardianship, or modifying people’s routine activities);
(2) deter rational offenders by increasing their perceptions of the cer-
tainty, severity, or swiftness of punishment; or (3) affect development
in a way that reduces the likelihood that individuals will develop or
rely on criminal behavioral strategies.
EVOLUTIONARY ECOLOGY AND TERRORIST ACTS
From this point of view, terrorist acts can be seen as a type of strategic
behavior that might develop in the same way that other strate-
gic behavioral styles do. Unfortunately, there is no widely accepted
definition of terrorism (e.g., Graham, 2005; Klinger and Heal, this

volume; Mullins and Thurman, this volume; Weinberg, Pedahzur, and
Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004). The FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful
use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof,
in furtherance of political or social objectives.” Some authors debate
the importance of including state-sponsored terrorism and genocide,
which are explicitly exempted by U.S. government definitions of ter-
rorism (e.g., Barak, 2004; Chomsky, 2003; Graham, 2005; Thackrah,
1989). Although terrorism may be motivated by a desire to obtain
political influence, our focus is on the behavioral strategies that
terrorists employ. Thus, we see no reason to distinguish between acts
of intimidation and coercion committed by individual actors, groups,
or by persons acting with the backing of their governments. In this
chapter, we discuss what is believed about the risk factors for engag-
ing in terrorist activities, motivation for committing terrorist acts, and
opportunities for terrorism. After providing that context, we consider
the implications for counterterrorism.
THE INDIVIDUAL: RISK FACTORS FOR TERRORISM
Vila’s (1994) evolutionary-ecological model begins with factors

associated with the development of strategic styles at the individ-
ual level (see Figure 4.1). Given the intense interest in this topic,
there is surprisingly little empirical research on the characteristics
of terrorists or the risk factors for terrorism. The U.S. government’s
study, Who Becomes a Terrorist AND WHY (Hudson, 1999, p. 35) states
that “Relatively little is known about the terrorist as an individual
and the psychology of terrorists remains poorly understood.” Our
search of the Proquest database, found only twelve scholarly sources
related to the search term “causes of terrorism.” We found no pro-
spective longitudinal studies and few studies where data were actu-
ally acquired from terrorists. Most of the studies we did locate were
small scale and used convenience samples (e.g., captured terrorists).
Other authors have also commented on the lack of data regarding
this important topic (e.g., Hudson, 1999; Silke and Taylor, 2000;
Soibelman, 2004).
One consistency that emerges from news reports and the schol-
arly literature is that terrorists do not fit the typical profile for violent
offenders developed from American data on violent criminals, such as
serious violent offenders in the United States. These offenders tend to
share multiple risk factors, such as low socioeconomic status, low IQ,
illiteracy, poor social skills, and living in certain very disadvantaged
urban areas with families that also have multiple difficulties. Use of
drugs and alcohol also are frequently part of the profile.
Although some authors emphasize the “dim economic prospects” of
young male terrorists (Ehrlich and Liu, 2002), many such individuals
come from affluent families and are not described as having troubled
childhoods or problems with delinquency. Soibelman (2004) writes
that “Terrorists are not usually generalised criminals” (p. 185). Bueno
de Mesquita (2005) argues that though lack of economic opportunity
in nation-states is positively correlated with terrorism, actual terrorist
operatives are not poor or lacking in education because terrorist orga-
nizations screen the volunteers for quality.
A more likely commonality for terrorists is that they may live in societ-
ies or social groups that have experienced economic hardship, though
this is a matter of debate in the literature (e.g., Fields, Elbedour, and
Hein, 2002). It is clear that some noted terrorist groups live in eco-
nomically depressed societies such as Palestine, Chechnya, and the
Basque region of Spain. There is ample evidence that those commit-
ting terrorist acts often believe their groups are economically disadvan-
taged or oppressed, and that their strategic options are constrained.
For example, Mao argued that the Red Terror was absolutely necessary
to “free the masses from long years of oppression” (quoted in Garrison
2004, p. 263). The Hindustan Socialist Republican Association
(HRSA) manifesto, “The Philosophy of the Bomb,” argued that terror
“is birthed by humiliation and desperation” (quoted in Garrison,
p. 270). There are few studies on this topic. Hewitt (1984) did not find
correlations between terrorism and rising unemployment or increases
in the cost of living. Testas (2004) found an interaction such that low
income had a larger positive effect on terrorist activities in countries
with civil war. Clearly more information is needed on this issue.
With respect to education, there also is mixed opinion in the lit-
erature. Some authors have proposed that terrorists’ educational
attainments are similar to those of economically well-off surrounding

populations. Other data suggest that this is not an accurate charac-
terization. Soibelman (2004), for example, found that all five of the
(captured) suicide bombers he interviewed had finished their school-
ing by age fourteen. Smith and Morgan (1994) found that whereas
54 percent of left-wing U.S. terrorists in their sample had a college
degree, right-wing terrorists were usually uneducated, unemployed,
or impoverished. Schbley’s (2003) data may help explain some of
these inconsistencies. She found that, after matching for numerous
other factors, Hizbullah’s Istishhadeens (HIS) with a college educa-
tion had the least affinity for martyrdom, were least susceptible to
indoctrination and the charisma of religious leadership, and were
least willing to commit terrorist acts. At the aggregate level, Testas
found that among thirty-seven Muslim countries, those with higher
education had more terrorism, though he explains that more educated
people are more likely to be involved in politics, and that in some
countries, more education may mean more religious education.
One common characteristic that terrorists do usually share is an
association with a group or cause. Whereas many of our street crimi-
nals do not have deep social or community ties (except sometimes to
gangs; Curry, this volume), terrorists over the centuries typically have
been involved with a group and share strong ties to that group. We
speculate that the typical terrorist, compared to other criminals, lacks
ties to society apart from the group in question, and that this social
isolation and lack of empathy for outsiders may be key to the cognitive
processes that allow otherwise law-abiding persons to ignore moral
prohibitions against violence. We find no studies that directly test this
hypothesis, but studies by Soibelman (2004), Garrison (2004), Ardila
(2002), and others suggest that terrorists may be motivated by reli-
gious beliefs, by the need for friendships, and by marginalization.
Finally, belief systems – constructs that affect resource valuation,
perceptions about opportunities and costs, and willingness to employ
particular behavioral strategies – appear to be a key factor in terrorism.
Many authors focus on belief systems as an impetus for terrorism, yet
most do not provide data about specific beliefs. Salij (2005) writes
that the root cause of terrorism is terrorists’ beliefs. Goertzel (2002)
believes that terrorists think rationally, but “they think within the
limits of belief systems that may be irrational” (p. 98). A few authors
do test the prevalence of specific beliefs. For example, Smith’s (2004)
content analysis shows that terrorism-practicing groups, compared
with controls, believed that enemies are more aggressive and danger-
ous. Fair reports that “grievances” turn Pakistani youths to religious
groups, which may in turn increase the base of potential sympathizers
of Islamist militant organizations. Unlike the irrational thinking of
psychotics, the belief systems of terrorists are shared by large numbers
of people. Justification for violence appears to be a very important
class of beliefs necessary for terrorism. Garrison argues that terror-
ists hold at least one of three basic concepts about society – that the
truth of their cause justifies any action that supports it. Other authors
have also discussed the issues of justification (e.g., Hastings, 2004)
and Jihad (e.g., Soibelman, 2004).
We see three common elements in the belief system of modern
terrorists:
• Perceived threat against the group or cause

• Learned justifications for extreme violence in defense of – or
liberation of – that group
• Cultural values that include martyrdom and self-sacrifice as a
positive outcome
Beliefs can be powerful. Just as it is possible to convince law-

abiding individuals to kill innocent strangers in war, under certain
circumstances it is possible to teach individuals that heinous terrorist
acts are acceptable and will be rewarded. Thus, potential terrorists
are many and are not limited to Muslim extremist groups. Would
Americans have engaged in a “terrorist insurgency” if another nation
invaded the United States, arrested the president, and assumed
power? Even a cursory Web search of the term “militia” indicates that
many would have.
There are also contradictory comments about the mental health
and personality characteristics of terrorists. Gallimore, using case
studies, argues that many terrorist leaders survived major traumatic
experiences from their childhood, and that “the terrorist personality
appears to develop from a painful and dysfunctional childhood in
which the individual forms personality and identity disorders” (2002,
p. 152). He characterizes members of the Ku Klux Klan, for example,

as individuals who “want, and need, to belong to a group so that they
can feel better about themselves and have the sense that they are part
of a group that is acting for the greater good of the victimized group”
(p. 155). Timothy McVeigh is characterized as someone who suffered
trauma during military service in the Persian Gulf, a victim of bullying
and humiliation in childhood, with psychological scars from his par-
ents’ numerous separations and eventual divorce (Gallimore, 2002).
The prevailing view is that suicide bombers do not have enough in
common to rely on a personality profile, though some authors believe
that suicide bombers may be characterized by an authoritarian per-
sonality (Lester, Yang, and Lindsay, 2004). We speculate that some
individuals involved in terrorist acts may have obsessive disorders –
which are necessary to focus so intensely on their cause – but there are
no empirical studies that test this. Despite these speculations, numer-
ous authors have suggested that terrorists do not share common per-
sonality or psychiatric features. Fabick (2002)writes that “there is no
terrorist personality per se . . . the type of person drawn to and radi-
calized into a terrorist subculture is unique to the particular political
and social context” (pp. 227–228). Atran (2003) agrees that suicide
terrorists have no appreciable psychopathology.
MOTIVATION FOR TERRORISM
Unlike many of the violent crimes that we study in the United

States – robbery, homicide, aggravated assault, domestic violence –
terrorism sometimes appears to have rather unselfish motivation.
Acts of terrorism are ostensibly committed for the benefit of a group
(e.g., LaFree and Dugan, 2004), at significant cost to the individuals
carrying out the acts. “Selfish” aspects of these acts might include the
respect and approbation that the individual receives from comrades,
or the martyrdom that is promised if he or she dies. Membership
in a successful terrorist organization also can help those who sur-
vive its dangers ascend to power (e.g., Hamas members in 2006,
the PLO in 1993, Irgun in 1948, or Lenin in 1917). Kfir (2002)
argues that the heroism of suicide attacks is an equalizer to “Western
superiority” (p. 147).
Terrorism is not the typical weapon of individuals representing

powerful societies. Instead, it tends to be the weapon of groups that
are politically weak, economically impoverished, and disadvantaged
compared to their adversary. In our terms, terrorist violence is a behav-
ioral strategy that enables members of an organization with little or no
conventional political or military might to exercise power and obtain
valued resources – whether they be political, economic, expressive,
or hedonistic. Ardila argues that terrorism is “The fruit of the resent-
ment and lack of empowerment that lead to acts against the civilian
population – men, women, and children” (p. 10). Many authors note
the relevance of political or economic disadvantage among terrorist
groups. For example, Looney (2004) discusses economic problems in
Pakistan as a motivator of terrorism. Ehrlich and Liu (2002) propose
that poverty, inequality, and large numbers of young men with dim
economic prospects are likely to contribute to terrorism. We suggest
that terrorism is most likely to be the weapon of individuals and groups
who do not have access to enough mainstream weapons to engage in a
“fair fight” with their adversary. This is consistent with Black’s (2004)
view of terrorism as “self-help”: “the handling of a grievance with
aggression” (Black, p. 10). It also is consistent with more conservative
voices who believe that “The circle of revenge and retaliation is one of
the most noticeable elements in terrorism. In many cases, the terrorists
want to retaliate against real or imaginary enemies who did something
bad to their people, to their culture, to their religion, or to their social
group” (Ardila, 2002, p. 10). Soibelman’s (2004) interviews with five
Palestinian suicide bombers echo this sentiment – all of his intervie-
wees reported negative experiences with the Israeli military, such as
the killing of a friend or being beaten. Reasons they cited for commit-
ting a suicide bombing included politics, religion, and honor.
Based on the study of human nature more generally, we believe that
it is unlikely that people would prefer terrorist activity to other methods
of redressing grievances or obtaining desired ends because of strong
preferences for survival and the resources put at risk by engaging in
terrorism. Terrorism evolves through a process involving economic
and political disadvantage, strong ties to a group, and perceived
threat to that group. Thus, individuals who belong to a “threatened”
group feel helpless to address the threat without resorting to extreme
measures. Certain characteristics of the group may foster the devel-

opment of justifications for the use of extreme terrorist violence, or
the ability to convince members that there will be positive outcomes
(beliefs related to martyrdom or Jihad, for example). Examples of
this dynamic abound. As a brief example we offer the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma, and al Qaeda’s 9/11 attack on the United
States. Soibelman argues that “The perceived threat from Israel to
Palestinian daily life and to Islamic culture more generally has led
the most extreme amongst the Islamist movement to claim Jihad as
an act of self-defence against the ‘enemies of God’” (2004, p. 179),
and provides examples of related sentiments among interviewees. We
believe that terrorism could be reduced substantially if extreme eco-
nomic hardships are avoided or ameliorated; social, religious, and/
or cultural isolationism are reduced; and/or political empowerment
made more achievable.
Of course, powerful groups and states have also used terror – during
the French and Chinese revolutions for example. In both cases, justi-
fications were made for the use of terror, and terror was used against
previously powerful persons. Most other cases of state terror also tend
to fit this pattern of desperation – or at least desperation was used as
an excuse for acting outside international norms for armed conflict
(e.g., SAS counterterror operations in Ireland; the U.S.-sponsored
Phoenix program in Vietnam; government operations supporting
apartheid by the Republic of South Africa; Nazi Germany’s efforts
to suppress underground groups by murdering random members of
their communities; and Japan’s actions during World War II in north-
ern China). Note, however, that genocide appears to follow a very
different dynamic: Those with sufficient power who wish to rid them-
selves of a group that they perceive to be troublesome or inferior may
simply do so.
In summary, we believe the three primary motives for terror are
(1) perceived threat to the group, (2) disadvantage of the group or
inequality between groups, and (3) perceived approbation or rewards
for committing terrorist acts such as respect, honor, or martyrdom.
The scholarly literature supports this view. LaFree and Dugan (2004)
point out that terrorists are more likely than common criminals to
see themselves as altruists. Garrison (2004) holds that the belief that
a cause is just provides fuel for violent acts, and he provides numer-
ous quotes taken from several centuries of writings that are consistent
with this observation.
SITUATION, OPPORTUNITY, AND TERRORISM
As numerous authors have documented, terrorism is not new; Aristotle

wrote about tyrants who deserved assassination (see Griset and
Mahan, 2003), and various “revolutionaries” have been writing about
their use of terrorism since at least the eighteenth century (Garrison,
2004). Terrorist acts have been perpetrated repeatedly in the United
States since very early in its inception (Simon, 2001). There have been
opportunities for terrorism since the advent of human society.
Routine Activities Theory specifies that criminal acts cannot be
committed without a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the
absence of a capable guardian. In the case of terrorism, the suit-
able targets consist of the entire population of the enemy group,
their property, and critical infrastructure. If the enemy population
is relatively large, there are a virtually infinite number of targets and
means to attack them, including chemical weapons, biological weap-
ons, car bombs, hotel bombs, suicide hijackers, sabotage of nuclear
power plants, and poisoning food and water supplies. Most people
have heard breathless commentators recount the endless possibilities
for terror on the evening news. Access to these targets will be easier
in societies that afford greater freedom of movement, assembly, and
information. Thus nations such as the United States are more vulner-
able to terrorism because of their size, complexity, wealth, and free-
dom. Conversely, the vulnerability of terrorist groups diminishes as
they become smaller, more disciplined, have fewer resources to tar-
get, and adopt a looser, networked cellular structure.
THE EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
According to an evolutionary-ecological perspective, counter-strategies

to terrorism must be applied in balance if they are to succeed.
Neither opportunity reduction, nor deterrence, nor development

strategies can succeed without both of the others. In recent years,
opportunity reduction has been a major focus of counterterrorism
efforts in addition to deterrence. For example, “guardianship” has
been increased by tightening airport, train and bus security, and bor-
der controls; monitoring biological, chemical, and radiological weap-
ons and know-how; and heightening security at nuclear power plants,
embassies, hotels, and other public buildings.
Protective strategies alone cannot succeed for several reasons: (1)
because of the virtually limitless number of terrorist targets in an
industrialized, free society; (2) because arms-race dynamics assure
that each counterterror strategy will provoke a counter-counter-
strategy so long as motivation for terror persists (Clarke and Newman,
2006, pp. 222–223; Cohen, Vila and Machalek, 1995; Ekblom, 1999;
Lynch, this volume); (3) because even capturing or killing terrorists
is futile unless the forces that produce new recruits are neutralized;
and (4) because costs to maintain armies in the field in order to fight
ephemeral terrorists or guerillas – especially on foreign soil – are
orders of magnitude greater than the costs of maintaining a scattered
resistance.
Deterrence is equally impotent alone because of asymmetries between
what conventional industrialized societies have at stake compared with
terrorists, as well as how they value those stakes. The utility of deter-
rence declines if terrorists are materially poor, if they place less value
on personal freedom (e.g., because of a fatalistic submission to God’s
will), or if what they value most is spiritual. Deterrence doesn’t work if
punitive consequences fail to evoke dread. Neither does it work very
well if they perceive the certainty and swiftness of punishment to be
remote, as they often seem for diffuse, disciplined terrorist groups.
Developmental counter-strategies also need bolstering by protec-
tive and deterrent counter-strategies. An unprotected society that
presents too tempting a target invites attack; a society that does
not punish attackers invites annihilation (see Cohen and Machalek
1994). However, in concert with a balance of protective and deter-
rent strategies, development offers a way out of one of the dilem-
mas plaguing the contemporary terror/counterterror cycle. The
crux of this problem is that the more fear people have of terrorism,
the more attractive they are likely to find protective, deterrent, and
retributive counter-strategies (see Forst, this volume). Similarly, as
was discussed previously, among the disaffected people who form
the “ocean” in which terrorists swim, perceptions of extreme disad-
vantage, humiliation, and despair are used to justify desperate and
horrible acts. Thus, the interplay of terror/counterterror strategies
easily leads to vicious cycles that ignore or undervalue developmen-
tal strategies. Only developmental strategies that attack the roots
of criminal and terrorist motivation can dampen arms races that
raise the costs – and limit the effectiveness – of protective strategies
while also increasing the stake current terrorists have in conven-
tional society.
MODELING COUNTER-STRATEGIC BALANCE
In contrast with wars-on-terror approaches, adding developmental

counter-strategies to those based on opportunity reduction and deter-
rence leads us to conceptualize terrorist acts as crimes committed by
amorphous groups of individuals who may act alone or as members of
loosely coupled networks (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001). This enables
victims of a terrorist attack to focus on the roots of the problem, as
well as to retaliate and armor themselves. Unlike war, crime control
requires a balanced, patient, and constructive approach. As former
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker summarized in a recent essay,
“Americans tend to want to identify a problem, fix it, and then move
on. Sometimes this works. Often it does not . . . What’s needed in
dealing with [war-torn, hostile, and chaotic regions of the world] is
a combination of understanding, persistence, and strategic patience
to a degree that Americans, traditionally, have found hard to muster”
(Crocker, 2009).
War is ineffective as a counter-strategy against opponents whose
motivation arises from deeply held religious beliefs that promise imme-
diate spiritual rewards (e.g., Jihad), and those who view themselves as
victims who are powerless against conventional military and economic
power. Each demonstration of military might emphasizes asymmetries
between victim, state, and terrorist. However, those asymmetries cut both
ways. Although conventional arms can inflict terrible casualties upon
irregular forces, even a lone terrorist operating outside the strictures

of conventional war and law can inflict mass casualties on his or her
conventional opponent. Thus, over-reliance on opportunity reduc-
tion and deterrence can tend to accelerate terrorist recruitment and
motivation in a way that ultimately may overwhelm the resources of
even very wealthy states – especially when they must fight on foreign
soil. A balanced approach to countering terrorism, one that produces
a net reduction in motivation to employ terrorist behavioral strategies
can avoid this trap.
The following simple thought experiment demonstrates the logic
behind our contention that strategies for reducing terrorism must
strike a balance between opportunity reduction, deterrence, and
development. We begin with just two propositions:
Competition among control strategies: Opportunity reduction, deter-
rence, and development counterterrorism strategies compete with
one another for limited funding resources.
Differing time scales: Opportunity reduction and deterrence strat-
egies – as well as terrorist behavioral strategies – tend to produce
immediate results (e.g., targets destroyed, enemies killed, barriers
built, technology deployed). Conversely, development-oriented
counterterrorism strategies tend to produce results that are gradual,
subtle, and incremental.
This combination of competition for resources and differing time

scales can produce unexpected consequences.
Popular assumptions that counterterror strategies necessarily will
reduce the magnitude and persistence of terrorist threats sometimes
may be wrong. As we’ve seen all too often since 9/11, terrorist acts
tend to provoke fear and outrage that, in turn, stimulate counterterror
strategies that focus on opportunity reduction and deterrence – what
we refer to as “retaliation and protection.” The general assumption
behind this control system is that retaliation and protection will tend
to increase in response to the fear and outrage provoked by terrorist
acts until sufficient pressure is applied to reduce them to an accept-
able level. Once that is achieved, social pressure for retaliation will
begin to decline. Figure 4.2 illustrates these assumed dynamics, where
F, R, and T, respectively, represent the social and political pressure
Retaliation
and protection
+ −
Fear and Terrorist

outrage + acts
Assumption: if R↑, then T↓
Figure 4.2. Commonly assumed model regarding control of terrorism.
produced by Fear and outrage, Retaliative and protective strategies,

and Terrorist acts.
However, when one considers the impact of competition between
counter-strategies for resources and the differing time scales on
which they affect terrorism, it becomes obvious that this model can
have perverse consequences. An imbalance between strategies based
on retaliation and protection and those with development-oriented
goals may lead to a situation in which, after some delay, devoting
more resources to retaliation and protection causes rather than con-
strains terrorism. We predict that expenditures for retaliation and
protection strategies can reach a tipping point where they diminish
funding for development strategies to the extent that they are no
longer effective at reducing terrorist recruitment. The result can be
a surge in terrorist recruitment which may overwhelm earlier prog-
ress. Once this system of interactions tips from a virtuous cycle to a
vicious cycle, it becomes ever more difficult to derail. Thus, the best
overall counterterror strategy strikes a balance between retaliation
and development.
Figure 4.3 illustrates these dynamics where F, R, T, and D repre-
sent the social and political pressure produced by Fear and outrage,
Retaliative and protective strategies, Terrorist acts, and Development
strategies. The tipping point that shifts this system from virtuous to
vicious occurs when the direct impact of R on T overwhelms the ame-
liorative impact of D on T. Ambassador Ryan Crocker addressed this
problem when he warned that “The perceived arrogance and ignorance
Retaliation
and protection − t+0
Development
+ −
−/+ t + n
Fear and Terrorist

outrage + acts
Outcome: if R < RDT, T↓, but if R > RDT, T↑
Figure 4.3. Unexpected consequences arising from competition between

different types of counterterror strategies.
of overbearing powers can create new narratives of humiliation that

will feed calls for vengeance centuries from now” (2009).
The mathematics of this sort of situation are well understood, and
have been modeled extensively to capture the dynamics of popu-
lation ecology (May, 1974), the diffusion of innovations (Rogers,
2003), and many similar problems. The model assumes that a pop-
ulation – whether of individuals or strategies – will tend to increase
exponentially in an environment until competition begins to sup-
press its growth rate. On the one hand, the growth in terrorism will
be constrained by cultural beliefs that do not favor terrorist strategies,
economic well-being, environmental factors, and technological capa-
bilities that limit the amount of terrorist crime a population can sup-
port – and will tolerate. On the other, it will be initiated by underlying
sources of alienation, and then stimulated as a consequence of retalia-
tion and protection strategies that motivate more individuals to adopt
terrorist strategies in the absence of sufficient development-oriented
counter-strategies that would improve quality of life, reduce social
isolation, and attack moral beliefs that foster terrorism and thereby
decrease the attraction of joining terrorist groups.
These dynamics have played out in several episodes, including the
response of Americans to homegrown terrorism from groups such as
the Weather Underground, Symbionese Liberation Army, and Black
Panthers during the 1960s and 1970s. It is entirely conceivable that
terrorist incidents might cause a society to thrash back and forth
between over- and under-reliance on retaliation and protection or
development-oriented counterterror strategies if intelligence failures

caused it to be surprised by each uptick in terrorism. Moreover, when
terrorist acts – or portrayals of those acts by government, media, or
other leaders – inflame public opinion, the result may be a more
tightly coupled system of interactions. As coupling increases, complex
systems such as this become more difficult to manage or predict, and
the outcome often is disaster (Perrow, 1999).2
IMPROVED COUNTERTERRORIST STRATEGIES
Applying the evolutionary-ecological approach to crime control

enables us to intervene on a variety of levels of aggregation to reduce
terrorism. We can address the individual. As noted earlier, not many
individual-level risk factors are known for terrorists. The most likely
risks are (1) strong ties to a disadvantaged cultural, political, or reli-
gious group, (2) beliefs that the group is threatened, (3) social iso-
lation, and (4) beliefs that violence is justified to redress grievances
or reduce threat. These risks must occur in combination for the
probability of terrorism to increase. As it happens, this is now the
case in many places around the world where cohorts of children are:
(a) growing up in societies with serious economic difficulties; (b)
experiencing and witnessing food shortages; (c) forming close ties
to religious or political groups that teach them that they are under
threat, and that certain enemies must be attacked in order for their
group to survive; and (d) learning that it is morally appropriate to
kill people from societies that threaten their own, and that individu-
als who die doing so are revered as martyrs, will gain honor for their
families, and will be richly rewarded in the afterlife.
Such individuals are ripe for terrorist recruitment. To reduce the
number of individuals vulnerable to the call of terrorism, we can
address economic factors, ties to known terrorist groups, social isola-
tion, and belief systems. Economic factors will be addressed later under
“motivation.” For the purposes of reducing the number of developing
individuals who will be open to terrorist justifications, ongoing efforts
2
Space considerations preclude a more thorough examination of the mathematical
processes driving these dynamics. See Vila (1997, pp. 48–52) for a more complete
discussion.
to eliminate poverty and starvation should help reduce resentments

that foster the development of terrorist beliefs.
Regarding ties to terrorist groups, our approach suggests strategies
that favor cultural evolution – the growth and development of favored
behavioral strategies over those that are less favored (e.g., Boyd and
Richerson, 1985; Richerson and Boyd, 2005). For example, two-
pronged public relations campaigns might be used to vilify terrorist
groups by emphasizing their heartless, indiscriminate violence, while
simultaneously giving support to nonviolent groups that have similar
goals but use different means. This contrasts with current tactics such
as the arrest of individuals belonging to either of these groups, spy-
ing on members, seizing assets, and breaking up international sup-
port networks. Only the most canny and hardened terrorists are likely
to survive such broad-spectrum tactics, yet theirs are the first behav-
ioral strategies one would prefer to cull. Similarly, perceptions that
an external threat is more serious or proximate richen the matrix
in which terrorists thrive. Low-key counterterror tactics that rely on
diplomacy are likely to reduce perceptions of threat more than dis-
plays of implacable military power. So, for that matter, are narrowly
targeted, covert special operations. Once again, an evolutionary
approach that includes developmental tactics as well as deterrent and
protective tactics is more appropriate than the current war on terror,
which does not. (See Stanton, 2009, for a vivid example from early
U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.)
Overblown perceptions of threats associated with social isolation
might be reduced, for example, by providing educational aid for
sciences and social studies in high-risk societies. Testas (2004) has
pointed out that “more education” may simply mean “more religious
education” in some countries, hence targeted aid for specific edu-
cational programs may be needed. Education used to broaden the
perspectives of high-risk children and foster an understanding of other
cultures, as well as empathy for persons outside their group, might be
one prong in preventing future terrorism. Public relations also may
be helpful. Working within high-risk nations and trying to foster pos-
itive views of the target group or nation – possibly through economic
aid or other types of exposure to the good things the “enemy” group
does – also can be effective.
In particular, long-term “public diplomacy” efforts to inform and

engage foreign publics show great promise. Such efforts include:
encouraging person-to-person contact with U.S. officials, academic
exchanges, and cultural events; supplying news stories, translating
books, stocking overseas libraries, and making foreign broadcasts
(Johnson 2006, pp. 163–166). Another promising option is military
involvement in humanitarian and relief efforts (e.g., Reaves, 2008),
which are overseen by DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action
(www.dsca.mil/programs/ha/ha.htm). For example, Indonesian
views of the United States improved following high-profile relief
efforts by U.S. military forces responding to the catastrophic earth-
quake and tsunami that struck South and Southeast Asia and Africa
on December 26, 2004 (GAO 2005, p. 12). At the height of relief
efforts, roughly “16,000 military personnel were deployed through-
out the areas most affected by the tragedy” (Cossa, 2005).
Note that reducing perceptions of threat is a two-way street.
Educating people in industrialized nations about the everyday cultural,
social, religious, and economic life in terrorist host nations could help
reduce pressure for immediate deterrent or defensive strategies and
increase support for more patient development. Public education also
might reduce the frequency of high-profile faux pas (e.g., crusader
metaphors and inflammatory cartoons or quotations).
Finally, the beliefs that justify violence could be addressed.
Diplomacy and working with high-risk countries to reduce visible and
public justifications for violence worldwide is one possible step. We
are not the first to advise attempting to change beliefs; for example,
Nye (2004) urges the use of “soft power” to build goodwill and induce
social reform in less developed nations, and Salij (2005) exhorts
policy makers to use moral persuasion to fight terrorism. Davis and
Jenkins (2002) look at dissuasion, persuasion, positive inducement,
and co-option as methods of “influencing” terrorists. Of course, if
the target societies rely primarily on violence to achieve their ends,
“moral persuasion” against a different type of violence is not likely to
be convincing.
Another counter-strategic option provided by our approach
addresses the issue of motivation. As mentioned earlier, motivation
for terrorism often appears to be associated with societal disadvan-

tage, individual economics, and perceived threat against a group or
cause. Affluent individuals tend to resist change and avoid taking
risks. Ehrlich and Liu (2002) hold that “one overriding conclusion”
(p. 190) from their work is that the factors clearly within the power
of the United States and its allies to alter are the economic ones.
For example, Palestinians, who have suffered through dramatic and
persistent unemployment and poverty, have been able to recruit a
steady stream of terrorist bombers during recent decades; by contrast,
the Weather Underground, a terrorist group operating in the United
States during the Vietnam War, was not. Even though polls began to
show that Americans were very upset about the Vietnam War and the
loss of life it caused, we speculate that because American quality of
life was very high, few individuals wanted to risk joining the Weather
Underground to fight against the war, particularly because other ways
to oppose the war were available. Some authors have expressed doubt
that economic support alone could eliminate established terrorist
groups (e.g., Hewitt, 1984). Although we agree that no single strategy
is likely to eliminate such a group, our argument is that any successful
strategy must address developmental concerns. Developmental strate-
gies – like deterrent and protective strategies – are necessary, but not
sufficient for countering terrorism over the long term.
Addressing quality-of-life issues might go a long way to reduce terror-
ism. For example, helping societies build infrastructure – electricity,
plumbing, roads, public transportation – would help establish a
quality of life worth defending. We would also recommend efforts to
help develop sustainable economies (Hastings, 2004) and economic
aid to develop employment skills. Even if some individuals still hated
their target society and believed that its people deserved to die, the
probability that they would practice terrorism would tend to decline
as economic circumstances improved.
DETERRENCE
Until relatively recently, the United States’ approach to preventing

terrorism was “all sticks, no carrots.” We relied mostly on deterrence –
laws, punishments, and partnerships with other governments – to
capture, detain, and punish suspects.3 Using deterrence is partic-

ularly difficult with terrorists for several reasons. First, capture and
punishment of terrorists is uncertain. We do not catch many of them,
and the probability for any individual involved in a terrorist group of
being apprehended or killed appears to be low. Enforcement atten-
tion currently is divided between known, suspected, and “potential”
terrorists on huge watch lists. When enforcement efforts are diffuse,
they are weakened. Kleiman (1999) describes the importance of
tipping points for criminal motivation; when individuals have a low
estimation of their chance of being punished for a crime, they are
practically invited to commit that crime.
Second, although increasing the severity of punishments may
have some effect on criminal behavior under normal circumstances,
increasing severity does not seem to be as effective for many groups
of terrorists, even if the chances of apprehension are good. Davis and
Jenkins (2002) argue that terrorism can be difficult to combat when
those relying on it are motivated by religion or other ideologies in
which martyrdom plays an important role. When offenders are not
even averse to death, our usual deterrents are not likely to have the
desired level of effectiveness. As LaFree and Dugan (2004) point
out, whereas individuals who commit common crimes usually try to
avoid detection, those who commit terrorist acts often seek maximum
attention and exposure. This has important implications for counter-
terrorism measures.
Finally, it is clear that overuse of severe punishments and repressive
measures can backfire. As Bueno de Mesquita (2005) suggests,
although government crackdowns may have some effectiveness
in decreasing the ability of terrorists to carry out attacks, they also
foment ideological opposition to the government and “impose
negative economic externalities” that make attacks more attractive.
In the particular case of terrorism, strong deterrent threats and harsh
punishment may actually increase the motivation to commit terrorist
acts, because cultural values, deeply held beliefs, and the influence of
3
Federal statutes most frequently used in the prosecution of American terrorists in
the 1980s, for example, were racketeering, automatic weapons, conspiracy, fire-
arms, explosive materials, stolen property, robbery and burglary, treason, mail
fraud, etc. (Smith and Orvis, 1993).
behavior associated with collective phenomena may exhort individuals

to attempt heroic deeds.
An analogy to drug dealing is in order. Suicide bombers are plen-
tiful, just as there is no dearth of drug dealers. Drug dealers make
money from drug dealing and drug users enjoy the product they sell.
However, there is no evidence that individuals accused of terrorist acts
enjoy committing them, or that there is much of a self-interested “pull”
to commit them. There seems only to be the “push” of beliefs that the
victims are part of an enemy group, and that the enemy group might
be intimidated if more of its members are killed. If we can remove the
“push” factors – the training, the poverty and inequality, the low stan-
dard of living, and military or economic threats – we might be able to
substantially reduce terrorism.
However, we will never eliminate the threat of terrorism. Any
possible act may be used by a behavioral strategist to achieve his or
her goals, but the probability of using terrorist acts, versus other forms
of behavior, to achieve desired ends is likely to decline substantially
if we can apply a balanced approach and sustain it over a sufficiently
long period of time. This skepticism about the elimination of terror-
ism is consistent with other authors (e.g., Rosenfeld, 2004), although
the logic of our arguments is not always the same. In a thriving society,
these acts would be seen as reprehensible because the association
with terrorism by a country with connections to the global commu-
nity would put that society at risk. As Garrison (2004) and others
have pointed out, the terrorist believes that violence is the only way
to achieve the desired goal – and requires significant justification for
using violence. This implies that terrorists view the use of violence as
a necessary evil.
In sum, although many of the suggestions we have made are not
original, this paradigm organizes our thinking about the problem in a
novel way. The evolutionary-ecological approach focuses attention on
the strategic balance of U.S. counterterror policies and predicts that
they will fail unless an appropriate balance is struck.
ALTERNATIVE BEHAVIORS
“Terrorism” describes a set of behaviors and motives. As such, the

practice of terrorism can never be eradicated completely. There are a
variety of ways we might reduce terrorism – and these involve address-

ing individuals, their motivation, and their opportunities. Ultimately,
the best approach to reducing terrorism is likely to be the provision
of alternative behaviors that will achieve the desired ends. Davis and
Jenkins (2002) point out:
However much we may wish it were not so, terrorism has been com-
mon throughout history; sometimes, it has even succeeded in bring-
ing about change. To imagine that it could be easily stigmatized out
of existence would be both ahistorical and naive. This is especially
so when dealing with people who are motivated to employ terrorist
tactics because they have no better instruments with which to pursue
their aims. Historically, rebellions against real or perceived oppres-
sion have routinely included the use of terrorism when the rebels did
not have the power to succeed otherwise. (pp. 3–4)
Even given a disadvantaged, isolated group that has been develop-

ing hatred against an enemy, the likelihood of terrorism is reduced
if that group has a viable alternative method of expressing its views
and attaining desired ends. If, when deterrence is applied, individuals
believe that they lack alternative means for redressing their griev-
ances or achieving their ends, they will not be able to substitute other
behaviors such as peaceful protest or political or economic action.
Openness to diplomacy, fostering democracy, and other political
methods may be useful to this end. Testas (2004) discusses a “devel-
opmental democracy” approach, whereby fostering higher living
standards and maintaining them would be accompanied by educa-
tion, favoring more compromise-oriented politics, higher income,
adaptability, tolerance, and moderation.
In some political environments, one or more of the suggestions drawn
from our theoretical approach could be deemed “appeasement,” and
would be rejected for more repressive measures. The contrast between
appeasement and repression has been politicized, but it actually is an
empirical question. Although we see the potential for diplomacy and
economic development and advocate their use to reduce motivation
for terrorism, there have been few studies that examine the effects of
various antiterrorism measures. In the absence of hard data on this
question, we think that the model described earlier makes a strong
game-theoretic case for a balanced approach to controlling terror-
ism. Consistent with our model, Testas (2004) found that repression
at lower levels decreases terrorism, but at high levels causes it to

increase. Hewitt examined a variety of deterrence measures and con-
cluded that they are minimally effective for reducing terrorism. His
analyses suggest a positive correlation between the killing of terrorists
and terrorist violence in some places. He adds:
although military dictatorships can suppress terrorism using extreme
measures, there is no evidence that, short of this point, repression
is an effective strategy. Whether we measure repression in terms of
the deprivation of civil liberties, the size of the security forces, the
amount of military activity or the number of people killed by the
security forces, the more repressive regimes are no more success-
ful in reducing terrorism than the more liberal regimes. Increasing
repression did not lower the level of terrorist violence in Cyprus,
Spain, Northern Ireland or Italy. (pp. 93–94)
Hewitt also reports that there was no discernible decline in terrorism

when emergency legislation, depriving the population of various civil
liberties, was imposed. Similarly, patrolling and indiscriminate mass
searches – of homes in particular – do not seem to reduce terrorism
in subsequent months. Because of dismal results using repression, the
time seems right to try some alternative approaches to terrorism.
As a summary to this discussion, we report a gratifying source of sup-
port for our thesis (although we had no input into its development).
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual, which
was released in December 2006 – more than a year after this essay
was first drafted – sets the doctrine that will guide the conduct of all
U.S. counterinsurgency operations involving infantry. The manual’s
fundamental principles are fully consistent with those we recommend
here for countering terrorism. This consistency is exemplified by the
second chapter, “Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military
Activities,” which begins with the following paragraph:
Military efforts are necessary and important to counterinsurgency
(COIN) efforts, but they are only effective when integrated into a
comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power.
A successful COIN operation meets the contested population’s
needs to the extent needed to win popular support while protecting
the population from the insurgents. Effective COIN operations
ultimately eliminate insurgents or render them irrelevant. Success
requires military forces engaged in COIN operations to –
• Know the roles and capabilities of U.S., intergovernmental, and

host-nation (HN) partners.
• Include other participants, including HN partners, in planning at
every level.
• Support civilian efforts, including those of nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).
• As necessary, conduct or participate in political, social, informa-
tional, and economic programs. (U.S. Army and Marine Corps,
2006, p. 2–1)
CONCLUSION
Ecological research suggests that over-dramatizing terrorist threats

and over-emphasizing punitive and protective counter-strategies with-
out addressing root causes will be counterproductive over the long
term. Here we have discussed both a model that predicts this, as well
as the scholarly literature on terrorism, most of which tends to support
our view.
Unfortunately, we have been forced to rely on little empirical data.
It is clear that prospective, longitudinal studies of individuals in high-
risk nations might help us understand what makes some individuals
more vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. Specific details about the
actual circumstances and grievances of terrorist organizations and the
extent to which these are associated with the rise of terrorism would
be helpful. Comparisons of individuals within societies who became
terrorists and those who did not – and societies with similar economic
problems in which terrorist groups emerged, compared to those where
the prevalence of terrorism was much lower – would be very useful for
understanding this problem. It also would be helpful to examine past
responses to terrorism, and the extent to which those responses were
followed by increases or decreases in terrorist incidents.
In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, we con-
tend that terrorism can best be controlled using measured responses
that balance the use of protective, deterrent, and developmental
counter-strategies. Just as with other types of crime, this approach
addresses the ultimate and proximate sources of a terrorist’s moti-
vation, how the costs and consequences of employing terrorist strat-
egies are assessed compared to other available strategies, and the
dynamics that create opportunities for committing terrorist acts.

Over-dramatizing terrorist threats and over-emphasizing punitive and
protective counter-strategies without addressing the root causes of ter-
rorism is counterproductive, and ultimately cannot succeed. Wars on
terror, like wars on crime, must fail because the metaphor is cruelly
deficient.
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chapter five
Gangs, Crime, and Terrorism

G. David Curry
Are terrorists like gang members? Terrorists commit crimes, primarily

murder and assault. Gang members also commit crimes, including
murder and assault. Gang members are more likely to commit a wider
variety of crimes (Klein, 1971, 1995; Spergel, 1995). As Rosenfeld
(2002, p. 1) notes, many criminologists bear only a “grudging
acceptance of terrorism” as a subject of study by criminology. Gang
researchers, including this author, have balked at any connection
between terrorism and gang crime, because the prospect flies in the
face of what we already know about gangs. In particular, there is a
belief among many of us that what is most important about gangs
was already said by Frederic Thrasher (1927). Research on gangs has
a long academic tradition. To propose a relationship between gangs
and terrorism is considered by some as an encroachment on that
tradition.
It turns out, however, that comparing street gangs to terrorist orga-
nizations is more promising than I had thought originally. I use the
term “street gangs” as defined by Klein (1995) to refer to gangs that
include both young adults and juveniles. Leaving either adults or juve-
niles out of the gang process distorts perceptions of gang crime.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
In “Why Criminologists Should Study Terrorism,” Rosenfeld (2002,

p. 2) suggests, “It is our (criminologists’) fault, our poverty of intel-
lectual imagination prevents us from studying terrorism.” Rosenfeld
argues that criminologists “blame terrorism when our theories don’t
97
fit terrorism.” He suggests that criminologists should instead blame

our theories. Since Rosenfeld’s admonishment, criminologists have
increased their efforts to deal with terrorism from the standpoint of
criminological theory (Deflem, 2004; Forst, 2009).
LaFree and Dugan (2004, pp. 55–56) identify conceptual similari-
ties and differences between terrorism and crime. As with the study of
crime, the study of terrorism is strongly enhanced when interdisciplin-
ary perspectives are considered. Like crime, terrorism is a social con-
struction. Formal and practical definitions of both terror and crime
may differ), depending on the observer. Sustained levels of terror,
like sustained levels of crime, undermine the social trust necessary for
stable social life.
Structurally, gang crime falls somewhere between most crime and
terrorism. A number of the differences between terror and crime
noted by Lafree and Dugan (pp. 57–61) do not hold when terror is
compared to gang crime. Whereas common crimes are usually defined
as specific acts such as murder or assaults, a number of laws declare
certain terror and gang-related activities to be crimes themselves, or
they officially enhance the sanctions available based on their terrorist
or gang-related contexts. Whereas most criminals seek to avoid detec-
tion, terrorists and gang members often attempt to make their acts of
violence publicly visible as statements of their group intentions. Some
of the similarities and differences are associated with reactions to ter-
rorism and crime. Increases in either tend to attract the involvement
of agencies charged with extra-local control (such as state or federal).
Lafree and Dugan (pp. 60–61) specifically exclude gang crime from
other types of crime when they note that terror and gang crime may
involve organized structure as well as sustained campaigns of violence.
Lafree and Dugan note further that both crime and terror are com-
mitted disproportionately by young males. Gang homicides differ
from nongang criminal homicides by involving younger perpetrators
and a greater proportion of males (Maxson et al., 1985, Miller and
Decker, 2001).
Both terrorism and gang violence are essentially social in nature.
Rosenfeld (2002, p. 3) explicitly compares terrorism to gang
crime: “Terrorism is intended to punish, deter, or reform evil-doers.
In that sense, it is no more or less justice-oriented than … gang
gangs, crime, and terrorism 99
delinquency” (p. 3). Terrorist organizations emerge and grow in what

Thrasher (1927) called the interstitial spaces in social organizations.
As is the case with gangs, terrorists are guided by and depend on the
collective and moral support of their comrades. Neither a terrorist
organization nor a street gang can be mistaken for an individual-level
enterprise. Though a single offender may commit a designated crim-
inal act, the act is always a reflection of an organizational context. As
Geis (2001) observes, “Delinquent gang members need to share com-
panionship and responsibility. Much of what they do in violation of
the law would never take place if the perpetrators did not gain from it
a sense of moral fellowship with others whom they know and value.”
Acts of terrorism share this collective affinity. The terrorist act requires
the existence of the attacking and attacked collective identity.
Both terrorist organizations and gangs can be described in theoreti-
cal terms as social control. Black offers a model of terrorism as a form
of social control, which he defines as the means by which a collective
responds to “conduct that is regarded as undesirable from a norma-
tive standpoint” (Black, 1989; cited by Bursik and Grasmick, 1993,
p. 14). As a form of social control, Black (2004, p. 10) labels terrorism
as “self-help,” in that it is action that “handles a grievance with aggres-
sion.” In its role in social control, terrorism is “a form of justice pur-
sued by organized civilians who covertly inflict mass violence on other
civilians.” It is the targeting of civilians that distinguishes terrorism
from guerrilla warfare, which primarily targets military personnel. As
a method of social control that is criminal in nature, it is similar to
murders and assaults committed for vengeance.
For Black (2004, pp. 12–13), the relationship between the
two groups of civilians – terrorists and their victims – fit a particu-
lar social geometry. The perpetrators and victims share a cultural
distance. Enemies may be “physically close but socially distant.” Social
connections between the two groups are likely based on a chronic
grievance. Though single incidents may be involved in the construc-
tion of the grievance, the grievance must have a more long-term con-
tent, such as disputed territory and a history of violent conflict. “Strong
ties among the aggrieved and a lack of ties to their adversaries make
a highly moralistic, explosive, and lethal combination” (Black, 2002,
p. 13). Although alternative, theoretically feasible interpretations
of terror have been offered (Forst, 2009, and other chapters in this
volume), Black’s theoretical model has much currency.
As noted, Rosenfeld (2002, p. 3) and LaFree and Dugan (2004,
p. 60) make passing but specific recognition of gang violence as shar-
ing a number of the features of terrorism. Gang members attacking
members of rival gangs often speak of their motivations as attain-
ing justice (self-help). The long-standing grievances between gangs,
particularly in locales where gangs are well organized, provide the
substance of social distance. Conflicts among gangs are frequently
intensified to the degree in which gangs are proximal in space. Hence,
Black’s geometry of terrorism may also represent a viable explanation
of gang violence.
Black’s (1989) definition of social control is a response to violations
of norms. Janowitz (1976, pp. 9–10) defines social control as “the
ability of a social group to engage in self-regulation.” Bursik’s (1993)
particular focus is the processes by which neighborhoods control
crime. From a model of social control suggested by Hunter (1985)
for the social control of neighborhood schools, Bursik developed a
systemic model of social control. Convenient for my intention here is
Bursik’s selection of the genesis and endurance of gangs in inner city
neighborhoods to demonstrate his model.
Prior to Bursik’s enhancement of social disorganization theory, a
problem for gang theorists had been the failure of structural models
to explain why well-organized gangs have endured and prospered in
communities where the personal ties within the neighborhood were
strong (Kornhauser, 1978). Strong neighborhoods are less likely to
be plagued by crime and delinquency including gangs. Bursik and
Grasmick (1993, pp. 31–38) observed that traditional social disorga-
nization theory (Shaw and McKay, 1942) focused on neighborhood
linkages at the personal level of social control – bilateral or multilat-
eral ties between individuals and families.
Bursik and Grasmick (1993, p. 17) note that neighborhoods that
control crime within their boundaries have linkages that transcend
the personal level of social control. Building on Hunter’s (1985)
model of the level of social control of schools, Bursik identified two
additional levels of social control that affect a neighborhood’s abil-
ity to control crime. The first of these two additional levels of social
control is the parochial level. Parochial institutions include schools,

businesses, churches, and voluntary organizations. Bursik notes that
whereas the ties between neighbors and their families are “affective”
in nature, social control at the parochial level is driven by nonsenti-
mental intentions. Linkages at the parochial level of social control are
motivated by collective concerns such as property values and quality
of education, and include control of crime. Some resources needed
to control crime and quality-of-life conditions of neighborhoods
exist outside the level of parochial control. This led Bursik to follow
Hunter in identifying the public level of social control. For the neigh-
borhood, public resources include police and fire protection, street
maintenance, zoning, taxes, allocations for education, and public
investments in jobs.
A community that has strong personal networks may lack the con-
nections to control and influence institutions at the parochial and
public levels. Often the strongest institutions (or quasi-institutions)
in neighborhoods devoid of parochial and public control are the
gangs themselves (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993, p. 178). Gangs that
provide alternative supports for youth, when families and schools can-
not, may become strong components of neighborhood organization
(Venkatesh, 2008). Not to be diminished in this context is the limited
source of illegal income that gangs can provide in the absence of legit-
imate opportunities.
In areas where terrorist organizations develop, the personal level
of social control may be the only resource to which inhabitants have
access. Persons may have no social control or linkages to the parochial
or public levels of social control in their social world. Rosenfeld (2004,
p. 25), in his “institutional balance” explanation of terrorist violence,
describes such a condition in societies where there is “a dominance of
family and religion”:
Individuals develop a strong sense of interpersonal obligation, but

one that is restricted to persons with whom they share particular
social statuses and identities, often based on kin, ethnic, and reli-
gious affiliation. In the absence of strong social support for univer-
salistic rules of conduct, a sense of identity with or obligations to
others who are outside of the relevant social groups is virtually non-
existent. (p. 25)
Whether one considers terrorist organizations and gangs as emerg-

ing from differential access to levels of social control, conditioned on
a geometry of social control, or imbalances in institutional spheres,
there exist conceptual similarities between gangs and terrorist orga-
nizations. Another question is the degree to which these theoretical
similarities are complemented by social linkages between the two
kinds of organizations.
THE ALLIANCE MODEL OF TERRORIST

AND GANGS RELATIONS
Law enforcement agencies share a common fear that international

terrorist organizations may develop alliances with U.S. street gangs.
This fear is supported by documented relationships between ter-
rorist organizations and organized crime. A United Nations report
(Eleventh United Nations Congress, 2005) describes what it is about
international organized crime that makes these groups an attractive
ally for terrorist organizations. In addition to growing global intercon-
nectivity, organized crime has the resources to “move money, share
information, exploit and manipulate modern technology, and pro-
vide endless quantities of black market commodities” (pp. 2–3). The
report goes on to note that “the emergence of transnational orga-
nized crime during the 1990s provided an example and role model
for terrorist groups to follow” (p. 9).
Conditions that reduce the appeal of cooperation with terrorist
organizations as allies for organized crime include the substantial dif-
ferences in goals of the two kinds of organizations. Organized crime
groups are typically pragmatic and profit-driven, more concerned
about profit than principle or politics (United Nations, 2005, p.
5). Terrorist organizations have ideological, political, and religious
goals. On one hand are opportunistic “businessmen,” on the other
are committed zealots. A disincentive for organized crime groups
to ally with terrorist organizations is that close association with ter-
rorist organizations can make organized crime a much higher pri-
ority for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. A disincentive
for terrorists to ally with organized crime is that association with the
opportunistic nonprincipled organized crime figures could make the
terrorist groups vulnerable to betrayal or even infiltration through

such connections (United Nations, 2005, p. 3).
Still, terrorist groups and organized crime share “similar needs
in terms of false documentation, weapons and the like,” and also
share a “common interest in countering the law enforcement efforts
of governments.” At the same time, to some degree, the kinds of
resources and expertise each possesses complement and supplement
those of the other (United Nations, 2005, p. 3). For these reasons,
the United Nations report concludes, “Cooperation between terrorist
groups and organized criminal groups can and do occur when their
interests overlap in such enterprises as human smuggling or arms and
munitions” (United Nations, 2005, p. 13).
If street gangs have the same level of organizational resources as
those attributed to international organized crime groups, there is
indeed a possibility that alarm about street gang and terrorist alliances
may be justified. Fortunately, gangs are not as well organized as some
law enforcement administrators and governmental officials portray
them. In an online issue of The Economist (2005), a list of conditions
was offered that would make street gangs viable allies for international
terrorist organizations. Not surprisingly, the list includes the charac-
teristics noted in the U.N. report as making organized crime groups
appealing allies for terrorist organizations. To be capable of carrying
out military-like operations or complex crimes of violence, gangs would
require leadership, functional roles, and discipline. International
crime organizations have access to stable crime-generated resources.
Gangs have been alleged to possess those kinds of resources through
control of drug traffic (Venkatesh, 2008). Federal law enforcement
officials have claimed to have found such connections for gang crimi-
nal organizations across national boundaries.
Gang Organization
A few gang researchers have argued that gangs are better organized
than most other researchers have found them to be (Sanchez-
Jankowski, 1991; Taylor, 1990). More generally, gangs have been
depicted as loosely organized confederations, subject to almost contin-
ual changes in structure, composition, and purpose (Decker and Van
Winkle, 1996; Hagedorn, 1998; Klein, 1995; Short and Strodtbeck,
1965; Spergel, 1995). Since Thrasher (1927), gang researchers have

suggested that conventional gangs could eventually become more like
organized crime groups.
One study in particular reveals the limited nature of gang orga-
nization. Decker et al. (2002) studied the level of organization of
four gangs identified as well organized by local law enforcement.
Law enforcement agencies in Chicago and San Diego were asked to
identify the most organized gangs in their jurisdictions. The Chicago
police selected the Black Gangster Disciple Nation (BGDN) and Latin
Kings. San Diego police identified Logan Heights Calle Treinte and
the Lincoln Park Syndo Mob. Gang members were enlisted from
two sources – probation offices and prisons. The researchers chose
these institutional sources because gang members on probation or in
prison had a greater likelihood of having committed serious offenses
and of being members of their gangs for longer periods of time. In
their interviews, the researchers sought information on structural
complexity, involvement in community, and relationships with other
gangs. Among measures of organizational complexity were levels of
membership, leadership structure, regularity of meetings, written
rules, membership dues, and consequences for leaving the gang.
Engaging in political activity and legitimate businesses is comparable
to similar activity by organized crime. Decker and his coauthors con-
sidered instrumental relationships with other gangs to be similar to
relationships among organized crime groups.
A primary finding on the level of organization in the San Diego
gangs emerged very early in the research. Between planning and
implementing the research project, the two San Diego gangs “had
been dismantled through aging out, splintering, and vigorous law
enforcement, prosecution, and incarceration.” One year before data
collection, the two San Diego gangs had been identified as the gangs
in city that were most organized and most likely to grow into orga-
nized crime groups. One year later, those gangs no longer existed.
The two Chicago gangs were much more highly organized than either
of the San Diego gangs. It was the BGDN that the researchers deter-
mined to be most organized, but by no means were the members
unanimous in attributing the organizational structure measures to
their gang. There was 100 percent agreement only on that the BGDN
had leaders. Decker and his coauthors concluded that only the BGDN
showed emergent structures that might be associated with organized
crime, but had not developed at that time enough to be considered
organized an crime group. In other words, what may be the best-
organized gang in the nation may have only the “potential” of becom-
ing an organized crime group.
Gang Access to Resources from Drug Sales

Research on gangs and drug trafficking has consistently shown the lim-
ited control that gangs have over drug trafficking. Studies by Reiner
(1992) and by Decker and Van Winkle (1996) concluded that street
gangs lack the organization and discipline to engage in effective drug
trafficking. From their studies of Chicago homicides, Block and Block
(1993) found that gang homicides were more likely to be turf-related
than drug-related. By analysis of crime records from four Los Angeles
police districts, Klein et al. (1991) determined that street gangs were
“minor players” in crack sales in Southern California. From the only
empirical data on a gang’s drug-selling operation, Venkatesh (1999)
estimated the hourly wage of “soldiers” in his drug gang as approxi-
mately seven dollars per hour. Others have found similar results for
the profits of street-level drug distribution (MacCoun and Reuter,
1992; Padilla, 1992).
Global Interconnectivity of Gangs

Gangs with the same names as American gangs are reported in other
countries, particularly in Europe (Klein et al., 2001). Though a few
European gangs use names that are taken from U.S. gangs, these gangs
have no structural connections to their U.S. counterparts (Decker and
Weerman, 2005). In fact, this copying of gang names has been found
in U.S. cities. Hagedorn (1998) noted the use of Chicago gang names
and alliances in Milwaukee, and Decker and Van Winkle (1996) found
the same for Los Angeles gang names and alliances in St. Louis. The
spread of gang names has led some law enforcement professionals
and researchers to mistake the spread of gang culture for a conscious
expansion strategy by the Los Angeles Crips and Bloods (Leet et al.,
2000). Based on a survey of law enforcement (Maxson, 1998), gang
culture spreads rather than the gangs themselves. An additional piece
of evidence in this conclusion is that gangs in emerging cities mix

symbols and colors differently from the big-city gangs from which they
have borrowed their names (Starbuc et al., 2004).
THE EL RUKN STREET GANG–LIBYA ALLIANCE
A rare alleged incidence of a terrorist alliance between an American

street gang and a foreign entity did not turn out well for the gang.
The alliance was to be between the El Rukn street gang and the
government of Libya. The El Rukn street gang had earlier incarna-
tions as the Blackstone Rangers and the Black P. Stone Nation. The
gang’s founders included an African American teenager named
Jeff Fort. Spergel (1995) describes Fort as having “an organiza-
tional talent, if not genius.” Fort originally served time for defraud-
ing the federal government through a training grant with Chicago’s
Woodlawn Organization. After his release from prison, Fort founded
the Moorish Science Temple of America and built what Spergel char-
acterized as an extremely well-organized criminal enterprise. Jeff Fort
was serving time again in 1985 when he was indicted for the El Rukn
terrorist alliance with Libya.
The planned alliance included the bombing of police stations and
government buildings. There was even a proposal to down an airliner.
The plan developed beyond a meeting in Panama between Libyan
officials and El Rukn lieutenants. Fort supposedly masterminded
the alliance from a federal prison in Bastrop, Texas by telephone.
Telephones in federal prisons are each marked with warnings that
calls are monitored. The El Rukns were alleged to have been offered
$2.5 million, and, after their reign of terror, asylum in Libya.
The alliance unraveled as federal authorities arrested Fort’s lieu-
tenants and charged the imprisoned Fort with a list of new federal
crimes. Eventually five El Rukn leaders, including Fort (New York
Times, 1987), were convicted and sixteen more pled guilty (Spergel,
1995, p. 137). Almost all of the El Rukn leaders pleading guilty
gave testimony against Fort. From being the best-organized gang in
Chicago or even the United States, the El Rukns became a nonplayer
among Chicago gangs. In a report by former Los Angeles prosecu-
tor Ira Reiner on gangs and violence, Reiner (1992) suggested that
gang members are among the most visible offenders. It was naïve of
the El Rukn leadership to assume that their planning activities would
go unnoticed. Gangs not only lack the structure and resources that
make them appealing alliances for terrorist groups, but, maybe more
so than organized crime groups, gangs also draw unwelcome atten-
tion from authorities to terrorist activities.
A RECRUITMENT MODEL
An alternative model of terrorist-organization connection to U.S.

street gangs is a recruitment model. In this scenario, gang members
may serve as recruitment pools for members or pawns of terrorist
groups. Cases of American-born citizens being recruited into Islamic
terrorist organizations are on record. Perhaps the best known was
Clement Rodney Hampton-el, an African American converted to
Islam and indicted for his participation in a plot to blow up a number
of New York structures, including tunnels and bridges. Still the only
prosecution involving the recruitment of a gang member as a terrorist
is the case of Jose Padilla.
On May 8, 2002, Jose Padilla, a member of the Latin Disciples street
gang was taken into custody as he stepped off of a plane at O’Hare
International Airport in Chicago. In a nationally televised statement,
Attorney General Ashcroft announced that Padilla was being charged
with conspiring to set off a non-nuclear, radioactive (“dirty”) bomb
(Whitney, 2005). Deputy Attorney General James Comey labeled
Padilla “a soldier of our enemy, a trained, funded, and equipped
terrorist. … a highly trained Al Qaida soldier who had accepted an
assignment to kill hundreds of innocent men, women and children.”
Though Padilla’s charges have been modified to plotting to rent
adjacent apartments in high rises, turn on the gas, and set off explo-
sions to destroy the buildings, Padilla’s story has always emphasized
his membership in the Latin Disciples. On May 8, Padilla was alleged
to be returning from a meeting with high-ranking al Qaeda Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed. Padilla, who was held without charges for over
three years as an “enemy combatant,” was transferred to the control of
civilian authorities in 2005. In January 2008, Padilla was sentenced to
seventeen years and four months in federal prison (Semple, 2008). As
in the case of the El Rukn alliance, Padilla’s status as a gang member

may have led in part to his being a target of law enforcement.
Gang researchers have recognized that the age of gang members
is increasing, as older gang members have limited alternatives in the
legitimate labor market. Venkatesh (1999) has suggested that some
of these older gang members are as frustrated with their gangs as
with the rest of society. George Knox, director of the National Gang
Crime Research Center (Sadovi, 2002), does not discount the possi-
bility of terrorist recruitment of gang members. In Knox’s words, “All
American gangs … have this combative, hate-the-system, tear-it-up
attitude. What drives gangs is conflict … they want to wreak havoc.”
Joining terrorist groups for gang members is “like they made it big
time.” Looking at the El Rukn and Padilla examples, it may be more
likely that gang members will reach out to terrorist organizations
than the other way around. As compared to the “alliance” model, the
recruitment model is more likely, but it is possible that from the per-
spective of terrorist organizations, recruits other than gang members
may be more attractive selections.
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM RESPONSE
Given the similar genesis of terrorist groups and gangs, why is it that
gangs appear so much weaker and less successful than terrorist groups?
One possible explanation is the grounding of Islamic terrorist groups
in a broader cultural belief structure. Individuals and even nations
often contribute or support terrorist groups. Gangs, on the other
hand, have no allegiance to a broader normative system. A search for
individual profits is not attractive to a wide range of supporters.
Another possible answer to the difference between terrorist groups
and gangs is in the decades-long reaction of U.S. law enforcement to
gangs. Beginning in the 1980s, law enforcement organizations have
concentrated on gangs. Greene and Decker (2007) point out that the
two major institutional reactions to gangs have been multiagency task
forces and gang-intelligence units. Despite the dearth of evaluations
of these kinds of gang suppression programs, Greene and Decker
(2007, p. 28) go on to suggest that “the fundamental reasons that
such interventions have not led to the outcomes that were expected
is that the nature of the problem was ‘misdiagnosed’.” It is generally

accepted among gang researchers that these suppression strategies
assumed that gangs were more organized than they actually were.
By focusing on gang members, the criminal justice system may have
inadvertently increased the gang problem by throwing the book at
gang members. These strong reactions to gangs may have led to the
incarceration of marginally involved youths, while giving gangs the
opportunity to become more organized in custodial settings. Though
gangs may thus have been strengthened or enlarged by suppression
strategies, the process left gangs isolated from their communities and
decreased the opportunities of street gangs to sustain profitable crimi-
nal enterprises.
It might be more effective to use task forces and intelligence units
against terrorist groups. Terrorist organizations are already well orga-
nized. Terrorist groups have cross-national connections and resources
comparable to those of international crime organizations. As Greene
and Decker (2007) note, gang-suppression programs have usually not
been evaluated. Much more can be done. In order to see if gang-
suppression strategies work against terror organizations, criminal
justice responses to terrorist organization should be subjected to
rigorous evaluation.
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zmag.org/znet
chapter six
Women Terrorists
Rita J. Simon and Adrienne Tranel
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines evidence from women involved in terrorist

organizations that are currently active. We examine the roles women
play in existing terrorist groups and the common demographic char-
acteristics of the women who join these groups. We also examine the
motives women have for joining terrorist organizations and whether
those motives differ by type of terrorist group. The evidence demon-
strates that women join terrorist groups for myriad reasons, including
marginalization by society, individual choice, avengement of another’s
death, recruitment by the organizations, and serving as pawns in a
man’s game. Charles Townshend, writing in Terrorism, reports:
Something like a quarter of the Russian terrorists of the 19th century

were women; a proportion possibly exceeded among the German
and American terrorists of the 1970s. A full third of the Communist
Organized for the Liberation of the Proletariat (COLP) in Italy were
women, and 31 percent of that nation’s Bridate Rossi (Red Brigades).
(Townshend 2002)
In an earlier paper published in 1980 that examined the historical

role of women in terrorist organizations, we found that women’s
involvement in such organizations was not a side effect of the wom-
en’s liberation movement. Rather, the evidence suggested that one of
the unintended consequences of women’s involvement in these orga-
nizations is that their involvement weakened traditional customs and
sex roles (Benson, Evans, and Simon 1980).
113
Like the 1980 piece, this chapter is limited largely to anecdotal evi-
dence about female terrorists, which creates only a thin foundation
for sociological generalization. In addition, if the female terrorists are
successful – and they largely are – the women die without ever relay-
ing their reasons for joining the organization. Therefore, projections
about why those women chose to join terrorist organizations, with-
out direct evidence about their choices, are speculative at best. For
example, do they join for ideological reasons or because the opportu-
nity is open to them and they have personal motives such as revenge?
Several common themes do exist among the various women’s stories
as to the roles they have played within their organizations, the kind of
women who join terrorist groups, and the reasons they cite for becom-
ing involved in terrorist organizations.
Citing an incident in July 2007 in which a woman approached seven
Iraqi policemen at a checkpoint in Ramadi and blew herself up, killing
everybody in the vicinity, Peter Berger and Paul Cruickshank warned
that female participation in suicide attacks “have grown alarmingly
in recent years. And unless we come to terms with the phenomenon
female extremist militants might be an important part of our future.”
The thrust of this chapter supports that warning, and not only among
Islamist militants (Berger and Cruickshank 2007).
A Brief History of the Role of Women in Terrorism

Women’s participation in revolutionary movements was historically
both commonplace and active. Over time, women in revolutionary
groups have not limited their roles to the stereotypical female role,
but instead have taken on prominent leadership roles, as seen in the
cases of Russia, Latin America, and East Asia. As of 1980, the women
who were joining revolutionary movements came from the middle
and upper classes and were generally of an age between adolescence
and their late thirties.
At the time of the 1980 piece, it did not appear that women’s
involvement in revolutionary groups and terrorist organizations
was a side effect of the women’s liberation movement. Rather, the
research showed that as women broke down traditional roles within
the organizations, in turn, the traditional female roles in society at
large dissolved. In examining the roles women played in various
women terrorists 115
revolutionary movements, the demographic characteristics of the

women who joined the groups, and the division of labor within the
groups, we found that women were not participating in terrorism
because of the women’s liberation movement.
Characterizing women currently involved in terrorism, Mia Bloom,
author of Dying to Kill, writes: “When men conduct suicide missions
they are motivated by religious and nationalist fanaticism, whereas
women appear more often motivated by very personal reasons”
(Bloom 2005, p. 145). As examples, Bloom describes the “Black
Widows,” the female operatives in Chechnya as persons who have lost
a loved one and are motivated by their personal tragedy. She notes
that Palestinian women are also motivated by the desire to recover
their family honor.
Importance of Women in Terrorism Today

Terrorist organizations have changed dramatically in the last twen-
ty-five years, and have taken on an entirely different dynamic in the
world. A brief description of the organizations discussed in this paper is
necessary for the reader to understand the variety of groups in existence
today and the purported purposes of the terrorist organizations.
Jessica Stern, in Terror In the Name of God, reports that “women have
been responsible for over a third of the suicide bombings carried out
by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka and over two
thirds of those perpetrated by the Kurdish Workers Party PKK” (Stern
2003, p. 53).
Al Qaeda is a terrorist group, founded largely in Afghanistan, with
a global network whereby its members fight against Western ideals.
Mostly founded on Islamic ideals, al Qaeda seeks to liberate Muslims
from what it perceives as Western domination. Al Qaeda is the organi-
zation held responsible for the attacks against the World Trade Center
on September 11, 2001. Other organizations considered in this chap-
ter are related to a particular country and that organization’s pursuit
of liberty from the dominating nation. In Sri Lanka, the Liberation
Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are Hindus who wish to be liberated
from the majority Buddhist nation. LTTE has fought a civil war for
nearly fifteen years against the Sinhalese Buddhist majority of Sri
Lanka. Likewise, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) seeks to drive the
British from Ireland; the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain seek

an independent Basque country separate from Spain; the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) has fought with Israel for years over
the boundaries between the two territories; and Chechnya seeks inde-
pendence from Russia.
Although nationalist revolutionary groups remain active throughout
many different countries, terrorism is now more globalized and far-
reaching in this age of technology. With the events of September 11,
2001, and the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, the
world has assumed a new perspective regarding terrorism. Terrorism is
no longer confined to a country’s borders and the nationalistic move-
ment within those borders. Rather, terrorism is now of international
concern and drives new policies and legislation. Modern politics are
primarily concerned with preventing terrorist groups from launching
large-scale attacks on other countries. Thus, the landscape in which
we consider this chapter on women terrorists has changed drastically,
but ironically, women’s reasons for participating in terrorist groups
remain largely the same.
CASE STUDIES: THE WOMEN WHO JOIN TERRORIST

ORGANIZATIONS
The data provide information on the roles that women assume when
they participate in terrorist groups and on the demographic charac-
teristics of the women who join these groups. With this research, some
conclusions can be drawn about the reasons why women join terrorist
groups, although limitations exist as to how far the generalizations
may reach, based on the limited number of stories available and the
anecdotal nature of those stories.
The Roles Women Assume in Terrorist Organizations

Women have maintained a high level of participation and activism in
the terrorist organizations they join. Although women play support-
ive roles in some groups, women do not play only supportive roles.
Rather, female members of these organizations can also be found at
high-level leadership and in front-line positions in which the mem-
bers participate directly in the attacks. But the roles that women fulfill
within the organizations are directly related to the kinds of organiza-

tions in which they participate. We previously divided contemporary
terrorist groups into two categories, a categorization that still holds
true today. The idealist groups are “inspired by vague notions of world
liberation and emphasize the dramaturgy of violence” and “are the
most eccentric and bizarre of all terrorist groups.” On the other hand,
the nationalistic groups “stress the political rights and liberation of
the people of a specific geographic area.”
But the groups that comprised the list of idealists in 1980 have now
gone defunct, mostly due to the capture of their leaders. Today, the
primary idealist group engaging in terrorism is al Qaeda. At the top
of the list of those people wanted for their alleged involvement in al
Qaeda is Aafia Siddiqui, the only female on the “deadly seven” list
created by former Attorney General John Ashcroft. Siddiqui is wanted
for her involvement as a “fixer” in al Qaeda, someone who has knowl-
edge about the United States and can help accomplish objectives for
other operatives. The allegations against her consist of suspicious
money transfers and purchases of military equipment on the Internet,
assisting the plot of the 9/11 attacks, a plot to blow up underground
gas tanks in Baltimore, and overseeing a $19 million diamond deal to
secure money for al Qaeda.
Siddiqui did not carry out any of the al Qaeda attacks against the
United States herself, but she did play a substantial role as an agent
and planner of the attacks. Her role was one of support and assis-
tance; she used her knowledge of the United States to assist in finan-
cial deals, and her knowledge of science and technology to plan the
attacks themselves. It is not clear that Siddiqui’s role was limited to
one of support and assistance because she is a woman, but it is pos-
sible that Islamic ideals underpinning al Qaeda objectives were the
reasons for her having a more secretive, behind-the-scenes role.
In 2005, al Qaeda sent three women on suicide missions, two in
Iraq and one in Jordan. One of the women, Muriel Degauque, was
a thirty-eight-year-old Belgian married to a Belgian of Moroccan
descent. Sajida Mubarak al-Rishawi was one of the two suicide bomb-
ers involved in the bombing of three hotels in Amman, Jordan. It
turns out that Sajida failed to detonate her bomb. According to an
account in Newsweek (December 12, 2005) the woman had lost three
brothers in the fight against the Americans, and had married her fel-
low bomber less than a week before she went on the suicide mission.
The nationalist groups the PLO and the IRA remain active, although
Spain, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya now represent additional countries
with active revolutionary movements. In the nationalist groups,
there is remarkably little division of labor, and women are becoming
increasingly active in direct terrorist attacks. In particular, women are
especially active in suicide bombings (as opposed to car bombings,
planted bombs, etc.). Yet in organizations where women make up the
same percentage of members as men, it is more likely that women in
those groups obtain positions of leadership.
The Palestinian example illustrates female activism in terrorist
groups and women’s ability to participate in any level of the organi-
zations. As in other countries where nationalist terrorist groups are
prevalent, Palestinian women play a large role in the physical attacks,
and particularly in suicide bombings. Women have been used to assist
in planning the attacks as well as in carrying the bombings out.
In March 1985, Sumayah Sa’ad drove a car loaded with dynamite
into an Israeli military position in southern Lebanon. The attack
killed twelve Israeli soldiers and wounded fourteen others. Two weeks
later, another young Palestinian woman drove a TNT-laden car into
an Israeli Defense Force convoy that killed two soldiers and wounded
two more (Stern 2003, p. 311).
In January 2002, Wafa Idris carried out a suicide bombing that
killed one Israeli and wounded one hundred others. Since January
2002, roughly seventy Palestinian women have followed in her foot-
steps, though only eight succeeded in blowing themselves up.
In September 2005, female recruits were being trained by Hamas
in the Gaza Strip to carry out attacks on Israel. The women were being
trained to plant roadside bombs, fire rockets and mortars, and infiltrate
Jewish settlements. Some of the women said they were married and
had children. Their husbands knew of their activities, as did the fathers
and brothers of the unmarried women. The husbands and brothers
of most of the women were also members of the armed wing of Hamas.
Religion and culture play an important role among Palestinians as
to what status women may have among the terrorist groups. There
is no ban in Islam on women participating in jihad, and women can
participate in jihad in both supportive roles and in active roles. The

groups justify bending traditional female roles as necessary to the
realization of jihad. For example, whereas normally women who ven-
ture outside of the home would have to be accompanied by a male
chaperon, if a woman goes out to fight and if she is not gone for
longer than a day and a night, then she may venture out without a
male chaperon. In addition, women are not required to wear the veil
if doing so assists in misleading the enemy.
The traditional prohibition against Muslims taking their own
lives is also a rule that has flexed in the face of what the Palestinian
terrorists deem “necessity.” Though the Koran condemns suicide by
men and women alike, both gender groups often ignore that rule
to achieve political goals such as liberation. Women are necessary to
the Palestinian revolutionary movement, because as suicide bombings
become more common, the group needs more people to commit the
bombings. As women have become more and more involved in terror-
ist organizations, they have achieved similar roles to those that men
hold. Conversely, however, Palestinian women often take advantage
of traditional notions of their role in society in order to carry out a
suicide bombing more effectively. For example, many women will take
on the role of carrying weapons, because in Islamic cultures, men are
not supposed to touch women they do not know, thus making it easier
for women to conceal explosives and other weapons.
We see a remarkable growth in the number of women terrorists in
Chechnya. Women are directly involved in terrorist attacks and, in
particular, suicide bombings. In the past several years, almost every
suicide bombing has involved women, and some of the attacks have
been carried out exclusively by women. Authorities say that female
suicide bombers have taken part in at least fifteen attacks since the
war erupted again in 1999. This growth in numbers has also been
noted among Irish women participating in the IRA.
As women become more directly involved in the physical, direct
attacks, they have expanded ideological notions about themselves, and
use their participation in these groups to see themselves as equals to
men. Women are involved in the terrorist acts committed by the Basque
separatists, ETA, who fight for the liberation of the Basque country
from the rest of Spain. Though the women in the organization are
outnumbered by men, they perceive themselves as ideological equals

to men. Once women become committed to ETA, they believe them-
selves to be determined fighters who follow through on their com-
mitment. They also see themselves as stronger than the men in ETA
because they have to endure more pain in their everyday lives.
Where women make up a larger percentage of the organization,
they are more likely to hold positions beyond those of suicide bombers.
In Sri Lanka, for example, women make up half of the population of
the LTTE, who seek liberation for the minority Hindu population.
Women began to join LTTE in the mid-1980s. Of the LTTE’s Central
Committee members, the highest decision-making body in the orga-
nization, three out of ten members are women. In addition, women
often occupy positions more central than, or at least equivalent to,
their male counterparts. One leader of the group, “Dhanu,” is known
for killing the former prime minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi. Notably,
prior to joining the LTTE, and two years before the bombing in which
Prime Minister Gandhi died, Dhanu was gang-raped and the Indian
peacekeeping forces killed her brothers.
In LTTE, women take part directly in the fighting and are given the
same training and experience as men. In fact, women were needed
during the 1980s because LTTE was experiencing a shortage of num-
bers and needed more fighters. By 1985, women had developed their
own army division of the LTTE. Women have proven themselves to
be strong fighters, and are cited as being just as harsh as their male
counterparts and just as willing to take their own lives in order to
accomplish a mission.
With the onset of women’s active participation in LTTE, other
traditional female roles began to dwindle. Girls no longer need to
travel with a male chaperone because their solitude allowed them to
carry out suicide missions. In addition, a young male is prone to more
danger from threats to his mission than is a young female. Because
women are less suspicious, they are able to carry out their missions
with a higher degree of success.
Demographic Characteristics of Women

in Terrorist Organizations
Terrorist organizations are attracting more and more women over
time, which suggests that these organizations are increasingly more
appealing to women. It is therefore important to examine what

classes of women are joining terrorist groups. In some instances, ter-
rorist organizations appear to be attracting young, educated, single
women. Most of the women are in their twenties, although the range
of ages spans from as young as eleven years old up to the early thirties
(Al Qaeda). However, Bloom notes that “women suicide bombers in
Sri Lanka and Turkey have few if any career options. Many of them are
unsophisticated and poorly educated and simply follow their leaders
blindly” (Bloom 2005, p. 165).
Female terrorists are usually not mothers. This fact is sometimes
attributable to an inability to have children or to the fact that they are
too young to have contemplated motherhood. Of the Spanish women
in ETA, very few of them are mothers and even fewer mothers assume
leadership positions. It is also rare that Irish mothers become involved
in the IRA. Idris, the first Palestinian suicide bomber, was divorced
after nine years of marriage, apparently because she and her husband
were unable to have children. It appears, then, that childless women
may choose to join terrorist organizations precisely because they do
not have children.
Often, the women in terrorist organizations come from the mar-
gins of society, as we see in the cases of Chechnya, Sri Lanka, and
Palestine. In Chechen society, if a woman is raped, that rape dishon-
ors her entire family. Therefore, a common characteristic among
female terrorists in Chechnya is that they are socially stigmatized in
some way – for example, they have been raped or they cannot have
children. In Palestine, a woman can be stigmatized for not being able
to have children. In Sri Lanka, some of the women who join LTTE
are women who have been raped. According to Hindu faith, a woman
who has been raped cannot then marry or have children. Therefore,
one way women can redeem themselves is through fighting for Tamil
freedom. In fact, family members of a rape victim will often encour-
age the woman to join LTTE. Moreover, usually the women who join
LTTE are low-caste Tamil women who join the group between the ages
of eleven and thirteen. These women are particularly recruited for
suicide bombings because they are not viewed as socially valuable.
The women who join terrorist groups are not seeking liberation
for women. In fact, sometimes the women who join these groups
are more conservative than their peers. For example, Aafia Siddiqui
is a divorced mother of three children who holds a degree from

Brandeis University and a doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. She has been described as a pious Muslim who comes
from a family of pious Muslims. Her mother was a strong activist
woman, and Ms. Siddiqui followed in her mother’s footsteps. Ms.
Siddiqui held traditional Muslim beliefs, wore traditional dress, and
read the Quran regularly. She is also described as having positive feel-
ings about the United States, and even believed that she could turn
the United States into an Islamic nation. Ms. Siddiqui was politically
active and was determined to reconcile her Islamic faith with Western
science and technology.
Another common characteristic of women who join terrorist orga-
nizations is that they seek to avenge some wrong that has been done to
them. This proposition is true in Palestine and Ireland, although the
most prominent story comes from Chechnya. Zarema Muzhakhoyeva
attempted to set off a bomb in a café in Moscow in July 2003. Her
attempt failed, however, and she was apprehended by the Russian
police. Zarema was twenty-two years old at the time she attempted the
suicide bombing, and had been married and pregnant at the age of
fifteen. Her husband died fighting for Chechen independence, and
so, according to Chechen tradition, Zarema and her daughter then
belonged to her husband’s family. That family, however, did not treat
Zarema well and she escaped, leaving her daughter behind. Finding
herself without any money, Zarema took out a loan from a group of
men who told her that the only way she could pay them back was
with her life. She said she wanted to complete the suicide bombing
to avenge her husband’s death, but at least in part, she was forced to
complete it by being drugged.
CONCLUSIONS: THE REASONS WHY WOMEN

JOIN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
Though the evidence is anecdotal and difficult to piece together

given the dearth of information about many of the subjects and the
speculation surrounding their circumstances, certain themes are con-
sistent despite the variety of motives suggested in the women’s stories.
Women are joining terrorist organizations with increasing frequency
and are becoming more personally active as suicide bombers. They

are motivated by clear objectives that seem unique to women.
First, as noted, a common characteristic of women in terrorist
organizations is that they have been marginalized by society in some
way. Women may therefore join terrorist groups as a way to avenge
themselves of their own plight, relieve their families of any dishonor
they have imparted (i.e., because of rape or an inability to have chil-
dren), or simply escape the society that has marginalized them. Some
societies, like the Tamils in Sri Lanka, encourage raped women to
redeem themselves by fighting for Tamil freedom. Therefore, margin-
alized women may see participation in terrorism as a way to achieve
redemption, or they may simply feel pressured into joining the orga-
nization in order to reduce any embarrassment on the part of the
family. Terrorism may also provide these women with a concrete
avenue by which they can achieve eternal beauty and glory. Though
socially marginalized women cannot be beautiful or glorified during
their lifetimes, they can achieve these goals through martyrdom.
Second, strong personal reasons underlie much of a woman’s deci-
sion to join a terrorist group. For example, in a manner closely related
to the idea of martyrdom, some women engage in terrorism as a way
to avenge the death of someone close to them. This tendency is partic-
ularly true among Chechen, Irish, and Palestinian women who have
witnessed grave atrocities being committed to their loved ones. These
women thus feel compelled to avenge the death of a loved one by kill-
ing those they deem responsible.
Other personal reasons among female terrorists include the desire
to fulfill their own political goals and motivations. Many women will
choose to become members of terrorist groups if they believe that
the choice will further their political hopes. In Spain and Ireland,
the female members of ETA and the IRA have made independent
decisions to join those organizations. The possibility always exists that
women join terrorist groups out of their own volition, and wish to
challenge political movements through terrorism.
Some writers suggest that women join terrorist organizations out
of religious motivation. This conclusion seems possible in the case
of al Qaeda, whose religious leanings have motivated the goals of
the group. But such a conclusion limits the discussion too narrowly.
Inherent in certain strains of the Islamic religion is a strong effect

of various Muslim beliefs on cultural norms. Al Qaeda is a compli-
cated organization with radical idealistic beliefs that reach beyond
the standard of mere religiousness. Among Palestinians, women are
able to surmount traditional cultural notions while concurrently capi-
talizing on those norms in order to carry out terrorist attacks. Thus,
women both obliterate and take advantage of cultural traditions as
they participate in terrorism. This correlation cannot be attributed to
a religious motivation for joining revolutionary movements.
Another less common reason that women join terrorist organiza-
tions is that they are merely pawns of the male game. In Chechnya,
this reason is particularly common; accounts are available to demon-
strate that some women have been coerced into joining terrorist orga-
nizations. However, evidence in other countries does not suggest that
women are forced into participation in terrorist groups; therefore
these phenomena may be unique to Chechnya.
Some female suicide bombers may have chosen to act as they did
because of the rewards they expect to receive in heaven. A male sui-
cide bomber may expect to be rewarded with seventy-two virgins, but
what about women? Women, according to some modern clerics may
expect to become chief of seventy-two virgins, that is, the fairest of the
fair (Tsai 2007).
Finally, it is entirely possible that women join terrorist groups
because they are recruited into the organizations out of the organi-
zations’ need for more participants. As terrorism becomes a more
common way for terrorists to make their beliefs known, especially
in the international arena, women’s participation becomes increas-
ingly more common. The groups need effective ways of deceiving
the enemy, and they need more members in order to carry out more
attacks. Therefore, the terrorist groups are learning that they can tap
into another source of power and numbers – women.
In examining the roles that women play in modern terrorist orga-
nizations and the demographic characteristics of the women who
join these organizations, we see that women participate in terrorism
for a number of reasons, including personal motivations, the need
to redeem themselves and overcome dishonor, sheer desire to be
politically active through terrorism, potential coercion into joining
the groups, and the need on the part of the organizations to have
more active members. Despite changes to the stage on which terror-
ism takes place today, women’s reasons for participating in terrorism
remain largely the same as they were thirty years ago. In the main,
they do not represent future leaders for gender equality or women’s
liberation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ann, Adele, “Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers: Women and the

Struggle for Tamil Eelam,” EelamWeb (1990), available from http://
www/eelamweb.com/women/.
Benson, Mike, Mariah Evans and Rita Simon, “Women as Political
Terrorists,” Research in Law, Deviance and Social Control, Volume 4
(1980), pp. 121–130.
Berger, Peter and Paul Cruickshank, “Meet the New Face of Terror,” The
Washington Post (August 12, 2007), p. B4.
Bloom, Mia, Dying to Kill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
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europe/3610327.stm.
Cunningham, Karla J., “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 26 (2003), pp. 171–195.
Cutter, Ana, “Tamil Tigresses, Hindu Martyrs.” Available at http://www.
columbia.edu/cu/sipa/PUBS/SLANT/SPRING98/article5.html.
“Failed Chechen Suicide Bomber Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison,”
Mosnews.com, August 4, 2004. Available at http://www.mosnews.com.
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www.priu.gov/lk/news _update/Current_Affairs/ca200004/
20000419LTTE_atrocities… (April 19, 2000).
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tive,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Volume 1 (1983), pp. 19–32.
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133, Issue 4704 (September 6, 2004).
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(September 8, 2004). Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.
Isikoff, Michael and Mark Hosenball, “Tangled Ties,” Newsweek (April 7,
2003). Available at http://www.msnbc.com/msn/com/id/4687305.
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Square Through ‘Islamikaze Martyrdom’,” Terrorism and Political
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MacDonald, Eileen, Shoot the Women First (New York: Random House,
1991).
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Peace and Conflict Studies, available at http://www.ipcs.org (March
31, 2003).
MEMRI, Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 83 (Feb. 12, 2002).
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Sign of What War Has Done,” The New York Times, September 12, 2004.
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(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966).
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(October 2004). Available at http://www.bostonmagazine.com,
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www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/Europe/10/04/france.spain.eta.
Stahl, Julia, “Palestinians Using More Children, Women for Terrorism,”
January 6, 2005. Available at http://www.cnsnews.com.
Stern, Jessica, Terror in the Name of God (New York: ECCO Harper Collins,
2003).
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(March 2005).
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Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/27/terror.
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Part two
STRATEGIES FOR INTERVENTION

chapter seven
Is Crime Prevention Relevant

to Counterterrorism?
Cynthia Lum and Christopher S. Koper
INTRODUCTION
Is the practice of crime prevention – as well as its scholarship, discourse,

tools, institutions, and perspectives – relevant to countering terror-
ism? Substantive concerns have been expressed about differences
between terrorism and crime, both in definition and nature, and
accordingly between applying crime prevention strategies and tactics
to counterterrorism (for a review of some of these arguments, see
Deflem, 2004; LaFree and Dugan, 2004; Mythen and Walklate, 2005;
Rosenfeld, 2004). On the one hand, terrorism – commonly defined as
violence motivated by political and/or religious ideology, with inten-
tions of creating mass casualties and/or public fear – is a unique type
of violence, with extralegal, political, and social elements that diverge
from the characteristics of everyday forms of crime. The applications
of crime prevention strategies, which mostly include schemes that
block very common forms of deviant behavior, could be too weak to
be applied to terrorism, or so general and far reaching that their use
might lead to costs of freedom and livelihood that greatly outweigh
benefits.
Further, the most promising counterterrorism approaches may lie
outside the criminologist’s purview and expertise, involving interna-
tional diplomacy, economic or political sanctions, technological or
military solutions, or the transformation of religious institutions. In
Northern Ireland, for example, a number of policing strategies used
against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were seen as exacerbating
rather than alleviating IRA terrorism (McGarry and O’Leary, 1999;
129
130 strategies for Intervention
Tonge, 2002). Some have argued that, in the end, political power-
sharing structures established by the Good Friday Agreement of 1998
as well as the IRA’s own de-legitimization were the most effective
mechanisms in reducing IRA terrorism (Reynolds, 1999). These were
political rather than criminal justice remedies. The extreme rarity
of terrorism may mean that many crime prevention techniques are
either irrelevant or even dangerous to counterterrorism efforts due to
unacceptable levels of false positives and the risks of civil and human
rights violations.
At the same time, parallels between crime and terrorism suggest that
crime-prevention theory and practices can be relevant to countering
terrorism (see LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw, 2009; Kennedy, 2009;
and Lum, 2009a). Terrorists engage in illegal activities – including
murder, assault, property damage, theft, money laundering, and con-
spiracy – all of which have been studied by crime prevention scholars.
As with other types of crime and violence, routines, opportunities,
and criminogenic commodities that facilitate terrorism could be suc-
cessfully blocked (Clarke and Newman, 2006). Criminal justice agen-
cies are responsible for dealing with the perpetrators and victims of
terrorism, arguably making the justice arena the most appropriate
place for prevention strategies to be developed. Furthermore, many
crime prevention researchers study individual, social, psychological,
and economic backgrounds and life-course patterns of individuals
to predict their later criminality. The same approach could be used
to study, for instance, why some juveniles are recruited into terror-
ist activities or what motivates an individual toward terroristic vio-
lence. The multi-disciplinary tradition of criminology matches well
with the study of terrorism; a few criminologists with the knowledge
and skill sets to study terrorism have already done so from varying
perspectives.
Ultimately, the question of whether crime prevention techniques,
perspectives, theories, and institutions are relevant to counterterror-
ism requires exploring the parallels between crime and terrorism,
the potential for applying crime prevention strategies to address-
ing terrorism, the legal and constitutional concerns about applying
preventive techniques to counterterrorism, and the costs and ben-
efits of such an effort. Further, the application of crime prevention
is crime prevention relevant to counterterrorism? 131
interventions (or any intervention) to terrorism must be scientifically

evaluated to determine the effectiveness of such approaches (see
Lum et al. 2006). In this chapter, we suggest that to begin to answer
this question, one useful approach might be to create an organizing
framework for crime prevention interventions, and then see if such a
framework could be applied to counterterrorism interventions, and
what the consequences of doing so would be. A framework we suggest
is the Crime Prevention Matrix, a three-dimensional visualization that
we have developed extensively for police interventions and research
(Lum, 2009b; Lum, Koper, and Telep, 2009) to categorize the wide
array of programs that could fall under the umbrella of crime preven-
tion. We explore whether, where, and when counterterrorism efforts
might fit into this matrix and, most important, what guidelines should
be used to determine the appropriateness of this fit. We close by dis-
cussing the implications: why and how those studying crime preven-
tion can contribute to counterterrorism studies.
A FRAMEWORK FOR CRIME PREVENTION
Broadly, crime prevention has been conceptualized as encompassing

actions, strategies, plans, perspectives, theories, and approaches that
attempt to reduce crime, criminality, and other social problems that
contribute to crime (Clarke, 1996; Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Eck
and Weisburd, 1995; Homel, 1996; Hughes, 1998; Newman et al.,
1997; Newman, 1973; Sherman et al., 1997; Tilley, 2005; Tonry and
Farrington, 1995). Prevention activities can range from the reactive
to the proactive; focus on individuals, groups, places, situations, times,
or physical objects; span different periods of the life of a person, place
or group; and involve both criminal justice and noncriminal justice
entities and institutions. Indeed, crime prevention encompasses a
dizzying array of interventions.
Because the conceptualization of crime prevention and its associ-
ated tactics and strategies can be so wide-ranging, it may be easy to
assert that the umbrella of crime prevention could also encompass
counterterrorism. As already mentioned, counterterrorism strategies
involve agencies, mechanisms, processes, theories, and conceptualiza-
tions that deal with violence, property damage, coercion, and fear.
Y: Specificity of prevention mechanism

Specific
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Figure 7.1. A crime prevention matrix.
But such a sweeping assumption does not pinpoint what type of crime
prevention perspectives and strategies apply to counterterrorism or
the scientific justifications for such applications. A better approach
may be to conceptualize crime prevention through an organizing
framework, then determine if counterterrorism fits such a framework
and what principles would justify such a fit.
To do this, we present one such framework in Figure 7.1, a three-
dimensional matrix of crime-prevention-program characteristics.
Initially inspired by Rosenberg and Knox’s (2005) Child Well-Being
Matrix, we developed this more broadly for crime prevention pro-
grams and have used it for policing evaluations.1 Each axis represents
varying degrees of a common categorizing trait of many crime preven-
tion programs – the scope or type of target, the specificity of the pre-
vention mechanism, and the level of proactivity of the intervention.2
The dimension on the X-axis represents the scale or scope of an
intervention’s target, and ranges from individuals at one end to
larger social aggregations of individuals and the spaces they occupy,
up to the national (or even international) level, at the other end.
1
The Matrix is available online at http://gemini.gmu.edu/cebcp/matrix.html
2
One could hypothesize other dimensions that could characterize crime prevention
programs, such as type of institution responsible, level of effectiveness, legitimacy
and legal challenges, and so on.
For example, some crime prevention strategies focus on reducing

the recidivism of individuals through rehabilitation schemes or by
addressing criminogenic groups like gangs. Place-based approaches in
contrast (Weisburd, 2002) focus on larger social aggregations, such as
blocks, communities, or neighborhoods. The divisions between these
categories are not determinate or discrete; ultimately, groups, places,
communities, nations, and the international arena are fluid and over-
lapping concepts based on different aggregations of individuals.
The Y-axis represents a second common dimension by which crime
prevention strategies are often classified – the level of specificity of
an intervention and its goals, from focused to general. More focused
crime prevention interventions might be tailored to target specific
types of individuals or places. General tactics, on the other hand, may
have broader, more philosophical goals such as deterring all poten-
tial lawbreakers (e.g., implementing three-strikes laws or increasing
police patrol). Like varying targets of crime prevention strategies
represented by the X-axis, characterizing crime prevention tactics on
degree of specificity is common and has been discussed by a number
of scholars (e.g., Erickson and Gibbs, 1975; Sherman and Berk, 1984;
Stafford and Warr, 1993).
The Z-axis represents the level of proactivity in an intervention, from
reactive to proactive to highly proactive. Reactive interventions either
reinforce or strengthen the reaction of criminal justice responses
(e.g., rapid response to 911 calls or reactive arrests by police). More
proactive programs reflect those interventions that tend to use analysis
and patterns of previous incidents to reduce the possibility of future
crimes. Moderately proactive strategies may intend to reduce a recent
crime flare-up or to deter an event likely to happen tomorrow. Highly
proactive interventions are geared toward more long-term effects by
dealing with underlying causes of problems or addressing early risk
factors.
The intersection of the three dimensions then presents a way to
describe and organize crime prevention programs. For example, the
area of the matrix where general, slightly proactive, and community-
level dimensions intersect could point to interventions such as
neighborhood watch or after-school recreational programs. Federal
enhancements for local gun crimes and other sentencing laws, to
provide another illustration, may be placed at the intersection of

more national, general, and slightly proactive strategies.
THE RELEVANCE OF THE MATRIX TO

COUNTERTERRORISM INTERVENTIONS
What would be the relevance of such an organizing framework to our

question of whether crime prevention approaches might be applied
to counterterrorism? First, the Matrix creates generalizations about
the characteristics of crime prevention interventions that can be
described by the three dimensions. Take for instance
situational crime prevention strategies such as placing a light next
to an outdoor cash machine to prevent robberies. Such a strategy
could be categorized as a proactive, place-based, and focused strat-
egy, and there is some evidence that indicates this type of prevention
approach is useful in reducing crime (Eck, 2002). On its face, this
strategy seems to have little relevance to the prevention of terrorism.
More generally, however, it represents an effort to increase guardian-
ship and reduce vulnerability at a place that presents special opportu-
nities for criminal activity. In a similar manner, focused and proactive
manipulations of the environment may have relevance to the preven-
tion of terrorist acts at vulnerable places. An example would be the
installation of metal detectors and other screening devices in airports
or train stations to prevent hijackings and bombings. Thus, it is the
intersection of the Matrix dimensions and the associated crime pre-
vention mechanisms at that intersection (in this case, protecting a
vulnerable area) that gives us a context in which to think about how
research in crime prevention helps to fill out a similar prevention
matrix for terrorism.
Which prevention measures, then, could be applied to terror-
ism given such a matrix? It could make more sense to place coun-
terterrorism efforts within the reactive realm of the matrix because
terrorism may be difficult to predict and therefore prevent proac-
tively. Reactive approaches to terrorism might range from the pur-
suit of known terrorist offenders by law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to military strikes against terrorist camps in foreign nations.
To consider another hypothesis, should we use strategies like directed

police patrol to reduce the likelihood of shootings or bombings at
potentially high-risk places like temples or mosques (a strategy that is
focused in terms of place but that emphasizes general deterrence), or
should we focus very specifically on the detection and surveillance of
known terrorist cells (a more reactive approach focused on individu-
als or groups)? Some counterterrorism should be placed in the top,
right-hand portion of the matrix, where strategies are more interna-
tional, abstract, and general. This realm could encompass legislation
that enhances the punishment of offenders or international investiga-
tions against money laundering.
One can now see that though the placement of interventions
into such an organizing framework can be useful, we also are con-
cerned about whether such placement would yield beneficial results.
Thus, we could further apply what we know from the crime preven-
tion evaluation literature about interventions and characteristics of
those interventions in terms of prevention effectiveness. If crime and
terrorism are similar enough in nature to suggest that similar pre-
vention approaches might be applied to both, then perhaps devising
counterterrorism measures with intersecting dimensions similar to
those of effective crime prevention interventions may be a useful way
of applying crime prevention perspectives to counterterrorism.
For example, Lum et al. (2009) did this for the entire range
of policing interventions that had been evaluated using at least
moderately strong methods. Mapping these studied interventions
according to the characteristics discussed earlier, yielded “realms
of effectiveness,” or clusters of evaluated interventions that have
been shown to have positive effects on crime reduction. Using this
knowledge about policing interventions (or any other category of
interventions) could provide guidance about what combination(s)
of characteristics of counterterrorism efforts may have a greater
chance of being effective. Similarly, if no evaluation exists regarding
an existing counterterrorism strategy, that strategy might be mapped
into the matrix to see if it falls within areas that are more likely to
have effective crime prevention strategies (as determined by scien-
tific evaluation).
GUIDANCE IN USING CRIME PREVENTION CONCEPTS

FOR COUNTERTERRORISM INTERVENTIONS
The presentation of the matrix is not meant to suggest that crime

prevention is so broadly defined that counterterrorism interventions
can fit unequivocally within its framework and vocabulary. Rather, the
question of whether criminologists might apply a crime prevention
framework when thinking about countering terrorism is an inquiry
about the theoretical logic of such placements, as well as the justifica-
tions and guiding principles for such decisions. Specifically, placing a
counterterrorism program into this matrix suggests that the preven-
tive mechanisms associated with intersecting dimensions of the area
of placement (e.g., proactive, general, place-based strategies) not only
are effective, but can also be applied to counterterrorism. We argue
that the placement of counterterrorism interventions into this matrix
must be guided by reasonable, empirically based principles and justi-
fications, not conjectures, academic turf-claiming, or politics. If coun-
terterrorism programs are to be placed within any crime prevention
framework, three guiding principles must be considered:
1. Use (and/or develop) knowledge about the nature of terrorism

to hypothesize about the areas of the Matrix (and thus the types
of strategies) that are most applicable to counterterrorism;
2. Use (and/or develop) evidence from rigorous outcome evalua-
tions to determine which crime prevention and counterterror-
ism strategies are effective; and
3. Weigh the costs and benefits of applying certain areas of the
Matrix to counterterrorism.
Guiding Principle (1): Use (and/or develop) knowledge about the nature
of terrorism to hypothesize about the areas of the Matrix (and thus the types of
strategies) that are most applicable to counterterrorism.
Arguably, we should begin by considering what is known about the
nature, etiology, and sociology of terrorism from existing research
(some of which is probably unknown to many criminologists). For
starters, we might consider research that addresses questions such as:
* What do we know about the types of people who engage in ter-

rorism? Do they fit a certain profile, based on their background
characteristics and their life trajectories? Do terrorists have similari-

ties to people who commit other acts of mass murder and mayhem
(e.g., school shooters and abortion-clinic bombers) or even more
everyday crimes?
* Are there precursor behaviors (e.g., money laundering) or involve-
ment in other activities and groups (e.g., hate crimes/groups) that
predict involvement in terrorism? How do social conditions such
as poverty, unemployment, religious ideology, and ethnic conflict
contribute to terrorism?
* What do we know about the organization and operations of ter-
rorist groups and cells? To what extent do they use other criminal
activities, such as drug dealing and money laundering, to further
their operations? How much do they rely on the assistance of per-
sons not directly involved in the attacks (e.g., financial backers)? Do
they operate in ways similar to those of other organized criminal
enterprises?
* At what specific places and times are terrorist acts most likely to
occur? What are terrorists’ preferred targets, tools, and methods
for inflicting mass casualties and/or terror?
* How do varieties of terrorism differ (e.g., domestic versus interna-
tional, political versus religious)?
Although this list of research questions is by no means exhaustive,

these sorts of inquiries can suggest hypotheses about the best ways
to characterize terrorism, terrorists, and ultimately counterterrorism
using our prevention dimensions. Such inquiries can better highlight
the parallels between terrorism and other forms of crime (LaFree and
Dugan, 2004); where such parallels exist, we can consider whether the
former might be reduced using interventions that successfully prevent
the latter. For example, if Muslim youths in isolated and impoverished
communities join groups at high risk for terrorism for some of the
same reasons that inner-city youths join criminal gangs, then perhaps
successful strategies for reducing gang membership could be used to
steer at-risk Muslim youths away from potential terrorist groups (see
Curry, this volume).
Similarly, knowledge about the response of terrorists to prevention
mechanisms could be used to theorize about whether a preventive
framework applies. For example, are terrorists deterred by death or
apprehension? The scant research available suggests not (Landes,

1978), so preventive mechanisms that emphasize general deterrence
may not be useful. However, if there are social-psychological forces
that allow for members of terrorist or other hate groups to be rein-
tegrated into society through shaming or mediation, then methods
akin to restorative justice may be appropriate. These strategies have
been shown to be effective in reducing recidivism among violent
offenders (Braithwaite and Strang, 2000; Sherman et al., 2000), and
some scholars have offered that they can also be applied to terror-
ism (McEvoy and Newburn, 2003; Umbreit, 2001). Others have used
a social-psychological approach to think about why individuals com-
mit acts of terror; they focus on interventions that make use of those
aspects of terrorism (Post, 2006; Victoroff, 2005).
To provide another illustration, we can consider the nature of
terrorists’ methods. To inflict mass casualties, terrorists must have
access to firearms, explosives, chemical agents, weapons of mass
destruction, or other equipment or machinery (such as an airplane)
that can be used to such ends. They also need targets where many
people congregate and that are relatively unguarded (e.g., trans-
portation hubs, shopping centers). These considerations suggest
that opportunities, routines, situations, and other mechanisms near
in space and time to the actual event, rather than early risk factors,
may be important to prevention. In this vein, Clarke and Newman
(2006) have emphasized the application of routine activities theory
and situational crime prevention to blocking opportunities for terror-
ism, rather than just trying to locate and arrest terrorists. In addition,
Roach et al. (2005), using Ekblom’s (2001) concept of conjunction
of criminal opportunities, lend insight into how opportunities and
processes that lead to a terrorist event could provide potential tar-
gets for prevention. Hypothetically, weapons and materials used to
make weapons might be detected and seized before they are used.
Metal detectors at airports, which are successful at least in reducing
airplane hijackings, are an example of how tangible opportunities can
be blocked (Cauley and Im, 1988; Enders and Sandler, 1993, 2000;
Enders et al., 1990; Landes, 1978). Such empirical knowledge about
which terrorism methods are the most salient can also help in placing
a counterterrorism strategy within a prevention matrix.
It should be emphasized, however, that deriving such parallels

between crime and terrorism is itself in need of empirical testing;
criminologists cannot simply assume the two are sufficiently similar by
logical deduction. Furthermore, using theory and research about the
nature of terrorism to draw parallels with crime should be approached
cautiously, as similarities between crime and terrorism do not suggest
that the outcomes of prevention efforts for crime and terrorism will
be the same. The similarities establish only links as to where in the
matrix counterterrorism strategies might be placed. More important,
we must have evidence that such strategies actually can be effective, a
point that leads to our second guiding principle.
Guiding Principle (2): Use (and/or develop) evidence from rigorous outcome
evaluations to determine which crime prevention and counterterrorism strate-
gies are effective.
Knowledge about the nature of terrorism can be helpful in hypothe-
sizing about where counterterrorism might fit in the matrix. However,
that knowledge still (a) needs to be empirically tested and supported
and (b) will not tell us if a counterterrorism program will work in
the same way as a crime prevention program might in the same area
of the matrix. As research on terrorism illuminates potential points
of intervention, we must then have rigorous evaluation evidence to
judge the effectiveness of intervention strategies appropriate for
those intervention points. Thus, as with crime prevention, rigorous
evaluation research is needed to provide an evidence-based rationale
for justifying the placement of intervention strategies into different
areas of our crime and terrorism prevention matrix.
Of course, the most relevant evidence to aid in this endeavor
would be that regarding strategies intended to counter terrorism.
Unfortunately, such evidence is virtually nonexistent, as Lum et al.
discovered in a systematic search and review of evidence on the out-
comes of counterterrorism programs. Others in this volume have also
emphasized that the rarity of terrorism events makes it difficult to truly
rely on a scientific evidence-base for devising interventions. Given this
dearth of knowledge, perhaps one alternative is using existing evalu-
ations of crime prevention programs and how they cluster within the
Matrix to help illuminate what might work or guide future evaluation
research. In other words, hypotheses about the effectiveness of some
counterterrorism strategies might be guided by whether similar strate-

gies are effective in reducing crime more generally.
Indeed, there is a substantial body of evidence on the effectiveness
of crime prevention techniques (Martinson, 1974; National Research
Council, 2004; Sherman et al., 1997; Sherman et al., 2002) that might
have relevance to counterterrorism. For example, one of the few
counterterrorism policies supported by rigorous evaluation evidence
is the enhancement of airport security, which has reduced hijackings
of airplanes (Cauley and Im, 1988; Enders and Sandler, 1993; Enders
et al., 1990). Clear parallels exist between airport-security measures
and other situational, place-based target-hardening techniques that
have shown promise as general crime prevention methods for micro-
places (Eck, 2002; Welsh and Farrington, 2003).
Another example is that, with certain exceptions, proactive strat-
egies in policing, such as problem-oriented approaches or hot-spot
policing, tend to be more effective in reducing crime than reactive
strategies (Sherman and Eck, 2002; Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Lum
et al., forthcoming). This may suggest that proactive policing strate-
gies have potential for success against terrorism as well. Such strate-
gies might include enhanced patrols at buildings and other places
considered to be at high-risk for attack, or attempts to establish better
community relations and information sources in places where terror-
ist cells are believed to exist.
Still other examples might be found in efforts to rehabilitate
offenders or to alleviate early risk factors for delinquency and crime.
As already described, there is some evidence that restorative justice
could be useful for violent offenders and for resolving group con-
flict. Cognitive-behavioral training, a strategy that seems promising
in offender rehabilitation and delinquency prevention (Gottfredson
et al., 2002; MacKenzie, 2002) or other conflict-alleviating interven-
tions (Victoroff, 2006) might also be effective in steering high-risk
recruits away from normalizing ideological notions that increase their
risk of being recruited into terrorist groups.
We should be mindful, however, that evaluation research on crime
prevention programs can help guide us only to the more effective
areas of the matrix. Counterterrorism interventions that use similar
prevention mechanisms still have to be tested as to their effectiveness.
Thus, evaluation research on counterterrorism is needed to get us

closer to choosing effective strategies. As will be emphasized in the
conclusion, this is an area that is drastically underdeveloped and one
to which crime prevention researchers could contribute.
Guiding Principle (3): Weigh the costs and benefits of applying certain areas
of the Matrix to counterterrorism.
Differences in the cost-benefit calculations associated with counter-
terrorism and other crime prevention interventions may be so vast
as to render implications of a crime prevention program irrelevant
to counterterrorism policy. Deriving counterterrorism strategies from
a crime prevention matrix may make logical sense and may even be
supported by evaluations. Yet such derivation may not be justified if
astronomical costs are associated with creating counterterrorism mea-
sures that mimic crime prevention efforts. This principle is especially
important in counterterrorism, where some potential terrorist acts
could be so catastrophic or generate so much fear that the public is
willing to incur substantial prevention costs, despite the irrationality
of associated policies. The astronomical expenditures on counterter-
rorism interventions since September 11 point clearly to this belief.
How terrorism distorts the cost-benefit calculus for prevention
mechanisms can be explicated both from the side of terrorists and
from that of those trying to prevent their attacks. The supply of
and demand for terrorism (Enders and Sandler, 2006, pp. 10–13;
Telhami, 2002) differ substantially from the corresponding curves
for other forms of crime, thus changing the cost-benefit calculus for
a particular area of the matrix. Terrorism has political and historical
elements to it that are not present in the nature of ordinary crimes
(Roach et al., 2005; Rosenfeld, 2004). Terrorism is often motivated
by emotions and causes that are stronger than those that motivate
everyday crime, making its supply less responsive to policies that
aim to increase its costs. Those who supply suicide bombings, for
example, are not deterred by the extreme cost of the act – the loss
of one’s own life. Additionally, there is little evidence that increas-
ing the risk of apprehension or the severity of punishment works in
deterring terrorists (Landes, 1978). Telhami (2002) has suggested
also that there is a demand for terrorism that is reflected in support
by nonoffenders – financial, rhetorical, or philosophical – for the
political and ideological agendas of groups and individuals who com-

mit acts of terrorism. The demand for everyday crime is much less
strong or common, except perhaps in the case of vice. The inelastic
supply and political demand for terrorism are problems that uniquely
affect our ability to rationalize about costs and benefits associated
with counterterrorism efforts.
The public fear and moral panic that terrorism incites serve to
distort further the calculation of costs and benefits. As we have noted,
terrorism is much rarer than common forms of crime, even using the
broadest definition of terrorism. Accordingly, counterterrorism mea-
sures may have to cast wider and deeper nets than their correspond-
ing crime prevention counterparts when attempting to prevent future
events. Although this can generate a high false-positive rate, citizens
might be more inclined to put up with a higher false-positive rate
because of their fear, which can translate into restrictions and viola-
tions of their constitutional, legal, and human rights. Additionally,
such false positives may fall disproportionately on racial, ethnic, and
religious minorities. Those who are more tolerant of false positives, by
contrast, may have low risks of being the victims of such errors.
Other costly unintended consequences of interventions can under-
mine the initial goals of those interventions. Take, for instance, the
suggestion of using community-oriented policing to fight terrorism.
Such policies could have vastly different benefit-to-cost ratios,
depending on how the policies are interpreted. One interpretation
seems beneficial: community-oriented schemes that aim to increase
the legitimacy of the police within minority communities by improv-
ing contact, establishing relationships, and providing better service
(Lum, Haberfeld, Fachner, and Lieberman, 2009). Such endeavors
can reduce marginalization, a potential cause of recruitment into
dissident groups, and also help police develop information sources
within communities where terrorists might be hiding (see Greene,
this volume).
A countervailing application of community policing might be to
encourage citizens to report any and all suspicious behavior to law
enforcement. Such a sweeping policy might lead to substantially higher
costs than benefits. In heterogeneous communities, members of one
group may use the police to gain leverage, direct blame, or cause
moral panic against other groups. Everyday behaviors of minority

ethnic or religious groups could be perceived as threatening by out-
siders and result in calls to the police about “suspicious” behavior.
Strategies could also erode already fragile relationships between the
police and communities that are viewed as suspicious or problematic.
Recent crackdowns on illegal immigration to fight terrorism could
undermine the relationships that police have built within immigrant
communities to address everyday problems. Just because an interven-
tion has logical appeal doesn’t mean that it is supported by evidence
or is legitimate for either crime prevention or counterterrorism.
More generally, wider nets and acceptance of the high costs of
preventing terrorism may be viewed as a necessary tradeoff between
security and democracy. However, this tradeoff could have serious
and substantial long-term costs. Democratic values can deteriorate if
the threshold of this balance is pushed too far, especially in coun-
tries where democratic culture and institutions are weak, fragile, or
developing. Long-term net widening can lead to gradual changes in
the tolerance for certain violations of political freedoms that may go
unnoticed across generations. Furthermore, how terrorism is defined,
and therefore who bears the burden of the negative externalities of
prevention efforts, is subject to a number of influences. The govern-
ment of the day may choose to be opportunistic in their net-widening
capacity, targeting specific opposition groups and further exacerbating
ethnic conflicts. When applying prevention techniques to counterter-
rorism, we have to be especially sensitive to this guiding principle.
In sum, the application of a preventive framework like the Matrix
to counterterrorism depends on what is empirically known about the
nature of terrorism, the evidence base of counterterrorism and crime
prevention interventions, and how cost-benefit calculations are likely
to change when applying crime prevention strategies to terrorism. We
conclude by considering how crime prevention scholars can contrib-
ute to these inquiries.
HOW CAN CRIMINOLOGISTS CONTRIBUTE?
This discussion emphasizes the need for a preventive framework

that uses empirical evidence, not conjecture, opinion, disciplinary
biases, or politics. We have described a number of counterterrorism

research topics to which criminologists might contribute: adding to
existing empirical evidence on the nature of terrorism and its paral-
lels to other forms of crime; building evidence on the effectiveness
of prevention measures potentially applicable to counterterrorism;
evaluating counterterrorism interventions themselves; conducting
cost-benefit estimates of crime prevention and counterterrorism pro-
grams; exploring knowledge about the collateral effects of counter-
terrorism; and understanding the institutional, social, and political
environments in which counterterrorism is played out.
In particular, criminologists may be particularly well-suited to con-
tribute to program evaluation and the development of evidence-
based policy in the area of counterterrorism. These two areas are
emphasized in criminological research but undeveloped in terrorism
studies. A comprehensive review of research on counterterrorism by
Lum et al. (2009) revealed that fewer than 1 percent of all studies
were based on empirical, systematic research (also Damphousse
and Smith, 2004). Under the Campbell Review process,3 Lum et al.
(2009) found only seven of over twenty thousand studies reported in
articles, books, government reports, dissertations, and other research-
publication venues involved moderately rigorous evaluations of
counterterrorism strategies. Those few studies revealed that tested
strategies failed to reduce terrorism; or worse, they led to increases in
terrorism. For example, though metal detectors in airports are effec-
tive in preventing airplane hijackings, there is evidence that there
may be substitution and displacement effects, leading to increases
in other types of nonhijacking terrorist events. Military responses to
terrorist events can increase terrorism in the short run and may have
few or no long-term effects. Little is known about the effectiveness of
imposing harsher punishments on terrorists or increasing their risk
of apprehension. Finally, protecting diplomats, securing embassies,
and adopting United Nations resolutions against terrorism seem to
3
The Campbell reviews are designed to search systematically for rigorous evalua-
tions of social interventions (e.g., in the fields of education, psychology, and crimi-
nal justice) and then combine similar findings to allow generalizations about what
is known about effectiveness of the programs evaluated, often using meta-analytic
techniques.
have little, if any, statistically significant effects on terrorism against

intended (or unintended) targets.
Thus, although there is a strong research tradition on the etiol-
ogy, economics, and political aspects of terrorism, we know very little
about what types of preventive strategies may be useful to counter acts
of terrorism – this despite the proliferation of counterterrorism strat-
egies and the exponential increase in spending on counterterrorism
programs that has taken place during the last few years (Congressional
Budget Office, 2006). In other words, there is a dire need for research
on how to prevent terrorism.
This is an area to which crime prevention scholars can make valu-
able contributions. The evaluation of crime prevention programs has
been a major tradition in the field of criminology and criminal justice
studies, and it has arguably been the most effective way in which our
field has influenced public policy. Criminologists have much expe-
rience with empirical outcome evaluations of programs intended to
reduce crime and its social harms, experience which is not mirrored
in political science or terrorism studies. For criminologists, the inter-
est in evidence-based assessments of counterterrorism programs is
also underscored by closely related underlying agendas: contributing
to the reduction of social problems, carving an important niche in
terrorism research, and addressing the moral panic that can accom-
pany counterterrorism measures. Often, scientific evidence can
have a moderating effect on rash, knee-jerk responses that may do
more harm than good. In the case of counterterrorism, sound eval-
uation research can provide a counterweight to policies that could
erode democratic and other social and political values (Mythen and
Walklate, 2005).
Prevention researchers will need to think carefully and creatively
about the best ways to evaluate counterterrorism measures. Improving
the evidence base of counterterrorism policy in this way will require
more than the obligatory “more evaluations.” It will require the
creation of an infrastructure to support such an endeavor (Lum,
Kennedy, and Sherley 2006). Crime prevention scholars have had
some experience building such infrastructures for the evaluation
of policing and corrections policies, and such experiences might be
useful to counterterrorism studies. This means investing in efforts to
produce more rigorous outcome evaluations, exploring alternative

methods for the study of rare events, building evaluation requirements
into public policies, improving access to information for evaluation,
and establishing more open dialog between and among researchers,
policy makers, and practitioners. These efforts can help support calls
for more evaluation research.
Criminologists have a clear role in counterterrorism research,
and our discussion of ways to apply our Crime Prevention Matrix to
counterterrorism emphasizes this point. Such applications require
exploration of the empirical parallels between terrorism and crime,
evaluations of crime prevention and counterterrorism programs,
and serious discussion of the costs and benefits of both. These are all
research areas where criminologists have experience and that have
yet to be adequately filled.
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chapter eight
Implications of Opportunity Theory

for Combating Terrorism
James P. Lynch
INTRODUCTION
Opportunity theory (OT) was an innovative approach to understand-

ing why crime occurs, as well as how crime is distributed across people,
places, time, and activities (Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garafalo,
1978; Cohen, Felson, and Land, 1980).1 Prior to the appearance of
OT, the typical approach to understanding crime was to determine
why certain people were motivated to commit crime and others were
not. The resulting criminological theories focused on the person,
and specifically the criminal, as the unit of analysis, and sociological
and psychological processes as the principal explanations for crimi-
nal motivation. OT in contrast, emphasized the occurrence of crime
rather than criminal motivation as the phenomenon to be explained.
The place or the situation is the unit of analysis, and characteristics
of those places or situations explain when crime will occur and when
it will not (Clarke, 1997).
OT was embraced immediately by applied criminologists and
practitioners, because it seemed much simpler and easier to trans-
late into policy than traditional criminological theory (Clarke, 1980;
1
The term “opportunity theory” is used to refer to a group of theories that address
the occurrence of crime rather than the motivation to commit crime. It includes
routine activity theory, lifestyle theory, defensible space theory, situational crime
prevention, and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).
These various theories differ in many respects, including the relative emphasis
given physical as opposed to social aspects of environments, to intentional as
opposed to naturally occurring variation in opportunity, and to macrosocial as
opposed to situational sources of opportunity.
151
Felson and Clarke, 1998). Under the latter paradigm, crime could
be affected only through the psychological and sociological processes
that affected motivation. This was a long-term process that was impre-
cise in its outcome, and largely out of the control of criminal justice
agencies that are often held accountable for crime and its distribu-
tion. OT gave these groups a way to understand the occurrence of
crime that could be immediately translated into action.
Practitioners were quick to use this theory to formulate policies,
and applied criminologists, in turn, studied these policies (and
other instances of opportunity reduction) to test the basic tenets of
OT. These efforts have produced a body of empirical literature that
demonstrates the effectiveness of opportunity reduction for control-
ling common law crime (Clarke, 1995; Guerette, 2009). This essay
addresses the issue of whether OT can be as usefully applied to terror-
ism, as it has been to ordinary street crime. The first of the following
sections describes OT, and the second considers its applicability to
the problem of terrorism. In the third section, we assess the extent
to which OT can be used to understand where and when acts of
terrorism will occur. This is done by comparing the nature of terror-
ist acts to the assumptions underlying OT, as well as to the assump-
tions required to employ the methodologies used to test opportunity
theories of street crimes. The matter of applicability revolves largely
around the question of whether OT can be useful for understanding
and preventing terrorism. We find that although OT provides a very
useful framework for thinking about preventing terrorist acts, it can-
not yet offer an empirically based understanding of where and when
terrorist acts will occur, and of how these acts can be prevented on a
consistent basis. Existing knowledge about the relationship between
opportunity reduction and fear of street crime, as well as the study of
opportunity reduction and its effect on fear of terrorism, may be, as
Forst suggests in Chapter 12, of more use in managing the fear engen-
dered by terrorism.
OPPORTUNITY THEORY
OT is designed to explain where and when crime will occur. Various

frameworks have been developed to identify attributes of places,
implications of ot for combating terrorism 153
activities, and times that are conducive to crime (Clarke and Cornish,
1985). Interventions have been designed to change these attributes
and thereby influence the prevalence and incidence of crime across
times, places, and activities (Clarke, 1997) The validity of OT has been
assessed by examining the effects of these manipulations of opportu-
nity as well as the naturally occurring variance in opportunity on the
occurrence of ordinary street crime.2
Defining Opportunity
OT subsumes a number of more specific attempts to define attributes
of situations that can affect the opportunity to commit crime. Lifestyle
theory, routine activity theory (RAT), and situational crime preven-
tion all attempt to identify the opportunity to commit crime. These
specific formulations of OT are similar in the concepts that they have
used to define opportunity, but differ with regard to the empirically
observable attributes of situations that they use to identify the subdi-
mensions of opportunity.
Cohen et al. (1980) argue that opportunity for crime exists when
attractive targets are exposed in the absence of guardianship. Targets
of crime are attractive if they have monetary or symbolic value to
an offender. So on average, a Bugatti will be more attractive than a
Dodge, because the former costs more than the latter and it is also
more prestigious to own. Exposure refers to whether the target of
crime is visible and accessible to the offender. If your Bugatti is kept
in a garage in a remote location, then potential offenders will not
select it as a target because they do not know it is there. Accessibility
means that the offender can physically get to the target either directly
or through a proxy. These two dimensions of exposure are additive
and independent. A target that is visible is more exposed than a tar-
get that is not, and a target that is both visible and accessible has even
greater exposure. Guardianship refers to the presence of guardians
who can intervene to prevent or interrupt the crime. Security guards,
2
“Ordinary street crime” refers to serious crimes of assault and/or theft such as those
captured in the Uniform Crime Reports index crime classification as opposed to
vice crimes such as gambling, prostitution, and drug use; more minor crime such
as loitering, simple assault, status offenses, and trespassing; or crime perpetrated
by deception rather than force, such as fraud or identity theft.
for example, would clearly affect guardianship in the situation. Guard

dogs would be similarly unambiguous as an example of guardianship.
Locks, in contrast, would affect exposure because they are passive.
They restrict access, but they do not act or cannot act to prevent or
interrupt a crime.
The most prominent early work on OT took the routine activity
approach to identifying criminal opportunity. It focused largely on
the naturally occurring, social aspects of environment produced by
macrosocial forces. At that time, Felson and his colleagues examined
the effects of the miniaturization of goods and the increasing labor-
force participation of women as social, structural, and technological
changes that, by altering routine activities, offered opportunity for
crime (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Cohen et al. 1980). Later, research-
ers used the newly emerging victimization surveys to associate more
direct measures of routine activities with opportunity, and thereby,
with criminal victimization (Maxfield, 1987; Lynch, 1987; Cantor
and Lynch, 1993). Gradually, the routine activity approach to identi-
fying criminal opportunity gave way to situational crime prevention.
In contrast, situational crime prevention emphasized both the phys-
ical and social aspects of environments, engineered as opposed to
naturally occurring opportunity, and the situation rather than one’s
position in the social structure. The dominance of the situational
crime prevention approach was due in part to abundance of good
data that could be used to test and elaborate the theory. Some of the
early natural experiments conducted by Clarke and his colleagues at
the Home Office captured the imagination of academics and prac-
titioners, and demonstrated that the manipulation of opportunity
could reduce crime in a given situation (Clarke and Mayhew, 1988;
Mayhew, Clarke, and Elliot, 1989). This gave rise to a large number
of evaluations of crime reduction programs based upon opportunity
reduction, all of which became potential data for testing and build-
ing OT (Guerette, 2009). In contrast, the data available for testing
routine activity theories was less abundant and the results less dra-
matic, so the interest in this approach to building OT waned.
The transition in Marcus Felson’s work illustrates this shift in
emphasis most clearly. In the 1970s, he did some of the pioneer-
ing work in routine activity theory with victimization surveys to make
the point that opportunity was important as a factor in understand-

ing crime (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Cohen et al. 1980). This work
stalled in the 1980s in part because of the inability of victim surveys
to provide the data necessary to build and test middle-level theories.
By 2002, he had abandoned the RAT approach and wholeheartedly
embraced the situational crime prevention (Felson, 2002).
Using the situational crime prevention approach, subsequent
definitions of OT became increasingly complex as a result of add-
ing dimensions to the theory and by elaborating the definition of
those initial dimensions. For example, the dimension of proximity
to motivated offenders was added to the opportunity framework to
acknowledge that the presence of motivated offenders in proxim-
ity to crime targets can affect the risk of crime, and that pools of
motivated offenders were distributed in space and time. Whereas
the initial work on OT categorized and examined the natural vari-
ation of criminal opportunity across places, situations, and activities
(Cohen and Felson, 1979; Langan, Cox, and Collins, 1987; Lynch,
1987; Maxfield, 1987), the development of the theory has been
driven more by the evaluations of programs and policies (Clarke
and Mayhew, 1988; Clarke, 1997). This makes for a slightly differ-
ent nomenclature. Those who study naturally occurring variation in
opportunity tend to identify and group attributes of targets, whereas
those evaluating policies tend to specify opportunity concepts by
identifying actions that can be taken to reduce opportunity. The two
vocabularies can usually be easily mapped one onto the other.
The evolution in OT can be seen very clearly in Ronald Clarke’s
work. In 1985, Clarke had taken the four concepts in routine activ-
ity theory – accessibility, guardianship, attractiveness, and proxim-
ity – and transformed them into three major intervention strategies,
each with four subdimensions. Opportunity could be reduced by
(1) increasing the effort required, (2) increasing the risk of appre-
hension, and (3) reducing the rewards for committing the offense
(Clarke and Cornish, 1985). Increasing the effort could be done by
hardening the target, controlling access, deflecting offenders, and
controlling facilitators. Hardening targets included steps like steer-
ing wheel locks that made it more difficult to accomplish the crime.
Access control included policies like entry phones or ID badges that
Table 8.1. Opportunity reduction strategies and techniques under each
Strategies
Increase perceived Increase Reduce anticipated Remove
effort perceived risk reward excuses
Techniques
Target hardening Entry/exit Target Rule setting
screening removal
Steering locks Merchandise Removal of Customs
tags car radio declarations
Access control Formal Identifying Stimulating
surveillance property conscience
Fenced yards Security guards Property marking Roadside
speedometers
Deflecting Surveillance by Reducing Controlling
offenders employee temptation distributors
Street closures Park attendants Off-street parking Drinking
age laws
Control Natural Denying benefits Facilitating
facilitators surveillance compliance
denied access to persons with no right to be near targets. Deflecting

offenders could be accomplished by closing streets or moving attrac-
tions that brought offenders near targets. Controlling facilitators
refers to restricting access to tools needed to accomplish the crime,
such as guns or computers. The full range of specific concepts
included under each opportunity reduction strategy is presented in
Table 8.1.
By 2003, Clarke’s opportunity reduction framework had increased
to five strategies with five specific activities in each. To the origi-
nal three strategies, he added reducing provocations and reducing
excuses. Reducing provocations refers to reducing the precursors of
crime events – the things that encourage or free potential offenders
to take advantage of the opportunity to commit crime. So the chance
of violence can be reduced by reducing frustrations in situations
stemming from crowding or long lines, so that persons are less likely
to respond violently to provocations. It can also be reduced through
avoiding disputes by clearly marking areas for different activities or
separating rival sports fans. Reducing excuses for violence removes
aspects of the situation that “neutralize” the moral binds of laws and
mores, and that allow people to “drift” into crime (Becker, 1963;
Matza, 1964). Making rules clear reduces “neutralization” by making
appropriate behavior unambiguous, and reinforcing this message
by featuring these rules prominently. Excuses for ignoring rules
such as inefficient service or drugs should also be removed to make
“neutralization” more difficult.
In his earlier formulations, Clarke conveyed the idea that poten-
tial criminals are rational actors who will look at crime in a cost-
benefit framework. By reducing the benefits and increasing the costs
in a particular situation, one can reduce crime. In his more recent
formulation, Clarke acknowledges that many potential offenders
are also irrational. They are influenced by affective states that can
be aggravated or ameliorated by the situation. This evolution also
marks an attempt to broaden the applicability of OT beyond the
explanation of property crimes to the understanding of violence.
Although OT has increased in complexity, it still has not reached
the level of specificity necessary to serve as an unambiguous guide
to the opportunity for common law crime in a given situation. What
will constitute target hardening, for example, in one situation may
not in another. This increased specificity will come as more work is
done on OT but the theory is not there yet. Moreover, some of the
concepts in the frameworks offered by Clarke and his colleagues
are not easily distinguished from others. Under “increase the risk,”
for example, Clarke lists “taxi driver IDs,” and under “reduce the
rewards,” he lists “licensed street venders.” The mechanism seems
similar in that both reduce the anonymity of potential offenders or
facilitators, and thereby increase the chance of apprehension. There
may be a distinction between these specific instances of opportunity
reduction strategies, but the concepts are not defined clearly and
extensively enough to know what this distinction might be. Some
of this ambiguity comes from the very applied nature of most of
the more recent work in opportunity reduction. Applying OT in a
specific instance requires adaptation of general concepts, and this
adaptation is so great and so unique to a specific situation that there
is no sense torturing a concept to make it clearer. Once a general
strategy has been chosen, the clinicians in the situation can give the
concept specific content.3 This is a good strategy if your primary

interest is reducing crime in a particular instance. It is less useful
if you are interested in building a generalizable and parsimonious
theory of opportunity. Here, fine distinctions in the implementation
of strategies become the means for refining the theory, but this task
has not been given the attention it should receive.
Opportunity theories of common law crime have increased in scope
and complexity over the last twenty years. They have begun to provide
a framework for understanding how situations can contribute to the
occurrence of crime. The application of opportunity reduction strate-
gies in specific situations has provided the data necessary to construct
an integrated and complete theory of criminal opportunity (Felson,
2002). The synthesis of these data, however, has not yet reached fru-
ition. So we can use the opportunity framework to suggest a range
of opportunity reduction strategies that could reduce street crime
in a particular situation, but the theory has not reached the level of
specificity where it would indicate unambiguously which opportunity
reduction strategy would be most effective in that instance.
TESTING OPPORTUNITY THEORY
In addition to defining what constitutes opportunity for crime in a

given situation, proponents of OT needed to establish empirically
(1) that reductions in opportunity were correlated with reductions
in crime, and (2) that reductions in opportunity would not simply
displace crime to other targets or result in the substitution of alterna-
tive technologies for those removed. Over the years, reasonably good
evidence has been amassed indicating that reductions in opportunity
reduce crime, and do not frequently result in displacement or adapta-
tion (Barr and Pease, 1990; Hesseling, 1994). Some of that evidence
is reviewed in the following section.
Testing the effects of opportunity on crime requires variation in
opportunity as well as in crime across situations. This variation has
3
The opportunity framework offers a well-developed process of crime analysis to
be applied to a particular situation – isolate the problem, review the literature,
analyze the problem, list potential interventions, implement the intervention, and
evaluate the outcome.
been observed in several ways. First, specific programs designed to

reduce opportunity were implemented in a specific set of situations,
and the covariation of crime and opportunity was assessed in that sit-
uation. Sometimes this manipulation of opportunity was done within
the context of an experiment – with random assignment and manipu-
lation of opportunity to experimental and control groups – but not in
others. Second, the natural variation in opportunity across situations
was correlated with the variation in crime across situations.
Evaluations of Interventions
The initial tests of OT took advantage of incidental and even acciden-
tal manipulations of opportunity. The detoxification of natural gas in
England, for example, removed the instrument of choice for suicide.
The result was that the rate of suicides with natural gas decreased
substantially whereas the rate of suicides by other means did not
change (Clarke and Mayhew, 1988). This supported the general
idea that reducing opportunity can reduce crime. Another instance
of incidental variation in opportunity was the motorcycle helmet law
in Germany (Mayhew et al., 1989). Here, a law was passed requiring
the use of helmets when riding a motorcycle. Since most motorcycle
thefts were not premeditated, potential offenders were not likely to
come equipped with a helmet. As a result, they were much more likely
to be stopped by the police when they were riding the stolen motor-
cycle, thereby increasing the guardianship on motorcycle thefts. After
the law was passed, the theft of motorcycles decreased dramatically
with no increase in the theft of other vehicles.
As opportunity reduction became more popular as a crime con-
trol strategy, the evaluation of self-conscious opportunity reduction
programs became a good source of data for testing OT. Evaluations
of the effect of the installation of wheel locks on motor-vehicle
theft, for example, showed that vehicle theft was reduced as a result
(Webb, 1997). A burglary intervention program in Huddersfield,
England was implemented and evaluated, demonstrating that
increased surveillance of repeat victims of burglary substantially
decreased burglary rates in the area (Anderson and Pease, 1997).
Similar evaluations of street lighting (Painter and Farrington, 1997),
closed-circuit television (Brown, 1997), and tagging of merchandize
(DiLeonardo, 1997) all found negative effects of these opportunity

reduction strategies on crime rates. Very sophisticated evaluations of
area-based police interventions also showed that opportunity reduc-
tion reduces crime (Weisburd et al., 2006). The results of these and
other evaluations (Guerette, 2009) led to the conclusion that in
a large number of situations (but not all), opportunity reduction
resulted in decreases in crime.
Although these vehicles for research helped establish the gen-
eral utility of OT they were less useful for elaborating the breadth
and depth of opportunity concepts. These evaluations of purposeful
attempts to reduce opportunity were dependent on the actions of
the police and others to initiate opportunity reduction programs.
The range of opportunity reduction strategies, and therefore the
range of opportunity concepts, that can be tested will be limited
as a result. The police may, for example, restrict their programs to
various forms of “target hardening” such as “clubs” for automobiles,
but avoid major design changes in motor vehicles, as these are seen
as the responsibility of motor-vehicle manufacturers. There was also
the tendency among advocates of opportunity reduction as a policy
to feature successful programs and not to report those that were not
successful (Clarke, 1997). Though this kind of selective evidence
encouraged the use of opportunity reduction as a crime control
strategy, it limited the usefulness of this evidence in building the
theory.
Naturally and Routinely Occurring Variation in Opportunity

Victimization surveys offered another venue for assessing the
co-variation of opportunity and crime. These surveys included victims
and nonvictims as well as information on places and situations that
could provide opportunity for common law crime. Victim surveys
have a number of benefits and liabilities as a source of data on OT.
The benefits include a representative sample of persons and, to the
extent that appropriate questions are asked of respondents, a repre-
sentative sample of opportunity. This avoids some of the selectivity
that occurs in the program evaluation data. Though this potential
has been exploited to some extent, difficult issues of survey design
have inhibited the use of this vehicle for elaborating and testing
OT. Some of the limitations of victim surveys as vehicles include

the fact that they are limited to the natural variation in opportu-
nity that exists in the population, and cannot introduce varieties of
opportunity reduction. This inability to manipulate opportunity and
the fact that most of these surveys are cross-sectional also limits the
use of experimental and quasi-experimental designs in testing OT
(Guerette, 2009). Nonetheless, the analysis of victim-survey data has
been a major source of evidence for establishing empirical support
for the opportunity perspective.
The initial studies based on victim-survey data used surveys that
were not specifically designed to test OT. Using the National Crime
Survey (NCS), Cohen and Felson (1979) found that households
with more people in the labor force had higher rates of burglary
victimization, due presumably to the lower levels of guardianship
in those households. Other studies found consistent relationships
between social-structural characteristics of persons or their lifestyle
that were proxies for opportunity concepts (Hindelang et al., 1978;
Cohen et al., 1980; Cohen and Cantor, 1981). A person’s labor-
force status was used to indicate the degree of exposure both for
the person and for the household that remained empty while the
person was at work. Persons in the work force had higher rates of
personal victimization and higher rates of burglary. Gradually, more
questions designed to measure opportunity concepts were added
to victim surveys, such as time out of the household and the pres-
ence or absence of self-protective devices (Cantor and Lynch, 1992;
Miethe and Meier, 1994; Rountree and Land, 1996; Tseloni, 2000).
The results again showed a negative relationship between oppor-
tunity reduction and victimization risk. Still more focused surveys
explored the effects of opportunity in specific activity domains such
as work or school (Cox, Collins and Langan, 1987; Lynch, 1987;
Addington, 2003). These domain-specific surveys were better able
to measure forms of opportunity reduction because they focused
on a smaller range of behavior. This simplified the survey-design
problems that have inhibited the use of victim surveys to test OT.
In almost every case, victimization surveys have supported the basic
relationship between opportunity reduction and victimization by
street crime.
Addressing Displacement and Substitution

In addition to demonstrating that opportunity reduction has a nega-
tive effect on crime, it was important to demonstrate that this crime
was not simply displaced to other places, other targets, or other crimes.
This is a bit more complicated than testing the negative correlation
between opportunity reduction and a specific crime of interest,
because one must identify the range of places, targets, and technolo-
gies that could be chosen when the opportunity to commit one type
of crime in a given situation is reduced. When the range of alternative
targets or alternative technologies is identified, one must monitor
these targets to ensure that displacement does not occur. In some
cases, the range of alternatives is clear, whereas in others, it might not
be. For example, in a study that is evaluating the effects of opportu-
nity reduction for car theft, should they assess the influence of this
program on motorcycles as a target of displacement or on bicycles?
What about trucks? It is conceivable that efforts to reduce burglary
could encourage burglars to join the drug trade or move to street rob-
bery. This type of displacement is not often assessed. Geographic dis-
placement is also complicated. Although studies have often examined
the effects on adjacent areas, more distant areas could be substituted,
because they have targets and access or egress similar to the area in
which opportunity was reduced. It may be the social similarity of areas
that make them attractive as alternative targets, and not their geo-
graphical proximity.
Most of the evidence from studies that have made reasonable
assumptions about where and to what displacement might occur
seems to support the idea that opportunity reduction does not simply
result in displacement. There is a true reduction in crime as a result
of opportunity reduction. Mayhew and Clarke’s (1988) study of the
effects of detoxification of natural gas on suicide included the moni-
toring of suicides by other means, and they found no increase in sui-
cide by other means. Similarly, the evaluation of the helmet laws in
Germany monitored other vehicle thefts to see if thwarted motorcycle
thieves would move on to these other targets (Mayhew, Clarke, and
Elliot, 1989). They did not. More sophisticated assessments of geo-
graphical displacement have shown that there is none, and that there
is evidence of adjacent areas benefiting from opportunity reduction
in targeted communities (Weisburd et al., 2006).
Summary
Opportunity theories of common law crime have developed substan-
tially since their inception in the late 1970s. The basic proposition that
crime can be reduced (and not just displaced) by reducing opportu-
nity in specific situations has been firmly establish with empirical test-
ing. Theories of what constitutes opportunity for crime in a particular
situation have become increasingly more complex over time, and it
is a worthwhile approach to understanding and controlling street
crime. This theory has not reached the level of specificity whereby it
can provide detailed guidance to efforts to control crime.
CAN OPPORTUNITY THEORY BE USED TO UNDERSTAND

AND COMBAT TERRORISM?
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the utility of an opportunity

reduction approach for controlling ordinary street crime is well estab-
lished, and OT is a useful way to accumulate and organize knowledge
about effective crime reduction. The purpose of this essay is to deter-
mine whether OT will be useful for understanding and combating
terrorism. There is no doubt that opportunity reduction is being prac-
ticed in response to terrorism. One need only go to an airport, gov-
ernment building, or monument to see that this is the case. We are
much less certain that this strategy is effective in reducing the number
or rate of terrorist acts, or that the approach to building OT for com-
mon law crimes can be applied to terrorism. Addressing these issues
must begin with a definition of terrorism and a comparison of terror-
ism to common law crime. If terrorism is like common law crime in all
important respects, then we can reasonably assume from the success
of OT in understanding common law crime that OT will be useful in
understanding and combating terrorism.
Terrorism and Ordinary Street Crime

Ordinary street crime includes acts of theft or violence in which offend-
ers take or damage the property or the person of a victim. These acts
are prohibited by statute or custom. The motive behind these acts can
be instrumental or expressive. When they are instrumental, they are
seen as a means to financial gain or power. When they are expressive,
they are motivated by emotions such as anger or fear. These crimes

require that the damage be done and that it be done intentionally.
Terrorism is like ordinary street crimes in some respects but not
others. Terrorist acts, like ordinary common law crimes, involve dam-
age to property or persons without the consent of the victims. This
damage is inflicted intentionally. As Forst (Chapter 12, this volume)
points out, the motives or purposes of terrorist acts are different from
those of ordinary crimes in that the former are intended to further
political goals through the generation of fear. The latter are designed
to further personal goals of accumulating property or exerting con-
trol over other persons. Consistent with these goals, perpetrators of
ordinary common law crime prefer that their acts remain largely invis-
ible, except in specific incidents in which offenders want their victims
to know for the purpose of intimidation. Even when their acts are visi-
ble, offenders in ordinary crimes take great pains not to be identified,
injured, or caught. In contrast, terrorists want to make their crimes
as visible as possible in order to maximize the amount of fear gener-
ated. They also are not as concerned with being identified, injured,
or caught. The goals of terrorism, then, are collective and political,
whereas the goals of ordinary common law crime are overwhelmingly
individualistic and economic.4 People commit burglary because they
want the property that this activity generates. Terrorists commit acts
of terror to advance the collective political goals of their group. From
these differences in goals come differences in objectives. The individ-
ualistic orientation of ordinary crime and its largely economic intent
means that offenders will want to limit the visibility of these acts and
keep secret the identity of the perpetrators. In contrast, terrorists want
their acts to be both visible and attributable to them.
These differences in the goals and objectives of terrorists, as
compared to persons committing street crimes, are consequen-
tial for the application of OT to the understanding of terrorism.
4
This is not to say that personal motivations do not affect terrorists, but that in the
case of terrorists, there is a corporate entity with interests that will constrain the
personal motivations of individual terrorists. Simon and Tranel (in this volume)
provide evidence of both the individual and organizational forces operating on
individual terrorists. This corporate entity is usually not a factor in the case of
street crime.
Opportunity theory assumes that criminals are rational actors, and

that we can know what their rational calculus is in choosing a tar-
get and a time for committing a crime (Clarke and Cornish, 1985).
Knowing how an offender reasons allows us to assess the attractive-
ness of targets and evaluate the costs imposed by guardianship. An
offender seeking to maximize monetary return will choose a target
that is the most valuable, fungible, and accessible, and that involves
the lowest risk of being caught. The definition of value, fungibility,
and accessibility would be reasonably similar across persons. This is
consistent with the greater emphasis given property crime in both
interventions based on OT and in tests of OT (Clarke, 1997). The
utility function for theft is more uniform and more easily under-
stood than for more expressive crimes such as assault.5
I would argue that the utility function for terrorists is more com-
plex and varied than for perpetrators of ordinary street crime,
therefore our ability to accurately identify attractive targets is more
limited.6 The generation of profit through theft is relatively simple
when compared to the generation of fear through terrorist acts.
Profit from theft is some function of the value of the goods stolen,
the transaction costs involved in stealing the goods, and transform-
ing the goods into money. The generation of fear is much more
complicated. Acts that will scare one person will not put fear in
another, whereas the valuation of property is much more uniform
across the population. The complexity of the link between crimi-
nal or terrorist acts and fear is so great that people often say that
fear of crime is “irrational.” This charge usually means that there
is not a simple relationship between fear and objective risk such
that groups with low levels of objective risk of criminal victimization
have high levels of fear of criminal victimization (Warr, 1984).
5
This is not to say that violent crimes are irrational. Tedeschi and Felson (1994)
make a good argument that violence often has a purpose such as (1) getting others
to comply, (2) restoring justice, or (3) protecting one’s self image. My contention is
that valuations of what constitutes insult or injustice in the population will be more
variable than what constitutes a desirable car or computer.
6
Clarke and Newman (2006) make a creative and serious attempt at identifying
the utility function of terrorists in target selection with their EVILDONE frame-
work. However creative this framework may be, it is, and probably will remain,
speculation.
The complexity of the crime-fear link can also be seen in the variety
of terrorist strategies that can be successful in generating fear. The
attack on highly visible symbols such as the World Trade Towers gen-
erates fear, but so too does suicide bombings in neighborhood shop-
ping centers or random shots by snipers in major metropolitan areas.
The complexity of the crime-fear link makes it difficult to understand
the utility function of terrorists. Understanding the terrorist utility
function is crucial to identifying the opportunity for the occurrence
of terrorist acts in a specific situation or place.
Opportunity theory and opportunity reduction strategies are most
useful in the case of “crimes of opportunity.” This term, “crimes of
opportunity,” generally means that the offender did not approach
the crime with forethought or intense motivation. If the offender is
highly motivated, then he or she is more likely to adapt to limitations
of opportunity, or to search for an alternative target or technology.
This is the case, even within ordinary street crime, where professional
burglars are more likely to respond to limitations on opportunity
with new technologies than casual burglars. To the extent that terror-
ists are more motivated than criminals who commit ordinary street
crimes, opportunity reduction strategies will be less effective, because
their effects will be short-lived as terrorists employ new technologies
or select new targets.
Opportunity theory and opportunity reduction are less applicable
to organized criminal activity, because the utility function of a corpo-
rate entity can be different from that of an individual offender. OTs
of ordinary street crime are based on the rational calculus of the
individual offender. In such a framework, concerns about the safety
of the offender loom large in the selection of targets. Corporate
entities are willing to pursue activity that is not in the best interest
of the employees doing the work, but is in the long-range interest of
the organization. Suicide bombers are a perfect instance of the pre-
eminence of corporate rationality over individual rationality. This is
not to say that the utility function of corporate crime entities can-
not be understood, but that it is different from that of individual
offenders who have been the main focus of OT based on common
law crime. Moreover, the utility function of the corporation may
be different from that of the individual, and both must be taken
into account. This is an added layer of complexity that has not been
explored much in studying opportunity reduction strategies in com-
mon law crime.7
Most terrorist acts involve organizations; the corporate pursuit of
innovation is more likely to develop successful adaptations to reduc-
tions in opportunity or to find new targets. The cost of searching
for alternative targets or technologies in response to opportunity
reduction can be borne by a group more easily than by an individual.
Moreover, the group can reinforce the motivation to search for alter-
native targets and technologies because of the commitment to group
goals or to colleagues in the group. Search behavior that would have
been abandoned by the individual will be pursued for the group. This
increases the likelihood that terrorists would engage in displacement
and substitution.
Terrorism is different from ordinary common law crime in ways that
make it unlikely that OTs or opportunity reduction strategies devel-
oped for common law crimes will be directly applied to terrorism.
Although it is intuitively appealing that limiting access or increasing
guardianship for a particular target will reduce the chance of terror-
ist attacks on that target, OT helps us very little in identifying likely
targets that a terrorist will choose, and the chances of displacement
and substitution are very high. Conceptual frameworks based on OT
such as those developed by Clarke and Newman (2006) are useful for
thinking about opportunity reduction, but there is little direct empir-
ical evidence indicating that one strategy will be more effective in pre-
venting terrorism than another in a specific situation.
Building a Theory of Opportunity for Terrorism

Although OTs developed for ordinary street crime may not be easily
or directly applicable to terrorism, it may still be possible to develop
empirically based theories of opportunity for terrorism using the
same methodologies that have been employed in developing OTs for
7
It is interesting that none of the many case studies of natural and engineered var-
iation in criminal opportunity have distinguished between organized and nonor-
ganized crime. This is consistent with minimizing the role of offenders in OT but
it would be a useful distinction in determining when OT can most fruitfully be
applied and when it cannot.
street crime. By evaluating opportunity reduction programs or taking

advantage of natural variations in the opportunity for terrorism, it
may be possible to better understand the link between opportunity
and terrorism. I believe that, unfortunately, here too, unique features
of terrorism make it unlikely that this type of empirical work will tell
us much.
There is no shortage of interventions designed to reduce the
opportunity for terrorism. One need only go to the airport, a gov-
ernment building, or the New York subway to see that increases in
surveillance of guardianship abound. The increased surveillance in
airports is particularly salient to me because I am on some form of
“no fly” list, as a result of which, I must see an airline representative
each and every time I fly in the United States. After twenty or thirty
minutes of checking, I am issued a boarding pass. We could learn
a great deal about the effectiveness of these increases in surveil-
lance if we assessed their effectiveness in a manner similar to what
Ron Clarke and his colleagues (1997) have done for surveillance
designed to reduce common law crime – monitoring the prevalence
of the crime prior to the reduction in surveillance, and assessing
it again afterward. Unfortunately, this approach is complicated by
the rare-event nature of terrorism. Places that are the object of
opportunity reduction programs can go for years and years without
a terrorist event, so reductions in terrorist incidents could be just
happenstance. It is very difficult to detect change in terrorism with
these evaluations.
It may be possible in these evaluations of opportunity reduction
programs to assess the frequency of the occurrence terrorism after
the intervention using some sort of counterfactual. Rather than
comparing the post-period to the pre-period, we would compare the
post-period to what we would expect the frequency to be in that post-
period. This expectation is based on theory or other empirical evi-
dence. This approach is more feasible when the theories on which
it is based are well established, and that is not the case with OTs of
terrorism.
If the evaluation of specific opportunity reduction programs is not
a fruitful empirical strategy, then perhaps examining the “natural”
variation in opportunity may be of some use. Here, the rare-event
problem can be addressed by accumulating terrorism events over

time and place to get enough sample cases to permit analysis. Thus,
incidents of terrorism can be aggregated in a sample of nations over
time to obtain several dozen incidents or more for each nation, or
they can be aggregated in nations over time to form a time series.
One of the problems in these approaches is finding a denominator of
the terrorist incident rate. What is the population at risk? Very often,
the population for a particular ecological unit – in this case, nation –
is used as the denominator. These national rates are compared, and
attributes of these nations are correlated with these rates to identify
the correlates of terrorism incidents. The same is often the case with
the time-series data, where changes in counts of terrorist events are
used rather than some rate based on the at-risk population (Enders
and Sandler, 2002). These highly aggregated types of analysis are very
blunt instruments indeed.
Not taking account of the at-risk population leaves open the pos-
sibility that changes in the volume of this population, and not some
policy change, have produced the observed changes in terrorist acts.
Moreover, aggregating the information to the nation level obscures a
great deal of the within-nation variation in both the dependent and
the independent variables. Terrorist attacks may be concentrated in
a specific region that may have very different characteristics from
those of the nation as a whole. The intervention behavior that is the
principal independent variable is often a national change in policy,
such as the use of metal detectors that will be differentially imple-
mented at specific locations within the nation or over time. This too
will add within-nation variation and limit one’s ability to determine
if the intervention has had an effect. Opportunity reduction strate-
gies or natural variation in opportunity will need to be very large to
observe any differences across these highly aggregated units. These
nation-level analyses are more likely to find effects of large differ-
ences in the social structure of nations, such as levels of inequality
or ethnic heterogeneity. Detecting the effects of differences at the
situational level, as OT requires, demands incident-level data, with
a record for each situation or place-time unit. Another complexity
with aggregating terrorist events to solve the rare-event problem is
the resulting increase in the heterogeneity of the terrorist events
included. The temptation is to include as terrorism any event that

minimally satisfies the definition. This will result in treating events
that are quite different in their intent, consequences, and context
as the same. Having this type of heterogeneity in the dependent
variable will reduce the explanatory power of any statistical model
(Lynch, 1987).
There have been a small number of very clever incident-level analy-
ses of existing databases of terrorism events (Lum and Koper, 2006),
but these, too, suffer from the rare-event problem and the ensuing
problems of aggregation that occur when researchers try to compen-
sate for the rarity of terrorist events. Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero
(2005), for example, studied airline hijackings, some of which were
terrorist acts. To get their sample of 828 hijackings they included
every known event over a fifty-two-year period. They measured pol-
icy changes using the year in which the policies were adopted with-
out any direct measure of implementation across time and place. In
some cases, they distinguished countries that implemented policies,
but there was no measure of variation below the nation. Even with all
of this aggregation, they could identify only 124 terrorist events, and
only 5 in the United States. This is much too blunt an instrument to
tell us much about the effects of opportunity reduction in specific
situations. The sample of terrorist events is small, the measures of
opportunity reduction are not very precise, and many other factors
can be at play across these wide expanses of time and space. Lum and
Koper (in this volume) are more sanguine about criminologists’ abil-
ity to build knowledge through program evaluations, but it is not clear
to me how this will be done in light of the rare-event problem and the
other problems that flow from it.
It may be possible to build incident-level databases that will be more
sensitive to opportunity differences in the situation. Analysts could
employ a case-control design wherein matched time-place units could
be found for every terrorist incident. So, for every monument that
was a target of a terrorist attack, one would find a similar monument
that was not the object of attack during some time period; and for
every shopping center that was attacked, a matching shopping center
would be found, and so on. The difficulty with a case-control design,
however, is the selection of the control cases, that is, those place-times
without terrorism incidents. Ideally, controls should be selected from

an exhaustive or at least representative list of all units, in this case,
time-place units. If this condition is not satisfied, any differences (or
failures to find differences) between the case and control groups
could be due to selection bias.
Obtaining a sampling frame or list of time-place units for such anal-
ysis is not simple. First, one would need a typology of places at risk
of terrorist attack, such as airports, planes, and mass-transit systems.
Then the time-places in which a terrorist attack occurred would be
selected as the case group, and a random sample or a matched sam-
ple of the remaining time-place units would be selected as a control
group. Thus, an airport that was the scene of a terrorist attack at a
given time would be compared to an airport at that same time that was
not the scene of the attack on various dimensions of opportunity.
It is not clear whether this type of database has been constructed
to study the effects of opportunity on terrorist acts, but this seems to
be a way of getting the situation-specific information necessary to test
OT and of dealing with the rare-event problem. By using all known
terrorist events in the analysis, we lessen the impact of the problem of
terrorism as a rare event. The ability to match cases and controls on
a variety of characteristics may also help preserve precious degrees of
freedom. Moreover, by introducing variation at the situation level, we
can provide a real test of situational crime prevention, also known as
OT. Perhaps the most difficult aspect of this approach will be getting
the attributes of situations without terrorist incident that are relevant
to opportunity. In systematically collecting data, we seldom pay atten-
tion to the dog that did not bark.
Though it is possible to build an empirically based OT of terrorist
incidents, it will not be easy. The rare-event nature of terrorism makes
it difficult to assess the effects of specific interventions designed to
prevent acts of terrorism. It also requires aggregating terrorist inci-
dents over a large number of places and times to get the number
of cases necessary for stable estimates. This aggregation lessens the
chance of finding the effects of situation-level differences in oppor-
tunity on the incidence of terrorism. Case-control approaches may
be of some use in solving these problems, but it has not been done
to date.
Summary
Opportunity theory developed from the study of ordinary common
law crime cannot be readily applied to terrorism. The “utility function”
of common law criminals, especially those engaged in property crime,
is reasonably well understood. As a result, criminologists are able to
identify targets that would be more or less attractive to potential crimi-
nals. The same is not the case with terrorism. The utility functions of
terrorists are not as well understood. It is also reasonable to assume
that the problem of displacement and substitution will occur much
more often in terrorism than it does in common law crime, in large
part because terrorism is more likely to be an “organized” crime. The
organized nature of terrorism also complicates understanding the
utility function of terrorists, because the rationality of the individual
terrorist can be quite different from that of the organization. Both
theoretical and empirical treatments of OT have not addressed the
relative applicability of the theory to organized and nonorganized
crime. Finally, building an OT of terrorism empirically cannot be
done as easily as it has been for ordinary common law crime because
terrorism is so much rarer.
OPPORTUNITY REDUCTION TO REDUCE

FEAR, NOT TERRORISM
The unique features of terrorism relative to ordinary street crime

make it very difficult to borrow from OTs of common law crime to
inform theory and practice with regard to terrorism. There are, how-
ever, unique features of terrorism that may make OT and interven-
tions based upon opportunity useful for controlling terrorism. The
uniqueness to which I am referring is the goal of generating fear
that is part and parcel of terrorism, but is usually a by-product and
often an unwelcome (to the offender) by-product of ordinary street
crime. Whereas opportunity reduction may not affect the occur-
rence of terrorism (and it is difficult for us to know if it has), reduc-
ing opportunity may (or may not) affect public fear as a result of
terrorism or the threat of terrorism. I argue here that what we know
about the effects of opportunity reduction and fear of street crime
may be more applicable to terrorism than the effects of opportunity
on the occurrence of street crime. Moreover, studying the relation-

ship between opportunity reduction and fear of terrorism is more
feasible than studying the effects of opportunity reduction on the
incidence of terrorism.
Why Study the Opportunity-Fear Relationship?

In the foregoing section, I have argued that the theory and methods
of OT developed for ordinary street crime do not hold much promise
for the reduction of terrorism. So in some sense, we study the oppor-
tunity-fear relationship because studying the opportunity-terrorism
relationship is not possible with some of the traditional tools used
by criminologists. A more important reason to study the effects of
opportunity reduction on fear is, as Brian Forst notes, that managing
fear is essential in controlling terrorism. If the goal of terrorism is
to generate fear, then reducing fear reduces the damage of terror-
ism, and reduces the incentives for terrorists to commit additional
terrorist acts. We cannot and will not stop engaging in opportunity
reduction programs even if we know that they are unlikely to have
much impact on the occurrence of terrorist acts or the durable dam-
age resulting from them. The political consequences of not visibly
reducing opportunity are, I believe, simply too great. I argue that the
goal of opportunity reduction strategies regarding terrorism is fear
reduction, not terrorism reduction; as such, this should be the object
of study. Some of the opportunity reduction efforts may be ineffective
or even counterproductive in reducing fear, and if that is the case, we
should find out. Finally, we should study the opportunity reduction-
fear relationship because we can. The literature on fear of ordinary
street crime has lessons for fear of terrorism. The association between
objective risk and fear is not straightforward. Moreover, fear is not a
rare event and can be studied empirically with the traditional tools
that criminologists have used.
Opportunity Reduction and Fear of Ordinary Street Crime

The literature on opportunity reduction and street crime includes rel-
atively little information on the effects of this policy on fear of ordinary
street crime. Virtually all the work examines the effect of opportunity
reduction on the occurrence of crime (Clarke, 1997). The literature
on communities and crime, including studies on the effects of com-

munity policing, have more to say about specific forms of opportunity
reduction and fear of ordinary street crime, although this is not their
principal purpose. The lessons that can be drawn from this literature
are limited, however, by the narrow range of opportunity reduction
measures that have been studied, and by the substantial differences
between policing street crime and responding to terrorism.
Studies of the fear of street crime have shown how complicated the
study of fear of crime can be. Warr (1984) distinguishes between fear
that is immediate and specific and anxiety that is concern over what
has been or what you suspect will be. He also distinguishes between
personal fear that pertains to yourself and altruistic fear that has as its
focus other people that you care about. Warr argues that in assessing
fear of crime, one must be clear about exactly which of these dimen-
sions you are interested in. This literature has also identified common
sources of fear of crime. Warr and Stafford (1983) maintain that fear
is a function of the perceived risk of you being a victim of crime, and
the severity of that crime in terms of psychic and durable harms. This
is a multiplicative function such that very serious crimes that are not
very prevalent (like murder) will not generate the maximum amount
of fear, but crimes of moderate severity that are quite prevalent (like
burglary) will engender higher levels of fear.
The perception of the risk of being a victim of an ordinary street
crime is affected by objective risk, but it is not determined by the risk
of being victimized. Much of the work on the relationship between
risk of street crime and fear has been driven by the fact that the groups
with the lowest risk of victimization tend to have the highest levels of
fear (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). Explaining that paradox has sent
criminologists in a variety of directions, looking for factors other than
objective risk of victimization that could account for the high levels
of fear among women and the elderly. Media and other sources of
information have been shown to influence our perception that we will
be a victim of street crime (Heath and Gilbert, 1996; Chiricos et al.,
1997). Cues in our environment that are not themselves victimiza-
tion, but that are believed to be associated with victimization can also
be a source the perception of risk (Hope and Hough, 1988; Skogan,
1990). Relatively little work has been done on the effect of opportu-
nity reduction on fear of crime per se.
Communities and Crime. The communities and crime literature has

taken some lessons from the fear of crime literature in terms of
measuring fear in residential communities, but it has been much more
focused on the effects of community organization and police policies
on crime and fear. Some of the attention to fear was occasioned by
the belief that fear of crime in residential communities reduces the
interaction among residents, and reduces the social organization that
these communities need to protect themselves (Skogan, 1990; Taylor,
1999). So fear of crime can breed crime, and crime can generate
perceptions of risk and thereby fear. A second reason for the emphasis
on fear, especially in policy evaluations, was the rare-event nature of
crime. It was difficult to detect the effects of police and other programs
on crime, because even in bad places crime was relatively rare and
required large samples to detect. Fear was more prevalent because
everyone can be afraid, and it was much easier to measure change in
fear in these communities.
These community studies can be divided into those that assessed
the natural variation in crime, fear, and community organization
and those that measured the effects of specific interventions on fear
and crime. The first group of studies showed a persistent relation-
ship between community organization and crime and fear. Highly
organized communities had low levels of crime and low levels of fear
(Maxfield and Skogan, 1981; Greenberg et al., 1982; Taylor, 1990).
These studies are of little use in understanding how opportunity
reduction might affect fear, because the nature of crime and the
nature of residential communities are so different from that of ter-
rorism. Ordinary street crime and specifically interpersonal violence
in residential communities is often highly individualistic, and occurs
among intimates for personal motives. Terrorism occurs among
strangers for political motives, and it is often a collective enterprise.
Much of community crime reduction and fear reduction relies on
persistent patterns of interaction that can be used to promote attach-
ments to the community, as well as ways to negotiate a consensual
social order in the area (Taylor, 1999). Terrorism is much too epi-
sodic to be affected by the same forces that influence common law
crime in residential communities. Negotiating an acceptable social
order will reduce routine street crime in a residential community,
but not more episodic events perpetrated by persons from outside of
the community. Moreover, a large proportion of terrorist acts occur
in nonresidential communities, where there are no residents whose
persistent patterns of interaction can be changed.
Evaluations of community intervention programs may have more
relevance for understanding the effects of opportunity reduction
on crime, because the interventions were policies of police agencies
that could presumably be applied in many different types of places.
Increased police surveillance, for example, can be implemented in
residential communities, but also at airports, train stations, monu-
ments, and other public, nonresidential places. The results of these
evaluations are mixed both in terms of the relevance of opportu-
nity reduction strategies to nonresidential communities and the
effects of these interventions on the fear of crime. Skogan found that
community-policing initiatives reduced fear of crime in six communi-
ties where he studied the effects of the policy. The effects of these pro-
grams on street crime itself were less evident and consistent. Skogan
(1990) and his colleagues found that reductions in fear were not
uniform across community-policing programs. In those places where
the police retained traditional patrol practices but increased their
intensity, there was no affect on fear. Where the police employed less
traditional modes of interacting with the public, such as conducting
door-to-door canvasses of communities or creating storefront drop-in
centers, the reductions in fear were much greater. Skogan specu-
lated that this difference was due to the increased visibility of police
engaged in these nontraditional activities. At this point, the lesson
from community-policing evaluations is: The greater the increases in
the visual presence of the police, the greater the reductions in fear of
street crime.
The community-policing literature may have more specific things
to say about the effects of opportunity reduction on fear of terrorism
when the various programs that were created during the mid- and late
1990s are parsed in terms of their specific components, and these
components related to levels and change in fear (see Greene, Chapter

10, this volume). This work is currently under way.
Evaluation of Specific Opportunity Reduction Initiatives. There have been

studies of the effects of specific opportunity reduction strategies on
fear of street crime independent of the community-policing programs.
Studies of the effects of street lighting on crime, for example, have
been mixed, but the more rigorous evaluations show a decrease in
fear in public places with increases in street lighting (Painter and
Farrington, 1997). Similar results have been found for evaluations of
closed-circuit television and other changes in environmental design.
The fear reduction resulting from increased lighting is presumed
to occur either because it reduces the objective or subjective risk
of victimization, or because it gives the residents confidence that
someone is doing something about the crime problem. These same
processes could be operating in the case of terrorism. The public may
believe that the screening and other opportunity reduction policies
at airports and other places reduce the risk of terrorist attacks. Even
if they do not believe that these policies are particularly effective or
efficient, they may feel reassured that someone is doing something
about it. Like the studies of community policing, these evaluations of
the effect of opportunity reduction on fear of ordinary street crime
have not been synthesized, and the effects of specific subcomponents
have not been isolated. There is, however, some reason to believe that
some opportunity reduction programs reduce fear of street crime.
Rigorous meta-analyses of studies examining the relationship of
opportunity reduction and fear of street crime would tell us more,
and some of this could be usefully applied to the investigation of the
link between opportunity reduction and fear of terrorism.
Again, we must ask how relevant these results for ordinary street
crime are for the reduction of fear of terrorism. In previous sections,
I have argued that terrorism is very different from street crime, but
in the case of fear generation, the two types of crimes may be more
similar. The major differences between common law crime and ter-
rorism cited earlier had to do with our ability to identify a priori likely
terrorist targets and to discourage displacement and substitution. In
some sense, none of these are relevant in the case of fear reduction.
Potential victims of crime and potential victims of terrorist attacks

may have similar reactions to opportunity reduction strategies than
victims of street crime do. They may perceive that they are safe, irre-
spective of their actual risk, or they may be relieved because they see
that someone is doing something about the problem.
CONCLUSION
Situational crime prevention has been successful in reducing crime,

and has demonstrated that OTs of crime are useful in understanding
why ordinary street crimes occur. The large body of work that has
accumulated on opportunity reduction has produced a framework of
growing complexity that can aid specific efforts to reduce ordinary
street crime. This framework has not yet achieved the specificity of a
theory that can be used to guide in great detail efforts to control ordi-
nary street crime. Practitioners must take the general concepts of OT
and adapt them to fit their unique street crime problem. In the case
of terrorism, it is not immediately clear that even the OT framework
can be applied to reducing terrorist acts. Differences in the nature
of terrorism and street crime make it more difficult to apply basic
opportunity concepts to situations and to assume that a substantial
amount of substitution and displacement will not occur. Moreover,
the rare-event nature of terrorism relative to ordinary street crime
makes it difficult to do the empirical investigations that were so useful
in establishing the basic tenets of OT in the case of street crime. The
use of case-control designs with the limited archival data that are avail-
able may be of some use in building an empirical basis for applying
the opportunity framework to terrorism.
This is not to say that the opportunity framework may not be use-
fully applied to terrorism, but rather that the work done thus far is
not immediately transferable to terrorism, and there are some ques-
tions as to whether it ever could be. The initial step taken by Clarke
and Newman in applying OT to terrorism is very speculative, but also
suggestive. It needs to be supported by some solid empirical work
employing research designs and data appropriate to the rare-event
nature of terrorism.
Another fruitful and logistically simpler line of inquiry would exam-

ine the association between opportunity reduction efforts and fear of
terrorism. Because the generation of fear is a distinguishing feature
of terrorism, the impact of opportunity reduction on fear may be as
important as its effect on terrorism itself. Certain forms of opportunity
reduction such as announcing color-coded preparedness levels may
raise fear without measurably reducing risk. Massive as opposed to
selective screening of airline passengers may have a calming effect on
a public that views it as evidence that someone is watching. The accu-
mulated literature on opportunity reduction and fear of street crime
may be of some use here. More rigorous meta-analyses of these studies
may provide some useful information about the effects of opportunity
reduction and fear that are useful for anti-terrorism efforts.
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Wortley, Richard. Situational Prison Control: Crime Prevention in Correctional
Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
“Situational Crime Prevention and Prison Control: Lessons for Each
Other.” Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 16, 2003, pp. 97–117.
chapter nine
Soldiers and Spies, Police and Detectives

Tomas C. Mijares and Jay D. Jamieson
INTRODUCTION
Successful, effective, mutually beneficial military participation in what

we would call civilian law enforcement is not unknown in history.
Ancient Rome and the contemporary French Gendarmerie – who have
an excellent working relationship with the rural population of France –
might be included on a list of good examples. Unfortunately, the list of
oppressive, abusive, even genocidal examples seems infinitely longer,
and this list is surely a source of our national apprehension about
using our military forces for standard police work.
Our founding fathers were, of course, sensitive to this issue and
sought to minimize the possibility that the American public would
suffer oppressive use of the military by unethical government lead-
ers. Indeed, although military resources have been utilized countless
times in response to domestic disasters and catastrophes, we tend to
focus our collective memory on the tragic results of hostile encounters
like the New York draft riots, Kent State, or the Texas border country,
where military force has been used in response to civilian behavior
with tragic results. We simply do not want our military involved in law
enforcement in civilian environments, or controlling civilian behavior
of any type, especially when the use of force might be deemed neces-
sary. It might be worth noting that the bright line that separates the
military and civil sectors is less clearly drawn in most other advanced
Western societies, largely because the insulation against invaders pro-
vided by two vast oceans is a luxury that European nation-states do
not share.
183
Aware of these problems, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act,

prohibiting the use of military forces to perform civilian governmen-
tal tasks unless expressly and formally authorized to do so under the
Constitution. The act does not allow the use of the federal military
in direct performance of civilian law enforcement activities, whether
federal or state in nature.
The distinction between direct performance and indirect assistance
of civilian law enforcement officials has at times proved to be the
source of litigation, and has been difficult for the courts to articulate
clearly. Under certain conditions, the president may grant the request
by a state governor for military personnel to perform emergency work
for ten days following a disaster (42 U.S.C. 5170b). Through the sec-
retary of defense, who must first determine if any transfer of assets
may weaken the national defense preparedness, the president may
also authorize the sharing of information gathered during military
operations (10 U.S.C. 371), the supply of military equipment and
facilities (10 U.S.C. 372), training and advice on the use and mainte-
nance of military equipment (10 U.S.C. 373), and the maintenance
and operation of military equipment for certain federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies (10 U.S.C. 374). Military personnel
may also be made available to operate equipment in conjunction with
counterterrorist operations, or help in the enforcement of counter-
drug laws, immigration laws, and customs requirements. Military per-
sonnel may also be used to conduct surveillance, intercept vessels or
aircraft near borders of the United States, operate communications
and transportation equipment, and transport criminal suspects to the
United States for trial (Doyle and Elsea, 2005). Military personnel
may not be used to seize an industry critical to national security even
during a national emergency (Youngstown County v. Sawyer, 1952),
subject civilians to military tribunals for criminal prosecution while
civilian courts remain available (Reid v. Covert, 1957), or compel state
officials to execute federal authority (Printz v. United States, 1997).
Despite various misgivings to the contrary, neither the law enforce-
ment community nor the military establishment is attempting to
usurp the response authority or the resources of the other. Indeed,
influences in their external environments have resulted in relatively
parallel courses in their historical development. Occasionally their
soldiers and spies, police and detectives 185
paths have intersected during naturally occurring and man-made cri-

ses. Once the problem has been resolved, each entity has returned to
a “business-as-usual” approach to their tasks. These questions of juris-
diction have become more complicated under the “war on terror,”
which presents a particular dilemma for our systems of federalism
and democracy. We have an unknown number of potentially violent
people, some perceived to be foreign, in our civilian midst. As the
enemy consists of terrorists determined to attack civilian and military
targets on both foreign and domestic soil, our police and our military
have a common foe.
The range of possibilities for terrorist attacks in the United States
makes this especially problematic. As an open, free society, we are a
relatively easy target for terrorists. Historically, we have been relentless
in our pursuit of attackers, criminal or military, but we are neverthe-
less quite vulnerable to any form of initial attack. Millions of people,
many of them foreigners, travel in and out of the United States every
year. Movement is relatively simple, and access to chemical ingredi-
ents, firearms, and technology is not especially difficult. Preventing
terrorist attacks while preserving our customary levels of personal
freedom is a daunting, perhaps impossible, task.
Terrorist attacks in the future could result in damage and contin-
uing danger that are beyond the response capabilities of our police
and civilian emergency resources. This is particularly true if the attacks
involve sophisticated biological agents, nuclear devices, or chemical
agents. The 2005 Katrina crisis in New Orleans should be a great les-
son to us. This naturally occurring catastrophe had been predicted,
described, and feared for at least fifty years, and gave clear warning
signs for nearly a week before striking. Still, local resources were easily
and immediately overwhelmed. Despite even the best efforts to pre-
pare civilian resources to respond effectively to mass-casualty home-
land scenarios, coordinated surprise attacks with advanced weaponry
could similarly overwhelm our traditional civilian services (Graham,
2005.) The military has long been involved in planning for response to
domestic catastrophes, and since 9/11 has been deployed to prevent
terrorist attacks against high-risk domestic targets during alerts, and
for rapid response should an attack occur (Graham, 2005). Current
contingency planning appears to coordinate the optimum use of
military resources along with locally based police in a wide range

of homeland-security roles, from block-level order-maintenance to
aggressive, massive response, and to disasters resulting from multi-
ple, sophisticated attacks. Although the publicity surrounding home-
land-security planning stresses a supporting role for the military, it
is likely that experience, equipment, training, and the capability of
deploying significant assets rapidly would logically place the military
in command of the response to a large-scale event (Graham, 2005.)
Historically, the missions of our military and our domestic police
have generally been distinct by design. Progressive police leaders,
nevertheless, have wisely taken advantage of developments in military
equipment and small-unit tactics, as they might be adapted to the
operational environment of the police. Though this trend may have
resulted in allegations of a militarization of American law enforce-
ment, an examination of many scenarios, particularly in the drug
traffic of organized crime, reveals a change in tactics by the criminal
element. The change in tactics by police officers is a countermea-
sure to the increased violence displayed by criminal suspects (Mijares
and McCarthy, 2008). Similarly, military leaders have recognized the
subtle but steady change of warfare from large-scale battlefields com-
plete with distinctive fronts to much smaller, yet equally treacherous
urban environments that require protracted engagements and the
cultivation of local citizens with methods similar to those employed
in community policing. (See Greene, this volume). Such develop-
ments are the result of exhaustive research, testing, and operational
experience. Just as innovations improve the effectiveness of soldiers,
so will the selective adaptation of equipment, technology, and meth-
ods improve the effectiveness of the police and civilian emergency
personnel.
As the homeland security missions of police and military draw
inevitably closer together in civilian environments in the future, the
“militaristic” countenance of our police and emergency personnel is
likely to increase as well. Should this be a cause of concern? How can
we also exploit the advantages that cross-training, intelligence shar-
ing, and experience can bring to the security mission?
Various scholars strongly argue that the conventional distinctions
between the United States military and the American criminal justice
system have become increasingly blurred (Kraska, 2001). Claiming

that the consequences of this obfuscation are both far-reaching and
disquieting, several commentators have critically examined a wide
variety of issues where they claim that the criminal justice system has
adopted elements of the military model in terms of technology, cul-
ture, language, philosophy, and organization (Kraska, 2001). These
commentaries suggest that for many reasons the primary beneficiary
to this arrangement has been local police departments, but their
increased effectiveness has come at the expense of civil rights. In his
work entitled The Pentagon’s New Map, Barnett (2004) encouraged
the transformation of our military into a more multidimensional
system of resources with the capability of rapid response to a wide
range of national needs, including traditional police roles. Indeed, it
may be argued that this has been accomplished. Our military’s abil-
ity to respond effectively to natural disasters, such as hurricanes, far
exceeds the ability of local and regional police to respond. It is logical
to expect an enhanced military capability in any sort of unexpected or
large-scale domestic need for order and control.
It is worthwhile to review the concerns regarding the police-military
nexus. Kraska and others have noted superficial similarities, such as
the use of military language by criminal justice practitioners, but these
discussions tend to overlook similar language use in other areas, such
as sports, politics, entertainment, and the arts.
Dunlap (2001) gives a more substantive historical analysis of the
differences between traditional law enforcement and the military
roles and how these roles have eroded with time. When analyzed in
terms of other entities, such as the role of the church in the educa-
tional system, this perceived erosion cannot be considered unique to
the current military–law enforcement paradigm.
Haggerty and Ericson (2001) describe the transfer of technology,
usually from the military to law enforcement. Similarly, no mention
is made of how technology has been transferred in many other areas.
For example, thermal-imagery technology was initially developed to
detect heat leaks in machinery and buildings, thus enabling engineers
to locate manufacturing anomalies and structural weaknesses. Much
later, this technology was applied to military and law enforcement
surveillance.
Dunn (2001) examines the coalescence of military and law enforce-

ment roles along the United States–Mexico border. Though it cannot
be denied that this venture is condemned to failure unless appropri-
ate training and adjustment of the “rules of engagement” are con-
ducted, it has now become painfully obvious that popular opinion is
demanding a less porous border. Decisions to augment law enforce-
ment deployments along the border with National Guard personnel
illustrate this reaction to public demand.
Despite the concerns of the critics of the police-military nexus, the
actual roles of the United States military and the American criminal
justice system remain distinct. The appearance of any role overlap
and subsequent merger of the two institutions is more the result of
simultaneous, but independently occurring, historical changes in
their respective external environments. Accordingly, the purpose
of the remainder of this chapter is to describe the adjustments by
each institution (military and police) in response to these changes in
their external environments. In so doing, it is important to note that
changes in the external environments of both the military and the
police result in structural and operational changes. Recommendations
will then be made to improve America’s ability to respond to terrorist
threats and incidents while staying within the rule of law and without
unduly alarming various elements of the populace.
CHANGES IN THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
Military
If we learned only one thing from our experience in Vietnam, it
should be never to underestimate the determination of a culture to
resist forced change from a foreign power. Relentless opposition and
uncompromising resistance over the long term eventually rendered
U.S. goals illogical in the face of the military and political costs,
no matter how disparate the relative strength of the opponents actu-
ally were.
A second lesson that we should be learning now is that future armed
conflicts are not likely to pit the world’s “superpowers” against each
other. Wars in the future (and perhaps in the present) will probably
arise from attempts by developed, technologically advanced nations
to manipulate underdeveloped nations into more active participa-

tion in global economic and political interchange (Barnett, 2004). In
Barnett’s view, the collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States
with no potential adversary of equal stature – no enemy with even a
remote possibility of defeating our armed forces and occupying our
homeland. Thus, it makes little sense to maintain a military designed
to engage a massive force of infantry, armor, artillery, and conven-
tional naval and air power. According to Barnett, it has not been easy
for our military leaders to make the cognitive transition from anticipat-
ing warfare with superpowers to engaging determined little guys who
seek to make the conflict as costly as possible, without any thought of
actually defeating the U.S. military in a conventional sense. He goes
on to trace how each branch of the military can expand operations on
the administrative peacekeeping front.
Police
Beginning in the middle 1960s, American law enforcement experi-
enced several changes in its external environment. These changes
were not merely in magnitude and frequency because of the dramatic
population growth after World War II, but they were also changes
in kind that fundamentally altered the way in which police services
were delivered.
Perhaps the most divisive issue to be confronted by the people of
the United States since the Civil War was the American involvement
in Vietnam. Thirty years after the withdrawal of military forces, the
conflict still remains a controversy, as major players in that debate are
still trying to justify their perspectives and actions (McNamara, 1996;
Fonda, 2005). On one hand, it was law enforcement’s responsibility
to ensure that the antiwar demonstrators were able to exercise their
First Amendment rights to free assembly and free speech in a safe
manner. On the other hand, the demonstrators could not be allowed
to violate others’ constitutional rights, civil rights, or destroy the prop-
erty of others. To complicate the issue, dissidents from other causes
often joined the antiwar demonstrators. Initially, the civil rights and
antiwar movements converged in the 1960s. Later they were joined by
a myriad of other causes ranging from environmentalism to abortion
rights advocates and opponents of the death penalty. For a variety
of reasons, the law enforcement community often found itself in the

center of the storm. Police officers were hardly recognized as individ-
uals, or even as law enforcement officers, but rather as the prototypi-
cal and readily accessible symbols of the hated “establishment.” These
demonstrations frequently became hostile and destructive riots, dem-
onstrating how the tactics, techniques, and technology of American
law enforcement were lagging behind the abilities and motivations of
the protesters.
Police administrators soon realized that the intuitive and tradi-
tional response to these large-scale disorders was inadequate (Gates,
1991). As the size of the problem grew in magnitude and frequency,
the simplistic solution was to introduce more officers and resources.
For example, during the riot of 1967 the Detroit Police Department
required assistance initially from the Michigan National Guard and
later the United States Army to deal with the magnitude of the cri-
sis. Similar solutions had been sought during the Watts Riot of 1965
and the Texas Tower Incident in 1966. However, without plans, estab-
lished procedures, coordination of effort and resources, and training
the efforts by law enforcement were not only ineffective but counter-
productive. In each of these instances, the police and military were
unable to communicate with each other because of incompatible
communication systems and an unclearly defined chain of command.
The inability to coordinate activities often led to disruption: Many
response units were assigned to some calls for service, while many
other calls went unanswered.
A second change to the external environment came from the quan-
tum increase in the drug culture. Historically, illegal drugs had been
limited to artisans and people of low income, particularly minori-
ties from the inner cities. This trend, too, changed in the 1960s with
emergence of the youth and drug cultures and their glamorization
by the entertainment media. Respectable mainstream America had
perceived itself as unsullied by such a plebeian form of entertain-
ment and stress relief. There are many theories about this rapid and
expansive growth, but one of the effects was a realization that illegal
drugs could no longer be contained to a specific area of geography or
society. Because the offenders were free to cross jurisdictional bound-
aries, law enforcement was forced to develop new tactics, techniques,
and technologies to deal with the problem.
Coinciding with the growth of the illegal narcotics trade has been
the marked increase in violent encounters by perpetrators within
the drug trade. Members of traditional organized crime groups had
been much more discreet in their use of violence as a disciplinary
tool or as a means of dealing with competitors. They simply wished
to avoid drawing unnecessary attention to their illegal activities. As
novices entered the drug marketplace, such caution was not applied.
Fatal force directed toward police officers by members of traditional
organized crime groups was generally the result of escape attempts.
Accidental shootings of innocent bystanders were often met with
organizational internal discipline, and were occasionally followed
by monetary apologies to families to discourage formal complaints
through the criminal justice process. However, the newly emerging
groups are less discriminate in their use of force and have incurred
the ire of much of the public.
Abadinsky (2007) attributes the increase in violence by organized
crime in particular to the corresponding rise in numbers and power
of non-Sicilian organized crime groups who have not yet learned
the “rules” of behavior. Specifically citing Russian organized crime
groups, Abadinsky suggests that the newly emerging groups have not
yet been in the United States long enough to have developed a proper
work ethic. Abadinsky also cites La violencia of the Latin American
groups wherein criminal drug traffickers come from areas where
they have totally discounted the legitimacy of political and economic
institutions, and thus embrace extreme violence with an indifference
to death.
There has been an emerging body of evidence that a symbiotic rela-
tionship is developing between Middle Eastern terrorists and Latin
American drug dealers who are peddling their wares in the United
States (CSIS, 1997; see also Abadinsky, 2007 and Mallory, 2007). The
arrests in July of 2005 of several illegal immigrants with connections
to both al Qaeda and the Latin American organized crime groups
exemplify this phenomenon.
In addition, anecdotal information from various drug-enforcement
personnel indicates that many former members of the now-defunct
Soviet military have found lucrative employment performing security
and training for various elements of the Columbian drug cartels. The
combination of the opportunity provided by organized crime with the
means made available by the former members of the Soviet military

and the motivation fostered by the presence of Middle Eastern ter-
rorists has produced a violent alliance that has little regard for the
sanctity of life (including the lives of the members themselves).
A fourth change in the external environment came through tech-
nological advancements. Except for changes in transportation and
communication systems, there had been relatively few technologi-
cal changes in American law enforcement since the first American
uniform-patrol forces of the first half of the nineteenth century. The
motorized patrol car, two-way radio, and the initial use of forensic tech-
nology changed policing substantially through the 1960s. Computers,
DNA analysis, and computerized crime analysis technologies changed
it much afterward.
Requirements for technological changes in different fields began
to have a later application to the specific area of law enforcement.
For example, the need to increase the effective range of electronic
communications systems while reducing the size and weight of the
hardware was mandated by the space exploration program. The dis-
coveries in this field ultimately led to the use of portable two-way
radios for police officers. Similarly, the development of chemically
produced fibers that were stronger and lighter than the steel used
in construction led to the invention of ballistic-resistant personal
body armor. Thermal imagery to identify structural and mechan-
ical weaknesses led to the development of electronic surveillance
equipment.
In most cases, this technology, which was often beyond the budgets
of many law enforcement agencies, also became available to criminal
users through both legal and black-market sources. It was also beyond
the ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct the research that
must be done before the technology is made part of the inventory.
The legal, economic, social, and political requirements and issues
associated with vetting innovations in American law enforcement,
though intended to promote organizational accountability and trans-
parency, have had a side effect of producing a lengthy and arduous
application process that may make the technology obsolete before it is
operational. Meanwhile, criminal opponents are consistently improv-
ing their own technological capabilities. Terrorist opponents such as
al Qaeda, which will probably encounter domestic police more in the

future, have extensively field-tested and refined more lethal bomb-
ing and signaling devices on the Iraq urban landscape and roadway
system. In addition, the legal parameters that guide law enforcement’s
use of any technology are always in a continuous state of interpreta-
tion and evolution in the criminal world.
Criminal users of technology are not bound by the legal constraints
of court decisions such as Frye v. United States (1923),1 operational
budgets, or formalized research needed to justify decisions to obtain
and use newly developed technology. Consequently, creative funding
practices and reliance on research from other fields (e.g., military
and industry) are needed to keep pace with strides in technology
made by the criminal element of society. For example, the use of ther-
mal imagery,2 complete with its legal and operational critics, has its
original interpretations stemming from Katz v. United States (1967)
and continuing to the present with United States v. Porco (1994) and
United States v. Cusumano (1995). These cases arose from the same
set of facts whereby narcotics investigators used thermal imagery to
detect the heat anomalies associated with the indoor cultivation of
marijuana in private residences. The defense argued that the investi-
gators possessed neither probable cause nor a warrant to conduct an
electronic search of the premises. These most recent interpretations
of the legality of thermal-imagery technology state that its use is lim-
ited to corroborating evidence gathered from other sources such as
a confidential informant. Irrespective of the type of alleged illegal
activity being investigated, the technology cannot be used in a “fishing
expedition” to uncover criminal activity. The Katz, Cusumano, and
Porco cases differed in terms of the areas being searched, the evidence
being sought, and the technology being used. However, in each case
the issue was the expectation of privacy and how it is to be observed
by law enforcement personnel.
1
This case requires the prosecution to demonstrate the scientific basis of any tech-
nology used to obtain and analyze evidence, and that the technology has gained
recognition among experts before the evidence is introduced.
2
Whereas normal photography makes images of differences in light waves, thermal
imagery makes images of differences in temperature. The thermal imagery used
in military and law enforcement surveillance was initially developed for industrial
uses to detect heat losses and structural defects.
Finally, changes mandated by court decisions had a great impact

on the delivery of police services. For example, Downs v. United States
(1975), though not necessarily binding on local police departments,
resulted in judicial notice that special situations dictate special
responses. This case involved an attempt to rescue hostages by person-
nel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation who had been called hast-
ily to the Jacksonville, Florida airport after a small commercial aircraft
had been seized with the attempt to fly it to the Bahamas. The incident
ended in tragedy when the untrained, unpracticed, and unequipped
investigators were unable to contain, control, and de-escalate the sit-
uation. The court thus indicated that responses to critical incidents
should be handled by personnel who have received the specialized
training, practice, and equipment needed to resolve events of this
magnitude safely. The changing nature of crime from individual
offenses to large-scale events such as drug raids, hostile crowd con-
trol, school shootings, and hostage rescues means that more police
officers and consequently more coordination of resources and efforts
are now required. As early as the Watts Riot of 1965 and the Texas
Tower incident in the following year, administrators slowly realized
the need to be able to respond immediately to large-scale and much
more dangerous situations without depleting the ability to respond
to routine calls for police service. Although the factual circumstances
of these cases differ considerably, they share the dimension that the
continuous addition of more police assets prevented the Los Angeles
and Austin police departments from responding to routine calls for
service. During these incidents, requests for police responses to auto
accidents, home burglaries, street muggings, or any other types of in-
progress crimes were subordinated and often ignored because of the
belief that simply adding more police personnel to the major event
would ultimately resolve the situation. This trend was largely done on
an individual-city basis and without any form of mandates from the
courts or legislatures.
However, City of Winter Haven v. Allen (1991) specifically precluded
the traditional ad hoc responses for critical incidents. In this case, an
investigation by a unit from the sheriff’s office led to the issuance of
a search and arrest warrant. Because the building to be searched was
a large structure, local municipal officers were requested to assist. In
the course of serving the warrant, a deputy sheriff gave chase to a

fleeing suspect. Because of a lack of communication and the coor-
dination that comes from group training, the deputy was caught in
a cross-fire and mortally wounded by one of the local officers. When
the deputy’s widow sued, the court agreed that this sort of makeshift
approach to a potentially critical incident was clearly inappropriate.
This decision has had many implications for the various managerial
functions of a law enforcement agency. It has become obvious to
administrators that law enforcement agencies must not only provide
special responses for special circumstances, they must do so in a man-
ner that does not violate existing legislation, such as Section 1983
of the United States Code, and that remains consistent with all rel-
evant litigation.3 Because the courts are powerless to initiate changes
without a specific case being brought for consideration through the
appropriate legal channels, the managerial and operational evolution
of police responses took place at a faster rate than the legal man-
dates occurred. Law enforcement managers have a professional and
moral obligation to seek continuous improvements in the methods
employed in the suppression of criminal activity. The Downs case, the
Winter Haven/Allen case, the Los Angeles riot, and the Texas Tower
incident have all led public managers to realize that extraordinary
situations were becoming more frequent, and that using a cohesive
and well-trained specialized unit was much more effective than deal-
ing with these events with large numbers of unprepared personnel
and improvised equipment.
ADJUSTMENTS TO THE CHANGES
Military
Since the end of the Cold War, our military has gradually placed
increasing priority on readiness for encounters such as operations in
3
Chapter 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code specifically states, “Every
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of
any state or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.”
Panama, and more recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rapid strikes

by conventional forces, followed by indefinite periods of occupation
and order-maintenance while the political environment stabilizes,
will probably characterize the majority of our overseas military mis-
sions in the foreseeable future. The operations in Iraq reveal how
extremely difficult this tactic can be in the face of a determined
and brutal array of opponents, and how politics and media repre-
sentations at home can have substantial impacts on operations on
the ground.
Remarkable developments in technology have enhanced the rapid-
strike capability of the U.S. military immeasurably. Global-positioning
systems and the ability to communicate and observe the Earth in close
detail from space have enabled the continuing development of pre-
cise target-identification and acquisition systems, weapon-guidance
systems, order-of-battle and battlefield-intelligence systems, and com-
mand-communication networks. As noted earlier, the terrorists also
benefit from these technologies, even if at a cruder level.
At the individual level, soldiers are equipped with weapons and tech-
nology that facilitates small-team operations in buildings and densely
populated urban environments. Night vision, thermal imaging, and
sophisticated communication links with command and intelligence
assets have continually increased the effectiveness of small-unit mis-
sions, as has the availability of heavy weapons and medical evacuation
resources when needed. They are also equipped with digital cameras
and Internet capabilities that, together with more transparent report-
ing, bring their daily activities closer to home and to others.
Although the military maintains the ability to effectively engage an
enemy with significant conventional military resources, preparation
for the future will most likely involve increasing attention to engage-
ment with insurgent forces, and managing the consequences of ter-
rorist-type attacks on both military assets and civilian populations. Our
intelligence capabilities have shifted fairly drastically from human
intelligence to signal intelligence over the past fifty years, and now we
are paying the price. It is clear that we need a significant strengthen-
ing in competency in Arabic, Farsi, and other foreign languages of
places where terrorism has roots.
Police
Law enforcement has adjusted to the changes in its external envi-
ronment in several ways. First, immediately after the passage of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, local law
enforcement agencies were given substantial block grants to improve
and increase their inventories of equipment. Admittedly, some of
these innovations and acquisitions may have been extravagant, and
in some cases irrelevant to the real needs and mission. In terms of
material purchases, most of the allotted funds were spent to obtain
weapons, protective equipment, personal communication devices,
and vehicles.
Simultaneously, the American military was upgrading its own inven-
tory for its increased role in Vietnam by reducing its inventory of
outdated equipment still in use from World War II and the Korean
War. Consequently, many surplus and obsolete items were made avail-
able to local law enforcement through various programs. In the early
stages of this program, a local law enforcement agency was required
to be quite active in the pursuit of this surplus military equipment to
supplement existing stocks of equipment and resources.
A second reaction by law enforcement to changes in the external
environment was the establishment of specialized units. With the
exception of the extremely large police departments, local agencies
had historically specialized only in terms of general patrol and crim-
inal investigation (i.e., detectives). Shortly after the end of World
War II, sub-specialties were initiated within these two general catego-
ries. This development was largely due to the dramatic growth in the
nation’s population after World War II and to the increasing complex-
ity of overall society. As problems have arisen, local law enforcement
agencies have specialized in response. The development of local spe-
cialized units for antiterrorism in the United States is a normal part
of this police evolutionary process; it saw its structural beginning with
the Kefauver Committee in the 1950s in a move to unify the frag-
mented approaches to intelligence gathering and sharing in the par-
ticular area of organized crime.
Through an improvement in technology, the patrol function
saw the development of areas such as traffic-enforcement units,
street-decoy operations, and canine patrol, whereas criminal inves-

tigation units were subdivided into areas such as homicide investi-
gation, vice enforcement, and robbery detection. A by-product of
organizational specialization over the next several years was the shar-
ing of information about tactics, techniques, and technology with
members of other organizations with similar assignments and con-
cerns. This sharing was both formal, through participation in confer-
ences sponsored by professional organizations such as the National
Tactical Officers Association, and informal, based on the subsequent
friendships formed by the formal arrangements. Whether formal
or informal, the sharing among peers from other organizations was
much more frequent and detailed than the information exchanges
within the parent organizations. It was a natural course of action that
this sharing later included military police units and other specialized
units. Although their missions, organization, and clientele may differ
slightly, the tactics and techniques that were initially developed at
the local police level are often shared with their counterparts in the
military. It has been noted elsewhere in this volume that in today’s
world, these bridge-building approaches have clear implications for
human intelligence and winning hearts and minds on the ground. A
good example of such cooperation has been the development of the
Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT)
program for training first responders in “active shooter” environ-
ments. The federally funded ALERRT curricula include training for
small-team tactics in response to deadly violence in crowded areas,
buildings, lowlight conditions, mixed-unit cooperation, dynamic
entry, hostage negotiation, and the like, all of which are common
to law enforcement and military encounters. Initially developed by
law enforcement experts in the field, the curricula and training have
been continuously refined over the years with new technology and
experiential input from the military, domestic law enforcement, and
foreign law enforcement.
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 was
passed to give federal aid to local law enforcement agencies to meet
the increased demands identified during the middle of the decade.
The bulk of this funding was directed toward the education and
training of personnel.
A concurrent phenomenon was the recognition that dedicated

training programs were needed for in-service personnel in response to
specifically identified shortcomings in the delivery of police services.
Historically, any training beyond the recruit level was directed pri-
marily toward firearms proficiency. However, changes in the external
environment identified several shortcomings in the knowledge, skill,
and abilities of police officers that could be addressed by restructur-
ing the training paradigm. These changes resulted in a move to certify
police personnel in specialized assignments such as breathalyzer oper-
ators, motorcycle officers, and radar unit operators, and necessitated
training programs dedicated to developing the expertise required
for satisfactory job performance. These certification programs were
usually identified by civil litigation for negligence in training, man-
dated by state legislatures, and administered through the respective
state commissions on law enforcement officer standards and training.
States such as California, Montana, and Texas have now mandated
that the officers tasked to respond to incidents of terrorism follow a
specific training curriculum.
However, the costs for training were expensive and the resources
were slight, particularly for the officers whose normal and recur-
ring duties involved tactical responses to in-progress violent criminal
behavior. The traditional methods of firearms training had usually
been nothing more than timed shooting at paper bulls-eye targets.
This sort of training, however inexpensive, was irrelevant and ineffec-
tive. Accordingly, alternative sources and methods were necessary to
maximize effectiveness. Because many of these officers had already
received a measure of tactical training during their military enlist-
ments, it was only logical and natural to call upon their previous expe-
riences, and to renew old contacts for using existing military facilities
and resources. Similarly, military combat experts had recently recog-
nized how combat had switched from the traditional large battlefield
of World War II to a more tactical form, close quarter battle (CQB).
Consequently, a sharing of information, equipment, and facilities
between law enforcement and the military was mutually beneficial.
These developments have clear relevance under the emergence of
the threat of terrorism and the need to protect subways, tunnels, heav-
ily populated centers, and other unconventional targets. The leads
initiated by the British SAS and the German GSG-9 have well demon-
strated the efficacy of national-local cooperative efforts.
Perhaps the most significant and important means by which the gap
in coordination during large-scale events continues is the informal
basis among the responders themselves. For example, the response
by local law enforcement officers to contain the Branch Davidian
incident after the first assault by the ATF was initiated spontane-
ously, independently, and simultaneously. According to discussions
with these officers,4 the response was conducted without the need
and interference of formalized agreements by elected politicians
and politically appointed agency heads. The relatively well-coordi-
nated response was viewed largely as the product of these officers,
who were members of the tactical units in their departments, having
trained together through conferences and coursework developed by
the Texas Tactical Police Officers Association. These courses are also
attended by military police units from the many Air Force and Army
bases located in Texas.
Similarly, when rescue workers realized the magnitude of the situa-
tion at the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and requested
assistance, firefighters and emergency medical service personnel lit-
erally from around the country did not wait for political permission
or public funding to allow them to render aid. They drove through
the night, usually at their own expense. The actions of the officers
were based on the recognition that the magnitude of the situation
would require additional personnel. Their response was not based
on predetermined formal arrangements or on any agenda, but fully
on the belief that it was the proper and humane thing to do. Finally,
as the storm clouds grew over the Gulf of Mexico prior to Hurricane
Katrina in 2005, approximately two hundred police officers from
around Texas had gathered in Pasadena for the annual SWAT com-
petition sponsored by the Texas Tactical Police Officers Association.
The four-day competition was cut short when the officers volunteered
to drive approximately two hundred miles to provide security during
4
Eight of the first responding officers were students at Southwest Texas State
University (now Texas State University). Three were assigned to the Austin Police
Department, two others were from the Texas Department of Public Safety, and
three were from the Travis County Sheriff’s Office.
military rescue efforts. Again, there was an absence of the bickering

over responsibilities, chains of command, expenditures, and resource
allocations that had characterized the formal relations between the
Federal Emergency Management Agency and the State of Louisiana.
Though some critics may wonder about their motivations, there was
no discussion of whether the intention was to assist the federal officers
or their fellow officers. Their intentions were to assist the citizens who
would be trapped by the flood surge. Similarly it is not uncommon for
American firefighters to cross the Rio Grande to assist with fires that
could endanger both sides of the river. Debates concerning their inten-
tions serve no purpose, and tend to ignore the basic altruism found in
those who choose this line of work. One side would say that they were
assisting the feds and the military; the other might argue that they
were used to having mutual-aid agreements with other police and fire
jurisdictions. So this was a natural extension of such mutual-aid pacts,
even if no formal pacts were in place. It’s like firefighters from all
over the country responding to California’s seemingly endless series
of broad and dangerous wildfires.
In none of these examples were the responding officers guided (or
hampered) by any form of existing official mutual-assistance pact.
Admittedly, this well-accepted practice requires continuous evaluation
to answer questions about administrative issues such as overtime pay,
equipment maintenance, chain of command, and the like. Although
the final outcomes were neither perfect nor even to the complete
satisfaction of most of the general public, the response would likely
have been even more disastrous if left to the “turf wars” and interne-
cine strife usually found among bureaucrats, politicians, and formal-
ized agreements. Whether the situation is a man-made calamity such
as a terrorist incident or a natural disaster such as a hurricane, local
law enforcement personnel have displayed a remarkable ability to set
aside issues and differences in abilities, funding, and organizational
structure in their response to a common cause.
This symbiotic relationship between the military and law
enforcement has developed from its informal beginnings during the
Revolutionary War to a more official operation. Each war has brought
more formalization to the program, with the largest amount of leg-
islation taking place during the Vietnam War era. The last major
legislation affecting veterans’ preference occurred under the Defense

Appropriations Act of 1997, which accorded preference to anyone
who served in the conflicts in the Middle East, as well as the peace-
keeping efforts in the area formerly known as Yugoslavia. Today, a
premium is given to personnel who wish to apply their military expe-
rience and training to a civilian law enforcement context in the form
of preference points for veterans during screening and hiring. A fairly
common career path has been to attend a college or university, enlist
in the military and gain valuable experience and contacts, and then
pursue a career in civilian law enforcement, often with increased
opportunity for continuing education and advancement under var-
ious programs. Recently this trend has become more pronounced
because of national economic trends that have resulted in veteran law
enforcement personnel staying on beyond their normally anticipated
retirement date, as well as corresponding cutbacks in police recruit
classes. Simply put, job applicants in any field are now required to
bring more tangible qualities to the employment table. Thus, because
of societal demands and external opportunities, police training has
truly evolved into an interorganizational phenomenon.
Similarly, police officers experienced in community policing
have increasingly been used to train peacekeeping officers in the
former Yugoslav republics. One needs only to examine the recruiting
efforts of corporations such as Halliburton, Xe Services (formerly
Blackwater), and DynCorp to see the premium placed on experience
that crosses military and law enforcement functions. Might we see a
similar cross-training in this opposite direction to our own military,
under the scenario predicted by Thomas Barnett?
CONCLUSIONS
Whether an event is a major criminal action, natural disaster, large-

scale industrial accident, or an act of terrorism, the natural reaction
of emergency responders is to go to and deal with the problem. This
tendency was clearly evident on September 11, 2001, when all sorts of
police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians were
seen going into the World Trade Center to assist and evacuate the
injured when everyone else was trying to escape. As the dust from the
collapse of the buildings settled and the operation shifted from one of
rescue to recovery, public safety personnel from around the country
poured in to help.
Even in the absence of a formalized agreement of mutual assis-
tance, emergency response personnel are noteworthy for their ability
to come together to resolve a critical situation and then return to
some measure of normality once the emergency is over. Though cynics
may claim that the success of military and public safety personnel to
deal with a problem on an as-needed and impermanent basis is the
result of Constitutional safeguards, an equally important and accurate
explanation may be found in the character of the individuals perform-
ing these tasks, and in the freedom enjoyed to use their resources and
abilities properly and appropriately.
From a more constructive perspective, it should be recognized
both formally and informally that each entity has something to
gain from the other. Events such as the Detroit Riot of 1967, where
members of the 101st Airborne were sent to assist the Detroit Police
Department, demonstrate how this principle has effectively worked
after the situation had been federalized. The law enforcement com-
munity benefited from the extra personnel, and the military learned
the importance of cultivating good relations with the local people.
Similarly, during the natural disasters of Hurricane Katrina in 2005
and Hurricane Ike in 2008, members of the United States Coast
Guard and the United States Air Force – with a federal mandate –
provided immediate law enforcement, rescue, and medical assistance
to the affected areas. The success to date has largely been a function
of their mutual ability to recognize both their organizational indepen-
dence and their operational interdependencies. Many state and local
large-scale events would have resulted in even greater numbers of
casualties if the understaffed, under-equipped, and often untrained
local, county, and state responders did not have immediate federal
military assistance.5
5
Some critics claimed that the military was slow in responding to the storm. However,
in anticipation that there would be many casualties, the United States Navy had sev-
eral ships ready to assist, but were kept out of the storm’s path to prevent damage
to the rescuing assets. In addition, units from the United States Air Force Reserve
responded from bases in Texas as soon as the storm had passed.
It is ironic that active engagement in warfare, with the attendant

misery and destruction, usually results in relatively rapid advance-
ment in medicine, science, and technology (Schaefer and Hyland,
1994). Our military’s active participation in engagements in recent
history, from Somalia and Kosovo to Afghanistan and Iraq, has cer-
tainly resulted in remarkable increases in medical capability that
have been transferred to civilian emergency medical responders. For
example, workers who have been injured on oil rigs, particularly burn
victims, are now routinely flown to Brooke Army Medical Center in
San Antonio, Texas, where the same medical procedures developed to
treat massive battlefield trauma are used to treat the civilian popula-
tion. University research for military needs, often funded through the
Defense Applied Research Projects Agency, in applications as diverse
as protective clothing, soft body armor, vehicles, and even diet and
exercise programs, have had a marked impact on domestic policing,
and can be immediately seen in many law enforcement conferences
and training sessions.
Despite the media-generated misperception of doughnuts and
boredom, our police are always engaged. Because of budgetary
limitations, our police generally do not enjoy the time or the wide
resources for research and training that facilitate the development of
military capabilities. Consequently, it has been wise for police leaders
to adapt advances in military technology and experience to the civil-
ian law enforcement environment. The interchange between our law
enforcement and military has been mutually beneficial.
The concern about militarism in American law enforcement seems
to be largely an issue of appearance. Apprehension about losing the
accustomed distinctions between police and military, or the glorifica-
tion of the tools of violence, might be an indication of a deeper fear
that our police will become an army, and be used domestically as an
oppressive force. Police veterans are likely to agree that this is impos-
sible, and that such fears are unfounded, just as military veterans are
likely to agree that there is no desire at any level to expand the mili-
tary mission to include any involvement in domestic law enforcement.
Historically, the military and law enforcement elements of our sys-
tem have worked well together without the formalized prescriptions
and proscriptions seen in other countries. For example, during the
Detroit Riot of 1967, the military immediately recognized their own

operational limitations, and formed teams of three soldiers with one
police officer who acted typically as both a guide and as a form of a
supervisor.
Nevertheless, we do not want our police officers to look or act like
soldiers. We will be uncomfortable if the police presence in our streets
includes assault rifles and tanks. What then, is to be the future of
American law enforcement if our police and military must join forces
and work in cooperation to prevent, minimize, and manage the effects
of terrorist attacks in the United States? The issue might be resolved
if police leaders made a conscious, systematic effort to avoid military
appearance. When Robert Peel put his London “bobbies” in navy blue
uniforms in 1829 to emphasize professionalism with the capacity to
use force, he took care to ensure that the public did not confuse the
police with the military, and so it should be today.
To accomplish this goal of mutually beneficial autonomy, there
must be a recognized chain of command established prior to the
development of the crisis. In some cases, the transfer of command
has even involved a formally signed document analogous to a con-
tract (Perkins and Mijares, 1996). The most memorable example of
this organizational principle took place on the international level in
1979 when the British Special Air Service took control of the Iranian
Embassy situation. Recognition of the proper chain of command and
a formal transfer of authority preceded the successful resolution of
the problem.
In addition to establishing a formal chain of command, it is neces-
sary that both sides break any existing barriers to the sharing of infor-
mation of mutual concern. As indicated earlier, information on such
topics as tactics, techniques, and technology has usually been shared.
A mere observation of the various tactical police conferences or the
many training programs hosted by the military clearly illustrates this
point. However, intelligence concerning the activities of terrorists and
other criminal suspects and groups is usually withheld. Historically,
the military has been reluctant to share this information under the
claim of national security, whereas the law enforcement community
has declined to do so citing prohibitive legal restrictions such as
evidentiary rules and mandated procedural practices.
Finally, continuous mutual-training exercises must be considered

to be part of the solution. Learning the substance of the training is
one issue. Applying it to realistic scenarios is another. Learning the
position and assignment of each part of a well-oiled machine is still
another, and is necessary to achieving an automatic response. A rela-
tively predictable reaction and acceptable level of performance can
be achieved only through unremitting and relevant training.
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chapter ten
Community Policing and Terrorism

Problems and Prospects for Local
Community Security
Jack R. Greene
INTRODUCTION
Since September 11, 2001, communities throughout the United

States and elsewhere have struggled with the question, “How to
provide security in an increasingly uncertain world?” As events subse-
quent to 9/11 have unfolded, U.S. policing, most particularly at the
local level of government, has increasingly become responsible for
protecting communities from terrorism as well as crime and social
disorganization. This role, however, is largely unspecified, and except
for the very largest cities like New York and Los Angeles, often beyond
local governments’ financial grasp. Nonetheless, it is generally recog-
nized that like politics, all terrorism is ultimately local, at least in the
consequences of such events.
In the last five years or so, the demarcation between local, state,
and federal policing in the terrorism arena has become blurred with
overlapping functions, and at times, with competing goals and objec-
tives. For example, whereas federal agencies may be singularly focused
on interdicting and preventing acts of terrorism (internationally and
domestically), local agencies are invariably tied to responding to ter-
rorism and mitigating its impacts once such events occur, while at the
same time providing a sense of community order and safety (see chap-
ter by Maguire and King, this volume). Moreover, the ability of local
policing to develop intelligence broad enough to address terrorism
is structured both by the size and complexity of the local jurisdiction,
but also by the larger set of linkages that the police have within their
jurisdiction (see Brodeur, this volume). It is argued here that building
208
community policing and terrorism 209
on these local relationships offers considerable promise to local-police

attempts to address and respond to concerns of terrorism. At the same
time, the ability of the local police to use these relationships is largely
dependent on local trust and confidence in the police, which is at
times stressed by concerns of police intrusiveness. Though local polic-
ing may have some incremental effect on preventing terrorism, the
ability of local police to manage community fear and social panic in
the face of terrorism is likely a positive by-product of recent programs
of community-oriented policing (COP) and problem-oriented polic-
ing (POP).
Community- and problem-oriented policing, and their progeny, pro-
grams that have followed in the footsteps and traditions of COP and
POP (e.g., “reassurance policing”), provide vehicles for strengthening
a local-police role in dealing with terrorism by providing local ground-
ing for security-focused efforts. These efforts must be grounded in the
communities’ acceptance of police interventions, rooted in the ability
of the local police to understand community dynamics and accepted
modes of intervention, and must also address public fear of terrorism.
This chapter focuses on the role of the local police in addressing ter-
rorism through the lens of community- and problem-oriented polic-
ing, most particularly on the problems and prospects of local police
embracing a role in terrorism prevention, response, and mitigation.
It is both hopeful and cautious.
This discussion is rooted first in a consideration of democratic
policing, followed by what is known about community- and problem-
oriented policing and their likely impact on an emerging local-police
terrorism role. Finally, the chapter concludes with a consideration of
the role that COP and POP can play in addressing issues of terrorism
as it plays out at the local level of government.
DEMOCRATIC POLICING AND COMMUNITY

TOLERANCE FOR POLICE INTERVENTION
Democratic policing continually struggles with the tension between

preventing or suppressing crime and maintaining social order.
Perhaps the single issue most confronting democratic policing is how
to transparently connect the means and the ends of law enforcement;
that is, how to focus on procedural as well as substantive justice (Tyler,

2001; Tyler and Huo, 2002).
The history of policing in the United States reflects this tension,
attempting to balance police practice with its social and legal ramifi-
cations. For example, attempts to limit or structure police discretion
are initiated largely from a recognition that such discretion may intro-
duce bias, resulting in a loss of respect for the law and law enforcers.
If the community does not view the police as legitimate, efforts to
prevent crime and social disorder are rendered impotent.
On the one hand, the police as modeled by Sir Robert Peel in
1829 in England – a model transported widely throughout the “New
World” – were first and foremost a preventive agent of social control
(Critchley, 1967). In point of fact, one of the major obstacles policing
had to confront in its early stages was assuring a wary public that the
police were not the surveillance arm of the ruling elite. The hallmark
of policing was and continues to be the prevention of crime, although
such a goal has often proven elusive. Emerging models of policing
have led to several “reforms” of the police, each in some way seeking
to make the police more civically accountable, community sensitive,
and focused on crime prevention.
On the other hand, policing has also been criticized as being a
mechanism for maintaining the status quo, and correspondingly, the
political power of the ruling class (Center for Research on Criminal
Justice, 1975; Chevigney, 1995). Since the late 1980s, policing in
Western societies has continually been seen as strengthening its role
as a repressive agent of social control, as part of a larger process of
class segregation that results in the police focusing their efforts on the
underclass and out-groups.
Most recently, David Garland (2001) suggested that, especially in
the United States, England, and Australia, a “culture of control” has
emerged via government legislators, and is supported by a public
sense of fear of crime and insecurity. Justice system philosophies and
practices have shifted from a progressive and liberally focused crime
control agenda found principally in the first half of the twentieth
century. This agenda emphasized what Garland (2001: 27) calls a
“penal-welfare” structure “combining the liberal legalism of due pro-
cess and proportionate punishment with a correctionalist commitment
to rehabilitation, welfare and criminological expertise”(27). In its

place, over the second half of the twentieth century, justice philoso-
phy and practice have embraced populist sensibilities, have become
considerably more punitive (less proportionate) in orientation, and
have abandoned concepts imbedded in the welfare state. Rather, they
have adopted neo-conservative ideologies emphasizing what Garland
calls “supply-side” criminology (2001: 129). Governments are “shift-
ing risks, redistributing costs, and creating disincentives.” Collectively
such changes have resulted in a broad “get tough” emphasis at all
stages of the justice process.
In the midst of these macro-justice-system changes, policing has
itself been the object of nearly a century of reform. Policing in the
United States and elsewhere has struggled to find its place on the
crime prevention/control continuum, where the choice of place
often sets the tension between organizational performance and insti-
tutional legitimacy in sharp relief. Some have argued that the police
continue to perpetuate an institutional myth of being well organized
to respond to crime in part to maintain institutional legitimacy, even
in the face of dwindling performance and public suspicion (Crank
and Langworthy, 1992).
In some ways, policing in the post–September 11 world, most par-
ticularly at the local level, is being “stretched” in role and functionality,
which in turn has the potential to diminish civic legitimacy. Tensions
between police agencies’ focus on performance-measurement and
the crime-attack model associated with police deployment around hot
spots (Sherman, 1992) and community perceptions of police legiti-
macy and fairness in the application of the law (Tyler and Huo, 2002)
are made all the more complicated in the new world order of inter-
national security and terrorism. The complexity of stretching police
roles to prevent terrorism – in addition to the many other roles that
they perform –across so many jurisdictions with varying degrees of
risk and capacity has proven a complicated matter for local policing
in the United States and elsewhere.
In the last half of the twentieth century, much of the reform
of American policing focused first on making the police more
professional, and then on making them more transparent and com-
munity friendly (Greene, 2000). Reform of the police during this
period included the introduction of stronger administrative organi-

zation (to separate the police from overt political control), the intro-
duction of police and community relations, the “war on drugs,” team
policing, followed by community- and problem-oriented policing, and
finally wrapping up the century with “zero-tolerance” (Greene, 2000).
Given the rapid succession of changes imposed on the police (though
they were certainly able to shake-off many of these efforts) there are
fragments of several of these reforms that affect the tenor of policing
today. Perhaps the two that have received the most attention are com-
munity- and problem-oriented policing, although each of the reforms
mentioned has a literature and ardent adherents – most particularly
those associated with zero tolerance.
Community- and problem-oriented policing have had limited impact
on crime and social order, but large effects on police and community
interactions, fear reduction, and the legitimacy that local communi-
ties extend to their police (National Research Council, 2004). It is in
this arena (community engagement, acceptance of the police, and
fear reduction) that the prospects of COP and POP emerge for local-
police responses to terrorism.
As Manning (2003: 41–43) suggests, a working definition of dem-
ocratic policing includes concern for legal guidance of the police,
who should be individually focused. It should not include involve-
ment in group politics, terrorism, or matters of homeland security for
that matter. He suggests that what the police do, or do not do, affects
their social acceptance and legitimacy, and that such legitimacy “is
a negotiated acceptance of the scope of the occupation’s claims,
[and] not an absolute or unchanging matter”(42). Broadening the
police role to specifically focus on terrorism and related matters
shifts the local-police role in a substantial way, and at the same time,
such a shift has implications for public acceptance of police actions
and intentions (see Manning, 2003, especially chapters 2–3). A gen-
eral idea raised here is that policing designed with a community-
or problem-oriented platform can potentially adjust responses and
routines to new roles such as preventing and responding to public
fear of terrorism, but only within the constraints of a democratic
policing platform.
THE RISE OF COMMUNITY- AND PROBLEM-ORIENTED

POLICING
American policing, unlike its British counterpart, was suspect from

its inception (Miller, 1977). Early attempts to create organized police
forces in the United States were complicated by public concerns
about the police being uncivil, corrupt, and taking on a political
surveillance role (Walker, 1977 and 1980). To be sure, British polic-
ing as originally cast in London, with the formation of the London
Metropolitan Police, also raised concerns with how the police were
to be used politically; but the police of London were soon accepted,
primarily because they were organized, uniformed, seen as linked to
the law, and generally civil (Miller, 1977).
By contrast policing in the United States was particularized, non-
uniform, and uncivil – even violent. So from its onset, U.S. policing
struggled with civic legitimacy. This struggle continues.
Reform of U.S. policing is said to have shifted from political to
administrative and then to community concerns (Reiss, 1992:
51–98). In each of these transformations, U.S. policing was pressed
for greater control and transparency. Initially slipping the grasp of
political machines, policing entered an era of administrative reform
focused on producing an orderly and professional police response.
Such a response was necessary for several reasons. First, policing in
the political era was unpredictable, corrupt, and nonresponsive to
interests other than those of a political nature. Second, policing was
losing legitimacy; consequently, part of the administrative reform
of the police was to at least create the “appearance of control”
(Manning, 1977), assuring those external to police agencies that
they were organized and generally impartial in the administration of
the law and local ordinances. Finally, administrative reform of polic-
ing can also be seen as a process that focused on improving the status
of policing, which embraced an ideology and some of the trappings
of professionalism.
Even before the administrative era of the police took hold in
American law enforcement, there were vocal concerns about the
lack of evenhandedness of the police. These concerns often involve
public reaction to what Brodeur (1983: 513) calls “high policing,”

which is “actually the paradigm for political policing: it reaches out
for potential threats in a systematic attempt to preserve the distribu-
tion of power in a given society.” When the police in the United States
and elsewhere have strayed too far into high-policing activities, they
have been most criticized and their institutional legitimacy has been
thus affected. Nonetheless, Brodeur argues that in Western societies,
high policing is increasingly more an operating model of the police.
Such a model of policing gains currency in times of crisis. Moral panic
(Cohn, 1972) is fertile soil for high policing.
Perhaps the administrative reforms of the police worked too well.
In adopting a control-centered model of organization and a military
sense of professionalism, the police distanced themselves not only
from politicians, but from the public as well. By the mid- to late 1950s,
the police had lost their community context; they were an administra-
tive organization, loosely coupled with politics, but mostly driven by
internal organizational norms (Greene, 2004: 30–54).
One of the first reforms of the police in the 1950s and 1960s was
focused on improving police and community relations (Radelet,
1969). This reform agenda called for a series of conversations between
the police and the public, often emphasizing cultural and racial toler-
ance, community-police partnerships, and adherence to matters of
procedural justice – the lack of which often enflamed police and com-
munity contacts during the era, producing some of the nation’s most
costly and deadly riots (Report of the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders, 1968).
The police and community relations (PCR) era (roughly 1955–75)
sought to sensitize the police to social and ethnic differences in local,
most especially urban communities, and then to design police pro-
grams that included the public in police process. The interventions
associated with the PCR movement focused on racial stereotyping by
the police, and the need to rebuild trust and legitimacy, particularly
in communities of color. This era yielded to new experimentation in
the 1970s that was framed under the idea of “team policing.”
Team policing had several characteristics. Chief among them was
community engagement and the de-specialization of policing, partic-
ularly as it is played out in local communities. Teams of police officers
were to be consistently assigned to geographic areas, thereby increas-

ing police and community contact. It also established geographic
accountability while improving local acceptance of the police, as well
as police knowledge of local mores. Police specialization was incorpo-
rated into the “team” so as to minimize the historic practice of police
specialists, who had little contextual knowledge of local areas, and
who trampled local relations in the name of the specialty. Though
short-lived, team policing set much of the stage for community- and
problem-oriented policing (Sherman et al., 1973; Schwartz and
Clarren, 1977).
Community policing and then problem solving gained popularity
in the late 1980s and into the 1990s. Both COP and POP gained cur-
rency in part because of the consistently negative critique of traditional
approaches to policing. By the late 1980s, there was considerable evi-
dence that traditional patrol practices lacked preventive power, that
follow-up criminal investigations were also limited in impact, and that
the public expected more of the police but was getting less. During
the 1970s and 1980s, there was considerable experimentation in the
use of foot patrols and other community-focused police responses
(Greene, 2000), but most produced mixed or inconclusive results
(National Research Council, 2004). Nonetheless, it was clear that by
the late 1970s the police needed a better model of crime prevention,
civic engagement, and accountability (Goldstein, 1977 and 1990).
Community policing is cast rather broadly, but its core elements
include the reassertion of crime prevention as a central police role,
improved dialogue and interaction between communities and their
police, the activation of communities in crime-prevention activities,
and the creation of partnerships with communities and with other
government and private-sector agencies. At the same time, commu-
nity policing broadened the deliverables of the police to include
public safety improvements, crime prevention, reduction in fear of
crime, and improved community quality-of-life. Community policing
seeks to build community capacity to both resist crime and work with
the police to prevent and mitigate the affects of crime (Mastrofski
et al., 1995).
Partnership has become the watchword for most community-policing
efforts. The approach asserts that the police must partner with the
community and other public and private agencies who serve a local
community and who have some impact on community quality-of-life
issues (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986). Partnerships with schools, civic
and religious organizations, other government agencies, and the pri-
vate sector are seen as necessary for mobilizing public and private
resources and support for crime prevention, as well as building trust,
and hence legitimacy, of the police.
Though it might be argued that partnerships in policing are more
rhetorical than real, there is some evidence that the police have
indeed begun the process of horizontally integrating themselves with
other local social, cultural, and economic institutions (Roth, 2000).
Moreover, it is also possible that those in the community now see the
police as more legitimate in the advent of community- and problem-
oriented policing approaches.
Under the broad umbrella of community policing, paying attention
to community fear and disorder, and preventing it by organizing the
community, speaking with offenders (particularly for minor crimes),
and changing the physical environment within which crime occurs
are interventions that focus on the broader problems and issues asso-
ciated with such behaviors. Moreover, though community policing is
a generalized model of policing, in contrast to problem solving (see
later), it is rooted in notions of community sociology and social psy-
chology, where individuals’ identity and affiliation with a commu-
nity is a precursor to reducing social disorganization and increasing
individual and community social capital.
PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING: AN APPLICATION
Though the police mandate under the community model is broad,

problem-oriented policing is considerably more focused on discrete
crime and social-order problems. Problem-oriented policing empha-
sizes the analytics and interventions of the police. As Eck (1993: 63)
suggests, “under the problem-oriented approach, the problem, not
the criminal law, becomes the defining characteristic of policing.”
Herman Goldstein, the father of problem-oriented policing, in
refocusing police efforts and strategies, suggested that the police
were too means-focused (the traditional model), and not ends- or
outcome-focused, specifically on the impact of their interventions

(Goldstein, 1990). Historically, the police measured effort, such as
the amount of time spent on patrol, the number of calls responded to
and the speed of the response, or the number of criminal investiga-
tions initiated or arrests made. Goldstein (1990) suggested that the
police should focus on outcomes – problems resolved or mitigated.
To be sure, problem-oriented policing has some overlap with com-
munity policing to the extent that the community is often engaged in
problem identification and definition, as well as in discussions about
interventions. In contrast to traditional policing, problem-oriented
policing also makes police decisions and actions more transparent to
both the public and police supervisors.
Problem-oriented policing has important implications for how
the police go about their business, how they organize and supervise
police work, and how police agencies are structured (Greene, 2004).
Additionally, under the norms of problem solving, police organiza-
tions must improve organizational intelligence; that is, their under-
standing of how police interventions work.
ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICING
In recent years U.S. policing has witnessed yet another emerging

style: zero tolerance. Some argue that this style of policing is actual the
result of misinterpreting or misrepresenting community- and problem-
oriented policing (Rosenbaum, Lurigio, and Davis, 1998: 192–194).
Others argue that zero tolerance is the application of community- and
problem-oriented policing to its fullest (Henry, 2001).
The zero-tolerance emphasis got its greatest boost in the early
1990s in New York, as the police there adopted many aggressive street
tactics. As crime in that city and throughout the country declined,
zero tolerance was portrayed as the cause of such declines. Under this
model, the police attack order problems in communities in the hope
that such an approach will dissuade and otherwise deter more serious
criminal behavior.
Zero-tolerance policing has its roots in the suppressive aspects of
policing, and in some ways, it returns the police to their more tra-
ditional law enforcement role. Such an approach to policing has
considerable implication for police and community interactions, and

for the legitimacy the public extends to the police.
For example, in mobilizing communities, one of the central fea-
tures of both community- and problem-oriented policing is public
acceptance of their role in working with the police on matters of
crime prevention. Under the zero-tolerance approach, the demand
for order may result in a deterioration of law, particularly the lawful-
ness of the police.
Events in New York City, Los Angeles, Miami, and New Orleans
involving police assaults on minority group members have cast doubt
on the efficacy of zero tolerance in policing, most particularly the
policing of minority communities. These events have been witnessed
in several American cities, and in most instances they occur through
aggressive police street tactics, not unlike the precipitous events of
the urban riots documented by the Kerner Commission in the 1960s.
Such actions reveal the delicate relationship between the police and
those policed. Moreover, there is evidence that the promise of zero tol-
erance, like the underlying model of “broken windows” on which it is
built, has several theoretical and analytic problems (Harcourt, 2001).
EXTENDING COMMUNITY-, PROBLEM-ORIENTED,

AND ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICING TO
TERRORISM – THE PROBLEMS
Prior to September 11, 2001, local policing in the United States had
little to do with homeland security (then called national security)
or terrorism, although the police have for nearly three quarters of a
century developed criminal and other intelligence1 used to address
organized crime, drug trafficking, and gangs (Greene and Decker,
unpublished). In the interim, the police have continued to respond
to community calls for service, organize communities for crime
1
Here the intelligence functions of the police beginning in the 1920s and continu-
ing intermittently to the present include the collection of information on orga-
nized crime, gangs, drug syndicates and networks, political subversives, and those
exercising political dissent. Though some of these activities are not particularly
well sanctioned by the public, they do represent evidence of the capacity of the
police to collect information and use it for intelligence purposes.
prevention under the rubric of community policing, and solve prob-

lems, mostly crime-related.
In many ways, the police role has been slowly stretched over the
past century, despite the fact that much of what constitutes the bulk of
police activity in the twenty-first century (patrol response and follow-up
criminal investigation) has a distinct root in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Although the police role has indeed been
stretched a bit under community- and problem-oriented policing, the
stretch was not particularly institutionally uncomfortable. This is the
case for two primary reasons.
First, through a major federal initiative to “put 100,000 cops on the
beat,” the U.S. federal government underwrote the large investment
in U.S. policing from about 1992 to 2001. These efforts focused pri-
marily on institutionalizing the precepts of community policing and
problem solving (for a review of federal efforts organized as part of
the COPS program, see Roth, 2000). The viability of these substan-
tial police investments remains an open question relative to impact
and opportunity cost (Roth, 2000; National Research Council, 2004).
Nonetheless, at a time when crime was seen as rising at an alarming
rate (late 1980s and into the early 1990s) such federal investment cer-
tainly helped local-police departments “beef-up” their forces, while
at the same time attempting to assuage public concerns about police
legitimacy.2
One reason supporting the adoption of community- and problem-
oriented policing as preferred modes of police functioning is related
to concerns about police accountability, and ultimately to the insti-
tutional legitimacy that communities give to or withhold from their
police. As previously indicated, much of community policing is focused
on community engagement and the building of trust. As a corollary
to community policing, problem solving focused police discretely on
forms of crime and disorder. To the extent that police have had some
success in problem solving, community support of the police has
2
Ironically, in a post–September 11, 2001, world, much of the federal effort has
been redirected to homeland security, and resources for local-police personnel
have effectively ended – at the very moment when police agencies took on a terror-
ism-prevention role, and when local governments were least able to afford more
police officers. Most of these resources have been redirected to federal initiatives.
generally been forthcoming (for a review of the effectiveness of prob-

lem solving (National Research Council, 2004: 243–246).
Problem solving has also been importantly aided by shared agree-
ment as to the object of police interventions. Much of the problem-
solving literature examines police interventions in crime hot spots or
in drug markets, whereas a smaller number of other projects have
examined problem solving across forms of violence and property
crime (National Research Council, 2004). In each case, the target
crime was generally known and accepted by the community. Such
acceptance is important (as discussed later) because it establishes a
normative sponsorship within which police activity occurs. This is to
say, using a problem-solving approach police typically have a clear
crime target, community awareness of the target and of the selected
police response. This is not to be construed that the community
is immediately supportive of the police; rather, it suggests that the
police generally work under a legitimacy umbrella provided by the
community and that COP and POP have helped expand the reach of
that umbrella (Cordner and Biebel, 2005).
MAPPING COP/POP TO TERRORISM PREVENTION,

CONTROL, AND RESPONSE
In mapping community policing or problem solving from crime to

terrorism responses, several issues must be confronted. First, how
have these approaches worked with crime, fear, and community con-
sensus building? Second, have these approaches produced informa-
tion that would inform terrorism prevention, and at what cost (social
or other)? That is to say, can the analytic routines and information
sets that inform COP/POP be extended to terrorism, and with what
likely outcome? Third, do the strategies and tactics of community
policing and problem solving lend themselves to addressing issues of
terrorism? Simply put, can COP and POP activities be employed on
the new terrorism front? Fourth, can the partnerships and alliances
now associated with both community policing and problem solving
be broadened to include terrorism? And fifth, does the extension
of community policing and problem solving to terrorism affect the
institutional legitimacy of the police – most especially how the public
perceives police behavior and practice?
CAN COP/POP BE MADE TO WORK FOR TERRORISM?
Community policing and problem solving have been associated with

policing for nearly twenty years. Each in its own right was hailed as the
“new paradigm” for policing, connecting the police and the public
and effectively addressing crime and social-order problems. Through
these strategies, the police were to be accountable – transparent in
their interactions with the public and effective in addressing public
safety, crime, fear of crime, and community quality-of-life. So what of
the evidence?
It is not particularly clear that community policing and problem
solving have been thoroughly implemented, except in a few agencies,
or that they have fully worked. That is to say, both evidence of the
implementation and effectiveness of these approaches are mixed. For
example, Roth and his colleagues (2004: 24–25) report that imple-
mentation evidence from the field suggests mixed and sometimes
conflicting implementation patterns. They suggest that
At least at the level of announced agency policy, reported use of com-

munity policing tactics proliferated between 1995 and 2000 . . . With
respect to problem solving, more agencies began reporting that they
were using elements of Goldstein’s paradigm . . . Yet on site, prob-
lem solving turned out to have an astonishing variety of meanings . . .
There is ample evidence that the police field has accepted the viabil-
ity of partnership-based problem solving and prevention strategies
as relevant and useful to their mission of crime fighting . . . Involving
other agencies in specific aspects of problem solving has not been
a difficult leap for police departments to make. Establishing com-
munity partnerships, however, is more difficult, as they must involve
some level of power sharing with the community.
A close reading of Roth (2004 and 2000) and his colleagues in

this and an earlier report on the National Evaluation of the COPS
Program suggests that the institutional shift from crime suppression
to prevention expected in the advent of community policing has not
fully materialized. Roth and his colleagues did find greater police
acceptance of partnerships (public and private), and greater police
inclusion of others relevant to crime-prevention activities. Finally, the
National Research Council (2004: 232–235), in what is the most thor-
ough review of police research to date, concluded that the effects of
community policing are also mixed, owing in part to the wide array
of programs and interventions that fall under the COP umbrella, and
the rather weak research designs to evaluate these programs.
Though the crime and social-disorganization findings relative to
the impact of community policing are mixed, there is broader sup-
port for a COP effect on community fear of crime. As the National
Research Council reports:
There is also evidence that community policing lowers the com-

munity’s level of fear when programs are focused on increasing
community-police interaction. Community policing strategies are
expected to influence fear of crime by making the police an easily
accessible and more visible presence, or reducing the sense of physi-
cal, social and psychological distance between ordinary citizens and
police officers, or both … studies show that policing strategies char-
acterized by more direct involvement of police and citizens, such as
citizen contract patrol, police community stations, and coordinated
community policing, often have the predicted negative effect on fear
of crime among individuals and on individual level of concern about
crime in the neighborhood. (2004: 234–235)
With respect to problem solving, the evidence is also mixed. In a

review of why problems don’t get solved, Eck (2004: 185–206) sug-
gested that several issues contribute to problem solving’s mediocrity.
They include: (1) The analytic skills required for problem solving do
not presently exist; nor are they necessarily part of police professional
development; (2) police managers are not particularly facile with prob-
lem solving; nor can they effectively discriminate between quality and
superficial problem-solving efforts; (3) little is actually known about
what works; (4) police problem solving often skips over the analytic
processes associated with this approach, often going right to solutions
and interventions, and not approaching problems in a systematic
manner; and (5) problem solving is made more difficult because we
do not know much about the problems to be solved (2004: 190–193).
Eck’s assessment has been reinforced by other assessments of problem
solving, including those of Clarke (1998), Read and Tilley (2000),
and Cordner and Biebel (2005).
Although there are many reasons for the fledging and often fragile
nature of community- and problem-oriented policing, what is clear
from the COP and POP literature is that the police are more engaged
with their communities than ever before, that this engagement is rela-
tively well accepted by the community, and that community concern
and fear of crime are potentially ameliorated by police strategies that
insist on community-police involvement. In point of fact, it may be
this platform (community engagement) that policing terrorism most
vitally needs – one focused on fear management, response, and miti-
gation, rather than prevention. Interestingly, in the “war on terrorism”
in Iraq, the military broadened its strategies from the “attack” mode
to include a “nation- or community-building” mode, reflecting its
understanding that long-term success in dealing with terrorism is as
much tied to reducing community fear, establishing community ties,
and engagement, and otherwise linking more directly to the commu-
nity in matters of social control (Fukuyama, 2006). Other nonmilitary
U.S. agencies have also expanded their nation- or community-building
roles as well. USAID, for example, implemented an Iraqi Community
Based Conflict Mitigation Program that reflects many of the precepts
of community policing.3
ARE COP/POP INFORMATION AND ANALYTICS

USEFUL TO UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM?
Policing in one form or another has always been about collecting

and processing information about crime and social disorder. Initially,
information about crime was collected about victims and offend-
ers, but today information is also collected spatially and temporally,
aggregating individual victim and offender data (for a critique, see
Garland, 2001). So the question might be asked: Can the local police
reasonably collect information on terrorism as they do on crime
through such processes as watch-and-warrant systems?
In today’s new security-conscious world, the slogan “all crime is not
terrorism, but all terrorism is criminal” reflects the general idea that
the information collected by the police might be simply applied to the
3
This program emphasizes community conflict assessment and peace building, the
implementation of an Iraqi Peace Foundation engaging academic and civic lead-
ers, and a series of youth peace-building initiatives carried out through the cre-
ation and facilitation of youth groups (see www.usaid.gov/iraqi).
issues of terrorism. How this is to occur is presently unresolved, and

it may not lend itself to easy resolution. Whether police information
about crime and other social conditions can be turned into intelli-
gence to be used in homeland security is not yet established, although
some argue that the processes for such a conversion are within the
grasp of the police (Carter, 2004).
This is true largely because the ability of the police to understand
problem sets is not well grounded. In practice, problem solving
often proceeds from the surfacing of some aggregate-level patterns.
These patterns are then pursued, but typically with traditional police
responses, like saturation patrol, sweeps, crackdowns, and targeted
investigations. In some respects, crime or social disorder is revealed
to the police by street-level behaviors that are witnessed by the police
themselves, or by individual complaints about negative behavior or
crime (Wilson, 1968; Black, 1980), for which there is some shared
agreement. Either the police directly observe a behavior, or the com-
munity mobilizes the police by calling for assistance. This is as true
today as it has been for nearly a century. So whether the community
or the police can discern the precursors to terrorism from the infor-
mation they collect on crime and social disorganization is yet known.
The problems here relate to the volume of information the police
collect, and its ability to actually be a predictor of future terrorism.
Looking for terrorism in traditional police information systems
might be likened to drinking from a fire hose; you will get some water,
but you are also going to get very, very wet. Even with advanced data-
mining techniques, scaling down police information to the subset
that might be more useful than others is a difficult task, and not yet
conceptualized or validated. Furthermore, although police informa-
tion systems have become more sophisticated over the past several
years, aiding in the detection and arrest of Timothy McVeigh through
a license plate, for example, they require much care and nurturing.
How the police will integrate data from several sources to address ter-
rorism is yet an unresolved question (see Brodeur, this volume).
The question of the prediction of terrorism also is quite problem-
atic. Information will be necessary to better understand if police
call-for-service and crime data have any predictive capacity for
terrorism prediction, except in some post hoc way. Perhaps these two
information sets overlap, and perhaps they do not. What is clear is

that the police collect much information, only a small portion of
which they actually use, and the information collected is generally
collected in the same way it has been for one hundred plus years,
although it is now automated. Just as important, retrospective analyses
that suggest that the police had contact with a terrorist because of a
speeding ticket, requires a leap of inference that such information
(ticket) is therefore a predictor of terrorism. Searching for known ter-
rorists among all who receive traffic tickets is probably not very useful.
Understanding the connection between types of behavior and police
information sources might be more revealing, however. Linking risk
to these information sets could also benefit police understanding of
behaviors in areas where risk is higher. Such a shift in analytic focus
might benefit local police if they are to have a role in anticipating ter-
rorism events.
Most recently, a set of analytics called COMPSTAT, pioneered in
New York City and touted as a major vehicle for reducing crime and
ensuring police accountability (Silverman, 1999; Henry, 2002), has
captured the imagination of American policing. As a generalized
process and set of analytics, COMPSTAT patterns crime spatially and
temporally, presenting the results of such analysis to police manag-
ers with the question “What are you going to do about this pattern?”
In addressing the COMPSTAT patterns presented, police command-
ers are seen as being more accountable as they pursue strategies
and tactics focused on the patterns. Though over the years some of
this analysis has indeed become more sophisticated (perhaps even
approaching some form of network analysis, see below), the underly-
ing model described earlier still captures much of what is now called
crime analysis or crime mapping.
On the surface this looks very analytic, and indeed a science of
spatial and temporal crime analysis has emerged in criminology
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984 and 1991), although not much
of this scientific development directly informs police crime analysis.
Nonetheless, the patterns and analyses presented via COMPSTAT and
its progeny simply aggregate crime and social-order problems, and
then map them according to the geographic areas of the police (typi-
cally beats, sectors, precincts, and the like). The resulting “hot spots”
are then addressed through police tactics of one form or another.

These analytic techniques actually compress time and space in inter-
esting, yet potentially problematic ways. Moreover, the data used for
such analyses are the same inputs that the police have always used: calls
for service and reported and observed crime and disorder.
More sophisticated analyses now take into consideration socio-
demographic and land-use data, but in their aggregation it is not clear
how these data can inform police strategies and tactics. Though such
analyses have gained considerable importance in describing among
other things community social disorganization (Sampson, 1989),
it is not clear that police strategies for crime control can or should
operate directly on aggregate social information. Such social data
can, however, create a context for sensitizing the police to local social
and economic conditions; but they do not in and of themselves pro-
vide clear direction for police action in individual cases. Nonetheless,
such analyses as applied to understanding community dynamics, and
hence new forms of crime, might prove useful in better understanding
terrorism and community fears of terrorism.
It is also important to recognize that the crime-analytic approaches
of the police are largely ex post facto explanations of crime and social
disorder. They rely on historical data, and it is presently unclear if such
analyses can predict crime events. Rather, they may predict areas in a
community where the likely probability of crime occurring is great-
est. Although these analyses do help inform the deployment of police
resources on a broad scale, they almost always do so in reaction to an
emerging problem, rather than as a method of preventing the problem
in the first place. Moreover, much of this analysis is univariate or bivari-
ate – in a criminological world defined by multivariate problems.
Perhaps the largest concern relative to mapping current police
analytic techniques from crime to terrorism is what we know about
the analytic and conceptual differences between the two (e.g., Krebs,
2001). Most important among these, according to Sparrow (1991), is
the general absence of forms of analytic thinking that might be use-
ful in examining terrorism, most notably, applied network analysis.
Sparrow (1991: 272) suggests:
Existing concepts from the discipline of network analysis have been
shown to be relevant to the analysis of criminal intelligence … The
law enforcement community, being largely unaware of the methods

and concepts developed within the discipline of network analysis,
has not yet had the opportunity to enunciate its needs for more
sophisticated tools.
Moreover, analyses of criminal and terrorist networks suggest substan-

tial differences in their patterning and structure. These studies have
implications for how the police operating under community policing
or problem solving might approach terrorism. For example, research
by Krebs (2001) among others suggests that terrorist networks, such
as those involved in the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United
States, are characterized by a dense under-layer of long-standing
trusted relationships that is effective in isolating those in the network
from externals. Such networks are “serpent in structure” – sparse
and elongated, distancing individual actors in the network from one
another, thereby gaining a greater degree of invisibility and secrecy. As
Krebs (2001: 39) indicates, “A strategy for keeping cell members dis-
tant from each other, and from other cells, minimizes damage to the
network if a cell member is captured or otherwise compromised.”
This structure is not often demonstrated in drug markets, where
needing the resources from drug sales (profit) makes the network
more visible to buyers and to the police, and where linkages among
dealers and suppliers are many (Morselli, 2005). Such networks,
though exhibiting many of the characteristics of covert social sys-
tems, make different tradeoffs between secrecy and stealth and
moving the product (drugs). Terrorist networks balance the need
for secrecy and stealth and goal attainment (Baker and Faulkner,
1993). Terrorist goals can be longer term, revealing less about the
network until such time as it acts. Simply applying notions about
drug networks to terrorism, for example, will not comport with what
we know about terrorist networks (Morselli, 2005). And using tra-
ditional crime-analytic techniques has the potential to ignore more
sophisticated network-analytic techniques thought more useful to
addressing terrorism. Clearly, the “all hazards” approach to crimi-
nal intelligence gathering and analysis advocated by some (Carter,
2004) is not likely to collect the appropriate terrorism-related infor-
mation, nor pattern it using applied network-analytic or other more
sophisticated approaches.
CAN COP/POP STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

INFORM TERRORISM RESPONSES?
In practice, it may be difficult to implement COP/POP strategies

that can effectively address terrorism, at least from the perspective of
prevention. What can be said of police tactics that surround community
policing is that general tactics like foot patrol, storefront offices, and
advisory committees may have some salutatory effects on community
perceptions of the police and on the reduction of fear of crime, but
how they are to be integrated into a “terrorism prevention system”
remains unknown. As will be discussed later, however, such community
investments can go a long way in building police responses to terrorism
and to the mitigation of the effects of terrorist acts, including fear.
To the extent that such approaches have increased the dialogue
between the community and the police while increasing information
sharing about local crime and disorder problems, then the extension
of community policing to terrorism might be characterized as increas-
ing information about something (terrorism) that the public may
perceive as alarming, but not in a criminal way. Such an interpretation
of police-citizen interaction brings to mind Bittner’s definition of
policing (1974: 17–44, and reported in Klockars, 1985: 16–17) as
“something-ought-not-to-be-happening-about-which-something-
ought-to-be-done – Now!” This represents a generalized citizen dis-
satisfaction with some aspect of communal life that is perceived to
warrant police intervention. Furthermore, though the general citi-
zenry can reasonably identify issues of social disorder and crime, it
is not clear that any consensus exists about what constitutes potential
terrorism, except perhaps in the most stereotypical ways.
Training the public on ways to identify potential terrorism, again
with exception for the most obvious activities (someone making a
bomb in plain view), will not be easy. Nor will it be easy for the police
to respond to wide variation in public attitudes toward out-groups,
immigrants, and others not like “us.” Moreover, even when the public
has reported activities they want addressed in their neighborhoods, it
is not clear that the police can respond. A summary of much police
research is that the community is often focused on questions of social
order, whereas the police are focused on crime. Such gaps in public
and police orientation in public safety are likely to be exacerbated

when considering definitions and signs of terrorism.
Tactics employed in problem solving have been critiqued as largely
involving traditional police responses to crime and social disorder –
saturation patrol, crackdowns, targeted investigations, and the like.
How such interventions are to be linked to terrorism prevention, raises
an important question illuminated by Eck (2004): “What is the prob-
lem and what are its dynamics and dimensions?” Generally speaking,
local policing has little familiarity with such questions. But what is also
clear is that when the police have ventured into intelligence gathering,
they have taken on a risk that has historically led to the loss of institu-
tional legitimacy.
CAN PARTNERSHIPS BE EXTENDED TO

TERRORISM PREVENTION?
In both community policing and problem solving, the idea of partner-

ship is emphasized. Simply speaking, community policing emphasizes
partnerships and interactions, especially with social and business com-
munities (typically those at the street level), whereas problem solving,
perhaps, stresses more complex partnerships between police, other
government agencies, and the private sector. As discussed earlier, the
police have often succeeded in creating limited partnerships with
business, mostly those focused on a particular crime, but have had
less success consistently engaging social communities.
Aggressive partnership initiation, development, and maintenance
are perhaps the most important contributions that COP and POP
bring to the question of addressing local responsibilities for terror-
ism. Revealing terrorism networks and intentions, as briefly alluded to
earlier, will require a collective focus and the sharing of information
about what terrorism is, how to identify it, and what to do with this
information once acquired. Moreover, it is in the area of partnership
development that the police have succeeded most, and hence there
exists a potential for mobilizing partnerships for crime prevention to
include terrorism prevention as well.
Police success in establishing partnerships is most related to the
response role of the police, rather than the prevention role, however.
That is to say, local policing (state, county, and municipal or town) has
for a number of reasons been less successful with primary interven-
tions, mostly those associated with prevention. In fact, policing in the
United States and elsewhere, though espousing a prevention rhetoric,
has in reality been most focused on rapid responses (a secondary inter-
vention) and the mitigation of harm (a tertiary intervention). This is
the case largely because local policing in the United States and else-
where was first organized as a “watch and ward” reactive system that
has been consistently criticized when local police took on too vigor-
ously a criminal intelligence role (Greene and Decker, unpublished).
Nonetheless, much of the success attributed to community policing
and problem solving can be associated with building relationships with
external others (for a model of police interventions and discussion of
the roles that the police can effectively play in addressing terrorism,
see Figure 10.1).
Partnerships remain complicated for the police, particularly in light
of their emerging homeland security and terrorism-response roles.
This results from the position local police find themselves relative to
usable information about potential terrorist acts, and the range of
actions that the local police can take in these processes. Let’s briefly
consider three issues concerning partnerships and their impact on
policing for terrorism: directionality, horizontal and vertical integra-
tion, and concerns with privacy and secrecy.
In many of the relationships the police have developed, the direc-
tion of interactions is from the police to the focal partner, whether that
partner be a community group, other government agency, or private-
sector interest. This has largely resulted in unidirectional relationships
and communications that are often characterized by asymmetric
communication and power. In respect to community groups, the
police have all but directed the activities of these groups, shaped the
community agenda, and often controlled access to information and
decision making within police circles. At the local level, this is also
the case for police relationships with other local government agencies
and with the private sector.
The historical reason for such asymmetry in the relationships
between the police and external others is that the police have, gener-
ally speaking, been unwilling or unable to share power. As information
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Prevention Emergency Mitigation

response
High Intrusiveness Low
Low Legitimacy High
COP/POP Roles
Community awareness Emergency response Community reassurance
Fear reduction Coordination of Order maintenance
Information gathering Resources, evacuation
routes, quarantine, etc.
Building partnerships
Figure 10.1. Community- and problem-oriented interventions for terrorism.
and decision making are instruments of exercising power, the police

have historically controlled and limited access to both. Even through-
out the 1980s and 1990s, when the idea of task forces crosscutting
government, community leadership, and business were proffered,
the tone and tenor of such relationships was often police-centric, and
research on these task forces was quite limited (Hayslip and Russell-
Einhorn, 2003). Thus, the level of interaction and information shar-
ing capable at the local level of government from the perspective of
policing continues to be shaped by the police control of these relation-
ships, and often by the struggle that external others have in working
with the police. In developing an intelligence-led model for policing,
Carter (2004) reinforces the need for the police to build intelligence
networks that are more inclusive and share information more broadly.
But even if such partnerships are indeed created, much of the infor-
mation that the police collect is not well thought out, documented,
or systematically connected. Manning (2003: 148–150) suggests that
even when technology is introduced to speed up and systematize

police information, often the initial information is problematic, lack-
ing or not particularly capable of such organization.
Despite the preceding commentary, it should be stated that police
horizontal integration into local communities, local government struc-
tures, and with the private sector is better off today, given the emphases
on COP and POP for such partnerships. Such horizontal integration
has resulted in the police being better linked with other sectors of
local government, the private sector, and community agencies, each of
which has an interest and capacity for preventing crime. This founda-
tion might become a platform for a limited local-police role in terror-
ism prevention, but perhaps a larger role in terrorism responses and
mitigation efforts. It is also a platform for fear reduction (see Forst,
this volume).
Unfortunately, the vertical integration of the police across local
jurisdictions and with superordinate jurisdictions (e.g., with the fed-
eral government) remains problematic, even with the emphasis given
to homeland security. At a tactical level, local policing has increased
its interaction with federal law enforcement and prosecution services
through what are known as Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). Local-
police interactions within a JTTF framework have produced mixed
results – some positive and some less positive.
Most police interactions in task forces have confronted several
communications and information-sharing barriers common in law
enforcement settings. They include: (1) different orientations about
crime, safety, and terrorism as one moves from the federal to the
local level of government; (2) different organizational jargon and
cultures; (3) the general absence of a sharing ethic among both fed-
eral and local agencies; and (4) a concern with the security of infor-
mation and hence limitations on sharing information with unknown
others – including police sharing this information with one another
(e.g., federal agencies v. local agencies) (Hayslip and Russell-Einhorn,
2003). Interagency collaboration among police agencies in the
United States and elsewhere is complicated by matters of jurisdiction
(enforcement of federal v. state or local law); the maintenance of
secret information and a general unwillingness to share information
(either through matters of government clearance levels for informa-
tion access, or through the keeping of information as power); and
conflicting organizational cultures and missions. Such barriers are

readily observable in police task-force operations, having yet to be
seriously resolved (see Brodeur, this volume). Moreover, historic con-
flict between federal and local law enforcement agencies, often based
on agency jealousy and rivalry, continue to haunt the development of
effective vertical linkages among locals and external others. Building
effective terrorism information sharing and intelligence networks will
require attention to establishing and sustaining horizontal and verti-
cal relationships, and reducing what are known barriers to each (see
Brodeur, and Maguire and King, this volume).
Perhaps one of the largest barriers to building effective networks for
collecting and sharing information on terrorism are those involving
concern for privacy and secrecy. Each of these ideas raises and coun-
ters claim to the legitimacy of the other in that advocates for privacy
seek to, among other things, reduce secrecy in government, whereas
those advocating for the need to increase secrecy under the umbrella
of homeland security inevitably must confront matters of privacy.
Responses to the events that unfolded on September 11, 2001,
have included “[t]he devotion of new resources and authority to law
enforcement entities, the further militarization of the police … and
the rapid incorporation of crime detection technology” (Brandl, 2003:
133). These changes in policing have resulted in the police being more
able to capture and process information about individuals, groups,
and places – hence, more intrusive. Such capacities raise concerns with
constitutional protections and individuals’ sense of a right to privacy.
Building effective partnerships for terrorism prevention, response, and
mitigation will have to squarely address issues of privacy and secrecy; to
do so only within the police community invites continued criticism of
the police, leading to broader concerns about institutional legitimacy.
WHAT ABOUT INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY?
From its initial formation, the U.S. police have continuously struggled
with issues of legitimacy – first in their initial formation, and subse-
quently for how much their activities intrude into the private lives
of citizens (Donner, 1990; Theoharis, 1990; Klinger and Grossman,
2002; Giroux, 2004; Greene and Decker, unpublished). To the
extent that local policing deviates from its public-place safety mission,
concern for police spying and the broader surveillance of public space
gives rise to questions of police institutional legitimacy. In the new era
of homeland security, intelligence gathering and the general cloak of
secrecy that wraps around these matters create the possibility for the
processes of the police and other government actors to become less
visible and, consequently, more subject to public concern.
Community policing especially seeks to improve police transpar-
ency in decisions and actions, thus helping to improve public accep-
tance of the police and their institutional legitimacy. Processes to
engage and include the community (Greene, 2000), a hallmark of
community policing, will be threatened to the extent that homeland
security matters move the police away from such civic transparency.
Balancing the need for information collection and assessment with
the legitimate concerns of the community that certain individuals or
groups will not be targeted as terrorists is a challenge if COP and
POP are to become a platform for preventing terrorism, particularly
as exercised by the local police. Recent immigrants to local communi-
ties will especially need assurance that they are not the focus of police
intelligence-gathering and terrorism interventions.
Moreover, how the community is to be engaged in terrorism preven-
tion is not particularly clear. Historically, the police viewed the public
as passive “eyes and ears” to observe and report suspected crime (or
criminal behavior) and then to wait for a police response. In many
respects, the same role is ascribed to the public in their engagement
in homeland security. The difference, however, is that whereas “sus-
pected crime” may be a somewhat vague term to the public, “suspected
terrorism” is even more elusive.
Beyond obvious situations where someone is overheard discussing
or directly seen in an act that involves a crime or act of terrorism,
expecting the public to discern terrorist activities may be wishful
thinking. Instead, cultural and other stereotypes will likely underpin
public reporting of suspected terrorism, further complicating the
police response to immigrant or culturally sensitive communities.
Given current assessments of terrorism networks, it is not clear that
terrorism will actually reveal itself to community residents in ways that
are observable, and hence capable of being amplified.
Perhaps most important is the maintenance of a police posture that
supports constitutional provisions and lawfulness. The moral panic
(Cohn, 1972) that is associated with events like terrorism can exac-
erbate relationships between social groups. Since 9/11, persons of
Arabic heritage have felt that they are subject to greater police intru-
siveness, singularly because of their customs and/or language. Local-
police legitimacy often rests on such perceptions. Police adherence to
constitutional protections – not engaging in racial or religious stereo-
typing – is a central concern in such communities. Local-police pro-
tection of perceived out-groups and their constitutional liberties will
become an important tool in maintaining community engagement,
particularly in marginalized communities.
Taken together, it does not appear that stretching COP or POP con-
cepts or tactics to terrorism is likely a smooth transition, most especially
when the focus is on intelligence gathering. If specific terrorism prob-
lems could be identified, then local police might engage in problem
solving, but given Eck’s (2004) critique, it is more likely the case that
(1) terrorism problems may be more difficult for the police to specify
and understand; ( 2) scanning for terrorism will be equally problem-
atic, given its secrecy and low-visibility prior to terrorist events; and (3)
the application of traditional police responses to terrorism is unlikely
to fully address these situations, except in the way that the police are
prepared for emergency response to catastrophic incidents.
THE PROSPECTS FOR COP AND POP AS

TERRORISM RESPONSES
This critique of the role of COP and POP as responses to terrorism,

most especially among local police, has been dimly cast. This is largely
the case because the evidence on the effectiveness of COP and POP
is indeed mixed. Although there remain a number of issues that con-
front terrorism responses at the local level, COP and POP do hold
some promise for local-police strategies for terrorism. They do so in
ways that deemphasize intelligence gathering and emphasize police
responses to and mitigation of terrorism events, including fear. What
follows is a bit of conjecture, but is consistent with the precepts and
limited evidence about the effects of COP and POP.
In Figure 10.1, a model of terrorism response for local police is
explored. The model has been used in the medical community to
separate out the differences between primary, secondary, and tertiary
interventions. The model is time-bound such that Time 1 represents

opportunities for prevention, Time 2, opportunities for response,
and Time 3, opportunities for mitigation. Seen in the context of cur-
rent or proscribed police responses to terrorism, Time 1 represents
activities associated with gathering intelligence to prevent or interdict
terrorism, Time 2 represents emergency responses to terrorism events,
and Time 3 represents efforts to mitigate the effects of terrorism or in
some sense to recover.
As shown in Figure 10.1, police actions often reflect tensions
between police intrusiveness and the legitimacy the police receive
from their publics. In a general sense, as the police move toward more
intrusiveness, the less legitimacy they might be accorded. This model
comports reasonably well with the history of American police over the
twentieth century.
Community- and problem-oriented policing schemes do offer some
important insights into how local policing can minimize its intrusive-
ness and maximize its legitimacy when dealing with matters of ter-
rorism. On the front end, those involving primary interventions,
COP and POP provide several avenues for local police. They include
increasing community awareness, reducing fear, gathering informa-
tion, and protecting out-groups.
Each of these activities, though intrusive, borrows from the commu-
nity contexts the police have learned, the local partnerships they have
built, and the legitimacy they have been accorded by their local com-
munities (residential and business). Moreover, such approaches fit
well with prior police actions in dealing with family and spousal abuse
and community crime prevention, among others. They can actively
involve the community in ways that dispel the idea of police spying,
while responsibly engaging the community in the general observation
of community conditions warranting police attention.
Developing community awareness, akin to crime-prevention efforts,
can (1) produce useful community information including the con-
texts for that information, and (2) reduce unwarranted fear and ste-
reotyping of out-groups. These actions do not approach intelligence
gathering in the same way, but do provide a useful vehicle for local
police to send information into agencies that organize or process
information for intelligence. At the same time, social and cultural
knowledge of the communities they police can be important in assur-

ing that constitutional protections are fully exercised, thereby moving
the local police to a less intrusive and perhaps more socially support-
ive role in preventing terrorism.
Given the ways in which we understand terrorism networks,
such information will almost always be beyond the reach of a sin-
gle jurisdiction. States and the federal government have a broader
intelligence-gathering and analysis role, and though the local police
are indeed loosely connected to these functions, they do not repre-
sent a corollary for an intelligence-gathering function at the local
level, except perhaps in the largest cities and most densely populated
regions. Rather, terrorism analysis is a matter of aggregation, beyond
single jurisdictions, requiring a strong role for states, regions, and the
federal government.
In fact, the history of the police has witnessed many problems when
intelligence gathering was a local-police role. This does not mean
that local police abrogate their responsibilities for protecting life
and property. It does mean that the local police cannot go this alone;
rather, they need to be part of a larger process, but not the central
driving component.
The partnerships that local policing has developed over many years
form an important foundation for planning and implementing emer-
gency responses to terrorism and other alert systems. Coordinated
first-responder systems, the protection of critical infrastructure, and
public/private responses to terrorism afford the local police a rather
natural leadership role in secondary responses to terrorism. Much like
the police response to crime, secondary responses are important for
saving lives, minimizing damage, and investigating terrorism events.
They build on accepted police roles and improved police practices
that have accumulated over many years.
Finally, the COP and POP experiences of the local police suggest
that they have a very broad role in post-emergency responses, includ-
ing such functions as reassuring the community after a trauma, pro-
viding order in time of major disruptions, and implementing a form
of democratic policing that assures for an orderly and lawful return
to civic processes that might be disrupted by terrorism. Mitigating the
effects of terrorism comports well with problem-oriented policing to
the extent that the lessons learned and analyzed can provide useful
information for future strategies and programs aimed at prevention.
The roles that COP and POP might suggest for local policing are
yet emerging, but they have import for balancing the response to
such events while at the same time keeping an established trust of the
police – something central to democratic policing. As police informa-
tion, analytics, and technical systems continue to improve, the local
police may have a broader role in the prevention of terrorism. And cer-
tainly local-police actions that result from intelligence provided by both
the public and private sectors to disrupt terrorism planning or execu-
tion are indeed positive. Having said this, it must be remembered that
local policing is constrained by many factors including jurisdiction, fis-
cal resources, analytic capacity, and public acceptance, among others.
Such constraints do not preclude a local-police role in terrorism
response; rather, they condition the range of effective responses that
can be implemented. Building on the limited successes of COP and
POP can nevertheless provide a foundation for local-police participa-
tion in terrorism responses.
CONCLUSION
In a post–September 11, 2001, era, the police have entered Huxley’s

Brave New World, often a world of shadows and intelligence gath-
ering, a world characterized by low-visibility planning and activity
among terrorists, by risk and uncertainty (Beck, 1992), and by a pub-
lic wariness – wariness of terrorism and of how the local police might
handle this new homeland security role.
The characteristics of this new world places public law enforcement,
particularly local policing, in an institutionally stressful role. On the
one hand, as the first responders to crime or terrorism, local police
are likely hard pressed to “do something,” as they are institutionally
positioned to feel the first consequences of a terrorist incident.
Furthermore, though risk is surely not evenly distributed, the pub-
lic is rather risk averse, and there is a heightened public insecurity
and fear of the new world order. It is clear that the local police face an
important institutional dilemma. If they are too vigilant in detecting
and preventing terrorism, they risk public criticism for overstepping
their bounds and for trampling on constitutional rights. As Manning

observes, the local-police assumption of a role in terrorism may actu-
ally diminish the idea of democratic policing (2003, Chapters 1–2),
thereby weakening their institutional legitimacy and escalating public
concerns with the overreach of police actions.
It may be that as the police move from their role of prevention to
response and mitigation, they move from uncharted to more charted
waters. The public accepts the police response to incidents and their
investigation in a post-incident time frame. The public also generally
accepts the police in a mitigation role, which seeks to minimize harm
through target hardening, tighter security in public places, and other
intrusions that might be warranted under the circumstances. It is not
clear however, whether the public expects that the police will gather
and act on intelligence gathered locally through public informants.
It is equally unclear that terrorism prevention should be a general-
ized response among local police. Local policing has been organized
around responders and investigators, with more of the former and
fewer of the latter. How the police are to blend community- and prob-
lem-oriented approaches to policing (both generalist approaches)
with terrorism approaches (currently a specialist approach) is not
clear, but it warrants further exploration.
What is clear is that superordinate agencies in states and in the
federal government have the resources, charter, and missions to
address international and now domestic terrorism. Clarifying their
role in working with local police agencies is a major undertaking, and
one not well specified (Carter, 2004). Terrorism prevention, though
local in impact, is likely understood in extra-local places. Addressing
terrorism in primary ways through COP or POP is not likely an effec-
tive approach, despite much rhetoric suggesting otherwise. This is
because COP and POP remain rather fluid, affording much latitude
in interpretation. Nonetheless, COP and POP have created stronger
social linkages between the police and social and business communi-
ties at the local level of government. This is an important foundation
upon which to build a revitalized role for local policing in terrorism.
By adopting a COP and POP approach to addressing issues of terror-
ism, local police build on several historic and well-accepted commu-
nity- and problem-solving roles. From the perspective of prevention,
local police can build partnerships, harden targets, share informa-

tion, and reduce community fear of terrorism and the moral panic
that has accompanied these events. At the same time, police can pro-
tect constitutional liberties for Muslims and other out-groups, thereby
reducing social conflicts that may be associated with fear of terrorism
from majority groups.
From the perspective of responding to terrorism, local police can
improve their first-response strategies and capabilities, coordinate
response approaches and technologies with other responding agen-
cies, and link public and private responses to terrorism. They can also
keep lines of communication open with the public and other audi-
ences to dampen likely panics associated with terrorist events, which
also helps maintain transparency and trust. Such a coordinative role
builds on the horizontal improvements the police have experienced
through COP and POP over the past twenty years or so.
Regarding local police tertiary responses – those associated with
mitigation and recovery – police can invest in reassurance polic-
ing, protect constitutional processes that may have been damaged
in the aftermath of terrorism, and quickly and effectively reestablish
order in what will likely be a disorderly and stressful time. Such a
recovery role for the police will also likely increase their institutional
legitimacy.
COP and POP represent important applications for the stretch
of local policing into the homeland security and terrorism-response
arena. They do so, however, by building on police legitimacy and
principles of democratic policing, extending gains made in commu-
nity acceptance, and expanding the ability of the police to work with
others to solve problems.
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chapter eleven
Go Analyze!
(Connecting the Dots)
Jean-Paul Brodeur
Government security intelligence services have been the subject of

numerous studies both before and since the attacks of September 11,
2001 (hereafter, “9/11”). These studies, generally undertaken by
official government commissions or committees, were begun in
the mid-1970s and early 1980s, following disclosures of abuses of
citizens’ rights by the FBI and CIA in the United States, and by the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS) in Canada (for disclosures, see for instance
Hersch). Triggered by allegations of abuse, the studies tended to take
a legal-normative approach toward the review of intelligence services.
Two prominent U.S. congressional reports came forth in 1976: that
of the Senator Church inquiry (United States, 1976) and that of the
Congressman Pike inquiry, leaked to the The Village Voice. In Canada
since the late 1970s, one commission of inquiry reported on the RCMP
Security Service – the McDonald Commission (Canada, 1981a, b)
and two others, the Keable Commission (Québec, 1981) – and since
the creation in 1985 of the Security Intelligence Review Committee
(SIRC), which oversees the operations of CSIS, Canadian focused on
the conformity of intelligence operations to Canadian law, includ-
ing the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Such legal normativeness is
reflected also in books focusing on CSIS (Cléroux; Mitrovica).
By contrast, there are few U.S. or Canadian studies on the effective-
ness of security intelligence and police services in the prevention of
terrorism. To study this issue one must refer to the reports published
in the United States following the numerous inquiries into the failure
of the U.S. intelligence services to prevent 9/11. The most important
245
of these, but far from the only one, was the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks against the United States (United States, 2004).
Prior to it, a joint congressional committee had considered the same
issues. A valuable source of information concerning the difficulties
encountered by the U.S. intelligence community in preventing 9/11
is provided by an appendix to the latter committee’s report compris-
ing the additional views of one of its members, Senator Richard C.
Shelby, who was then Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence (United States, 2002). Despite their usefulness, these
reports are often written by those with little field experience in polic-
ing and in counterterrorism. They tend to overestimate the value
of processing intelligence in preventing terrorism. More particularly,
a careful reading of these reports shows that the analysis of intelli-
gence – connecting the elusive dots – is viewed as the new panacea
for all that went wrong in the failure to prevent 9/11. The general
argument of this chapter is that improving our capacity to prevent ter-
rorism requires that reforms should be made at levels that are more
basic and more concrete than the processing of intelligence. Sound
judgment is much more needed than analytic sophistication.
Intelligence is an important instrument – perhaps the most impor-
tant – in preventing terrorist attacks. So it should come as no surprise
that the agencies responsible for collecting and analyzing security
intelligence would be subject to such extensive scrutiny and, when
failures occur, to criticism. This can be summarized in a single phrase
that has become a catchphrase in intelligence studies: The U.S. intel-
ligence services are said to have failed to “connect the dots” before
9/11. Such failure of analysis was to be remedied by increasing the
analytic capacities of the various agencies involved in counterterror-
ism. “Go analyze!” became the new mantra (Levine). Before proceed-
ing further, it must be emphasized that we do not share a common
definition of intelligence or of analysis. In many dictionaries on
policing (Wakefield and Fleming) or on terrorism (Thackrah) and in
encyclopedias on terrorism (Combs and Slann; Kushner), there are
no specific entries defining either intelligence or analysis. Intelligence
is not defined in itself, but in context – for instance, in the context of
intelligence-led policing – and the definition varies according to con-
text. Tentatively, I would define intelligence as confirmed information
go analyze! 247
that is potentially actionable for a specific purpose under definite cir-

cumstances. Technically, analysis means breaking down an entity (e.g.
a situation, a substance, or a problem) into its constituent parts. The
word has also a generic meaning and refers to any operation of the
mind when it is reflecting upon a subject. The same conclusion that
applies to intelligence also applies to analysis: It is defined in the con-
text in which it is performed. I shall now characterize the meaning of
analysis in the context of global counterterrorism.
To assert that these agencies could have “connected the dots”
implies that they had both the data and a specific procedure for doing
so. This procedure – analysis, I argue – has two characteristics:
1. If the different “dots” or clues come from different sources –

that is, different intelligence agencies – then the information is
pooled, or brought together in one place for analysis.
2. The clues are then analyzed. Schematically, this is done by
starting from a given clue (“dot”) and linking it to another one,
reiterating the process until all the dots have been connected
and the intelligence authorities have a complete picture of the
situation. The peculiarity of this process is that the clues are
not identical – in fact, they may not even be similar. It is only
by carefully examining a “dot” that the analyst can connect it to
another one by inference or deduction.
So much for the contextual description of analytical intelligence

work, but this is really a schematic, idealized vision of what analysts do.
In this chapter, I consider the practicalities of this task of “connecting
the dots” with which we entrust our intelligence services. How,
exactly, do they do that? Or to put the question another way, does the
on-the-ground work of connecting the dots resemble the schematic
description of intelligence work – data pooling and analysis – just
presented?
In attempting to answer this question, I will review some examples
of criticism leveled at the U.S. and Canadian intelligence services for
failing to connect the dots.1 After all, it may be possible to infer how
1
My analyses are based on a review of all U.S. governmental reports published since
9/11, with particular attention to the additional views of Senator Shelby.
intelligence should work from a description of how it failed to work.

We may be able to draw a line around the negative space – the intel-
ligence lapse(s) – so as to better fill that space. To that end, I have
divided the remainder of this chapter into five parts. In the first two
parts, I review two important manifestations of the U.S. intelligence
services’ putative failure to “connect the dots,” referring to them as
“counterexamples” because they display how a security agency ought
not to operate. Because these counterexamples involve communica-
tion failures between a security agency (CIA) and a policing organiza-
tion (FBI), I briefly address in a third part of this chapter the issue
of the police role in counterterrorism. The fourth part is devoted to
highlighting some crucial features of the analytical process from the
standpoint of logic. In the last part, I discuss and elaborate on several
of the reforms that have been proposed to rectify the situation. Thus,
the criticism is not strictly negative; much of it is constructive.
FIRST COUNTEREXAMPLE: THE CASE

OF AL-MIHDHAR AND AL-HAZMI
According to the various inquiry commission reports, the task of

connecting the dots involves four procedures, at least in theory: (1)
separating the wheat from the very large mass of chaff among the
information gathered; or, as this stage is commonly known, “separating
noise from signals”; (2) searching for patterns by data mining;
(3) inference; and (4) deduction.
A Lapse of Surveillance
Before presenting this counterexample, I want to deal briefly with
the 20–20 hindsight fallacy. As is well known, a terrorist from Canada,
Ahmed Ressam, driving a car filled with explosives, was intercepted
by a customs officer in 1999. Ressam had planned a bombing at the
Los Angeles International Airport for the advent of the new millen-
nium. Although he had been under surveillance by various Canadian
policing agencies, notably by CSIS, he skipped out of the country to
train in Afghanistan in 1998, and came back undetected to Canada
carrying a valid (nonforged) passport under the name of Benni
Antoine Norris in February 1999. He prepared his terrorist attempt
go analyze! 249
without being hampered by CSIS or any police force, and left for
the United States, where he was arrested before succeeding with his
plan. In its review of the Ressam affair, CSIS’s oversight committee,
the SIRC concluded that it saw “no evidence that it was a lack of vig-
ilance on the part of the service that contributed to Ressam’s ability
to escape detection after his return in 1999” (SIRC: 2002–2003, pp.
6 and 71). SIRC’s assessment surely lacked a critical edge. Yet as far
as we know, lacking any indication that they might be the same per-
son, it was nearly impossible for CSIS to connect the dots between
Benni Antoine Norris and Ahmed Ressam. The situation, as we shall
see, was quite different in the case of Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi, who
never changed their identity and lived under their own names in
the United States, where they took part as two of the 9/11 suicide
bombers. This case is probably the only one on which all critics of
the U.S. intelligence community agree that there was unexplained
negligence.
The U.S. State Department has what it calls a “tip-off list” of indi-
viduals subject to special scrutiny when they apply to obtain or renew
a visa to the United States. The list mainly consists of names supplied
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security
Agency (NSA). These two agencies, in particular the CIA, are said to
have gravely neglected their task of updating the tip-off list before
9/11. Shelby’s figures (United States, 2002: 26) are striking: In the
three months prior to 9/11, the CIA added 1,761 names to the
list, whereas in the three months following 9/11, this number rose
to 4,251.
Two of the terrorists on board the plane that hit the Pentagon on
9/11 were Khalid Al-Mihdhar (KAM) and Nawaf Al-Hazmi (NAH). In
early March 2000, the CIA learned that KAM and NAH had attended
a meeting with numerous al Qaeda–linked terrorists in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia. The CIA also knew that NAH had entered the United States
in December 1999 and that KAM held a multiple-entry visa for the
country. On March 15, 2000, less than two weeks after the Kuala
Lumpur meeting, the CIA learned that KAM had just entered the
United States. His name had not been added to the tip-off list, nor
did the CIA consider his presence in the United States to warrant
any particular action. The decision not to keep NAH and KAM under
surveillance allowed the two to live under their own names in San
Diego until December 2000. KAM used his name to obtain a vehi-
cle registration and rent an apartment, while both attended a flight
school in May 2000. In July 2000, NAH obtained an extension of his
visitor’s visa under his own name. KAM, and perhaps also NAH, left
the United States on December 15, 2000.
The next month, the CIA learned that one of the terrorists at the
Kuala Lumpur meeting, attended by KAM and NAH, had later taken
part in the attack on the destroyer USS Cole in the Yemeni port of
Aden on October 12, 2000; the al Qaeda network claimed responsibil-
ity for this attack. In June 2001, KAM applied for a U.S. visa in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. Following the usual procedure, the State Department
authorities in Jeddah searched the Consular Lookout and Support
System (CLASS) database, linked to the tip-off list. Because the CIA
had not added KAM’s name to the list, they found nothing out of the
ordinary. Likewise, in June 2001, when CIA agents met with their FBI
counterparts, they did not relay any intelligence on NAH or KAM.
Both men returned to the United States that same month and went
about preparing the 9/11 attacks. It was not until August 2001 that
the CIA decided to put them under surveillance and to alert the FBI
to their presence in the United States, but by then it was too late. The
rest is history – the terrible history of 9/11, in which NAH and KAM
played their deadly part.
What Went Wrong?

In every major report critical of the intelligence services – here, the
CIA – this case is cited as an instance of failure to connect the dots.
But what exactly did the CIA fail to do? Two things. First, it declined to
share with the FBI the information it had on KAM and NAH. Second,
and more crucially and inexplicably, it failed to put the names of
NAH and KAM on the tip-off list. Both terrorists applied to the State
Department on several occasions after March 15, 2000, regarding
visas, and both crossed the U.S. border several times. If they had been
on that list, they could have been intercepted and interrogated. It
is noteworthy that the authorities ran a tip-off verification on KAM
when he applied for a visa in Jeddah in June 2001. One cannot state
unequivocally whether it was the CIA’s reluctance to share informa-
tion with another agency or if it was simple neglect that caused the
go analyze! 251
problem. But it was clearly not so much a matter of sharing intelli-

gence – as, for example, with the FBI – as of putting two suspects’
names on a surveillance list.
In the case at hand, then, the failure to connect the dots does not constitute
a lapse in the processing and analysis of intelligence. The CIA did not fail to
use the intelligence-processing procedure just described – to connect
the dots by means of analysis, inference, and deduction – but rather,
it failed to take two concrete actions, whether through reticence or
neglect: (1) to share information with the FBI; and (2) to add two
names to a State Department surveillance list. The nature of these
omissions must be stressed: Contrary to what is evoked by the phrase
“connecting the dots,” they were not lapses of intelligence analysis,
but instances of a dramatic failure to act – indeed, to take the most
straightforward of actions. This first counterexample illustrates the
general argument developed in this paper: The failures occurred at a
much more basic level than the analysis of intelligence.
SECOND COUNTEREXAMPLE: GENESIS

OF THE 9/11 ATTACKS
It is not my intention in this second part to present the results of in-

depth research into the genesis of the 9/11 attacks. This research has
not been rigorously carried out, and it is unlikely that all the informa-
tion necessary to do so is currently available. Instead, I will discuss
the intelligence that was available to the American security services
in the years preceding 9/11, as revealed by the inquiry commis-
sion reports that reviewed their activities following the attacks. The
approach taken by these reports is essentially to discuss a set of intel-
ligence information possessed by the security services, and then to
criticize them for failing to connect the dots contained in that information.
I will begin by presenting the information in question, then go on to
assess the nature and merits of the argument that the agencies failed
to connect the dots.
The Looming 9/11 Attacks

Five aspects of this episode are particularly significant:
1. First – and this is not systematically mentioned by the inquiry

commissions – the twin towers of the World Trade Center
(WTC) were the target of a devastating attack in 1993. Thus, it

was common knowledge that the Twin Towers were a terrorist
target. Furthermore, it should have been clear to any observer
that the terrorists had learned the lesson of what they saw as
an initial failure; they had to take a different approach from
planting bombs in underground parking lots. The bombs had
caused casualties and damaged the lots but had not been pow-
erful enough to affect the structure of the towers. What else
might work?
2. A terrorist named Abdul-Hakim Murad2 linked to al Qaeda (in
particular, to Ramzi Yousef3) was arrested in Manila in 1995.
He was interrogated (and possibly tortured) at a Philippine
military facility for over two months. Following this incident,
the CIA and the FBI learned that al Qaeda–linked terrorists
planned to hijack twelve commercial airliners and either bring
them down in the Pacific ocean or fly them into buildings. By
then Murad had confessed to his role in a conspiracy to do the
latter – specifically, to fly a small plane packed with explosives
into the CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia – and was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment in the United States in May 1998.
Since Murad’s implication in a plot targeting the CIA does not
appear in his indictment, it appears that the American agen-
cies “forgot about” this affair. Nevertheless, it is indisputable
that the CIA was aware of a foiled plan devised in 1995 to use
an aircraft as a projectile with which to hit a building of great
symbolic value.
3. The third item in this case is a ten-page report commonly
referred to as the “Phoenix Memo,” written on July 7, 2001
by an FBI agent detached to Phoenix, Arizona (United States,
2004, pp. 272–273).4 The agent noted that persons on a list of
suspected al Qaeda–linked terrorists were taking flying lessons
2
Not to be confused with the Islamic studies scholar Abdal-Hakim Murad of the
University of Cambridge.
3
Ramzi Yousef was one of the perpetrators of the 1992 attack on the WTC. He was
arrested in 1995 and brought to justice in the United States.
4
The full text of the memo is available at www.thememoryhole.org/911/phoenix-
memo. The 9/11 report is a paraphrase of the memo.
go analyze! 253
at Arizona schools. He feared that these suspects would obtain

pilot’s licenses and use them to infiltrate the U.S. civil aviation
community. The memo begins:
The purpose of this communication is to advise the Bureau and New

York of the possibility of a coordinated effort by USAMA BIN LADEN
(UBL) to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation
universities and colleges. Phoenix has observed an inordinate num-
ber of individuals of investigative interest who are attending or who
have attended civil aviation universities and colleges in the State of
Arizona. The inordinate number of these individuals attending these
types of schools and fatwas … [redacted passage] gives reason to believe
that a coordinated effort is underway to establish a cadre of individuals who
will one day be working in the civil aviation community around the world.
These individuals will be in a position in the future to conduct terror activity
against civil aviation targets. (Italics mine)
The memo expressed no concern about the possibility of flight

students’ committing suicide attacks; such concern would come
later. At this stage, the main point was that al Qaeda–linked terrorists
might try to get jobs in the civil aviation industry and use their posi-
tions to commit terrorism. The memo’s author proposed that all U.S.
flight schools be placed under surveillance to determine whether al
Qaeda–linked suspects were being trained there. But his supervisors
did not follow up on his recommendations, which they considered
unfounded and too costly to apply. A graver mistake was that they
did not investigate any of the names submitted by the agent. This
was regrettable, to say the least, because the main suspect named in the
Phoenix Memo had a classmate named Hani Hanjour, who would become one
of the nineteen perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.
4. The fourth item in this case was the August 16, 2001, arrest
of Zacarias Moussaoui, because of his suspicious behavior at a
Minnesota flight school. Following his arrest, Minnesota FBI
agents made sustained efforts to obtain a search warrant for
Moussaoui’s computer, but those efforts were squelched by
superiors, who went as far as to call the agents alarmists. Yet,
as was revealed at Moussaoui’s trial in March 2006, one of the
Minnesota agents had defended himself against this accusation
by stating that he was trying to prevent someone from flying
a hijacked aircraft into the Twin Towers. Could he have put it

any more bluntly?
By this time (the summer of 2001), the FBI was aware that
Moussaoui had briefly, and unsuccessfully, taken flying lessons at
the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma before going to
Minnesota for further training. The FBI also knew that Osama bin
Laden’s personal pilot had been trained at Airman two years earlier.
Among Moussaoui’s friends was Richard C. Reid, who would become
notorious in December 2001 when he tried to blow up a plane with
explosives hidden in his shoes. As alarming as they were, these clues
were not the only ones. After Moussaoui was arrested, FBI agents
determined that he had not only taken flying lessons, but also pur-
chased box cutters of the type later used on 9/11, received money
from Germany (the origin of 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta), and
frequented the incendiary Finsbury Park mosque in London (whose
activities gave the city the moniker “Londonistan”). All this informa-
tion was entered in evidence at Moussaoui’s trial.
5. Zacarias Moussaoui was the paradigmatic Phoenix Memo

suspect, a conclusion reinforced by the evidence discussed
earlier. The FBI’s striking missteps in this case were eventually
denounced by Coleen Rowley, an FBI agent with the Minnesota
division. Her statement garnered much media attention and
she was named one of Time Magazine’s three women of the year
for 2002. (Lacayo and Ripley)
What Went Wrong?

Let us again focus on the meaning of this failure by the security ser-
vices to extract from the information in their possession the increas-
ingly specific intelligence that it contained. To reiterate, the CIA and
the FBI knew the following:
1. Murad’s interrogation had revealed a terrorist plan to hijack

commercial airliners and use them as missiles against symbolic
targets (buildings).
2. The Phoenix Memo reported that suspects linked to active terror-
ist organizations were taking flying lessons at American schools
without a credible motivation for obtaining a pilot’s license.
go analyze! 255
3. A suspect, Zacarias Moussaoui, who fit the profile described in

the Phoenix Memo (as indicated by the information gathered at
the time of his arrest), was in custody.
The American intelligence services did not pool or share this

information as expeditiously as they should have, and they did not
engage in joint analysis of its meaning. But the real lapse is found
elsewhere: in the inadequate action taken on the information possessed.
This lapse, it must be stressed, has nothing to do with the inabil-
ity to reason from one clue to another – to connect the dots. What
tripped up the intelligence services was not the task of reconstitut-
ing a message by putting together different pieces of a puzzle. By
and large, the whole message was present in the first piece: A plan existed
to hijack planes and fly them into buildings. The two subsequent
pieces merely reiterated this message, each one more specifically
than the last. By the time of Moussaoui’s arrest and initial interroga-
tion, all the relevant details were known: A suspect in a terrorist plot
was under arrest and ostensibly able to provide detailed information
about his accomplices. In short, the information-processing failure
was much more elementary than the failure to reason from point A
to point B: The intelligence agencies failed to recognize the repetition
of a single message that changed only by becoming more specific.
Being on the lookout for the repetition of a threat does not require
sophisticated skills.
THE ROLE OF POLICE IN COUNTERTERRORISM
The role of police in counterterrorism is a topic of its own, and it is

addressed in other chapters of this book (Klinger and Heal, Chapter
2, this text; Greene, Chapter 10). My remarks will be limited to the
role of the police in the gathering and analysis of intelligence. This
role, as I shall try to argue, is currently problematic.
The Police and the Cult of Evidence

In his Additional Views, Senator Richard Shelby (Alabama) is quite
trenchant in his judgment on the involvement of police in intel-
ligence work: “Intelligence analysts would doubtless make poor
policemen, and it has become very clear that policemen make poor
intelligence analysts” (United States, 2002, 62).5 Shelby encapsu-

lates his diagnosis of this police failure in denouncing the “tyranny
of the case file.” The tyranny of the case file has several implications,
all of which are detrimental to the collection and analysis of intel-
ligence. The police payback is essentially a court conviction – the
bigger the convicted criminal, the bigger the reward. A conviction
is secured by presenting evidence in court. The court standard of
proof for such evidence is that it be beyond “reasonable doubt.” In
contradistinction, intelligence is usually the result of probabilistic
inference that would not stand up in court unless probability could
be transformed into near certainty. Several consequences follow
from this initial divergence of intelligence from court evidence: (1)
Focusing on courtroom tactics in a single case at a time, police tend
to compartmentalize information that may connect several differ-
ent cases; they lack a comprehensive strategic perspective. (2) Filing
cases upon their clearance by conviction, police organizations have
a weak intelligence memory. When attempting in August 2001 to
establish whether Zacarias Moussaoui was a terrorist, FBI agents from
the local field office visited the flight school in Norman, Oklahoma
where Moussaoui had been taking flying lessons; they were not aware
that their own field office had previously been concerned about that
very flight school because the personal pilot of Osama bin Laden
had also trained there (United States, 2002, 65). (3) Because of its
low payback, intelligence work is viewed as a less prestigious appoint-
ment within police organizations, and is not sought after by the
highest performing officers.
Research that I have recently conducted on criminal investigation
in Canada confirms Shelby’s diagnosis (Brodeur and Ouellet, 2005).
Working from the file of a major Canadian urban police force, I col-
lected a sample of 153 cleared cases of homicide involving 191 sus-
pects who were prosecuted between 1990 and 2001. All gathered
information was coded according to 163 variables. The results of
the statistical analyses were used to conduct in-depth interviews with
5
Senator Shelby closes the section of his additional views devoted to the FBI by reit-
erating this assessment: “As one former director of the National security Agency
(Gen. William Odom) has suggested, ‘cops’ cannot do the work of ‘spies’” (United
States, 2002, 74).
go analyze! 257
homicide investigators, which provided strong confirmation of the

quantitative findings. Among the most general findings were:
A criminal investigation is divided into three segments. First, there

is the identification inquiry, where the investigator tries to identify the
perpetrator(s) of an offense. Secondly, there is the location investiga-
tion, which consists in finding the perpetrator(s) when they are on
the run. Lastly, there is the building of the court file, which implies
bringing together all the elements of proof that are to be presented
in court to secure a conviction. These three kinds of inquiries are
different in their methods and are submitted to different standards.
The most important difference is the following: it is only the third
segment of the investigation – building the court case – that is sub-
mitted to the higher standard of evidence (proof beyond reasonable
doubt). The two first segments of the investigation – identification
and location – must obey the requirement of “probable cause,”
which allows for probabilistic inferences and for the trial-and-error
approach that is typical of the first stages on an inquiry. Thus both
the police and the intelligence officers use probabilistic inferences
and the true difference between their respective modus operandi is
not to be found there. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that
the securing of a court conviction is the real payback for the inves-
tigators and justifies elaborate procedures such as the protection of
the crime scene.
In 80% of cases, the suspect eventually prosecuted is identified
within 24 hours or less (in 53% of cleared cases, the suspects were
identified immediately by police answering a 911 call). In 68% of the
cases identified suspects were arrested within 24 hours. (In 44% of
these cases arrest coincided with identification and was immediate.)
Key factors leading to the identification of suspects charged with
homicide were the testimony of an eye witness still present at the
crime scene (22.5% of cases), spontaneous confession by the suspect
(20.5%), and denunciations by various people (police informant,
accomplice, friend, family member or spouse (30%). In almost all
homicide cases the police are thus able to identify a suspect because
someone tells them who he or she is. Investigative work, electronic
surveillance, forensics, and, most of all, criminal intelligence are of
marginal importance and were significant in fewer than 2% of the
cases. Although computerized data banks are routinely consulted in
every case, they yield no decisive information for solving a case.
Key factors in the arrest of an identified suspect closely parallel
the findings for identification: patrolmen and women arrest 23.5%
of suspects in flagrante delicto, and suspects give themselves up in an
additional 20% of cases. Criminal investigation and other factors

listed above, such as intelligence, play a marginal role here as well.
The use of forensics and all types of expertise (DNA, polygraph,
hypnosis) and intelligence were also examined. One of these factors
was determinant of the outcome of a case in less than 3% of the
cases, with the exception of the polygraph, which essentially serves
to eliminate potential suspects.
There was no indication that either private security or private
security intelligence played any role in clearing homicide cases.
These results are in line with the research literature. Although his
U.K. sample was limited (twenty cases), Martin Innes found that
half the cases he examined were “self-solvers” (Innes, 2003, p. 292).
Recent research conducted in the United States on a sample of 589
cleared homicide cases found that the key determinant for solving a
case was information provided by eyewitnesses and other informants
(60.5 percent of cases; Wellford and Cronin, table 9, p. 27). They also
found that half the homicide cases in their sample were solved in less
than a week.
The importance of police patrols in solving criminal cases was rec-
ognized early by Richard v. Ericson in his study of general crime investi-
gations (p. 136). He characterized the role of investigators as limited
to processing suspects already made available by the patrol officer.
The upshot of these findings on police investigations is that the police
are much less dependent on intelligence to succeed in their actions
than are agencies involved in protecting national security. The intel-
ligence units of police forces are generally very small and staffed
by civilians who do not enjoy a high degree of acceptance from the
sworn police personnel (according to my own research, they rarely
mix outside the working hours). The RCMP is in Canada the main
police force that is charged with protecting Canada’s national secu-
rity. Its intelligence unit is composed of one senior civilian analyst
assisted by as many as four junior staff members. At a 2009 meet-
ing held with national security officials from the RCMP, I asked if
there was a procedure for centralizing in some RCMP fusion center
(e.g., at headquarters) all the local information on national security
that was collected by the regional detachment of this police force.
The answer was that the implementation of such a procedure was
go analyze! 259
under way, but it was only in its initial stage. Police forces seem to
compound the bureaucratic impediments to change with the lack of
flexibility of militarized organizations (see Greene, and Maguire and
King, this volume).
The police cult of evidence impedes their cooperation with secu-
rity service agents. However, it is not the cult of evidence as such that
impedes the sharing of intelligence, but rather one of the implications
of proving one’s case in court. Court proceedings are governed by an
ethos of publicity. Justice must not only be done, but must be seen to
be done. This requirement implies that all witnesses must testify in
public, including police and security service informants. As the follow-
ing example will show, it is this prerequisite that informants testify in
public – thus potentially revealing their identity – that is the real bone
of contention between the police and the intelligence community.
A bomb hidden on board Air-India flight 182 from Montreal to
New Delhi via London exploded when the aircraft was flying over the
coast of Ireland in 1985, killing 329 people (another bomb exploded
on the same day at Narita airport, killing two persons, apparently as
part of the same plot). This was by far the most murderous terrorist
attack in all of Canadian history. Although the event also triggered
the costliest investigation in Canadian history, it was never solved;6 two
Sikh nationalists were indicted in 2005, but they were later acquitted
for lack of evidence (Bolan, 2005). In 2000, a CSIS agent admitted in
an interview to the Toronto newspaper The Globe and Mail that he had
destroyed up to 150 hours of taped interviews with key informants
on the case (Mitrovica and Sallot; also Mitrovica). The agent claimed
that he was ordered in 1986 to turn over his tapes and his informants
to the RCMP, and that he destroyed the tapes because he felt morally
obliged to do everything within his power to protect the identity of
his sources. He is quoted as saying, “unless we could get an ironclad
6
The RCMP announced in 1999 that the investigation had already cost them 26
million in Canadian dollars (Mitrovica and Sallot). The investigation resulted
years later in the indictment of two members of the Canadian Sikh community,
who were acquitted in 2005. We must then assume that the investigation is still
going on (2010) and involves more police organizations than just the RCMP. At
the end of 2006, the Canadian government established a commission on the Air-
India bombing and its aftermath.
undertaking that these people wouldn’t appear in court, it was a no

go” (Mitrovica and Sallot).
The clash between the cultures of public evidence and of confi-
dential intelligence is underlined by this incident. The purpose of
gathering evidence is to secure post facto convictions in public court
proceedings, whereas the goal of collecting intelligence is to covertly
prevent terrorist attempts from ever happening. In operational terms,
the true difference between prosecution and prevention is not that
the former takes place after the fact and the latter before. The signifi-
cant difference is that criminal prosecutions are public proceedings,
whereas the prevention of terrorism is largely a stealthy affair, usually
involving the use of informants and undercover operatives working in
the twilight zone between proaction and entrapment. Hence, when
a large number of suspects are rounded up in a preventive opera-
tion, they have to wait for their trial for a long period of time; most
are usually released without charges after having been neutralized for
a time. Notwithstanding the importance of ever-present turf battles,
the need for security clearances, and tension between the policing
and national security cultures, the greatest impediment to the sharing
of information is that the intelligence community has – or believes
it has – a much stronger commitment to protect the identity of its
sources, which would be threatened by public court proceedings.
New Police Cultures

Police tactics and strategy has evolved so much since the end of the
Second World War that we could devise a policing mini-Scrabble
with the spate of letters used to form the acronyms referring to these
new policing models – e.g. team policing (TP), community-oriented
policing (COP), problem-oriented policing (POP), compared-
statistics policing (COMPSTAT), intelligence-led policing (ILP), and
most recently “terror-oriented policing” (TOP) (for this last one,
see Simonetti Rosen, 2004b). In the same way that George Kelling
claimed that zero-tolerance policing was a “distortion” (Nislow.
p. 2), if not a “bastard child,” of the Broken Windows approach, one
can ask whether the transition from COP, POP, and ILP to TOP can
be made without warping the original impulse that triggered the
development of these alternative models. Although the models are
go analyze! 261
different from each other, there is one common thread strongly run-
ning through them. COP, POP, and Broken Windows approaches all
involved moving away from the narrow and crippling definition of
policing as criminal law enforcement. It would seem that TOP would
imply a refocusing of policing on crime through the struggle against
homegrown terrorism. Will such refocusing generate distortions? I
will tentatively examine this question with respect to the two issues
connected with the central subject matter of this chapter, the process-
ing of security intelligence.
The first of these issues is local knowledge. There is a consensus
among researchers that community policing is an invaluable source of
firsthand information about neighborhoods, which is presently under-
utilized (Innes, 2006; Peterson; Simonetti Rosen, 2004b; Greene, this
volume). This information is so valuable because community policing
means, by definition, policing in symbiosis with the community. There
is, however, another name for this close relationship that is much more
ominous: infiltration. As terrorist expert Brian Jenkins emphasized in
the interview he gave Law Enforcement News (Simonetti Rosen, 2004a,
p. 11): “[The police] don’t want to do things that are going to alienate
the very community that they set out to help, and want to have help-
ing them do their police job. And one can see that. There’s not an
easy answer to this. Domestic intelligence gathering is going to be an
extraordinarily sensitive topic, as it should be in a democracy.”
A second issue is related to possible distortions of the meaning of
intelligence as it transits between police and security intelligence agen-
cies. In a public talk given in 2005, RCMP Commissioner Zaccardelli
remarked that ILP “reeks of secret service, spy agency work – the capi-
tal “I” in “Intelligence” (Zaccardelli). At the time, the RCMP and its
commissioner were under investigation by a federal commission of
inquiry – the O’Connor inquiry – for having shared with their U.S.
counterparts unchecked intelligence on the involvement of Canadian
citizen Maher Arar and others in terrorism. The information – which
turned out to be false – led to the extraordinary rendition of Mr. Arar
to Syria, where he was detained and tortured for several months. The
RCMP was blamed by the commission for its insensitivity to the conse-
quences of sharing incriminating intelligence with U.S. security agen-
cies for an individual suspected of terrorism (Canada, 2006, vol. III).
In an article significantly entitled “Intelligence Led Policing or

Policing Led Intelligence?” Nina Cope raised the question of whether
intelligence would be the driving force of police operations or whether
the police would configure intelligence to fit its own internal organiza-
tional priorities. She found analysts were frustrated because the police
did not “action” the work they produced, and the result was a chasm
between the theory and practice of intelligence-led policing and the
current role of analysis (Cope, pp. 197 and 201; also Innes, Fielding,
and Cope). Whether police intelligence units can collect and process
information to meet the needs of other agencies involved in coun-
terterrorism is a question we are not now in a position to answer. It
is all the more difficult to predict the future given that information
sharing between police and security intelligence agencies tends to be
a one-way street oriented toward the latter. The police lack in a vast
number of cases the security clearance to be given access to national
security intelligence.
THE LOGIC OF CONNECTING THE DOTS
In a stimulating article, Innes et al. (2005, p. 39) rediscovered the

relevance of “providing an epistemologically oriented critique of some
of the key techniques associated with crime analysis.” Although there
is some examination of the standards of valid reasoning at academies
that train security intelligence agents (Rieber), the discipline of logic,
which has studied human reasoning for millennia, is seldom referred
to in security intelligence studies. Because this chapter focuses on the
analytical process of making connections between different pieces of
information, I now want to make several points on the basis of what
logic has taught us. I will first discuss three examples of inferential
processes, and then discuss their implications for the processing of
intelligence.
Let us begin with examples. The paradigmatic expression of con-
necting the dots is given by the conditional sentence: “If … then …”
(e.g., “If Benedict is a celibate, then he is unmarried”). But all condi-
tional sentences are not logically equivalent. Putting capitals for sen-
tences, the bracketed conditional can be expressed through symbols
go analyze! 263
in the following way: P → Q (“if P, then Q” or “P implies Q”).7 Let us

now reflect upon these three conditional sentences:
(1) If Mary is a mother, then Mary has given birth to at least one
child.
(2) If Socrates is man, then Socrates is mortal.
(3) If KAM met with al Qaeda members, then KAM is plotting
against the United States.
These three conditional sentences are actually quite different,

although the latter two are of the same logical type. All three can be
symbolized as “P → Q”. The only one that may qualify as a valid infer-
ence is the first one.8 The first meaning of the word “mother” accord-
ing to the Oxford English Dictionary is “a woman in relation to a child or
children to whom she has given birth.” Substituting the definition for
the defined word, conditional (1) can thus be translated into:
(1) If Mary is a woman in relation to a child or children to whom she

has given birth, then Mary has given birth to at least one child.
Conditional (1) may qualify as a valid inference only because it

expresses what is called a tautology (the meaning of “Q” is the same as
the meaning of “P”, which is why it can appear to be derived from it).
The case of conditional (2) is wholly different. This conditional is
like a logical nursery rhyme. All students of logic have stumbled upon
it at one time, and it has become Western cultural shorthand for a
valid inference. What came to be forgotten is that conditional (2) is
literally a piece of shorthand, and that it does rest on a tacit premise
usually taken for granted and asserting that all men are mortal. The
fully developed syllogism is thus: “Because all men are mortal, if Socrates
is a man, then Socrates is mortal.” The crucial difference between condi-
tional (1) and (2) is that conditional (2) is not true on the basis of the
7
The logical connective symbolizing a conditional (if … then) is usually expressed
by a sign resembling a horseshoe or by a small arrow.
8
Expressed as a conditional, sentence (1) logically derives from a universal analytic
judgment: “All mothers have children.” For some logicians, no conditional of the
form “if … then …” expresses a valid inference, even if it embodies an analytic
statement – a statement where the predicate (having a child) only explicates what
is already implied in the meaning of the subject (mother).
meaning of words only. It rests on the empirical generalization that

all men are mortal, which is drawn from experience. (If individuals
physically resembling us came from another planet, we wouldn’t
know just by looking at them, and by applying to them the designa-
tion “men” whether they were mortal or not.) We are now blind to the
empirical character of the statement “All men are mortal” because it
has become such a cultural commonplace that it stands for the arche-
typical statement of the obvious.
Conditional (3) reminds us that a conditional not expressing a
tautology rests on external empirical evidence. The full syllogism
that is backing conditional (3) is similar to that on which conditional
(2) rests (with an important difference): “Because all persons meeting
with members of al Qaeda are plotting against the United States, if KAM met
with al Qaeda members, then KAM is plotting against the United States.” The
difference is the following. “All men are mortal” expresses a true fact,
whereas we do not only ignore whether all persons meeting with mem-
bers of al Qaeda are actually plotting against the United States, but we
also suspect that this might be false (e.g., they may meet with al Qaeda
to negotiate the release of U.S. hostages and for other purposes bene-
ficial to U.S. interests). In the same way that the word “man” does not
contain in its meaning the notion of mortality, the clause “meeting
with al Qaeda members” does not encompass in its very meaning the
notion of “plotting against the United States.” Whether it actually
(or probably) does is a question of fact only to be solved empirically
through some field research.
The upshot of this discussion has been variously expressed by logi-
cians. In his Elements of Symbolic Logic, Hans Reichenbach (p. 70)
stated that the conclusion of an inference is tautologically implied by
its premises; in a similar way, Lemmon (p. 77) demonstrated that all
derivable assertions are tautologous. Equivalents of such statements are
found in all classic textbooks of logic, as for instance in Kalish and
Montague (p. 185) and in Manicas and Kruger (p. 49). Now, a tau-
tology is no expression of triviality, as it took centuries to derive some
of the tautologies making the backbone of mathematical logic. (As
we saw in the second counterexample, merely noticing recurrences
or redundancies would have connected the dots.) However, tautol-
ogies show only the implications of the meaning that we give to the
go analyze! 265
signs – the various languages – that we use. They do not tell us any-
thing new about the external world. For that, we need field research
and fresh information.
The implications of this discussion for the processing of intelligence
are immediate. First, if we require that the analysis of intelligence
measure up to the canon of logical demonstration, rather than to the
trial-and-error process that characterizes probabilistic inference, the
only dots that will be connected through analysis will be mirror images
of each other – statements that are merely synonymous – and we will
learn little that is new. Second, and more important, the linguistic
sequence “if P, then Q” is never valid when purporting to say some-
thing about the external world, unless it is also backed by a set of facts
that are not automatically given as part of the meaning of either “P”
or “Q”. It may well be that an analyst already has under his sleeve the
factual statements that will allow him to complete his probabilistic
chain of inference. Going back to conditional (3), it may be that the
analyst already has at his disposal the information that one of the al
Qaeda members that met with KAM was involved in the bombing of
the destroyer USS Cole. This would allow him to progress further in
connecting the dots. It may also be that this information or some other
that is vital to completing the picture beginning to emerge through
connecting the dots is not yet available to the analyst. In this case,
there must be a way for him to reach out to some field agent to com-
plete and check out the limited but promising intelligence he is pro-
cessing. If analysis is dichotomized from field work, as is often the case
in policing and security intelligence agencies, it will only go round
in circles. Some of these circles may be informative, but many will be
empty and redundant. Third, the most frequent procedure used in
processing intelligence – particularly criminal intelligence – has little
to do with analysis. This procedure consists of linking photographs of
suspects by variously oriented arrows in order to depict a criminal or
a terrorist network. Technically, this procedure has little to do with
analysis, and each link between suspects should be validated by exter-
nal empirical evidence.
The post-9/11 critique of the intelligence community was based on
the fact that unanalyzed raw data was next to useless. Such criticism
now appears to be the “new normal,” or better still, the new common
sense. But the reverse is no less true: Analysis that is not continuously
buttressed by fresh facts only begets diminishing returns and ends
up preying on itself. As the philosopher Kant famously said: Sense-
data without concepts are blind, but concepts without sense-data
are empty.
Finally, I will make a case for the hunt of redundancy. Two things
should be done to separate the signal from the noise. First, informa-
tion should be validated, that is, confirmed by more than one source
whenever possible. Security intelligence services are well aware of
this need. There is however a second requirement that must also be
met: putting aside the mass of information that may be accurate but
useless for action, from relevant “actionable” intelligence that meets
operational imperatives. Redundancy may be a guide for this second
task. The discovery of modus operandi and more generally of patterns
is essentially a search for repetition in the flow of information. Hence,
there is a point, even urgency, in perusing what appears at first to be
semantic tautologies, but what may reveal on closer examination to be
invaluable pointers for the prevention of acts of terrorism. This is the
upshot of the “flight lessons” negligence.
PROPOSED REFORMS
Since the 9/11 attacks, a considerable number of recommenda-

tions have been made to correct these logical problems. Any reforms
adopted should take account of the strikingly elementary nature of
these problems. Our governments should be wary of attempting to
turn the intelligence authorities into clairvoyants; what is needed is
not a modern deck of Tarot cards in the form of high-tech artificial
intelligence software. Here, I present and elaborate on three oft-
repeated recommendations:
1. The most basic recommendation is to implement structures allow-

ing for better pooling of information. This recommendation has
become a commonplace, but it is nonetheless worth revisiting.
The first requirement in implementing it is to reassess the prin-
ciple of information ownership, which underlies the proprietary
behavior characteristic of the intelligence services, based on the
go analyze! 267
CIA FBI OTHER
Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence

collection collection collection
Analysis Analysis Analysis
Figure 11.1. Traditional paradigm.
Analysis
Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence

collection collection collection
CIA FBI OTHER

Figure 11.2. New paradigm.
following principle articulated by an intelligence specialist who

testified before the Shelby Committee: “‘ownership’ of informa-
tion belong[s] with the analysts and not the collectors” (United
States, 2002, 36). The application of this principle entails
nothing less than a shift from the current paradigm (Figure 11.1)
to a new one (Figure 11.2):
There are two advantages to such a paradigm shift, which is already

under way. The first, as expected, concerns the pooling of infor-
mation, such that all sources can be analyzed together (known as
“all-source fusion”). The second and equally important advantage is
that one can be assured that the information will in fact be analyzed,
because analysis is the common node toward which all information
sources converge.
2. Several important obstacles to the establishment of the new

paradigm must be eliminated. The primary of these is admin-
istrative and legal in nature: Members of the intelligence
community do not all enjoy the same security clearance level,
making it difficult if not impossible for information to be shared

among them. More specifically, the police do not have the same
clearance level as the security intelligence services. It must be
ensured that all analysts responsible for the fusion of informa-
tion sources, regardless of agency, are cleared to access the rel-
evant sources. A second obstacle is the general acceptance of
the “need to know” principle in the intelligence community.
This principle makes sense from an operational standpoint, but
must be reinterpreted for the purposes of intelligence analy-
sis. A third obstacle is the duplication of intelligence collection
efforts. Not only is duplication detrimental to efficiency, but it
also illegitimately fosters secrecy. When someone deliberately
follows in another’s footsteps, it is often to observe him clandes-
tinely and exploit what he learns for different purposes.
3. In intelligence analysis, emphasis must be laid on guaranteeing
that the single most elementary information-processing
operation – the methodical identification of recurrence in collected
information – is carried out systematically and competently.
Specialists can then determine the degree of importance to be
assigned to different recurrences and attempt to discern mean-
ingful patterns in the data.
I did not put analysis above collection in Figure 11.2 to show that
analysts should be in the commanding seat over data collectors, but
rather to emphasize that they should be able to task field collectors to
check out and complete information needed to connect the dots. This
was the point made in the previous section of this chapter: Collection
and analysis must be a two-way street with intense traffic.
CONCLUSION
Policing is fertile ground for myth making, as an unending string

of police reforms has shown since 1945. A recurrent feature of
this reforming process is its bipolarity, as it moves from insulation
to community, from crime to disorder, from deprived areas to “hot
spots.” The intense criticism to which the intelligence community
was subjected in the aftermath of 9/11 led me to believe that we were
go analyze! 269
preparing for yet another trip, from the Arctic of data collection to
the Antarctic of data processing. As much as the previous intelligence
motto was “Go collect! (signal intelligence or SIGINT),” the new word
would now be “Go analyze! (human intelligence or HUMINT).” In
this chapter, I left aside for future treatment the important topic of
SIGINT vs. HUMINT. Moving from the concrete to the abstract, no
intelligence icecap was going to be melted unless we blended intelli-
gence collection with intelligence analysis and developed a feedback
process looping them together.
The first “don’t” examined here was not a failure of intelligence, but
a failure of acting on the clear and present danger revealed by intel-
ligence. Putting intelligence into action meant in this case sharing it
with others, which was not done to a puzzling degree. Intelligence
divorced from common action is an exercise of the mind without
benefit to security.
The second “don’t” discussed was intended to show that intelligence
is generally not the painful mind-slashing exercise that tries to extract
a needle from a pile of glass. One guideline should be: Look for the
obvious! The obvious is what recurs in the data and keeps popping
back through field verification.
Because the counterexamples examined here involved a failure of
communication between the CIA and the FBI in the first case, and
a neglect of pursuing a police lead in the second one, it is essential
to give further thought to the relationships between cops and spies.
Two issues are of utmost importance. The first is that policing and
security agencies will not share intelligence as long as: (1) the police
fail to develop a culture of prevention with the attendant rewards for
preventionist cops, and (2) the police are refused the security clear-
ance needed to contribute to national security to the extent of their
capacity. The second issue is that there is a threshold beyond which
the past is transformed into something else that perverts it. With
respect to that great police capital – trust – there is truly a world of
difference between community policing and community infiltration
policing. Promoting ambiguity between these policing strategies will
have destructive consequences for democratic policing (See Greene,
Chapter 10, this volume). Infiltration policing will supersede com-
munity policing only at the cost of bastardizing it in the same way that
zero-tolerance policing was said by George Kelling to be the bastard

child of the Broken Windows approach.
Finally, it must be emphasized that intelligence analysis is no sil-
ver bullet. It can turn into a circular information boomerang if dis-
connected from fieldwork. More importantly, agencies involved
in cryptology such as the U.S. NSA and Canada’s Communications
Security Establishment (CSE) never shied from using the knowledge
of mathematicians to break up secret codes. To the extent that they
are involved in the analysis of data, the policing and the intelligence
communities should not refrain from using the professional skills of
people who have devoted their work to clarifying the nature of analy-
sis and to making it more valid and efficient.
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speeches/sp_cacp_3_e.htm
chapter twelve
Managing the Fear of Terrorism

Brian Forst
It’s absolutely essential that eight weeks from today, on November 2nd, we
make the right choice, because if we make the wrong choice then the danger
is that we’ll get hit again.
– Vice President Dick Cheney (2004)1
I approved this message: “I want to look into my daughter’s eyes and know
that she is safe, and that is why I am voting for John Kerry.”
– Senator John Kerry (2004)2
THE PROBLEM OF FEAR IN THE ERA OF TERRORISM
Prior to September 11, 2001, people in the United States were espe-
cially fearful of rapists and robbers, airplane crashes and cancer, hur-
ricanes and sharks. On that day, and for years afterward, terrorism
became Public Fear Number One. Although the 1993 bombing of
the World Trade Center and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of
the Murrah Federal Building were sensational events, they did not
shake ordinary citizens to their core, as did the 2001 attack. Two great
oceans had insulated the United States from serious acts of violence
by foreign sources, and its citizens were protected by the strongest
military on earth. The jet hijacking and suicide bombings that killed
nearly 3,000 people, brought down the twin towers of the World Trade
Center in New York, and inflicted major damage on the Pentagon in
Washington raised fear in the United States to a new level entirely. In
the days that followed, people throughout the United States bought
1
Milbank and Hsu
2
Shapiro.
273
millions of dollars worth of duct tape and gas masks, puzzled over
the meaning of terror alert color codes, and became extremely suspi-
cious of men in turbans and women covering their heads with scarves.
Four days after the 9/11 attack, a Sikh gas station owner, Balbir Singh
Sodhi, was shot and killed in Phoenix by a local resident who thought
Sodhi was a Muslim.
This chapter inquires into the nature and sources of the fears that
drive such behaviors. Fear of terrorism is clearly understandable, but
to what extent is it useful and reasonable, and to what extent is it harm-
ful and irrational? How are our fears related to objective risks? How is
fear influenced by media and politicians? What can be said about the
social costs of excessive fear? What, if anything, should public officials
do about the public’s fear of terrorism? What can ordinary citizens do
about them? These are the issues taken up in this chapter.
Such questions about the fear of terrorism have received much less
attention from media, politics, and the academy than have facts and
speculations about terrorists: the dangers they present, the immorali-
ties of and justifications for their behaviors, how we may be able to
deter them, how we should respond to them, how to obtain infor-
mation from them and sanction them, how to protect targets against
their attacks, and how to destroy them and keep others from enlisting
in their causes and doing more of what they do. Attention to these
considerations is useful and necessary, but they deal only with what
economists would refer to as the “supply side” of terrorism. They tell
us nothing about the importance of our behavior as past and prospec-
tive victims of terrorism, and they ignore the public’s fear of terror-
ism, and how fear tends to aggravate the problem of terrorism.
Criminologists have learned that fear of crime can impose costs
on society that exceed those of crime itself – manifesting as reduced
quality of life, wasteful expenditures on resources and measures that
do little to prevent crime, stress-related illnesses and health costs, and
related social costs – and that it is manageable (Cohen; President’s
Commission; Warr). Terrorism is crime in the extreme, and fear plays
a substantially more central role in terrorism than in conventional
crime. Although fear is often used instrumentally to obtain compli-
ance in rape, robbery, domestic violence, and a few other crimes, it is
not an end in itself. In the case of terrorism, instilling fear is a primary
managing the fear of terrorism 275
goal of the act. It serves the larger political aim of the terrorist.
Accordingly, our ability to understand terrorism and determine how
best to deal with it publicly and privately depends critically on our
ability to understand the nature and sources of fear and the harms
that it imposes on society. Strategies for dealing with offenders and
protecting targets against conventional crime have been found to be
effectively complemented with strategies for managing the public’s
fear of crime (Skogan; Warr). In the case of terrorism, the stakes may
be much higher and the prospects much greater for complementing
strategies that deal with terrorists and targets of terrorism by find-
ing and implementing equally effective strategies for managing the
public’s fear of terrorism.
Fear is not all bad. As with fear of crime, reasonable levels of fear
of terrorism are helpful to generate the sort of concerns that help us
to develop coherent approaches to preventing terrorism in the first
place and dealing with it effectively when it does occur. There are
ample reasons to conclude, however, that the public’s fears of terror-
ism are inflated well beyond reason, and that inflated fears tend to
harm us both in the short and long term. In the short term, acute
fear diverts people from productive activities; it induces them to con-
sume resources that may do little to provide real protection against
harm; and it can produce severe stresses and reduce social capital and
quality of life over an extended period. It can create detachment and
distrust, and can harm emotional and physical health and economic
well-being. In extreme cases it can produce public panics, severe
social and financial disruptions, and sharp spikes in accidental deaths
and injuries and suicides. New Yorker essayist Adam Gopnik puts it suc-
cinctly: “Terror makes fear, and fear stops thinking.”
Over the longer term, fear can induce politicians to pander to
the public’s fears, reduce freedoms, and invoke responses at home
and abroad that may serve more to alienate prospective allies, rather
than to reduce the sources of the threats and thus enhance security.
There can be good reason to fear fear itself, as President Franklin D.
Roosevelt warned in his 1933 inaugural address. Today the public’s
fear of the fear of terrorism appears to be too small, and the con-
sequences of this lack of concern for the hazards produced by fear
could be considerable.
FEAR AND RISK OF TERRORIST ACTS
Terror is very much a matter of fear: Terrorism gets its traction from
the public’s fear. Its power lies “almost exclusively in the fear it creates”
(Martin & Walcott). The word “terror” means fear in the extreme. It
is derived from the Latin verb terrere, to cause trembling. Acts of ter-
ror are most successful from the terrorist’s perspective when they cre-
ate mass hysteria and induce target populations to implode, imposing
much greater harms on themselves as a consequence of misplaced
fear than from the immediate harm of the acts of crime. Receiving a
substantially larger payoff than from the initial attack thus rewards the
terrorist, providing incentives for further such acts. This cycle could
be broken if prospective terrorists understood that their acts, even
substantial ones, drew limited attention and had little subsequent
impact on the target population. In our current fear-obsessed culture,
however, this prospect seems unlikely. In the words of the legendary
cartoon character, Pogo: “We have met the enemy, and it is us.”3
The Nature and Sources of Fear

Awareness of the central role of fear to the success of terrorist acts
can open pathways for reducing the harms of terrorism through the
development of policies for managing the public’s fear of terrorism.
It is necessary, first, however, to understand the nature and sources of
fear, and how fear is related to real risks and other factors.
Fear is a natural human emotion, a sense of personal alarm caused
by the anticipation of a threat, typically accompanied by physiological
changes such as increased pulse, perspiration, rapid breathing, and
elevated galvanic skin response (Mayes). People may fear for their
own safety or for the safety of loved ones, or both. Fear is not all bad: It
keeps us out of harm’s way. Some of it is innate – fear associated with
abrupt physical change is clearly evident in newborn babies – but it is
3
“Pogo” was a popular comic strip created by Walt Kelly in 1951. The strip ran in
hundreds of newspapers throughout the United States in the latter half of the
twentieth century. Pogo was a naive possum with keen powers of observation who
hung out in the Okefenokee swamp with his friends: Albert Alligator, Howland
Owl, Porky Pine, Beauregard the houn’ dog, Mallard de Mer (the seasick duck),
Deacon Muskrat, Wiley Cat, and others.
mostly learned, either the anticipation of a recurrence of a previously

experienced harm, or the anticipation of a harm about which one
person has been warned by another or others. In the case of crime,
fear may be induced by an actual victimization, an immediate threat
such as a menacing person behaving strangely in a high-crime area at
night, by news of a series of violent stranger attacks in an area, or by
other signals of danger ahead.
Fear is a matter of biology: The emotion we refer to as “fear” is stimu-
lated by physical phenomena. Neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux describes
the mechanics of fear as centered in the amygdala, an almond-shaped
mass of gray matter in the anterior portion of the temporal lobe, the
“hub in the brain’s wheel of fear.” Stimulation of the amygdala gen-
erates an outpouring of stress hormones, including adrenaline, pro-
ducing a state of extreme alertness, followed by secretion of a natural
steroid, cortisol. Research physician Marc Siegel describes the result as
follows: “The heart speeds up and pumps harder, the nerves fire more
quickly, the skin cools and gets goose bumps, the eyes dilate to see bet-
ter and the brain receives a message that it is time to act.” Though the
triggers of fear vary from one species to the next, all animals with this
brain architecture experience fear through this basic mechanism.
Fear is in the genes. Some cognitive barriers that cloud one’s ability
to recognize legitimate threats are inherited. Creatures with too little
fear of genuine threats are more inclined to be killed by the threaten-
ing entities, and the genetic lines of those victims tend to diminish or
vanish altogether as a result. Age and gender are obvious examples
of biological factors behind fear, although the gene pool may not be
altered as much over the long term due to greater risk of death to
certain people based on these factors as by other factors. Younger
people tend to be less fearful than older people, hence they more
often engage in behaviors that bring greater risks to their own safety
and the safety of others – due in part to lower levels of experience, but
due largely as well to inherent differences in tastes for risk between
the young and old. They are more likely to succumb to accidental
deaths than are older people and more likely to be victims of crime.
Furthermore, because males tend to be more aggressive and less fear-
ful, they tend to experience higher rates of accidents and violent
victimizations than females.
Fear is also environmentally determined. First-born children tend to be

more cautious than second-born (Forer; Harris; Sulloway). And fear is
learned: Most of us are inclined not to repeat behaviors when we know
from direct experience that the behaviors can hurt us, nor are we
inclined to engage in them in the first place when we are told by influ-
ential others – parents, neighbors, teachers, media, and peers – that
the behaviors are dangerous. Such direct and indirect experiences
shape our sense of the risk associated with various threats; they give us
an unsystematic empirical basis for assessing objective risks of harm.
Fear and Risk

Unfortunately, unsystematic evidence, whether experienced first-hand
or learned indirectly, can be highly unrepresentative of reality. The
nature of the event experienced directly may itself be unrepresenta-
tive of the class of events with which we associate the experience; the
occurrence of the event may be more or less rare than we realize; our
recollections of events change over time; and the filtering of informa-
tion about events not directly experienced may distort our percep-
tions of the risk and typical nature of the thing feared. The confusion
associated with the accumulation of these various distortions can be
compounded by mixed messages given by others, who are likely to
have different experiences. Parents often condition children to err
on the side of caution – to overestimate threats. Peers often counter-
vail against parental messages, encouraging their peers to engage in
thrill-seeking behaviors. Social scientists have discovered that the net
effect of this interaction of our unique innate predispositions with a
vast jumble of mixed information from the environment and from
others can cause our subjective assessments of risk of a particular threat
to be often at considerable variance with the actual objective risk of
the threat. We tend to blow some threats well out of proportion and
underestimate others.
Our understanding of the discrepancy between subjective assess-
ments of risk and actual objective risks was informed by research con-
ducted in the 1970s by experimental psychologists Daniel Kahneman,4
4
Khaneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 2002 for his research on
departures of individual behavior from the standard assumptions of rationality in
neoclassical economics.
Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic, and others, following the path-breaking

research of psychologist and decision theorist Ward Edwards in the
1950s and 1960s. They found that people use a variety of heuristics–
simple rules of thumb that are easier to use than more rigorous meth-
ods involving complex computations – to draw inferences and make
decisions. They found further that people do so both in ordinary
situations and to assess and respond to extraordinary hazards. The
various heuristics used, however, contradict fundamental propositions
of probability theory and tend to distort people’s perceptions of risk.
Kahneman and Tversky (2000) refer to the tendency of people
to distort probabilities as the psychophysics of chance. One of the most
common distortions is the tendency for most people to give excessive
weight to improbable events (pp. 1, 7–9, 209). They have difficulty
distinguishing between small probabilities, like 1 in 100, and extreme
rarities, like 1 in 1,000,000. The former is, in fact, 10,000 times more
likely than the latter. These distortions tend to produce excessively
risk-averse behaviors in most situations involving rare but sensational
threats; incoherent behaviors in situations involving uncertainty in
which facts are presented in convoluted terms; and excessively risk-
taking behaviors in situations involving large but uncertain benefits,
as in lotteries with odds stacked against the bettor.5
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) refer to another such distortion as
the availability heuristic (or simply availability): People tend to think
that events are more probable when they have occurred recently.
The events loom large because they are fresh in the memory. For
example, people are inclined to fear earthquakes more when they
have occurred in the past year than when they have not occurred
recently, even though the risk may in fact be less a few months after
an earthquake than years later, at the start of the next earthquake
cycle. Cass Sunstein (2002) observes that the availability heuristic was
readily evident in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, when “many
Americans were afraid to travel in airplanes and even to appear in
5
Kahneman and Tversky incorporated this principle as one of the basic elements of
their prospect theory, which holds that people tend to make judgments and decisions
myopically, based on the desirability of changes from current positions, rather
than based on comparisons of the desirability of final outcome levels. This induces
people to weigh losses more heavily than gains, and give greater weight to given
changes when they start with smaller amounts.
public places” (p. 50). Similarly, Gary Kleck et al., have found that
perceptions of punishment are unrelated to actual levels of punish-
ment. They speculate that these misperceptions are a product of the
low relationship between highly publicized punishment events and
the actual rate of routine, largely unpublicized punitive activities of
the criminal justice system (p. 654). The challenge of discouraging
the public from overreacting to prospective acts of terrorism thus has
a clear parallel to the challenge of discouraging prospective offend-
ers from committing criminal acts: Both involve the widespread
misperception of threats.
Inflated perceptions of threats are often exacerbated by vivid media
images of victims of rare disasters. When people see the photograph
of a victim of a one-in-a-million event on the evening news – a per-
son killed by lightening or a shark attack, or by a suicide bomber in
Madrid or London – their first reaction is typically not that it is virtu-
ally impossible for them also to be victimized by such an event. Even
when they are told that the risk is less than one in a million, they tend
to distort the risk when confronted with the incontrovertible image
of a real victim of disaster. The photograph of a death scene accom-
panied by a photo of the previously live victim offers more palpable
information about a threat, thus it is more compelling than the infor-
mation that such episodes actually occur at an extremely low rate.
Finucane et al. refer to this as the affect heuristic – the tendency for
perception and behavior to be excessively influenced by images that
trigger emotional responses.
Cass Sunstein (2002) refers to the tendency for people to suspend
rational inference in the face of the affect heuristic as “probability
neglect.” He notes that the tendency for people to ignore prob-
abilities and behave less rationally is particularly great in the case of
terrorism:6
6
It must be noted that the risks of some threats defy objective assessment. It is one
thing to observe precise miscalibrations between actual and subjective rates of
mortality associated with shark attacks, tornadoes, commercial jet crashes, and
lung cancer – about which we have a wealth of empirical information – and quite
another to talk about excessive weight that a person gives to the risk of a nuclear
terrorist attack, given the absence of any such event to date. Still, there are enough
terrorist events about which ample evidence does exist to make such assessments of
many sorts of terrorism. For example, the RAND Corporation and the U.S. State
Department have collected data on terrorist attacks, and such data have been ana-
lyzed by Bruce Hoffman, Brian Jenkins, Robert Pape, and others.
When probability neglect is at work, people’s attention is focussed

on the bad outcome itself, and they are inattentive to the fact that it
is unlikely to occur. Almost by definition, an act of terrorism will trig-
ger intense fear, and hence people will focus on the awfulness of the
potential outcomes, not on their probabilities. (p. 51)
Sunstein (2002) observes other factors that tend to distort people’s

judgments in the presence of uncertain threats, including the follow-
ing: when the threat is unfamiliar or misunderstood, when people
have less personal control over the situation, when the media give
more attention to the threat, when the situation is irreversible, when
the threat originates with another person rather than from a natural
phenomenon (p. 59), and when people are influenced by the fears
of others – a process known as group polarization. (p. 88). Sunstein
(2003) speculates that the millions of Americans who devoted time
and energy to duct tape and emergency supplies would have been far
safer had they spent the time and energy losing weight, staying out of
the sun, driving carefully, and ending their smoking habits.
Frank Furedi (2002a) amplifies many of these points in his book,
Culture of Fear, arguing that perceptions of risk, ideas about safety, and
controversies over health, the environment, and technology have little
to do with science or empirical evidence. They are shaped more pro-
foundly by deeply rooted cultural assumptions about human vulnera-
bility. These forces have worsened in the post-9/11 era: “‘The end is
nigh’ is no longer a warning issued by religious fanatics; rather, scare-
mongering is represented as the act of a concerned and responsible
citizen . . . The culture of fear is underpinned by a profound sense of
powerlessness, a diminished sense of agency that leads people to turn
themselves into passive subjects who can only complain that ‘we are
frightened’” (2004).
The consequences of the public’s excessive fear of sensational
events such as terrorism appear to be considerably greater than is
widely understood. According to Marc Siegel:
We feel the stress and become more prone to irritability, disagree-

ment, worry, insomnia, anxiety and depression. We are more likely to
experience chest pain, shortness of breath, dizziness and headache.
We become more prone to heart disease, cancer and stroke, our
greatest killers … Worry about the wrong things puts us at greater
risk of the diseases that should be concerning us in the first place.
It remains to be determined precisely how much stress-related illness

and injuries and other social harms have been stimulated by gross
exaggerations of danger in media and political messages. In the
meantime, existing evidence suggests that the social costs of fear are
high. Gregg Easterbrook has speculated that people’s frenzy to buy
duct tape in the days and weeks after 9/11 may well have caused need-
less traffic deaths and injuries that greatly exceeded the risks to safety
from lack of duct tape. David Ropeik observes, in fact, that during the
three months following the 9/11 attack, about 1,000 more people
died in traffic fatalities than in the same period the previous year, due
to a combination of factors that almost surely included a fear-induced
spike in the demand for driving rather than flying distances of greater
than 100 miles. Ropeik also anticipates an increase in deaths due to
stress-related illnesses attributable to fear of terrorism.
Virtually every day, someone somewhere becomes the widely pub-
licized victim of a tragic but rare event. Yet for each such person, the
quality of many thousands of other lives may be diminished substan-
tially when they live their lives beyond reasonable precaution, in fear
that they too might succumb to the unlikely tragic prospects that have
befallen the few, about whom we may know more than is good for our
own safety and well-being.
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA
We learn about serious acts of violence generally, and terrorism in

particular, through the media: television, radio, newspapers, maga-
zines, and increasingly, the Internet. In our free and open demo-
cratic society, the public is served with such information under the
First Amendment to the Constitution: “Congress shall make no law …
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Restrictions on
such information would make it more difficult for the public to hold
their elected officials accountable for failures to provide protection
for which they are responsible. The public obtains useful information
about terrorism principally through the media.
At the same time, however, much of the information about terror-
ism conveyed through the media is far beyond useful. To this extent,
the media serve as an essential instrument of terror: Without media,
terrorists would have no stage on which to perform their acts of fla-

grant violence against noncombatants. The fear that defines terror-
ism requires media broadcasting; the wider the audience reached, the
greater the fear and more effective the act. In an essay on the sym-
biotic relationship between the media and terrorists, international
relations professor Paul Wilkinson (1997) puts it this way:
It would be foolish to deny that modern media technology, com-

munications satellites and the rapid spread of television have had a
marked effect in increasing the publicity potential of terrorism . . .
[W]hen terrorist leaders set up support infrastructures for terrorism
overseas, the production of magazines, newspapers and other chan-
nels of propaganda generally becomes a key part of their activity . . .
[A]lthough terrorism has proved remarkably ineffective as the major
weapon for toppling governments and capturing political power, it
has been a remarkably successful means of publicising a political
cause and relaying the terrorist threat to a wider audience, particu-
larly in the open and pluralistic countries of the West.
The public is especially fearful of extreme predatory acts of violence,

acts against which they are powerless to defend or protect themselves.
This sense of powerlessness surely contributes to the public’s exagger-
ated fears of terrorism, crime, and shark attacks. Media accounts of
such attacks against innocent victims by predators seize the public’s
attention indelibly. Accidents in cars and homes, in contrast, are more
likely to be a product of one’s own behavior. Heart attacks can be pre-
vented through better diet and exercise, and fatal falls from staircases
or ladders can be prevented through more attention to safety.
The sense of powerlessness that lies beneath the public’s exagger-
ated fears of predatory attacks offers vicarious thrills for those who sit
safely in their homes and witness the aftermath of such attacks. In the
weeks preceding the 9/11 attack, two of the most prominent items in
the news were the disappearance of Washington intern Chandra Levy
and shark attacks. Sheer curiosity often attracts people to such events,
presented as news, and secret pleasure may hold them there, so that
they may behold from a distance sensational stories of predatory
tragedies that befall hapless others.
For the media, these curiosities and vicarious thrills stimulate
enhanced audience shares and, in turn, more extensive media airing
of such events (Schaffert). The disproportionate attention these

events receive is often justified on the grounds that the media are sim-
ply satisfying the public’s demand. The if-it-bleeds-it-leads approach
to media programming, however, brings with it a moral hazard: The
disproportionate media attention given to extreme acts of predatory
violence can further distort the public’s already inflated fears of ter-
rorism and other predatory events. Disproportionate publicity given
to such events leads people to perceive that the risks are greater than
they actually are. Sunstein (2005) points to several examples of “this
month’s risk,” including the Love Canal scare in the late 1970s, the
Alar apple pesticide scare of 1989, and the summer of the shark in
2001 (pp. 78–98). Most Americans might be surprised to discover,
as Anne Applebaum and others have observed, that in this era of ter-
rorism, their lives are actually far safer, and they live much longer
than just about any group in human history. One can imagine all this
changing due to a cataclysmic terrorist event, but one should appre-
ciate as well that such an event might be preventable through the
management of fear.
The public’s gross misperceptions of risk derive largely from the
tendency of mass audiences to unconsciously take information pro-
vided over the airwaves and cables unskeptically as gospel. The late
Marshall McLuhan, celebrated authority on the power of media, lik-
ened the public’s difficulty in distinguishing between media presenta-
tions and the real world to a fish that has no experience of life outside
the pond: “We don’t know who discovered water but we’re pretty sure
it wasn’t the fish.”
Perhaps the most serious consequence of media preoccupations
with crime and terrorism is that they may contribute significantly
to self-fulfilling cycles of fear and violence. Some of this is self-
evident: Terrorists use the media as a tool for terror, taping videos
of the beheadings of noncombatants, and broadcasting warnings of
further attacks by jihadist leaders. Western media outlets ordinarily
edit and often censor the more gruesome of these media images, but
there can be little doubt that the widespread airings of these events
and threats in news reports feed the fire of fear and give life to the
self-fulfilling prophecy of clashing civilizations. Media coverage shapes
public opinion, and public opinion, in turn, shapes public policy.
Even in the domain of crime, where the perpetrators typically have

little or no interest in making the public more fearful, evidence indi-
cates a statistical association between fear of crime and media. Wesley
Skogan and Michael Maxfield, for example, have found a systematic
positive correlation between the fear of crime and the number of
hours spent watching television, after controlling for crime rates and
other factors. Linda Heath has found similar evidence in correlations
between fear of crime and the reading of newspapers that emphasize
the reporting of crime. Although such systematic evidence has not yet
come forth for the case of terrorism, largely because frequent acts ter-
rorism are a relatively recent phenomenon, the impact of 9/11 gives
reason to expect a stronger association between media presentations
and fear resulting from terrorism than from crime.
The reporting of information about terrorism, crime, and other
threats to public safety (including natural disasters, accidents, and ill-
nesses) appears on the whole to be relatively reliable in all major media
sources: The facts appear to be accurate. The topics selected and the
way they are reported, however, provide an exceedingly invalid sense
of the likelihood that an individual will be a victim of any of these
threats. The media have more incentive to provide public informa-
tion that is accurate – a growing corps of media ombudsmen has
helped in this – than to ensure that the information is representative
of ordinary life. Ordinary life is, by definition, less newsworthy. Rare,
extreme events are more newsworthy than commonplace trivial ones,
but the problem with even accurately reported extreme events is that
they tend to overwhelm the senses.
Mark Warr has noted that the reporting of such events typically
provides insufficient historical or geographical context. Information
that focuses on the extreme rarity of the most severe events is consid-
ered less interesting, hence less newsworthy. Warr proposes a thought
experiment to illuminate the effect of crime reporting on the per-
ceived risk of victimization, an experiment that applies especially
well to the problem of basing assessments of the risk of terrorism on
individual events: Imagine the prospect of one’s trying to estimate
accurately the magnitude and causes of population growth in a city
through nonrepresentative interviews with people who have left or
moved into the city. The information might be interesting, but it
would have little general applicability to the population of interest.

The problem is likely to be worse with respect to terrorism. We have
learned much more about the rates and causes of crime based on
valid information in the United States and elsewhere; we have very lit-
tle comparable evidence about terrorist events and their causes. Scary
stories supplant such evidence, and however reliable those stories may
be, they are no substitute for valid evidence of the prevalence of the
threats described.
Incentives for reliable media accounts of terrorism and other events
that may stimulate public fear grow out of a responsibility for objective
reporting. Reporters who fail to satisfy high standards of accuracy, and
their employers, can become stories themselves, as has occurred in
the cases of Jason Blair and the New York Times, Dan Rather and CBS,
and Eason Jordan and CNN. Checks against biased, inaccurate, or
otherwise irresponsible reporting is further enhanced by ombudsmen,
noted earlier, and by a growing industry of media-on-media reporting,
such as WNYC’s weekly On the Media program, Slate Magazine’s “Press
Box” column, and numerous Internet media watch “bloggers.”
Terrorism raises unique and extremely vexing questions about
media objectivity. How do reporters balance their responsibilities
to their employers for exciting stories with high standards of profes-
sionalism, and how do they balance both of those with their sense of
patriotic duty when conflicts emerge among the three? How should
a hostage event be reported when the reporting can itself influence
the outcome of the event? How much detail should a reporter provide
about the vulnerability of domestic targets if doing so might give new
ideas to potential terrorists? Should reporters protect their sources of
information when doing so can endanger innocent others? Why do
terrorist events in the Middle East receive so much more attention
than equally, if not more, serious events in Africa or Southeast Asia?
Does “balanced” reporting require that every point of view, however
unrepresentative or extreme, be included in the story? What rules
and circumstances should determine whether an attacker is called a
“terrorist” rather than an “insurgent” or “freedom fighter”? How, in
short, does a reporter balance the right of the public to have accurate
information when doing so feeds fear and terrorism?
Several commentators have drawn conclusions about where report-
ers come down on these questions. Some argue that the reporting
tends to favor the terrorists excessively (Alexander; Bassiouni; Cohen;

Podhoretz), whereas others argue that reporters allow their sense of
patriotism to overwhelm the objectivity of their reporting (Ewers). Still
others assert that the reporting reveals the incivility of the terrorists and
thus hurts the causes they intend to advance (Martin; Paletz et al.).
A major difficulty in assessing objectivity is that such assessments
are largely in the eyes of the beholder. Those who think FOX News’
reporting of terrorist events is objective will rarely be inclined to see
Al Jazeera’s reporting of the same events as objective, and vice versa.
Many regard both to be biased, with FOX News giving a distinctly pro-
American perspective and Al Jazeera reporting from a strong pro-Arab
perspective. The facts reported by both may in fact be accurate, but the
selection of events reported, people interviewed, and segments shown
may not be at all representative of the respective populations from
which each of these selections is made. The selection may, instead, be
designed to feed the point of view of a particular audience.
What compass should the print and broadcast media journalists
and producers follow to guide them through this thicket of difficul-
ties, balancing the public’s right to know with its right to be protected
from harm? Several treatises have been written on the role of journal-
ists and the standards of professional journalism. Most lists of such
standards include commitments to reporting that is truthful and
unbiased, responsible and in good conscience, engaged and relevant,
comprehensive and proportional. Kovach and Rosentiel explain that
it has been common, but is no longer acceptable, to evade commit-
ments to standards and reduce journalism to simple platitudes like
“We let our work speak for itself.” Instead, they write, “The primary
purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with the information they
need to be free and self-governing” (p. 17). This is particularly essen-
tial, they observe, in emerging nations. In advanced nations, and par-
ticularly the United States, they see another danger – namely, that
“independent journalism may be dissolved in the solvent of commer-
cial communication and synergistic self-promotion” (p. 18). They see
the ideal of a free and independent press threatened for the first time
not just by intrusive governments, but no less by commercial interests
that may conflict with high goals of public service.
Journalism professor Philip Meyer puts it starkly: “Our once noble
calling is increasingly difficult to distinguish from things that look
like journalism but are primarily advertising, press agentry, or enter-

tainment. The pure news audience is drifting away as old readers
die and are replaced by young people hooked on popular culture
and amusement.” Meyer sees the source of the problem in a shift
in media ownership. Faceless investor-owned corporations now run
media outlets that were previously owned by people with a stake in
local communities.
Columnist Jim Hoagland sees the commercialization of media as
having dire consequences for both the responsible coverage of terror-
ism and the larger conversation on national security matters. He sees
this as more disturbing even than the decline of civility in society:
It is not so disturbing that the national political discourse has become

detached from civility. That has been true, and not fatal, at other
periods in American history . . . What is disturbing is that the national
political discourse is increasingly detached from reality. The emo-
tionalism and character assassination practiced by both sides … is
mistaken for “politics.”
Instead of turning out more engineers or scientists, American soci-
ety seems at times more geared to forming consumers, producers
and critics of a particularly bombastic kind of political theater, which
comes in entertainment and information flows that are increasingly
hard to distinguish.
Can the media find a way of controlling itself more responsibly and
effectively in the face of these pressures? If it fails, what recourse can
the public take? Philip Meyer argues that the only way to save jour-
nalism is to develop a new business model that rewards community
service, one “that finds profit in truth, vigilance, and social responsi-
bility.” He observes that the nonprofit sector may be more amenable
to responsible public service journalism, that support from founda-
tions can be a more than suitable complement to conventional com-
mercially supported media. Meyer regards National Public Radio
(NPR) as a suitable model for nonprofit journalism:7
7
Some commentators see NPR and public television as biased (see, e.g., Farhi;
Novak). These criticisms are valid largely to the extent that foundation support
comes disproportionately from either the left or the right and with strings attached,
explicitly or otherwise. Meyer’s argument for the nonprofit model recognizes this
problem; it aims primarily to deal with the problem of commercial pressure for
sensational reporting.
While subscriber support is an important source of its revenue, more

than 40 percent comes from foundation and corporate sponsors.
NPR keeps a policy manual that spells out the limits of permissible
relationships with funders. It does not allow grants that are narrowly
restricted to coincide with a donor’s economic or advocacy interest.
There are other prominent nonprofit broadcast media outlets,

including C-SPAN and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, cre-
ated by Congress in 1967. C-SPAN is significant for its distinctly non-
commercial format and educational mission. It presents unedited
broadcasts of lectures, Congressional hearings, academic panel dis-
cussions, and book reviews on matters of public interest, policy, inter-
national affairs, science, politics, economics, literature, health, the
environment, and ethics.
One of the distinctive features of the nonprofit broadcasting
media is that it presents more thoughtful, less sensational coverage
of critical issues. Thus, nonprofit broadcasting offers an answer to
William Raspberry’s lament of the “death of nuance” in contempo-
rary media:
Some of the blame for the death of nuance must be laid to the mind-
less divisiveness of those cable news outlets that treat politics as a
blood sport. It’s hard to acknowledge that the other guy maybe has a
point when he is determined to prove to the world that you have no
point whatsoever. Nuance starts to sound wimpy.
Clearly, there are many ways to strengthen the ability of media to serve
the public more effectively in the era of terrorism. Paul Wilkinson,
director of the St. Andrews University Centre for the Study of Terrorism
and Political Violence, reminds us that the stakes are high and advises
that the media should strive not to serve the interests of terrorism. He
recalls Margaret Thatcher’s metaphor: “Democratic nations must try
to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of
publicity on which they depend.” He concludes that this can be done
without sacrificing the high standards of professional journalism.
THE ROLE OF POLITICS
The media are not alone in feeding and inflating our fears. Politicians
have learned as well that playing to the voters’ fear of crime and
terrorism can win elections, and failure to do so can end political

careers. In a televised debate with George H.W. Bush, in the presi-
dential election of 1988, Michael Dukakis was asked about his oppo-
sition to capital punishment: Would he not support the death penalty
for a hypothetical offender who had raped his wife? His deliberate,
bland response, together with his having been held accountable for
a heinous crime committed by convicted felon Willie Horton follow-
ing a furlough release while Dukakis was governor of Massachusetts,
all but sealed Mr. Bush’s victory. Few presidential candidates of either
political party have expressed opposition to the death penalty since
the Bush-Dukakis election, and it has become common practice for a
political candidate to seek political advantage by “Willie Hortonizing”
the opponent, attempting to persuade the electorate that the oppo-
nent is weak on crime.
In the 2004 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate John
Kerry accused the Bush Administration of waging a thoughtless, insen-
sitive response to terrorism, and that the result was a less secure United
States. Vice President Cheney responded with this retort: “America
has been in too many wars for any of our wishes, but not a one of them
was won by being sensitive” (Milbank and Hsu). The pair of quotes
that open this chapter, by Cheney and Kerry respectively, reflect the
continuation of this sort of rhetoric in the presidential election of
2004. Though many saw the Bush team as the leading fear-mongers,
sociologist Frank Furedi (2004) wrote that the “politics of fear” tran-
scends the political divide: “In fact, Kerry is a far more sophisticated
practitioner of the politics of fear than his Republican opponents.”
Politicians who avoid fueling the fires of fear can be found in both
major political parties, but many other politicians across the politi-
cal spectrum have shown little hesitancy to exploit public fears about
threats to domestic and foreign security in order to win votes, and
they appear to be able to do so with impunity.
Parents often aim to overcome their children’s lack of awareness
of real dangers such as street traffic – and mythical ones such as
razor blades in Halloween apples – by magnifying the risks, hoping
to replace their children’s inexperience with protective information,
however distorted. They often take the opposite approach to deal
with imaginary threats such as monsters under the bed by reading
calming bedtime stories. Paternalistic governments may be inclined
to treat their citizens in much the same way, blowing some risks out
of proportion and enacting overly protective laws – Furedi (2002b)
and Sunstein (2005) refer to this as the “precautionary principle”8 –
and underplaying others, especially when special interest groups (the
tobacco lobby is a prominent example) make such distortions attrac-
tive. One of the characteristic strengths of an established free society
is a bond of mutual trust and responsibility between the elected and
the governed: Government ensures that the information the public
has about domestic and foreign threats is accurate and balanced, and
it trusts them to handle the information responsibly. Terrorism can
erode this cohesion, and politicians who use terrorism for political
ends may accelerate the erosion.
Clearly, effective political leadership is the critical alternative to
political pandering, especially in the face of threats to national secu-
rity. One has only to consider Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s
effective exhortations to the people of England, and Londoners in
particular, to be courageous in the face of brutal and incessant blitz-
krieg bombings by the Germans in World War II. He led both by both
word and example, holding cabinet meetings at 10 Downing Street
rather than in bunkers, often well into the dangerous nighttime as
bombs exploded nearby. The people followed Churchill’s lead, and
the courage of the British helped first to enable them to survive the
attacks and carry on, and eventually to contribute in significant ways
to the defeat of Germany. (On the occasion of his eightieth birth-
day, in 1955, Churchill remarked that it was Britain that “had the
lion’s heart,” that he merely “had the luck to be called upon to give
the roar.”) A memorable display of fear-reduction leadership echoing
Churchill’s was revealed by New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani in the hours
and days following the 2001 attack on the World Trade Towers.
FEAR AND PUBLIC POLICY
Can we reduce the problem of terrorism by managing the public’s fear

of it? We can address this question first by considering the relevance
8
Frank Furedi (2002b): “The aftermath of 11 September has given legitimacy to
the principle of precaution, with risk increasingly seen as something you suffer
from, rather than something you manage.” Cass Sunstein’s 2005 book, Laws of
Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle , addresses the consequences of the problem.
to terrorism of fear-management strategies for conventional crimes.

Then we can consider how those strategies might not apply to terror-
ism and how additional strategies might be appropriate.
Fear-reduction strategies for conventional crime were first insti-
tuted in the 1980s, when police departments introduced them as an
essential part of the community policing movement. A centerpiece of
those programs was the idea that the police should be in closer contact
with the public – largely through the use of foot patrols, bike patrols,
the establishment of mini-precincts in local neighborhoods, and new
incentive systems to induce police officers to become less authoritar-
ian and more service-oriented (Cordner; Skogan). These programs
spread to the courts and correctional sectors and to the community
at large in the form of neighborhood-watch networks, thus making
the control of fear a central element of community-oriented criminal
justice systems, a complement to conventional court-centered strate-
gies for preventing street crime. Many of these practices and policies
may be applicable to the problem of terrorism, where the stakes may
be much higher. Local authorities, after all, see acts of terrorism as
extreme violent crimes under state law. From their perspective, these
fear-management interventions should be highly relevant and useful.
At the same time, however, some fear-reduction interventions for
street crimes may be more relevant and practical than others for the
prevention of terrorism. Effective outreach programs to mosques in
neighborhoods with Muslim populations, for example, are likely to
be more useful to deal with fear within both the Muslim and non-
Muslim communities in those areas than programs aimed at remov-
ing graffiti. We would do well, in any case, to consider the full range
of fear-reduction strategies and interventions to ensure that policies
and practices that are applicable to the public’s fear of terrorism are
not overlooked. These programs have proven their value in neighbor-
hoods throughout the United States, and they are likely to have paral-
lel applicability for individuals and institutions, public and private, to
reduce the destructive effects of the fear of terrorism. At the federal
level, homeland security officials are authorized and responsible as
well to consider approaches that will effectively manage the public’s
level of fear to ensure that it is neither excessively high nor too low
relative to objective threat levels.
To the extent that elevated fear is a key objective of acts of terror,

public policy makers would do well to focus not only on interven-
tions against terrorists and the protection of targets, but as well on
managing the public’s fear of terrorism. Fear is not an immutable
given, a phenomenon over which we have no control. It is manage-
able, both for individuals and groups, and by both public and private
interveners.
It is important, first, to be clear that the total elimination of fear
is neither an attainable nor a desirable goal. Just as it would not be
healthy to eliminate pain altogether, so would it be unsafe to seek a
way to eliminate fear altogether. Some level of fear is necessary for us
to feel compelled to take ourselves out of the path of immediate dan-
ger, and then to take measures to counter the sources of the danger
(de Becker). In the case of both crime and terrorism, the goal should
be twofold: (1) to make accurate objective assessments of the risks of
threats, and then realign subjective assessments of the risks so that
they correspond to the objective assessments, and (2) to remove ele-
ments of fear that serve no useful purpose. In much the same way that
we can consider frameworks to assist us in finding an optimal balance
of security and liberty, and can assess criminal sanctions in terms of
the total social costs of crimes and sanctions (Forst), so might we do
well to consider policies that aim for optimal levels of fear for various
threats, levels that balance the cost of fear with the cost of victimiza-
tion averted by fear. Though the social costs of fear are not easily cal-
culated, consideration of social costs provides a framework that helps
identify the key factors for consideration and determine how to orga-
nize them coherently to provide a basis for assessing public policy.
AN AGENDA FOR REDUCING THE SOCIAL COSTS OF FEAR
We have noted that Mayor Rudolph Giuliani showed exemplary lead-

ership skills in the days after the 2001 terrorist attack on New York
City. Two years later he remarked, “Courage is not the absence of fear;
rather it is the management of fear” (Gambrell).
How might policy makers and public officials begin to think about
the management of the public’s fear? At the local level, fear-reduction
strategies that have been a key aspect of successful community policing
programs can be tailored to deal with fear of terrorism, as we have

noted. At the federal level, just as effective energy policy cannot ignore
the public’s insatiable demand for and often wasteful consumption of
scarce energy resources, so must an effective terrorism policy recog-
nize the importance of interventions that deal effectively with a parallel
problem on the demand side of terrorism: dysfunctional fear. Strategies
for managing the public’s fear of terrorism might be developed in
such a way that satisfies both liberals and conservatives alike. Neither
group can take comfort in the prospect that we may have actually con-
tributed to our insecurity and misallocated resources along the way by
placating exaggerated public fears – for example, by overemphasizing
airport security at the expense of vulnerability at ports, nuclear and
chemical facilities, and other critical and no less vulnerable targets.
Several authorities have argued persuasively that such misallocations
have been induced by misplaced fears (Fallows; Applebaum). Systems
of accountability used by the Office of Homeland Security and associ-
ated agencies can be reshaped to support fear management as a legiti-
mate goal of those agencies.
One basic approach to the public management of fear is to treat
excessive fear as a public health problem. Under such a strategy, the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services could be directed to
develop a coherent and comprehensive set of programs for prevent-
ing and responding to the problem (Butler, Panzer, and Goldfrank).
John Braithwaite’s suggestion (see Chapter 16) that we might be
much better off treating terrorism as a public health problem than
to demonize terrorists and thus feed their hunger for martyrdom, as
we have, would surely facilitate a program of treating fear as a public
health problem too.
Sunstein has proposed the strengthening of deliberative democra-
cies to help manage fear (2005). He has proposed, in particular, a
federal risk-assessment agency to collect data and conduct research
aimed at reducing actual risks and better aligning objective and sub-
jective risk levels (2002). He notes that a significant barrier to the
adoption of such reform is that public-minded administrators who
dismiss the public’s irrationality are often overruled by populist poli-
ticians who respond to parochial agendas and short-term concerns,
however irresponsible for the nation as a whole, as well as to public
concerns of the moment, however irrational and shortsighted (2002,

2005). He adds that education and public information can help to
restore rational deliberation to the process. Tharoor (2005) has
suggested along a similar line that the media, for too long a source
of fear-mongering, is capable of serving no less as an instrument of
education and tolerance.
Protection of the public is the first responsibility of government,
and misplaced fears undermine public safety. The effective public
management of fear is central to this responsibility of government.
In cases of extreme abuse of the media’s responsibility not to harm
the public, the courts may be able to step in to provide protections.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed in the landmark 1917 case of
Schenck v. United States, “The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater, and caus-
ing a panic.” This could apply as well to needlessly incendiary media
accounts of violence or threats of violence.
Effective, credible leadership is extremely important. It creates a
bond of trust between the government and the governed, a contract
in which the people will follow loyally and manage their fear respon-
sibly when they have sufficient reason to believe that the govern-
ment is leveling with them without divulging information that helps
terrorists needlessly – that is, when the government attains a proper
balance between liberty and security. On February 23, 1942, Franklin
D. Roosevelt, spoke words that echoed Churchill’s effective leader-
ship across the Atlantic Ocean in the same war effort: “Your govern-
ment has unmistakable confidence in your ability to hear the worst,
without flinching or losing heart. You must, in turn, have complete
confidence that your government is keeping nothing from you except
information that will help the enemy in his attempt to destroy us.”
When leadership of this sort fails to emerge, or when effective
leaders get assassinated – an all-too-frequent occurrence in places
most desperately in need of effective leaders – nongovernmental
organizations and responsible citizens are left to find ways to fill the
void. In such cases ordinary citizens must become extraordinary; they
must step up and become leaders. Extraordinary courage in the face
of extreme terror has been displayed by citizens in India, Iraq, and
Israel in recent years, even in the absence of a Churchill-like figure.
The day after a series of bombings on commuter trains in Mumbai

(formerly Bombay) killed over 200 people in 2008, Mumbai’s tracks
were cleared, trains resumed their routes, and the Bombay Stock
Exchange’s stock index rose by 3 percent9 (Wonacott and Bellman).
Some portion of fear is, of course, unmanageable. Fear is, after
all, in our genes, a natural survival instinct. Yet when such biological
instincts get out of hand and worsen and the dangers we confront, it
is precisely the capacity of humans to reason – to “get a grip” on our-
selves under stress – that has contributed immeasurably to the resil-
ience of our species.
We have good reason to fear terrorism, surely more so today than
prior to September 11, 2001, but we will do well to keep the risks that
terrorism poses to our national security in perspective. Cataclysmic
risks were more immediate in the United States in World War II and
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and people in most other countries
have been considerably more exposed to terrorism than have people
in the United States. There is no cause for alarm if we take reasonable
and effective measures to neutralize persons who have demonstrated
a clear intent to commit acts of terrorism, if we protect the primary
targets of terrorism, and if we can manage to manage our fear. The
9/11 attack revealed that concerns of the U.S. government and its
citizens about terrorism had been inadequate, that the risks exceeded
our fear (Clarke). Today fear is the greater problem, and it is danger-
ous because of the strong tendency for it to feed on itself, to make us
behave badly, to allow our instincts to overcome our ability to think.
Perhaps our greatest challenge is to master our capacity to “get a grip”
when confronted with real danger.
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Anne Applebaum, “Finding Things to Fear,” Washington Post (September

24, 2003), p. A29 M.
Cherif Bassiouni, “Media Coverage of Terrorism,” Journal of Communica-
tion, Volume 32 (1982), pp. 128–143.
9
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh offered helpful words of inspiration to his peo-
ple, but Wonacott and Bellman attribute India’s strength in the face of terror to the
indomitable spirit of ordinary people, a deep understanding that life must go on.
Adrienne Stith Butler, Allison M. Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank, editors,

Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health
Strategy (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2003).
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(New York: Free Press, 2004).
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Gary W. Cordner, “Fear of Crime and the Police, An Evaluation of a
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Paul Farhi, “Public Broadcasting Targeted By House,” Washington Post
(June 10, 2005), p. A1.
James Fallows, “Success Without Victory: A ‘Containment’ Strategy for the
Age of Terror,” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 295, No. 1 (January/February
2005).
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“The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits,” in The
Perception of Risk, edited by Paul Slovic (London: Earthscan, 2000),
reprinted from the Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Volume 13
(2000), pp. 1–17.
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Thomas, 1969).
Brian Forst, Errors of Justice: Nature, Sources and Remedies (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Frank Furedi, Culture of Fear: Risk-Taking and the Morality of Low Expectation
(Continuum, 2002).
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Jon Gambrell, “Courage is Managing Fear, says Giuliani: Ex-NY Mayor
Talks at Miami U,” Cincinnati Enquirer (November 19, 2003).
Karen Gardela and Bruce Hoffman, The Rand Chronology of International
Terrorism for 1986 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation Report
R-3890-RC, 1990).
Judith Rich Harris, No Two Alike: Human Nature and Human Individuality
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).
Linda Heath, “Impact of Newspaper Crime Reports on Fear of Crime: A
Methodological Investigation,” Journal of Personality and Social
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Jim Hoagland, “Politics as Theater,” Washington Post (August 18, 2005),
p. A21.
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(August 2005), pp. 623–59.
Brian M. Jenkins and Janera Johnson, International Terrorism: A Chronology,
1968–1974, report prepared for Department of State and Defense
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Emotional Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998).
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America’s War Against Terrorism (Harper-Collins, 1988).
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1979).
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it Pays,” Columbia Journalism Review, Issue 6 (November–December
2004).
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(September 8, 2004), p. A1.
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(March 21, 2005), p. A19.
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chapter thirteen
Should Profiling Be Used to Prevent

Terrorism?
A. Daktari Alexander
INTRODUCTION
The use of racial profiling as a crime control measure is not new, nor
is it a sophisticated or unique approach to controlling or preventing
crime. Since the beginning of law enforcement in the United States,
people, groups, and societies have sought ways to distinguish crimi-
nals from others.
One of the most significant and stark examples of racial profiling
in the express interest of national security was the internment (i.e.,
imprisonment) of Japanese and Japanese Americans living in the
United States during World War II. The day after the December 7,
1941, attack of the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii by military
forces from Japan, the United States entered the war. All Japanese
people residing in the United States were seen as potential threats to
the security of the country because it was believed that they would aid
the enemy Japanese. The threat was felt more acutely on the Pacific
coast, prompting legislators in California, Oregon, and Washington
states to forcefully advocate that something be done to reduce or
remove the threat of future attacks by any Japanese (Nagata; Ng).1
1
Both Nagata and Ng discuss not only the internment of Japanese and Japanese
Americans during the Second World War, but also what internees were feeling at
the time. For example, according to Nagata, even though civil liberties of Japanese
Americans were violated, this did not immediately result in a call for justice from
those who were interned. To be considered loyal Americans, most would not openly
oppose any policy that would go against a presidential or congressional order in
time of war, even though the order clearly violated the Constitution that the war
seemed so desperate to protect.
300
should profiling be used to prevent terrorism? 301
On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order

9066, which resulted in the forcible internment of people of Japanese
ancestry residing in the United States. This order gave the authority
to the secretary of war to establish designated areas where certain per-
sons could be restricted to prevent sabotage and espionage against the
United States, and to prevent interference with the “successful pros-
ecution of the war” (Executive Order 9066, 1942).2 About 120,000
2
In 1942, President Roosevelt instituted Executive Order No. 9066, which autho-
rized the secretary of war to prescribe military areas, and stated the following:
“Whereas the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protec-
tion against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, nation-
al-defense premises, and national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of
April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat.
1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U.S.C., Title 50, Sec. 104);
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United
States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and
direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from
time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such
action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such
extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which
any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any
person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the
Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discre-
tion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such
area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other
accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or
the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accom-
plish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region
or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the
Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall
supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said
Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.
I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military
Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander
may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to
each Military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use
of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance
of state and local agencies.
I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent
establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the
said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the fur-
nishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land,
shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services.
This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the author-
ity heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941,
nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigation of alleged acts of
sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department
Japanese and Japanese Americans were rounded up and placed in

internment camps in the western United States. In addition to being
imprisoned, many of those interned had their property confiscated,
including homes and businesses.
Today, the predominant view regarding the internment of Japanese
and Japanese Americans during World War II is that it was racist and
wrong. Apologies and reparations have been made to the individuals
and families affected by the internment, and there is no evidence that
any Japanese or Japanese Americans residing in the United States had
anything to do with the attack at Pearl Harbor, or had any plans to
further attack the United States.
More than a half a century later, the U.S. government declared war
in response to terrorist attacks on its soil by Muslim terrorists from the
Middle East. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
the U.S. government believed that future attacks would occur, and
that these could be more lethal through the use of biological, chemi-
cal, nuclear, and radiological weapons. Fear of subsequent terrorist
events induced a severe retaliatory response from the United States,
both military and domestic, all in the name of a “war on terrorism.”
This chapter seeks to present a commentary on the use of ethnic
and racial profiling as justified by that “war.” Since the terror attacks
of 2001, a great deal of law enforcement energy and resources have
been directed toward prevention of subsequent terrorist incidents.3
Overwhelmingly, the focus of law enforcement has been toward
Muslims and Arabs with connections or ties to the Middle East, an area
that has been described as a breeding ground for terrorists. There is a
concern that this type of government scrutiny adversely affects those
of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regula-

tions for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and respon-
sibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder.
Signed, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE WHITE HOUSE, February 19, 1942.”
3
Costs of the war on terrorism have been documented by the National Priorities
Project (NPP): “To date, four supplemental requests have been made by the
Administration for funding, and Congress has appropriated funding with minor
changes. The first included approximately $54.4 billion for the Iraq War (enacted
in April 2003); the second $70.6 billion (enacted November 2003), the third $21.5
billion (passed as part of regular appropriations for the Department of Defense
for fiscal year 2005); and the fourth $58 billion (enacted April 2005).” <http://
nationalpriorities.org; accessed October 1, 2005>
who are Muslim but not affiliated with any terrorist group. Accordingly,
this discussion of profiling will touch on the fairness and legitimacy of
ethnic and racial profiling, and it will discuss the effectiveness of such
profiling as a crime control and counterterrorism tool.
In this commentary on ethnic profiling and terrorism, I will present
several hypotheses that attempt to explain or establish a point of ref-
erence for the practice of racial profiling. The hypotheses presented
may be tested using past and present experiences and knowledge and
anticipated future experiences. It is important to recognize, along the
way, the legal and ethical side of racial and ethnic profiling. This is of
such overarching significance that the U.S. Congress, in 1868, rati-
fied the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
guaranteeing individuals due process of the law and equal protection
under the law. More recently, the U.S. government has explicitly stated
that neither race nor ethnicity should be used as a sole factor in deci-
sions to stop, search, detain, or arrest individuals, and that doing so
constitutes a violation of one’s constitutional rights.4
WHAT IS RACIAL PROFILING?
Researchers in the area of criminal justice and criminology have

defined racial profiling as “the use of race as a key factor in police
decisions to stop and interrogate citizens” (Weitzer and Tuch, p. 435);
“[T]he use of race or ethnicity as a factor in demarcating people for
differential treatment or close scrutiny” (Domke et al., p. 606); and
“[T]he use of race as an indicator in a profile of criminal suspects”
(Walker, Spohn, and DeLeon, 1999, p. 111.) Racial profiling has also
4
Racial profiling is not an officially accepted practice by the United States govern-
ment. A June 17, 2003, six-page Fact Sheet on Racial Profi ling by the United States
Department of Justice contains a quote from Attorney General John Ashcroft that
states, “This administration … has been opposed to racial profiling and has done
more to indicate its opposition than ever in history. The President said it’s wrong
and we’ll end it in America, and I subscribe to that. Using race … as a proxy for
potential criminal behavior is unconstitutional, and it undermines law enforce-
ment by undermining the confidence that people can have in law enforcement.”
The fact sheet further states, “Racial profiling sends the dehumanizing message to
our citizens that they are judged by the color of their skin and harms the criminal
justice system by eviscerating the trust that is necessary if law enforcement is to
effectively protect our communities.”
been described as “the use of race as a criterion in police decision

making during discretionary traffic and field interrogation stops”
(Engel and Calnon; Engel, Calnon, and Bernard). The U.S. govern-
ment defines racial profiling as “any police-initiated action that relies
on race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than the behavior of an
individual or information that leads police to a particular individual
who has been identified as being or having been engaged in criminal
activity” (Pampel, p. 5).
The use of race in profiling occurs either (1) when race is the
only factor of the individual and there is a direct link between crim-
inality and race, or (2) when a person’s race is the primary factor
used to screen the individual for a crime, and there is an indirect (or
diffuse) link between criminality and race, so that other factors must
be present in order to make the connection between race and crime
(Pampel). Amnesty International has defined racial profiling as “the
targeting of individuals and groups by law enforcement officials, even
partially, on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion,
except where there is trustworthy information, relevant to the local-
ity and timeframe, that links persons belonging to one of the afore-
mentioned groups to an identified criminal incident or scheme” (p.
v). In general, these definitions of racial profiling indicate that race
or ethnicity is a key factor in the decision of law enforcement to con-
sider an individual as a criminal suspect. Furthermore, police officers
who are racists use race differently in the decision to search minority
motorists than in the decision to search a white motorist. An example
suggested is that a racist police officer may search all available black
motorists, “but only young drivers driving late-model cars with tinted
windows and counterculture bumper stickers when it comes to White
motorists” (Harcourt, 2004, p. 1307).
Another view regarding racial profiling is that it does not exist.
Instead, the term criminal profiling is more accurate. Criminal pro-
filing “may include such things as a person’s race, manner of dress
and grooming, behavioral characteristics, when and where the obser-
vation is made, the circumstances under which the observation
is made, and relative to information the officer/investigator may
already possess” (Fredrickson and Siljander, p. 28). Under this per-
spective, criminal profiling focuses on the behavior of the individual,
not primarily the individual’s race, although it might be a mediating

factor (Bumgarner).
Who is Affected by Racial Profiling and How are They Affected?

Although racial profiling may affect white as well as black Americans,
blacks and other minorities are most likely to be racially profiled due
to their minority status. Because whites in the United States have more
power (political, social, and economic) than other racial groups, they
are rarely subject to profiling (Pampel). This is a key issue for those
concerned about racial profiling. Is there a differential impact on
racial and ethnic minorities? If so, what is the nature and extent of
the impact?
Many have voiced concerns about the fundamental unfairness
of racial profiling, and that racial profiling may result in “the wide-
spread investigation and mistreatment of racial minorities and the
tension between racial minority communities and law enforcement
agencies” (Banks, 2003, p. 573). The profiling of racial and ethnic
minorities may, in fact, contribute to the beliefs that (1) individuals
from minority groups are criminal or have criminal tendencies, and
(2) individuals from minority groups are responsible for committing
most crimes. Because race is used to define who is criminal, there is
an expectation of criminal intent. Ideally, one of the goals of any type
of profiling should be to establish the ability to discern which persons
within certain groups are criminals or terrorists. Ultimately, one of
the goals of crime policy should focus on how to selectively incarcer-
ate the small numbers of very high-risk criminals that are responsible
for most crimes (Alexander and Bernard; Colvin; Moffitt).
Another factor that is not brought out explicitly in the discussion of
racial profiling is that racial and ethnic profiling captures or expresses
the visual and physical differences among members of society. If indi-
viduals look different in skin color or other physical or cultural aspects
in contrast to the majority in society, then those minority individuals
might be subject to scrutiny because an expectation is created that
they will also be different in other ways. These expectations and beliefs
require very little, if any, empirical support to be accepted as fact.
Here are a few examples to illustrate this point: (1) After the attack on
Pearl Harbor, all Japanese persons were seen as a threat to the United
States. (2) Most young black males are seen as potential criminals,
especially violent ones. (3) After September 11, 2001, all Arab- or
Middle Eastern-looking males were viewed by many as terrorists or
potential terrorists. Interestingly, after the bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995 – which was,
until the 9/11 attack, described as the “worst domestic terror attack
in U.S. history” (Henderson, p. 123) – there was no public outcry to
view all young white males as potential deadly terrorists, nor was there
widespread belief that young white males would develop into terror-
ists capable of replicating this type of terrorist act.
In addition to the visual differences that make it easier to pro-
file racial and ethnic minorities, population size is also a factor that
makes this type of profiling easy to administer. It would be difficult,
if not impossible, for law enforcement to scrutinize every white male
between twenty-five and thirty-five years of age. It is more efficient to
scrutinize minority populations because they are fewer in number,
have less social, economic, and political power to refuse such scrutiny,
and they show up disproportionately as convicted offenders.
How is Racial Profiling Being Used?

Racial profiling is exclusively used as a crime control or anticrime
strategy. On one side of racial profiling are individuals or groups that
do not fit the profile and do not merit the attention of criminal justice
officials. These are the people that we do not hear about in media
reports of racial bias in policing. Furthermore, the number of indi-
viduals excluded from a profile is not known. On the other side, are
individuals who do fit the profile and thus merit additional attention
from law enforcement.
Over the past two decades, racial profiling has been synonymous
with reports of young black males being harassed by police, who
were aggressively pursing those involved in the illegal drug trade
as a result of the war on drugs (Becker, 2004; Engle and Calnon;
Engle, Calnon, and Bernard).5 This has contributed immeasurably
to the over-incarceration of blacks over the past several decades.
5
Becker (2004) reports similar rates of drug use among blacks and whites, although
the types and amounts may vary for the individual user.
More recently, the term “driving while black” (DWB) has been used
to express the process of treatment and harassment experienced by
African American motorists who are stopped by police because they
fit a particular profile, but are not involved in any illegal activities. In
the case of DWB, police use pretext-stops of vehicles in order to con-
duct vehicle searches for illegal drugs.
How Effective is Racial Profiling in Reducing Crime?

According to both Howard S. Becker (1963) and Stan Becker
(2004), if you target those believed to be criminal, you will find the
criminal. However, they come to the same conclusion for different
reasons: Howard Becker, as well as other labeling theorists (e.g.,
Goffman; Lemert; Merton), believes that if you target those believed
to be criminal, you are more likely to create a criminal; whereas Stan
Becker assumes no relationship between the treatment of certain
groups by law enforcement and the group’s reaction to that treat-
ment. In general, racial profiling disproportionately affects certain
ethnic and racial groups. For example, Becker (2004) argues that
because certain crimes vary by race, a comparison based on “respec-
tive percentages” to test for racial profiling is not an appropriate com-
parison, though many scholars would argue that crime rates vary by
race because of differential law enforcement, not differential involve-
ment (Beckett; Walker, Spohn, and De Lone).
Differential law enforcement of minority groups as criminal sus-
pects assumes that other groups do not engage in criminal behavior,
or the likelihood that other groups do not engage in such behavior
is rather low. Though such assumptions may be verifiable empirically,
they are most often based on beliefs, stereotypes, practices, and expe-
riences, which may be slow to recognize emerging trends in behav-
ior. For example, the long-held belief that upper- and middle-class
youth did not commit crime because there was little financial need to
do so, in contrast to youth from lower socioeconomic backgrounds,
has been shown repeatedly to be empirically invalid (Cloward and
Ohlin; Merton).
Do arrests based on racial profiling reduce crime? Unfortunately,
the research on racial profiling does not answer this question. Most of
the empirical research on racial profiling is cross-sectional and lacks
both an historical context (especially regarding drug laws and their

enforcement) and a coherent sociological framework. In addition,
the current state of research on racial profiling is able to infer only
that racial profiling is occurring, and this is accomplished chiefly as a
result of the disproportionality of minority group involvement in the
criminal justice system. As Engel, Calnon, and Bernard discuss in their
review of the research, unless we know why individuals are stopped
and searched by law enforcement, it is difficult to know for certain
that racial profiling has occurred. In addition, the authors stated that
an “officer’s discretionary decision making differed for White and
non-White Citizens” (p. 269). It is not known whether disproportion-
ality is indicative of racial profiling. If we are to find out if racial profil-
ing has occurred, and in order to explain officers’ behavior, we need
to know why the officer performed the stop.
Should crime policy use a race-based approach? Should terrorism
policy use an ethnically based approach? It will be useful, first, to know
why law enforcement agents target particular groups. If they use such
profiling, it will be essential to measure its effectiveness in reducing
the crimes for which people are profiled. If racial profiling has no
effect, it will be both ineffective and immoral, especially in light of
the disproportionate number of racial and ethnic minorities already
under criminal justice supervision.
These problems are no less important in screening for terrorism.
The conventional argument is as follows: “The facts relating to terror-
ism remain clear: Islamic anti-American terrorism almost by definition
involves Muslims from the Middle East or Asia. A system of random
screening that ignores this fact can easily miss potential terrorists and
threaten the safety of flyers” (Pampel, p. 22).
However, unlike screening for crime, anti-terrorism screening
should evolve through methods that allow for a greater possibility of
future attacks that is not limited to past experiences. For example,
focusing counterterrorism efforts at airports may open the door to
rail, bus, or train vulnerability (such as the terror attacks in London
on July 7, 2005).
What Can We Conclude about Racial and Ethnic Profiling?

Racial and ethnic profiling targets a class or group of people, but
may not effectively target crime or terrorism. Racial profiling has
contributed to the increased entry of blacks and other minorities,

especially Hispanics, into the criminal justice system. This type of law
enforcement strategy could be described as selective incapacitation,
but it has not been shown to effectively reduce crime. Furthermore,
incapacitation is an expensive, resource-consuming crime control strat-
egy that may not be justified by its crime-reducing effects. Moreover,
the causes of crime may not be reflected in changes in crime control
strategies or changes in law. For example, targeting young black males
for arrest and confinement does not reduce crime in general, but it
may reduce or affect crime committed among this group due to an
incapacitation effect. However, by focusing law enforcement efforts
on one group does not mean that this is the only group participat-
ing in criminal behavior. It simply means that society has determined
that particular groups require greater law enforcement focus, and
using race as the primary decision point about who is criminal and
who is not criminal places some individuals at greater risk of racial
profiling.
Racial profiling makes those in power feel empowered and safe
(to some degree) because it provides temporary control in situations
where one has little to no control over a particular outcome (e.g., a
terrorist bombing or violent crime rates), but one needs to show that
they are doing something to reduce or alleviate the particular out-
come of interest. Racial profiling is tolerated primarily because it does
not affect those in power.
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

RELATED TO RACIAL PROFILING
Banks, Eberhardt and Ross (2006) argue that that there is a societal
consensus against racial discrimination, but this consensus against
racial discrimination becomes unattainable as a practical reality
because we exist in a racially stratified society. For example, after
September 11, persons of Middle Eastern descent in the United
States, particularly young adult males, were greatly suspected of being
terrorists or having information about possible terrorists; thousands
were interviewed and hundreds were taken into police custody and
charged as terrorists, despite having no history of or affiliation with
terrorism.
There is no agreement about the conditions under which racial

profiling can be “legitimately and constitutionally used in policing” to
reduce crime (Harcourt 2004, p. 1279); however, Harcourt describes
technical distinctions to racial profiling. For example, when con-
sidering the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
which protects persons from unreasonable searches and seizures by
state officials, and is extended to places where individuals have a right
to expect privacy, race is used either exclusively or as one of many
factors. If race is used as one of many factors, then there is techni-
cally no discrimination. Thus, the degree to which race plays a part
in the search must be disentangled from other factors to show racial
discrimination.
When considering the Fourteenth Amendment, which dictates a
due process to protect an individual’s rights against infringement by
state and local government officials, the Amendment provides that
“… no State shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.” The technical distinctions
related to a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment are profiling
without individualized suspicion (i.e., race or ethnicity used as the
only factor in deciding who may be detained and arrested) or the use
of eyewitness identification that includes information about race. If
race is used as part of eyewitness identification, then there is techni-
cally no discrimination.
Whren v. United States (1996) suggests that race can legitimately be
considered as a factor in the determination to stop an individual so
long as the police independently have reasonable suspicion (Harcourt;
Pampel). Moreover, according to Harcourt, police use of racial pro-
filing is constitutionally acceptable if (1) racial profiling reduces
the amount of the profiled crime (if it does not then the practice
is counterproductive); (2) while maintaining or increasing the effi-
cient allocation of police resources; (3) without producing a “ratchet
effect” on the profiled population” (p. 1279). A ratchet effect occurs
when racial profiling creates a supervised population disproportion-
ate to the distribution of offending by racial group (Stuntz, 2002).
Thus, there can be no, “disproportionate collateral consequences on
the profiled population” in order for racial profiling to be constitu-

tionally acceptable (Harcourt, 2004, p. 1280), but this standard is
seldom considered problematic.
TERRORISM
Prior to September 11, 2001, the risk of a terrorist attack in the United
States by foreign or domestic entities was relatively low in contrast to
terrorism attacks in other nations (Henderson). In fact, many schol-
ars and experts on terrorism focused their discussions on Europe,
eastern Europe, and the Middle East, including Russia, Italy, West
Germany, Ireland, Spain, Algeria, Israel, and Iran (e.g., see Crenshaw,
1983;1995).
Terrorism and Profiling

According to Henderson, the United States government defines
terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpe-
trated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clan-
destine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (p. 4),
but Henderson cautions that this definition may lack completeness,
because it does not include “how terrorism relates to other forms of
violence or to violent action by government itself” (p. 5). In order
to define terrorism, we must know not only what violence is commit-
ted by antigovernment groups, but also if government retaliation in
response to terrorism is also terroristic.
However, in general, terrorism refers to the threat or use of vio-
lence to intimidate or coerce, usually for political purposes. Terrorism
produces a state of fear in society, regardless of how small the actual
risk of attack. Continued or prolonged terrorism may erode public
confidence in a government’s ability to protect its citizens.
Profiling for terrorists is a natural outgrowth of a declaration of war
against all terrorists. War is a large-scale campaign intended to destroy
an enemy with little regard for immediate consequences. Civil liberties
and other legislative protections afforded individuals tend to become
less important in times of war. In 2006, over 500 individuals were held
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, believed to be enemy combatants who posed
a terrorist threat to the United States.6 These individuals were denied

civil liberties and procedural safeguards that are usually afforded those
presumed to have committed crimes. Ethnic profiling was practiced on
a much wider, although considerably less intrusive, scale at all points of
entry to the United States following the 9/11 attack.
The use of racial profiling in terrorism assumes that terrorists
come primarily in certain shapes and sizes. This is a limited view; it
does not include dynamic or emerging aspects of terror. For exam-
ple, current profiles may not be valid for future predictions of ter-
rorist attacks, perhaps in response to profiling. As we learned from
the 2002 Washington, DC–area sniper experience, profiles based on
race may be erroneous and therefore misleading in the investigation
and apprehension of criminals.7 In Baghdad, it was reported in 2005
that a female suicide bomber, disguised as a man, was responsible for
killing six and wounding thirty people.8
Who are the Terrorists?

In defining a terrorist, Horowitz confines his description to ideology
and does not mention race, ethnicity, or national origin (86). The
6
As to the number of detainees, on September 12, 2005 the Department of Defense
(DOD) announced the transfer of one detainee from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
(GTMO): “Prior to this transfer, [the] DOD has transferred or released 245
detainees from GTMO – 177 for release, and 68 transferred to other governments
(29 to Pakistan, five to Morocco, seven to France, seven to Russia, four to Saudi
Arabia, two to Spain, one to Sweden, one to Kuwait, one to Australia, nine to Great
Britain and two to Belgium). There are approximately 505 detainees currently at
Guantanamo.”
7
Blacks were ruled out as suspects in the incidents of sniper rifle attacks that ter-
rorized the Washington, DC area during the fall of 2002. To this end, agents for
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and local law enforcement profi led and
believed the suspect to a white male acting alone, allowing John Muhammad and
Lee Boyd Malvo, who are both African American, to escape detection for weeks.
As to mistaken identity in racial profiling, Jonathan D. Glater, in a New York Times
article (June 22, 2003) stated that racial profiling is problematic when people
incorrectly identify members of racial groups, especially when individuals are
under pressure to make distinct racial identifications. As an example, Glater states,
“What if an airline passenger looks Middle Eastern to you, but is in fact Samoan,
Spanish, Czech or a combination of all three?”
8
“The woman was disguised as a man in a white dishdasha – a traditional male
robe – and a kaffiyeh head scarf to blend in with the other applicants lined up to
join the Iraqi army, which takes only men.” Al-Qaida in Iraq claimed responsibility
for the blast, saying in an Internet posting that it was carried out by “a blessed sis-
ter.” As reported in The Seattle Times , September 28, 2005.
focus of who is a terrorist, then, is attitude and behavior. This distinc-

tion is important because one’s race or ethnicity does not necessarily
indicate that an individual will become a terrorist. Furthermore, ter-
rorists may be associated with particular racial, ethnic, or religious
groups, but acts of terrorism are by no means limited to or confined
to such groups. Acts of terrorism in the United States have been fairly
rare, but they have committed overwhelmingly by white American
males; nonetheless, the label of “terrorist” has not been associated
with this group (Henderson).
HOW EFFECTIVE IS RACIAL PROFILING

IN REDUCING TERRORISM?
Counterterrorism measures are effective only if they prevent a terror-

ist attack or have the effect of reducing the impact of a terrorist attack
when the attack happens. Presently, it is not possible to predict with
any certainty when a terrorist attack will occur, despite attempts by the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security to give the public the status of
the possibility of a terrorist attack in its color-coded alert system.9
In order to better predict terror attacks, we need to know the num-
ber of attacks that are successful in an area, and the number that are
unsuccessful. The successful ones are generally rare, and the unsuc-
cessful ones are mostly undocumented.
In addition, we need fairly complete and accurate data of all
terrorists groups and their capability and readiness to commit an
attack. Thus, racial profiling may not be particularly useful given
that information about the behavior of specific terrorists or terror-
ists groups may be more effective at reducing terrorism than racial
profiling. It is most likely that other such information can better
govern law enforcement practices and resource allocations than pro-
filing, and would be useful as well for informing security protocols
at airports and train and subway stations, as well as helping in the
9
An example of this occurred when the setting of the terror alert level was changed
from elevated (i.e., Yellow) to high (i.e., Orange), but this was only for mass-transit
systems, as stated by Homeland Security Chief Michael Chertoff in a press briefing
just after the London bombing attacks on July 7, 2005: “[This alert is] targeted only
to the mass transit portion of the transportation sector.”
establishment of controls and restrictions at points of entry into the

United States (i.e., target hardening).
It is possible that the use of racial and ethnic profiling fail to prevent
terrorist attacks. For instance, about three months after the London
terrorist bombings on July 7, 2005, it was discovered that the terror-
ists had made at least one practice run of the subway routes that were
later bombed. In this case, it may have been more useful to use the
surveillance video in conjunction with intelligence information.
If we implement a strategy of racial profiling and there is a subse-
quent reduction in terrorist attacks, should we then conclude that
racial profiling is effective in wars on terror? Without controlled
experimentation, such inferences are dubious; any number of other
factors not accounted for might in fact be more important causative
factors, including tighter security at airports and train and subway
stations, as well as tighter controls and restrictions at points of entry
into the country.
According to Silver and Miller (2002), actuarial risk assessment
tools that use the risk attributes of a population to make decisions
about an individual’s risk could aid in the prediction of criminal
behavior. Essentially, individuals are scored, and a level of risk is deter-
mined using an algorithmic analysis that produces a model of risk.
Furthermore, Silver and Miller suggest that most of the prediction
tools previously used produce models that show a high preponder-
ance of false positives. However, current risk assessment models do
not predict that an individual will engage in a particular behavior,
but rather the individual has a likelihood for the particular behavior,
given his or her attributes. Thus, actuarial models are used to predict
behavior “in advance of future acts of crime or violence” (Silver and
Miller, p. 147). At its core, actuarial models are used to demark high-
risk individuals from others.
However, Silver and Miller state that tools used to predict social
and criminal behavior (i.e., actuarial prediction methods) are more
focused on “the efficient management of institutional resources
rather than to target individuals …” (p. 139). And because actuarial
predication methods are group-based, these “methods contribute to
the continued marginalization of populations already at the fringes
of the economic and political mainstream” (p. 139). Thus, actuarial

models are not without their collateral costs.
Ultimately, the goal of a crime control policy such as racial profiling
should focus on how to selectively incarcerate the small numbers of
very high-risk criminals who are responsible for the targeted crime.
From a cost-effectiveness point of view, subjecting large numbers of
people who are unlikely to commit offenses to increased scrutiny may
increase prison populations, but with no added benefit to society. To
this end, actuarial models of risk could be useful if they are used to
target high-risk criminals.
Specifically to terrorism prediction, Sirseloudi (2005) proposes
short-, medium-, and long-term prevention strategies in detecting ter-
rorist campaigns. These prediction models rely on individual, group
and contextual factors and rely more heavily on political and socio-
logical phenomena, such as the levels of inequality, group cohesive-
ness, and interests in political targets. The type of prediction models
suggested by Sirseloudi are more nuanced than raced-based predic-
tion models.
RACIAL PROFILING AS A CRIME CONTROL POLICY
Although Kingdon (1995) presents a picture of how the policy process

generally evolves, he readily admits that cause-and-effect relationships
are extremely precarious when dealing with policy. Factors that drive
crime policy include the public, the media, politicians, political elites,
policy makers, social scientists, and the economy, and these factors are
difficult, if not impossible, to control for. Therefore, overemphasizing
the influence of policy within criminology may be meaningless if we
cannot determine the impact of the influence, because without this
determination there is essentially nothing to say. Until we can deter-
mine what is driving crime policy in more than isolated instances, and
to what certainty, the study of any crime control policy, such as racial
profiling, will continue to be difficult. For example, when we consider
all the factors that may lead to decisions about crime policy it is diffi-
cult to ignore the players involved (e.g., see Kingdon). It is also impos-
sible to duplicate research of this type because conditions and players
may change. This is a major weakness of efforts that are designed to

quantify research in crime policy. Research of the type suggested by
Scheingold (1998), though theoretically appealing, may not be fully
testable, nor replicable, therefore it cannot be validated. Sheingold
suggests the use of political criminology to address the policy issues
and implications of criminological research. Scheingold indicates
that although interest in crime and research of crime has permeated a
great number of disciplines, researchers generally fail to incorporate
work from fields other than their own. In order to make criminology
and crime policy more complete, Scheingold would marry these two
related yet disconnected fields. Perhaps he believes that the short-
comings of both fields will be alleviated if they are combined. For
example, criminologists spend a great deal of time testing theories,
constructing elaborate research designs, presenting hypotheses, and
reporting their findings, but are restrained in making policy recom-
mendations, whereas political sociologist tend to make many policy
recommendations despite relatively weak research and theory con-
struction (e.g., see Beckett, 1997).
Another concern about crime control policy is that it is overwhelm-
ingly punitive. Greenberg and West (2001) suggest that punishment
is one of the many tools available to shape crime policy. Tyler and
Boeckman (1997) believe that punitive policies such as Three Strikes
do not decrease crime, but have the opposite effect. Moreover, puni-
tive responses to crime can only grow at the expense of other forms
of crime control. Lyons and Scheingold (2000) similarly discuss the
punitive nature of crime control but realize that policies delivering
crime control are extremely complex, and the focus on punishment
is at the expense of other crime policy strategies.
Crime policy and criminological research complement one another
in that research shows what is going on with crime and criminals, and
then crime policy should be adjusted according. This relationship
requires that when a policy is implemented, researchers will look at
how it affects crime and the general state of affairs. This is especially
true for the use of racial profiling. Clearly, any crime policy should
consider what the effect might be beyond the population of crimi-
nal offenders, similar to Rochefort and Cobb’s (1994) essay about
problem definition and how conflicts such as terrorism expand or
produce what Stuntz and Harcourt describe as collateral or ratchet

effects. Therefore, one way that crime policy can be beneficial is if it
provides state and local agencies and the general public with detailed
information on the potentially significant societal effects that the pro-
posed policy is likely to have, ways in which the significant ill effects
may be minimized, and alternatives to the policy.
With so much emphasis on the issue of crime control, the use of
racial profiling to combat terrorism is also an ethical issue. For the
most part, racial profiling seems to be accepted because the ends jus-
tify the means (i.e., utilitarianism), and the benefit to society is per-
ceived as more important than the rights of the individual. However,
utilitarianism makes sense only when one knows the outcome of
his or her actions (Pollock, 2008), which is not possible. The use of
racial profiling to fight terrorism is a particularly problematic issue
because if it is used in such a manner, it provides another form of
discretion, authority, power, and force (Pollock) that might not be
justified under other conditions. Moreover, its use must be confined
to a grave and certain threat, the lack of viable alternatives, and there
must be a high probability of success (Pollock). Thus, racial profiling
to fight terrorism should not be used as a tool of convenience.
WHAT CAN WE CONCLUDE ABOUT RACIAL

PROFILING AND TERRORISM?
There are a number of things that we should keep in mind about

racial profiling and terrorism: First, the criteria the U.S. government
uses to profile terrorists are secret, therefore, it is not known whether
race is used in the profile. However, because the criteria for suspicion
of terrorism are in fact secret, it is most likely that race and ethnic-
ity may be prominent features of the profile. This is especially likely
because after the September 11, 2001, attacks, hundreds of Arab and
Middle Eastern men were apprehended, detained, and questioned by
law enforcement based solely on their race or ethnicity.
Second, because the public’s reaction to terrorism is highly emo-
tional, we can expect that as the severity of attacks or heightened fear
of attacks increase, so does the public acceptance of counterterrorism
measures that restrict civil liberties, especially those most suspected
of being responsible for terrorist attacks. Prime examples of this are

Executive Order 9066, issued in 1942, and the USA PATRIOT Act,
enacted in 2001. Though Executive Order 9066 allowed for the civil
liberties of any person thought to be a threat to the United States at the
time to be restricted, law enforcement specifically targeted Japanese
residents. The USA PATRIOT Act also gave broad and unprecedented
government authority to law enforcement to pursue anyone at their
discretion who may have any connection whatsoever with any terrorist
or terrorist group.
Third, racial and ethnic minorities are most likely – to the extreme –
to be targeted for racial profiling for crime in general, and for terror-
ism in particular.
Fourth, a terrorist attack against U.S. citizens that occurs within the
United States will receive a much greater military and policy response
than terrorist attacks against citizens that occur outside the United
States.
Fifth, even if there is no consensus about the use of racial profiling
to combat terrorism, we need to know if racial profiling is effective in
reducing terrorism, as well as the effectiveness of other strategies, and
this can best be achieved when racial profiling is openly discussed and
adequately measured.
Racial and ethnic profiling has become a hot political issue. Many,
particularly in the law enforcement community, argue that racial pro-
filing does not occur, and refute any and all evidence that shows that
race does affect, in some unexplained way, how decisions are made in
regard to which citizens are pulled over while driving or stopped and
searched on the streets. Like much of the discrimination that occurs
in the criminal justice system, it is difficult to measure directly. It is
nonetheless essential that we do much more to estimate the social
and ethical costs of screening policies that impose extra burdens on
ethnic and racial minorities, and to balance them with those of pro-
tecting U.S. citizens against terrorism.
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(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983).
Domke, David, Philip Garland, Andre Billeaudeaux, and John Hutchenson,
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Engel, Robin Sheppard Jennifer M. Calnon, and Thomas J. Bernard,
“Theory and Racial Profiling: Shortcomings and Directions in
Future Research,” Justice Quarterly, Volume 19, Number 2 (2002),
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nating the Confusion Between Racial and Criminal Profiling and Clarifying
What Constitutes Unfair Discrimination and Persecution (Springfield,
IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, LTD, 2002).
Goffman, Erving, Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963).
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Their Growth, 1971–1991,” Criminology, Volume 39, Number 3
(2001), pp. 615–654.
Harcourt, Bernard E., “Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the
Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of
Criminal Profiling More Generally,” University of Chicago Law Review,
Volume 71, Number 4 (2004), pp. 1275–1381.
Henderson, Harry, Terrorism (New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2001).
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(New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1995).
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Lyons, William and Stuart Scheingold, Politics of Crime and Punishment.
In The nature of crime: Continuity and change (Washington, DC:
National Institute of Justice, 2000).
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Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy,” Psychological
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of the Japanese American Internment (New York: Plenum Press, 1993).
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Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002).
Pampel, Fred C., Racial Profiling (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2004).
Pollock, Joycelyn M., Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice, 6th
Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2008).
Rochefort, David A. and Roger W. Cobb. Problem Definition: An
Emerging Perspective. In The Politics of Problem Definition, pp. 1–31
(Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1994).
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23 (1998) 857–895.
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Volume 111, Number 8 (2002) pp. 2137–2179.
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But Why?” Law and Society Review, Volume 31, Number 1 (1997)
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Justice: Race, Ethnicity, and Crime in America, 4th Edition (Belmont,
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chapter fourteen
Federal-Local Coordination
in Homeland Security
Edward R. Maguire and William R. King
Any legislative change which would render … local and state law enforcement
subservient to federal jurisdiction, would, in my opinion, be disastrous.
– J. Edgar Hoover 1954
[A]gencies at different levels of government will, as a generality, have differ-

ent organizational cultures that are not ideally suited to the development
of effective countermeasures against the crime and related problems each
agency targets.
– William Geller and Norval Morris 1992
INTRODUCTION
Lack of coordination and cooperation between law enforcement

officials at all levels of government has received prominent atten-
tion since the terrorist attacks on United States soil on September
11, 2001. The contentious relationship between the FBI and local
police is depicted regularly in television and film; it is one of the stock
Hollywood clichés in police and crime dramas. Local police have com-
plained for many years about being patronized, alienated, upstaged,
or simply ignored by FBI agents (Geller and Morris 1992). Whereas
the relationship between the FBI and state and local police is the most
obvious and visible issue in federal-local coordination for homeland
security, the more general concern is how the federal government’s
entire alphabet soup of agencies can work cooperatively with local
governments to secure the homeland. Concerns about terrorism have
brought these issues to the forefront, with news reports, professional
associations, think tanks, and government commissions all coming to
322
federal-local coordination in homeland security 323
similar conclusions: The linkages between federal and local agencies

need significant improvement if we are to prevent terrorist incidents
on American soil and enhance homeland security.
For anyone doubting the need for federal and local authori-
ties to work together in preventing and responding to terrorism on
American soil, consider two sets of statistics. First, according to the
Census Bureau, there are more than 25,000 separate “places”1 in the
United States, including cities, towns, townships, villages, boroughs,
and other forms of local government (U.S. Census Bureau 2005).
Every one of these places is a potential location where an aspiring ter-
rorist may live, work, visit, pass through, plot and plan, or carry out an
attack. Although the federal government certainly plays a role in pre-
venting terrorism in all these places, it is not difficult to imagine that
local authorities may find themselves in a much more advantageous
position to discover – perhaps even inadvertently – evidence or intel-
ligence that the planning of a terrorist incident may be afoot. Second,
the number of federal law enforcement officials pales in comparison
to the number of state and local police. In 2003 the FBI had 11,633
special agents (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003). Of these, only
2,196 of them worked directly on terrorism through Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2004a). Compare these
numbers with the 731,903 full-time sworn officers working in 17,876
state and local law enforcement agencies in 2004 (Reaves 2007),
and the approximately 2 million security guards (Police Executive
Research Forum 2004) in the United States, and it becomes quickly
apparent that federal officials cannot prevent, deter, investigate, and
respond to terrorism by themselves.
All of these law enforcement officers are connected to the home-
land security network, many only tenuously. Thus, the sheer number of
officials with some role in counterterrorism is enormous. Differences
in level of government (local, county, state, or federal), jurisdiction,
1
The U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.) defines a “place” as: “A concentration of popula-
tion either legally bounded as an incorporated place, or identified as a Census
Designated Place (CDP) including comunidades and zonas urbanas in Puerto
Rico. Incorporated places have legal descriptions of borough (except in Alaska
and New York), city, town (except in New England, New York, and Wisconsin), or
village.”
training, skills, experience, occupation, and organizational culture

make organizing this vast network of officials very difficult.
This chapter explores the relationship between local governments
and the federal government in homeland security policy and practice.2
We begin by drawing on terminology and insights from interorgani-
zational theory and social network theory, focusing on the nature of
counterterrorism networks, the importance of boundary spanners
who operate within these networks, and the challenges these networks
present for homeland security (Alter 1990; Cook and Whitmeyer
1992; Oliver and Ebers 1998; Salancik 1995; Shrum 1990). Next we
explore the role of the federal government in homeland security.
Then we review the role of local governments. We close by exploring
a number of issues and challenges in federal-local coordination for
homeland security.
INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS
Organizations are complex social entities with unique cultures, struc-

tures, histories, traditions, goals, and practices. Scholars have spent
decades trying to understand organizations: how they acquire their
unique qualities, how they change or resist change, and how they
can improve their performance. The FBI, for instance, has been the
object of intense scrutiny for many years by analysts seeking to under-
stand how and why it operates as it does (Theoharis 2004; Wilson
1978). Police agencies, especially those in large cities like New York
(Lardner and Repetto 2001), Los Angeles (Herbert 1996; Woods
1993), and Chicago (Lindbergh 1998; Skogan and Hartnett 1997)
have also been studied extensively. More generally, the American
police as an institution have been studied with increasing frequency
over the past four decades. More than 1,250 Ph.D. dissertations with
the word “police” in the title have been written since 1967 (Skogan
and Frydl 2004). If organizations – especially law enforcement orga-
nizations – are so complex that they are able to generate all of this
2
We do not consider the role of state governments. This is neither an oversight on
our part, nor an indication that state governments do not play a key role in the
homeland security network. Our focus in this chapter is on relationships between
federal and local government agencies.
attention from researchers, imagine the exponential increase in com-

plexity that would result from asking all these separate, autonomous
organizations to work together to achieve common goals. Picture a
giant network with thousands of separate nodes (each node represent-
ing an agency), with pathways or ties drawn from every node in the
network to every other node. For the sake of illustration, if there were
just 1,000 separate nodes in the network, each one of them having
an equal responsibility for preserving homeland security, there would
be 499,500 separate ties between nodes in the network.3 Every one of
those ties represents a potential connection via which two organiza-
tions can cooperate, coordinate, collaborate, and communicate. Each
tie also represents a location where efforts to work together could
break down.
As it turns out, the picture is far more complex than illustrated in
this simple example. First, the American homeland security appara-
tus contains multiple overlapping networks that vary in occupation,
location, mission, and authority. In other words, there are networks
of networks. Second, there are far more than 1,000 separate nodes in
the networks of agencies responsible for homeland security. Third,
the nodes are not all equal in power, authority, or importance. These
kinds of inequalities are common structural features of social net-
works. In fact, network theorists have developed a number of methods
to measure centrality, or the extent of “power and dominance in inter-
organizational service delivery systems” (Alter 1990: 485). Fourth, the
pathways or ties between the nodes are not equivalent. In the lan-
guage of social network theory, some are weak ties and some are strong
ties (Granovetter 1983).
Although social networks can quickly become very complex, inter-
organizational networks do not require every individual within each
agency to be responsible for achieving the day-to-day linkages nec-
essary for the agencies to work together. Instead, the responsibility
rests on the shoulders of a much smaller number of boundary spanners,
people whose jobs are to span the boundaries between two or more
3
According to mathematical rules for computing “combinations,” the formula for
determining the number of dyads or 2-way ties in a system of nodes (n) is: n! /
[2! (n – 2)!]. So, with 1,000 nodes, the formula reduces to 1000! / [2 (998!)] = 499,500.
This approach treats the direct pathway between two agencies as a single tie.
organizations. Sociologist Wesley Schrum conceptualizes interorgani-

zational relations as
a product of interactions between individual representatives of orga-
nizations acting as boundary spanners. In this view, the boundary
relations of an organization are simply the set of external ties its
members maintain; and one way of describing an interorganizational
system is to examine the set of these relations. (Shrum 1990: 497,
italics preserved from original)
Boundary spanners play a crucial role in establishing and sustaining

interorganizational relationships.
All organizations have boundaries of some sort. However, orga-
nizations vary widely in the extent to which these boundaries are
permeable. Some organizations, including human service bureaucra-
cies (like the police), are involved heavily in frequent exchanges with
elements of the environments in which they are situated – clients,
customers, suppliers, regulators, politicians, the media, and other
organizations. Others, like national security agencies, have tightly
sealed boundaries. In either case, whether an organization’s bound-
aries are permeable or sealed, the job of coordinating with other enti-
ties in the organization’s environment falls on its boundary spanners.
Just as understanding the spread of an epidemic means finding the
locations and recent travel patterns of its key carriers, understand-
ing federal-local coordination in homeland security means paying
careful attention to these boundary spanners, and the nature of the
exchange behaviors they engage in with other organizations in the
network.
Some organizations will have permeable outer boundaries, allow-
ing frequent exchanges between selected members and entities in
the external environment, but will have a tightly sealed “technical
core” (Thompson 1967). The technical core of an organization is
the nucleus where the majority of work is accomplished. Picture a
large, modern police agency in an American city. The chief of police
and other executives are involved in frequent exchanges of informa-
tion with the media, local politicians, and various citizens and busi-
ness groups. The agency’s public information office works regularly
with the media to manage the way the police agency and its members
are portrayed in the media. Community relations officers busily orga-

nize “feel-good” community events with friendly officers, clean and
polished police cars, fingerprint kits for families to record their chil-
dren’s fingerprints, and balloons and plastic replicas of the agency’s
badge for the kids. All of the police employees fulfilling these vari-
ous roles are boundary spanners whose role is, in the terminology of
organizational scholars, to interact with and enact their environment
(Weick 1979). To enact the environment means to manage it, shape
it, manipulate it, or seek to achieve some control over it. Although
these boundary spanners play a valuable role in securing valuable
resources for the police organization from various elements in its
environment – resources like funding, personnel, goodwill, commu-
nity support, and a perception that the police agency is a legitimate
and responsive agency of local government – the one thing they do
not influence is the way work is accomplished in the technical core.
Police work, whether in patrol, investigations, or special operations,
continues on largely unabated and uninfluenced by the behavior of
these boundary spanners. The boundary spanner is like an agency’s
visible representative, its “presentation of self,” to some portion of the
outside world (Goffman 1959; Manning 1977).
Concepts from interorganizational theory and social network theory
are crucial for understanding federal-local coordination in homeland
security. These concepts and theories provide useful insights about
how a giant network of agencies and individuals can manage the job
of cooperation, collaboration, coordination, and communication
(“the 4 C’s”).
The organizations responsible for achieving homeland security are
linked in a vast and complex web of networks. Some of these net-
works are primarily local or regional, such as the networks of agencies
responsible for processing criminal offenders or for responding to
disasters, whether natural or man-made. Others may span levels of
government, such as partnerships between the FBI and local police,
or between the Department of Homeland Security and local disaster-
response agencies. This mix of networks – horizontal and vertical;
local, national, and international; public and private – is where the
job of homeland security gets done.
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Attorney General John Ashcroft announced in November 2001 that

preventing terrorist attacks would henceforth be the core mission of
federal prosecutors (Breinholt 2003: 1). In a 2001 speech, President
George W. Bush reinforced the role of U.S. Attorneys in homeland
security when he told them they were “on the front line of war” (The
White House 2001). The federal courts also play a crucial role by hear-
ing the terrorism cases brought before them by federal prosecutors.
The importance of a strong federal response to terrorism was rein-
forced by the 9/11 Commission Report: “countering terrorism is now
the top national priority for the United States government” (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004: 361).
The report specified that the threat is not simply terrorism, an amor-
phous term that conceals a variety of different behaviors of varying
severity. The primary threat is Islamist terrorism committed by al Qaeda
or others who are committed to a radical and violent interpretation
of Islamic ideology. The 9/11 Commission Report calls for a coordinated
political and military strategy to address this threat. The strategy relies
on three broad approaches: to “attack terrorists and their organiza-
tions; prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism; and protect
against and prepare for terrorist attacks” (National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004: 363). Although local
governments in the United States can play a role in each of these
three approaches, clearly the federal government is (and should be)
the nucleus that directs and coordinates the various activities. The fed-
eral government must rely on the use of a variety of strategies, many of
which are well beyond the purview of local governments: “diplomacy,
intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign
aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense” (National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004: 363–364). The fed-
eral government has access to resources, expertise, authority, people,
and places that are simply unavailable to local governments.
The job of accomplishing this diverse list of tasks falls to an alphabet
soup of federal agencies. Many of them fall within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), an “umbrella” department established in
October of 2001 to coordinate the work of the various agencies whose
functions relate to homeland security in the United States (Bush

2002). Although the organizational structure of the Department
of Homeland Security is exceedingly complex, some of its major
components include the Transportation Security Administration,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Citizen and Immigration
Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service.4
The Joint Terrorism Task Forces

The federal agency with primary responsibility for law enforce-
ment and intelligence gathering in homeland security is the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The major apparatus through which the FBI
achieves coordination with local agencies is its Joint Terrorism Task
Forces (JTTFs). First established in New York in 1980, there are now
more than 100 JTTFs. Sixty-five of them were created after the terror-
ist attacks of 9/11. According to the standard language contained in
the memoranda of understanding between the FBI and local agencies
involved in each JTTF:
The mission of the JTTF will be to utilize the collective resources

of the participating agencies for the prevention, preemption, deter-
rence and investigation of terrorism and activities related to terror-
ism, both actual and potential, occurring in or affecting the U.S.
carried out by terrorist groups and/or individuals, as well as appre-
hending individuals carrying out such violations.
These regional JTTFs all report to the National Joint Terrorism Task
Force office in the Strategic Information and Operations Center at
FBI Headquarters. The JTTFs have been called “the foundation of
the Bureau’s information sharing efforts” (National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States n.d.). The National JTTF
contains representatives from thirty-eight U.S. agencies, and is con-
sidered the “operational nerve center” or the “point of fusion” for
collecting terrorist intelligence and preventing terrorist incidents
(Federal Bureau of Investigation 2004b).
4
Information on the Department of Homeland Security is derived from: http://
www.dhs/gov. Accessed March 4, 2007.
Although all JTTFs are a little different from one another, they share
some common elements.5 Each one is headed by an FBI Supervisory
Special Agent with experience in counterterrorism operations and
investigations. The task force also contains other FBI special agents,
as well as federal, state, and local law enforcement officers from other
agencies. Each task force appoints a special agent to serve as a coor-
dinator. The coordinator handles administrative functions such as
arranging memoranda of understanding (MOUs) for all participat-
ing agencies; securing equipment, supplies, and space; and managing
budgets. Most of the task forces discourage part-time participation by
members, preferring the commitment of full-time task force mem-
bers. This requirement limits participation by smaller law enforce-
ment agencies who may not be able to spare an officer for full-time
participation in a JTTF. The nature of the work is different from what
most local police officials are accustomed to:
Unlike fugitive or drug task forces, JTTFs do not have numerous

arrests, search warrants, or seizures. Rather, the bulk of the work
often relates to long-term surveillance, electronic court-ordered
monitoring, source development, or interviews, none of which may
garner significant statistics in the traditional law enforcement sense.
(Casey 2004: 5)
Coordinating with State and Local Governments

Both the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation have established offices dedicated to coor-
dinating with state and local authorities. Within the Department of
Homeland Security, the primary agency responsible for coordinating
with local governments is the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness. According to a fact sheet prepared
by the office:
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of State

and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP)
is the federal government’s lead agency responsible for preparing
the nation against terrorism by assisting states, local and tribunal
jurisdictions, and regional authorities as they prevent, deter, and
respond to terrorist acts. SLGCP provides a broad array of assistance
5
Most of the material in this paragraph is drawn from Casey 2004.
to America’s first responders through funding, coordinated train-

ing, exercises, equipment acquisition, and technical assistance.
(Department of Homeland Security n.d.)
The office has three primary components: the Office for Domestic
Preparedness, which conducts joint exercises and provides grants,
training, and technical assistance to state and local governments
through a variety of programs meant to enhance emergency prepared-
ness; the Office of Community Preparedness, which works to encour-
age citizens to prepare for terrorism and other critical incidents; and
the Office of State and Local Government Coordination, which serves
as a single point of contact for state and local governments wanting
information about DHS.
Seven months after the 9/11 attack, the FBI established the Office
of Law Enforcement Coordination (OLEC). Director Robert S.
Mueller, III appointed Louis Quijas, a police chief from High Point,
North Carolina, as the assistant director of OLEC. The role of the
office is to enhance the coordination, cooperation, and communica-
tion between the FBI and its law enforcement partners at all levels of
government (Federal Bureau of Investigation n.d.; Federal Bureau of
Investigation 2002). By 2006, the FBI appeared to have made prog-
ress in its efforts to restore its tarnished image with state and local
law enforcement agencies. Emblematic of this progress is a weekly,
unclassified intelligence bulletin sent to police agencies through-
out the nation. A review conducted by the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States found that the FBI is “doing
a much better job of sharing threat-related information” with state
and local law enforcement officials, though there were complaints
that the FBI “still needs to share much more operational case-related
information” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States 2004: 8). Despite these reform efforts, the commission
found that “important information from these national investigations
does not reach the officers responsible for patrolling the cities, towns,
highways, villages, and neighborhoods of our country” (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004: 9).
The challenge is how to distribute information from the nerve cen-
ter to these various nodes, while still maintaining the integrity of the
FBI’s counterterrorism operations.
Other Federal Roles

There is also a network of federal agencies responsible for cultivating
and analyzing intelligence gathered in other nations and protecting
the United States against foreign enemies. These agencies typically
do not come into direct contact with local communities. Some crit-
ics have argued that current laws prohibiting direct linkages between
local police and the U.S. military forces place American cities at risk
(Klinger and Grossman 2002; Schmidt and Klinger 2006). Similarly,
some cities have complained about not having access to raw human
and signals intelligence gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and other federal intelligence-gathering agencies. Police chiefs
complain that their chief source of terrorist threat warnings is CNN
(Murphy and Plotkin 2003).
In accordance with the statements of the attorney general and pres-
ident noted earlier, U.S. Attorneys also play a crucial role in the fight
against terrorism. They coordinate with other local officials by leading
anti-terrorism task forces. They prosecute suspected terrorists under
federal law, acting as gatekeepers to the federal criminal justice sys-
tem. A number of agencies refer terrorism cases to U.S. Attorneys for
prosecution. A recent study found that federal prosecutors declined
to file charges in 82 percent of the terrorism cases referred to them
by the FBI and 64 percent of all the terrorism cases referred to them.
During the two years after 9/11, federal investigators referred 6,472
individuals classified as terrorists for prosecution. Not all of these
were classified as international terrorists. In the five years after 9/11,
1,391 individuals classified by the Justice Department as international
terrorists were referred for prosecution; only about a quarter of these
referrals were accepted (Trac Reports 2006). Although the federal
prosecution of terrorists is a vital task, federal prosecutors handle a
fairly small number of terrorism cases (Trac Reports 2006).
The federal government plays a variety of other crucial roles in
homeland security: training first responders and other personnel;
funding the development of new technologies and new capacities;
coordinating the testing and calibration of various prevention and
response activities; providing laboratories and scientific expertise to
agencies at all levels of government; and coordinating with govern-
ments from other nations to secure intelligence and carry out joint
operations. The vast number of homeland security activities carried

out by the federal government is much too large to cover briefly here.
The federal government is clearly the appropriate agency to coordi-
nate homeland security functions for the nation, but local govern-
ments have a part to play as well. We turn now to a consideration of
their role.
THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

All politics is local.
– Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, 1994
All terrorism is local.

– Gilmore Commission, 2000
Since September 11, 2001, American police agencies have instituted

a number of changes designed to enhance their capacity to prevent,
respond to, and investigate terrorist incidents in the United States.
These changes have included a suite of anti-terrorist and counterter-
rorist activities.6 Police agencies are key members in the various local
and regional networks of agencies that must work together to secure
the homeland. This section examines the role of local governments in
homeland security. It includes subsections on the fundamental role of
local government, prevention, response, and investigation.
The Local Role

When it comes to homeland security, local police play the most fun-
damental and largest role. Their roles are often overshadowed by the
FBI and other federal agencies falling under the homeland security
umbrella. The federal government has invested significant resources
in fighting terrorism, to be sure, but responsibility for establishing the
front line of defense in America’s cities and towns falls most heavily
on state and local police. The 11,633 FBI agents simply cannot do it
alone. Even J. Edgar Hoover, the founder of the FBI, recognized the
6
According to Riley and Hoffman (2005), anti-terrorism is “the prevention of terror-
ist acts primarily, but not exclusively, through physical security measures” whereas
counter-terrorism is “the collection and analysis of intelligence, developing contin-
gencies and allocation of specific sources, both to anticipate terrorist acts and to
respond to them once they have occurred.”
importance of the role of local governments when he wrote: “Local

responsibility, recognized by our forefathers, remains the key to sound
law enforcement.” (Hoover 1954: 45)
Prevention
On April 26, 2001, in Tamarac, Florida, Broward County sheriff’s
deputies ticketed Mohammed Atta for driving without a driver’s
license. He skipped his court date on May 28, and a warrant was issued
for his arrest. On July 5, a Delray Beach police officer stopped him
for speeding and issued a warning. The officer was unaware of the
arrest warrant because it had not been entered into the state’s warrant
database. The officer was also unaware that Atta had an expired visa
and was on a CIA “watch list.” At 8:46 a.m. on September 11, 2001,
Atta piloted American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower of the
World Trade Center (CNN.com 2002b; Stanek 2003; Zeller 2004).
Authorities believe Atta was the ringleader for the plot to hijack and
crash four planes.
Atta was not the only hijacker to have an encounter with local
police in the months leading up to 9/11. On May 1, 2001, according
to Congressional testimony by FBI Director Robert Mueller, Nawaf
al-Hazmi “reported an attempted street robbery … to Fairfax, Virginia
Police – he later declined to press charges” (Mueller 2002). On
September 11, Hazmi was one of the hijackers on American Airlines
Flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon. On August 1, 2001, Hani
Hanjour was stopped for speeding by police in Arlington, Virginia. He
is believed to have been the pilot of American Flight 77 that crashed
into the Pentagon (CNN.com 2002a, b; Stanek 2003). On September
9, 2001, Trooper 1st Class Joseph Catalano stopped Ziad S. Jarrah
for speeding on Interstate 95 in Pikesville, Maryland. Jarrah was on
a CIA “watch list,” but Trooper Catalano had no way of knowing that
(CNN.com 2002a). Two days later, Jarrah was one of the hijackers on
United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in rural Pennsylvania after
passengers and crew members overpowered the hijackers (CNN.com
2002a, b; Stanek 2003).
All of these incidents, however minor, represent lost opportuni-
ties where better communication and cooperation between federal
and local authorities might have paid huge dividends. Consider for
a moment the case of a sheriff in North Carolina who spotted a

group of men buying a large quantity of cigarettes. A subsequent
investigation by the JTTF “uncovered a cigarette smuggling enter-
prise involving two dozen people, some of whom had connections
to Hizballah operatives in Lebanon. The investigation ultimately
resulted in a RICO and terrorist financing indictment” and subse-
quent conviction (Breinholt 2003: 28). The following quote from
a London newspaper aptly summarizes the local police role in
preventing terrorism:
Local police have unique advantages over national assets … to help

prevent acts of terrorism because they are part of the community.
They “walk the beat,” communicate regularly with local residents,
and are more likely to notice even subtle changes in the neighbor-
hoods they patrol daily. Common sense tells us – as does experi-
ence – that local law-enforcement personnel are uniquely situated to
notice (or otherwise learn of) and investigate unusual or suspicious
behavior. Based on the numbers alone, we can assume that local law
enforcement personnel are much more likely than national agents
to cross paths with terrorists. (Eddy 2005)
Since 9/11, tremendous energy has been invested in improving this

kind of coordination and cooperation between federal and local
authorities.
The FBI recently started a pilot program for sharing federal
counterterrorism data with state and local police. The impetus for
the program, according to former FBI Assistant Director James
Kallstrom, is simple: “If we have our cops deaf, dumb, and blind as
to what the federal government knows in databases in Washington,
how are we going to protect our society?” (Hirschkorn and Feyerick
2004) The challenge will be ensuring that the data are clean, accu-
rate, and useful. American police departments have struggled on a
much smaller scale to maintain intelligence databases on gangs and
gang members. According to Charles Katz, one police gang unit he
studied routinely failed to purge the gang intelligence database of
old records, which led to a number of problems: nongang members
ending up in the database, records listing gang members who were
incarcerated or dead, and inflated estimates of the size of the gang
problem (Katz 2003: 510). There was no conspiracy or deliberate
effort by the police to maintain inflated or inaccurate lists of gang

members. The problems were much more banal: poor communica-
tion, inadequate understanding of departmental policy, inefficien-
cies, and “serious abnormalities in internal information processing.”7
If individual police agencies struggle to maintain updated lists of gang
members, imagine the vastly more complex challenge of populating,
maintaining, and cleaning terrorist intelligence data, sharing it with
thousands of agencies, and controlling it sufficiently to prevent leaks.
Indeed, several government audits have highlighted problems with
the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center watch list (see Department of
Justice 2005; U.S. General Accounting Office 2006).
Though there are many examples where the downward flow of
intelligence fails to flow smoothly from federal agencies to local agen-
cies and down to cops on the street, presumably there are also prob-
lems with the upward flow of intelligence from cops on the street
back to the federal government. As one FBI Special Agent in Charge
said, “I need every officer, DMV officer, campus police and others on
the front line to gather and share their information” (Murphy and
Plotkin 2003: 43). There are two practical problems with securing
the upward flow of intelligence. First, the information must be in a
form that federal agencies can use. All of the various nodes in the
network must standardize their intelligence and reporting formats.
Ad hoc intelligence collection won’t work. Second, there must be
some kind of triggering mechanism that federal agencies can use to
communicate to local police about what is suspicious. Imagine, for
example, that the FBI is looking for someone buying old CO2 canis-
ters. A typical street cop might pull someone over and see that he has
twenty old CO2 canisters in the back of his truck, but never think any-
thing of it. The suspect explains that he is taking the canisters to the
scrap yard. This valuable information is not recognized as important
7
Although Katz (2003: 510) characterizes these information processing problems
as “abnormalities,” we wonder if instead they are normal. One possibility may be
that trying to maintain official records on ambiguous phenomena like gang and
terrorist group affiliation is naturally going to produce some problems with data
quality. Just as Perrow (1984) characterizes some catastrophic accidents as a nor-
mal by-product of certain organizational characteristics, we wonder whether some
difficulties in maintaining accurate data are a normal by-product of measuring
inherently ambiguous phenomena.
by the officer, thus the FBI loses a vital opportunity to benefit from
the upward information flow that street cops could have initiated.
Information flow is not the only issue to be resolved in enhancing
coordination and cooperation between federal and local agencies.
Local police now must develop many kinds of new competencies,
some of which might have seemed pretty odd prior to 9/11. They are
learning how to gather intelligence on terrorist threats; how to detect
chemical, biological, or radiological threats in time to prevent mass
casualties; how to conduct risk assessments to identify and protect vul-
nerable assets that might become terrorist targets; how to train their
officers to spot suspicious activities consistent with terrorist prepara-
tion for an attack; and they are securing new technologies for pro-
cessing data, evaluating risk, and detecting vulnerabilities. Imagine
the reaction of police officers prior to 9/11 if they were told that
the NYPD was purchasing “gamma neutron detectors” (by 2006 the
NYPD had 120 of them) or other sophisticated technologies outside
the mainstream for police (Kelly 2004: 12). Police agencies around
the nation are now grappling with a new reality – that preventing ter-
rorism is a crucial part of their role.
Response and Recovery

The initial response to recent terrorist attacks on American soil has
been executed primarily by local police, fire, EMS, medical facility per-
sonnel, and other agencies and organizations. We do not expect this
trend to change in the future (unless terrorists begin targeting military
bases), hence local agencies will continue to bear the brunt of the initial
response to terror attacks. The 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City involved a collective response by
dozens of agencies and organizations, including many whose role is
often overlooked, like blood banks and mental health agencies (Gilcher
2001; Manzi, Powers, and Zetterlund 2002; Tucker et al. 1998). Even
though the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon occurred on federal govern-
ment property, the initial response was by the fire and police depart-
ments from Arlington County, Virginia (Murphy and Plotkin 2003: 28).
Most of the first responders to the 9/11 attacks on New York’s World
Trade Center were local; among these first responders, 60 police offi-
cers and 343 firefighters were killed (National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States 2004). In mass-casualty events, the bur-
den for responding also extends to numerous local medical providers,
including mental health professionals, ambulances, hospitals, medical
examiners, and even mortuary services.
Because local first responders are closer to the scene of an attack
than federal authorities and have the resources to respond quickly,
they will always play a primary role in response. However, this does
not minimize the role of the federal government. One of its major
roles is to fund, train, and equip local first responders, as well as to
monitor and augment their capacities. One crucial role is to con-
duct drills and simulated attacks to test the response capabilities of
communities around the nation. For instance, the Department of
Homeland Security organizes the “TOPOFF” (Top Officials) series
of simulations. In April, 2005, DHS executed TOPOFF 3 by staging
simulated terrorist attacks in Connecticut and New Jersey. In October,
2007, DHS staged TOPOFF 4, the fourth exercise in the series, by
simulating the detonation of “dirty bombs” (explosives that release
radiological material when detonated) in Guam, Arizona, and Oregon
(Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The exercises are meant
to test the nation’s preparedness. A crucial element of those tests is
examining the way federal, state, and local authorities work together
and with the various nongovernmental organizations playing a crucial
role in homeland security (Katz, Staiti, and McKenzie 2006).
The federal government has also played a crucial role in develop-
ing protocols for critical incident response. On February 28, 2003,
President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5,
directing the Department of Homeland Security to establish a
National Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident Management
System (NIMS). A fundamental premise of the NRP is that “incidents
are typically handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible,” a sort
of federal stamp of recognition for the role of local authorities during
critical incidents (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2004: 15).8
According to the directive, NIMS will “provide a consistent nationwide
approach for Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively
8
In March 2008, the Department of Homeland Security replaced the NRP with the
“National Response Framework.”
and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, and complexity” (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security 2004: 69–70). Though it contin-
ues to evolve, NIMS was first unveiled on March 1, 2004.
One of the key elements of NIMS is the nationwide adoption of the
Incident Command System (ICS). ICS is a management system for coor-
dinating and controlling personnel, equipment, supplies, and activities
during emergency incidents requiring a response from one or more
agencies. It relies on the age-old structural notion of “unity of command”
by establishing on-site an incident commander in charge of a central
command post typically established in the field by first responders near
where the incident is unfolding (U.S. Department of Homeland Security
2004: 10). ICS also includes a number of structural modules that can be
added as needed. The incident command structure can be adapted to
fit critical incidents of different types and scales.
On the surface, ICS appears to be a standard bureaucratic or
“mechanistic” structure for coordinating the activities, equipment,
and personnel of multiple agencies. Recent research by organizational
scholars has found, however, that ICS allows for more flexibility and
adaptability than standard mechanistic structures (Bigley and Roberts
2001). Mass-casualty incidents vary in type and scale, from a house
fire or a small flood to a bombing or airplane crash. Incident man-
agement protocols need to be flexible or adaptive to account for
the nature and scope of the incident. If the protocol is too rigid, it
will inhibit this flexibility or adaptability. If it is not rigid enough, it
may lead to chaos. ICS is designed to fall in the middle, with enough
structure to coordinate and communicate and allow for a kind
of “constrained improvisation” (Bigley and Roberts 2001: 1282).
Research on natural and man-made disasters has shown that the abil-
ity to establish a “hastily formed network” is crucial for responding
effectively (Denning 2006). Although discussions of ICS are almost
universally positive, one recent evaluation suggests that ICS is “ill
suited to the complexity of … a good deal of disaster response efforts”
(Buck, Trainor, and Aguirre 2006: 21).
On August 29, 2005, nearly four years after 9/11 – a period of
unprecedented change in the nation’s disaster-response apparatus –
Hurricane Katrina struck southeastern Louisiana. The storm was one
of the worst natural disasters in American history, flooding more than

80 percent of New Orleans and causing the deaths of more than 1,800
people. The disaster raised serious doubt about the capacity of the
federal government to respond effectively to mass-casualty incidents.
According to one disaster response expert, “local, state, and federal
leaders appeared disconnected at best and insensitive and incompe-
tent at worst” (Waugh 2006: 11). Some argue that the Department
of Homeland Security’ s myopic focus on terrorism led it to ignore
attention to the much more common risks posed by natural disasters.
Others faulted the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
the Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Strategy,
and the White House for thinking more politically than administra-
tively, thus failing to coordinate effectively with local officials (Waugh
2006: 11).
Although the federal government plays a vital role in preparing
communities to respond effectively to terrorist incidents, the onus
is still primarily on local governments. The greatest role the federal
government can play is in helping local governments improve their
individual and collective capacities to respond to critical incidents.
Other key roles include coordinating multiple levels of government
and carrying out simulations and tests to identify weaknesses.
Investigation
The primary mechanism through which local police investigate terror-
ism is through their participation in the FBI’s regional Joint Terrorism
Task Forces, described earlier. Many local law enforcement agen-
cies have also formed their own regional networks of agencies. For
example, two officers from the Redondo Beach Police Department
(California) were assigned by their agency to serve as liaison officers
with a regional anti-terrorism task force called the South Bay Group.
These officers eventually
became fully credentialed, cross-designated federal officers with Top

Secret clearances. The detectives work in the JTTF office and are
treated like FBI Agents in virtually all aspects of case assignment and
management. Although the local officers have Top Secret clearance,
they do not always have the same level of access to information that
Agents do. (Murphy and Plotkin 2003: 16)
Each participating agency in the region appoints a Terrorism Liaison

Officer (TLO): “The goal is to have every agency identify one person
who will receive information regarding terrorism and transnational
crime, effectively interpret and assess that information and appro-
priately forward or handle that information” (Murphy and Plotkin
2003: 17).
Whether participating in regional networks of local agencies or
JTTFs, it is clear that for all but the largest local law enforcement agen-
cies in the nation (like New York and Chicago), their role in investi-
gating terrorism typically involves working with other agencies, either
through the JTTF or through other task forces. These interagency
partnerships often come to resemble organizations in their own right,
with established hierarchies, rules, policies, and procedures. David
Thacher has observed that such collaborations resemble organizations
in development, or what he terms “inchoate hierarchies” (Thacher
2004). Although they have some of the features of traditional orga-
nizational structures, they often lack others, such as fixed facilities of
their own, an independent identity, a longstanding sense of history
or tradition, or an established organizational culture. The number
of interagency and intergovernmental task forces in law enforcement
has been increasing over the past two decades, and the escalation of
that trend after 9/11 could represent a fundamental shift in the struc-
ture of American law enforcement (Maguire and King 2004).
Although law enforcement agencies in local government and fed-
eral government have much in common – including occupational
responsibilities for detecting and investigating crimes and arresting
offenders – there are crucial differences that influence their ability
to work together in investigations. First is that local law enforcement
agencies are a part of local government, and must answer to local con-
stituencies, including the citizenry, the media, and local government
officials. Federal (or even state) agencies occasionally come to com-
munities, stir the pot and generate hostility, and then leave without
suffering the same consequences as local agencies. Local police must
be able to function smoothly and effectively in the community once
the FBI or other federal agencies leave town. This is why, when the
U.S. Department of Justice called upon local police agencies through-
out the United States after 9/11 to interview Middle Eastern men,
some agencies objected. Mark Kroeker, the police chief in Portland,

Oregon, refused to do it, arguing that “some of the questions cannot
be asked by Portland police officers without violating Oregon state
law, pure and simple” (Oregon Objects 2001). Portland later became
the first city to pull out of a Joint Terrorism Task Force when its city
council objected to the idea that the mayor and the police chief were
ineligible to receive the same security clearance as the police officers
assigned to the JTTF (McCall 2005).
THINKING ABOUT NETWORKS

It takes networks to fight networks.
– Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996: 82
The challenges of effective coordination between federal and local

agencies in homeland security are daunting. Since 9/11, agencies
with different missions, functions, budgets, cultures, structures,
reward systems, and jurisdictional boundaries are being asked to work
together seamlessly to prevent, respond to, and investigate terror-
ist incidents. The potential sources of error, confusion, inefficiency,
miscommunication, and conflict are too numerous to count. At the
same time, the idea that the terrorist incidents of 9/11 happened
on American soil and killed ordinary Americans served to unite the
nation against a common enemy – al Qaeda specifically, but Islamic
extremism more generally. Although it is difficult to forge the kinds of
interagency alliances necessary for homeland security, we believe the
effort is fueled, in part, by a common sense of purpose shared by most
Americans, especially in the law enforcement community.9
It is important to view federal-local coordination in homeland secu-
rity both up close and from a distance. From the latter perspective,
and reminiscent of the structural-functionalists from sociology in the
1940s, we envision homeland security as a massive set of functions that
society needs to perform. Starting with the realities of our federalist
9
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any research evidence on the extent to which
September 11 enhanced feelings of nationalism among law enforcement officers.
There is evidence, however, to suggest that politicians and the media relied more
heavily on nationalist themes in their communications after September 11 (see
Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeaux, and Garland 2004).
system of government, we can ask two basic questions: What kinds of

structures are most appropriate for performing those functions? To
what extent do the structures now in place deviate from those ideal
structures? Viewing these questions through the lens of social network
theory and organizational theory provides some insights about the
benefits and challenges of our existing homeland security apparatus.
Critics of the American criminal justice system have pointed out
for years that it is a nonsystem: chaotic, fragmented, and inefficient
(Skoler 1977). Others view the diversity of approaches and the decen-
tralized character of American criminal justice as a virtue, as the prin-
cipal hallmark of a federalist system that ensures the rights of state
and local governments. This longstanding debate over the decen-
tralized structure of American criminal justice has resurfaced with a
vengeance following the 9/11 attack, raising new concerns about the
extent to which America’s patchwork quilt of agencies is sufficient to
protect us. The key appears to be achieving a balance between the
strengths of federal and local authorities. Let us examine how this bal-
ance has been achieved for the three major categories of homeland
security tasks noted earlier: prevention, response and recovery, and
investigation.
Prevention
When it comes to preventing terrorism, the federal government’s role
is to serve as the nerve center of a massive network of agencies. The
challenge is to ensure an adequate, but not excessive, flow of infor-
mation – both upward and downward – between the center and the
periphery. Sharing information among thousands of agencies and
millions of workers is challenging in its own right, but accomplishing
this kind of information exchange in an industry where lives depend
on secrecy, confidentiality, and access control may take the greatest
minds of our generation.
In addition to the technical and logistical challenges with gathering,
processing, analyzing, and sharing information are other more mun-
dane challenges associated with the roles, missions, and traditions of
each level of government. Consider Dearborn, Michigan, which has
one of the largest Arab populations in the United States. A study of
the Dearborn Police Department and its role in homeland security
identified two challenges “that cities incur when they engage in pro-
active surveillance to identify potential terrorists: damage to their
reputation (since police surveillance implies that its objects are not
trustworthy) and damage to police legitimacy (since new surveillance
may undermine trust between police and the community)” (Thacher
2005: 635). The study found that the benefits of intelligence gather-
ing on terrorism often accrue to jurisdictions other than the localities
where these activities take place. Police chiefs may understandably
find little motivation to have their agencies engage in practices that
have the potential to damage relationships with their own communi-
ties, especially when the benefits of such an approach are ambiguous.
As a result of these concerns, some cities end up focusing far more
attention on more concrete (and less controversial) prevention activi-
ties like target hardening and response and recovery preparation.
Response and Recovery

State and local governments bear most of the burden for responding
to acts of terrorism. The role of the federal government in this effort
is primarily supportive, involving capacity building, training, equip-
ping, coordinating, and providing additional resources and support
needed to strengthen the local response operations in the event of a
catastrophe. Though local governments have primary responsibility
for responding to terrorist incidents, the costs of lack of preparedness,
in terms of both human and economic costs, are simply too great for
the federal government to adopt a laissez-faire policy.
The ideal response to both natural and man-made disasters is a
partnership between local and federal officials. Unfortunately, achiev-
ing that partnership has often proved difficult. Direct federal involve-
ment in disaster response sometimes produces conflict with local
officials. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, for instance,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency cut emergency commu-
nication lines in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. The local sheriff restored
the lines and posted armed deputies to ensure that FEMA would not
damage them again (Grissett 2005). Despite these problems, local gov-
ernments typically request federal support during disaster operations.
The U.S. military, for instance, routinely responds to local requests for
assistance, providing what it terms “Military Support to Civil Authority”

during both natural and man-made disasters (Winthrop 1997).
Despite substantial efforts to be trained, equipped, and otherwise
prepared for disaster response, the reality is that no community will
ever truly be ready in the sense that it can execute a neat, controlled,
carefully packaged set of responses in an orderly fashion. Disasters
are ambiguous and unpredictable, and they defy our best efforts to
launch carefully planned and programmed responses. Hierarchies
are notoriously poor mechanisms for responding to disasters. They
are too rigid, and they stifle the kinds of impromptu, adaptive, impro-
visational responses that are crucial in disaster relief. Instead, the
quality of the response often depends less on hierarchical command-
and-control principles than on the ability to establish what has come
to be known as a hastily formed network (HFN). “An HFN has five
elements: it is (1) a network of people established rapidly (2) from
different communities, (3) working together in a shared conversa-
tion space (4) in which they plan, commit to, and execute actions, to
(5) fulfill a large, urgent mission” (Denning 2006: 16–17). Though
it seems almost instinctual to establish or rely on hierarchies to solve
our problems, current thinking about disaster response is focused
more intensely on interagency and intergovernmental networks than
on bureaucracies. HFNs hold great promise for improving response
and recovery efforts in the future.
Investigation
The federal government has primary responsibility for investigating
acts of terrorism. Through the JTTFs, the federal government is able
to rely on local police officers from around the nation who serve as
boundary spanners, representatives of local law enforcement agencies
whose job it is to secure the appropriate flow of information and inves-
tigative resources between the two levels of government.10 It is here
where both network theory and organizational theory would suggest
10
It is important to point out that programs like the JTTF blur the boundaries
between federal and local agencies. Research shows that the boundaries are nei-
ther clear nor static, with the federal criminal jurisdiction expanding dramatically
over the past century (Friel 2000; Richman 2000).
the need for caution. When a local police agency assigns an officer
to a JTTF, it is giving up that employee, to some extent, to the fed-
eral government. The officer still receives a paycheck from the local
agency, but receives his or her marching orders from the Assistant
Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) of the JTTF.
We view the local officer assigned to a JTTF as a linchpin in the
network of agencies responsible for homeland security. He or she is
a boundary spanner, a bridge between the local police agency and
the JTTF. We envision this boundary-spanning role producing four
kinds of problems or challenges. First, the cultures of the FBI and
local police agencies are very different, especially in the context of
terrorism. The FBI pays far more attention to security clearances and
compartmentalization of information than do local police agencies.
A police officer assigned to a JTTF will necessarily become accultur-
ated by his peers to respect the secrecy of the information to which
he or she is exposed. Furthermore, disclosing classified information
will subject the officer to a number of penalties, including federal
criminal charges (Murphy and Plotkin 2003). For both cultural and
legal reasons, therefore, the local officer assigned to a JTTF is likely
to be cautious about sharing information with members of his or her
own agency.
Second, in many instances, the police officer’s own commanders,
including his or her chief of police or the local government execu-
tive, will not have a sufficient security clearance to allow information
sharing by the officer. This was one of the primary concerns raised by
police chiefs at an executive session convened in November 2002 by
the Police Executive Research Forum and the Office of Community
Oriented Policing Services in Washington DC. This is one of the con-
cerns that drove the city council of Portland, Oregon to withdraw
its city police officers from the regional JTTF. We predict that other
communities may follow in Portland’s footsteps, because assigning
employees a higher security clearance than those to whom they report
is a recipe for any number of problems.
Third, in spite of concerns about the FBI by local police officers,
it is likely that police officers assigned to the JTTF will perceive their
role as privileged. Protecting the homeland against terrorists is more
glorious work than catching burglars or car thieves or responding to
motor vehicle accidents. The history of policing has shown over and
over again that assigning police officers to special units isolates those
units and the officers that work in them, often generating hostility,
if not more benign social distance, between special unit officers and
general police officers. This is yet another potential source of com-
munication problems between officers assigned to JTTFs and other
officers.
Finally, police officers assigned to a JTTF are investigators or detec-
tives. They typically do not hold a high rank within their own orga-
nizations. By virtue of not having held such a rank, they may hold
a narrow perspective on the information needs of the agency as a
whole. It would be unfair to expect them to think like a captain or
a commander, imagining all of the various ways that what they have
learned through their work at the JTTF could be used by patrol offi-
cers on the street, by trainers at the police academy, by the members
of the bomb squad, or by any of the other myriad niches within the
police organization.
Taken together, all of these factors suggest that police officers
assigned to JTTFs face challenges in serving as effective boundary
spanners between their two organizations. Although they are unlikely
to be co-opted within the culture of the FBI writ large, there is a strong
possibility that they may identify with and become ingrained in the
culture of the JTTF. They may face pressures not to share informa-
tion with others in their own agencies, including those above them in
the command structure. Given their rank and their career trajectory
within the local police department, they probably have formidable
expertise in investigative methods, as well as street smarts. They are
unlikely, however, to be well versed in the larger set of strategic and
administrative issues of concern to police commanders. Therefore,
their role as boundary spanners is likely to be incomplete.
Creating a more complete bridge between JTTFs and local police
agencies will mean creating a pathway through which information of
strategic or administrative importance can be transmitted on a regu-
lar basis. This structure, in an appropriate form, would enable police
leaders to make more informed decisions about homeland security
issues. Police chiefs and others have raised several possibilities for
achieving these levels of communication and cooperation. One is
simply to ensure that there is a strong relationship between the local

police chief and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the JTTF or
the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the FBI field office to whom he
or she reports. This relationship could be valuable in many ways, but
it is a limited format for achieving the kinds of ongoing, regular com-
munication needed for genuine homeland security. These arrange-
ments need to be more formal and structured if we are to avoid the
kinds of breakdowns that occur routinely in such informal relation-
ships, and that occurred in the Hurricane Katrina fiasco. Another rea-
son for something more structured than an informal relationship is
that police executives and FBI SACs and ASACs both have notoriously
short tenures in office. Another possibility raised by police chiefs is to
establish an executive council in which police chiefs meet regularly
with the regional SAC or the ASAC. Again, we view this as a valuable
but limited solution. The solution is loosely coupled with the problem.
Three kinds of communication dyads would occur: between the chief
and the ASAC, the JTTF officer and the ASAC, and the chief and the
JTTF officer. This kind of loose coupling is, as noted before, a recipe
for communication breakdown. The solution is to provide a format in
which police chiefs (or their delegates) and their JTTF officers attend
routinely scheduled meetings with other chiefs and officers as well as
the ASAC. This arrangement could provide the greatest opportunity
for all the parties involved to communicate openly and effectively. We
would expect the result to be an increased capacity for police organi-
zations to be responsive to the needs identified by JTTFs.
A 2005 study by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found
that, in general, the JTTFs have successfully implemented the FBI’s
counterterrorism strategy (Office of the Inspector General 2005).
The OIG report identified several ways the JTTFs could improve,
including: (1) ensuring that all members receive training in terrorism
and counterterrorism, (2) providing an orientation to new members,
(3) preparing documents clarifying the roles and responsibilities of
members, (4) doing a better job of sharing terrorism-related informa-
tion with agencies that do not have officers assigned to the JTTF, (5)
establishing performance measures, (6) enhancing overall staffing
levels, including analytical and administrative support, and (7) reduc-
ing the extent of turnover among JTTF leadership. Overall, from a
network perspective, the structure of the FBI’s terrorism investigation

apparatus appears sound. Regional JTTFs integrate the resources of
many agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, and each JTTF
reports to a national JTTF located at headquarters. The overall net-
work is centralized, as it needs to be, but it relies heavily on resources
mobilized from around the nation. The key will be to ensure that
the boundary-spanning activity between agencies is optimized. Future
research should examine this question.
CONCLUSION
Radical Islamic terrorists have adopted a resilient network structure

consisting of a series of widely dispersed, semi-autonomous cells.
Many commentators have pointed out that hierarchies and traditional
command-and-control military doctrine are ineffective approaches
for defeating enemies that have adopted these kinds of network struc-
tures. Therefore a common policy recommendation both before
and after 9/11 has been for the U.S. government to invest in the
development of counterterrorism networks capable of defeating net-
worked enemies in what Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) refer to as a
“netwar” (e.g., Gormley 2002; Kapucu 2009; Zanini and Edwards
2001). For example, according to political scientist William Gormley
(2002: 9–10), “Networks are more nimble and flexible than hier-
archies; they are better able to adapt to changing circumstances …
whether we win the war against terrorism will depend on whether we
manage to master the network as an institutional form.”
The United States has invested heavily in the development of many
different kinds of counterterrorism networks of different sizes and
scopes, at multiple levels of government, and across national and ide-
ological borders. Some of these networks are more nimble and flex-
ible than others. The Department of Homeland Security’s sprawling
organizational chart is really a hybrid structure combining networks
and hierarchies. Little is known about the extent to which it is capable
of overcoming the inherent difficulties to which such a structure is
prone.
Since 9/11, researchers and analysts have invested significant
energy in applying the theories and methods of social network analysis
to terrorist networks (e.g., Krebs 2001; Sageman 2004; Tsvetovat and

Carley 2005). Comparatively little energy has been invested in apply-
ing these same theories and methods to the social and organizational
networks responsible for preventing, responding to, and investigat-
ing terrorism in the United States. This is unfortunate, because social
and organizational network analyses could reveal potential structural
problems in these various networks before tragedies (like Hurricane
Katrina) strike. A recent analysis of intergovernmental disaster-response
systems, for instance, concluded that these systems have increased in
complexity over time (Kapucu 2009). This analysis, though helpful,
barely scratches the surface of what might be learned from investing in
network analysis of the U.S. homeland security apparatus.
Networks have different properties than markets and hierarchies,
and we do not yet adequately understand how they emerge, in what
ways they exhibit weakness or breakdown, and how they succeed. If
understanding networks of individuals is difficult, understanding
enormous networks of agencies employing millions of individuals is
daunting. Yet if it is true that it takes a network to defeat a network,
investing in achieving that understanding is crucial. Elaborating a net-
work perspective on federal-local cooperation in homeland security
should bear much fruit.
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chapter fifteen
Liberty and Security in an Era of Terrorism

John Kleinig
INTRODUCTION
Not only did the events of September 11, 2001 (henceforth 9/11)
have a profound effect on our national and international psyches,
but they also prompted a radical reconsideration and even revision
of seemingly well-established moral responses. The racial profiling by
police that had been recently condemned by public opinion and official
inquiry was often revived with a different attitude and outcome when
the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were identified. Governmental
surveillance that would have been considered incompatible with a free
society was suddenly and overwhelmingly enshrined in what, without
a trace of irony, was called the USA PATRIOT Act. Even the revulsion
against torture that seemingly required no further justification has
been reviewed and reconstructed in official memoranda and public
debate.
This was not, of course, the first time that some of these issues had
been broached. National security has a long history of debate associ-
ated with it.1 The Korematsu (1944) decision of World War II, sanction-
ing the internment of large numbers of Japanese Americans, was only
one of the more notorious occasions on which such debate occurred.
Other incidents during the Vietnam War (e.g., the publication of the
Pentagon Papers and violation of Daniel Ellsberg’s privacy rights)
1
Consider, for example, the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, available at <http://
earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/sedition/>, the suspension of habeas
corpus and free speech rights during the Civil War, and the Espionage Act passed
during World War I.
357
excited similar concerns.2 Secret CIA manuals prepared for Latin

American military use crossed the public radar screen in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.3 Nevertheless, the current debate, focused on the chal-
lenges of terrorism – and even more particularly terrorism at home,4
rather than engagement with another national entity – has given that
discussion a Machiavellian cast that it has not previously had.
The many issues that call for discussion are both general and partic-
ular. My purpose here, however, is to focus primarily on some of the
general ones and more specifically on conceptual issues relating to
the “tension” between liberty and security, generally understood to be
national security. I will consider what is at stake when we appeal to lib-
erty and security, the rhetorical significance of “an era of terrorism,”
and the metaphors we use in dealing with the tension between liberty
and security.
LIBERTY
First, consider liberty, which is often used interchangeably with free-

dom but is sometimes distinguished from it. A strong case may be
made for each alternative, but for heuristic purposes I will distinguish
them, reserving “freedom” for a level of personal development, and
using “liberty” to refer to a social state of affairs.
Freedom
It is useful to start with freedom, which I characterize as an individual
achievement of maturation and learning – specifically, as a state of per-
sonal development in which one has acquired the capacity to reflect
on and revise one’s attitudes, reasons, motives, and desires, and to act
upon them. With such freedom comes a measure of responsibility for
what we do, both morally and otherwise.
2
New York Times Co. v. United States , 403 U.S. 713 (1971); United States v. Ehrlichman ,
376 F.Supp. 29 (D.D.C. 1974); United States v. Ehrlichman , 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir
1976); cert. denied , 429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
3
The KUBARK manuals are available at <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/>.
4
What is insidious about terrorism, it is said, is not simply that the enemy is not
identifiable in the way that an enemy state is, but that the threat of terrorism does
not exist solely beyond one’s borders but may also threaten from within. The spec-
ter of “sleeper cells” has generated much of the moral mileage driving the USA
PATRIOT Act and its progeny.
liberty and security in an era of terrorism 359
Such personal freedom is related to, though not identical with,

personal autonomy or individuality. Autonomy refers to a heightened
level of individual freedom. In his chapter on “Individuality, as One
of the Elements of Well-Being,” John Stuart Mill (1859, Chapter 3)
says that a person “must use observation to see, reasoning and judg-
ment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimina-
tion to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control
to hold to his deliberate decision.”5 He is speaking of autonomy. In
the larger passage from which this is taken, Mill makes it clear that
autonomy is not simply a matter of “rational” development; it also
has emotional and motivational dimensions. It concerns the capacity
to choose well. It involves both authenticity (whereby one’s reasons,
feelings, attitudes, and judgments become genuinely one’s own) and
competence (a level of development of rational capacities and other
discriminative sensibilities that protect one against systematic igno-
rance, self-deception, and other debilitating pathologies). Further, it
involves the development of individuality, something achieved in con-
cert with others rather than in social isolation.
Here we shall leave aside an important and long-standing debate
whether this account should be supplemented by certain substantive
beliefs that must be held if a person is truly to be said to be free.
Elements of this debate are also involved in the debate over whether
liberty (or, freedom) should be construed as positive or negative.6
Liberty
As I am using it here, liberty is concerned with external, social con-
straints on the person.7 We may speak of it as having both individual
and collective dimensions – that is, as a way of characterizing either an
5
Mill <http://www.bartleby.com/130/3.html>.
6
This debate goes back to the nineteenth century, where it revolved around the
question whether liberty and freedom required not merely the absence of social
constraints, but also access to the wherewithal that would enable a person to make
use of such negative liberty. For without such wherewithal, one’s (negative) liberty
might not be said to be worth much. In the twentieth century, the debate was given
a Cold War cast in Isaiah Berlin’s influential essay, “Two Concepts of Liberty.” He
saw in positive liberty, and the “self-mastery” he believed it implied, the seeds of a
paternalistic perfectionism.
7
There may be nonsocial constraints on action that do not constitute limits on lib-
erty. Gravity and my physiological structure both have some bearing on how high I
may be able to jump, but they are not constraints on my liberty.
individual or a group. It is often argued that liberty, as an absence of

constraint or domination by others, is primarily individual. However,
I believe this to be somewhat misleading. Individual liberty is most
likely to exist in an environment of liberty, in which collective rules
operate to secure individual liberty and, with it, the conditions for
individual flourishing.8
For present purposes, it is important to recognize that the domain
of liberty is not undifferentiated. Although liberty may exist to varying
degrees (my liberty with regard to the speed at which I travel is greater
on the New Jersey Turnpike than on Sullivan Street in Manhattan),
and though it tends to be valued both in itself and for what it enables
us to do, we have accorded a distinctive status to some kinds of lib-
erty. We designate such as liberties. They demarcate spheres of activ-
ity that we consider it important not to constrain at all, or that may
be constrained only under special circumstances. Generally, these
are spheres of activity that are central to a conception of ourselves as
Millian individuals. Many of them are enshrined in what we refer to as
our civil liberties – our ability to communicate and associate with oth-
ers, our ability to think and believe as we wish, including our worship-
ing or not worshiping as we determine.9 Such liberties – and probably
others, including some political liberties such as voting – are often
seen as central not only to our standing as persons (as possessing
dignity and owed the respect of others), but also to a liberal or free
society. A society that unreasonably constrains liberty in these spheres
will not be a liberal (or “free”) one, whatever else we might want to
say about it.
It is not that there may be no degrees of liberty with respect to com-
munication or speech, but the considerations that allow constraints
on these liberties are (and need to be) of a different order from those
8
It is the reference to securing the conditions for individual flourishing that helps
to link liberty in its collective and individual aspects with freedom, in both its basic
sense and its heightened autonomous expression. They are causally intertwined –
with free persons developing more successfully and being better sustained in a
society that is characterized by liberty. Were it not for our concern with personal
freedom, we would not have the interest we do in liberty.
9
Cf. Amendment I of the U.S. Constitution. For Mill’s own catalog, see On Liberty,
Ch 1.
that allow constraints on liberty more generally. Thus, the kinds of

considerations that permit us to reduce the maximum speed limit on
highways from sixty-five miles per hour to fifty-five are not – or at least
should not be – the same as the kinds of considerations that will allow
us to limit certain kinds of speech. This distinction will have a signifi-
cant place in our later discussion.
Privacy
I mention as one further dimension of liberty our interest in privacy.
Thought of as a social condition, as in the right to privacy, privacy
may be seen as a liberty interest. That is, acknowledging a person’s
privacy is tantamount to granting that person a liberty with respect to
certain kinds of information, usually personal. Such liberty is relevant
to certain governmental responses to terrorism, particularly those
concerned with surveillance.
Privacy is a complex and multilayered concept, and here I do no
more than note certain aspects of that complexity (Benn and Gaus).
Basically, its sphere is that of information or knowledge concerning
one’s person. That which constitutes one’s “person” is not fixed and
to some degree is culturally relative, both between and within cul-
tures. Centrally, it concerns one’s agency – one’s standing as an auton-
omous chooser or moral agent (who, by virtue of that status deserves
the respect of others10). It is because of this that the voyeur or person
who eavesdrops violates privacy, even if the other person is not aware
of it and no other harm is threatened or done: She or he is treated by
someone else as a mere object, or is deceived as to the nature of what
she or he is doing – namely, controlling the flow of personal informa-
tion to others. To the extent that someone becomes aware of breaches
to his or her privacy, then a further harm may be done insofar as his
or her freedom to act in a certain way may be impaired. If I become
aware that someone is listening in on a private conversation I am hav-
ing, this will redefine the terms of my conversation in certain ways,
and I will have to make adjustments for the intruder’s presence. I can
no longer “be myself.”
10
In the classical liberal sense of respect for persons, i.e., respect for one’s status as a
person, not necessarily respect for the particular person one is.
Although this core notion of privacy is sustained by deontological

considerations – as a duty to be respectful of others – it also has con-
siderable consequentialist support. Very often, information concern-
ing my person can make me vulnerable to others. It can bring me into
disrepute or be used against me in certain ways. I can be made an
object of humiliation or scorn; I can be manipulated and exploited.
The consequentialist dangers of exposing “personal information”
have led to an extension of the notion of a privacy violation from the
compromise of one’s dignity and agency and disregard for the respect
to which one is due, to broader exposures of oneself to threat as a
result of information concerning oneself being available to others.
Thus, to the extent that others have information concerning my
address, phone number, social security, or PIN numbers, I may find
myself victimized – or at least more easily victimized – in certain ways.
Others who have this information without our consent may use it to
stalk, harass, or blackmail us, or damage our financial interests or oth-
erwise harm us. Sometimes the information in question may not be
particularly private, but is then collated in some way that will enable
others to exploit our profile in a harmful manner. Identity theft is an
increasingly common phenomenon here. Misuse is made easier by
the fact that there are private companies (such as ChoicePoint and
LexisNexis) that gather and collate such personal information. It is
some such fears that inform the opposition to governmental digital
surveillance and other information-gathering operations that have
emerged since 9/11. Information (or, too often, misinformation)
makes one vulnerable to governmental overreaching.
We may have no absolute right to privacy, just as we have no absolute
right to liberty from others’ interference, but those who would invade
our privacy need to have appropriately strong reasons for doing so.
Privacy is not merely an aspect of our liberty, but a liberty in itself.
Properly understood, individual and collective liberty will exist in
some kind of creative tension. Civil society of a liberal democratic
kind is characterizable as a social order in which some measure of
individual liberty is ceded to sustain institutions (including a structure
of civil liberties) designed to ensure maximum individual liberty
within a larger understanding of possibilities for and the conditions of
human flourishing. It will not be presumed that there is only one way
in which humans may flourish, though much that might be accommo-

dated within such an understanding is open to contestation.
SECURITY
Although the occupants of a Lockeian state of nature possess basic

rights to life, liberty, and property, such a state offers little security.11
The possession of rights is not sufficient for their enjoyment. In the
social contract tradition, to effect their security, the occupants of a
state of nature would choose to enter into “civil society” – that is,
one characterized by institutions designed to secure for its members
conditions for the exercise of their rights (Locke).12 Security is no
peripheral social condition, but critical to the prosecution of a life
that is able to realize its potential. Or, to put it in terms more focused
on our present concerns, we can expect there to be some reasonable
accommodation between security and liberty in both its individual
and collective dimensions. Some level of security will be needed not
only to ensure the social conditions of liberty, but also to foster indi-
vidual human flourishing. Insecurity will impinge not only on liberty,
both collective and individual, but also on freedom. In addition, a
lack of security can breed fear (“a sense of insecurity”), and with fear
may also come a further contraction of freedom.13
As is often the case when we think of liberty (or freedom) – implicitly
(or sometimes explicitly) having in mind a liberty from X so that we
are at liberty to Y – so too when thinking about security, we generally
have in mind our being secure against X so that we can be secure to Y.
Both liberty/freedom and security are context dependent.
Also like liberty, security may be seen as individual or collective, and
we might expect the two to be causally linked in some way. At least in
liberal societies, collective security will generally enhance the security
11
This essay was initially drafted in the middle years of the George W. Bush
Administration. The literature on security has since that time been enriched by
several sources, including Waldron (2006) and Caudle.
12
In his Second Treatise Of Civil Government, Ch. 9, Locke identifies these as legisla-
tive, judicial, and executive.
13
Our propensity for such fear is one of the things that give terrorism its strategic
rationale. On the problematic interplay of subjective and objective factors, see
Zedner (2003).
of the individual. Public safety is correlated with individual safety. Such

collective security can of course take various forms, of which national
security will be only one. There will, for example, also be the collec-
tive security provided by local or state police departments. National
security14 will comprehend the institutions of the larger society – the
state or country – and the military and National Guard will secure
them against outside and even some inside threats.
The idea of national security has never been entirely clear-cut. It is
rarely defined in legislation or elsewhere, and when defined it tends
to be defined extremely broadly. Traditionally and most simply – or
at least until the collapse of the Soviet Union – it referred first and
foremost to the security of borders, to the conditions for ensuring
against conquest. Its primary agent has been a standing army, ready to
defend those borders. As some writers have put it – often as a prelude
to its criticism, especially by those working in peacemaking studies15 –
it has had a militaristic ring about it.
But even in that traditional sense, national security has referred
to something more than merely uncontested or secure borders.
There has been the associated idea of an absence of threat. There is
an implicit subjective dimension – an absence of fear or, as we might
want to put it, an absence of a sense of insecurity.16 And the threat
in question has not simply been to borders; it has usually been or
included the threat to a way of life – to institutional and cultural tradi-
tions and values.17 Borders do not mark out only the boundaries of a
14
State security might seem a bit more accurate, because we are usually referring to
political jurisdictions rather than nations or nationalities. Sometimes, of course, a
nation-state will be involved. However, as I will suggest, it is probably no accident
that we speak of national rather than simply state security, because it is not simply
jurisdictional integrity that is at stake, but also institutional and cultural. The more
recent notion of homeland security seems to focus mainly on internal or localized
threats to national security.
15
Such writers see development and the reduction of invidious inequalities, not the
possession of strong borders, as the key to national security. To be honest, I am not
sure why authors have to think – or so often tend to think – in terms of either/or.
But the debate already points to areas of contestation.
16
“Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values,
in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (Wolfers,
p. 150). Zedner (2003, at p. 157) draws attention to a tradition in which a sense of
security is not seen a desirable but as a form of complacency.
17
Cf. Morgenthau: “National security must be defined as integrity of the national
territory and its institutions” (1960, p. 562).
sovereign state, but also the sphere within which a historical cultural
narrative unfolds – a richly textured institutional and cultural history,
characterized by distinctive memories and myths. National security
secures not only geographical borders, but also a complex set of tradi-
tions and ways of living.18
What has happened with the concept in recent years is that the
importance of territorial border issues has tended to recede, and
the idea and element of threat has expanded to encompass actual
and potential hazards to domestic tranquility and stability other than
those posed by simple conquest.19
Threats to national interests20 may take many forms and, if sufficiently
dire, may be considered threats to national security. Pandemic or
contagious disease (human and agricultural), environmental con-
ditions (such as pollution and global warming), and extraterritorial
economic circumstances and decisions (such as trade barriers and
currency decisions) are now frequently spoken of as impinging on
national security interests. And the threats need not necessarily be
external. Internal dissension and poverty may also be seen as threats
to national security. Not only, therefore, will outside dangers posed to
a national collectivity be seen as threats to national security, but also
internal challenges – perhaps those arising out of a failure to create or
secure conditions for a segment of the local population.
Even beyond these considerations, national security has recently
been broadened to include the establishment of or support for a
18
That can be true not only of free societies but also of oppressive ones. One of the
volatile issues confronting Iraqis has been the preservation of the “character” of
Iraqi society – no small feat in a country that encompasses at least three major
traditions. That can be true not only of free societies but also of oppressive ones.
One of the volatile issues confronting Iraqis has been the preservation of the “char-
acter” of Iraqi society – no small feat in a country that encompasses at least three
major traditions.
19
The most influential developments seem to be associated with what is called the
Copenhagen School (at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute), primarily –
though not exclusively – in the work of Barry Buzan. See Buzan et al. Its members
employ the language of “securitization” to indicate ways in which various social
phenomena (political, economic, societal, and environmental) are marketed as rel-
evant to national security. Securitization requires only the successful portrayal of
these phenomena as threats.
20
I consider interests to be those matters in which one has a stake, particularly the
ingredients of well-being.
variety of international initiatives – most critically, support for broadly

democratic or rights-based polities.21 It was the success of this expan-
sion that enabled a switch from “weapons of mass destruction”
threatening American freedom to “forces of undemocratic tyranny”
threatening American freedom, or, even more broadly, to honoring
the “nonnegotiable demands of human dignity.” The thought here
has been that national security requires, if not anything as universal
as global security, then some commonality or sharing of concern for
societal integrity. Thus, a number of writers have tried to focus on
what is called “common security” or “cooperative security.”22 National
security has become, if not secondary to a broader form of interstate
or international security, then coequal with it.23
Central to an assessment of the moral force of appeals to national
security will be not only what is embodied in our understanding of
it, but also what, given that understanding, is then taken to consti-
tute a (serious) threat to it. It is almost always in the interest of those
in power to give national security the widest possible interpretation,
and then to overestimate the actual threat posed by what they con-
sider will endanger it. The Communist witch hunts of the 1950s
21
The assumption here is that such polities are less likely to threaten each other. For
discussions of this old chestnut, see White; also Ahlmark. See also the speech of
President George W. Bush to the United Nations General Assembly: “In this young
century, our world needs a new definition of security. Our security is not merely
found in spheres of influence, or some balance of power. The security of our world
is found in the advancing rights of mankind” (September 21, 2004) <http://merln.
ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/WH/20040921–3.pdf>.
22
And some of these have argued that national security concerns should give
way to broader cooperative security arrangements. Alternatively, other writers have
pushed for the replacement of a concern for national security with one for human
security.
23
One other movement and counter-movement should be noted. Whereas Lockeian
thinking places the focus of security on individuals – needing their rights secured
against predatory others, leading to the formation of a protective/securing state –
a number of contemporary writers have shifted their attention almost completely
from the security of the individual to that of the state. The state and its interests
are not seen as the sum of those of the individuals who make it up; and neither is its
security reducible to the security of its citizens. It has its own identity and interests,
and what secures it is not determined by what secures the interests of these or those
individuals who inhabit it. In the opposite direction, there have been those who
believe that the state is only secondary to the individuals who make it up, and who
have therefore asserted the claims of what they call human security, in which state
relevance consists simply in the fact that, in a global human order, it is the actor
“with the greatest relative power” (Aravena).
were “justified” in terms of national security and, as noted, we have

recently seen the issue of “weapons of mass destruction” exploited to
similar effect. Not only so, it is often in the interests of those in power
to clothe partisan concerns in the language of national security.24
License may be an enemy of liberty, but because it is often made to
bear more moral weight than it can reasonably bear, national secu-
rity may be its own enemy. It is important, then, in considering argu-
ments grounded in appeals to national security, to look at both its
scope and substance.
What I consider to be a particular problem in the discussion
of national security is a slide from “national security interests” to
“national security.” Although national security is concerned with the
protection of various state interests – in, for example, secure borders,
the preservation of cultural traditions, the perpetuation of key civil
institutions – it does not follow that whenever some national inter-
est is threatened, compromised, or damaged, then “national security”
will be at risk. It will depend on both the nature and magnitude of the
threat or risk. Even threatening national security will not necessarily
put it at risk. There may be those who believe that the “Great Satan”
needs to be put down – that at least is their stated ambition – but
if their resources do not match up to their desires, it can hardly be
argued that they place national security at risk. The risk must be dire,
imminent, and real.25
I do not wish to argue that we should stick with a traditional under-
standing of national security. The world we live in is not the world
of one hundred years ago, and our national interests are not as
localized as they were one hundred years ago. Even though talk of a
global village takes it too far, there is nevertheless a sense in which we
24
In the run-up to the 2004 elections, it was frequently claimed that electing John
Kerry would endanger national security. As Forst notes with the quotes of Dick
Cheney and John Kerry used to introduce Chapter 12 (used earlier in a paper pre-
sented at the American Society of Criminology meeting in Toronto, November
2005), both the Republican and Democratic presidential ticket contenders
exploited public insecurity shamelessly in their campaigns. What is merely “regime
security” often seeks to represent itself as “national security.”
25
To comment in this way of course courts some sort of political backlash. For to
ignore or downplay such threats may be to encourage their expression in increas-
ingly effective ways. But, likewise, to respond to them overactively may also strategi-
cally advantage those who make them.
(understood as a “peculiar people”) are now more easily impacted by

events (and not just hostile armies) beyond our geographical bound-
aries. Conflict overseas may bring pressures to accept refugees or may
threaten energy supplies or global environmental disaster. However,
the links need to be spelled out and, if necessary, defended and quantified.
Otherwise we will find ourselves on a political slippery slope in which
neither the slipperiness nor the slope nor the end point will be clear.
The Vietnam War was almost certainly sustained by means of a flawed
argument (the domino theory) about the international spread of
Communism. Its mistakes are repeatable.
AN ERA OF TERRORISM?
The dialectic of liberty and security is intensified by talk of what is spo-

ken of as “an era of terrorism.” Is this political hyperbole – as I suspect
is the language of “wars” on crime and drugs?
There is some reason to think so. Though the phrase has gained
currency since 9/11, there is nothing particularly new about terror-
ism. Israel and Northern Ireland have experienced it for many years.
And there are many precedents before that. The idea that we now
live in an era of terrorism may well reflect a somewhat U.S.-centered
perspective on what is happening in the world. Of course, there are
other contemporary terrorist movements (as in Chechnya and Spain)
that might make us think of terrorism more globally, but this would
probably be to overlook what is just as legitimately viewed as state
terrorism during the time of Stalin. There is some reason to suspect
that the phrase is being exploited by those who invoke the claims of
national security in order to justify policies and conduct that should
be seen as improperly invasive. At the same time, it is probably in the
interests of terrorists to create a culture of fear concerning both its
imminence and immanence, as terrorism is a strategy that creates and
exploits widespread fear.
Yet I do not wish to minimize the temporal and global significance
of terrorism. What is of greater concern to me is that I suspect that
“we” have responded to 9/11 in ways that may have fomented and
encouraged terrorism, rather than seeking to understand and meet
it in more measured and effective ways. Terrorism is a complicated
phenomenon, whose roots as well as tactics require understanding,

and even if almost all terrorism comes to moral grief over its tendency
to treat “innocents” or “non-combatants” merely as means rather than
as Kantian ends, it also requires a response that does not draw those
who engage in a “war on terrorism” to adopt tactics that might them-
selves be characterized as terroristic.26
BALANCES, TRADE-OFFS, AND JUDGMENTS
Balances
In considering the relations between liberty and security – how they
are to be “played off” against each other – the metaphors we use are
not irrelevant. It is very common to use the metaphor of a scale, in
which liberty and national security are placed in opposing pans, one
to be “balanced” against the other in zero-sum fashion.27 The under-
lying, or at least implied, idea is that there is an appropriate level or
balance to be achieved, an equilibrium – one, moreover, that does not
threaten the integrity of the other. Appropriate liberty is that which
balances appropriate security.
The need for such balancing is seen as an essential and pervasive
feature of our social existence. Given Lockeian or, even more gloom-
ily, Hobbesian presumptions about the subjects of liberty, some con-
straints on liberty will always be required in order that our security
can be assured. The problem, it is said, will be to get the right bal-
ance, namely, one in which constraints on liberty are appropriate to an
appropriate level of security.28
26
Fortunately, with the advent of the Obama administration, U.S. policy has been
undergoing major reassessment, and though it may be too early to see how much it
will change, there is some reason to believe that the militaristic approaches favored
by the previous administration will be moderated by understandings that are more
heavily informed by policing approaches. Intelligence gathering and interrogation
techniques previously favored by the CIA are giving way to those used by the FBI
through its involvement in the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative.
27
For just a few of the many examples, see Rosen; Committee on Federal Courts;
Gross. There are, however, a few dissenters, including Waldron (2003), Fleming
(2004); Scanlon (2004); and Zedner (2005).
28
The picture involves an oversimplification in that it fails to accommodate other
“values” – such as efficiency, economy – that might also need to be “balanced”
against liberty or security.
Securing the right balance is not something that can be determined

in the abstract or once and for all, but will change, depending on the
gravity of a threat and the level of risk (to security). Where the risks
are small, appropriate constraints on liberty will be few, but where
the risks are large and imminent, we might expect liberty to be sub-
stantially, appropriately, and justifiably diminished. An appropriate
balance is also a function of the importance we attach to liberty and
security. Some constraints on liberty might be seen as more important
than others, though this will be complicated by the fact that people
may disagree as to their importance. Further, the level of security that
we consider necessary will also offer opportunities for contestation.
Some of us are more risk-averse than others. So, even if the balanc-
ing metaphor works, it will have to confront some complexity in its
application to social life.
The balancing metaphor has a surface plausibility, or at least it
strikes us as familiar and easy to work with. Both liberty and national
security can be thought of as matters of degree – of more and less –
and, on the face of it, it seems reasonable to think that where secu-
rity threats are great, liberty might reasonably be contracted, and that
where security threats are minimal, liberty might – indeed, ought to –
be expanded. The only significant issue might appear to be one of
getting the balance right – of judging the gravity and probability of
risk to security accurately enough to make appropriate adjustments
to liberty.29
Many have said that the balance changed dramatically, if not irrev-
ocably, on 9/11: What we thought to be an appropriate balance of
liberty and security was shown not to be so. An appropriate balance
needed to be restored. Grave threats that we thought were theoretical
29
I am of course assuming that we can compute degrees of liberty in a relatively
unproblematic way. That is not an unproblematic assumption. Even leaving to one
side the challenge posed by the liberty/liberties distinction, it is not clear how to
compare the constraint on liberty constituted by a change of speed limit of 65 mph
to 55 mph with a change of drinking age from 18 to 21. Are these equivalent con-
straints or different, and if so, which is the greater? Included in these questions are
thorny distributional matters both on the side of who bears the costs and who ben-
efits, questions we take up later. (Note that one constraint affects a narrower group
of people than the other – this presumably will require some justification, no doubt
along the lines that drinkers between the ages of 18 and 21 are disproportionately
responsible for risky behavior.)
and remote before 9/11 were shown to be real and imminent. To

ensure the level of security that we valued (i.e., considered appropri-
ate), we would need to give up a measure of liberty.
We did not of course have to react in the way that we did. We
might have argued that the balance was adequate as it was and that
we simply needed to recognize that even an appropriate balance
would not rule out every contingency. It was a cost that would need
to be borne from time to time (like the occasional conviction of an
innocent person despite the procedural safeguards we have insti-
tuted). It is no easy matter to judge what an appropriate level of
liberty is and what an appropriate level of security is. Every judgment
regarding an appropriate “balance” will have implications for the
other, and it will be important to consider what constraints on one
will appropriately strengthen the other – and who will make such
determinations.
However we might have reacted, the invocation of a balancing
argument makes certain important assumptions. One of course con-
cerns the balancing metaphor – to which I shall return. However,
other important presumptions may also need examination. Central
among those is the presumption that what was lacking on 9/11 was
a proper balance of liberty and security rather than the functionality
of existing mechanisms. If, as it seems reasonable to argue, particularly
in light of The 9/11 Commission Report, the existing mechanisms for
security were dysfunctional in various ways, then what was lacking
may not have been an appropriate balance of liberty and security but
well-functioning security mechanisms – mechanisms that needed to
be brought up to standard.30 No shift in the balance might have been
called for, but simply a more efficient administration of what already
existed. Improved policies and practices might indeed enhance both
security and liberty.
Returning, though, to the balancing metaphor: Are liberty and secu-
rity balanceable in the way that is suggested? The metaphor presumes
30
This is a critical consideration because, even were it decided that the balance had
been wrongly struck, any rectificatory change would be of little value were the new
mechanisms not to function properly. Why should we assume that dysfunctional
intelligence agencies with new powers would function any better than the same
ones with the old powers?
that national security and liberty are commensurable values, appro-

priately balanced against one another. No doubt, to the extent that
our ethic is a straightforwardly consequentialist one – that is, to the
extent that our moral values are subordinate to some end, such as the
greatest happiness or good for the greatest number31 – then this will
seem to be a reasonable presumption. The right balance of security
and liberty will be the ratio that maximizes happiness, good, and so
on. So, for example, in the interests of security and overall social good,
I may no longer enter certain venues without a picture ID or without
subjecting my backpack to X-ray scrutiny. There does not seem to be
anything particularly problematic about that if there is some reason
to think that failure to have a valid ID or a backpack X-rayed would
actually heighten a security risk.
But even on straightforwardly consequentialist premises, there are
problems. Remember that what we have are not two values of equal
“substance.” Constraints on liberty are likely to be more certain than
risks to security. Actual constraints on liberty must be weighed against
risks to security. How do you weigh an actual contraction of liberty to
engage in Activity A against an increase of “security” from 70 percent
to 95 percent (or even from low to high)? It’s not easy. It is made even
more problematic by the fact that it is notoriously difficult to esti-
mate levels of risk with any kind of accuracy. Moreover, in the political
sphere – and this is where policy is made – it is highly prone to parti-
san taint. We need not look further than calculations of dangerous-
ness in the criminal justice arena, in which sex and violent offenders
have found themselves victims of what are barely more than ideologi-
cal judgments. Risk data are very spongy, and those who make policy
may be inclined to draw conclusions from the data according to their
prior leanings.
However, the view that liberty and security can be balanced in some
consequentialist manner is highly tendentious, both morally and
constitutionally. Morally, as already noted, there are certain liberties –
or, as we often refer to them, rights – that cannot be easily accom-
modated to the balancing metaphor. They function as constraints
31
Here of course we will have to assume that notions of happiness and good are
unitary. Otherwise we get into the Millian problem of quality v. quantity (in
Utilitarianism) or of the commensurability of different kinds of goods.
on consequentialist or maximizing doctrines. Robert Nozick spoke

of such rights as side-constraints (Nozick, at p. 28 et seq.), as consid-
erations that should not be entered into a utilitarian calculus; and
Ronald Dworkin (1984), in his view of rights as trumps, suggests that
when utility conflicts with rights, utility must normally give way. To the
extent then that liberty encompasses what we may consider to be our
“civil liberties” or “rights,” the simple balancing metaphor is problem-
atic, indeed, inappropriate. It is not, as Nozick’s and Dworkin’s termi-
nology perhaps misleadingly suggests, that values and “goods” such as
national security can never take precedence; but, should they do so, it
will not be as the result of a simple balancing process.
Civil liberties do not inhabit the realm of liberty in a purely addi-
tive way. Even though freedom of speech and freedom of association
may be expanded or contracted, they are not expanded or contracted
as part of a continuum with the expansion or contraction of speed
limits or drinking ages – as part of a more general liberty of action
or movement. The freedoms of speech and association have a special
place within the sphere of liberty. Briefly, they are seen as necessary
conditions – indeed, elements – of human flourishing and not merely
its catalysts. Their abrogation or constriction requires a special kind
of argument, not simply some consideration about greater security or
efficiency or social welfare.
We give constitutional recognition to the special status of liberties
via the Bill of Rights, in which agents of government are inhibited
from engaging in maximizing reasoning. Even if it is more efficient to
tap phones or enter premises at will when a murder is being investi-
gated, we do not permit such invasions unless certain stringent condi-
tions have first been satisfied. Arguments from efficiency (utility) are
not sufficient. A different kind of argument is required if we are to
engage legitimately in such activities.
We might of course want to argue that these aspects of liberty (our
liberties) are simply weightier than other parts, and that when they
are constrained, the security interests just have to be higher. Now, it
is certainly true – as was awkwardly recognized by their initial pro-
ponents (Dworkin, 1977; Nozick, 1974) – that the side-constraining
and trumping effects of certain considerations, such as rights, are
not absolute. Although some have asserted otherwise, justice need
not be done if the heavens will fall. But this does not leave the bal-
ancing metaphor intact. When, as in emergency situations, rights
must be compromised lest disaster (and not simply some maximizing
end) occur, what results is not a balance in which appropriate levels
of liberty and security are secured, but a situation in which there is
a derogation from or infringement of (some) liberty; it is not merely
diminished.
The balancing metaphor – at least in the present context – will not
do. It is too simplistic, reminiscent of the view that rights cannot come
into conflict, or that the virtues constitute a unity.
The balancing metaphor, to the extent that it is seen as a weighing
of commensurables, is problematic in yet another way. Appeals to
the metaphor suggest that what we lose in liberty we gain (or regain)
in safety and security. We. It tends not to work that way. Most of us
are probably not affected by the USA PATRIOT Act or other mea-
sures introduced following 9/11. Ostensibly, our security has been
increased or restored, but most of us will not have borne any signifi-
cant costs in return. But there have been significant costs for some –
and they have fallen disproportionately on a small segment of the
population – those with Middle Eastern appearances, those with visa
irregularities, those who, for some reason or other, have had gov-
ernmental attention turned on them. Those satisfying certain pro-
files or who have appeared on various “watch lists” have borne the
brunt of the costs of “our” greater security. What we may have in each
pan of the scales, then, is on the one side, increased security for the
large majority, and on the other, decreased liberty for a much smaller
minority.
Now, it might be argued that that is precisely how it should be,
because it is from among those groups that our security has been jeop-
ardized. This might look a bit more plausible – at least as a matter of
policy – were it arguable that a high proportion of those made to bear
the cost are also linked to terrorism in some active or conspiratorial
way. But this is not arguable at all. Only a minute proportion of those
on whom the burden of heightened security has been thrust have and
have had any constructive connection to – let alone sympathy with –
the cause of terrorism. They are no more morally tainted than those
who have suffered no appreciable diminution of liberty (or, more

significantly, abrogation of their liberties).32
In means-end reasoning of the kind that suffuses “the war on
terrorism,” it is important to ensure that certain conditions are sat-
isfied if the end is to be appealed to in justifying the means. One of
those conditions is that the means actually achieve the end sought (or,
less stringently, make it highly probable that the end will be accom-
plished – see Kleinig). It is all very well to argue that, in the name of
security, our liberties need to be curtailed. But we first need some
assurance that such contractions will (likely) increase our security.
More than say-so is required. If, as has been suggested, our security
on 9/11 was inadequate not because more stringent controls were
not available, but because controls that were already in place were
ineptly employed, then we have no reason to think that additional
controls will be correlated with greater efficiency/security. As Jeremy
Waldron expresses the point, it is not enough to argue that “reducing
a given liberty is necessary for combating terrorism effectively. It may
be a necessary condition, and yet – because sufficient conditions are
unavailable – the terrorist threat may continue unabated.” The point
is important, because there are significant costs to the curtailment or
contraction of liberties, especially for certain members of the com-
munity – aliens, members of particular religious or ethnic groups,
political dissidents, and so forth. If what is done to them is to have
any justification, it needs to be correlated with significant security
benefits that would not otherwise have been realized.33 The worry of
course – and this is why such consequentialist arguments need to be
looked at carefully and realistically – is that (even mild) crackdowns
of various kinds may contribute to social alienation and worsen the
security situation.34
32
Presumably, we do not gain in security from the investigation of those who pose no
threat to it. If the investigation is sufficiently ill-conceived, it may in fact diminish secu-
rity by creating sympathy for the terrorist cause where there was previously none.
33
Waldron (2003) suspects that such contractions have more symbolic than real
value, because they show that the authorities “care about” or are “doing something
about” a situation – such as presidents visiting areas devastated by hurricanes. What
is the moral worth/weight to be accorded such symbolic acts?
34
Thus, despite Attorney General John Ashcroft’s comments (March 20, 2002) on the
“voluntary” interview program initiated by the U.S. government on November 9,
A further condition for valid means-end reasoning is that unin-

tended side effects be taken into account. Just as profiling – even if
seen as an effective law enforcement tool – may have as an unwanted
(but important) effect the aggravation of historically troubled rela-
tions between different ethnic groups, so too may the constriction of
liberties have unintended and undesirable side effects. As Waldron
puts it:
When liberty is understood (as it usually is) in a negative sense, it

is something that cannot be reduced without increasing something
else, namely the powers and means and mechanisms that obstruct or
punish the ability of individuals to do what they want. Reducing lib-
erty may prevent an action taking place which would otherwise pose
a risk of harm. But it necessarily also increases the power of the state,
and there is a corresponding risk that this enhanced power may also
be used to cause harm.35
The point is an obvious one, but viewed through the lens of liberalism,
is also one of some importance. Liberal thought, even in its democratic
version, is predicated on a distrust of concentrated power, especially
power that is less than transparent.36 Even republican liberals strongly
committed to the importance of governmental mechanisms (see, e.g.,
Pettit), believe that those mechanisms need to be carefully circum-
scribed through “checks and balances.” We might of course want to
argue that any governmental powers exercised on “our” behalf will be
exercised benevolently. But that would be overly sanguine, given the
history not only of the previous but also of almost any government
administration. Government officials generally have strong incentives
2001, that “the process of reaching out to foreign nationals and their communities
fostered new trust between law enforcement and these communities” <http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept _11/ashcroft_018.htm>, a great deal of ill will was cre-
ated. In this program, some 5000-plus young men who had recently entered the
United States on visas from “countries with suspected terrorist links” were indi-
vidually “invited” to talk with government agents about their reasons for visiting,
past movements, knowledge concerning 9/11, and feelings about it. Few felt able
to refuse. A follow-up group of a further 3000+ was indicated in the March 20
announcement.
35
Waldron (2003), p. 204.
36
This of course has been one of the major complaints about the governmental
response to 9/11 – the lack of access to what is going on in Guantánamo Bay, the
secret handling of aliens, and certain provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.
to err on the side of security; elected public officials, in particular,

are rarely voted out of office for either protecting the public too vig-
orously or placing the safety of the majority above the liberties of a
minority.
First, we should not forget that the boundaries of terrorism have
been cast very broadly to maximize governmental flexibility: Political
dissent may sometimes be enough to trigger governmental attention.
That is troubling enough. But in addition, we have seen a number of
provisions that were introduced explicitly and specifically for the “war
on terrorism” now transferred to the wider “war on crime.”37 Such
measures would have been considered overly intrusive had they been
intended for ordinary law enforcement purposes.
Trade-Offs
If we want a more promising metaphor to characterize the situation,
I think we might do better with that of a trade-off. From time to time
Waldron and others slide from the balancing metaphor to that of the
trade-off as though they had similar implications (Waldron, 2003,
pp. 196–198, 203; cf. also Thomas, p. 1208) I think not. When we
trade one value off against another, we acknowledge not simply an
adjustment to the balance – the restoration of an equilibrium that has
been upset – but have in view a cost or sacrifice to one when the other
is given priority. There is an infringement or derogation of liberties or
rights when liberty is traded off for security.
A trade-off is not a trade. In a trade – at least in theory (a “fair”
trade) – one value is exchanged for another and no party to the trade
loses. Each party sees the exchange as being advantageous. A had x
and B had y, B wanted x and A wanted y, and the trade, because con-
sensual, satisfied both. A trade-off, on the other hand, involves a ten-
sion or conflict, whereby A, in order to get y, must sacrifice x. Even
if deemed an acceptable trade-off, it is nevertheless at some cost. A
would have preferred to secure y without sacrificing x. In a trade-off
the key issue will be to determine whether the sacrifices can be justi-
fied or sustained, and to determine how the costs incurred should be
responded to.
37
Most of these expansions have so far focused on financial crimes.
If many values that we might pursue are side-constrained by our

liberties or rights, national security has at least the potential for a
trade-off. The courts have long recognized that even constitutionally
guaranteed rights may be infringed in the name of national security
or some other broad social interest (such as public safety or territorial
integrity). However, such interests are not to be casually invoked. Any
claim must be subject to strict scrutiny, in which the interests invoked
in favor of constraining the liberty must be specified and explicitly
defended.38 Thus, vague references to “national security” will not do.
As noted earlier, the national security interests that are that are threat-
ened will need to be specified, the ways in which they are threatened
will need to be articulated, and the threat will need to be quantified
in some way.
Security, of course, may be seen in the same way as liberty – as a
right – though what is likely to be in view will not be national secu-
rity so much as personal security. (The two kinds of security may be
related, of course, because national security may facilitate or provide
an environment for personal or individual security.) To the extent
that securing our right to personal security comes into conflict with
our liberties, the tension will not be between some good and our lib-
erties, but between two rights – or, to put it in a way that encompasses
national security, between a good (national security) that secures a
right (personal security) and some other rights (our liberties). How
are such tensions to be resolved? Although we may use the metaphor
of a trade-off, it is a different kind of trade-off from that involved when
a liberty is traded off against some communal or social good.39
38
Strict scrutiny requires that “some compelling state interest” be shown. It stands in
contrast with what is called a “rational relations” test in which liberty is constrained
(say, a dress code for employees or a lowering of the speed limit); all that usually
needs to be shown is that there is a plausible connection between the restriction on
liberty and the purposes of the restricting body. In the broad gap between these
two, a third level of scrutiny – “heightened” – has developed to secure interests that
are deemed “important” but not “fundamental” (say, the interests of gay men).
39
The choice of metaphor can also reflect much deeper debates within moral theory
between those who view ethics as a rational system grounded in some single princi-
ple or set of compatible principles, and those who claim that we are confronted by
a plurality of values – either (as MacIntyre has suggested in “After Virtue .”) because
we have inherited fragments from competing moral schemata, or because (try as
we might) our human condition is such that we are confronted by a moral plurality
that calls for judgment rather than calculation. Debates over deontological and
To a degree, of course, we assume that though the interests of both

national security and individual liberty will be in some tension, they
will also be mutually supportive. Like courage and discretion, generos-
ity and caution, or even justice and happiness, we expect that in the
ordinary transactions of life we will be presented with choices that do
not violate the demands of either. Discretion will temper courage and
courage will save discretion from cowardice; caution will contribute to
wise expressions of generosity, and generosity will overcome the inertia
of caution; justice will check the aggregative tendencies of happiness,
and happiness will save justice from rigidity. Thus, we anticipate that
security will enhance our freedom and that freedom will guide secu-
rity. Were such not to be the case, our lives would be wretchedly torn.
But circumstances sometimes arise in which we are faced with what
seems to be a moral necessity to give one precedence over the other –
not merely a precedence that arises because one has some inherent
priority over the other, but a precedence that serves to compromise or
undermine the other, leaving a residue of moral loss or even taint.
Judgment
At the end of the day, however, there are reasons for thinking that
both metaphors (of balance and trade-off) fail to do justice to the com-
plexity involved in clashes between security and liberty – even though
the metaphor of a trade-off comes rather closer to the mark.40 What
is required is judgment. Judgment is not a matter of algorithmically
drawing conclusions from premises, but of incrementally bringing
consequentialist theory, or between universalists and particularists, often reflect

such deeper debates. This, however, is not the place to do more than acknowledge
them.
40
Scanlon (following Rawls) makes use of the language of “adjustment.” To summarize
this discussion: Rawls holds that basic liberties such as freedom of expression (once
defined) cannot be balanced against other interests. But they need to be “adjusted.”
The powers and prerogatives (and limits on powers and prerogatives) that define
these liberties need to be specified. What is specified in this process is, among
other things, the grounds on which expression may legitimately be regulated. In
determining these limits we need to take various potentially conflicting interests
into account. However, in this process of balancing and adjustment, our interest in
assuring conditions for the development and full exercise of the two moral pow-
ers has the primary role: If allowing some other interest to justify restrictions on
expression in a certain way would pose a threat to the full exercise of these powers,
then that justification for restriction cannot be allowed (p. 1484).
reasons to bear on one another – point and counterpoint – until we

can reach a conclusion that is defensible. This will involve the assem-
bling of relevant considerations, prioritizing them, and then making
determinations about whether or to what degree, in the particular
case (if that is what we are concerned about) or in respect of a partic-
ular policy (if that is the level at which we are seeking to reach a deci-
sion), one is to be sacrificed to the other. The process is one of the
interplay of reasons enabling one – perhaps – to warrant trading off
a measure of one in favor of the other. The trade-off, if any, is deter-
mined though a judgmental process. Stanley Benn puts it well, and
deserves the last word:
The metaphor of “balancing” or “weighing,” with its image of weights

held in the balance or in the hands, is not altogether perspicuous
when applied to arguments or claims. For one thing, weighing
and balancing suggest the achievement of a state of equilibrium –
equal weights – while judgment requires the determination of an
outcome because some reasons “outweigh” others. More important
than this, however, is the consideration that judging claims and rea-
sons generally proceeds seriatim. There is commonly a presumption
of right, which counterclaims are then designed to override. These
in turn may be undercut or overridden, as may be those adduced
against them in their turn. Admittedly, deciding whether a claim
has indeed been undercut or whether a counterclaim overrides
may itself demand judgment, and secondary disputes employing
precisely similar tactics can develop at each point in the argument.
It will always help in settling such disputes to understand precisely
what kind of argument is going on. To describe it as one in which
“considerations are being weighed” or “balanced” is not helpful,
because the metaphor does not really illumine the process.41
RE F E RE N CE S
Per Ahlmark, “How Democracy Prevents Civic Catastrophes” <http://

www.unwatch.org/speeches/demcat.html>.
Francisco Rojas Aravena, “Human Security: Emerging Concept of Security
in the Twenty-First Century,” Disarmament Forum, Volume 2 (2002)
<http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1442.pdf>.
41
A Theory of Freedom, 296–297. Cf. Science Research Council v. Nassé H.L.(E.), [1980]
A.C. 1028, at 1067, [1979] 3 W.L.R. 762 at 771 (Lord Wilberforce).
S.I. Benn, A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1988).
S.I. Benn and G.F Gaus, “Public and Private – Concepts in Action,” in S.I.
Benn and G.F. Gaus (eds), Public and Private in Social Life (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1983), pp. 3–27.
Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1969).
Barry Buzan, O . Wyer, J.D. Wilde, and O. Waever, Security: A New Framework
for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997).
Sharon L. Caudle, “National Security Strategies: Security from What,
for Whom, and by What Means,” Journal of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management, Volume 6, No. 1 (2009) <http://bepress.com/
jhsem/vol6/iss1/22>.
Committee on Federal Courts, “The Indefinite Detention of ‘Enemy
Combatants’: Balancing Due Process and National Security in the
Context of the War on Terror,” The Record, Volume 59 (2004),
pp. 41–75.
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977).
“Rights as Trumps,” in Jeremy Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (Oxford:
OUP, 1984), pp. 153–167.
James E. Fleming, “Securing Deliberative Democracy,” Fordham Law
Review, Volume 72 (2004), pp. 1435–1476.
Emanuel Gross, “The Struggle of a Democracy Against Terrorism –
Protection of Human Rights: The Right to Privacy versus the National
Interest – The Proper Balance,” Cornell International Law Journal,
Volume 37 (2004), pp. 27–94.
John Kleinig, “Noble Cause Corruption or Process Deviance: Ruminations
on Means and Ends in Policing,” in Stanley Einstein and Menachem
Amir, (eds), Uncertainty, Vol. 4: Police Corruption – Paradigms, Models
and Concepts (Huntsville, TX: OICJ Press, 2004), pp. 129–146.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
John Locke, Second Treatise Of Civil Government (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1980). Originally published in 1690.
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd edition (South
Bend, IN: Notre Dame Press, 2006).
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: Penguin Classics, 1982). Originally
published in 1859.
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among the Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace, 3rd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) <http://www.9–11com-
mission.gov/report/index.htm>.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1997).
Jeffrey Rosen, “The Naked Crowd: Balancing Privacy and Security in
an Age of Terror,” Arizona Law Review, Volume 46 (Winter, 2004),
pp. 607–619.
T.M. Scanlon, “The Constitutional Essentials of Political Liberalism:
Adjusting Rights and Balancing Values,” Fordham Law Review, Volume
72 (2004), pp. 1477–1486.
Philip A. Thomas, “Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Power: 9/11: USA and
UK,” Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 26 (April 2003),
pp. 1193–1224.
Jeremy Waldron, “Security and Liberty: the Image of Balance,” Journal of
Political Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2 (2003), p. 208.
“Safety and Security,” Nebraska Law Review, Volume 85 (2006), pp. 454–507.
Matthew White, “Democracies Do Not Make War on One Another … Or
Do They?” <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/demowar.htm>.
Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” in Arnold
Wolfers (ed.) Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 147–166.
Lucia Zedner, “The Concept of Security: An Agenda for Comparative
Analysis,” Legal Studies, 23 (2003), pp. 155–158.
“Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflections from Criminal
Justice,” Journal of Law and Society, Volume 32 (December 2005),
pp. 507–533.
chapter sixteen
Regulating Terrorism
John Braithwaite
This essay argues that both the war and criminal justice models are
too crude, particularly in their theory of deterrence, for responding
to the problem of global terrorism. An alternative regulatory model is
advanced that overlays the public health concepts of primary, second-
ary, and tertiary prevention with other older ideas of containment of
injustice and enlargement of justice. An interconnected web of con-
trols might enable an over-determined prevention of terrorism that,
in spite of its redundancy, could be more cost-effective than the war
model, because the principle of responsiveness means parsimony in
resort to expensive coercion. It is possible to have an evidence-based
approach to regulating rare events like 9/11 terrorism by applying
the principles of evidence-based regulation to micro-elements that are
constitutive of macro-disasters. Viewed through this lens, support for
pre-emptive wars on terrorism is not evidence-based, but grounded in
other public philosophies, notably retribution.
RECONSIDERING DETERRENCE
An early version of this paper was presented at some conferences

and published on the Internet in March 2002. The opening para-
graph began: “Both the war model for confronting a transnational
problem and the criminal justice model share a central commitment
to the deterrence doctrine.” There is surely an important role for
deterrence in confronting terrorism, especially if we deploy the more
sophisticated models of deterrence of international relations (IR)
theory, as opposed to those of criminology or law and economics. IR
383
deterrence is more dynamic than the models that now dominate crim-
inology. This is the legacy of criminology and the economics of law
from Bentham: Deterrence means statically projecting the product
of a probability and a severity of punishment that makes compliance
rational. With regard to terrorism, a dynamic enforcement pyramid
approach to deterrence is favored that is more akin to IR thinking
about deterrence and compellence.
But first consider a psychological model of deterrence that is critical
of both the criminal justice and IR models. This is Brehm and Brehm’s
(1981) theory of Psychological Reactance. It is a theory grounded
empirically in a large number of psychological experiments. These
show that when deterrent threats are escalated, you get a deterrence
curve with a positive slope as predicted by deterrence theory. But you
also get a reactance or defiance curve with a negative slope. Escalating
threat simultaneously delivers more deterrence and more defiance
(on defiance theory, see Sherman [1993]; on deterrence and defi-
ance with terrorism, see Frey [2004a]). Whether deterrence works
depends on the positive slope of the deterrence curve being steeper
than the negative slope of the defiance curve. The net effect of esca-
lating threat is formally the sum of these two curves.
What is especially interesting about the psychological reactance
literature is that it also reveals some important insights about the con-
ditions where the deterrence curve will be steeper than the defiance
curve. Experimental research suggests that deterrence is stronger
than defiance when the freedom we seek to regulate is not very impor-
tant to the target of deterrence (Brehm and Brehm 1981; Braithwaite
2002: 102–110). Hence if we think of a freedom that is not so critical
to us, like the freedom to park our car wherever we like, defiance is
minimal. We do not explode when we confront a sign that says, “No
parking 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.” Because the defiance curve is minimal in
slope here, deterrence of parking violations with fines works almost
exactly as rational choice theory in economics predicts. If on the
other hand, we seek to regulate a freedom as important as freedom of
religion by throwing Christians to the lions, we may then find, as the
Romans did, that because defiance is so great with such a freedom,
Christianity actually grows as a result.
regulating terrorism 385
It seems possible that Osama bin Laden and Hamas have an intui-
tive understanding of this theory. Their game is perhaps not so dif-
ferent from that of martyrs like St. Peter. It is to provoke deterrence
that is rendered counterproductive by defiance. For bin Laden, it is
to provoke a pan-Islamic, not just pan-Arab, consciousness of oppres-
sion of their freedom. It is to portray the war on terrorism as another
Christian crusade. If the United States no longer believes in deter-
ring terrorism, clearly Israel does. In general, it does not assassinate
Hamas leaders to prevent terrorism as soon as it acquires intelligence
about them; instead it murders them, and whoever is with them, as
soon as possible after an act of Hamas terrorism occurs. There is a
place for deterrence in a strategy to defeat terrorism. It is just that for
Israel, and the White House in supporting Israel, it may be the wrong
place. In their strategy, deterrence is positioned to engender defiance
that continues cycles of tit-for-tat terror.
RECONSIDERING JUSTICE
A second important empirical result from the psychological litera-

ture comes from Tom Tyler’s (1990) work. Tyler finds that criminal
enforcement and other forms of social control work when they are
administered in a way that their targets perceive as procedurally fair.
This research shows a surprising capacity of people to buckle under to
social control that delivers bad outcomes to them so long as those out-
comes are dispensed through processes they accept as fair. Marrying
these results to defiance theory, we might say that deterrence effects
will exceed defiance effects when sanctions are seen as an outcome
of fair procedures, a critical part of which is genuinely listening to
the point of view of the other. This implies listening rather than just
blustering at the United Nations. Furthermore, it might mean being
unwilling to go to war without a UN resolution that specifically legiti-
mates the war. I will come back to the importance of the procedural
justice results and this important question of legitimacy with wars
on terrorism.
The dynamic theory of social control illustrated here is justified in Res-
torative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Braithwaite 2002). Figure 16.1
ASSUMPTION
Incompetent or INCAPACITATION
irrational actor
Rational actor DETERRENCE
Virtuous actor RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Figure 16.1. Toward an integration of restorative, deterrent, and incapacita-

tive justice.
represents a responsive regulatory pyramid. It means you have a pre-

sumption in favor of starting at the base of the pyramid by trying dia-
logue, reconciliation, and creative problem solving (restorative justice)
first. Then when that fails and fails again, you may be willing to escalate
through a hierarchy of forms of deterrent justice. Then when deterrence
fails, you become willing to resort to incapacitative justice – incapacitat-
ing terrorists by putting them in jail or killing them, for example. As you
move up through escalated deterrence options to more incapacitative
options, if a cooperative response is elicited, you must de-escalate your
response. Here the explanatory and normative content of responsive
regulation has a lot in common with Graduated Reduction in Tension
(GRIT) theory in IR.
The presumptions of responsive regulatory theory are precisely
the opposite of those expounded by Newt Gingrich during his 2002
speaking tour in Australia to sell the war on terrorism. Mr. Gingrich
argued that the burden of proof is upon those who are against the war
option for expanding the war on terrorism to new targets to come up
with alternatives. Responsive regulatory theory imposes that burden
on those who wish to escalate.
Following this line, my own view would not be to rule out the
military option, but to be more circumspect about it than the Bush
administration was. So with the war on terrorism, when the Taliban

announced that they were willing to negotiate with the United States
about handing Osama bin Laden and his leadership over to a third
nation to be tried in a court of law, the responsive regulatory pre-
sumption is that it is morally right to take up such an offer (see Pilger
2002: 103–104). Even if one had the belief, as I did, that the offer
was likely not sincere, one should still negotiate. The reason is that
it is procedurally just to listen to the perspective of the other before
escalating. Even when one feels 90 percent certain that negotiations
will fail, the arrogance of refusing to listen undermines the legitimacy
of the war option, and will make it harder to win the peace. Grounded
in procedural justice theory, the hypothesis here is that the Muslim
world would be less resentful and defiant today about the war on ter-
ror if the United States had negotiated in good faith before bombing
Afghanistan.
Responsive regulatory theory assumes that all individual and col-
lective actors have socially responsible selves, rational selves, and
irrational or incompetent selves (Figure 16.1). Moreover, it assumes
that sophisticated diplomacy can often persuade actors to put their
best self forward. This is one of the reasons I will argue that General
George C. Marshall is a good candidate for the greatest American of
the American century (Pogue 1966, 1973, 1987). He had the ability
to persuade a socially irresponsible actor, such as Stalin, to put his
socially responsible self forward, to be trustworthy with him; Stalin
in turn said that Marshall was the one person in the West whom he
did trust. Second, responsive regulatory theory assumes that when
actors are being irrational or incompetent in their judgments, it is
possible for good diplomacy to persuade them to be susceptible to
rational incentives like deterrent threats. The psychological evidence
on the capacity of human beings to abandon one kind of self, in favor
of another that seemed utterly entrenched, never ceases to amaze
(Turner et al. 1987).
CONTAINMENT AND ENLARGEMENT
Enough of negative cases according to the theory. Heroes of the twen-

tieth century by the lights of restorative and responsive regulatory
theory are Nelson Mandela and General George C. Marshall. Mandela

overcame the peaceniks in the African National Congress (ANC) to
take them into an unfortunately necessary armed struggle against
Apartheid. It included attacks on civilian targets such as the power
grid, but he also counseled against attacks directed at killing civilians.
His escalation was very gradual and oriented to bringing the hearts and
minds of the rest of the world with his just cause. When he prevailed
politically, he proffered restorative justice to his enemies through the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. His jailers sat beside him at his
inauguration as president.
General George C. Marshall equally understood the need to over-
come the resistance of U.S. isolationists during the late 1930s to proj-
ect deterrence to Hitler (Stoler 1989; Cray 1990). He led a reluctant
United States and president to the view that it would have to build
an army that could defeat Germany in a ground war in northwest-
ern Europe, and project a capacity to do that – not just a capacity
to defend itself through airpower (FDR’s late 1930s vision). It was
Marshall who resisted Churchill’s “closing the circle” policy of 1942 –
a bombing war plus scattered ground engagements at the periphery
of Europe. Marshall saw the need for more decisive escalation to take
some pressure off the Red Army by thrusting at the heart of Europe.
Then after the war, it was Marshall as secretary of state who persuaded
a punitive American people to learn from the mistakes of Versailles
and heal Europe through the Marshall Plan – the finest moment
of the American century (Ferrell 1966; Pogue 1987). Marshall was
always more decisive in his support for escalation when that was what
was needed, and likewise always more dramatic in his de-escalation
than those around him.
Through this theoretical lens we can see more clearly the virtues of
the containment theory of the Truman Doctrine that incubated dur-
ing the decade or so when Marshall was the most dominant influence
on U.S. strategy. In the crafting of the Truman Doctrine of contain-
ment, one must give substantial intellectual credit to George Kennan
(1947), who drafted the first version of it after Marshall appointed
him head of a new Policy Planning Staff in the State Department.
Containment was mostly sustained by all U.S. presidents until George
W. Bush. It meant refusing to bring on a full-scale war with the Soviet
Union or China, even when the United States had nuclear weap-
ons and the Communists did not, but rather containing them from
occupying new territory such as South Korea or Taiwan. It meant
containing the spread of nuclear weapons through the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation regime initiated on Marshall’s watch. In retrospect, the
accomplishments of nuclear non-proliferation are fairly remarkable,
as were the accomplishments of deterring invasion of South Korea
and Taiwan without a massive conflagration. Again, it was Marshall as
defense secretary during the Korean War who got the job of contain-
ment done. He calmed the megalomania of his commander, Douglas
MacArthur, who would have brought on a war with the People’s
Republic of China, a scenario that Marshall regarded as a Russian
trap. It was this policy position even more than his constructive rela-
tionship with Stalin that later caused Senator Joseph McCarthy to vil-
ify him. The Truman Doctrine was premised on a prudent patience.
Part of that prudence in Korea was institutionalizing the principle of
seeking the authority of the United Nations for military containment.
Containment would at times take bold resolve to deter expansion.
However, so long as totalitarianism was contained, in the long run it
would prove to have more internal contradictions than liberal market
democracies. In the long run, contained totalitarianism is more likely
to self-destruct than contained democracy.
The genius of Marshall was not only that he had a clear vision of
the strategic role of deterrence in a policy of containment, but that
he also had a vision of what the Clinton administration later came
to describe as enlargement – enlargement of the space on the globe
secured by democratic institutions. But Marshall extended a level of
U.S. generosity toward the former fascist states that Clinton never
persuaded the United States to extend to former Communist socie-
ties. Since Marshall, U.S. foreign policy seems never to have gotten
the balance so right between investment in containment and invest-
ment in enlargement. John Foster Dulles, Marshall’s successor as
U.S. Secretary of State, embarked on many ill-conceived adventures
in containment that in fact crushed the enlargement of democracy,
especially in Latin America (e.g., the U.S.-orchestrated Guatemalan
coup of 1954). For all the foreign aid the West poured into the
Middle East – most of it U.S. weapons for Israel – Britain, France,
and the United States failed massively to promote the enlargement

of democracy in the Arab world, and did much to bolster tyrannical
puppets resented by the ordinary people of the region.
THE TORN WEB OF U.S. CONTROLS ON TERRORISM
This analysis of containment and enlargement failure is also true

of the U.S. strategic response to terrorism. The containment fail-
ures included U.S. opposition to an anti-terrorism treaty during the
1990s that might have criminalized the funding of terrorist organiza-
tions (see also Clarke [2004: 98] on domestic sensitivity to upsetting
Arab investors in the United States), the abysmal intelligence fail-
ures, and failures of target hardening against hijacking that allowed
the September 11 attacks to succeed. Frontline managers of airline
security – flight captains – were not even put on alert after intelli-
gence of planned hijacks associated with al Qaeda were deemed seri-
ous enough to warrant distracting the president from his long summer
holiday with a briefing. It was known that unlike the U.S. security
establishment from the time of Dulles and CIA Director George H.W.
Bush, al Qaeda was a learning organization, one that learned from its
mistakes. The fact that it had failed to topple the World Trade Center
once, and that a previous attempt by Islamists to topple the Eiffel
Tower with a hijacked aircraft had failed, should not have consti-
tuted assurance for assuming it would continue to fail at such known
objectives. When various elements of the intelligence establishment
reported deep suspicions over the flight training of certain characters
who were actually known by other elements of U.S. intelligence to be
associated with al Qaeda, there was reason to believe that al Qaeda
had not given up on its ambition of crashing aircraft into major public
buildings in the United States (see U.S. Congress 2004: xi, xiii, 85).
Then there was the explicit warning from the Taliban foreign minister
two months before September 11.
George W. Bush was presented as a consummate delegator to a
world amazed at the thought of the new CEO of any major organiza-
tion taking a full month’s holiday six months into starting the job.
While he was at the Crawford ranch, something went wrong with this
system of delegation that future public inquiry will hopefully fully lay
bare. If he was too busy to talk to the foreign minister of the country
that was the greatest threat to his nation’s security, then why was some-
one not reporting to him who was part of this conversation? Richard
Clarke’s (2004) White House insider account now makes it clear that
whereas Clinton had been “hands on” with al Qaeda and had plans to
assassinate or “snatch” bin Laden, Bush paid limited attention to the
terrifying briefings he was given, and which detailed imminent plans
for al Qaeda to attack America.
The enlargement failures related to the timidity in pushing for
the enlargement of democratic sovereignty for the Palestinians; for
enlarging opportunities for the bereft Muslims of the refugee camps
of Pakistan and many other places that became breeding grounds for
al Qaeda recruitment; for enlarging democracy in former Arab ally
states like Iran under the Shah, Iraq before 1990, Afghanistan after
the Soviet withdrawal, and Saudi Arabia today. Bin Laden understood
that in a world where the majority of refugees in the twenty-first cen-
tury had become Muslims, providing practical support for a more
just future for them – such as the schools he supported in Pakistan
and the orphanages he funded for Muslim victims of the Bosnian war
(Jacquard 2002: 70) – was a good investment. In Urdu, Taliban means
band of scholars, a reference to the way they were recruited – as poor
children for whom Islamist madrassas were the only way they could
afford an education. Saudi democracy might have integrated into its
power structure many of the idealistic young Muslim men returning
from victory against the Soviet Union in the Afghanistan war. Instead
it treated them as dangerous elements, a threat to the total control
of the royal family. Saudi institutions gave them no legitimate path to
political voice, only the path of terrorism. Most bouts of terrorism in
the twentieth century, after all, had ended with the integration of some
terrorist leaders into democratic power structures – whether it was
Northern Ireland terrorism, Israeli terrorism, South African terrorism,
East Timorese terrorism, the terrorism of the Italian Red Brigades, or
of the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany (see Frey 2004a).
Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid (2003) has attempted to demonstrate
that the evidence shows that Islamist organizations are more success-
ful when they reject violence in favor of electoral politics. Al Qaeda’s
appeal will collapse only when Muslims who believe in the ideal of
an Islamic state turn on al Qaeda for using un-Islamic means for

achieving the end they share (see Gunaratna 2002: 239). Of course
the more injustice and humiliation the West hurls at Islamists, the
less likely such a marginalization of al Qaeda will become. British
Prime Minister Blair showed the wisdom of the democratic integra-
tion option when he released IRA terrorists from prison in 1998 so
they could speak and vote when their political party decided whether
to end armed struggle and support power sharing in Northern
Ireland.
The returning veterans from Afghanistan were treated as danger-
ous elements in Saudi Arabia partly because they had already been
made dangerous thanks to the cynical way the United States, France,
Egypt, Pakistan, and others fostered Islamic extremism as a proxy
against the pre-1989 Soviet Union. John Cooley’s (2000) detailed
account in Unholy Wars of the relationship between the U.S. intel-
ligence establishment and Islamists as “a strange love affair that went
disastrously wrong” is compelling. For instance, several of the 1993
World Trade Center bombers had received CIA training and had
used a chemical formula for the huge bomb taught in CIA manuals,
versions of which were found in the possession of some of the con-
spirators (Cooley 2000: 223, 243). During the Afghan war against the
Soviets between 1979 and 1989, the CIA and the Pakistani military
institutionalized training in terrorism and financed the propaganda
of Islamic proponents of suicidal martyrdom. After the Soviets were
defeated, these CIA-trained Islamists fanned out to create homicidal
havoc in a dozen Muslim nations from the Sudan to Indonesia, and
in the Philippines, France, the United States, Chechnya, Bosnia,
Kosovo, Kashmir, across Africa and Central Asia, and more (Cooley
2000; Jacquard 2002).
U.S. encouragement of terrorism in one era that comes back to bite
the United States in another is not a new phenomenon. The Nixon
administration’s CIA urged its Australian counterpart to refuse to
hand over to Attorney General Lionel Murphy its files on Australian
terrorist training camps of the fascist Ustacia for Croatians wishing
to destabilize the Communist yet tolerantly multicultural Yugoslavian
regime of Tito. The stand-off was resolved in a famous incident in
1973 when Murphy was forced to institute a raid on his own security
organization to seize the files. The United States has also allowed ter-
rorist training camps to flourish in its own territory. The CIA organized
a 1985 terrorist bombing in Beirut that was rather like the Oklahoma
City bombing, though not as widely reported. CIA involvement was
revealed years later by the same team at the Washington Post that broke
Watergate. A truck bomb parked outside a mosque detonated as peo-
ple left: Eighty were killed and two hundred and fifty were wounded,
mostly women and children. A Muslim cleric believed by the CIA to
be a dangerous character was the main target, but he was untouched
(Chomsky 2001: 44). From the time of the Dulles brothers, a large
number of terrorist incidents were sponsored by the CIA in Latin
America. White House staffer, Colonel Oliver North, organized fund-
ing for the Nicaraguan terrorist group, the Contras, by selling arms to
elements of the “Axis of Evil” in Iran. The aid swapped to the Contras
for arms to Iran was laundered by the CIA through the Arab bank
widely used to fund terrorist organizations, the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI). This same bank was used to launder
money by other sometime U.S. allies of the 1980s, Saddam Hussein
and Manuel Noriega, by drug lords laundering money from illegal
arms trading, and for covert nuclear programs.
The United States has protected as well as funded terrorists who
have sought to bomb and assassinate the political leaders of other
nations, such as Fidel Castro. Indeed, the Reagan administration set
a new benchmark by directly bombing the home of Libyan leader
Ghaddafi two decades ago, though it only succeeded in killing his
baby. Political assassination has been repeatedly proven to be a threat
to peace in the modern world. Michael Ignatieff (2004: 21) argues
for the balancing perspective: “The fact that liberal democratic lead-
ers may order the surreptitious killing of terrorists … need not mean
that ‘anything goes’.” His view that the effects can be limited by
allowing such measures only in temporary emergencies is hardly per-
suasive with regard to assassination. There would likely be peace in
Palestine today if after the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, the
new Israeli Prime Minister Peres had not ordered the assassination
of Yahya Ayyash, known as “the bombmaker.” His assassination was
reciprocated with a devastating round of Hamas suicide bombings in
February and March 1996 that killed more than fifty Israelis (Quandt
2001). This allowed Benjamin Netanyahu to present himself as the

“security” candidate and defeat Peres, who had until his ill-conceived
assassination been way ahead in the polls. It was Netanyahu’s provoca-
tions that then unraveled the peace process.
The biggest tear in the U.S. web of controls against terrorism was
therefore more than its undermining of the efforts of other states in
the late twentieth century to negotiate an anti-terrorism treaty. It was
that it actively promoted terrorism in this era; it actively used the same
banks that should have been targeted by international cooperation to
attack the financing of terrorism; and it actively undermined the rule
of international law through foreign political assassinations.
At the same time the United States undermined the fundamentals of
global containment of terrorism, it neglected enlargement. In the late
twentieth century, the wealthiest nation in the world devoted the small-
est proportion of its GDP to foreign aid. The nation that in Marshall’s
era had wooed the UN to New York could no longer afford its mem-
bership dues. A Marshall plan for Afghanistan from the 1980s may
have helped preserve their long-suffering people from totalitarianism,
Talibanism, tribal warlordism, terrorism, American bombs, resurgent
drug running, and the ungovernability that is their contemporary
plight. But America had changed: George W. Bush was elected on a
platform of opposition to the kind of nation-building in the world’s
Afghanistans that won George Marshall his Nobel Peace Prize.
When security is threatened, it is natural to prioritize containment
over enlargement. But this is a mistake because enlargement makes
containment easier. Fortunately, the United States has not privileged
containment over enlargement in all aspects of the war on terrorism.
A nice case in point is the work of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), which promulgates national policies to combat the money
laundering that is the lifeblood of terrorist organizations. In its early
years the FATF gradually expanded a so-called “white list” of states
coming into compliance with its anti-money-laundering policies.
The shift to sanctioning an unfortunately labeled “black list” of non-
complying states was accelerated by September 11. But this “black list-
ing” could be more effective because it built on the foundations of
years of expanding “white listing.” Enlargement of the regime was a
platform for the containment of money laundering in rogue states.
Some lawyers and criminologists are inclined to think that the

criminal justice model is superior for combating terrorism to the war
model. There is something in this. Criminologists believe it is bet-
ter to nab organizational criminals alive than dead. Then when we
arrest them, we let them know that the system will go easier on them,
perhaps keep them out of jail altogether, if they provide evidence
useful for catching bigger fish in the organization than themselves
(Wilkinson [2000: 98] argues this worked particularly well with the
Red Brigades in Italy). With Islamist terrorist organizations the more
important evidence about bigger fish might relate to financiers of
the networks. Al Qaeda cell leaders or the people they answer to may
be fungible operatives who are as undeterrable as bin Laden himself in
their willingness to die for their cause. It is likely, however, that many
of the wealthy Saudi businessmen who seem to be among the funders
of al Qaeda would be susceptible to deterrence, even if only by nam-
ing and shaming them, because of their dependence on trading with
the West for their wealth.
With warlordism more generally in the contemporary world, World
Bank regression analyses suggest that the existence of diasporas of
wealthy funders in the West explains why war persists in some parts
of the world more than others (Collier 2000). So, wealthy U.S. funders
of the IRA and the protestant paramilitary organizations were one rea-
son for the persistence of terrorism in Northern Ireland. Suicide bomb-
ers are often not only motivated by the embrace of their God in death
as martyrs, but also by generous payments to the struggling families they
leave behind. Herein lies further appeal of a criminal justice model that
captures low-level offenders and then moves up organizations to deter
financing of terrorism. This is a less clumsy model of pre-emption than
the war model. Little to date has been achieved in using immunities to
persuade smaller fish to give up bigger fish. Little wonder when even
a Taliban foreign minister who sought to give up bin Laden before
September 11 is rewarded by being touted as the most senior person
they have “captured,” and still being held in U.S. custody at the time
of writing. The Bush Doctrine of military pre-emption is clumsy; more
subtle models of pre-emption informed by corporate crime enforce-
ment were quite beyond the Bush administration, which is why charges
were not laid against any of the major funders of al Qaeda.
THE PUBLIC HEALTH MODEL
One would not want to push hard for the superiority of a criminal
justice model over a war model. A failing of the FBI before September
11, 2001, was that they had limited interest in intelligence that would
not help secure prosecutions – their regulatory strategy with terror-
ism was far too preoccupied with one preferred tool – prosecution
(see U.S. Congress 2004: 37,122). Instead of the nature of the prob-
lem driving the choice of tools, the tool of choice determined which
problems and targets would be a priority (Sparrow, 2000; Brodeur,
this volume). It may be that there is more appeal in the ideal of the
public health model of integrating primary prevention (e.g., clean
water for all), secondary prevention (vaccinating targeted at-risk
groups), and tertiary prevention (treatment of those already ill).
This approach to problems of violence has been developed by James
Gilligan (2001: 14–17).
It might be attractive to examine the U.S. strategic goals of contain-
ment and enlargement manifest in the diplomacy of George Marshall.
An attraction of this examination is that it helps us look more broadly
than just at how we respond to terrorists once they have become ter-
rorists (tertiary containment). Containment is bound to have more
attraction than enlargement if we consider only how to respond to
existing terrorists. This will cause us to over-invest in containment
and under-invest in enlargement. As we have seen, enlargement of
democracy, of the sphere of social justice, or of freedom from poverty
or liberation from refugee camps may be the most important forms of
primary prevention of terrorism. A positive example of post–Septem-
ber 11 primary prevention by enlargement is the funding the World
Bank is providing to madrassas in Pakistan’s North West Frontier
Province on condition that they provide a quality educational curricu-
lum to refugees and other poor children, as opposed to the doctri-
naire education that fueled al Qaeda recruitment from the madrassas.
Poor schools that receive funding by people of another religion are
more likely to teach children religious tolerance.
The imbalance between investment in primary prevention and
tertiary prevention by containment was well illustrated by the Bush
administration increases in the defense budget to fight its war on
terrorism, which made U.S. defense spending roughly equivalent

to the rest of the world’s nations combined; the 2002 increase alone
was greater than the total expenditure of all the world’s nations on
foreign aid. Enlargement (democratic “nation building”) seems
expensive only when we forget to compare the costs of foreign aid to
build democracies to the costs of over-investment in coercive control.
Enlargement seems expensive when we forget how the Marshall Plan
was a sound long-term investment for the U.S. economy because it
fueled a long boom of U.S. exports to Europe and Japan.
Secondary prevention also suffers under-investment under the
war model. For example, there is a dearth of investment in preven-
tive diplomacy and enhancing capability for forms of secondary
prevention such as research and development on target hardening
on preventable problems like aircraft hijacking, cyberterrorism, or
hoof-and-mouth disease attacks on the nation’s farmers. Any one of a
number of such forms of secondary prevention might have prevented
September 11. This is the theme of redundant or over-determined
controls to which we will return in the concluding pages of this essay.
As we move from tertiary to secondary to primary prevention,
we move in a direction that makes enlargement more important in
the balance between enlargement and containment. However, even
with tertiary prevention, enlargement can be more important than
containment. Most Americans believe that the bombing of Serbia
was responsible for the fall of Slobodan Milosevic. Most Serbian
opponents of Milosevic believe the bombing made their job harder.
Milosevic was not overthrown during or after the bombing, but later
by the progressive enlargement of a Serbian democracy movement.
Led by NGOs, students, and other young people, they became more
and more fearless in their campaigning in universities, schools,
workplaces, and ultimately on the streets, eventually winning the
hearts and minds of surging masses of Serbs. The triumph was not
of NATO bombs, but was akin to the triumph of people power in
the Philippines against Marcos in the 1980s, the people of Eastern
and Central Europe against Communist states in 1989, and in the
2004–5 wave of democratic revolutions in Georgia, the Ukraine, and
Kyrgyzstan. International NGOs played useful roles in supporting
the Serbian NGOs; dollars from the West (particularly from George
Soros) flowing to those NGOs were also important. But it was indig-
enous Serbian politics that ultimately pried open the contradictions
of Milosevic’s totalitarianism, causing the military to switch allegiance
from the tyrant to the people, as containment theory predicts.
Western governments have supported warlords when they fought
the enemies of the West, even when those warlords crushed indigenous
democracy movements and even when they supported themselves by
trafficking drugs into the West. In the case of Saddam Hussein, the
United States supported him militarily even when he used weapons
of mass destruction against democracy movements. In New and Old
Wars, Mary Kaldor (1999) suggests that in late modern conditions,
the path to democratic transition for war-torn states is to identify
“islands of civility” that always exist in such states and build out from
them. Under the public health model, expanding civility in this way is
akin to spreading good hygiene. Let us hope that is what the United
States and UN ultimately achieves in Afghanistan, rather than assist-
ing a new set of warlords to expand their sway and reestablish wider
drug empires. In Israel, the long-term benefits of building peace and
democracy in Palestine by the peace movements on both sides joining
hands are profound, yet the prospects for such an outcome remain
dim. The sad fact of the history of Palestine is that whenever there has
been that bottom-up momentum for peace, top-down leadership has
been missing; whenever there has been top-down leadership (perhaps
as with the “roadmap”), bottom-up commitment to peace was miss-
ing. At times, when both seemed to be coming together, events like
the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin have derailed either the
top-down or the bottom-up leadership for peace.
So the prescription of this essay is to be reluctant to embrace wars on
terrorism, but diligent at weaving a web of controls against terrorism,
and firm in our resolve to escalate an enforcement pyramid until ter-
rorism stops after it has broken out. This means tertiary containment
delivering a ceasefire that exists as a platform for the other forms of
containment and enlargement in the other five boxes in Figure 16.2.
Instead of pre-emptive wars on terrorism, the prescription is for war
as a last resort and a balance of primary, secondary, and tertiary pre-
vention of terrorism, with each of these levels encompassing a bal-
ance of containment of violence and enlargement of democratic
Enlargement Containment
Marshall plan, global A global peace movement
democratic institution that builds the consciences
building, reform of the of citizens who reject
IMF/development banks, a violence.

Primary prevention
West committed to social Reject bellicose strategies
justice and dignity for the like assassination that
Muslim world. engender defiance and
assist terrorist recruitment.
Preventive diplomacy. Financial action task
Preventing the living of force.
lives in refugee camps. Nuclear non-proliferation.

Secondary prevention
Access to education for all Biological weapons treaties.
children in Pakistan that Target hardening (e.g.,
teaches religious tolerance. airlines, anthrax vaccines).
U.K. releases IRA terrorists Intelligence cooperation on
from prison to vote on terrorism that leads to
power sharing in N. Ireland. arrests.
Mujahedeen returning from International Criminal

Tertiary prevention
fighting Soviets (e.g., bin Court.
Laden) given a seat at the
table of a Saudi democracy.
Figure 16.2. Tying together the strands of a web of controls to prevent

terrorism.
institutions of non-violence. With an effective web of controls against

terrorism, each strand in the web might be easily broken, but when
the strands of the web are tied together to produce an effective and
mutually reinforcing redundancy of control, the risks to our persons
from terrorism can continue to be kept far below the risks of common
crime. Although Dershowitz (2002: 2) believes religiously inspired
international terrorism is the “greatest danger facing the world today,”
many times more people are murdered every year in the United States
than have been killed in international terrorist incidents throughout
the globe in the last forty years (most of whom are, of course, not
Americans).1
Even with the progress that has been made with nuclear safety regu-
lation, a bigger Chernobyl remains a greater practical risk to the world
than nuclear terrorism. With a tightly woven web of controls against
terrorism, it can become a much lower risk. With international secu-
rity threats of all kinds, if a nation like the United States makes the
six-fold investment in an appropriate web of controls, it might find
that halving its military spending would be responsible.
TOWARD AN EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY ON EXTREMISM
An alternative perspective on terrorism has been suggested by Peter

Wilkinson of the British Health and Safety Executive: the “safety case”
approach to offshore oil rig safety. The safety case idea is that instead
of command-and-control inspection of oil rigs for compliance with
rules, the company is asked to prepare a safety case on how it will
manage the specific set of safety risks that confront a single rig – given
the particular oceanographic and oil/gas production contingencies it
confronts. Once approved by the state regulator, it is an offense for the
company not to comply with the requirements of its own safety case.
With occupational health and safety, we have evidence that command-
and-control inspections of factories and mines to secure compliance
with rules does improve safety, so is it responsible to abandon this in
favor of a safety case regime in the absence of evidence that it will
work better? Wilkinson pointed out that the disasters we try to prevent
on offshore oil rigs are rare events, such as a “hundred year wave.” It
1
Frey (2004b: 5) shows deaths from international terrorism ranging between a peak
of 3,250 in 2001 and 34 in 1968; in most of these years more than 20,000 people
were murdered in the United States; Hoffman (2002: 7) points out fewer than 1000
Americans were killed by terrorists either in the United States or overseas in the
thirty-three years prior to 9/11.
follows that we can never have a credible evidence base for making
such a policy shift. However, in a world where some airlines, some rail
operators, some coal mines, and some nuclear power plants around
the world adopt a safety case approach and others do not, it is possible
to do systematic empirical research on the efficacy of the innovation,
with matched controls where the outcomes are not major disasters,
but smaller events that are known to be elements of disasters – like
separation failures with aircraft, derailments, coal-mine-collapse inju-
ries, and automated shut-downs of nuclear power plants.2
In other words, part of what regulatory research is about is assessing
whether policies will work with big problems by being systematically
evidence-based about how effective the policies are with smaller prob-
lems that are elements of the bigger problems.
The most dangerous characters in the world are those who respond
to the “what works” conundrum with big problems by substituting an
ideological commitment to a totalizing theory like rational choice
as a guide to what to do. Of course, most practitioners of IR are not
theoretically myopic in this way. They are students of history who
analyze what has happened in past in crises that have some features
in common with the unique crisis that today confronts us. Then they
“think in time” about how circumstances are different today from
what they were then, about how features of the current crisis might
cause quite a different outcome than occurred with the like crisis
from the past (Neustadt and May 1986). Understanding the ebb and
flow of history helps us to be wise; it does not enable us to be rigorous
scientists of IR.
As a patient, we would rather go to a doctor with the skills of a good
clinician – who can discern what is different about our set of symp-
toms from the classic set in the textbook – than go to a good medical
researcher. At the same time, we might not want the textbook to be
written by doctors who spend all their time seeing patients. For this
task we want experts who immerse themselves in the mountains of lit-
erature on the theory of disease and evidence on how to control it. We
want the textbook to be evidence-based, whereas we want our doctor
to be diagnostically detectivelike to come up with a treatment for our
2
I am indebted to Andrew Hopkins for bringing this point to my attention.
particular symptoms and medical history. Like oil rigs that blow up, we
die only once. But the difference is that there are millions of deaths
each year for evidence-based medicine to study scientifically. Even
so, we can have the benefits of a dual-track diagnostic and evidence-
based regulatory policy by building our evidence base on more micro-
incidents that are credibly constitutive of macro-disasters. Though we
need the detective work of the intelligence community to diagnose
specific threats of nuclear terrorism, we can also study systematically
whether nuclear plants with safety case regimes have lower incidence
of unaccounted loss of nuclear materials than command-and control-
regimes. Figure 16.2 finds an important place for both in a prudent
web of regulatory controls.
The art of intelligence should be guided by an evidence base on
what kind of micro-intelligence analytics are more likely to connect
the diagnostic dots, and which kinds recurrently fail to illuminate the
bigger picture. We want creative intelligence analysts who look at
the same phenomenon through many different analytic lenses, who
can see it as different things at once. But we also want analysts who
know from the literature on evidence-based intelligence that certain
analytic lenses promoted by intelligence charlatans recurrently dis-
tort the truth in knowable ways. Or as French President Chirac put it,
explaining his disbelief in 2002 and 2003 that Iraq had weapons of
mass destruction, we need empirically educated political leaders who
are wary of the history of how intelligence services “intoxicate each
other” (Blix 2004: 128, 263).
A difficulty with this approach is in establishing which ingredients
are best targeted for small-scale work. Root cause analysis of terror-
ism does not have the scientific respectability and ideological neutral-
ity that it does in health and safety (New South Wales Department
of Health 2004). Conservatives like to argue that poverty is not a
root cause of terrorism because most poor people do not become
terrorists (Dershowitz 2002: chapter 1), whereas safety scientists are
not prone to reject water as a cause of death by drowning because
most people who are immersed in water do not drown. In a more
fundamental challenge, Dershowitz (2002: 28) contends that “to
understand and eliminate the root causes of terrorism … is exactly
the wrong approach”:
The reason terrorism works – and will persist unless there are signifi-
cant changes in the responses to it – is precisely because its perpetra-
tors believe that by murdering innocent civilians they will succeed
in attracting the attention of the world to their perceived grievances
and demand that the world “understand them” and “eliminate their
root causes.” (Dershowitz 2002: 28)
This might make sense if what we were considering as root causes to

be eliminated equated to demands to release political prisoners. But a
World Bank initiative to reduce poverty that is motivated by a number
of factors including a desire to reduce terrorism hardly seems to imply
the Dershowitz moral hazard.
The web of controls idea is that we make up for the inferiority of a
micro-evidence base for macro-problems by greater redundancy in the
web of controls. Let me summarize the set of empirical claims about
the conditions for micro-regulatory success that we might seek to
deploy for the problem of global terrorism (citing the micro-regulatory
research where a more detailed case is made for each claim).
1. Success in reducing risk more likely comes from an integrated
web of regulatory controls that is redundantly responsive to the
multiple explanatory theories grasped as relevant to the control
problem. It is less likely with a singular control strategy based
on a single theory (Braithwaite 1993; Braithwaite and Drahos
2000: especially chapter 23).
2. Intelligence experts undisciplined by evidence sufficiently deci-
sive to refute their most erroneous analyses tend to “intoxicate
each other.” Just as we need doctors who do contextually wise
detective work grounded in a reading of texts written by schol-
ars with the best grasp of the theory and systematic evidence
to test it, so we need terrorism intelligence that is literate in its
responsiveness to regulatory theory and evidence at the same
time as it is artful in its detective work (Braithwaite 1993).
3. Responsive regulation that is dynamic tends to control risks
more effectively than static command-and-control regulation
(such as the Benthamite deterrence of setting static expected
punishments that exceed average expected benefits) (Ayres and
Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite 2002: especially chapters 1, 2 and
4; Braithwaite, 2003a).
4. In international affairs, top-down preventive diplomacy works

in limited but important ways in forestalling armed conflict
(Touval and Zartman 1985, 1989). In resolution of more micro-
forms of violence (e.g., school and workplace bullying/sexual
harassment), top-down preventive diplomacy works much bet-
ter when it is complemented by bottom-up restorative justice
(Braithwaite 2002: chapter 3). Therefore, we might improve
our effectiveness in responding to global terrorism by com-
plementing Camp David–style elite preventive diplomacy
over Palestine with bottom-up restorative justice in refugee
camps that links ever-widening islands of civility there to ever-
widening islands of civility in Israel (Kaldor 1999; Braithwaite
2002: chapter 6).
5. In addition to the embrace of diplomacy that prevents armed
conflict, states should eschew diplomacy that provokes it – as
I allege the United States and the Soviet Union each did in
the Middle East and Afghanistan in an attempt to embroil the
other in armed conflict with third parties, including terrorists.
These terrorists then came back to bite the shortsighted states
that enabled their original terrorist provocations – bin Laden
being an example. This means turning away from the politics of
recurrently humiliating the Muslim world as playthings of major
powers, in favor of a politics of dignity and respect for the social
justice claims of the Muslim world.
6. Webs of controls are best when they conceive justice as holistic
(Braithwaite 2002: 150–158). Social justice for blacks in South
Africa creates the conditions for the restorative justice of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Tutu 1999). Procedural
justice prevents violence (Tyler 1990; Braithwaite 2002); and
restorative justice creates superior conditions of procedural
justice (Barnes 1999). This means theorizing enlargement of
democracy as enlargement of justice as non-domination (Pettit
1997). This normative theory can be refined by iterative adjust-
ment to the explanatory theory that domination induces defi-
ance (often accompanied by violence) (Braithwaite and Parker
1999; Braithwaite and Pettit 2000; Braithwaite 2003b).
CONCLUSION
In the end, the theory of how to design webs of regulatory contain-

ment is less persuasive than the evidence of the failures of Bush I in
the Gulf War and Bush II in the war on terrorism. These were failures
of under-reaction, followed by coercive over-reaction, followed by a
failure to de-escalate by decisively substituting investment in enlarge-
ment for investment in containment. These doctrines are less persua-
sive than the contrast of the American regulatory praxis of George
Marshall: contestation of under-reaction to Hitler before World War
II, prudent advocacy of escalated containment that prevented suc-
cessful invasions of South Korea and Taiwan a decade later, and the
visionary de-escalation of a Marshall Plan that enlarged democracy
and justice as a response to the injustice of fascism. Marshall was not
without flaws, such as his complicity in following the Nazis into the
bombing of civilian populations on a shocking scale, even if less shock-
ing than under Churchill’s preferences. He suffered some large diplo-
matic failures, such as failing to broker a peace between Mao Zedong
and Chiang Kai-shek; likewise, he failed to dissuade Truman from
establishing a state of Israel in a way that would suit Stalin – through
destabilizing Western influence in the Arab world. It is impossible
to love the introspective general as much as Mandela’s more conta-
gious compassion. Yet humanity owes Marshall no less homage. That
homage is due because of his grasp of enlargement as well as contain-
ment, of the detailed networking of primary, secondary, and tertiary
prevention that is the stuff of global security.
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Pettit, P (1997) Republicanism. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Pilger, J (2002) The New Rulers of the World, Verso, London.
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Stoller, MA (1989) George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American
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DG (eds) Mediation Research, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
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Tyler, T (1990) Why People Obey the Law, Yale University Press, New
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of September 11, 2001 by the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
US Government Printing Service, Washington, DC.
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Frank Cass, London.
Part three
THINKING ABOUT TOMORROW

chapter seventeen
Using Open Source Data to Counter

Common Myths about Terrorism
Gary LaFree
There is a central irony in our approach to global terrorism: Though

effective policy against terrorism depends especially on hard data
and objective analysis, the study of terrorism has lagged behind many
other fields in the social and behavioral sciences. In their encyclopedic
review of political terrorism, Schmid and Jongman (1988, p. 177)
identified more than 6,000 published works, but point out that much
of the research is “impressionistic, superficial [and offers] … far-
reaching generalizations on the basis of episodal evidence.” More
recently, Silke (2003) concludes that only 3 percent of articles in ter-
rorism journals used inferential analysis compared to 86 percent in
forensic psychology and 60 percent in criminology. Similarly, Lum,
Kennedy, and Sherley’s (2006, p. 8) systematic review of over 14,000
terrorism articles published between 1971 and 2003 found that only
3 percent were based on quantitative analysis. Thus, as a result of
the lack of systematic empirical research, an area that is especially
in need of clear-eyed, dispassionate facts is especially susceptible to
half truths and myths. The purpose of this review is to use a newly
available data set on terrorist attacks around the world since 1970 to
challenge ten common myths about terrorism. I use myths here in
the everyday sense of fictitious or unscientific conclusions.
In fairness to researchers, studying terrorism raises unique chal-
lenges. To begin with, terrorism represents a type of behavior that is
especially difficult to define and measure. As PLO Chairman Arafat
The author thanks Erin Miller for her assistance with the database and Gary Ackerman
and Erin Miller for helpful comments.
411
412 thinking about tomorrow
famously noted in a 1974 speech before the United Nations, “One

man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” For example, though
the United States regards Hamas as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
(United States Department of State, 2008), many Palestinians regard
it as a legitimate political party that won a major democratically held
election in 2006. By contrast, whereas the Chinese regard the ethnic
Uyghurs that have been detained by the United States at Guantanamo
Bay as terrorists, much of the rest of the world appears to disagree
(Washington Post, 2005). Indeed, many of the most prominent terror-
ist groups in the world (including Shining Path, ETA, the FMLN, the
IRA, FARC, the ELN, and the PKK) often define themselves as free-
dom fighters. This fundamental characteristic of terrorism no doubt
explains in part why international organizations such as the United
Nations have not succeeded in adopting a universally accepted defini-
tion (European Commission, 2008, pp. 3–4).
Defining terrorism is no less complex for researchers. Schmid and
Jongman’s review (1988, p. 5) found 109 different research defini-
tions of terrorism. Indeed, the first chapter of many influential books
on terrorism (e.g., Hoffman, 1998; Smelser, 2007) is devoted to
exploring and defending competing definitions. However, despite
the considerable complexity, most commentators and experts agree
on several key elements, captured in the operational definition we
use here: “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by
non-state actors to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal
through fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007).
Note that this operational definition excludes state terrorism and
genocide, topics that are important and complex enough to warrant
separate treatment.
Beyond the challenge of arriving at a defensible definition of ter-
rorism is the considerable difficulty of collecting valid data on ter-
rorism. Data on illegal violence has come traditionally from three
sources, corresponding to the major social roles connected to crimi-
nal events: “official” data collected by legal agents, especially the
police; “victimization” data collected from the general population of
victims and nonvictims; and “self-report” data collected from offend-
ers (LaFree and Dugan 2004, pp. 53–74). Victimization surveys have
been of little use in the study of terrorism. Despite the attention it
using open source data to counter common myths 413
gets in the global media, terrorism is much rarer than more ordinary
violent crime. This means that even with extremely large sample sizes,
few individuals in most countries will have been victimized by ter-
rorists. Moreover, because victims of terrorism are often chosen at
random, they are unlikely to know perpetrators, making it impossible
to produce details about offenders. Finally, in many cases, victims of
terrorism are killed by their attackers – a problem in criminology
research limited to the study of homicides.
Self-report data on terrorists have been more important than vic-
timization data, but they also face serious limitations. Most active
terrorists are unwilling to participate in interviews. Even if willing to
participate, getting access to known terrorists for research purposes
raises obvious challenges. As Merari (1991, p. 88) has put it, “The
clandestine nature of terrorist organizations and the ways and means
by which intelligence can be obtained will rarely enable data collec-
tion which meets commonly accepted academic standards.”
Although government departments in some countries do collect
official data on terrorism (e.g., the U.S. National Counterterrorism
Center), data collected by governments are suspicious either because
they are influenced by political considerations or because many fear
that they might be so influenced. Moreover, whereas vast amounts
of detailed official data on common crimes are routinely produced
by the various branches of the criminal justice system in most coun-
tries, this is rarely the case for terrorism. For example, the major-
ity of offenders suspected of terrorism against the United States
are not legally processed for terrorism, but rather for other related
offenses, such as weapons violations and money laundering (Smith,
Damphousse, Jackson, and Sellers, 2002). In addition, much primary
data are collected by intelligence agents (e.g., informers, communica-
tions intercepts) and are not available to researchers working in an
unclassified environment.
In response to these data challenges, researchers have long relied
on open source unclassified terrorist event databases. Terrorism event
databases generally use the electronic and print media to collect
detailed information on the characteristics of terrorist attacks. LaFree
and Dugan (2007) describe eight of these event databases, with varying
coverage going back as far as 1968. Analyses based on event databases
have provided important insights into a wide range of terrorism-re-

lated empirical questions. However, an important limitation of most
event databases is that they include only transnational events – those
involving a national or a group of nationals from one country attack-
ing targets in another country or attacking foreign targets in their
home country. This is a potentially critical limitation, because sources
that have compared domestic and transnational terrorist attacks (Asal
and Rethemeyer, 2007; LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw, 2009; Schmid,
2004) conclude that the former outnumber the latter by as much as
seven to one.
Moreover, as Falkenrath (2001, p. 164) points out, dividing
bureaucratic responsibility and legal authority according to a
domestic-international distinction is “an artifact of a simpler, less
globally interconnected era.” Groups such as al Qaeda have global
operations that cut across domestic and international lines. Others
(e.g., the Abu Nidal Organization or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
operate in multiple countries and hence engage in acts of both domes-
tic and transnational terrorism. In short, excluding domestic terrorist
attacks impedes a more sophisticated understanding of terrorism and
may ultimately weaken counterterrorism efforts.
In this essay I present conclusions drawn from newly available data
on 82,910 worldwide terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2007 from the
Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD is to my knowledge
the most comprehensive open source database on terrorist attacks
assembled to date. Importantly, it is also the first unclassified event
database that traces domestic as well as transnational terrorism over a
prolonged time period. In the rest of this essay, I will rely on the GTD
to evaluate ten myths about terrorism. These myths are centered on
common misconceptions about the extent of terrorism, the sources
of terrorism, the lethality of terrorism, the resilience of terrorists, and
counter-terrorist interventions.
THE EXTENT OF TERRORISM
MYTH 1: Terrorist Attacks Reach Every Corner of the World

The ubiquity of modern communication systems means that indivi-
duals are now routinely bombarded by images of terrorist attacks
Table 17.1. Twenty top-ranking countries in terms of total terrorist attacks and
fatalities, 1970 to 2007
Rank Most frequently attacked Most fatalities

Country Frequency Country Fatality count
1 Colombia 6767 Iraq 17754
2 Peru 6038 Sri Lanka 14272
3 El Salvador 5330 India 13434
4 India 4318 Colombia 13009
5 Northern Ireland 3762 Peru 12822
6 Spain 3165 El Salvador 12496
7 Iraq 3161 Nicaragua 11324
8 Turkey 2691 Algeria 8545
9 Sri Lanka 2611 Philippines 6304
10 Pakistan 2536 Pakistan 5540
11 Philippines 2490 Guatemala 5135
12 Chile 2287 Turkey 4674
13 Israel 2140 Burundi 4084
14 Guatemala 2023 Afghanistan 3764
15 Nicaragua 1986 United States 3339
16 South Africa 1921 Rwanda 3200
17 Lebanon 1913 Lebanon 3093
18 Algeria 1650 Russia 3057
19 Italy 1487 Angola 2861
20 United States 1362 Northern Ireland 2842
Source : Global Terrorism Database.
from around the globe. This blanket coverage leaves the impression
that no location on the planet is safe from terrorism. But in fact,
our analysis of the GTD indicates that terrorist attacks are highly
concentrated in geographic space. This concentration can be dem-
onstrated at the national level by examining the proportion of all
terrorist attacks that take place in those countries with the most ter-
rorist activity. In Table 17.1 we present the top twenty countries in
terms of terrorist attacks, and compare the cumulative percentage of
total attacks against these countries to their share of all countries in
the world.
According to Table 17.1, the top twenty countries and territories in
terms of terrorist attacks account for nearly 72 percent of all terrorist
activities, but less than 10 percent of all countries of the world. Two
percent of the world’s countries account for more than 27 percent
of the world’s terrorist attacks. Five percent of the world’s countries

account for half of the world’s terrorist attacks.
Considerable concentration is also apparent if we examine terrorist
attacks with smaller geospatial units. For example, in an analysis of
known terrorist attacks in India from the GTD, Cutter (2005) found
that the vast majority of all attacks were concentrated in just two
regions: the Punjab and Kashmir region on the border with Pakistan
and the area around Bangladesh. The vast majority of Indian territory
suffered few terrorist attacks from 1970 until quite recently – which is
one of the reasons why the 2008 attacks on Mumbai were so shocking.
Similarly, in an analysis of the GTD for Germany, Behlendorf (2008)
found considerable geospatial concentration of terrorist attacks at the
province level. In short, terrorism, like more common crime, is highly
concentrated across geographical units.
MYTH 2: Terrorist Attacks were Rapidly Increasing

in the Years Leading up to 9/11
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, had an immediate and
dramatic impact on levels of public concern about terrorism in the
United States and well beyond. Similarly, more recent attacks such as
those in Madrid on March 11, 2004, in London on July 7, 2005, and
in Mumbai on November 26–29, 2008, also raised concerns about
terrorism among citizens, not only in the countries attacked, but from
observers around the world. Accordingly, many might assume that ter-
rorist attacks and fatalities were up sharply in the years leading up
to the twenty-first century. But the GTD shows that the patterns of
terrorist attacks since 1970 are more complex than is commonly rec-
ognized. Figure 17.1 shows trends in total attacks and fatalities from
1970 to 2007.
According to Figure 17.1, terrorist attacks reached their twentieth-
century zenith in 1992 (with over 5,100 attacks worldwide), but had
substantially declined in the years leading up to the 9/11 attacks.1
1
Most of the 1993 data in the GTD were lost by the original data collectors and we have
never been able to recover them fully (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). Unfortunately,
1993 was a very active year for world wide terrorist attacks. For Figure 17.1 and the
other trend analysis we estimate 1993 rates by taking the average value for 1992
and 1994.
6000 All attacks

Fatal attacks
5000
4000
Frequency
3000
2000
1000
0
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
Number of attacks
Figure 17.1. Total and fatal terrorist attacks, 1970 through 2007 (n = 82,910).
In fact, total attacks in 2000 (1,351) were at about the same level as
total attacks in 1977 (1,307). Looking more broadly at overall trends,
Figure 17.1 shows that worldwide terrorist attacks through the mid-
1970s were relatively infrequent, with fewer than 1,000 incidents each
year. But from 1976 to 1979 the frequency of events nearly tripled.
The number of terrorist attacks continued to increase until the 1992
peak, with smaller peaks in 1984, at almost 3,500 incidents, and 1989,
with more than 4,300 events. After the first major peak in 1992, the
number of terrorist attacks declined until the end of the twentieth
century, before rising steeply to a ten-year high of nearly 3,300 in
2007 – four years after the start of the Iraq War. Still, total attacks in
2007 were 36 percent lower than total attacks for the 1992 peak.
Fatal attacks also declined in the years prior to the 9/11 attacks.
In fact, fatal attacks in 2000 (580) were considerably lower than they
had been more than two decades earlier, in 1979 (832). In general,
the number of fatal attacks clearly followed the pattern of total attacks
(r =.93), but at a substantially lower magnitude (averaging 947 fatal
attacks per year compared to 2,294 total attacks per year worldwide).
Fatal attacks rose above 1,000 per year for the first time in 1980. After
hovering close to 1,000 attacks annually for most of the 1980s, they
more than doubled between 1985 and 1992. Like total attacks, fatal
attacks declined somewhat after 1992, bottoming out in 1998 with
426 attacks, and then rising again to a global peak of more than 2,100
fatal attacks in 2007. The peak in 2007 (2,111) was similar to the peak
in 1992 (2,178).
In short, in the four years prior to 9/11 worldwide terrorist attacks
and fatal attacks were at the lowest level they had been at for twenty
years. However, both total and fatal attacks have increased consider-
ably since then, so that in 2007 total attacks were back to levels they
had been at in the mid-1990s, and total fatal attacks were approach-
ing the peak year of 1992.
MYTH 3: The United States is More Frequently Targeted

by Terrorists than any Other Country in the World
The United States has long been perceived as being the target of an
inordinate number of terrorist attacks. Thus, Neumayer and Plumper
(2008, p. 2) argue that most foreign victims of terrorist attacks are
U.S. citizens, and the U.S. State Department recently claimed that
one-third of all terrorist attacks worldwide are directed at the United
States (Crenshaw, 2006, p. 8). However, because previous estimates
of attacks against the United States have been based only on transna-
tional terrorist attacks, they do not take into account the possibility
that the groups that target the United States may be even more active
in targeting their own countries.
In Table 17.2 I present new data from the GTD showing the twenty
most frequently attacked countries in the world, from 1970 to 2007. I
also present a rank ordering of the twenty countries with the most ter-
rorist fatalities for the same years. According to Table 17.2, the United
States ranks twentieth in terms of total attacks. The most frequently
attacked country in the data set is Colombia, with over 6,700 attacks.
Note that the top three most frequently attacked countries are all
Latin American, and three other Latin American countries are in the
top twenty (Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua). Latin America had the
largest number of terrorist attacks of any region of the world through-
out the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. Four Middle Eastern or
Persian Gulf countries are in the top twenty (Iraq, Turkey, Israel, and
Lebanon) and four are in South Asia or Southeast Asia (India, Pakistan,
Table 17.2. Percentage of total attacks for the twenty most frequently attacked
countries, 1970–2007
Rank Country Cumulative % of Cumulative % of

all attacks all countries
1 Colombia 8.16 0.48
2 Peru 15.44 0.96
3 El Salvador 21.87 1.44
4 India 27.08 1.92
5 Northern Ireland 31.62 2.40
6 Spain 35.44 2.88
7 Iraq 39.25 3.37
8 Turkey 42.49 3.85
9 Sri Lanka 45.64 4.33
10 Pakistan 48.70 4.81
11 Philippines 51.71 5.29
12 Chile 54.46 5.77
13 Israel 57.05 6.25
14 Guatemala 59.49 6.73
15 Nicaragua 61.88 7.21
16 South Africa 64.20 7.69
17 Lebanon 66.51 8.17
18 Algeria 68.50 8.65
19 Italy 70.29 9.13
20 United States 71.93 9.62
Sri Lanka, Philippines). Western Europe contains three countries in

the top twenty (Northern Ireland [treated here as a country], Spain,
and Italy). South Africa and Algeria are the sole countries from Africa
in the top twenty most frequently targeted countries.
Table 17.2 shows that at number fifteen, the United States ranks
higher in terms of total fatalities than attacks. However, 90 percent
(N = 3, 007) of total U.S. terrorism fatalities from 1970 to 2007 are
accounted for by a single event – the four coordinated attacks on
September 11, 2001. If these attacks are removed from the estimates,
U.S. fatalities during the period spanned by the data would be similar
to fatalities for Canada or Greece.
In a recent study, my colleagues and I (LaFree, Yang, and
Crenshaw, 2009) examined the attack patterns of fifty-three foreign
terrorist organizations that were identified by the U.S. Department
45,000
90.6%
40,000 (38,113)
35,000
30,000 Attacks
Fatalities
25,000
96.6%
20,000
(16,346)
15,000
10,000
9.4%
5,000 3.4% (3,943)
(570)
0
U.S. Non-U.S.
Figure 17.2. U.S. and non-U.S. attacks by 53 foreign terrorist groups identi-
fied as threats to the United States.
Source : LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009).
of State and subsequently the National Counterterrorism Center as

especially dangerous for the United States. In Figure 17.2, I show
the proportion of attacks by these fifty-three groups against the U.S.
homeland and U.S. targets in other countries compared to attacks
on targets not connected to the United States. The results are strik-
ing. According to Figure 17.2, between 1970 and 2004 more than
96 percent of the more than 16,000 terrorist attacks from these
groups were directed at non-U.S. targets. Moreover, of the 3.4 per-
cent of all attacks directed at the United States, only five attacks (0.9
percent) were on the U.S. homeland. These include one attack by
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) on August 18,
1983 against the Washington, DC Navy Yard (Navy Regional Data
Automation Center) with small explosives as well as the four attacks
that occurred on September 11th, 2001.2 Major targets for anti-U.S.
attacks in other countries from these fifty-three groups included
U.S. businesses (233), U.S. diplomats and embassies (106), and the
U.S. military (96).3 The rest of the attacks are widely scattered in
2
The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing was not included in the analysis because
the perpetrators of the event were not affiliated with any of the fi fty-three terrorist
groups identified by this study at the time the attack occurred.
3
The GTD excludes attacks related to open combat between opposing armed forces,
both regular and irregular. However, the GTD includes attacks against the military
terms of target selection and include U.S. educational institutions,

journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and tourists. The U.S.
suffered proportionally more fatalities from attacks at the hands of
these fifty-three groups than their non-U.S. targets, with U.S.-directed
attacks accounting for over 9 percent of total fatalities. But again, a
very large proportion of these fatalities (76.3 percent) are accounted
for by the 9/11 attack.
The fact that total attacks and fatalities by this set of designated anti-
U.S. organizations is so lopsidedly against non-U.S. targets is consis-
tent with the proposition that the decision of anti-U.S. terrorist groups
to attack the U.S. is often strategic. Attacks on the U.S. may be useful
for pragmatic as well as ideological reasons; attacks on Americans are
highly visible, and both acts of terrorism and the American response
may well arouse popular emotions in an audience of importance to the
terrorist organization. Also, as Crenshaw (2001) suggests, the United
States may become a preferred target if domestic challengers cannot
succeed at home unless the scope of the conflict is expanded beyond
local boundaries. Beyond these considerations, attacks on U.S. tar-
gets can be useful for directly influencing American policies – such
as compelling the U.S. to withdraw from a military commitment that
supports a local government. The bombing of the Marine barracks
in Lebanon in 1983 is a prominent example. Terrorism directed at
the United States may also be a mechanism for drawing it into a local
conflict, perhaps to pressure the government to make reforms or to
undermine its legitimacy.
Regardless of the strategic intent behind attacks on the United
States, or the virulence of anti-American ideology, our results show
that the vast majority of terrorist attacks by foreign groups deemed
dangerous to national security by the American government are in
fact directed at non-U.S. targets. Local governments suffer the most.
U.S. decision makers might be well advised to avoid parochialism, and
keep in mind the fact that even the most seriously threatening groups
direct most of their activities elsewhere.
if the military is there as an internationally recognized peacekeeping force, if the

attack is against military forces on leave away from their area of operation (as in the
attack on the USS Cole), or if the attacks are against military personnel who are in
their place of residence (LaFree and Dugan, 2007).
40,000 92.7%
(35,322)
35,000
30,000
Transnational
25,000 Domestic
20,000 93.1%
(15,225)
15,000
10,000
6.9% 7.3%
(1,121) (2,791)
5,000
0
Attacks Fatalities
Figure 17.3. Total domestic and transnational attacks by 53 foreign terrorist
groups identified as threats to the United States.
Source : LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009).
THE SOURCES OF TERRORISM
MYTH 4: Most Terrorist Attacks Involve Disgruntled Groups

and Individuals from One Country Carrying Out Attacks
on Civilians in Other Countries
As noted earlier, because none of the open source terrorist event data-
bases before the GTD included domestic terrorist attacks over a long
time period, we have lacked baseline information about how common
domestic attacks were compared to transnational attacks. In the recent
study by LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009), we were able to use the
GTD to examine the domestic and transnational attack patterns of
the fifty-three foreign organizations that were identified by the U.S.
government as especially dangerous for the United States. Figure 17.3
shows that between 1970 and 2004, more than 93 percent of the non-
U.S. attacks of these groups were domestic attacks. More than nine
times out of ten, these groups operated at home against local targets.
These fifty-three groups are not a random sample of terrorist groups
in the GTD. However, because they have been identified by the U.S.
government as foreign groups that are especially dangerous to the
United States, we might assume that compared to a random sample,
they would be especially likely to carry out transnational attacks. The
fact that they do not has several important policy implications. First, it
underscores the importance of proximity to terrorist targeting. Even
though these groups have ample interest in striking the United States,
actually doing so is not an easy task. Anti-American objectives are not
sufficient. Mounting an attack against the United States from primary
bases outside the United States is extremely challenging. Clarke and
Newman (2006, p. 154) conclude that “Terrorists are constrained by
geography. Like criminals, they will choose targets that are close to
their operational base.”
And second, the ratio of transnational to domestic attacks likely
reflects challenges faced by attackers due to cultural and linguistic bar-
riers. Foreign attackers typically encounter an environment in which
they have an imperfect understanding of local language, culture, and
daily life. This impediment may explain why recent research by Smith
and Damphousse (2009) shows that international terrorist attacks
against the United States have a much longer planning time horizon
than attacks by domestic groups. To overcome cultural and linguistic
obstacles, foreign attackers will probably be more likely than domestic
attackers to rely on immigrant communities or diasporas within the tar-
get country. Similar reasoning leads Clarke and Newman (2006, p. 143)
to conclude that “externally based terrorists will mount their attacks
from locations that are as close as possible to the target.” Put in another
way, foreign terrorist groups need locals. Thus, a recent report by the
U.S. State Department (2008) stresses the importance to al Qaeda of
local recruits, especially in the West. More generally, the results under-
score both the atypicality and the lethal ingenuity of the 9/11 attacks.
Al Qaeda was able to engineer 9/11 without using locals, but instead
relied on specially trained and highly qualified foreign operatives. Thus
far the ability to commandeer such assets has been exceedingly rare.
MYTH 5: Terrorism is Unrelated to Traditional

Political Grievances
Because of the seeming irrationality of high-profile al Qaeda attacks
in recent years, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that a large num-
ber of terrorist attacks involve political disputes over territory. In
Table 17.3 we list the twenty most active terrorist groups in terms of
attack frequencies and fatalities. This analysis is based on a study by
Table 17.3. Twenty most active terrorist organizations in terms of attack frequency and fatalities, 1970 to 2006
424
Rank Most frequent perpetrators Most fatalities
Organization Frequency Organization Fatality count

1 Shining Path (SL) 2817 Shining Path (SL) 6057
2 Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) 1378 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 4038
3 Farabundo Marti National Liberation 1249 Al Qaeda 3460
Front (FMLN)
4 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 1165 Hutus 3222
5 Revolutionary Armed Forces of 1066 Mozambique National Resistance 2247
Colombia (FARC) Movement (MNR)
6 National Liberation Army of 784 Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 1856
Colombia (ELN) (FMLN)
7 Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) 608 Revolutionary Armed Forces of 1791
Colombia (FARC)
8 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 569 Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn 1646
9 Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) 568 Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) 1342
10 Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) 535 National Union for the Total Independence 1151
of Angola (UNITA)
11 New People’s Army (NPA) 472 New People’s Army (NPA) 1084
12 Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) 455 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 1071
13 Taliban 438 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 1060
14 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) 412 Hizballah 899
15 Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M) 403 Taliban 876
16 M-19 (Movement of April 19) 321 Tutsi 858
17 Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) 287 Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 807
18 People’s Liberation Front (JVP) 274 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 728
19 Movement of the Revolutionary Left 257 National Liberation Army of Colombia 646
(MIR) (Chile) (ELN)
LaFree and Dugan (2009) in which we analyzed both the GTD and an
event database collected by the RAND Corporation. Notice how many
of these groups are organized around disputes having to do with polit-
ical control over territory. Although there are major differences in
terms of their orientation, this explains in large part the motivations
of virtually all of the top twenty groups, including Shining Path, ETA,
the IRA, FARC, Hamas, and the LTTE.
South Africa is an especially striking example of this phenomenon.
Both pro- and anti-apartheid terrorist attacks in South Africa resulted
in an enormous amount of political violence during much of the 1980s
and early 1990s. However, in an analysis of terrorist attacks in South
Africa using GTD data, Van Brakle and LaFree (2007) found that vio-
lence ended rapidly following the first democratic elections at the end
of apartheid. In fact, a major reason why it is so difficult to develop
a universal definition of terrorism is that it is often a method used to
advance political goals on which nations and individuals disagree.
THE LETHALITY OF TERRORISM AND THE RESILIENCE

OF TERRORIST GROUPS
MYTH 6: Most Terrorist Attacks are Incredibly Lethal

Again, because highly lethal terrorist strikes are the ones that grab the
headlines, it is easy to suppose that most terrorist attacks are incred-
ibly lethal. In Figure 17.4 we examine total fatalities attributed to the
82,910 attacks in the GTD.
According to Figure 17.4, more than half of all terrorist attacks
since 1970 (where information was available) involved no fatalities.
Many incidents are directed at property. Others attacks are aimed
at civilians, but they fail. Furthermore, in many other cases terror-
ist groups provide a warning to civilians before striking. This has
been a common practice for ETA and the IRA, and used to be a
common practice for the Weather Underground. Thirty years ago
these considerations led terrorism researcher Brian Jenkins (1975)
to suggest that “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of
people dead.”
Of course, it is still the case that 45 percent of the attacks in the GTD
(or more than 34,000 attacks) involved at least one fatality. Incidents
Chemical
Other
Melee 0.26%
0.37%
1.98%
Incendiary
7.65%
Unknown
9.84%
Explosives/Bombs/
Dynamite
43.68%
Firearms
36.22%
Figure 17.4. Weapons used in terrorist attacks, 1970 through 2007 (n = 82,910).
that are especially worrisome are the 1.5 percent (or 1,138) that pro-
duced more than twenty-five fatalities. In fact, Jenkins (2007) has
recently revisited his earlier statement, and after reviewing the stated
plans of terrorist groups operating in the early twenty-first century
concluded that indeed “many of today’s terrorists want a lot of people
watching and a lot of people dead.” But nevertheless, the majority of
terrorist attacks since 1970 produced no fatalities.
MYTH 7: Most Terrorist Attacks Rely on

Sophisticated Weaponry
Terrorism-related plots in the electronic and print media are often
portrayed as incredibly complex operations relying on split-second
timing and intricate weaponry. These images no doubt encourage us
to think that most terrorist strikes depend on sophisticated weaponry.
In Figure 17.5 we show the weapons used in terrorism attacks from
the GTD from 1970 to 2007.
60.00
50.00
40.00
Percent
30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00
0 1 2 to 4 5 to 10 11 to 25 over 25
Number of fatalities per attack
Figure 17.5. Total fatalities per terrorist attack, 1970–2007 (n = 82,910*).
*
Data on fatalities were missing in 8.1% of cases.
Contrary to the view of terrorism that we commonly get from the

media, the vast majority of terrorist attacks rely on readily accessible
weapons. According to Figure 17.5, the most common weapons in
the GTD database were explosives and firearms. These two categories
account for nearly 80 percent of all attacks. For the most part, the
explosives used were readily available, especially dynamite, grenades,
mortars, and improvised devices placed inside vehicles (“car bombs”).
Similarly, the most common firearms were also widely available,
including especially automatic weapons, shotguns, and pistols. After
explosives and firearms, incendiaries (fire or firebombs) account for
nearly 8 percent of the incidents. Melee attacks, which include assaults
with weapons such as blunt objects, knives, and ropes, account for
fewer than 2 percent of all attacks. Weapons included in the “other”
category were diverse, including items such as sabotage equipment,
vehicles (not vehicle-borne explosives), biological, radiological, and
fake weapons. Among the more sophisticated weapon types were 523
attacks using remote-detonated devices, 213 attacks using chemical
agents, 26 attacks involving biological agents, and 15 attacks involv-
ing radiological materials. Note that chemical agents were responsi-
ble for about one quarter of 1 percent of all incidents, and biological
and radiological agents were each present in less than three–one

hundredths of 1 percent of all attacks. The remote-detonated devices
were usually left on the roadside or attached to vehicles. Sometimes
they were planted in packages and detonated at strategic locations.
Chemical agents range from letters containing rat poison to tainted
water supplies. Ten of the twenty-six biological weapons cases were the
U.S. anthrax attacks of 2001 – in which seven people died. Likewise,
ten of the fifteen cases involving radiological materials were related to
attacks in which an individual sent envelopes containing monazite to
Japanese government officials, causing no injuries.
Terrorism is the tool of the poor and the weak. It is used precisely
because the groups involved do not have a lot of sophisticated weap-
onry. If they did, they would probably use it in more conventional
military ways. Typical terrorist attacks use readily available weapons.
In contrast to high-profile media reports, sophisticated weapons,
including chemical, biological, or radiological materials, are the rare
exception.
MYTH 8: Most Terrorist Organizations are Long

Lasting and Difficult to Eradicate
Given the persistence of high profile, long-lasting groups like al
Qaeda, the Tamil Tigers, or the Irish Republican Army, there is also a
common perception that most terrorist groups have long life spans.
The GTD identifies more than 1,500 separate terrorist groups. We
gauged their longevity by the amount of time from their first strike
to their last. In Figure 17.6 I show the average length of time these
organizations have mounted attacks, based on a recently completed
analysis of an earlier version of the GTD (LaFree, 2008).
According to Figure 17.6, nearly 75 percent of the terrorist orga-
nizations identified in the GTD from 1970 to 1997 lasted for less
than a year. These results suggest that most terrorist groups are like
most business start-ups – very likely to disappear during their first year
of operation. Forming and maintaining groups is not all that easy,
despite impressions to the contrary from the media. Why do we have
the impression that terrorist groups are long lasting and difficult to
eradicate? Probably because we hear so much about the groups that
are successful. But for every al Qaeda and ETA, there are many more
80.00%
74.72%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
14.77%
10.00%
4.62% 4.62%
1.26%
0.00%
Less than 1 1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 20 over 20
Figure 17.6. Years of operation for terrorist groups, 1970–1997.
short-lived, relatively unknown groups such as the Anti-Capitalist

Brigades and the Revolutionary Flames.
COUNTERTERRORISM
MYTH 9: Terrorist Groups are Impervious to Governmental

Counterterrorist Policies and Rarely Make Mistakes
Just as some researchers and policy makers are overly optimistic about
the abilities of governments to use deterrence measures to stop ter-
rorist groups, other researchers and policy makers are overly pessimis-
tic about the chances that terrorist organizations will make mistakes
and miscalculations that can be exploited. Although research on the
desistance of terrorist groups has been neglected, the topic has been
receiving increased research attention in recent years (Cronin, 2008;
Jones and Libicki, 2008; for a review, see LaFree and Miller, 2009).
My colleagues and I (Dugan, Huang, LaFree, and McCauley,
2009) recently used the GTD to examine the targeting strategies of
two terrorist groups that were based in Turkey, and were especially
active during the 1970s and 1980s: the Armenian Secret Army for
the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of
the Armenian Genocide (JCAG). At the end of the First World War,
Government actions Deterrence Backlash
Falls Curfew 1.212
Internment 0.942
Operation motorman –0.671

Criminalization/ Backlash
0.537 Deterrence
Ulsterization
The Loughall
0.083
Incident
The Gibraltar
0.178
Incident
–1 –0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5

Figure 17.7. Violent attacks in Northern Ireland, 1969–1992.
Source : LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009).
the Armenian diaspora included roughly 1.4 million people in thirty-

four countries. Armenians worldwide had been traumatized by the
brutal attacks that killed approximately one million Armenians in
Turkey in 1915. Fifty years after these mass attacks, many Armenians
felt considerable impatience with their traditional leadership groups
who had been unable to advance recognition of the attacks, let alone
advance national liberation for Armenians remaining in Turkey and
the USSR. This discontent laid the foundation for ASALA and JCAG.
In Figure 17.7, I show total terrorist attacks committed by ASALA
and JCAG from 1975 to 1988 from the GTD. Figure 17.7 shows
a dramatic increase in attacks by both groups, peaking in 1980 for
JCAG and 1981 for ASALA. Following these peaks, attack levels fall
off dramatically, especially for ASALA. Whereas ASALA staged forty-
six attacks in 1981, by 1984 the annual total had dropped to only five
attacks, and four years later, ASALA had stopped attacking altogether.
Though JCAG never had as many attacks as ASALA, the number of
attacks launched by JCAG also fell dramatically after 1982. Our goal in
this research project was to figure out what explained the sudden desis-
tance in violent attacks of ASALA and JCAG after the early 1980s.
After modeling many possible explanations for this sudden desis-
tance, our conclusion was that the most convincing explanation was
a strategic shift by ASALA in its targeting strategy. Before the early
1980s, ASALA was careful to target Turks and avoided non-Turkish and
especially Armenian casualties. However, starting in the early 1980s,
they became far less discriminate in their targeting methods. The
pivotal historical event in our analysis was an especially brutal attack
on Paris’s Orly Airport in 1983. An explosive device detonated pre-
maturely in the terminal area by the Turkish Airlines counter, killing
eight people (four French, two Turkish, one American, one Swedish)
and wounding over fifty more. The expansion of increasingly inept
attacks such as the one at Orly created a polarized and hostile climate
within ASALA and in Armenian perceptions of ASALA. We concluded
that this change in targeting strategy seriously undermined the legiti-
macy of ASALA among its supporters in the Armenian diaspora and
in the West. Interestingly, although JCAG was not involved in the Orly
bombing, and in general had a much more disciplined approach to
the use of terrorist violence, JCAG attacks also declined rapidly follow-
ing Orly. These results suggest that when a terrorist organization that
depends heavily on a diaspora overreaches in terrorist targeting, it
may offer a strong opening for discrediting terrorism as a tactic, even
discrediting terrorist groups that have not overreached.
Perhaps the most general lesson from ASALA’s rise and fall is a per-
spective on terrorist motivation. Most terrorists want to mobilize and
lead others to support their cause. Terrorists who claim to represent
an ethnic or communal group want to mobilize and lead their own
people in preserving communal culture and values. Therefore, the
most important audience of terrorist activity may often not be the
enemy target of attacks, but rather the terrorists’ own sympathizers
and supporters. Any terrorist group that loses sight of its major audi-
ence is vulnerable.
MYTH 10: To be Effective Against Terrorism, Governments

Must Strike Back Rapidly and Forcefully
The belief that the credible threat of severe punishment deters
crime and other objectionable behavior is as old as criminal law
itself, and has broad appeal to both policy makers and the public.
Deterrence models generally assume that human beings are rational,
self-interested actors who seek to minimize personal cost while maxi-
mizing personal gain (Paternoster, 1987; Ross and LaFree, 1986). An
important implication of such perspectives is that individual behavior

can be altered by the threat and imposition of severe punishment.
Deterrence models have been applied to a wide variety of criminal
behavior, including drunk driving (Nagin and Paternoster, 1993),
burglary (Wright and Decker, 1994), robbery (Wright and Decker,
1997), shoplifting (Piquero and Tibbetts, 1996), income-tax evasion
(Klepper and Nagin, 1989), drug selling (Jacobs, 1996), and white-
collar crimes (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Simpson, Piquero, and
Paternoster, 1998). Deterrence models would seem to be especially
appropriate for understanding terrorist violence, given that many
terrorist attacks are carefully planned and appear to include at least
some consideration for risks and rewards. Indeed deterrence-based
thinking has dominated counterterrorist policies in most countries
since the origins of modern terrorism in the late 1960s (Braithwaite,
2005; Collins, 2004; Frey and Luenchinger, 2002), and there is sub-
stantial research support for the argument that deterrence-based poli-
cies can reduce terrorist violence (Clarke and Newman, 2006; Dugan,
LaFree, and Piquero, 2005; Enders and Sandler, 2006).
However, research on terrorism (McCauley, 2006; Nevin, 2003),
and more generally, research from criminology (Braithwaite, 2005;
Pridemore and Freilich, 2007; Sherman, 1993) and psychology
(Brehm and Brehm, 1981; Tyler, 1990) suggests that the threat and/
or imposition of punishment does not always deter future acts of vio-
lence, and may in some cases, actually increase violence. Thus, it is
useful to contrast deterrence effects (i.e., the extent to which government
threats or imposition of punishment reduces the future incidence of
prohibited behavior) from backlash effects (i.e., the extent to which
government threats or imposition of punishment increases the future
incidence of prohibited behavior).
Researchers (Atran, 2003; Crenshaw, 2002; Higson-Smith, 2002)
have long argued that terrorists frequently rely on the response of
governments to mobilize the sympathies of would-be supporters. To
the extent that government-based counterterrorist strategies out-
rage participants or energize a base of potential supporters, such
strategies may result in a backlash that increases the likelihood of
further terrorist strikes. Sharp (1973) refers to this phenomenon as
“jujitsu politics,” and McCauley (2006) points out that because of this
principle, responses to terrorism can be more dangerous than ter-

rorism itself. Thus, according to Benjamin and Simon (2005, p. 21),
Osama bin Laden’s decision to authorize the September 11 attacks
was animated in large part by the belief that American retaliation
would inevitably kill innocents and thereby demonstrate the extent of
American hatred toward Muslims.
More generally, there is an extensive psychological literature sup-
porting the conclusion that under the right circumstances, pun-
ishment may elicit increases in proscribed behavior. Thus, in their
formulation of reactance theory, Brehm and Brehm (1981, p. 4) argue
that when an individual or group is threatened with some new form of
social control they are immediately motivated to act to eliminate this
control and restore their original freedom. Relatedly, much psycho-
logical literature (Duckitt and Fisher, 2003; LeVine and Campbell,
1972) suggests that threats from out-groups generally increase the
cohesion of in-groups, and also the pressure on in-group deviants to
conform and to support in-group leaders.
Criminology literature also provides some support for backlash mod-
els. Thus, early labeling theorists (Becker, 1963; Tannenbaum, 1938)
pointed out that punishment leads to identity changes in individuals
as well as social changes in society that result in criminal offenders
increasing their deviant behavior following their official labeling –
a concept Lemert (1951, p. 77) famously referred to as “secondary
deviance.” Sherman (1993) has argued that whether punishment
results in deterrence will depend on whether offenders experience
sanctioning as legitimate, the social bonds between the sanctioning
agent and the individuals or groups being sanctioned, and the extent
to which offenders can deny their shame by seeking support from
others in the community. Support for the conclusion that punish-
ment is more likely to be seen as legitimate by the punished when the
punishment is perceived to be procedurally fair is supplied in several
survey-based studies by Tyler (2000; for a review, see Tyler, 2006).
My colleagues and I recently used GTD data (LaFree, Dugan, and
Korte, 2009) to contrast deterrence and backlash perspectives based
on the efforts of the British to stop terrorist violence in Northern
Ireland committed by the Irish Republican Army and their allies.
Based on a region about the size of Connecticut, with a population
Terrorism activity
50
45
ASALA
40 JCAG
35
30
Incidents
25
20
15
10
0
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Year
Figure 17.8. Attacks by ASALA and JCAG, 1975 to 1988.
Source : Dugan, Huang, LaFree, and McCauley (2009).
of about 650,000, the republicans launched nearly continuous strikes

from the 1960s through the early 1990s that made Northern Ireland
the most politically violent region in the European Community (later
the Union) during this period. We identified six high-profile coun-
terterrorist interventions used by the British from 1969 to 1992 to
reduce republican violence in Northern Ireland, and then we used
statistical tests to determine whether the future risk of attacks during
this period increased, decreased, or remained the same after each of
the major interventions.
Figure 17.8 shows that the results of these British interventions were
more consistent with backlash than deterrence explanations. Three
of the six British interventions produced significantly higher risks of
future terrorist strikes by republicans and two interventions had no
significant effects. The five interventions that were either followed
by no change in terrorist strikes or significantly more terrorist strikes
included two targeted assassinations of terrorist leaders (Loughall
and Gibralter incidents), attempts to treat terrorists more like com-
mon criminals than politically motivated activists (criminalization), a
military curfew (Falls), and a partial suspension of due-process rights
for those suspected of terrorism (internment). The only clear-cut
support for deterrence among these six interventions was the use of a
major military surge called Operation Motorman, which significantly
reduced the risk of new attacks.
This is not the only study of terrorism to identify backlash effects.
The basic finding that the imposition of harsh criminal justice and
military interventions to reduce terrorism may well be counter-
productive has been found in a wide variety of countries and under
varying political circumstances (Collins, 2004; Geraghty, 2000;
Kenney, 2003; Lichbach, 1987; Malvesti, 2002; Nevin, 2003; Soule,
1989; Turk, 2002). Given the evidence that deterrence-based
thinking with regard to terrorism is often demonstrably unsuccessful,
we must ask ourselves why it remains the most common reaction of
governments to terrorist threats. One obvious answer is that govern-
ments that experience terrorist strikes face tremendous pressure to
take some action, and oftentimes there appear to be few obvious alter-
natives to harsh military or criminal justice interventions. The British
began experimenting with a variety of counterterrorist strategies after
their forces moved into Northern Ireland in 1969. Only one of the
interventions we examined showed signs of significantly reducing
risks of more republican violence.
I hasten to add that this is a case study. We do not know whether
government counterterrorist strategies have had similar effects in
other regions of the world, on different groups or individuals, or
indeed, even in this region of the world during different time periods.
Nevertheless, our results strongly suggest that in terms of the opera-
tion of the IRA in Northern Ireland at least, many deterrence-based
measures adopted by the British either had no effect on future terror-
ist strikes or actually increased their likelihood. We need a lot more
careful analysis of the deterrent and backlash effects of various coun-
terterrorist strategies in different countries and contexts.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Historically, terrorism and its consequences have not been major

specialization areas for researchers in the social and behavioral sci-
ences. This could be regarded as a dangerous omission given that
terrorists frequently try to exploit fear and provoke emotional rather
than rational reactions. Social researchers can help sort out these
complex forces; there are indications in recent years that they are in
fact more engaged. Terrorism research solicitations by the National
Science Foundation, the National Institute of Justice, and the Bureau
of Justice Administration, as well as the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security’s Centers of Excellence program, have all strength-
ened support for social scientific studies of terrorism and responses
to terrorism. The Minerva program (Washington Post, 2008), funded
by the Department of Defense, promises to increase further levels of
support. Moreover, spurred by brutal attacks such as the Madrid and
London bombings, funding of social science research on terrorism
and responses to terrorism has also expanded greatly in Europe (Eder
and Senn, 2008).
Several of the myths discussed in this paper could be more easily
summarized as “the myth of the super-terrorist.” This would apply
to the assumption that terrorist attacks are ubiquitous (myth 1), use
sophisticated weaponry (myth 7), and are incredibly lethal (myth 6),
and that terrorist groups are always long lasting (myth 8) and never
make strategic errors (myth 9). As we have seen, terrorist attacks are
highly concentrated in geographical space, rely to a large extent on
readily available, unsophisticated weaponry, and frequently involve
few or no fatalities. The typical terrorist group disappears in less than
a year, and there is ample evidence that terrorists frequently make
strategic errors. What makes terrorism so incredibly challenging is
precisely the asymmetric weakness of its perpetrators. A half century
ago, William Wolf (1957) drew this comparison memorably in an
essay about the possible impact of a wasp on a speeding automobile
with four passengers. If a wasp that flies into the window of a moving
car causes a driver to lose control and crash, an insect weighing less
than half an ounce, armed with a tiny syringe containing a drop of
irritant, can take the lives of four people and convert a large, power-
ful car into a heap of scrap. Thus, “action and reaction can be ridicu-
lously out of proportion” (p. 33).
The exceptional originality of the 9/11 attacks are directly
connected to several of the other myths discussed here, including the
perception that attacks were rapidly increasing just before 9/11 (myth
2), the perception that the United States is the most likely country to
be targeted by terrorists (myth 3), and the assumption that most ter-
rorist attacks involve disgruntled groups from one country attacking
civilians in another country (myth 4). The 9/11 attacks likely do rep-
resent a watershed of sorts – the end of the wave of primarily Marxist-
Leninist-inspired terrorism that dominated the world until a few years
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of transnational
jihadi-style terrorism that began in the 1990s and rose dramatically
following the 9/11 attacks. As we have seen, there are many strate-
gic reasons why the United States makes a good target for terrorist
attacks. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that at least up
until this point in history, the vast majority of terrorism has been car-
ried out by domestic groups on local targets.
This leaves myth 10, the assumption that deterrence measures are
universally the best response to terrorism. At present there is very lit-
tle extant literature on categorizing and measuring counterterrorism
policies and efforts. But from the research that does exist, there is
ample evidence to suggest that striking back forcefully does not always
achieve the hoped-for policy objectives, and may trigger backlash
effects that make things considerably worse. Sorely needed are more
sophisticated analyses of countermeasures according to a taxonomy
that spans the lifecycle of terrorist groups and events, from address-
ing grievances and countering ideological radicalization to deterring
attacks and punishing perpetrators.
Objective research on terrorism is especially critical, because policy
in this area is likely to be driven – even more than with common acts
of violence – by exceptional cases. We need to guard against what
Thomas Schelling (1962) described many years ago as “a routine
obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely.”
Social science research can help.
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chapter eighteen
Criminal Justice and Terrorism

A Research Agenda
Brian Forst
INTRODUCTION
Criminologist Richard Rosenfeld observed – just a year after the 9/11

attack – that a sea change had occurred in politics since the attack,
but very little had changed in the field of criminology. His case was
compelling: Though terrorism differs from crime in one fundamen-
tal way – it involves violence for an ideological cause rather than for
personal gain – criminologists should study it nonetheless because it
shares many other elements with crime, and criminologists may be
able to apply their frameworks for analysis fruitfully to terrorism. He
added that studying terrorism might even make criminology richer.
The contributors to this anthology have demonstrated that we accept
Rosenfeld’s argument, and we are not alone. Terrorism courses have
emerged in criminal justice and criminology programs throughout
much of the academy, and criminologists are engaging increasingly
in research on terrorism. Much in the manner that a political scien-
tist (James Q. Wilson), an industrial engineer (Alfred Blumstein),
and an economist (Gary Becker) expanded the way we think about
crime and analyzed it in the late 1960s, forty years later criminologists
from different disciplines and with different skill sets are taking up
Rosenfeld’s challenge, and thinking about terrorism in ways that are
usefully informed by our understanding of violence and its basic ele-
ments. We have learned that terrorism is indeed different from crime
in important ways, but that it shares essential features that cannot be
ignored either by those aiming to enrich our field, or by those wish-
ing to contribute to the public policy debate about how to prevent
443
and respond to the problem. Acts of terrorism are, after all, virtually
always criminal acts too, and they warrant no less attention as a class
than do such criminological staples as domestic violence, organized
crime, hate crime, and drug crimes. Acts of terrorism have occurred
less frequently than other crimes, but they have proven to be no less
profound in the public’s awareness, in media accounts, and in poli-
tics. We may wish that it received less media and political attention – if
only to reduce its appeal – but that it gets so much is reason enough
to give it more scholarly attention.
Much as the study of crime was largely a subspecialty of sociology
in the 1960s, the study of terrorism was, until recently, a subject of
study mostly for political scientists, including Martha Crenshaw,
Walter Laqueur, and Robert Pape. Then, following Rosenfeld’s urging,
criminologist Mathieu Deflem edited an anthology, Terrorism and Counter-
Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives (2004), with essays by Gregg Barak,
Bonnie Berry, Donald Black, Laura Dugan, Gary LaFree, Rosenfeld,
and others. LaFree and his criminologist colleagues at the University
of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism have written much on terrorism (e.g., LaFree
and Dugan; LaFree and Hendrickson; Rausch and LaFree) and have
assembled the Global Terrorism Database, an open-source data set
with information on some 75,000 terrorist events internationally since
1970 – as discussed in the previous chapter. As they continue to grow
the database, they are making the data available to other scholars to
help better understand terrorist violence. This anthology provides fur-
ther evidence of a deep, continuing interest. Scan any recent meeting
program of the annual American Society of Criminology or European
Society of Criminology, and you will find other criminologists contrib-
uting to our collective understanding of terrorism as well.
Social scientists from other disciplines are weighing in fruitfully
too. In 2003, sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer produced Terror in the
Mind of God; the following year, psychologist Marc Sageman gave us
Understanding Terror Networks (2004); and in 2006, economists Walter
Enders and Todd Sandler wrote The Political Economy of Terrorism. Like
crime, terrorism calls for eclectic perspectives, and there’s a place at
this table for criminologists.
criminal justice and terrorism 445
LESSONS LEARNED: DEFINITIONS ARE NEEDED,

AND SO IS FLEXIBILITY
How, then, can criminologists and criminal justice scholars contrib-

ute to the collective understanding of terrorism, and to the prospect
of shaping interventions to prevent it? We can do so, first, by under-
standing basics: how terrorism is a unique form of aggression and
crime, and how it is distinguishable from other forms of aggression –
especially, street crime, war, and insurgency. It is essential also to con-
sider different types of terrorism and the settings within which each
type manifests. The preceding chapters have contributed to this goal.
But the problem of terrorism is in many ways more challenging
than that of crime and justice. Terrorism is a crime, but it is more,
and one cannot say precisely how much more, because its boundaries
are vague. Crime is defined by the law, and whereas some crimes, like
marijuana use, make for problems at the margins of legality, these
pale in comparison to those presented by our having to choose among
the literally hundreds of available definitions of terrorism. We can say
at least that terrorists are fundamentally different from criminals in
one important respect: They generally do acts of aggression in the
name of causes – political, religious, and other – beyond their own
self-interest.
A review of the definitions used by the contributors to this and other
works on terrorism make clear, first, that there is no single, precise
definition of terrorism with which all authorities will agree. Given the
complexity of terrorism and the fact that it is not clearly defined by
law, as are other categories of crime, we have resisted trying to find a
single definition acceptable to all scholars and practitioners. Among
the definitions that have been presented in this volume and elsewhere,
some ignore threats; some focus on harms to human life and ignore
property; some ignore attacks on military or government targets,
regarding those as acts of insurgency or guerrilla warfare; definitions
vary as to what constitutes a noncombatant (e.g., a few regard taxpay-
ers who help to provide financial support for objectionable govern-
ment acts as collaborators and legitimate targets); some include acts of
“ethnic cleansing” that are motivated strictly by hatred and lacking in
any coherent political objective; some exclude acts committed by sov-

ereign states against their own people, regarding these as acts of brutal
tyranny rather than terrorism; some hold that terrorism requires ele-
ments of secrecy and surprise, to ensure that the act shocks a target
population; others distinguish their definition of terrorism by calling
it a tactic or strategy rather than an ideology or other conventional
“ism” – a definition that draws attention to ill-conceived political cam-
paigns to wage unwinnable “wars on terrorism” (Forst, 2009).
In Chapter 1 we started with a simple characterization of terror-
ism: “the use of force against innocent people, usually with a politi-
cal or religious motive, and typically aimed at producing widespread
fear.” If we must settle on a single definition, my nomination would
be for one that is a bit more nuanced, which I have used elsewhere
(Forst, 2009):
Terrorism is the premeditated and unlawful use or threatened use of

violence against a noncombatant population or target having sym-
bolic significance, with the aim of either inducing political or reli-
gious change through intimidation and destabilization or destroying
a population identified as an enemy.
LESSONS LEARNED: INTERACTIONS

AND TYPOLOGIES OF TERRORISM
Interactions are an inconvenient reality in criminological research.

Cause–effect relationships among variables of primary interest often
depend on the levels of other variables. Arrest has been found to
be an effective deterrent for employed domestic assault offenders,
for example, but not for unemployed batterers (Sherman, 1992).
Similarly, rehabilitation programs tend to be more effective for offend-
ers who are ready to conform to social norms than for those who are
not (Laub and Sampson, 2006). We ordinarily address this issue the-
oretically by identifying typologies of offending behaviors that vary
by category of offender and victim, type of crime, situation, and so
on.1 This should be the case as well for terrorism. One would expect,
1
We address the issue empirically using interaction terms if the effects are relatively
fi xed and by estimating separate multivariate equations for different levels of key
mediating factors when the effects vary with those variables.
for example, that policies that are effective in breaking up terrorist

networks will be of little help in solving “lone-wolf” terrorism, and
that state-sponsored terrorism is likely to call for political rather than
criminological solutions.
Given the virtually infinite variety of circumstances that shape ter-
rorist events, every group or act that fits any conventional definition of
terrorism is unique, usually in several respects. Still, there are generic
dimensions that distinguish various terrorists, terrorist groups, and
terrorist acts from most others. Particular acts of terrorism fall invari-
ably into any of a variety of categories, including the following:
* whether or not politically motivated.

* whether the group or individual committing the act operated under
state authority.
* nature and extent of association with larger terrorist organizations
or networks.
* size and extent of organization and planning.
* whether justified in religious or ethnic terms.
* whether aimed primarily at people or at symbolic targets (as with
ecoterrorism).
* types of people targeted.
* lethality – extent of the harms inflicted.
Each terrorist event can usually be characterized conveniently and

usefully in terms of particular combinations of these and sometimes
other dimensions. We classify in this way for two reasons. We do so
for analytic purposes, intending to create a taxonomy that identifies
variables that interact with policy options, and that produces greater
variation of behaviors between the categories for any dimension than
within particular categories. And we do so for policy purposes, recog-
nizing that different kinds of problems call for different tools and
interventions. For example, solutions to the problem of state-spon-
sored terrorism are more likely to be found through the lens of polit-
ical science than through that of criminology, and solutions to the
problem of identifying a lone-wolf serial terrorist are more likely to
be found through the lenses of psychology and forensic science than
through that of sociology. Much work remains to be done to refine
the taxonomies on both the analytic and policy fronts, to link a variety
of theoretical perspectives and emerging data sets to discrete types of

events, motives, organizations, and outcomes.
LESSONS LEARNED: THE BARRIERS TO EMPIRICAL

RESEARCH ON TERRORISM ARE FORMIDABLE
One cannot help but notice the paucity of systematic empirical evi-
dence on terrorism, as Gary LaFree and others have noted in previous
chapters. To a much greater degree than for street crime, terrorism
defies statistical analysis for several reasons. First, though terrorism
cases may share the property of having a political motive,2 they are
a heterogeneous stew that varies by type of extremism (Islamic,
Christian fundamentalist, environmental, antiglobalization, etc.),
whether connected to a larger network, extent of planning, weapon
of choice, or other distinguishing factors. These subcategories of
terrorism are as diverse as the major crime categories are different
from one another. One cannot seriously consider either the causes of
terrorism or successful counterterrorism strategies in such heteroge-
neous aggregates.
Terrorism is difficult to analyze empirically for a second rea-
son: Terrorists, to a greater degree than other criminals, tend to
operate in unpredictable ways, aiming to create fear and turmoil,
and relying on surprise to achieve both. When terrorist screening
protocols used in the months after the 9/11 attack ignored women
as suicide bombers, terrorists responded by enlisting women to par-
ticipate in suicide bombings (see Simon and Tranel, this volume). To
the extent that terrorists operate intentionally outside of predictable
patterns to exploit elements of fear and uncertainty, such patterns are
less likely to show up in the data.
Terrorism is more difficult to analyze than other crimes for a third
reason: We simply do not have enough reliable data on cases of each
major type of terrorism to provide a basis for statistical inference
along the lines that parallel the analysis of conventional criminal jus-
tice data. That there have been too few terrorist cases on American
2
We say “may” because some acts that for many authorities qualify as terrorism, such
as genocide and hate killings, have a dubious political motive.
soil to permit empirical analysis is a blessing for those of us who care

first and foremost about the well-being of our loved ones, but it is a
curse for empiricists interested in understanding terrorism.
PROSPECTS FOR RESEARCH ON TERRORISM
So much for barriers in the way of empirical analysis of terrorism.

Let us turn now to the brighter side – prospects for criminologists
to contribute to our understanding of terrorism. Criminologists
have weighed in frequently with evidence about crime and interven-
tions that has advanced the discussion of public policies and led to
improvement. Research on community policing, intermediate sanc-
tions, and reentry from prison programs serve as prominent exam-
ples. This will be more difficult to accomplish for terrorism, for the
reasons noted.
Empirical evidence can and should inform counterterrorism policy
nonetheless. An abundance of opportunities remain for criminolo-
gists to make a difference in shaping more effective and just counter-
terrorism policies by making good use of data that are reliable and
relevant. When the evidence is insufficient, we do the best we can with
theory, indirect evidence, and common sense. Our goal is to explore
research prospects that can provide insights into the development
of sound policies for preventing terrorism, and for responding to it
when our efforts at prevention fail.
I see several prospects for achieving this goal, including the adapta-
tion of crime prevention models to the problem of terrorism, the esti-
mation of social costs associated with terrorism and counterterrorism
policies, research into the fear of terrorism, and a miscellany of other
topics. Let us look at each of these.
Adapting Crime Prevention Models to Terrorism

One major area in which we can contribute to the conversation on
terrorism is in reshaping models for crime prevention that are appli-
cable as well to terrorism. Several models have clear relevance to
the prevention of terrorism, including the routine activities theory,
randomized mixed strategies from the theory of games, and military
gaming and simulation models.
The routine activities theory (or opportunity theory) provides a

platform for thinking about the prevention of terrorism even in the
absence of empirical evidence. Opportunities for terrorism and other
predatory crimes can exist only when there are willing offenders, suit-
able targets, and the absence of adequate guardians to protect the
targets from the offenders (Cohen and Felson, 1979). If any one of
these three components is not present or is unmet in a particular situ-
ation, there will be no opportunity for terrorism. This theory can help
to inform the development of commonsense situational controls in
determining how to allocate scarce guardianship resources toward the
prevention of crime – even without valid empirical estimates. On the
willing-offenders side, it suggests a need to focus on the surveillance
of extremists and to target individuals and groups known to have ties
with terrorists. Routine activities theory could help as well in develop-
ing a system of weights to drive the allocation of target-hardening and
protective resources to accessible targets, in order to maximize the
effectiveness of these resources (Clarke and Newman, 2006). Routine
activities theory suggests, moreover, that fear-reduction strategies may
be useful for making terrorist targets less attractive. In his chapter on
routine activities theory and terrorism, James Lynch, though sober
about the prospects for routine activities to help in preventing ter-
rorism generally, nonetheless urges closer scrutiny of the relationship
between opportunity reduction and the fear of terrorism – specifi-
cally, that it will be more useful to focus on opportunity-reduction
strategies as they pertain to fear, if not to terrorism.
Another model, which could be used in conjunction with the
routine activities theory, is provided by the theory of games: the idea
of a mixed strategy to inform the allocation of scarce guardianship
resources (Luce and Raiffa, 1989; Enders and Sandler, 2006). The
terrorist will have the most difficulty anticipating the likelihood of
detection and capture if security agents and surveillance instruments
are allocated randomly across the array of vulnerable targets in pro-
portion to the net value that the terrorist attaches to each prospec-
tive target, taking into account the cost to the terrorist of attacking
each target. This randomized strategy will apply to personnel and
other movable resources, ensuring that they are optimally allocated,
rather than to fixed protective resources, such as barricades and other
target-hardening capital resources, which should also be allocated in

proportion to the net value of the target, but in a fixed rather than
random manner.
Randomized and other strategies for preventing terrorist attacks
can be assessed under a variety of scenarios by applying simulation
gaming models. Gaming models have proven useful in developing
military strategies in both conventional combat operations and to
deal with problems of insurgency and other forms of unconventional
warfare (Myerson, 1997). They could prove useful too for assessing
alternative preventive approaches to protecting against assassination,
hostage taking, and other terrorist threats.
Estimating the Social Costs of Terrorism

and Counterterrorism Policy
A second major area in which criminologists can contribute to the
development of effective counterterrorism policies is in the estima-
tion of social costs associated with critical aspects of terrorism, such
as fear, and to assess fundamental tradeoffs in terrorism policy.
Criminologists have found that fear of crime can impose costs on
society that exceed those of crime itself, manifesting as reduced qual-
ity of life, wasteful expenditures on resources and measures that do
little to prevent crime, stress-related illnesses and health costs, and
related social costs (M. Cohen, 2000; Warr, 2000). Because the shock
and damage associated with successful acts of terrorism are generally
much greater than for typical street crimes, the level of fear and the
associated social costs are generally much larger as well.
Estimates of the social costs of alternative counterterrorism policies
can be useful also to find better balances between security and con-
stitutional rights to liberty and privacy, to put principles discussed in
John Kleinig’s chapter to use in assessing policies that threaten those
rights. A prime example is the assessment of profiling and screening
systems that aim to balance the social costs of false negatives (failures
to detect real terrorists) and false positives (imposing delays and
other intrusions on innocent people screened, and alienating them
in the process) (Forst, 2004). Many of these costs are elusive, but we
can begin the process of assessing them by imputing values implicit in
policies that have been clearly shaped by politics rather than sound
analysis. Specific interventions range from relatively benign passive

screening systems at one end to torture on the other. Some, like
unobtrusive surveillance systems, may be capable of simultaneously
enhancing security and reducing intrusions that violate privacy or
liberty. Others, such as torture to extract intelligence, are not only
morally objectionable and illegal under most systems of justice with
jurisdiction over U.S. agents, but also generate what Braithwaite refers
to as “defiance” and appear to make us less secure.
Other Prospects
Criminologists and criminal justice researchers can contribute to our
understanding of terrorism and how best to prevent and counter it in
other ways too. Many of these prospects overlap, but they are distinct
in essential ways.
• Managing fear of terrorism. As noted in preceding chapters by Forst

and Lynch, policy makers and researchers alike have directed the
preponderance of their attention to the supply side of terrorism –
focusing on the characteristics and motives of terrorists – rather
than the demand side, on relationships between media, politics,
fear, and target attractiveness. We would do well to call attention
to this imbalance and shift the focus, assessing the costs of fear and
the benefits to policies for managing it more effectively. We can
contribute to the policy conversation also by further developing
coherent theories of fear, crime, and terrorism, and testing those
theories with direct and indirect evidence.
• Dealing with the “bunches-of-guys” problem. A key to allocating scarce
guardianship resources is to understand better how seemingly ordi-
nary people become willing offenders. Research by Jessica Stern,
Marc Sageman, and others has seriously undercut the notion that
suicide terrorists are irrational. Mildly alienated young people,
unchecked, can become extremists and then terrorists. Marc
Sageman finds that terrorist groups are much like gangs in that
they often evolve from friendships and kinships, that the seeds of
terrorism germinate as some members of a cell influence the think-
ing of the others, and that the cells typically emerge spontaneously
from below rather than through “top-down” recruiting. Sageman
finds these internal group ties to be more powerful than external

factors such as common hatred for an outside group. He sees the
participation in these associations as more fraternal than deeply
ideological, suggesting that the members may be more receptive
to positive Western influences than their parents and grandparents
were. David Curry’s chapter echoes some of these ideas; he notes, in
particular, that both gangs and terrorist groups often emerge from
social settings dominated by personal rather than instrumental ties.
Curry’s distinction between an “alliance” model for the former and
a “recruitment” model for the latter is rich with potential for fur-
ther research and policy development.
• Dealing with extremism. A related area for further inquiry is the
development of more coherent approaches for understanding and
dealing with extremists. Acts of terrorism are invariably commit-
ted by extremists. Although jihadi terrorism has received most of
the attention since September 11, 2001, other religious extremists
have engaged in terrorism over the years, as have extremists whose
causes are secular rather than religious. Criminologist Franco
Ferracuti urges officials to find inducements to encourage alien-
ated extremists of all stripes to exchange the renunciation of vio-
lence for legitimate places in society. Much of the public response
to extremism and terrorism has been overreaction – the product
of fear, intolerance, and impatience rather than thoughtful, sys-
tematic approaches to developing and carrying out public policy in
this critical area. Effective strategies for preventing hate crimes and
responding to them when they emerge may be applicable to cer-
tain types of extremism. Extremism is, after all, generally grounded
in hatred. Theories from the criminology literature may prove
fruitful for our understanding of these groups and the forces that
shape them, including general strain theory (Agnew, 2005) and life
course theory (Laub and Sampson, 2006).
• Restoring legitimacy through improved systems of accountability. The legit-
imacy of government is undermined when its agents fail to provide
public services adequately, or when they show disrespect for the
citizens they are sworn to serve. Military and law enforcement
efforts to quell terrorism will produce a loss of legitimacy if the
agents intrude excessively on the rights of citizens, or if they fail to
provide adequate levels of security. Just as community policing and

problem-oriented policing can be effective ways of building social
capital in communities, as described by Jack Greene in Chapter 10,
so can an enlightened counterinsurgency strategy succeed in win-
ning support of areas besieged by terrorism. As with criminal justice
legitimacy, the restoration of legitimacy in counterterrorism activi-
ties requires the effective use of sound systems of accountability, the
absence of which has permitted such disasters as the Abu Ghraib
and Guantanamo prison scandals and their aftermaths. These mat-
ters do not lend themselves readily to empirical analysis, but the
criminal justice literature generally, and policing in particular, is
rich in the analysis of systems of accountability, and we would do
well to explore similar applications in assessing systems of account-
ability for counterterrorism.
• Restoring legitimacy through more prudent exercise of discretion. Criminal
justice decisions are driven not so much by policy as by the exercise
of discretion by agents situated at or near the bottom of the organi-
zation chart (Ohlin and Remington, 1993; Walker, 1993). How well
those agents exercise discretion is determined by the way in which
they are recruited and screened, trained and supervised, and how
they are held accountable. Lapses in any of these areas can induce
random and often unwarranted disparities in the exercise of discre-
tion, as well as systematic errors of justice, either in the direction
of excessive intrusions against due process or excessive impunity
(failures to bring culpable offenders to justice). Both types of errors
have social costs (Forst, 2004). This is true in the criminal justice
system, and it is no less true in the domain of terrorism and coun-
terterrorism policy. Studies of discretion in economics and pub-
lic administration have been usefully informed by principal-agent
models (Stiglitz, 1987), and such models can be incorporated into
criminal justice thinking on the exercise of discretion in matters
of crime and terrorism. The chapters by Tomas Mijares and Jay
Jamieson (Chapter 9) and by Edward Maguire and William King
(Chapter 14) address this constellation of issues, and these provide
a basis for further inquiry along these lines.
• Discovering smart power. Repeated failures of the negative-sum game
of hard power (i.e., military force and economic sanctions) have
been well documented (see, for example, Savage and Vila, this
volume), as have the repeated successes of the positive-sum out-
comes of soft power – attractions that induce nations to cooperate
in economic, social, and military alliances (Nye; Wright). The use
of hard power under the war on terror and presumptions of zero-
sum stakes has had counterproductive effects in the Middle East,
as has excessive use of force by the police in many American cities
(Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). Each hangover from the overuse of hard
power should serve as a reminder of Jeremy Bentham’s nineteenth-
century dictum that the least amount of force needed to secure
order is both just and effective. Alternatives to aggressive policing
(community policing, improved training, and constraints on exces-
sive use of force) and nonpunitive alternatives to incarceration
(restorative justice, mediation programs, reintegration, electronic
monitoring, etc.) have counterparts in the use of diplomacy and
positive inducements to reform, to take the wind out of the sails
of terrorism. Much as effective interventions against crime require
a judicious blending of restorative, rehabilitative, and protective
instruments, so too may effective interventions against terrorism
require “smart power” – a sensible blending of hard and soft power
(Armitage and Nye, 2007). John Braithwaite argues along a similar
line in his chapter that security can be strengthened by a shift from
a hard power counterterrorism strategy to one that emphasizes the
use of a public health model strategy.
• Empowering women. Perhaps the most urgent long-term need –
the most viable prospect for reducing terrorism throughout the
world – is to find ways to activate what may be the world’s most
effective force against violence: women. The potential for using
this vast resource has been stifled most profoundly through the
repression of women, particularly in the places that are the most
prolific seedbeds of terrorists. Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis
(2006) has made the point succinctly: “women are our best hope
in dealing with the Muslim world, because they have so much to
gain from modernization.” Women constitute the majority of the
planet’s population. With individual exceptions, they have been a
dominant voice against aggression in virtually every culture where
their voices can be heard. For eons they have been the primary
nurturers of children, who are every next generation of leaders

and followers. When given the opportunity, they have proven them-
selves to be extremely effective in leading people through difficult
times. Gradually, in one culture after the next, we have seen that
women have made enormous gains in education, employment,
and in social status, as Rita Simon and Adrienne Tranel observe
in Chapter 6. The places in which women have made the most
advances have tended to become more civil, more productive, and
less inclined to produce wars and terrorists. Women’s gains, it turns
out, are men’s gains too. One of the great tragedies is that their
opportunities have been most severely limited in poor, failed states,
the places most in need of effective leaders and followers. It will be
difficult to change the deeply held prejudices that keep cultures
stuck in this condition, but solutions to the problem may be more
attainable and less divisive if we regard the prejudices as bound pri-
marily in culture and tradition rather than religion. Criminologists
such as John van Maanen (1978) have made considerable gains to
advance our understanding of the rich textures of culture that defy
quantitative analysis, and the prospective gains from research along
similar lines applied to gender and terrorism are equally vast, with
much larger stakes.
CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset of this essay, criminal justice policy research

today grows not only out of the wisdom of sociology, but that of
psychology, political science, economics, public administration,
industrial engineering, and more. None of these scholarly perspec-
tives has a monopoly on the information needed to deal effectively
with either crime or terrorism. We are likely to be most effective in
dealing with both problems by moving beyond interventions derived
from reductionist thinking, by drawing from several perspectives in
mixes that are bound to vary with specific problems and settings.
Perhaps the most effective strategy for the academy to deal with
the problem of terrorism is to let a thousand flowers bloom. This
approach has helped criminologists and criminal justice researchers
to understand crime and deal with it effectively, and the knowledge

we have accumulated along the way has clear relevance as well to the
problem of terrorism.
A joke about different perspectives on problem solving may serve
to make the point. It involves a mathematician, a physicist, and an
engineer who are each given a red rubber ball and asked to find its
volume. The mathematician derives the formula V = 4/3πr3, furrows
his brow at the prospect of having to measure anything and assumes
the radius of the ball to be one inch, and calculates its volume as four-
thirds π inches. The physicist takes a calibrated beaker half-filled with
water, pushes the top of the ball down to the surface, and measures
the rise in the volume of the water. And the engineer looks up the
model and serial number in his red-rubber-ball table.
As we continue to work to understand terrorism, we need not
despair that there is so little reliable data to provide a basis for finding
answers to our most critical questions. Criminologists can continue to
join with other social scientists to develop more reliable data, and in
the meantime interpret the data we have through the lens of coherent
theories and the wisdom of common sense. Where data on terrorism
are insufficient, theoretical insight, indirect evidence, and prudence
will be the best we can offer. Of this we can be sure: We will never have
the luxury of turning to the equivalent of a red-rubber-ball table to
find lasting solutions to the problem of terrorism.
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Index
20–20 hindsight fallacy, 248 alliance model of terrorists and

9/11, 1, 7, 20, 27, 40, 53, 200, 202, 245, gangs, 102
250, 273, 302, 337, 357, 433, 443 al-Mihdhar, Khalid, 249
changed policing, 218 American Indians
created a narrative about a new US-sponsored terrorism against, 48
security-liberty balance, 371 American Society of Criminology, 444
failure to prevent, 251 Amnesty International, 304
internationalized terrorism, 116 amygdala, 277
leadership following, 291 animal-rights extremists, 45
like a wasp in a car, 436 anthrax attacks of 2001, 54
product of numerous ignored appeasement
threats, 391 an empirical question, 89
product of numerous security Arafat, Yassir, 411
lapses, 390 Arar, Maher, 261
revealed lack of agency Aristotle
coordination, 322 on assassination, 77
revealed lack of preparedness, 296 Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation
stirred up fear of Middle Easterners, 306 of Armenia, 429
9/11 Commission Report, 328, 371 Atta, Mohammed, 254, 334
Authorization for the Use of Military
actuarial risk models, 314–315 Force Joint Resolution, 36
actus reus, 22–23 availability heuristic, 279
affect heuristic, 280 Ayyash, Yahya
Afghanistan assassination of, 393
needed a Marshall Plan, not
military power, 394 backlash effects, 432–435.
agency See also defiance theory
an aspect of right to privacy, 361 beliefs common to terrorists, 73
airport security, 140 Bentham, Jeremy, 384, 455
al Qaeda, 20, 22–23, 31, 40, 61, 76, Beslan, 20
107, 115, 117, 249, 252–253, 342, Bill of Rights, 373
391–392, 395, 414, 423 bin Laden, Osama, 1, 61, 254, 256, 385,
funded by Saudis, 395 387, 391, 433
missed opportunities by the West, 395 offered for arrest prior to 9/11, 395
al-Hazmi, Nawaf, 249, 334 Black Widows, 115
all hazards policing, 227 Blair, Prime Minister Tony, 392
461
462 Index
blowback. See defiance theory failures by U.S. intelligence services, 248

bond relationship targeting, 30 involves four procedures, 248
Branch Davidian incident, 200 logic of, 262
bunches of guys, 452 practicalities, 247
Bush, President George H. W., 405 requires data and procedure, 247
Bush, President George W., 388, containment v. enlargement, 389
390–391, 394, 405 containment model, 388
COPS Program, 221
California, 23–25 cost-benefit, 141
laws relevant to terrorism, 21 cost-benefit analysis, 141–142
Central Intelligence Agency, 58, 332 counterterrorism
failed communication with FBI, 269 analysis, 247
failure to act, not failure to connect and crime prevention, 134
dots, 251 criminal justice model slighty better
failures to prevent 9/11, 249, 250 than warfare model, 396
trained Islamists in guerrilla interactions are a key to understanding
warfare, 392 what works, 446
Chechens, 20 public health model for, 383
Cheney, Dick, 273, 290 regulatory model is preferable, 383
Chicago gangs research issues, 144–145
more organized than San Diego role of police, 255
gangs, 104 too little focus on demand-side,
Christian extremists, 45, 49 fear, 274
Churchill, Winston, 291, 295 via a criminal justice model, 395
resisted by George Marshall, 388 counterterrorism strategies, 83
civil liberties, 360 education, 84–85
counterterrorism threats to, 143 limitations of protective strategies, 78
civil society, 363 crime
civility instrumental v. expressive, 163
decline of, 288 crime analysis, 225
clash of civilizations, 284 crime mapping. See crime analysis
Clinton, President Bill, 389 crime prevention, 210
cognitive-behavioral training, 140 aspects are relevant to terrorism, 130
communication failures, 248 evidence of effectiveness, 140
community partnerships interventions are varied, 131
difficult to build, 221 proactive and reactive
community policing, 7, 142, 209, 212, approaches, 133
215–216, 219, 237 reactive strategies, 134
about building trust, 219 Crime Prevention Matrix, 131–134, 136,
and terrorism, 220 139, 141, 143, 146
as a fear-reduction strategy, 292 crime prevention strategies
can reduce fear, 222 largely irrelevant to terrorism, 129
goals, 215 criminal investigation
origins, 213 three segments of, 257
partnerships and prevention, 229 criminal justice system
seeks to improve transparency, 234 not really much of a system, 343
varying effects on fear, 176 criminal profiling, 304
COMPSTAT, 225, 260 can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, 307
congressional inquiries on intelligence criminological theory, 14
services, 245 relevance for counterterrorism
connecting dots, 246, 402 policy, 14
Index 463
criminologists Dulles, John Foster, 389

and terrorism, 443
can contribute to understanding El Rukn, 106, 108
terrorism, 443–444, 457 Ellsberg, Daniel, 357
criminology emergency response, 203
few empirical studies of terrorism, 411 enlargement failures, 391
has largely overlooked terrorism, 411 era of terrorism
irrelevant to many aspects of as political hyperbole, 368
terrorism, 129 ethnic profiling, 302, 312
multidisciplinary approaches, 130 easier when a minority, 306
Crips and Bloods, 105 is not always effective, 308
C-SPAN, 289 legal and ethical aspects, 303
culture of fear reifies perceived differences, 305
can be exploited by terrorists, 368 evaluation research
culture of prevention, 269 on counterterrorism, 141
evidence-based medicine
Defense Applied Research Projects benefits from large samples, 402
Agency, 204 evidence-based strategy, 401
Defense Appropriations Act of 1997, 202 evolutionary ecology, 66
defiance theory, 384, 432, 452 evolutionary-ecological perspective,
democratic policing, 209, 237 67, 77, 88
definition, 212 extremism
diminished by counterterrorist activity, finding ways to deal with, 453
239 typically grounded in hatred, 453
Department of Homeland Security, 327, extremists
330, 338, 436 left-wing, 47
an umbrella of agencies, 328 right-wing, 47
myopic focus on terrorism, 340
sprawling organization chart, 349 false negatives, 451
Department of State terrorism data, 57 false positives, 451
Department of State Farabundo Marti National Liberation
changed definition of terrorism, 59 Front, 420
detention of combatants, 35 FBI Annual Reports on terrorism, 57
deterrence, 87, 383 fear
can be more than offset by a natural human emotion, 276
defiance, 384 acute, 275
limits of, 78 and risk, 278
more effective when perceived associated with time watching TV, 285
as fair, 385 can lead to harmful policies, 294
deterrent threats culture of, 281
can be counterproductive in due to sense of powerlessness, 283
terrorism, 87 excessive fear is self-endangering, 275
Detroit goal of terrorism, instrument of street
1967 riot, 190, 203, 205 crime, 274
developmental democracy, 89 goal of terrorist, instrument of
Dhanu, 120 criminal, 165
discretion is accompanied by physiological
errors in the exercise of, 454 changes, 276
driving while black, 307 is largely a matter of biology, 277
drug dealers is mostly learned, 277–278
similarities to terrorists, 191 is shaped by experience, 278
464 Index
fear (cont.) force, use of

is useful up to a point, 275 on suspected terrorists, 33
keeps us out of harm’s way, 276 Fort, Jeff, 106
management strategies, 292–293 Fourteenth Amendment, 303, 310
nature and sources of, 276 Fourth Amendment, 310
not a rare event, 173 fourth-generation warfare, 29
of crime, managing, 292 freedom
of fear may be too small, 275 distinct from liberty, 358
often excessive due to overestimated Kleinig definition, 358
threats, 278
often inflated due to media, 282 gang crime
political pandering, 289 falls between other crime and
reduction strategies, 292 terrorism, 98
role in crime and terrorism, 164 gang homicides
role of leadership in reducing, 295 related more to turf than drugs, 105
social costs of, 282, 293 gang research, 97
tends to increase with age, 277 gangs, 97
fear management, 173, 223 alliance and recruitment models, 5
fear of crime, 174 and terrorist cells, 5
estimating the social costs of, 451 global interconnections, 105
fear of terrorism, 152 less well-organized than terrorist
is inflated well beyond reason, 275 groups, 103
understand in order to prevent most are weakly organized, 104
terrorism, 450 no allegiance to larger system, 108
fear reduction, 173, 216 gang-suppression programs
central to policing against terrorism, in need of evaluation, 109
232 general strain theory, 453
interventions, 177 Geneva Conventions, 35
fear-reduction programs Ghaddafi, Moammar, 393
for crime and terrorism may be Gingrich, Newt, 386
similar, 177 Giuliani, Rudolph, 291, 293
fear-reduction strategies, 7 Global Terrorism Database, 414–415,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 323, 331 418, 422, 425, 427, 429, 433, 444
11,633 agents in 2003, 323 Goldstein, Herman, 216
central role in Joint Terrorism Task Graduated Reduction In Tension
Forces, 329 Theory, 386
Federal Emergency Management Agency, group polarization, 281
201, 329, 340, 344 guardianship
federal government examples at airports, buildings and
role in homeland security, 324 subways, 168
federal prosecutors, 328 may be active or passive, 154
process few terrorism cases, 332 role in opportunity theory, 153
role in homeland security, 332 guerilla warfare. See terrorism: and
federal-local law enforcement guerilla warfare
coordination, 322 distinct from other forms of
often more costly than beneficial to terrorism, 99
locals, 344 guerillas, 54
Financial Action Task Force, 394
first responders, 337 Halliburton, 202
first-generation warfare, 28 Hamas, 412
foot patrols, 215 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 36
Index 465
Hanjour, Hani, 253, 334 can harm police-community

hard power, 455 relations, 344
hate crime, 54 often conflicts with goal of
Hertzberg-Alarcon California Prevention conviction, 260
of Terrorism Act, 25 sensitive topic in a democracy, 261
heuristics, 279 intelligence information sharing
Hitler, 388 often a one-way street, 262
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 295 intelligence services
homeland security failure to prevent 9/11, 245
core mission of federal prosecutors studies of the effectiveness, 245
post-9/11, 328 intelligence-led policing, 231, 246
federal-local coordination, 326 interagency partnerships
networks of networks, 325 often become bureaucratic, 341
hostis humani generis, 37 investigation of terrorism, 340
hot spots, 220 Irish Republican Army, 129, 433
hot-spot policing, 140 Islamic terrorists, 31
Hurricane Katrina, 185, 200, 203, 339, Islamist terrorism, 328
344, 348 islands of civility
Hussein, Saddam, 1, 398 as a source of terrorism
prevention, 398
Idris, Wafa, 118
illegal immigration, 143 Japanese
immigrants internment during World War II, 300,
threatened by police interrogations, 234 302, 357
Immigration and Customs Jarrah, Ziad S., 334
Enforcement, 329 Joint Terrorism Task Forces, 232, 323,
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 55 329, 340
incapacitation, 309 can have sharp internal cultural
incapacitative justice, 386 differences, 347
Incident Command System, 339 consists of 38 agencies, 329
infiltration policing intelligence role, 329
conflicts with community policing, 269 investigative responsibilities, 345
informants mission of, 329
problem of revealing their identities, often become bureaucratic, 341
259 operations vary from place to
information pooling, 266 place, 330
insurgents, 50 varying levels of local support, 342
intelligence, 245 Justice Commandos of the Armenian
actionable, 266 Genocide, 429
as art guided by evidence, 402
Brodeur’s definition, 246 Kant, Immanual, 266
essential to effective prevention of Kennan, George, 388
terrorism, 246 Kerner Commission, 218
evidence-based, 402 Kerry, John, 273, 290
few definitions of, 246 Korematsu decision, 357
information flow, 337 Ku Klux Klan, 47, 74
role of police in gathering and Kurdish Workers Party, 115
analyzing, 255
intelligence analysts labeling theory, 433
make poor police officers, 255 left-wing terrorists
intelligence gathering more educated than average, 72
466 Index
legitimacy as terrorist’s oxygen of publicity, 289

and transparency, 234 capable of public service education, 295
lost in intelligence-gathering, 229 commercialization of, 287–288
of the police, 8 conflicting goals, 286
of wars on terrorism, 385 feeding fear and terrorism, 286
police, 211–214, 216, 219, 233, 240 focus on extreme events, 285
undermined by intrusiveness, 236 incentives for reliable reporting, 286
undermined by lapses in discretion, 454 news as entertainment, 288
undermined by poor exercise of nonprofit broadcasting, 289
discretion, 453 objectivity, 286
liberty often serve terrorist aims, 52
all constraints are not the same, 360 professionalism, 287
constraints often have undesirable side role in fueling fear of terrorism, 54
effects, 376 satisfying voyeuristic interests, 283
distinct from freedom, 358 serve prophecies of clashing
Kleinig definition, 359 civilizations, 284
parallel with security, 363 mens rae, 22–23
liberty and security militarism
a tradeoff, not a balance, 369, 377 concerns about increases in
balancing social costs, 451 policing, 204
life course theory, 453 military
local governments adjustments to external shifts, 195
role in homeland security, 324 changes in the external
London Metropolitan Police, 213 environment, 188
London transit attack of 2005, 30 changing role post-9/11, 186
lone wolf terrorists, 62 distinct from police by design, 186
symbiotic relationship with police, 201
MacArthur, Douglas, 389 tragic results in domestic events, 183
Madrid, attack of 2004, 416 used as law enforcers, 184
managing fear of terrorism. See also fear used in counterterrorism activity, 184
management Mill, John Stuart, 359
Mandela, Nelson Miranda rights, 34
model of restorative justice, 388 mixed strategy
maneuver warfare, 28 to efficiently allocate scarce
Marshall Plan, 388 guardianship resources, 450
Marshall, General George C., Moorish Science Temple of America, 106
388–389, 405 moral panic
decisive yet judicious, 388 preventing, 240
model statesman, 387 Moussaoui, Zacarias, 253, 255–256
martyrdom Mubarak al-Rishawi, Sajida, 117
and defiance theory, 385 Mumbai attack of 2008, 296, 416
makes harsh sanctions Murad, Abdul-Hakim, 252, 254
counterproductive, 87 Muzhakhoyeva, Zarema, 122
mass murder, 22–23, 26 myths about terrorism.
McCarthy, Senator Joseph, 389 See terrorism: myths
McLuhan, Marshall, 284
McVeigh, Timothy, 40, 46, 49, 74, 76 nation building, 394
captured via license check, 224 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
media, 282 against the United States, 246
a central instrument of terrorism, National Commission on Terrorist
282, 284 Attacks Upon the United States, 331
Index 467
National Consortium for the Study opportunity theory, 6, 69, 151–152, 157
of Terrorism and Responses to and common law crime, 158
Terrorism, 444 and crime displacement, 162
National Counterterrorism and fear of terrorism, 450
Center, 46, 58, 420 effective for many situations, 160
National Gang Crime Research is really a class of theories, 153
Center, 108 limited relevance to terrorism, 152
National Incident Management more policy-relevant than other
System, 338 theories of crime, 151
National Public Radio, 288 place or situation unit of analysis, 151
National Response Plan, 338 relevance to specific situations, 157
National Response Strategy, 340 relevance to terrorism, 163
national security tests of, 158
and national interests, 365 to reduce fear, 172
exploitation of it a slippery slope, 368 use of wheel locks to reduce auto
exploitation of it may undermine it, thefts, 159
367 used to reduce gas suicides, 159
not clearly defined, 364 used to reduce motorcycle thefts, 159
relates to both borders and organized communities
traditions, 365 have low levels of crime and fear, 175
National Security Agency, 249
need to know principle, 268 Padilla v. Hanft, 36
negotiation Padilla, Jose, 107
builds legitimacy, 387 Palestine
supports procedural justice, 387 plagued by disunity, 398
Netanyahu, Prime Minister Palestinian terrorism
Benjamin, 394 women actively involved, 118
netwar, 349 Palestinians, 20
network analysis PATRIOT Act. See USA PATRIOT Act
needed for criminal intelligence, 227 peace process
networks unraveling of, 394
and networks of networks, 325 Peel, Robert, 205, 210
centrality property, 325 Peres, Prime Minister Shimon, 393
Nichols, Terry, 46 Phoenix Memo, 252, 254–255
nuclear weapon proliferation, 389 piracy
laws against, 37
Office for Domestic Preparedness, 331 PKK. See Kurdish Workers Party
Office of Community Preparedness, 331 police
Office of Law Enforcement accountability, 215, 219, 221
Coordination, 331 adjustments to external shifts, 197
Office of State and Local Government and military, 7
Coordination, 331 changes in the external
Oklahoma City bombing, 40, 46, 53, environment, 189
273, 306, 337 collaborations, 232
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets cult of evidence, 259
Act of 1968, 197–198 partnerships, 237
open source data on terrorism, 413 police intelligence units
Operation Phoenix typical characteristics of, 258
as US-sponsored terrorism, 48 police legitimacy. See legitimacy: police
opportunity reduction strategies, 66, police officers
78–80, 160, 169 make poor intelligence analysts, 255
468 Index
police-community relations, 214 profiling

police-community relations era, 214 racial. See racial profiling
policing social costs of, 451
federal versus state and local Psychological Reactance Theory, 384
authority, 8 public health model
real-world constraints on, 238 relevance for counterterrorism, 396
policing terrorism three levels of prevention, 396
importance of information, 223
political criminology, 316 Rabin, Prime Minister Yitzak, 393
political pandering. See fear: political assassination of, 398
pandering racial profiling, 300, 302, 357
politicians based on flawed premises, 312
tend to err in favor of security over definition, 303
liberty, 377 difficult to assess effectiveness of, 313
politics easier when a minority, 306
as a blood sport, 289 fundamentally unfair, 305
politics of homeland security, 58 in vehicle stops, 304
pork barrel in homeland security. is an ethical issue, 317
See politics of homeland security is not always effective, 308
Posse Comitatus Act, 33–34, 184 legal and ethical aspects, 303
precautionary principle, 291 reifies perceived differences, 305
prediction of terrorism, 224 unclear whether it reduces
prejudices crime, 307
bound primarily in culture, not RAND Corporation, 425
religion, 456 recruitment model of gangs, 107
prevention of terrorism Red Brigades
primary forms of, 396 ended by criminal justice sanctions, 395
secondary forms of, 397 Red Terror, 71
tertiary forms of, 397 regulatory model, 383
preventive diplomacy, 404 Reid, Richard C., 254
prisoners of war responsive regulation, 403
terrorists as, 35 Ressam, Ahmed, 248
privacy, 361 restorative justice, 140, 386, 388, 404
deontological considerations, 362 relevance to counterterrorism, 138
not merely an aspect of liberty, 362 retaliation and protection, 80–81
privacy and secrecy revolutionaries, 50
barrier to police intelligence, 233 right-wing terrorists
proactive policing, 140 less educated than average, 72
probability neglect, 280 risk assessment
probable cause often distored by emotion, 278
allows for probabilistic inference, 257 often distored by heuristics, 279
problem solving, 222. See also Roosevelt, Franklin D., 295, 301
problem-oriented policing 220 Routine Activities Theory, 77, 138, 450
through partnerships, 229 routine activity theory, 154
problem-oriented policing, 7, 140, 209, a subset of opportunity theory, 153
212, 215, 219, 237 policy implications, 155
and terrorism, 220 Rowley, Coleen, 254
application, 216 Ruby Ridge, 49
difficult due to mediocrity, 222
origins, 213 Sa’ad, Sumayah, 118
procedural justice, 385, 387, 404 Saudi Arabia, 392
Index 469
second- generation warfare, 28 can improve the exercise of

secondary deviance, 433 discretion, 454
Secret Service, 329
security Taliban, 387, 394–395
and rights, 363, 451 means “scholars” in Urdu, 391
as absence of threat, 364 Tamil Tigers, 115
individual and collective, 363 30% women, 120
proper level depends on aversion to target-hardening, 140
risk, 370 Task Force on Disorders and
Security and Intelligence Review Terrorism, 56
Committee, 249 tautology, 264
security and liberty. See liberty and security team policing, 214
severity of punishment technical core, 326
does not deter terrorists, 87 technology
Siddiqui, Aafia, 117, 121 impact of changes on military, 196
simulation transfers between military and
for assessing counterterrorism police, 187
strategies, 451 terror
situational crime prevention, 134, 138, means fear in the extreme, 276
154–155, 178 terrorism
a subset of opportunity theory, 153 1986 task force definition, 42
advantages for empirical analysis, 154 acts are also criminal acts, 444
smart power, 455 ancient roots of, 53
social capital, 454 and aggression, 2
social control theory, 5, 385 and common law crime, 163–164
social costs, 451 and crime, 19, 66
social disorganization theory, 100 and crime prevention, 6
social network analysis and criminal violence, 20
under-utilized in and education, 71
counterterrorism, 349 and fear, 7
social network theory, 325 and federal law, 25–26
boundary permeability, 326 and guerilla warfare, 20
boundary spanning, 325–327 and hate crime, 54
strong and weak ties, 325 and poverty, 71
soft power, 85, 455 and profiling, 311
Soros, George, 398 social costs, 451
Southern Poverty Law Center, 57 and public policy, 33
Sri Lanka, 115 and social control theory, 385
Stalin, Josef and state laws, 22
tamed by George Marshall, 387 and war, 19
street gangs as a public health problem, 294
bear similarities to terrorist as a tactic, 67
organizations, 97 as asymmetric warfare, 30
suicide terrorists, 74 as crime, 2, 6, 21, 27, 32–34
super-terrorist as piracy, 37
a myth, 436 as poor man’s battle, 29
supply-side criminology, 211 as supply-demand problem, 142
surveillance as war, 27, 31, 34–35
and right to privacy, 361 barriers to empirical research on, 448
syllogism, 263 boundaries are vague, 445
systems of accountability by groups, 18
470 Index
terrorism (cont.) in Turkey, 429

by individuals, 18 in United States history, 48
can be reduced, not eradicated, 89 information gathering can
causes of, 70 backfire, 234
changing nature of, 47, 61 is committed for a cause beyond
Combs’s definition, 41 self-interest, 445
committed mostly by young males, like Jenkins’ definition, 42
crime, 98 Krieger’s definition, 41
Cooper’s definition, 42 Ku Klux Klan acts of, 55
criminal justice model a poor fit, 383 LaFree definition, 412
danger of over-dramatizing, 67 lethality of attacks, 425
danger of viewing as war, 67 limited predictability of, 56
Defense Department definition, 42–43 Lodge’s definition, 41
defies empirical analysis for several many definitions of, 2–3, 41, 43, 70,
reasons, 448 412, 445
definition, 129, 311 Martin’s typology of definitions, 44
definition of, 2, 17, 29, 33 media gets it wrong, 52
definition typology, 44 more than a crime, 445
definitions, 41 myths, 411
definitions vary by agency interests, 46 need for creative thinking about, 37
difficult to predict, 169 not necessarily an irrational act, 452
difficulty of predicting events, 49 open source data on, 413
dimensions of, 447 Poland’s definition, 42
distinct from guerrilla warfare, 54 predicting, 61
distinct from other forms of primary motives for, 76
aggression, 445 prospects for research on, 449
ecological perspective of, 4 rarity makes prediction difficult, 168
elements of (Mullins-Thurman), 45 root cause analysis of, 402
evidence-based prevention, 383 rooted in extremist beliefs, 72
facilitated by technology and Sobel’s definition, 41
globalization, 116 socially constructed, 98
FBI definition, 43, 70 spatial distribution of events, 415
Forst’s definition, 446 State Department definition, 43
Friedman’s definition, 41 taxonomy serves two useful
goals more complex than for purposes, 447
crime, 165 theory of deterrence doesn’t apply, 383
growing public awareness of, 55 Thornton’s definition, 41
how definitions vary, 445 tool of the poor and the weak, 428
Howard and Sawyer’s definition, 42 traditionally a subspecialty of political
in Algeria, 419 science, 444
in Colombia, 418 typology of, 447
in Germany, 416 unlike common law crime, 167
in India, 416 unlike crime in primary goals, 164
in Iraq, 44 US Air Force definition, 42
in Latin America, 418 valid data are elusive, 412
in Northern Ireland, 433, 435 varieties of, 18
in South Africa, 419, 425 war model a poor fit, 383
in South Asia, 418 Wardlaw’s definition, 41
in Southeast Asia, 418 weapons used in attacks, 426
in the Middle East, 418 Whittaker’s typology of definitions, 44
in the United States, 47, 418, 422 women in, 5, 448
Index 471
terrorism intelligence tyranny of the case file, 256

calls for analytic skill and
artfulness, 403 U.S. Attorneys, 332. See also federal
terrorism investigation prosecutors
primary responsibility is federal, U.S. Civil War, 28
not local, 345 U.S. Coast Guard, 329
terrorism law, 32 U.S. Customs and Border
Terrorism Liaison Officer, 341 Protection, 329
terrorism prevention, 232, 239 USA PATRIOT Act, 26, 318, 357, 374
benefits from multidisciplinary USS Cole, 250
thinking, 456 Uyghurs, 412
partnerships may be key, 229
relevance of crime prevention victimization surveys, 154
models, 449 used to test opportunity theory, 160
terrorist groups, 428 Vietnam, 189
camaraderie like gangs, 99 lesson of, 188
often cooperate with organized vigilantes, 50
criminals, 103 vulnerable terrorism targets, 60
similarities to criminal gangs, 452
tend to live in poor societies, 71 war, 67
terrorist incentives, 173 war model
terrorist motives, 74 is based largely on deterrence, 383
terrorist networks, 227 war on terror
terrorist organizations, 428 has complicated jurisdictional
goals of, 102 authority, 185
terrorist personality, 73 War on Terror, 1, 5
Terrorist Screening Center alternatives, 79
watch list of, 336 war on terrorism, 302, 375
Terrorist Threat Integration Center, 58 and legitimacy, 385
terrorists can’t win wars against -isms, 446
agitational, 50 failures of under- and
are not like typical violent over-reaction, 405
criminals, 71 is based largely on retribution, 383
as pirates, 37 Watts
terror-oriented policing, 260 1965 riot, 190, 194
theory of games weapons of mass destruction, 23, 53
and counterterrorism strategies, 450 exploited politically, 367
third-generation warfare, 29 Weather Underground, 47, 86, 425
Thirty Years War, 28 web of controls, 398, 400, 403–404
totalitarianism more effective when more redundant,
more effectively contained than 403
countered, 389 Westphalia, Peace of, 28
transparency women
in policing, 221, 240 as potent force for
Transportation Security counterterrorism, 455
Administration, 329 women terrorists, 113, 448
Treaty of Paris, 37 are usually not mothers, 121
Truman Containment Doctrine, brief history of, 114
388–389 can more easily conceal explosives, 119
Truth and Reconciliation demographic profile of, 121
Commission, 388 in 19th century Russia, 113
472 Index
women terrorists (cont.) revenge as motive, 122

in Chechnya, 115, 119, 121–122, 124 stigmatization as motive, 121, 123
in Hamas, 118 usually between adolescence and late
in the Basque separatist movement, 119 thirties, 114
in the IRA, 119 usually from the middle and upper
in the Red Brigades, 113 classes, 114
increased participation in suicide World Trade Center bombing of
attacks, 114 1993, 273
motivated more by personal than World War I, 28–29
political reasons, 115 World War II, 29
motives, 113, 122 Worldwide Incidents Tracking
not related to women’s liberation System, 58
movement, 113
often active participants in terrorist Yousef, Ramzi, 252
organizations, 116
Palestinian, 119 zero-tolerance policing, 212, 217
rarely involved in car bombings, 118 distortion of Broken Windows
redemption as motive, 123 approach, 260

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CR IMINOLOGISTS ON TER ROR ISM

This volume presents eighteen original essays addressing what is widely

Jack R. Greene is Professor and former Dean of the College of Criminal

James P. Lynch is Director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, on leave

Recent books in the series:

Cambridge University Press

© Cambridge University Press 2011

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

First published 2011

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data

isbn 978-0-521-89945-1 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or

About the Authors page ix

1. Introduction and Overview – Brian Forst,

part i nature of the problem

2. Manifestations of Aggression: Terrorism, Crime,

3. The Etiology of Terrorism: Identifying, Defining,

4. Balancing Counterterrorism Strategies: Lessons

5. Gangs, Crime, and Terrorism – G. David Curry 97

6. Women Terrorists – Rita J. Simon and Adrienne

part ii strategies for intervention

7. Is Crime Prevention Relevant to Counterterrorism?

8. Implications of Opportunity Theory for Combating

9. Soldiers and Spies, Police and Detectives – Tomas

10. Community Policing and Terrorism: Problems

11. Go Analyze! (Connecting the Dots) – Jean-Paul

12. Managing the Fear of Terrorism – Brian Forst 273

13. Should Profiling Be Used to Prevent

14. Federal-Local Coordination in Homeland

15. Liberty and Security in an Era of Terrorism – John

16. Regulating Terrorism – John Braithwaite 383

part iii thinking about tomorrow

17. Using Open Source Data to Counter Common

18. Criminal Justice and Terrorism: A Research

A. Daktari Alexander is Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at

John Braithwaite is Federation Fellow with the Regulatory Institutions

Jean-Paul Brodeur was Professor of Criminology and Director of the

G. David Curry is Professor in the Department of Criminology

Brian Forst is Professor of Justice, Law, and Society at American

Press, 2005); and The Privatization of Policing: Two Views, coauthored

Jack R. Greene is Professor and former Dean of Northeastern

Charles “Sid” Heal is a retired commander of the Los Angeles

Jay D. Jamieson teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in the

Louisiana. Dr. Jamieson holds a BA degree in economics from the

William R. King is an Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at Sam

John Kleinig is Professor of Philosophy at John Jay College of

David Klinger is Senior Research Scientist at the Police Foundation

Christopher S. Koper is Director of Research at the Police Executive

Gary LaFree is Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice and

in advancing criminal justice statistics in 1994, and the Phillip Hoke

Cynthia Lum is Deputy Director, Center for Evidence-Based Crime

James P. Lynch is Distinguished Professor at the John Jay College of

Edward R. Maguire is an Associate Professor in the Department of

Tomas C. Mijares is Professor of Criminal Justice at Texas State

Wayman C. Mullins is Professor of Criminal Justice and director of

Joanne Savage is Associate Professor in the Department of Justice, Law,

and Sentencing Handbook: Sentencing Guidelines in the Criminal Courts

Rita J. Simon is University Professor at American University, with joint

Quint C. Thurman is Professor of Criminal Justice and Department

Adrienne Tranel is an attorney with the law firm of Kator, Parks

service, employment, and general litigation at the administrative,

Bryan Vila is a professor of criminal justice at Washington State