BASIC LEG AL ETHICS

1' Semester; AY 2019-2020

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Read and digest the following cases below.
2. Write your case digests in a big record book. Observe proper format in writing your case digests.
3. Case books shall be submitted during the Final Examinations schedule. No Case Book, No Final Exam Policy.
LIST OF CASES FOR FINALS:

1. Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

2. In Re: Petition to sign in the Roll of Attorneys Michael Medado, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
3. Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer's Oath, B.M. No. 712, March 19, 1997
4. Garrido v. Attys. Garrido and Valencia, A.C. No. 6593, February 4, 2010
5. Tan v. Atry. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, Jan 10, 2018
6. Brennisen v. Atty. Contawi, A.C. No. 7481, April 24, 2012
7. Figueroa v. Barranco, SBC Case No. 519, July 31, 1997
8. Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000
9. Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009
10. Dulalia Jr. v. Cruz, A.C. No. 6854, April 25, 2007
11. PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005
12. In the Matter of IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, December 19, 1980
13. Santos Jr. v. Atty. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, January 20, 2000
14. In re: Victorino Lanuevo, A.M. No. 1162, August 29, 1975
15. Ricafort v. Medina, A.C. No. 5179, May 31, 2016
 Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
G.R. No. 100113, September 03, 1991
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's
decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." (Italics supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college
degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." (Italics supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an
appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them
in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel
about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193
N. E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice
by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed
of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.],
194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144]). (Italics ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions
of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the
law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute.'" (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice
of law."
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions
on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Commissioner will please proceed.

"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section 1 is that 'They must be Members of the Philippine Bar’ —- I am quoting from the provision — 'who have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.’"

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily
refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are
using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up
on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of
the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article
on the Commission on Audit?

"MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work: it will involve legal work.
And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"Mr. OPLE, Thank you."

x x x (Italics supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Italics supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although
many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpfully defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire
practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the
late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely
describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician
and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers
in specialized practice will usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty
such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way
in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate
practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, hereinbelow quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other
professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of
the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need
for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed
upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the
appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision
and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational
analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an
early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal-policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently
engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the
complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time"
lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one,
the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and
some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain
matters. Other corporations have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or
jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. (Italics supplied)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work
actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first
hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs
provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is
practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as
glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys
while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990,
p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer
Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and
the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4)

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional
law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into
the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current
advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a
corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and
the need to think about a corporation's strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal
both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not
only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a new
role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-
making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends
are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. (Italics supplied)

The practicing lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world
famous. (Italics supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial
structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found
to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external
activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Underscoring supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both
planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Italics supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be
used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Italics supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all kinds of
negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction
in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal
trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences
attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay
competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most
vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel bear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues,
including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more
complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel
nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not to
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution" or make-up of the modern
corporation. (Business Star, "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4)..

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each
aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in
a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen
and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He
has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as a lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During
his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which
involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, Monsod's, work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared
for NAMFREL in its accredition hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of
the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a guasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia-Munoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Italics supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as
the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Underscoring supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is
concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms;
(2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative
drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L.
Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on
August 26-31, 1973). (Italics supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an
economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of
technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Italics supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the
contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for
foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said; 'They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle
and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’ (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments,"
Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor - verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement - that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights,
the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide." (italics supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." (Italics supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-
taking, posting of bond, etc.... (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission
on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity."
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was
intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of
law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice "... is what people ordinarily mean by the
practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law
practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or
in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact
that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the
acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he
lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined
that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of
such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of
the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

 (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for
help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
"No blade shall touch his skin; No blood shall flow from his veins."
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly
replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, J., see brief concurrence.
Melencio-Herrera, J., In the result, on the same bases as Justice Narvasa.
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, and Padilla, JJ., see dissent.
Feliciano, J., certify that he voted to dismiss the petition.
Bidin, J., join in the dissent of J. Gutierrez.
Sarmiento, J., on leave.
Regalado, J., No part due to extended personal association with respondent Monsod.
Davide, Jr., J., No part. I was among those who issued a testimonial in favor of Chairman Monsod which was submitted by him to
CA.

CONCURRING OPINION

NARVASA, J.:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there
has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments — that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due
assessment thereof, be confirmed — was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently
merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore
vote to DENY the petition.

DISSENTING OPINION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled
one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these
5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did
not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one on official
leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on
Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission
errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsicality and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in
management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His
integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written
into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for
even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where
membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court
and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if their main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committees, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law,
whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar
examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that
the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of
one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with
intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the
latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, it appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law
except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law
practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M. A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the
University of Pennsylvannia during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

"1.15.1 Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M. A. in Economics (Ph.D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief,
South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum
Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Financiera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation" (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law enough attention or
a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving legal advice or legal
services, he was the one receiving that advice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use
of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and
customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or
apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor,
barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people
honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a
member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

"The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and
it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will,
contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Assn'n v. People's Stock
Yards State Bank, 344. III. 462, 176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law"
has been defined as 'Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of
advice or rendition of any sort of service by any persons, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such
service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.' Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass’n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901." (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E.2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they
should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

"Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared
contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: 'Very seldom.' In answer
to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-nine years of his business, he
said: 'I have no idea.' When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was 'I suppose.' Asked if he did not recall
making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: 'I don't recall
exactly what was said.' When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and
contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: 'Well, I don't
believe so, that is not a practice.' Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where
he was not the broker, he finally answered: 'I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned.'

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with
real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but
that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that connection. x x x." (People v. Schafer, 87
N.E.2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

"x x x. An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more
especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these
professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled 'attorneys in fact;' but the single word is
much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law.' Abb.
Law Dict. 'Attorney.' 'A public attorney, or attorney at law,' says Webster, 'is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients.' 'The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the
court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the
state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. * * * His rights are to be justly compensated for his services.'
Bouv. Law Dict. tit. 'Attorney.' The transitive verb 'practice,' as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to
perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming; * * * to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art, etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc. x x x." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Italics supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case
of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx

"x x x Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer
and demanding payment for such services. x x ." (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointments itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of
practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
"1. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as
a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo,
p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal
knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission
to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on
the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened
to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business
transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in
the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the
background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator,
Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The
Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

DISSENTING OPINION

CRUZ, J.:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which
I must differ with him while of course respecting his viewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination
has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from
resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body.
Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose between two
claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be
reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no
reason why we cannot disqualify an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he
has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of
the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced
in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long
as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the
realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and
applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not
affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when,
on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory
Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as "the performance of any acts ... in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too
global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he
does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely)
connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the
various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose
principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for
agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers
and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over
the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of
his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.

DISSENTING OPINION

PADILLA, J.:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the
respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin
respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional
qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarassment to all
parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod’s disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition
then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed
qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod’s comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of
“practice of law for at least ten (10) years” has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in
this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC,
including the Chairman thereof to “have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years,” (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1),
1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As
declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) “upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries.”

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been
“engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years.” It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met
and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, “practice” refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.[1] To “practice” law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in
the “practice of medicine.” A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or
attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:[2]

“Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment
for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). x x x” (italics supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several
factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes “practice of law.” It states:
“1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as
a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents
involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term ‘practice of law’ (Ernani Pano, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing, People v. People’s Stock-yards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and
Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, ‘all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et a., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term
‘practice of law’. (Martin, supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a
lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or
writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989
ed., p. 30).”[3]
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the
constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS
prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did
perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the
practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as “practice of law.” To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:[4]
“Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.”
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of
COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such
position.
 IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER.
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979[1] and passed
the same year’s bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.[2]

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together with
the successful bar examinees.[3] He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,[4] but he failed to
do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had mispla ced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys[5] given by
the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.[6]

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance
of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.[7]

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corp orate and
taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken
belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial
to his status as a lawyer”;[8] and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and
was subsequently forgotten.”[9]

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to
provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.[10] Not having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he b e allowed to sign
in the Roll of Attorneys.[11]

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September 2012[12]
and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.[13] The OBC recomm ended that the
instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.[14] It explained
that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his
negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.[15]

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a
fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him
the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of
members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to
Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who cal led this Court’s attention to petitioner’s
omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30
years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medad o very candidly
replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you
don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna
happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.[16]

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law,[17] which is
more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For
this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the
profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the
Laurel Law Office,[18] Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy
Development Corporation.[19]
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full -fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of
law is not a right but a privilege,[20] this Court will not unwar rantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who
have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having
signed in the Roll of Attorneys.[21] He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.”[22]

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts[23] as it
negates malice or evil motive,[24] a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a law ful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its consequences.[25] Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when
he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath -taking was already the Roll of Attorneys.
However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim
an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full -
fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of
signing therein that would have made him so.[26] When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing
law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the
court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,[27] which is punishable by fine
or imprisonment or both.[28] Such a finding, howeve r, is in the nature of criminal contempt[29] and must be reached
after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.[30] In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner
committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unautho rized practice of law, we refrain from making
any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law , the
unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9
is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law.[31] As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law.
However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period,
petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the prac tice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act
that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANT ED. Petitioner Michael A.
Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is
likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period,
petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
BAR MATTER No. 712, March 19, 1997
PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath -
taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s convi ction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty
to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pl eas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty
to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused
a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation
Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the
order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring
petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admiss ion to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed
by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner
likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the
hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer
to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather
than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the
neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength a nd treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only
out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on
Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his
son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co -accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father
who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely
demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits
the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to th ose who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of
this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of
equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing
petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant
and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a f inding that the
participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."[1]

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious d eficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's
child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronoun ced and profound in
cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third
parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy
and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a
lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the l egal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic wi th a genuine concern for
civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he mak es when taking the lawyer's
oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community.
As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of
society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a
date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.
 MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO VS. ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO AND ROMANA P. VALENCIA
A.C. No. 6593, February 04, 2010
PER CURIAM:

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit[1] and a supplemental affidavit[2] for disbarment against the
respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and A tty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint -
affidavit states:

That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marr iage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino
Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x

That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito,
Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

xxxx

That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me that
sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her clai ming that the former is a child of my
husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that
sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinson's Department Store at Ermita, M anila
together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona
Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x

xxxx

That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Liv e Birth of the child,
stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana
Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.

That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and join ed Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence x
xx

That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial support to the prejudice
of our children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.

xxxx

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P.
Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation,
wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x

In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea's charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged
that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he mar ried
Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea
knew all his escapades and understood his "bad boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea
grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty.
Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial
difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denie d that he failed to give financial support to his children with
Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except
for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.[4] Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been
employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11,
1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children
with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.

In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that
Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due
to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the
romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea
kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia)
financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a
proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty.
Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action a gainst her.

In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings[6] in view of the criminal complaint for
concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity[7] (of marriage) Atty. Garrido
filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of
merit.

Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal
wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had n o personality to file her complaints against them. The
respondents also alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was
already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his admission to the b ar. The IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.[9]

Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she
wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is t he father of her six (6) children.[10] The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion.[11]

On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan)
submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents' disbarment.[12] The Commission on Bar Discipline
of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with
modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:

x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar,
Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P.
Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denie d his motion
under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.

Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under the
circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warra nt his disbarment. He also argues that the
offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.

Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is
already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding
his situation.

In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos -Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of
the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty
from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77 -year old Atty.
Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his
bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty.
Garrido.

THE COURT'S RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and
to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure - such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questi ons,
or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant - do not apply in
the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.[13] We have so ruled in the past
and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.[14] First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.[15] The admission
qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public
concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not
a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own;[16] effectively, his or her
participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention o f the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint
is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law,
and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that
the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in
Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar
does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or
moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.[18] Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable
presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar.[19]

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over
the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of
law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to
take before admission to the practice of law.

In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public
interest concern, Maelotisea's affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note
further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now
available for the Court's examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We
cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had
submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financ ial interest in
continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.[20] Immora l conduct is gross when it is so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency.[21] We ma ke these
distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.[22]

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or
multiple marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal
remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondent's pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage
and family - institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values
essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this
light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first wife was
subsisting. We held that the respondent's act of contracting the second marriage was contr ary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent
from admission to the Bar.

Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent s ecretly contracted a second
marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of
that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage - a sacred
institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido esta blished a
pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it
was reprehensible to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereaft er and during the marriage, he
had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his
reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to
Constancia.[26] This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Mael otisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first
marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra -marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and
without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as
wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage wi th Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty.
Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he
was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not "valid."

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt
to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with
two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a
period of more than ten (10) years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by
Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This
was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage
declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifical ly, violations of the
bar admission rules, of his lawyer's oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar.[27] As a
lawyer, he violated his lawyer's oath,[28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[29] and Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility,[30] all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying
Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he ente red this second marriage while his first marriage with
Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to
Maelotisea.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Co de of Professional Responsibility, which
commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same
Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal pro fession"; Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example in
promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own
personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are
mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case , he
also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal
profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Profes sional Responsibility.[31] Lawyers
are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity
and fair dealing.[32] Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community appro bation.[33]
Needless to state, those whose conduct - both public and private - fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.[34]

Atty. Valencia

We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively
liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:

x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not
afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to
the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer's professional capacity
or in his private life. Again, the claim that his marr iage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents
from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the
fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degre e of morality required of them as members of
the Bar.[35]

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.[36] To have good moral
character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not eno ugh that he or she has a good
reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the
public in the place where she is known.[37] The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes ,
namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4)
to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[38] Each purpose is as important as the other.

Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty.
Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty.
Garrido's admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a
romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she
married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumst ances, to our
mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed
of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latter's family problems,
would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby
effectively alienating the other person's feelings and affection from his wife and family.

While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido's marriage with M aelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that
he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward
off Atty. Garrido's advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice -married man with both marriages subsisting at
that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty.
Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and t heir
children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia's presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second
family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the
prism of law.

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia's expressed belief that Atty. Garrido's second marriage to Maelotisea was
invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on
confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido's marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the
honesty of this expressed belief.

The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this
marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido's second marriage, we can only call this
Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with
family. Despite Atty. Valencia's claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his
capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong[39] leads us to the
opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong f or the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by
entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that
Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her "husband." Atty.
Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his
second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with
another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia's perverse sense of moral values.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia's actions grossly immoral. Her actions
were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to
another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the
confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during
the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencia's conduct could not but be
scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the community's sense of dec ency; while she professed to be the
lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not
object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her
behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to
adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.[40] In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as
officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Att y. Valencia failed to live up
to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.

Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme
Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer's lack of the
essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and
Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be
exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of
the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.[42]

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show
the parties' pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their la ck of mental and emotional fitness and
moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers
of the court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido's plea for compassion and his act of sup porting his children with
Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the
Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are
commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencia's behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious
flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profess ion and
without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an on -looker victimized by the
circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyer's Oath; and
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P.
Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of
Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, RESPONDENT.

A.C. No. 9000, January 10, 2018
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint[1] filed by Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (complainant) against Atty. Haide
V. Gumba (respondent), and for which respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six months. The issues
now ripe for resolution are: a) whether respondent disobeyed a lawful order of the Court by not abiding by the order
of her suspension; and b) whether respondent deserves a stiffer penalty for such violation.

Factual Antecedents
According to complainant, in August 1999, respondent obtained from him a P350,000.00 loan with 12% interest per
annum. Incidental thereto, respondent executed in favor of complainant an undated Deed of Absolute Sale[2] over a
105-square meter lot located in Naga City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2055[3] under the name of
respondent's father, Nicasio Vista. Attached to said Deed was a Special Power of Attorney[4] (SPA) executed by
respondent's parents authorizing her to apply for a loan with a bank to be secured by the subject property. Complainant
and respondent purportedly agreed that if the latter failed to pay the loan in or before August 2000, com plainant may
register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds (RD).[5]

Respondent failed to pay her loan when it fell due. And despite repeated demands, she failed to settle her obligation.
Complainant attempted to register the Deed of Absol ute Sale with the RD of Naga City but to no avail because the
aforesaid SPA only covered the authority of respondent to mortgage the property to a bank, and not to sell it.[6]

Complainant argued that if not for respondent's misrepresentation, be would no t have approved her loan. He added
that respondent committed dishonesty, and used her skill as a lawyer and her moral ascendancy over him in securing
the loan. Thus, he prayed that respondent be sanctioned for her infraction.[7]

In his Commissioner's Report[8] dated February 9, 2009, Commissioner Jose I. de la Rama, Jr. (Commissioner de la
Rama) faulted respondent for failing to file an answer, and participate in the mandatory conference. He further declared
that the SPA specifically authorized respondent to mortgage the property with a bank. He stressed that for selling the
property, and not just mortgaging it to complainant, who was not even a bank, respondent acted beyond her authority.
Having done so, she committed gross violation of the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canon 1,[9] Rule 1.01,[10] and Canon
7[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As such, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In the Resolution No. XIX-2010-446[12] dated August 28, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner de la Rama.

Action of the Supreme Court

Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution[13] dated October 5, 201 1, w hich sustained the findings and conclusion of
the IBP. The Court nonetheless found the reduction of the penalty proper, pursuant to its sound judicial discretion and
on the facts of the case. Accordingly, it suspended respondent from the practice of law fo r six months, effective
immediately, with a warning that a repetition of same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
On March 14, 2012, the Court resolved to serve anew the October 5, 2011 Resolution upon respondent because its
previous copy sent to her was returned unserved. [14] In its August 13, 2012 Resolution,[15] the Court considered the
October 5, 2011 Resolution to have been served upon respondent after the March 14, 2012 Resolution was also returned
unserved. In the same resolution, the Court also denied with finality respondent's motion for reconsideration on the
October 5, 2011 Resolution.

Subsequently, Judge Margaret N. Armea (Judge Armea) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Naga City, Branch 2
wrote a letter[16] inquiring from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) whether respondent could continue
representing her clients and appear in courts. She also asked the OCA if the decision relating to respondent's suspension,
which was downloaded from the internet, constitutes sufficient notice to disqualify her to appear in courts for the period
of her suspension.

According to Judge Armea, her inquiry arose because respondent represented a party in a case pending in her court;
and, the counsel of the opposing party called Jud ge Armea's attention regarding the legal standing of respondent to
appear as counsel. Judge Armea added that respondent denied that she was suspended to practice law since she
(respondent) had not yet received a copy of the Court's resolution on the matter .

In her Answer/Comment[17] to the query of Judge Armea, respondent countered that by reason of such downloaded
decision, Judge Armea and Executive Judge Pablo Cabillan Formaran III (Judge Formaran III) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Naga City disallowed her appearance in their courts. She insisted that service of any pleading or judgment
cannot be made through the internet. She further claimed that she had not received an authentic copy of the Court's
October 5, 2011 Resolution.

On January 22, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) referred the October 5, 2011 Resolution to the OCA for
circulation to all courts.[18] In response, on January 30, 2013, the OCA issued OCA Circular No. 14 -2013[19] addressed
to the courts,[20] the Office of Chief S tate Prosecutor (CSP), Public Attorney's Office (PAO), and the IBP informing
them of the October 5, 2011 and August 13, 2012 Resolutions of the Court.

IBP's Report and Recommendation

Meanwhile, in its Notice of Resolution No. XX -2013-359[21] dated March 21, 2013, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt
and approve the Report and Recommendation[22] of Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner Cachapero)
to dismiss the complaint against respondent. According to Commissioner Cachapero, there is no rule allowing th e
service of judgments through the internet; and Judge Armea and Judge Formaran III acted ahead of time when they
implemented the suspension of respondent even before the actual service upon her of the resolution concerning her
suspension.

Statement and Report of the OBC

In its November 22, 2013 Statement,[23] the OBC stressed that respondent received the August 13, 2012 Resolution
(denying her motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution) on November 12, 2012 per Registry Return
Receipt No. 53365. Thus, the effectivity of respondent's suspension was from November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.
The OBC also pointed out that suspension is not automatically lifted by mere lapse of the period of suspension. It is
necessary that an order be issued by the Court lifting the suspension to enable the concerned lawyer to resume practice
of law.

The OBC further maintained in its November 27, 2013 Report[24] that respondent has no authority to practice law and
appear in court as counsel during her suspension, and until such time that the Court has lifted the order of her
suspension. Thus, the OBC made these recommendations:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended that:

1. Respondent be REQUIRED to file a sworn statement with motion to lift order of her suspension, attaching therewith
certifications from the Office of the Executive Judge of the court where she practices[h]er profession and IBP Local
Chapter of which she is affiliated, that she has ceased and desi sted from the practice of law from 12 November 2012 to
12 May 2013, immediately; and

2. The IBP be REQUIRED to EXPLAIN within 72 hours why they should not be sanctioned for disciplinary action for
issuing said Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-359, dated 21 March 2013, purportedly dismissing this case for lack of
merit.[25]

On February 19, 2014, the Court noted[26] the OBC Report, and directed respondent to comply with the guidelines
relating to the lifting of the order of her suspension as enunciated in M aniago v. Atty. De Dios.[27]
Upon the request of respondent, on December 2, 2014, the OBC issued a Certification,[28] which stated that respondent
had been ordered suspended from the practice of law for six months, and as of the issuance of said certific ation, the
order of her suspension had not yet been lifted.

Complaint against the OCA, the OBC and Atty. Paraiso

On February 6, 2015, respondent filed with the RTC a verified Complaint[29] for nullity of clearance, damages, and
preliminary injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order against the OCA, the OBC, and Atty. Nelson
P. Paraiso (Atty. Paraiso). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2015 -0007.
Essentially, respondent accused the OCA and the OBC of suspending her from the pr actice of law even if the
administrative case against her was still pending with the IBP. She likewise faulted the OBC for requiring her to submit
a clearance from its office before she resumes her practice of law after the suspension. In turn, she argued that Atty.
Paraiso benefited from this supposed "bogus suspension" by publicly announcing the disqualification of respondent to
practice law.

In its Answer,[30] the OCA argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, which seeks reversal, modific ation
or enjoinment of a directive of the Court. The OCA also stressed that respondent should raise such matter by filing a
motion for reconsideration in the administrative case, instead of filing a complaint with the RTC. It also stated that the
issuance of OCA Circular No. 14-2013 was in compliance with the Court's directive to inform all courts, the CSP, the
PAO, and the IBP of the suspension of respondent.

For its part, the OBC declared in a Report[31] dated March 24, 2015 that during and after the per iod of her suspension,
without the same having been lifted, respondent filed pleadings and appeared in courts in the following cases:

x x x (1) Civil Case No. 2013-0106 (Romy Fay Gumba v. The City Assessor of Naga City, et. al.), (2) Civil Case No.
RTC 2006-0063 (Sps. Jaime M. Kalaw et. al. v. Fausto David, et al.), (3) Other Spec. Proc. No. RTC 2012 -0019 (Petition
for Reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21128 of the Registry of Deeds of Naga City v. Danilo O.
Laborado).[32]

The OBC likewise confirmed that as of the time it issued the March 24, 2015 Report, the Court had not yet lifted the
order of suspension against respondent. The OBC opined that for failing to comply with the order of her suspension,
respondent deliberately ref1tsed to obey a lawful order of the Court. Thus, it recommended that a stiffer penalty be
imposed against respondent.

On June 42015, the OBC reported that the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 2015 -0007 for lack of jurisdiction, and pending
resolution was respondent's motion for reconsideration.[33]

Issue
Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law during the period of her suspension and prior
to an order of the Court lifting such suspension?

Our Ruling
Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege [subject]
to the inherent regulatory power of the [Court],"[34] It is a "privilege burdened with conditions."[35] As such, lawyers
must comply with its rigid standards, whic h include mental fitness, maintenance of highest level of morality, and full
compliance with the rules of the legal profession.[36]
With regard to suspension to practice law, in Maniago v. Atty. De Dios,[37] the Court laid down the guidelines for the
lifting of an order of suspension, to wit:

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision
imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately e xecutory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15
days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final
and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through
the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared
in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the
courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition
of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as ma y be warranted.[38]
Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a Resolution dated October 5, 2011 suspending respondent
from the practice of law for six months effective immediately. Respondent filed her motion for reconsideration. And,
on November 12, 2012, she received the notice of the denial of such motion per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365.

While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only personally or by registered mail,[39] and that mere
showing of a downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to respondent is not a valid service, the fact however,
that respondent was duly informed of her suspension remains unrebutted. Again, as stated above, she filed a motion for
reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution, and the Court duly notified her of the denial of said motion. It thus
follows that respondent's six months suspension commenced from the notice of the denial of her motion for
reconsideration on November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.
In Ibana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya,[40] despite having received the Resolution anent her suspension, Atty. Paita -
Moya continued to practice law. She filed pleadings and she appeared as counsel in courts. For which reason, the Court
suspended her from the practice of law for six months in addition to her initial one month suspension, or a total of
seven months.

Too, in Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,[41] respondent therein, Atty. Lozada, appeared and signed as counsel, for
and in behalf of her husband, during the period of her suspension from the practice of law. For having done so, the
Court ruled that she engaged in unauthorized practice of law. The Court did not give weight to Atty. Lozada's defense
of good faith as she was very well aware that when she repr esented her husband, she was still serving her suspension
order. The Court also noted that Atty. Lozada did not seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can
represent her husband in court. In this regard, the Court suspended Atty. Lozada f or six months for her wilful
disobedience to a lawful order of the Court.

Similarly, in this case, the Court notified respondent of her suspension. However, she continued to engage in the practice
law by filing pleadings and appearing as counsel in courts during the period of her suspension.
It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law, the lawyer must
desist from performing all functions which require the application of legal knowledge within the perio d of his or her
suspension.[42] To stress, by practice of law, we refer to "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the
legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.”[43]
In fine, it will amount to unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful order of the Court if a suspended lawyer
engages in the practice of law during the pendency of his or her suspension.[44]

As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during and even after the period of her suspension and
without filing a sworn statement for the lifting of her suspension, r espondent signed pleadings and appeared in courts
as counsel. Clearly, such acts of respondent are in violation of the order of her suspension to practice law.

Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is necessary that there is an order from the Court lifting
the suspension of a lawyer to practice law. To note, in Maniago, the Court explicitly stated that a suspended lawyer
shall, upon the expiration of one’s suspension, file a sworn statement with the Court, and that such statemen t shall be
considered proof of the lawyer’s compliance with the order of suspension.

In this case, on February 19, 2014, the Court directed respondent to comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the
suspension order against her by filing a sworn statement on the matter. However, respondent did not comply. Instead,
she filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 2015-0007) against the OCA, the OBC and a certain Atty. Paraiso with the RTC.
For having done so, respondent violated a lawful order of the Court, that is, to comply with the guidelines for the lifting
of the order of suspension against her.

To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the Court is two -fold: 1) she filed pleadings and appeared
in court as counsel during the period of her suspension, and prior to the lifting of such order of her suspension; and 2)
she did not comply with the Court's directive for her to file a sworn statement in compliance with the guidelines for the
lifting of the suspension order.

Under Section 27,[45] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from practice
of law for willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, among other grounds. Here, respondent willfully
disobeyed the Court's lawful orders by failing to comply with the order of her suspension, and to the Court's directive
to observe the guidelines for the lifting thereof. Pursuant to prevailing Jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6) months
from the practice of law against respondent is in order.[46]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional period of six
(6) months (from her original six (6) months suspension) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, to determine the
reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of
this Decision to the record of respondent as member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.

LORENZO D. BRENNISEN VS. ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI

A.C. No. 7481, April 24, 2012
PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen against
respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of his lawyer's oath.

The Facts

Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Dionisio, Parañaque City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21176[2] of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. Being a resident of the
United States of America (USA), he entrusted the administration of the subject property to respondent, together with
the corresponding owner's duplicate title.

Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent, through a spurious Special Power of Attorney (SPA)[3] dated
February 22, 1989, mortgaged and subsequently sold the subject property to one Roberto Ho (“Ho”), as evidenced by
a Deed of Absolute Sale[4] dated November 15, 2001. As a result, TCT No. 21176 was cancell ed and replaced by
TCT No. 150814[5] issued in favor of Ho.

Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for having violated
his oath as a lawyer, causing him damage and prejudice.

In his counter-affidavit,[6] respondent denied any formal lawyer-client relationship between him and the complainant,
claiming to have merely extended his services for free. He also denied receiving money from the complainant for the
purpose of paying the real estate taxes on the property. Further, he averred that it was his former office assistants, a
certain Boy Roque (“Roque”) and one Danilo Diaz (“Diaz”), who offered the subject property to Ho as collateral for
a loan. Nevertheless, respondent admitted to having confirm ed the spurious SPA in his favor already annotated at the
back of TCT No. 21176 upon the prodding of Roque and Diaz, and because he was also in need of money at that
time. Hence, he signed the real estate mortgage and received his proportionate share of P 130,000.00 from the
proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to have fully settled.

Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ho and insisted that it was a forgery.
Nonetheless, he sought complainant's forgiveness and promise d to repay the value of the subject property.

In the Resolution[7] dated July 16, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Action and Recommendation of the IBP

During the mandatory conference held on October 21, 2008, the parties stipulated on the following matters:

That complainant is the owner of a property covered by TCT No. 21176 (45228) of the Register of Deeds of
Parañaque;

Respondent was in possession of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of the property of the complainant;

The property of the complainant was mortgaged to a certain Roberto Ho;

The title to the property of complainant was cancelled in year 2000 and a new one, TCT No. 150814 was issu ed in
favor of Mr. Roberto Ho;

The Special Power of Attorney dated 24 February 1989 in favor of Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is spurious and was not
signed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen;

That respondent received Php100,000.00 of the mortgage loan secured by the mortgagee on the aforementioned
property of complainant;
That respondent did not inform the complainant about the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his property;

That respondent has a loan obligation to Mr. Roberto Ho;

That respondent has not yet filed any case against the person whom he claims to have falsified his signature;

That respondent did not notify the complainant that the owner's copy of TCT No. 21176 was stolen and was taken
out from his office.[8]

In its Report[9] dated July 10, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP -CBD), through Commissioner
Eduardo V. De Mesa, found that respondent had undeniably mortgaged and sold the property of his client without the
latter's knowledge or consent, facilitated by the use of a falsified SPA. Hence, in addition to his possible criminal
liability for falsification, the IBP-CBD deduced that respondent violated various provisions of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility and accordingly recommended that he be disbarred and his name strick en from the Roll of
Attorneys.

On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of Commissioner De Mesa through
Resolution No. XIX-2011-248[10] as follows:

“RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above -entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex 'A' and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and finding Respondent guilty of falsification; making or using falsified documents; and for benefiting from the
proceed[s] of his dishonest acts, Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is hereby DISBARRED.”

The Issue

The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath when he mortgaged and sold
complainant's property, which was entrusted to him, without the latter's consent.

The Court's Ruling

After a punctilious examination of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and recomm endation of
Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors that respondent acted with deceit when, through the use of
a falsified document, he effected the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his client's property for his personal benefit.

Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's property without his knowledge or consent, and partook of the
proceeds of the sale for his own benefit. His contention that he merely accommodated the request of his then
financially-incapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware
that complainant's signature reflected thereon was forged. As aptly opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent
transactions involving the subject property were effected using the owner's duplicate title, which was in respondent's
safekeeping and custody during complainant's absence.

Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors correctly recommended his disbarment for
violations of the pertinent provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

Canon 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or d eceitful conduct.

Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client which may come into his possession.

Canon 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from client.

Canon 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

In Sabayle v. Tandayag,[11] the Court disbarred one of the respondent lawyers and ordered his name stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys on the grounds of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. The respondent lawyer
knowingly participated in a false and simulated transaction not only by notarizing a spurious Deed of Sale, but also –
and even worse – sharing in the profits of the specious transaction by acquiring half of the property subject of the
Deed of Sale.

In Flores v. Chua,[12] the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer for having d eliberately made false representations
that the vendor appeared personally before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. He was found guilty of
grave misconduct.
In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and plain inability to discharge the bounden duties
of a member of the legal profession. He failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to practice law and to live up
to the exacting standards demanded of the members of the bar. It bears to stress that “[t]he p ractice of law is a
privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these
standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.”[13]

Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal l awyer-client relationship between him and complainant
will not serve to mitigate his liability. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a
lawyer's private or professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another.[14]

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the penalty of disbarment proper in this case, as recommended
by Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors. Section 27, Rule 3 8 of the Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or othe r gross
misconduct in such office, xxx or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice xxx” (emphasis supplied)

The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.[15] Having carefully scrutinized
the records of this case, the Court therefore finds that the standard of substantial evidence has been more than
satisfied.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, having clearly violated his lawyer's oath and the Canons
of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and his name
ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's
personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.

PATRICIA FIGUEROA VS. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR.

SBC Case No. 519, July 31, 1997
ROMERO, J.:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after
unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant
petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that
respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.

The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent
and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies.
Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first
acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on
December 11, 1964.[1] It was after the child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would
marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than
twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter’s birthdays. Her trust in him and
their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent ma rried another woman. Hence, this petition.

Upon complainant’s motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On
February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant’s failure to
comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier
comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court
denied respondent’s motion to dismiss.

On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by
respondent on September 17, 1979.[2] Respondent’s third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court’s Resolution
dated September 15, 1982.[3] In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good standing
in the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a
lawyer.[4]
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case
for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer’s oath upon payment of the
required fees.[5]

Respondent’s hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to complainant’s
opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath -taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP’s report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take
the lawyer’s oath.

We agree.

Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971 because of the charges of gross immorality made by
complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also
claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.

We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from
the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a
doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute gros sly immoral conduct. The Court has held
that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. “A
grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincip led or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a high degree.”[6] It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of respectable members of the community.[7]

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang[8] quite relev ant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both
of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent,
is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplin ary sanction against him, even if as a
result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.[9]

Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do not find
complainant’s assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be
respondent’s girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and
intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to h ave sexual congress with him. Complainant was then
an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be
easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with anot her woman. We cannot
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be
entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of r evenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the
end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he
worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions ar e ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there
appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him.[10] Respondent, who is now sixty -two years of age, should thus
be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer’s oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take
his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
 LESLIE UI VS. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO
A.C. No. 3319, June 08, 2000
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an
immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon
City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Liann i, Lindsay and Carl
Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui,
was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime
in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa
City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her
office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent
admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and
Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then
on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and r espondent would come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued,
and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant th en
met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship
with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that
respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant
against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui
sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had
children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of
their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in
1985[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his
children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted t o let the children gradually to know
and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.[4]

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the
Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988,
respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos
Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu,
Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few
days after she reported to work with the law firm[5] she was connected with, th e woman who represented herself to
be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.

It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were marri ed abroad and
that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him.
Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother,
Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents' funds.[6] By way of
counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in th e amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against
complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.

In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos
Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that
the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui,
and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S.
No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:

Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents
allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos
Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by
complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast
Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they, a dmittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early
(sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant pu ts it, had
been prima facie established by complainant's evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the
"fact of respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house,
proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement
alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the
complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).

It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on the matter
support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Riza l to the Secretary of Justice, but the same
was dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui
lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Man ila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in
Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and
for submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of
respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on
October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to s ubstantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of
Marriage [11] duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department
of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the
date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22,
1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was
because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock.[12] It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183[13] and 184[14]
of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false
allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and
lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),[15] respondent averred that she did not have the
original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she anne xed
such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.

Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has
conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent
averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character for the
practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent c onducted herself in an immoral manner.[17]

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui
because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fac t, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that
the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his
courtship.[18]

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have
knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent
reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant
confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent
stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the
marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not p resent evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui
on this matter.

Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of
respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a
picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No.
PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,[19] does not prove that she acted in an imm oral manner. They
have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency
and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of
evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department
of Justice [21] to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship
with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her
conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagr ant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love
with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways
with him.

In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty.
Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man
which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respo ndent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio,
personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs.
Bonifacio was the Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her
parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant
likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a
document containing an intercalated date.

In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show
sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is
no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that
her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to
respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and
Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to
be single. The Commission does not find said cla im too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human
experience.

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single, separated, or without
any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single
women prefer single men.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the
United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of
1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other
because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be
considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim
that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode
destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.

x x x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated
December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respo ndent is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified
Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty."

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession
simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process,
once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege. It has been held -
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his convicti on of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.
The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight -laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed
him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave
birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil sta tus of Carlos Ui, she left him.

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple,
they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. P erhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not
have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out
more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that something was amiss in
her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For insta nce, respondent admitted that she
knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest
effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 198 7, Carlos Ui
never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering
respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion t hat respondent was imprudent in managing her personal
affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent
believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes condu ct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.[27]
Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[28]

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards."[29] Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral i ndifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the C ourt will exercise its
disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein
complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to
believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was
provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would veri ly recall
the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can
forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially
so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage
Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguar d the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is
hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage
Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more sever e sanction will be
imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.
 PEDRO L. LINSANGAN VS. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
A.C. No. 6672, September 04, 2009
CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office
against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients[2] to transfer
legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims.[4]
To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano
tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent's services
instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent's" calling card:[6]

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling
card.[7]

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discip line (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8]

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,[9] found that
respondent had encroached on the professiona l practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11]
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the
CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier
penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modif y the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant's professional practice in
violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct
themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer's services
are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST,
FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should
not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to
commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public's estimation and impair its ability to efficiently
render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.[14]
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO
SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY
SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN'S CAUSE.

This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry
and champerty.[18]

Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed
by Labiano and referred to respondent's office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as
profited from referrals' suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory
hearing.

Through Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano's word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment vi olating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of
the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

With regard to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal
another lawyer's client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees
for his services.[20] Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
receiving benefits from Labiano's "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano's connection to his office.[21]
Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another's legal practice. He cannot escape liability under
Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend mon ey to a client except, when in the interest
of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of just ice, he
has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer's fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash
bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer's independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not
be adversely affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire
devotion and fidelity to the client's cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client's case,
the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.[23]
Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own rec overy rather than that of his client, or to
accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
duty of undivided fidelity to the client's cause.[24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the Court's
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining empl oyment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to
protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the
legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients),
the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is
grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer's best advertisement is a well -
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.[27] For this
reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by public ation in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer's name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labiano's calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice clients
(who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions . Money was
dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal
profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule
that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano's calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of one year effective immedi ately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Suprem e Court of the
Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be
circulated to all courts.
So ordered.

JUAN DULALIA, JR. VS. ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ

A.C. NO. 6854 (FORMERLY CBD CASE NO. 04-1380), April 27, 2007
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged by Juan Dulalia, Jr.
(complainant) of violation Rules 1.01,[1] 6.02,[2] and 7.03[3] of the Code of Professional Respon sibility.

The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as follows:
Complainant's wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for the construction of a
warehouse. Despite compliance with all the requirements for the purpose, she failed to secure a permit, she attributing
the same to the opposition of respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal
Engineer and concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows, quot ed verbatim:
xxxx

This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F. Soriano, Spouses David Perez and Minerva
Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and Mrs. Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors.

It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the building of the abovenamed person has started
and that the undersigned and his family, and those other families mentioned above are respective owners of the
residential houses adjoining that of the high-rise building under construction of the said Mrs. Soriano -Dulalia. There
is no need to mention the unbearable nuisances that it creates and its adverse effects to the undersigned and his above
referred to clients particularly the imminent danger and damage to their properties, health and safety.

It was represented that the intended construction of the building would only be a regular and with standard height
building and not a high rise one but an inspection of the same would show otherwise. Note that its acc essory
foundation already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of the undersigned's residential house in particular, which
readily poses danger to their residential house and life.

To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property, los s of life and for the protection of the safety
of all the people concerned, they are immediately requesting for your appropriate action on the matter please at your
earliest opportune time.

Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of M eycauayan who is the Chief Legal Counsel of its
Legal Department, and by virtue of Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
he is inquiring if there was already full compliance on the part of the owner of the Building under construction with
the requirements provided for in Sections 301, 302 and 308 of the National Building Code and on the part of your
good office, your compliance with the provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same foregoing cited Building Code.

Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the non -compliance with said Sections 301, 302, 303
and 304 of the National Building Code by all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only to penalties
provided in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)

x x x x[4] (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied)

By complainant's claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit because of a personal grudge against
his wife Susan who objected to respondent's mar rying her first cousin Imelda Soriano, respondent's marriage with
Carolina Agaton being still subsisting.[5]
To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit[6] he filed against respondent before the
Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e)[7] of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (The Anti -Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c)[8] of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees).[9]

By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005,[10] the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, through
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the complaint in light of the following
findings:
The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that resp ondent allegedly opposes the application of his wife for a
building permit for the construction of their commercial building. One of the reason[s] stated by the complainant was
that his wife was not in favor of Imelda's relationship with respondent who is a married man. And the other reason is
that respondent was not authorized to represent his neighbors in opposing the construction of his building.

From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have satisfactorily answered all the charges an d
accusations of complainant. We find no clear, convincing and strong evidence to warrant the disbarment or
suspension of respondent. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred
against him until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant to overcome the
presumption and establish his charges by a clear preponderance of evidence. In the absence of the required evidence,
the presumption of innocence on the part of the lawyer continues and t he complaint against him should be dismissed
(In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman vs. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).
x x x x.[11] (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of June 25, 2005,[12] the Board of Governors of the IBP adopt ed and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.

Hence, the present Petition for Review[13] filed by complainant.

Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a second marriage with Imelda Sor iano
on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still
subsisting.

Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan to
oppose his wife's application for building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, complainant
maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03.

To his Comment,[14] respondent attached the July 29, 2005[15]Joint Resolution of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainant's complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Section 4 (a)
and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution reads:
x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of herein respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz addressed to
the Building official appears to be not an opposition for the issuance of complainant's building permit, but rather to
redress a wrong and an inquiry as to whether compliance with the requirements for the construction of an edifice has
been met. In fact, the Office of the Building Official after conducting an investigation found out that the re was [a]
violation of the Building Code for constructing without a building permit committed by herein complainant's wife
Susan Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order was issued. Records disclose fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the said
violation had been committed that Susan Dulalia applied for a building permit. As correctly pointed out by
respondent, the same is being processed pending approval by the Building Official and not of the Municipal Zoning
Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the allegation that respondent was engaged in the private practice of
his law profession despite being employed in the government as Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the
undersigned has taken into consideration the explanation and clarification made by the respondent to be justifiable
and meritorious. Aside from the bare allegations of herein complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate
the complaints against the respondent.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the charges of violating Rules 6.02 and 7.03
in order.

Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as Municipal Legal Officer to advance his own
personal interest against complainant and his wife.

As for respondent's September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that he opposed the application for building
permit. He just inquired whether complainant's wife fully complied with the requirements provided for by the
National Building Code, on top of expressing his concerns about "the danger and damages to their properties, health
and safety" occasioned by the construction of the building.

Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed on September 28, 2 004,[17] whereas the
questioned letter of respondent was priorly written and received on September 13, 2004 by the Municipal Engineer/
Building Official, who on the same day, ordered an inspection and issued a Cease and Desist Order/Notice stating
that "[f]ailure to comply with th[e] notice shall cause this office to instate proper legal action against you."[18]

Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 2005[19] from the Office of the Municipal Engineer showed,
complainant's wife eventually withdrew the application as she had not yet secured clearances from the Municipal
Zoning Administrator and from the barangay where the building was to be constructed.
Respecting complainant's charge that respondent engaged in an unauthorized private practice of l aw while he was the
Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a position coterminous to that of the appointing authority, suffice it to state
that respondent proffered proof that his private practice is not prohibited.[20]

It is, however, with respect to respondent's admitted contracting of a second marriage while his first marriage is still
subsisting that this Court finds respondent liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County, Nevada, USA,[21] when the Family
Code of the Philippines had already taken effect.[22] He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to have had the
impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code.[23] For while Article 256 of the
Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive application, there is a qualification thereunder that it
should not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or ot her laws.

Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as opposed to
grossly immoral conduct, connotes "conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community."[24] Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[25]

In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la C ruz,[26] this Court declared that the therein respondent's
act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting constituted immoral conduct, for
which he was suspended for two years after the mitigating following circumstances were considered:
After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not
been romantically involved with any woman;

His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for h is wife, whom he described to be very
intelligent person;

He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child went to Australia;

Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[27]

In respondent's case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the benefit of the doubt on his claim
that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable provision when he contracted the second marriage abroad. From
1985 when allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an allegation which was not refuted, until his marriage in 1989 with
Imelda Soriano, there is no showing that he was romantically involved with any woman. And, it is undisputed that his
first wife has remained an absentee even during the pendency of this case.

As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda Soriano. The com munity in which they
have been living in fact elected him and served as President of the IBP -Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999 and has been
handling free legal aid cases.

Respondent's misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at the t ime he contracted his second
marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude of his residential community towards his second marriage
notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.

As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a secon d marriage while the first marriage was still
in place as being contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[28]

In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students
and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and ju risprudence.
Respondent's claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the
United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines together with his second wife on
October 9, 1990 does not lie, as "ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith."

Apropos is this Court's pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:[29]

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the
rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well -informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with
legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.[30] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that a similar
infraction will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all
courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
 PCGG vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. NOS. 151809-12, April 12, 2005
PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar
to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to
recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had
extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings
on its current account with the Central Bank.[1] It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had
approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related i nterests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59%
was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency
loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK f ailed to recover
from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan
group submitted the winning bid.[5] Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with
the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation as
mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon
C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill -
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG,
on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a compl aint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo
Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan,
Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso
Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank),
Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune
Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp.,
Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco
Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development
Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then Presi dent Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several wri ts of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above -named persons by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify,
among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.[7] After the filing of the parties' comments, this Court
referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-
0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify r espondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et
al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005[8] and 0096 -0099.[9] The motions alleged
that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General[10] and counsel to Central Bank, "act ively intervened" in the
liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking
Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al.
when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank's officials on the procedure to bring about
GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance
in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila
and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former govern ment lawyers from accepting "engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG's motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.[11] It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on
behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.[12] It further ruled that respondent Mendoza's
appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one -year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former
public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the o ffice he used to
be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.[13] The PCGG did not seek
any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan' s Second Division to the Fifth
Division.[15] In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG's
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.[16] It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22 , 1991,
and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005.
The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5,
2001.[17]

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of
the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.[18] The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawye r from accepting employment in connection with any
matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time -bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive
the objection to respondent Mendoza's appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the reso lution in Civil Case No.
0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19]

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way
and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.

I
Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again,
the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts
of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or
collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was
directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It unde rscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as
superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including
specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falseho ods and a duty to explore settlement
alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees
and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader appli cation to all aspects of a
lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post -revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in
England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and proced ural rules to govern attorney
behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set
in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluct uated
within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards
of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional
core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post -revolutionary
period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.[20]

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century, American
legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New
York "Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight
statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal
educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the
broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought
a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid -nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than
the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations - e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath and
the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an
attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and
safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney -client privilege
and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties , with the likely exception of service to the
poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post -revolutionary periods, these standards were
isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more
comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal
ethics.[21]

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their pra ctice -
the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for
lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic
discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the
academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and
oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules of
law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re -emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar
associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but the y disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the
late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left
off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association a nd the American Bar
Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.[22]

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code
of Ethics was the model for several states' codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA)
1908 Canons of Ethics.[23]

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of
public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its
own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[24]

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns
was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from
private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and
influence garnered in government service."[25] These concerns were classified as adverse -interest conflicts' and
"congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former government
lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while
employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.[26] On the other hand,
"congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former
government lawyers.[27] For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons,
individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and ad ded thirteen new
canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified
them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts."[29] The rationale for
disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer's largely discretionary actions would be influenced
by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties
who might later become private practice clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. RETIREMENT FROM JUDICIAL POSITION OR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and
1937, respectively.[31]

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics.[32]

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful
revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the "adequacy
and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The committee re commended that the canons needed substantial revision, in
part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus
unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise obser ved that Canon 36 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in
matters during their employment with the government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in t he 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by
Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere.[34] In the cas e of Canon
9, DR 9-101(b)[35] became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the
Model Code.[36]

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth
by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA
adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the
conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give
better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enf orceable standards were the black letter Rules." The
Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing
comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules
made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.[37] In particular, the
ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of
anxious clients as well as the norm's indefinite nature.[38]

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local
customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court
promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility dea ls
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the word
"intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has
no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of
respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096 -0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless,
there remains the issue of whether there exists a "congruent -interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second,
the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The American
Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable
transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" whi ch was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while
he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the
"matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:[40]
The PCGG's Case for Atty. Mendoza's Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed
Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as couns el for
respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the
closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even
filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the
Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then
Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P.
Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the
Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The
pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following
procedure should be taken:

1)
Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been
made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be
reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.

2)
If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3)
The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing deci sion to liquidate the bank
and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4)
The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been
taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that
Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with
the court the petition for assistance in the bank's liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the
Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25,
1977, containing a report on the current situation o f Genbank;

Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24,
1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI -praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at
bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for
its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank
on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The
procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. - Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or
examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non -bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that
its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the
department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may,
upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the instit ution to do business in the Philippines
and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as
receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible colle ct and gather all the
assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes
including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non -bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non -bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of it s
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the
Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claim s
against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central
Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of
the receiver previously appointed by the Moneta ry Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient
speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non -bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to c reditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non -bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate cour t to collect and
recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if
there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its acti ons under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of th e court in which
the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The
restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a
bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond
of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by
the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they
are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the
restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non -bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business.
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non -insolvent bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions in the banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28 -A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liqu idate GENBANK is not the "matter"
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as
daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and
cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the
definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which
is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No.
0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself i nvolved was in informing Central Bank on the
procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, ther efore, is not the
same nor is related to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are
ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to
Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill -gotten is far removed from the issue
of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others,
to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of
GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the
dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor Gener al in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means,
viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between
points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to
occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)[41]
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others.[42]
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene"
includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.[43]
Under the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings.[44] We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention"
under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by
the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as "x x x
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law."

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which
he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code
restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in
the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the
rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No . 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be
signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual
participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long
number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed
merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type
of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of
the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court
litigator protecting the interest of government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the
IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take -off from similar efforts
especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is
still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibili ty, the Court took account
of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end
without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to ca use a chilling
effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match
compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation.
The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them
defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in
private practice.[45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too
great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty
which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified.[46]
Indeed, "to make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter."[47]

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as
well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an
opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tac tical
use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its
choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in
recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary."[48] Even the United States Supreme Court
found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals' description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game."[49] In the
case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify re spondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after
PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fa ct, the recycled motion for
disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify
in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not
only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has c onfidence.[51] The client with a
disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter.[52] The effects of this
prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial o f due process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the security
of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge
official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee
who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom."[53] He adds: "Any system that affects
the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
independence."[54] The case at bar involves the position o f Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent
Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to rec ommend acquittal of the innocent; it is
this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue
dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the ru le of law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his
profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all
members of his law firm.[55] Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal
profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well
observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best[56] which can lead to
untoward results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government
attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government -client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect.[58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theo ry has been rejected in
the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct[59] and some courts have abandoned per se disqualification
based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the
defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.[60]

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who
"switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee may
compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at
bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure ho w to
liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the
sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential
official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be
bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent
Mendoza is not working against the interest of Cen tral Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity
of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide
instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent
Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides
are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service.[61] The example
given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or s he is
currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the
Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government
policies."[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably excessive."[64] He opines "x x x it is hard
to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hidi ng someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client -
the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the "best" government lawyers - the
ones who were hardest to beat - not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates."[65] But again, this particular
concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central
Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed,
he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of former
officials" or their "clout."[66] Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the
rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employee's influence may actually be the power or
authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x."[67] More, he
contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea
that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship ra ther than on the merit says more about the
present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal
officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the off icials will tend to disfavor
their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism."[68]

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the
rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that
(1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by
this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot,
by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied
without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially
addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.

CONCURRING OPINION

SANDOVAL - GUTIERREZ, J.:

I join Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his ponencia. Motions to disqualify counsel from representing their clients must
be viewed with jaundiced eyes, for oftentimes they pose the very threat to the integrity of the judicial process.[1] Such
motions are filed to harass a particular counsel, to delay the litigation, to intimidate adversary, or for other strategic
purposes. It therefore behooves the courts to always look for the parties' inner motivations in filing such motions.

This case illustrates the sad reality that the filing of motions for disqualification may be motivated, not by a fine sense
of ethics or sincere desire to remove from litigation an unethical practitioner, but to achieve a tactical advantage.

The facts are undisputed.

Subsequent to the downfall of President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986, came the first edict[2] of President Corazon C.
Aquino creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the ill -gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their subordinates, and associates.

PCGG's initial target was Lucio Tan and the above -named private respondents (Tan et al., for brevity). It issued
several writs of sequestration on their properties and business enterprises. To nullify such writs, Tan et al. filed with
this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. On February 15, 1990, after comments thereon were
submitted, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were raffled to it
Fifth Division, docketed as follows:
(a) Civil Case No. 0095 - Sipalay Trading Corp. vs. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG's Order dated July 24,
1986 sequestering Lucio Tan's shares of stocks in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation (Century Park Sheraton
Hotel);

(b) Civil Case No. 0096 - Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corp., Iris Holding and Development Corp.,
Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG's Order
dated June 19, 1986 sequestering the shares of stocks in Allied B anking Corporation held by and/or in the name of
respondents Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development
Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc.;
(c) Civil Case No. 0097 -- Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos,
Jr. and Foremost Farms, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG's Order dated August 12, 1986 sequestering
the shares of stocks in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Kha o Tan, Florencio
T. Santos, Natividad Santos and Florencio N. Santos, Jr.;

(d) Civil Case No. 0098 - Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. and Fortune Tabacco C orp. v. PCGG., which seeks to nullify the
PCGG's Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stocks in Fortune Tobacco Corp. held by and /or in the
name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Flor encio N.
Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc.; and

(e) Civil Case No. 0099 -- Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos
and Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG's Order dated July 24, 1986 se questering the
shares of stocks in Shareholdings, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano
Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos and Natividad Santos.

(f) Civil Case No. 0100 - Allied Banking Corp. vs. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG's Search and Seizure
Order dated August 13, 1986, issued on bank documents of Allied Banking Corp. [3]
Civil Cases Nos. 0096 and 0100 involve Tan, et al.'s shares of stocks in the Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank).

Meanwhile, on July 17, 1987, the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against Tan et al. This time, the case
was raffled to the Second Division, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 0005. Among the properties sought to be
reconveyed were Tan et al.'s shares of stocks in the Allied Bank.

Since 1987, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza has been the counsel for Tan et al. in all the above cases. But it was not until
February 5, 1991, or after four years, that the PCGG filed three (3) identical motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza. In
Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, PCGG filed a motion to disqualify him. It filed another similar motion in Civil Case No.
0100. The last motion was filed in Civil Case No. 0005. His disqualification was sought under Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which reads:
Rule 6.03. - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
In each motion, PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza, then Solicitor General of the Marcos Administration, "actively
intervened" in the liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), subsequently acquired by Tan et al.
and became Allied Bank. PCGG's allegations are similar in every aspect, thus:
"(1) He was the former Solicitor General of the Republic of the Philippines for almost 14 years appearing on behalf of
the Republic in multitudes of cases.

(2) The records show that, as then Solicitor General, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza appeared as counsel for the Central
Bank of the Philippines in Special Proceedings No. 107812, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, in
connection with the Central Bank's Petition for assistance in the Liquidation of General bank and Trust Company
(herein called "Genbank", for brevity). The records also show that Defendant Lucio Tan and his group were the same
persons who acquired Genbank's assets, liabilities and interest.

(3) Consequently, Atty. Mendoza's appearance as counsel for the Defendant herein runs counter to the long -cherished
ethical canon of the legal profession which prohibits a counsel to appear in litigation adverse to the interests of his
former client. Interpreting this sanction, jurisprudence has held, that:
'The lawyer's obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and to keep his confidences, also forbid the
lawyer from accepting retainers or employment from others in matters adve rsely affecting any interest of the client
with respect to which confidence has been reposed in him. (Canon of Professional Ethics, 6). The prohibition stands
even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have
been honest. (5 Am. Jur. 296).'
(4) The reason for the prohibition is obvious. Apart from the obligation to keep inviolate the prior relationship
between counsel and his former client, such counsel obtains material information in confidence. Consequently, he
should not be allowed to represent a party with adverse interest to his former client, arising out of the very
transaction subject of the former relationship.

(5) In the case at bar, it should be stressed that Defendant Lucio Tan and his group acquired the assets and liabilities
of Genbank. This manner of acquisition has been alleged to have been fraudulent, arbitrary and a product of collusion
between them and the Central Bank officials. (Refer to Criminal Case No. 005 pending before this Honorable Court.)
Atty. Mendoza's appearance as counsel for Defendants, clearly violates the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that:
'A lawyer shall not after leaving the government service accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service.' (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6, Rule 6.03)'
(6) In the liquidation of Genbank and its eventual acquisition by Lucio Tan and his group, Atty. Mendoza, as
Solicitor-General, personally advised the Central Bank officials on the procedure to bring about Genbank's
liquidation. In the Memorandum for the Governor of the Central Bank dated March 29, 1977 (signed by the following
subordinates of then CB Governor Gregorio Licaros, namely: Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas (deceased),
Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, Deputy Governor & General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, Special Asst. to the
Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, Asst. to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and Direct or Antonio T. Castro, Jr.), the
following portion disclosed Atty. Mendoza's participation:
'Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General (atty. Mendoza) and he advised that
the following procedure should be taken:

'(1) Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been
made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank cannot be
reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.

'(2) If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

(3) The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the
bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

(4) The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had
been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank."
Plainly stated, it was Atty. Mendoza who was the legal author of the closure of Genbank and the ev entual sale to Mr.
Lucio Tan and his Group. Clearly, Atty. Mendoza should be disqualified in this case."
On April 22, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[4] in Civil Case No. 0005 denying PCGG's motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza.

On May 7, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[5] in Civil Case No. 0100 also denying PCGG's similar
motion.

Motions for reconsideration were filed but to no avail. The PCGG took no further action. These Resolutions,
therefore, became final and executory.

Subsequently, in a Decision dated August 23, 1996, the Sandiganbayan jointly granted Tan et al.'s petitions in Civil
Cases Nos. 0095 and 0100. On March 29, 1996, this Court, in G.R. Nos. 112708 -09[6] affirmed the said Decision. The
PCGG neither assigned as error nor mentioned the Sandiganbayan's denial of its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
in Civil Case No. 0100.

In the interim, the PCGG's motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096 -0099 remained pending with
the Sandiganbayan. It was only on July 11, 2001, or after ten (10) years, that it denied the PCGG's motion by merely
adopting its Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 denying a similar motion, thus:
"Acting on the PCGG's "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P. MEND OZA AS COUNSEL FOR
PETITIONER" dated February 5,1991 which appears not to have been resolved by then Second Division of this
Court, and it appearing that (1) the motion is exactly the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005
as in fact, Atty. Mendoza in his "OPPOSITION" dated March 5, 1991 manifested that he was just adopting his
opposition to the same motion filed by PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Court's Order dated March
7,1991, the herein incident was taken-up jointly with the said same incident in Civil Case No. 0005 (pp.134 -135,Vol. I,
Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this Division hereby reiterates and adopts the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil
Case No. 0005 of the Second Division (pp.1418 -1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. 0005) denying the said
motion as its Resolution in the case at bar."[7]
The PCGG moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but was denied. In the Resolution dated
December 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan ruled:
"Acting on respondent PCGG's "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" dated August 1, 2001 praying for the
reconsideration of the Court's Resolution dated July 12, 2001 denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P.
Mendoza as counsel for petitioners, to which petitioners have filed an "OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1, 2001" dated August 29, 2001, as well as the respondent's "REPLY (To
Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration)" dated November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel in these cases was exactly the same in substance as that motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 (re:Republic vs. Lucio Tan, et al.) and the resolutions of this
Court (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying the main motion as well as of the motion for reconsideration
thereof had become final and executory when PCGG failed to elevate the said resolutions to the Supreme Court, the
instant motion is hereby DENIED.[8]
Hence, the PCGG's present petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096 -0099.

Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., in his Dissent, granted the petit ion. On the procedural issues, he ruled that the
assailed Resolutions dated July 11 and December 5, 2001 denying PCGG's motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza are
interlocutory orders, hence, in challenging such Resolutions, certiorari is the proper remedy, no t appeal, as invoked by
Tan et al. Based on the same premise, he likewise rejected Tan et al.'s claim that the Resolution dated April 22, 1991
in Civil Case No. 0005 constitutes a bar to similar motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the doctrine of res
judicata.

On the substantive aspect, Mr. Justice Callejo's Dissent states that Atty. Mendoza violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. According to him, Atty. Mendoza's acts of (a) advising the Central Bank on how to
proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK, and (b) filing Special Proceedings No. 107812, a petition by the Central
Bank for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK, with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila,
constitute "intervention." And that while it may be true that his posture in Civil Cases Nos. 0096 -0099 is not adverse
to the interest of the Central Bank, still, he violated the proscription under the "congruent -interest representation
conflict" doctrine.

Crucial to the resolution of the present controver sy are the following queries:
(1) Is certiorari the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated July 11 and December 5, 2001
denying the PCGG's motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096 -0099?

(2) May Sandiganbayan Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 be considered a bar to similar motions
to disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the doctrine of res judicata?

(3) Does Atty. Mendoza's participation in the liquidation of GENBANK constitute intervention?
There are some important points I wish to stress at this incipient stage. I believe they should be considered if we are
to arrive at a fair resolution of this case. The scattershot manner in which the PCGG filed the various motions to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza shows its intent to harass him and Tan et al. It may be recalled that the PCGG filed three (3)
identical motions, one in Civil Cases Nos. 0096 -0099, another in Civil Case No. 0100 and the last one in Civil Case
No. 0005. Of these cases, only Civil Cases Nos. 009 6, 0100 and 0005 actually involve Tan et al.'s shares of stocks in
the Allied Bank. Civil Cases Nos. 0097, 0098 and 0099 have entirely different subject matter. Thus, insofar as these
cases are concerned, the motions to disqualify lack substantive merit. W hy then would the PCGG file identical
motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in these unrelated cases? Its intention is suspect. To subject Tan et al. to
numerous and baseless motions to disqualify their lawyer is, no doubt, a form of harassment.

As this juncture, it is important to emphasize that in evaluating motions to disqualify a lawyer, our minds are not
bound by stringent rules. There is room for consideration of the combined effect of a party's right to counsel of his
own choice, an attorney's interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client of replacing disqualified
counsel, and any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding.[9]

I. Whether the PCGG's proper

remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions dated July 11 and
December 5, 2001 is appeal, not
certiorari.

The bottom line of this issue lies on how we categorize an order denying a motion to disqualify an opposing party's
counsel. Is it interlocutory or final?

An order is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in
the lower court.[10] On the other hand, an interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which
does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial c ourt in order to settle and determine the
entire controversy.[11]

In Antonio vs. Samonte,[12] this Court defined a final judgment, order or decree as "one that finally disposes of,
adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some rights or rights of the par ties, either on the entire controversy or on
some definite and separate branch, thereof and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside x x x." In De la
Cruz v. Paras,[13] it was held that a court order is final in character if "it puts an end t o the particular matter resolved
or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of," such that no further questions can come before the court except
the execution of the order. In Day v. Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City,[14] this Court ruled that an order
which decides an issue or issues in a complaint is final and appealable, although the other issue or issues have not
been resolved, if the latter issues are distinct and separate from others.

With the foregoing disquisition as basis, it is my vie w that an order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is final and,
therefore, appealable. The issue of whether or not Atty. Mendoza should be disqualified from representing Tan et al.
is separable from, independent of and collateral to the main issues in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099. In short, it is
separable from the merits. Clearly, the present petition for certiorari, to my mind, is dismissible.

II. Whether the Resolution dated April

22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005
constitutes a bar to similar motions to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the
doctrine of res judicata.

I am convinced that the factual circumstances of this case justify the application of res judicata.

The ponente refuses to apply res judicata on the ground that the Sandignbayan Resolution da ted April 22, 1991 in
Civil Case No. 0005 is just an interlocutory order.

Assuming arguendo that an order denying a motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is indeed an intelocutory order, still, I
believe that res judicata applies.

It will be recalled that on August 23, 1996, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision granting Tan et al.'s petitions in
Civil Cases Nos. 0095 and 0100. Such Decision reached this Court in G.R. Nos. 112708 -09.[15] On March 29, 1996,
we affirmed it. The PCGG could have assigned or rais ed as error in G.R. Nos. 112708-09 the Sandiganbayan
Resolution dated May 7, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0100 denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza but it did not.
The fact that a final Decision therein has been promulgated by this Court renders the Re solution dated May 7, 1991
beyond review. The PCGG may not relitigate such issue of disqualification as it was actually litigated and finally
decided in G.R. Nos. 112707-09.[16] To rule otherwise is to encourage the risk of inconsistent judicial rulings on the
basis of the same set of facts. This should not be countenanced. Public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of
judicial time and the interest of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability should be
accorded judicial rulings and that controversies once decided shall remain in repose, and that there be an end to
litigation.[17]

III. Whether Atty. Mendoza's

participation in the liquidation of
GENBANK constitutes intervention.

As stated earlier, Atty. Mendoza is sought to be disqualified under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states:
Rule 6.03. - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened whi le in said service.
In determining whether Atty. Mendoza committed a breach of this Rule, certain factual predicates should be
established, thus: (a) in connection with what "matter" has Atty. Mendoza accepted an engagement or employment
after leaving the government service?; (b) in connection with what "matter" did he intervene while in government
service?; and (c) what acts did he particularly perform in "intervening" in connection with such "matter"?

The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as Solicitor General, "actively intervened" in the closure and liquidation of
GENBANK. As primary evidence of such intervention, it cited his act of filing Special Proceedings No. 107812 with
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila; and the Memorandum dated Ma rch 29, 1977 of certain key officials
of the Central Bank stating that he (Atty. Mendoza) advised them of the procedure to be taken in the liquidation of
GENBANK and that he was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to such liquidation.

Tan et al. denied Atty. Mendoza's alleged "intervention," claiming that when he filed Special Proceedings No. 107812
with the CFI of Manila, the decision to prohibit GENBANK from doing business had already been made by the
Central Bank Monetary Board. Also, Atty. Mendoza, in appearing as their counsel in Civil Cases Nos. 0096 -0099, does
not take a position adverse to his former client, the Central Bank.

The first concern in assessing the applicability of the Rule is the definition of "matter." The American Bar As sociation
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility stated in its Formal Opinion 342 that:
"Although a precise definition of "matter" as used in the Disciplinary Rule is difficult to formulate, the term seems to
contemplate a discrete and isolatable transaction or set of transactions between identifiable parties. Perhaps the scope
of the term "matter" may be indicated by examples. The same lawsuit or litigation is the same matter. The same issue
of fact involving the same parties and the same situ ation or conduct is the same matter. By contrast, work as a
government employee in drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations, or laws, or
in briefing abstract principles of law, does not disqualify the lawyer under DR 9-101 (B) from subsequent private
employment involving the same regulations, procedures, or points of law; the same "matter" is not involved because
there is lacking the discrete, identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and sp ecific parties.
In the case at bar, the Court's task is to determine whether Special Proceedings No. 107812 falls within the concept of
"matter." This must be analyzed in relation with Civil Case No. 0096. Anent Civil Cases Nos. 0097, 0098 and 0099,
there is no doubt that they do not involve the shares of stocks of Tan et al. in Allied Bank. Thus, only Special
Proceedings No. 107812 and Civil Case No. 0096 must be considered.

Special Proceedings No. 107812 is a "petition by the Central Bank for Assistance in the Liquidation of General Bank
and Trust Company" filed by Atty. Mendoza as Solicitor General. The parties therein are the Central Bank of the
Philippines and Arnulfo B. Aurellano, on the one hand, and the Worldwide Insurance & Surety Company, Midland
Insurance Corporation, Standard Insurance Co., Inc and General Bank & Trust Company, on the other. The issues,
among others, are whether or not the Central Bank acted in good faith in ordering the liquidation of GENBANK;
and, whether the bidding for GENBANK is a sham.

Civil Case No. 0096 is for the annulment of various sequestration orders issued by the PCGG over Tan et al.'s
properties. The parties therein are Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corporation, Iris Holdings &
Development Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., and Jewel Holdings, Inc., as petitioners, and the PCGG,
as respondent. The issues here are "whether the Sequestration Order issued by the PCGG on June 19, 1986 over the
shares of stocks in Allied Bank of Lucio C. Tan and h is co-petitioners in Civil Case No. 0096 was issued without
notice, hearing and evidence."

A careful perusal of the above distinctions shows that the two cases are different in all aspects, such as the parties,
issues, facts and relief sought. Special Proceedings No. 107812 cannot therefore be considered a "matter" in
connection with which Atty. Mendoza accepted his engagement as counsel in Civil Case No. 0096. The connection
between the two cases, if there be, is very minimal as to give rise to the applic ation of the proscription.

As aptly stated by Justice Puno:

"But more important, the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved
in Civil Case No. 0096. Again the bald facts speak for themselves. It is given that Atty. Mendoza had nothing to do
with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale
of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the
procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK through the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" Sp. Proc. No. 107812, however, is not the same
nor related to but different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the
sequestration of the stocks owned by Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill - gotten. The
case does not involve the liquidation of GENB ANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.
Whether the shares of stocks of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill -gotten is far removed from the issue of the
dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the
banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not
an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
Atty. Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on
a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096."
As Solicitor General, Atty. Mendoza represented the Republic of the Philippines in every case where it was involved.
As a matter of practice and procedure, he signed every pleading prepared by his Associates. Taking this into
consideration, will it be just to disqualify him in all the cases containing pleadings bearing his signature? The answer
must be in the negative. His disqualification might be too harsh a penalty for one who had served the government
during the best years of his life and with all his legal expertise.

Webster Dictionary[18] defines "intervene" as "to come or happen between two points of time or events;" "to come
or be in between as something unnecessary or irrelevant;" or "to come between a s an influencing force. The ponencia
defines "to intervene" as "to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance." "Intervention" is
interference that may affect the interest of others. Corollarily, the counterpart of Rule 6.03 is the Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 9-101 (B) of the American Bar Association (ABA), thus:
A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a manner in which he had "substantial responsibility" while he was a
public employee.
Substantial responsibility envisages a lawyer having such a heavy responsibility for the matter in question that it is
likely he becomes

personally and substantially involve in the investigative or deliberative processes regarding the matter.[19] Since the
word "intervene" has two connotations, one affecting interest of others and one done merely in influencing others,
Rule 6.03 should be read in the context of the former. To interpret it otherwise is to enlarge the coverage of Rule
6.03. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the dra fters of our Code of Professional Responsibility.

Further, that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent papers relative to the liquidation of GENBANK is not
sufficient to disqualify him in Civil Case No. 0096. In Laker Airway Limited v. Pan Americ an World Airways,[20] it
was held that:
"Like the case law, policy considerations do not support the disqualification of a government attorney merely because
during his government service he had access to information about a corporation which subsequently turned out to
become an opponent in a private lawsuit. If the law were otherwise, the limiting language of the Disciplinary Rule
could be bypassed altogether by the simple claim that an attorney may have viewed confidential information while
employed by the government, and government lawyers would face perpetual disqualification in their subsequent
practices."
In fine, I fully concur in Justice Puno's Dissent that "Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot
apply to Atty. Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Special Proceedings No. 107812
is an intervention in a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the instant petition for certiorari.

SEPARATE OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Petition in this case should be DISMISSED on two grounds: (1) res judicata, specifically, conclusiveness of
judgment; and (2) prescription.

In his Dissent, the esteemed Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr. argues that Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza violated Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility,[1] because after leaving his post as solicitor general, he appeared as counsel
in a "matter in which he had intervened while he was in said service" (as solicitor general). He postul ates that the
Code of Professional Responsibility should be a beacon to assist good lawyers "in navigating an ethical course through
the sometimes murky waters of professional conduct," in order "to avoid any appearance of impropriety." He adds
that the Code should be strictly construed and stringently enforced.

On the other hand, the distinguished Justice Reynato S. Puno contends in his ponencia that Rule 6.03 of the Code has
been incorrectly applied by Justice Callejo, because the "procedural advice" giv en by Atty. Mendoza is not the
"matter" contemplated by the said Rule. The ponencia explains that an "ultra restrictive reading of the Rule" would
have "ill-effects in our jurisdiction."

With due respect to both Justices Puno and Callejo, I respectfully s ubmit that there is no need to delve into the
question of whether Rule 6.03 has been transgressed; there is no need to discuss the merits of the questioned
Sandiganbayan Resolutions allowing Atty. Mendoza to represent private respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.
After all, a Resolution issued by the same court resolving the very same issue on the "disqualification" of Atty.
Mendoza in a case involving the same parties and the same subject matter has already become final and immutable. It
can no longer be altered or changed.

I believe that the material issue in the present controversy is whether Atty. Mendoza may still be barred from
representing these respondents despite (1) a final Order in another case resolving the very same ground for
disqualification involving the same parties and the same subject matter as the present case; and (2) the passage of a
sufficient period of time from the date he ceased to be solicitor general to the date when the supposed disqualification
(for violation of the Code) was raised.

Conclusiveness
of Judgment

The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the relevant part of which I
quote as follows:
"Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.
" The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity; and

"(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto."
The above provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment. Under the first concept, res judicata serves as an absolute proscription of a subsequent
action when the following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment or order was final; (2) it adjudged the pertinent
issue or issues on their merits; (3) it was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) between the first and the second actions, there was identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes
of action.[2]

In regard to the fourth requirement, if there is no identity of causes of action but only an identity of issues, res
judicata exists under the second concept; that is, under conclusiveness of judgment. In the latter concept, the rule
bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues involving the same pa rties but on different claims or causes of
action.[3] Such rule, however, does not have the same effect as a bar by former judgment, which prohibits the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.

In other words, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue,
judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction; it has thus been
conclusively settled by a judgment or final order iss ued therein. Insofar as the parties to that action (and persons in
privity with them) are concerned, and while the judgment or order remains unreversed or un -vacated by a proper
authority upon a timely motion or petition, such conclusively settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any
future or other action between the same parties or their privies, in the same or in any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, the only identities requ ired for the operation
of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is that between parties and issues.[4]

While it does not have the same effect as a bar by former judgment, which proscribes subsequent actions,
conclusiveness of judgment nonetheless operates as an estoppel to issues or points controverted, on which the
determination of the earlier finding or judgment has been anchored.[5] The dictum laid down in such a finding or
judgment becomes conclusive and continues to be binding between the same p arties, as long as the facts on which
that judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the court. The binding effect and
enforceability of that dictum can no longer be re -litigated, since the said issue or matter has already been resolved and
finally laid to rest in the earlier case.[6]

Relevant Antecedents
Showing the Application of the
Conclusiveness Doctrine

Let me now discuss some relevant antecedents to show the application to this case of res judicata, specificall y the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment.

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1 of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) issued sometime in June to August 1986 several Writs of Sequestration over certain properties
of Respondents Lucio Tan et al., properties they had supposedly acquired by taking advantage of their close
relationship with former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
On August 17, 1987, the PCGG instituted before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint aga inst the same respondents for
"reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" vis -à-vis their sequestered properties. The Complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 and raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan (SBN).

Meanwhile, in separate Petitions before this Court, the validity of the sequestration Writs was questioned by herein
respondents, but said Petitions were referred by the Court to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases
were raffled to the SBN Fifth Division and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096, 0097, 0098 and 0099. Civil Case No.
0096, in particular, involved the validity of the Writ of Sequestration issued by the PCGG over herein private
respondents' shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation (form erly General Bank and Trust Company or
"GenBank").

In all the above-mentioned cases, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza was the counsel of Tan et al.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed in Civil Case No. 0005 a Motion[7] to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
therein Respondents Tan et al. In a Resolution[8] dated April 22, 1991, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) denied
that Motion. The anti-graft court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the PCGG.[9] Because the
latter did not appeal the denial, the Resolution became final and executory.

Similarly, in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099, PCGG filed a Motion[10] to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
Respondents Lucio Tan et al. According to respondent court, "the motion is exactly the same in substance as that
motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005"; in fact, both incidents were taken up jointly by the Second and the Fifth
Divisions of the Sandiganbayan.[11] Indeed, a perusal of both Motions reveals that, except as to their respective
captions, the contents of the Motions are identically worded. Both Motions were anchored essentially on the same
ground: that by virtue of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Mendoza was prohibited from
acting as counsel of Tan et al. in the pe nding cases. During his tenure as solicitor general, Atty. Mendoza had allegedly
"intervened" in the dissolution of GenBank, Allied Bank's predecessor.

Thus, in its herein assailed July 11, 2001 Resolution, respondent court resolved to reiterate and adopt "the Resolution
dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division x x x denying the motion."

Resolution in Civil Case

No. 0005 a Final Order

As distinguished from an interlocutory order, a final judgment or order decisively puts an end to (or disposes of) a
case or a disputed issue; in respect thereto, nothing else -- except its execution -- is left for the court to do. Once that
judgment or order is rendered, the adjudicative task of the court on the particular matter involved is likewi se
ended.[12] Such an order may refer to the entire controversy or to some defined and separate branch thereof.[13] On
the other hand, an order is interlocutory if its effects are merely provisional in character and still leave substantial
proceedings to be further conducted by the issuing court in order to put the issue or controversy to rest.[14]

I have no quarrel with the general test -- expounded, with acknowledged authorities, in the Dissenting Opinions of
Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Callejo -- for determining whether an order is interlocutory. Such test, however,
applies to orders that dispose of incidents or issues that are intimately related to the very cause of action or merits of
the case. The exception lies when the order refers to a "de finite and separate branch" of the main controversy, as held
by the Court in Republic v. Tacloban City Ice Plant.[15]

Under the present factual milieu, the matter of disqualification of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents is a
"defined and separate branch" of the main case for "reversion, reconveyance, and restitution" of the sequestered
properties. This matter has no direct bearing on the adjudication of the substantive issues in the principal controversy.
The final judgment resolving the main case d oes not depend on the determination of the particular question raised in
the Motion. The April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 had finally
and definitively determined the issue of Atty. Mendoza's disqualifi cation to act as counsel for Tan et al. Since that
Resolution was not appealed, it became final and executory. It became a conclusive judgment insofar as that particular
question was concerned.

Applying the Doctrine of

Conclusiveness of Judgment

There is no question as regards the identity of the parties involved in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096. Neither has the
jurisdiction of the Second and the Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan been placed at issue. Clearly, the matter raised
in the two Motions to Disqualify, though separately filed at different times in those two cases, are likewise the same
or identical. Also undisputed is the fact that no appeal or certiorari petition was taken from the April 22, 1991
Resolution of the Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005, which had denied PCGG's Motion.

To counter the application of res judicata, Justices Morales and Callejo opine that the said April 22, 1991 Resolution
was merely interlocutory. It "merely settled an incidental or collateral matter x x x; it can not operate to bar the filing
of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other cases x x x," Justice Callejo explains. I beg to disagree.

True, there is, as yet, no final adjudication of the merits of the main issues of "reversion, reconveyance and
restitution." However, I submit that the question with respect to the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza had
nonetheless been conclusively settled. Indeed, the April 22, 1991 SBN Resolution had definitively disposed of the
Motion to Disqualify on its merits. Since no appeal was taken therefrom, it became final and executory after the lapse
of the reglementary period.[16]

While it merely disposed of a question that was collateral to the main controversy, the Resolution should be
differentiated from an ordinary interlocutory order that resolves an incident arising from the very subject matter or
cause of action, or one that is related to the disposition of the main substantive issues of the case itself. Such an order
is not appealable, but may still be mod ified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds adduced before final judgment.
Verily, res judicata would not apply therein.[17]

But, as illustrated earlier, the issue of the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza is separate from and independent of the
substantive issues in the main case for "reversion, reconveyance and restitution." This particular question, in relation
to Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, was finally settled in the Resolution of April 22, 1991, issued
by the SBN Second Division. In fact, I submit that this question had to be squarely resolved before trial proceeded, so
as not to prejudice the movant in case its arguments were found to be meritorious. Otherwise, the Motion would be
rendered naught.

In 2001, ten years after its filing, the identical Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case Nos. 0096 -0099
finally came up for deliberation before the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan. The Fifth Division correctly noted
that the pending Motion was "exactly the same in subst ance as that Motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005." Thus, it
resolved to reiterate and adopt the Second Division's April 22, 1991 Resolution denying the Motion. Interestingly and
understandably, the Fifth Division of the anti -graft court no longer separately reviewed the merits of the Motion
before it, because the Second Division's Resolution disposing of exactly the same Motion and involving the same
parties and subject matter had long attained finality. That Resolution became a conclusive judgment between the
parties with respect to the subject matter involved therein.

Exception to Application of
Conclusiveness of Judgment

Justice Morales further cites Kilosbayan v. Morato,[18] in which the Court[19] said that "the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially
unrelated claims are involved." Explaining further, the Court cited therein the "authoritative formulation" of the
exception in Restatement of the Law 2d, on Judgments, thus:
"§28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the
following circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new
determination is warranted in order to take account or a n intervening change in the applicable legal context or
otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws; x x x. [Emphasis and omissions in the original.]"
In accordance with the above exception to the rule, Justice Morales believes that the doctr ine of conclusiveness of
judgment does not apply to this case, because the issue at bar -- disqualification of counsel -- "is undoubtedly a legal
question" and "Civil Case No. 005 and Civil Case No. 0096 involve two different substantially unrelated claims ."

I respectfully disagree with respect to her second point, which actually qualifies the exception. I believe that the two
cases involve substantially related claims. Civil Case No. 0005 seeks to recover alleged ill -gotten shares of stock of
respondents Tan et al. in Allied Bank. Civil Case No. 0096 questions the validity of the Sequestration Writ over the
same shares of stock involved in Civil Case No. 0005. In the ultimate analysis, both cases refer to the determination
of who has a valid ownership claim over said stockholdings.

In any event and as earlier discussed, in our jurisdiction, the only identities required for the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment to operate as an estoppel are those of parties and issues.[20]

Similar Motions in
Other PCGG Cases

Parenthetically, it is worth mentioning that in their Memorandum,[21] Respondents Tan et al. aver that similar
Motions to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza were likewise filed in Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0095 and 0100. The former
case, Sipalay Trading v. PCGG, involved shares of stock of Lucio Tan in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation; the
latter case, Allied Banking Corporation v. PCGG, sought the invalidation of an Order for the search and seizure of
certain documents of Allied Bank.

In both cases, the Sandiganbayan denied the separate Motions to Disqualify, as well as the Motions for
Reconsideration. No further actions were taken by the PCGG on such denials, which thus became executory.
Consequently, Atty. Mendoza was allowed to represent Lucio Tan in those cases.

On the merits of the said cases, which were consolidated, the Sandiganbayan granted both Petitions on August 23,
1993, by nullifying the Writ of Sequestration questioned in Civil Case No. 0095, as well as the Search and Seizure
Order assailed in Civil Case No. 0100. On March 29, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the SBN's Decision in the
aforementioned consolidated cases.[22] Consequently, now deemed res judicata are all issues raised in Civil Case Nos.
0095 and 0100 -- principal, incidental and corollary issues, including the matter of the alleged disqualification of Atty.
Mendoza.

Presence of Identities of
Parties and Issues

As earlier discussed, the only identities required for the principle of conclusiveness of judgment to operate a s an
estoppel are those of parties and issues. In the case before us, both identities are clearly present. Hence, the principle
of conclusiveness of judgment applies and bars the present Petition.

From the foregoing, I submit that this Petition should be dismissed on the ground of conclusiveness of judgment.
Parenthetically, the proper recourse to assail the July 11, 2001 and the December 5, 2001 Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the R ules of Court. The
certiorari proceeding before this Court is apparently a substitute for a lost appeal, deserving only of outright
dismissal.[23] In any event, contrary to the allegations of petitioner, respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolutions.

Proscription
Time-Barred

True, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility does not expressly specify the period of its applicability or
enforceability. However, I submit that one cannot infer that, ergo, the prohibition is absolute, perpetual and
permanent.

All civil actions have a prescriptive period.[24] Unless a law makes an action imprescriptible or lays down no other
period, the action is subject to a bar by prescription five (5) years after the right of action accrued.[25] Criminal
offenses -- even the most heinous ones -- as well as the penalties therefor, likewise prescribe.[26] Relatedly, even so -
called perpetual penalties and multiple sentences have maximum periods.[27]

Relevantly, it is worth pointing out that Republic Act No. 6713 prohibits public officers and employees from
practicing their profession for only one year after their resignation, retirement or separation from public office, in
connection with any matter before their former office.[28]

Prescription is intended to suppress stale and fraudulent claims arising from transactions or facts that have been
obscured by defective memory or the lapse of time.[29] It was designed to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until relevant proofs are lost, memories faded, and
witnesses no longer available.[30] Consistent with law and jurisprudence and the purpose of statutes of limi tations,
the prohibition on former government attorneys from involvement in matters in which they took part long ago,
pursuant to their official functions while in public service, should likewise have an expiry or duration.

In the present case, the liquidation of GenBank, in which Atty. Mendoza purportedly participated as then solicitor
general, took place in 1977 or more than a quarter of a century ago. Since early 1986, he has ceased to be solicitor
general and has since engaged in the private practice o f law. In 1987, he became counsel for Respondents Tan et al. in
Civil Case No. 0005 and, since 1990, in Civil Case Nos. 0095 to 0100.[31] At the time, at least ten (10) years had
passed since his alleged involvement in the GenBank liquidation. Moreover, in 1991 when the separate Motions to
Disqualify were filed by PCGG in these aforementioned cases, he had been outside government service for about five
(5) years, and fifteen years had gone by since the said liquidation.

Now it is already 2005. If we go by the rationale behind prescription, the extent of the individual participation of
government officials in the GenBank liquidation may indeed "have become so obscure from the lapse of time," if not
from "defective memory."

It is undeniable that government lawyers usually handle a multitude of cases simultaneously or within overlapping
periods of time. This is in fact a common remonstration, especially among prosecutors, public attorneys, solicitors,
government corporate counsels, labor arbiters, even trial a nd appellate judges. Yet, as dutiful public servants, they
cannot reject or shrink from assignments even if they are already overloaded with work. Similarly, lawyers in private
practice, whether by themselves or employed in law firms, are in a comparative plight.

It would not be strange or uncommon that, in a period of five years, an attorney in government service would have
handled or interfered in hundreds of legal matters involving varied parties.[32] Thousands of attorneys who have
chosen to dedicate their service to the government for some years are in such a situation. Hence, to perpetually and
absolutely ban them from taking part in all cases involving some matter in which they have taken part in some distant
past, pursuant to their official functions then, would be unduly harsh, unreasonable and unfair. It would be
tantamount to an unwarranted deprivation of the exercise of their profession. Be it remembered that a profession,
trade or calling partakes of the nature of a property right within the mea ning of our constitutional guarantees.[33]

Moreover, to attribute to a former government lawyer a violation of some ethical rule because of participation in a
matter that has been forgotten in good faith due to the lapse of a long period of time and does not involve interest
adverse to the government would likewise be harsh, unreasonable and unfair.

Similarly, there are many competent private practitioners who, at some point in their long careers, would wish to serve
the government. Would their fine and wide-ranging practice and experience, which would otherwise be beneficial to
the government, likewise forever bar them from getting involved in matters that concern a party with whom they have
had dealings several years ago and whose interests are not adver sely affected? In the case of acknowledged experts in
specific fields of law, of what use would their needed expertise be to the government if they have to inhibit
themselves from every case involving a party they have served in the distant past, consideri ng the limited number of
parties that may actually be involved in a specific field (for instance, intellectual property or bioethics law)?

I submit that the restraint on the exercise of one's profession, or right of employment including that of attorneys
formerly in government service, must survive the test of fairness and reasonableness. The restriction should not be as
pervasive and longer than is necessary to afford a fair and reasonable protection to the interests of the government.
After all, the disqualification of government attorneys is a drastic measure, and courts should hesitate to impose it
except when necessary.[34]

Thus, I submit that the restriction on government lawyers --specifically with respect to subsequent engagement or
employment in connection with matters falling under the "congruent -interest representation" -- should be allowed to
expire after a reasonable period when no further prejudice to the public may be contemplated. The duration of this
prohibition should be no more than five (5) years from retirement or separation from government service. Five years
is the prescriptive period for suits for which no period is prescribed by law.[35]

It would be reasonable to assume that five years after separation from the service, one would mo st likely have lost the
loyalty of one's former personal contacts, if not the loyal associates themselves, who may be able to facilitate the
acquisition of important information from the former office. In all probability, the lapse of the said period would also
naturally obscure to a reasonable extent a lawyer's memory of details of a specific case despite active participation in
the proceedings therein. This principle holds if, in the interval, one has handled countless other legal matters as is so
common among lawyers in government offices.

Consequently, after the said period, former government attorneys should be allowed to take up cases involving
matters that were brought before them during their incumbency in public office, so long as such matters do n ot come
within the "adverse-interest conflict" doctrine and the conflict-of-interest rule[36] applicable to all lawyers in general.

For the same reasons, the disqualification of members of the judiciary under Section 5(b) and (d)[37] of Canon 3 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct[38] should also prescribe in five (5) years from the time they assumed their judicial
position; or from the time they retire from or otherwise end their government service.

I realize that the application of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 5 of Canon 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct is quite important to many members of the bar who have served, or who aspire to
serve, the government.

On the one hand, our rules of discipline should protect the interest of the public by discouraging attorneys in
government from so shaping their practice as to give unfair advantage to their future private clients, or from
jeopardizing confidential information learned while in government service. On the other hand, government service
should not be discouraged by overly strict ethical rules that perpetually prohibit government lawyers from later
making reasonable and appropriate use in private practice of the expertise or experience they have gained.[39]

The reality is that the best lawyers will want to join the more lucrative private sector sooner or later, and the
government will hardly be able to attract them if they would later be unreasonably restricted from putting their
government experience to some use.[40] After all, government service should afford lawyers the opportunity to
improve their subsequent private employment. The nature of the job brings such lawyers into inevitable contact with
clients interested in their fields of expertise. Because the practice of law is becoming increasingly specialized, the
likely consequence of a wholesale approach to disqualification would be encouragement of a two -track professional
structure: government lawyer, private lawyer. The suspicion, and the reality, of ethical impr oprieties unrelated to
particular government cases would be eliminated -- but at the cost of creating an insular, static legal bureaucracy.[41]

Such a pervasive, perpetual ban would deter too many competent attorneys from entering government service, to t he
detriment of the public.[42] The Court must strike a balance. I believe that the adoption of the aforementioned period
of limitation would achieve the purpose behind Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as
Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

To summarize, the present Petition is barred by the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, because the April 22,
1991 Resolution of the SBN Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005 -- which resolved on the merits the very same
ground for the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza, and which involved essentially the same parties and the same
subject matter as the present case -- constituted a final and executory order, no timely appeal having been taken
therefrom.

Furthermore, the disqualification of former government lawyers from congruent -interest representation under Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be effective only for a period of five (5) years from the
retirement or the separation from government service of the official concerned. The purpose of such prescriptive
period is to prevent undue restraint on former government lawyers from the private practice of their profession,
especially in the field of expertise that they may have gained while in public office. Similarly, the disqualification of
members of the judiciary, under Section 5 (b) and (d) of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct should end
five (5) years after they assumed their judicial position.

Implications of the
Dissenting Opinions

Endless re-litigations of the same question, as well as forum shopping, are invited by the opinion of the dissenters
that the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan's Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005 does not bar the
filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza from other cases between the same parties. Such a holding would
effectively allow herein petitioner to file exactly the same Motion in each of other and future cases involving the same
parties or their privies and the same subject matters, even after the first Motion involving the same question or issue
will have already been finally resolved in one of like cases.

Further, it would also allow petitioner to let a contrary resolution of the incident in one case become fina l through
petitioner's withholding recourse to a higher court in order to await a possible favorable ruling in one of the other
cases. As it is, absurdity already surrounds the handling of Civil Case No. 0005 and No. 0096, both of which involve
the same parties and the same subject matter.

In Civil Case No. 0005, which seeks to recover allegedly unlawfully acquired properties consisting of shares of stock
of Respondent Tan et al. in Allied Bank, Atty. Mendoza is allowed to serve as their counsel. However, in Civil Case
No. 0096, which merely questions the validity of the Writ of Sequestration issued against the shares of stock in Allied
Bank of the same respondents, he is prohibited, per the dissenters, from acting as their counsel. This is preposterous.

Moreover, treating the first Resolution as not yet final and executory, even if no appeal or certiorari has timely been
taken therefrom, would allow the questioned counsel to act as such throughout the trial period until final judgment by
the court a quo. Thereafter, on appeal, his alleged "disqualification" may still be raised by the other party as an issue.
If the appeals court or this Tribunal ultimately finds that the said counsel is indeed disqualified on the ground of
conflict of interest or "congruent-interest representation conflict" and thus reverses the trial court's ruling, the case
would necessarily be remanded for new trial. As a result, the entire proceedings would become naught and thereby
unnecessarily waste the precious time, effort and resou rces of the courts as well as the parties. Worse, the evidence (or
defense) adduced by the "disqualified" counsel through his prior connections with the government (or the adverse
party) could have already created bias in the court or in the public mind.

These are precisely the procedural absurdities abhorred by the doctrine of res judicata, the fundamental principle of
due process and of the rule proscribing forum shopping.

Having already shown that Atty. Mendoza can no longer be disqualified at this po int for his alleged violation of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, due to res judicata and prescription, I submit that there is no more
need to discuss on the merits whether indeed there was in fact such violation. Such discussion would be merely
academic and moot.

May I close this Opinion with this oft-quoted ruling of former Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap, who was himself a former
PCGG commissioner, on the soundness of upholding final judgments even "at the risk of occasional errors":
"It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the
law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and
conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been
well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law, more than an important principle of public policy: and that
it is not too much to say that it is a fu ndamental concept in the organization of the jural sytem. Public policy and
sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite
date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were cons tituted was to put an end to controversies."[43]
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

While I concur in the scholarly and ably-written dissent of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., I feel compelled to write a
separate dissenting opinion to reflect the additional reasons behind my position.

Justices Artemio V. Panganiban and Angelina Sandoval -Gutierrez are of the opinion that the petition can be dismissed
on procedural grounds, they contending that the Presidenti al Commission on Government (PCGG) is precluded from
filing a motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel in Civil Case Nos. 0096 since the Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) had already denied PCGG's motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counse l in Civil Case No. 0005.
In short, they are invoking the doctrines of conclusiveness of judgment and law of the case.

I believe Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato[1] penned by the distinguished Justice Vicente V. Mendoza is
instructive.

To recall, Kilosbayan, Incorporated (Kilosbayan, Inc.), et al. filed on January 28, 1994 a petition with this Court
challenging the validity of the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) on the ground that the same was made in violation of the
charter of the PCSO. This Court in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.[2] invalidated the contract.
One of the issues raised before this Court in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, J r. was the standing of
petitioners to maintain the suit. On that score, this Court held through Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. that petitioners had standing to sue.

As a result of the decision in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. G uingona, Jr., PCSO and PGMC entered into negotiations
for a new agreement which would conform to the Court's decision.

On January 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA).

On February 21, 1995, Kilosbayan, Inc, et al. filed a petition against then PCSO Chair Manuel Morato seeking to
declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it was substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.

Its ruling in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr. notwithstanding, this Court in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.
Morato ruled that the therein petitioners did not have standing to sue.

It explained that the doctrines of law of the case and conclusiveness of judgment do not pose a barrier to the
determination of petitioners' right to maintain the suit:
Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of the case." We do
not think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not
its continuation: The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate
court. Thus in People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992 999 (1958), it was stated:

"'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of these case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which
such decision was predicated continue to be facts of the case before the court." (21 C.J.S. 330)

"It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is
substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on
the prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or re -adjudicated therein.
(5 C.J.S. 1267)

"In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where after a definite determination, the court has
remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than those arising s ubsequently
to such determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with its mandate; and if the court
below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the appellate court, its action will not be
questioned on a second appeal . . .

"As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same is held to be the law of the case whether that decision is
right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276 -77)

"Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case on a
subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption is
that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due consideration whether all or none of them
are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286 -87)"

As this Court explained in another case. "The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate court,
,merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It differs from res judicata in
that the conclusive of the first judgment is not dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is generally, if not
universally, not final, It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its questions of law, and is confined in
its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case . . . ." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA
503, 521 (1979))

It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by he parties before in G.R. No. 113375, the ruling
there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case." The parties are the same but the cases are not.

Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related doctrine of "conclusiveness of
judgment."[3] According to the doctrine, an issue actually and directly passed upon and determined in a former suit
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action bet ween the same parties involving a different of action.
(Peñalosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 313 (1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 [1960])

It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel do es not
apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210, 222 (1979); BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 (3rd Ed., 1988)) Following this ruling it was held in Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed. 898 (1947) that where a taxpayer assigned to his wife interest in a patent in 1928 and
in a suit it was determined that the money paid to his wife for the years 1929-1931 under the 1928 assignment was not
part of his taxable income, this determination is not preclusive in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts
to his wife under another deed of assignment for other years (1937 to 1941). For incom e tax purposes what is decided
with respect to one contract is not conclusive as to any other contract which was not then in issue, however similar or
identical it may be. The rule on collateral estoppel it was held, "must be confined to situations where t he matter raised
in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first preceding and where the controlling facts
and applicable legal rules remain unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599 -600, 92 L. Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if the relevant
facts in the two cases are separate even though they may be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern
the legal issues which occur in the second case. Thus the second proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction
identical with but in a form separable form, the one dealt with in the first proceeding. In that situation a court is free
in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. . . ." (333 U.S. at 601, 92
L. Ed. at 908)

This exception to the General Rule of the Issue Preclusion is authoritatively formulated in Restatement of the Law 2d,
on Judgments, as follows:

§28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the
following circumstances:
....

(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new
determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or
otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws; . . .

Illustration:
.. .

2. A brings an action against the municipality of B for tortious injury. The court sustain B's defense of sovereign
immunity and dismisses the action. Several years later A brings the second action against B for an unrelated tortious
injury occurring after the dismissal. The judgment in the first action is not conclusive on the question whether the
defense immunity is available to B. Note: The doctrine of stare decisis may lead the court to refuse to reconsider the
question of sovereign immunity. See §29, Comment i.

The question whether the petitioners have sta nding to question the Equipment or ELA is a legal question. As will
presently be shown, the ELA, which the petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different
from the 1993 Contract of lease entered into by the PCSO with the PG MC. Hence the determination in the prior case
(G.R. No. 113375) that the petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the
parties does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit. (Emphasis and und erscoring supplied;
italics in the original)
The doctrine of law of the case does not, I believe, apply to the present case for this is the first time that the issue to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza has been elevated before this Court. It is the decision in thi s case which will be the law of
the case. A reading of Republic v. Sandiganbayan[4] cited by Justice Sandoval -Gutierrez shows that the issue currently
before this Court was not passed upon. Thus, this Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan stated:
The key issues, in query form, are:

(1) Was the SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss proper?

(2) Should the SANDIGANBAYAN have disposed first such motion to dismiss rather than resolving it as part of the
judgment?

(3) Was the nullification of the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY and of the search and seizure order issued
against ALLIED correct?

(4) Were the sequestration and search and seizure orders deemed automatically lifted for failure to bring an action in
court against SIPALAY and ALLIED within the constitutionally prescribed period?[5]
I also believe that the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since in the case at bar, the question of
whether the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza should be granted is undoubtedl y a legal question. Moreover, Civil
Case No. 005 and Civil Case No. 0096 involve two different substantially unrelated claims.

Justices Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez further opine that the order of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0005
denying PCGG's motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is not an interlocutory order but a final order, and that as a
result, the principle of res judicata applies.

With all due respect, I believe that we cannot characterize the denial of PCGG's motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
as a final order. Black's Law Dictionary defines interlocutory in the following manner:
Provisional; interim; temporary; not final. Something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit
which decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. An interlocutory order or
decree is one which does not finally determine a cause of action but only decides some intervening matter pertaining
to the cause, and which requires further steps to be taken in order t o enable the court to adjudicate the cause on the
merits.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Justice Oscar M. Herrera, an authority in remedial law, distinguishes between a final judgment and interlocutory order
in this wise:
The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final or executory as of right (final and
executory), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party
is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the
rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Co urt except to await the
parties' next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the
taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final, or to use
the established and more distinctive term, final and executory. (Investment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals cited in Denso
[Phils.], Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 280; see also Bank of America NT & SA, G.R. No. 78017,
June 8, 1990 186 SCRA 417)

An interlocutory order refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point
or matter but it is not the final decision of the whole controversy.[7] (Bitong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123553,
July 13, 1998, 96 SCAD 205) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Justice Florenz D. Regalado is of the same view:
An order is considered interlocutory if it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the trial
court on the merits of the case. An order is final, for purposes of appeal, if it disposes of the entire case.

Where the order is interlocutory, the movant has to wait for the judgment and then appeal from the judgment, in the
course of which appeal he can assign as error the said interlocut ory order. The interlocutory order cannot be appealed
from separately from the judgment. The general rule is that where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy is certiorari, p rohibition or mandamus depending
on the facts of the case.

Where the order appealed from is interlocutory, the appellate court can dismiss the appeal even if no objection
thereto was filed by the appellee in either the trial or appellate court.[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Another respected scholar of remedial law, Justice Jose Y. Feria, has formulated this guideline in determining whether
an order is final or interlocutory:
The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is i nterlocutory or final: Does it leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The
key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be d one on the merits of the case.[9] (Emphasis
and underscoring)
In fact, this same test was used in Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals,[10] cited by Justice Panganiban to determine
whether the trial court's order was interlocutory or final:
In this particular instance, the test to determine whether the order of 06 January 1995 is interlocutory or final would
be: Does it leave something else to be done by the trial court on the case? If it does, it is interlocutory, if it does not,
it is final. Evidently, the trial court would still have to hear the parties on the merits of the case...

xxx

Indeed, the word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit
which decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy." An interlocutory order does
not terminate nor does it finally dispose of the is (sic) case; it does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the
parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against e ach other but leaves something yet to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on its merits. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Applying the foregoing test, it is clear that the order denying PCGG's motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is
interlocutory because it does not finally dispose of the case.

Interestingly enough, the U.S. Supreme Court is in agreement with Justice Callejo's conclusion that the
Sandiganbayan's denial of PCGG's motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is an interlocutory o rder. In Firestone Tire &
Rubber Company v. Risjord,[11] the American Court ruled that an order denying motions to disqualify the opposing
party's counsel in a civil case are not appealable prior to final judgment in underlying litigation since such an ord er
does not fall within the collateral order exception of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation,[12] which is
cited by Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez.
Under § 1291, the courts of appeals are vested with "jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisio ns of the district
courts ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." We have consistently interpreted this
language as indicating that a party may not take an appeal under this section until there has been "a decision by the
District Court that 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment."' Coopers s & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), quoting
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945). This rule, that a party must
ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits, serves a number of
important purposes. It emphasizes the deference that appellate cou rts owe to the trial judge as the individual initially
called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the course of a trial. Permitting piecemeal
appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in our
judicial system. In addition, the rule is in accordance with the sensible policy of "avoid[ing] the obstruction to just
claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals fr om the various
rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment." Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 325, 60 S.Ct. 540, 541, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940). See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124, 82 S.Ct. 654,
656, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962). The rule also serves the important purpose of promoting efficient judicial administration.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2149, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974).

Our decisions have recognized, however, a narrow exception to the requirement that all appeals under § 1291 await
final judgment on the merits. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra, we held that a "small class" of
orders that did not end the main litigation were nevertheless final and appealable pursuant to § 1291. Cohen was a
shareholder's derivative action in which the Federal District Court refused to apply a state statute requiring a plaintiff
in such a suit to post security for costs. The defendant appealed the ruling without await ing final judgment on the
merits, and the Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to require that costs be posted. We held that the Court of
Appeals properly assumed jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to § 1291 because the District Court's order constitu ted
a final determination of a claim "separable from, and collateral to," the merits of the main proceeding, because it was
"too important to be denied review," and because it was "too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id., at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225. Cohen did not establish
new law; rather, it continued a tradition of giving " 1291 a "practical rather than a technical construction." Ibid. See,
e.g., United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 413-414, 46 S.Ct. 144, 70 L.Ed. 339 (1926);
Bronson v. LaCrosse & Milwaukee R. Co., 67 U.S. 524 -531, 2 Black 524, 530-531, 17 L.Ed. 347 (1863); Forgay v.
Conrad, 47 U.S. 201, 203, 6 How. 201, 203, 12 L.Ed.2d 404 (1848) ; Whiting v. Bank of the United States, 38 U.S. 6,
15, 13 Pet. 6, 15, 10 L.Ed. 33 (1839). We have recently defined this limited class of final "collateral orders" in these
terms: "[T]he order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an im portant issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, supra, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S.Ct. at 2457 (footnote omitted). See Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 658,
97 S.Ct. 2034, 2039, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977).

[1] Because the litigation from which the instant petition arises had not reached final judgment at the time the notice
of appeal was filed. [FN11] the order denying petitioner's motion to disqualif y respondent is appealable under § 1291
only if it falls within the Cohen doctrine. The Court of Appeals held that it does not, and 5 of the other 10 Circuits
have also reached the conclusion that denials of disqualification motions are not immediately app ealable "collateral
orders." [FN12] We agree with these courts that under Cohen such an order is not subject to appeal prior to
resolution of the merits.

FN11. Counsel for respondent represented at oral argument in this Court that the case was, at that ti me, in the
discovery stage. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36.

FN12. See n. 10, supra.

An order denying a disqualification motion meets the first part of the "collateral order" test. It "conclusively
determine[s] the disputed question," because the only issue is wh ether challenged counsel will be permitted to
continue his representation. In addition, we will assume, although we do not decide, that the disqualification question
"resolve [s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action," the se cond part of the test.
Nevertheless, petitioner is unable to demonstrate that an order denying disqualification is "effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment" within the meaning of our cases.

In attempting to show why the challenged order w ill be effectively unreviewable on final appeal, petitioner alleges that
denying immediate review will cause it irreparable harm. It is true that the finality requirement should "be construed
so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and pote ntially irreparable injuries to be suffered," Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331, n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901, n. 11, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). In support of its assertion that it
will be irreparably harmed, petitioner hints at "the possibility that the cours e of the proceedings may be indelibly
stamped or shaped with the fruits of a breach of confidence or by acts or omissions prompted by a divided loyalty,"
Brief for Petitioner 15, and at "the effect of such a tainted proceeding in frustrating public policy, " id., at 16. But
petitioner fails to supply a single concrete example of the indelible stamp or taint of which it warns. The only ground
that petitioner urged in the District Court was that respondent might shape the products -liability plaintiffs' claims for
relief in such a way as to increase the burden on petitioner. Our cases, however, require much more before a ruling
may be considered "effectively unreviewable" absent immediate appeal

[2] To be appealable as a final collateral order, the challenged o rder must constitute "a complete, formal and, in the
trial court, final rejection," Abney v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 659, 97 S.Ct. at 2040, of a claimed right "where
denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever," Unite d States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533,
91 S.Ct. 1580, 1582, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971). Thus we have permitted appeals prior to criminal trials when a defendant
has claimed that he is about to be subjected to forbidden double jeopardy, Abney v. United States, supr a, or a
violation of his constitutional right to bail, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951) because those
situations, like the posting of security for costs involved in Cohen, "each involved an asserted right the legal and
practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial." United States v. MacDonald, 435
U.S. 850, 860, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 1552, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978). By way of contrast, we have generally denied review of
pretrial discovery orders, see, e. g., United States v. Ryan, supra; Cobbledick v. United States, supra. Our rationale has
been that in the rare case when appeal after final judgment will not cure an erroneous discovery order, a party may
defy the order, permit a contempt citation to be entere d against him, and challenge the order on direct appeal of the
contempt ruling. See Cobbledick v. United States, supra, at 327, 60 S.Ct. at 542. We have also rejected immediate
appealability under § 1291 of claims that "may fairly be assessed" only after t rial, United States v. MacDonald, supra,
at 860, and those involving "considerations that are 'enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's
cause of action.'" Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S., at 469, 98 S.Ct., at 2458, quoting Mercantile National Bank
v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558, 83 S.Ct. 520, 522, 9 L.Ed.2d 523 (1963).

An order refusing to disqualify counsel plainly falls within the large class of orders that are indeed reviewable on
appeal after final judgment, and not within the much smaller class of those that are not. The propriety of the district
court's denial of a disqualification motion will often be difficult to assess until its impact on the underlying litigation
may be evaluated, which is normally only after fina l judgment. The decision whether to disqualify an attorney
ordinarily turns on the peculiar factual situation of the case then at hand, and the order embodying such a decision
will rarely, if ever, represent a final rejection of a claim of fundamental righ t that cannot effectively be reviewed
following judgment on the merits. In the case before us, petitioner has made no showing that its opportunity for
meaningful review will perish unless immediate appeal is permitted. On the contrary, should the Court of Appeals
conclude after the trial has ended that permitting continuing representation was prejudicial error, it would retain its
usual authority to vacate the judgment appealed from and order a new trial. That remedy seems plainly adequate
should petitioner's concerns of possible injury ultimately prove well founded. As the Second Circuit has recently
observed, the potential harm that might be caused by requiring that a party await final judgment before it may appeal
even when the denial of its disqualification motion was erroneous does not "diffe[r] in any significant way from the
harm resulting from other interlocutory orders that may be erroneous, such as orders requiring discovery over a work -
product objection or orders denying motions for recusal of the trial judge." Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 438
(1980), cert. pending, No. 80-431. But interlocutory orders are not appealable "on the mere ground that they may be
erroneous." Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98, n. 6, 88 S.Ct. 269, 275, n. 6, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967). Permitting
wholesale appeals on that ground not only would constitute an unjustified waste of scarce judicial resources, but also
would transform the limited exception carved out in Cohen into a license for broad disregard of the finali ty rule
imposed by Congress in § 1291. This we decline to do. [FN13]

FN13. Although there may be situations in which a party will be irreparably damaged if forced to wait until final
resolution of the underlying litigation before securing review of an order denying its motion to disqualify opposing
counsel, it is not necessary, in order to resolve those situations, to create a general rule permitting the appeal of all
such orders. In the proper circumstances, the moving party may seek sanctions short of disqualification, such as a
protective order limiting counsel's ability to disclose or to act on purportedly confidential information. If additional
facts in support of the motion develop in the course of the litigation, the moving party might ask the tri al court to
reconsider its decision. Ultimately, if dissatisfied with the result in the District Court and absolutely determined that it
will be harmed irreparably, a party may seek to have the question certified for interlocutory appellate review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), see n. 7, supra, and, in the exceptional circumstances for which it was designed, a writ of
mandamus from the court of appeals might be available. See In re Continental Investment Corp., supra, 637 F.2d, at
7; Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 178 U.S.App.D.C., at 262, 546 F.2d, at 1028. See generally
Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification of Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45
U.Chi.L.Rev. 450, 468-480 (1978). We need not be concerned with the availability of such extraordinary procedures in
the case before us, because petitioner has made no colorable claim that the harm it might suffer if forced to await the
final outcome of the litigation before appealing the denial of its disqualifica tion motion is any greater than the harm
suffered by any litigant forced to wait until the termination of the trial before challenging interlocutory orders it
considers erroneous.

III

[3][4][5] We hold that a district court's order denying a motion to di squalify counsel is not appealable under § 1291
prior to final judgment in the underlying litigation. [FN14]

FN14. The United States in its brief amicus curiae, has challenged petitioner's standing to attack the order permitting
respondent to continue his representation of the plaintiffs. In light of our conclusion that the Eighth Circuit was
without jurisdiction to hear petitioner's appeal, we have no occasion to address the standing issue.[13] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; italics in the original)
The ruling in Firestone was subsequently reiterated in Flanagan v. United States[14] and Richardson -Merrell, Inc. v.
Koller.[15]

Justice Panganiban further suggests that the prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is not
perpetual but merely lasts for five years primarily relying on the Civil Code provisions on prescription and the
doctrine that the right to practice law is a property right protected by the Constitution.

I do not agree with this framework of analysis. Carried to its logical conclusion, Justice Panganiban's proposal would
mean that after five years from the termination of the attorney -client relationship, all lawyers would be able to
represent an interest in conflict with that of the former client and that they would no longer be bound by the rule on
privileged communication.

It bears emphasis that the law is not trade nor a craft but a profession, a noble profession at that.
The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which i s entrusted only to those who
are qualified and who possess good moral character. If the respect of the people in the honor and integrity of the legal
profession is to be retained, both lawyers and laymen must recognize and realize that the legal professio n is a
profession and not a trade, and that the basic ideal of that profession is to render public service and secure justice for
those who seek its aid. It is not a business, using bargain counter methods to reap large profits for those who conduct
it. From the professional standpoint, it is expressive of three ideals - organization, learning and public service. The
gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. The professional spirit - the spirit of public
service - constantly curbs the urge of that instinct.

The law as a profession proceeds from the basic premise that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions and carries with it the responsibility to live up to its exacting standards and honored traditio ns. A person
enrolled in its ranks is called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the state - the
administration of justice. That the practice of law is a profession explains why lawyers repute and of eminence
welcome their designation as counsel de oficio, as an opportunity to manifest fidelity to the concept that law is a
profession.
The law must be thought of as ignoring commercial standards of success. The lawyer's conduct is to be measured not
by the standards of trade and counting house but by those of his profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly the ethical rule against advertising or solicitation of professional employment, rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession.

In the matter of fixing his fees, an attorney should never forget that "the profession is a branch of the administration
of justice and not a mere money-making trade" and that his standing as a member of the bar "is not enhanced by
quibbling relative to just fees, equivalent to the bargaining between a prospective purchaser and a merchant in the
market before a sale is made." Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns are simple rewards for a job
done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from
government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. However, while
the practice of law is a profession and an attorney is prim arily an officer of the court, he is as much entitled to
protection from the against any attempt by his client to escape payment of his just fees, as the client against exaction
by his counsel of excessive fees.

To summarize, the primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are: (a) "a duty of
public service, of which emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without
making much money;" (b) "a relation as officer of the court to the administ ration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity, and reliability;" (c) "a relation to client in the highest degree fiduciary;" and (d) "a relation to
colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.

These characteristics make the law a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. Its basic ideal is to render service and to
secure justice for those who seek its aid. If it has to remain a noble and honorable profession and attain its ideal,
those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tene ts and principles but should also, by their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. And because they are the vanguards of the law and the legal systems, lawyers must at all
times conduct themselves in their professional and private dealings with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.[16]
Moreover, the relation of attorney and client is, however, one of trust and confidence of the highest order. It is highly
fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
... A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak
points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No
opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client's secrets.

The rule is a rigid one designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct but as well to
preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where he may be required to choose between
conflicting duties, and to protect him from unfounded suspicion of professional misconduct. The question is not
necessarily one of right of the parties but of adhere to proper professional standards. An attorney should not only
keep inviolate his client's confidence but should likewise avoid the appearance of treachery and double -dealing.[17]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in Nakpil v. Valdes,[18] this Court through Justice Reynato S. Puno held that the test to determi ne whether
there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict.[19]

Justice Panganiban justifies his theory on the ground that in 5 years time, the lawyer will develop a mild case of
amnesia such that "in all probability, the lapse of the said period would also naturally obscure to a reasonable extent a
lawyer's memory of details of a specific case despite active participation in the proceedings therein." He thus cites his
own personal experience as a member of this Court:
Modesty aside, in my nearly ten (10) years in this Court, I have disposed of about a thousand cases in full -length
ponencias and countless cases by way of unsigned minute or extended Resolutions. This does not include the
thousands of other cases, assigned to other members of the Court, in which I actively took part during their
deliberations. In all honesty, I must admit that I cannot with certainty recall the details of the facts and issues in each
of these cases, especially in their earlier ones.
While it is true that over time memory does fade, the ravages of time have been mitigated with the invention of the
paper and pen and its modern offspring - the computer. It is not uncommon for lawyers to resort to note taking in the
course of handling legal matters.

The proposition that "a profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees" is not unqualified. In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[20] which Justice
Panganiban relies on, this Court held:
A profession, trade or calling is a property within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be
deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and
unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.

Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been
upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the p olice power by the state particularly when their conduct
affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and
welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within
the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own
property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much wider. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)
Under the foregoing, the perpetual application of Rule 6.03 is clearly a va lid and proper regulation.

In his ponencia, Justice Reynato S. Puno labels as insignificant the role of then Solicitor General in the liquidation of
General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), saying that "it is indubitable from the facts that Atty. Mendoza had
no iota of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK" and that his only involvement
was "advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation with the CFI of Manila." Justice Puno observes that "the procedure of liquidation is simple and is given in
black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29."

Atty. Mendoza's lack of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK is to me not
material. What is material is his role in facilitating the liquidation of GENBANK through his legal expertise. In
advising the Central Bank, Atty. Mendoza did not just mechanically point to section 29 of Republic 265. As then
Solicitor General, and as a lawyer known for his keen legal acumen, Atty. Mendoza synthesized facts, which by reason
of his position he was privy to, and law with a view to successfully liquidate the bank.

Ultimately, Justice Puno advocates for a liberal interpretation of Rule 6.03 since a strict interpretation would cause "a
chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent."

With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to this position which is grounded on the premise that this is "the only card
that the government may play to recruit lawyers." Effectively, this is likely to result in the compromising of ethical
standards which this Court must never allow. While it is desirable to recruit competent lawyers into government
service, this does not justify the disturbanc e of our mores.

The canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility must be strictly construed. Admittedly the salary for
serving in government often pales in comparison to that of the private sector. I submit, however, that while financial
considerations are important, they are not the sole factor affecting recruitment of lawyers to the government sector. I
would like to think that serving in government is its own reward. One needs only to look at all of us members of this
Court to know that money is not everything. All of us have, at one point in our legal careers, been tempted by the
promise of financial success that private practice usually brings. But in the end, we decided to take the road less
traveled and serve in government. And I would like to believe that each and everyone of us has made a difference.
There is more to this mortal coil than the pursuit of material wealth. As Winston Churchill puts it: "What is the use of
living if it be not to strive for noble causes and make this muddl ed world a better place for those who will live in it
after we are gone?"

ACCORDINGLY, concurring in the dissenting opinion of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., I vote to grant the petition
insofar as Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned, thus granting the motio n to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza in the
said case.

DISSENTING OPINION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes' proverbial "bad man" who wants to know just
how many corners he may cut, how close to the line he may play, without running into trouble with the law. Rather, it
is drawn for the "good man" as a beacon to assist him in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky
waters of professional conduct.[1]
With due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion. I believe that the present case behooves the Court to strictly
apply the Code of Professional Responsibility and provide an ethical compass to lawyers who, in the pursuit of the
profession, often find themselves in the unchartered sea of conflicting ideas and interests. There is certainly, without
exception, no profession in which so many temptations beset the path to swerve from the line of strict integrity; in
which so many delicate and difficult questions of duty are continually a rising.[2] The Code of Professional
Responsibility establishes the norms of conduct and ethical standards in the legal profession and the Court must not
shirk from its duty to ensure that all lawyers live up to its provisions. Moreover, the Court must not tolerate any
departure from the "straight and narrow" path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession and enjoin all lawyers to
be like Caesar's wife - to be pure and appear to be so.[3]

Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1[4] of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the
PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against re spondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tanenglian,[5] Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong
(represented by Tarciana C. Tan), Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung P oe Kee, Mariano
Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim,
Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation, Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery,
Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp.,
Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade
Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings,
Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings and Development Corp. (collectively referred to herein as respondents
Tan, et al., for brevity), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, P anfilo O. Domingo, Cesar
Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Sandiganbayan
(Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with
former President Marcos.

Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
seeking to, among others, nullify the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comments
thereon, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper disposition, docketed therein
as follows:
Civil Case No. 0096 - Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corp., Iris Holding and Development Corp.,
Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG's Order
dated June 19, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Al lied Banking Corporation held by and/or in the name of
respondents Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development
Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc.;

Civil Case No. 0097 - Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr.,
and Foremost Farms, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG's Order dated August 12, 1986 sequestering the
shares of stock in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Kh ao Tan, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad Santos and Florencio N. Santos, Jr.;

Civil Case No. 0098 - Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. and Fortune Tobacco Corp . v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG's
Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Fortune Tobacco Corp. held by and/or in the name of
Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr.,
Shareholdings, Inc.; and

Civil Case No. 0099 - Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and
Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG's Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of
stock in Shareholdings, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian,
Florencio T. Santos and Natividad Santos.
In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty. Estelito P . Mendoza, who served as
the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of former President Marcos.

The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) a motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to the Central
Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Ba nking Corporation. As shown above, among
the litigated properties are the sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp. (Civil Case No. 0096).

The acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. is outlined by the PCGG as follows:
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) got into financial difficulties. The Central Bank then
extended an emergency loan to GENBANK reaching a total of P310 million. In extending this loan, the Central Bank,
however, took control of GENBANK with the execution of an irrevocable proxy by 2/3 of GENBANK's outstanding
shares in favor of the Central Bank and the election of seven (7) Central Bank nominees to the 11 -member Board of
Directors of GENBANK. Subsequently, on March 25, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Centr al Bank issued a
Resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent, forbidding it to do business and placing it under receivership.

In the meantime, a public bidding for the sale of GENBANK assets and liabilities was scheduled at 7:00 P.M. on
March 28, 1977. Among the conditions for the bidding were: (a) submission by the bidder of a letter of credit issued
by a bank acceptable to Central Bank to guaranty payment or as collateral of the Central Bank emergency loan; and (b)
a 2-year period to repay the said Central Bank emergency loan. On March 29, 1977, the Central Bank, through a
Monetary Board Resolution, approved the bid of the group of respondents Lucio Tan and Willy Co. This bid, among
other things, offered to pay only P500,000.00 for GENBANK assets estimated at P688,201,301.45; Capital Accounts
of P103,984,477.55; Cash of P25,698,473.00; and the takeover of the GENBANK Head Office and branch offices.
The required letter of credit was also not attached to the bid. What was attached to the bid was a letter of Panfi lo O.
Domingo, as PNB President, promising to open an irrevocable letter of credit to secure the advances of the Central
Bank in the amount of P310 million. Without this letter of commitment, the Lucio Tan bid would not have been
approved. But such letter of commitment was a fraud because it was not meant to be fulfilled. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Gregorio Licaros and Panfilo O. Domingo conspired together in giving the Lucio Tan group undue favors such as the
doing away with the required irrevocable letter of cr edit, the extension of the term of payment from two years to five
years, the approval of second mortgage as collateral for the Central Bank advances which was deficient by more than
P90 Million, and many other concessions to the great prejudice of the gove rnment and of the GENBANK
stockholders.

GENBANK eventually became the Allied Banking Corporation in April 1977. Respondents Lucio Tan, Willy S. Co
and Florencio T. Santos are not only incorporators and directors but they are also the major shareholders of this new
bank.[6]
Atty. Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. since Atty.
Mendoza, in his capacity as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank's officials on the procedure to bring about
GENBANK's liquidation. Further, he appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. He filed the said petition with the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Manila and docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 107812.[7]
The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendoza's present appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in the case
involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility proscribing former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

Acting on the said motion, the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) issue d the assailed Resolution dated July 11, 2001
stating:
Acting on the PCGG's "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA AS COUNSEL FOR
PETITIONER" dated February 5, 1991 which appears not to have been resolved by then Second Division of this
Court, and it appearing that (1) the motion is exactly the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005
as in fact, Atty. Mendoza in his "OPPOSITION" dated March 5, 1991 manifested that he was just adopting his
opposition to the same motion filed by PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Court's Order dated March 7,
1991, the herein incident was taken-up jointly with the said same incident in Civil Case No. 0005 (pp. 134 -135, Vol. I,
Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this Division hereby reiterates and adopts the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil
Case No. 0005 of the Second Division (pp. 1418 -1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. 0005) denying the said
motion as its Resolution in the case at bar.[8]
The PCGG sought the reconsideration thereof but its motion was denied in the assailed Resolution dated December
5, 2001, which reads:
Acting on respondent PCGG's "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" dated August 1, 2001 praying for the
reconsideration of the Court's Resolution dated July 12, 2001 denyin g its motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P.
Mendoza as counsel for petitioners, to which petitioners have filed an "OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1, 2001" dated August 29, 2001, as well as the respondent's "REPLY (To
Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration) dated November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to disqualify
Atty. Mendoza as counsel in these cases was exactly the same in substance as that motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 (re: Republic vs. Lucio Tan, et al.) and the resolutions of this Court
(Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying the main motion as well as of the motion for reconsideration
thereof had become final and executory when PCGG failed to elevate the s aid resolutions to the Supreme Court, the
instant motion is hereby DENIED.[9]
The Resolution[10] dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005, which was
adopted by the Fifth Division in Civil Cases Nos. 0096 -0099, denied the similar motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. holding, in essence, that the PCGG "has failed to prove that there exists an
inconsistency between Atty. Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel
of the Lucio Tan group."[11] The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) explained, thus:
... It has been said that the test of inconsistency in cases of the character under consideration is not whether the
attorney has ever appeared for the party against whom he proposes to appear, but whether his accepting the new
retainer will require him, in forwarding the interests of his new client, to do anything which will injuriously affect his
former client in any matter in which he formerly represe nted against him, and whether he will be called upon, in his
new relation, to use against his former client any knowledge or information acquired through their former connection.
Nor does the rule imposing disability on the attorney mean that he, having on ce been employed by a client, shall
never thereafter appear in any matter against him but merely forbids the attorney's appearance or acting against the
client where the attorney can use, to the detriment of such client, the information and confidences acq uired during the
existence of their relation as attorney and client (7 C.J.S., Pp. 828 -829, cited in Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs.
PCGG, supra). Significantly, PCGG's "Reply" does not controvert Atty. Mendoza's claim that in appearing in the
instant case, he does not take a position adverse to that he had taken in behalf of the Central Bank of the Philippines
in SP No. 107812. Neither did it challenge Atty. Mendoza's claim that the position he took as Solicitor General in
behalf of the Central Bank in 1977 when he filed the said case (SP No. 107812) has been maintained by his successors
in office. In fact, even incumbent Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia had interposed no objection to Atty. Mendoza's
appearance as counsel for the Lucio Tan group for as l ong as he maintains the same position he has taken on behalf
of the Central Bank of the Philippines as Solicitor General, which position refers to the various resolutions of the
Monetary Board and actions of the Central Bank in regard General Bank and Trus t Co. as being regular and in
accordance with law (Annex "A", Rejoinder, Records, Pp. 1404 -1405).[12]
The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) further observed that Atty. Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. was well beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he
ceased to be the Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said provision prohibits a former public official or employee
from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year
from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.

As earlier stated, the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) was adopted by the Fifth
Division in the resolutions now being assailed by the PCGG. Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG.

Procedural Issues

The following procedural issues are raised by respondents Tan, et al.: (1) whether the assailed Sandiganbayan (Fifth
Division) Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 are final and executory; hence, the PCGG should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the instant petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 thereof; and (2) whether the instant petitio n is already barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second
Division) Resolution dated April 22, 1991 under the doctrine of res judicata.

In contending that the PCGG availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing the instant petition for certiorari,
respondents Tan, et al. rely on Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Re gional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7975, likewise, states:
Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. -
...

Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court.
I am not persuaded by the arguments proffered by respondents Tan, et al. The above -mentioned rules do not preclude
the resort to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court of orders or resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan. The special civil action of certiorari may be availed of where there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[13]

In this case, the remedy of appeal is not available to the PCGG because the denial of its motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. is an interlocutory order; hence, not appealable. The word
"interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides
some point or matter, but is not a final decisio n of the whole controversy."[14] An interlocutory order does not
terminate nor does it finally dispose of the case; it does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties'
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other but leaves something yet to be done by
the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.[15]

Accordingly, this Court, in not a few cases, had taken cognizance of petitions for certiorari of resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan which were in the nature of interlocutory orders. For example, in Serapio v. Sandiganbayan,[16] we
took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petition for certiorari which assailed the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
denying the petition for bail, motion for a reinvesti gation and motion to quash filed by accused Edward Serapio. Also,
in San Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan,[17] we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petitions for certiorari
of several resolutions of the Sandiganbayan involving the sequestered sh ares of stock in the San Miguel Corp.

To my mind, the PCGG properly filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respo ndents Tan, et al.
in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099.

With respect to the second procedural issue raised by respondents Tan, et al., i.e., the instant petition is already barred
by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil C ase No. 0005 under the doctrine of
res judicata, I submit that the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in this case.

Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court reads in part:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
...

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors -in-interest
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors -in-interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts - (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness
of judgment.[18] Paragraph (b) embodies the doctrine of res judi cata or res adjudicata or bar by prior judgment, while
paragraph (c) estoppel by judgment or conclusiveness of judgment.[19] In Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit,[20]
Justice Artemio Panganiban explained that the term "final" in the phrase judgments o r final orders in the above
section has two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal because the
period to do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible tribunal involved .[21] The
second sense connotes that it is an order that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is
interlocutory.[22] The phrase refers to a final determination as opposed to a judgment or an order that settles only
some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a
motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment apply
only to those falling under the second category.[23]

For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following elements must concur: (1) there is a
final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
judgment is one on the merits; and (4) there is, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action.[24] When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment.[25]

In any case, whether as a bar by prior judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, the doctrine of res
judicata applies only when there is a judgment or final order which, as earlier discussed, leaves not hing else to be
done. As explained by Justice Panganiban, a judgment or an order on the merits is one rendered after a determination
of which party is upheld, as distinguished from an order rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point.[26] To reiterate, the said judgment or order is not interlocutory and does not settle only some
incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action.

The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No . 0005 denying the
PCGG's similar motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. therein was evidently an
interlocutory order as it did not terminate or finally dispose of the said case. It merely settled an incidental or
collateral matter arising therein. As such, it cannot operate to bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza in the other cases because, strictly speaking, the doctrine of res judicata, whether to serve as a bar by prior
judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, does not apply to decisions or orders adjudicating
interlocutory motions.[27]

Substantive Issue

The substantive issue in this case is whether the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Canon 6 of our Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES.

Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the acc used is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
A good number of the Canons in our present Code of Professional Responsibility were adopted from the Canons of
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association (ABA).[28] Rule 6.03, in particular, is a restatement of Canon 36
of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provided:
36. RETIREMENT FROM JUDICIAL POSITION OR PUBLIC EMPLOYMEN T.

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement a ccept
employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his
private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official.[29] Rule 6.03
makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office. A plain reading of the rule shows
that the interdiction (1) applies to a lawyer who once served in the government, and (2) relates to his accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

In the United States, an area of concern involving ethical cons iderations applicable to former government lawyers is
called the "revolving door" - the process by which lawyers temporarily enter government service from private life then
leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, co ntacts, and influence garnered in
government service.[30] To address this, the disqualification of a former government lawyer who has entered private
practice may be sought based either on "adverse -interest conflict" or "congruent-interest representation conflict."

In the "adverse-interest conflict," a former government lawyer is enjoined from representing a client in private
practice if the matter is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government
and if the interests of the current and former clients are adverse.[31] It must be observed that the "adverse -interest
conflict" applies to all lawyers in that they are generally disqualified from accepting employment in a subsequent
representation if the interests of the former client and the present client are adverse and the matters involved are the
same or substantially related.[32] On the other hand, in "congruent -interest representation conflict," the
disqualification does not really involve a conflict at all, be cause it prohibits the lawyer from representing a private
practice client even if the interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely parallel.[33] The
"congruent-interest representation conflict," unlike the "adverse -interest conflict," is unique to former government
lawyers.

I believe that Atty. Mendoza's present engagement as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096,
which involves the sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp., violates the ethical precept embodied in Rule
6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, which is akin to the doctrine of "congruent -interest representation
conflict."

Contrary to the majority opinion, the subject

matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with
or related to a "matter," i.e. the liquidation
of GENBANK, in which Atty. Mendoza had
intervened as the Solicitor General

The qualifying words or phrases that define the prohibition in Rule 6.03 are (1) "any matter" and (2) "he had
intervened" thereon while he was in the government service.[34]

The United States' ABA Formal Opinion No. 324 recognized that it is difficult to formulate a precise definition of
"matter" as used in their Disciplinary Rule (DR), nonetheless, it suggested that the term "contemplates a d iscrete and
isolatable transaction or set of transaction between identifiable parties."[35]

There is no dispute that Atty. Mendoza, as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank on the procedure to bring
about the liquidation of GENBANK. It is, likewise, admitted by respondents Tan, et al. that Atty. Mendoza filed with
the then CFI of Manila, the petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK (Special Proceeding No.
107812).[36] GENBANK was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and b ecame Allied Banking Corp.,
whose shares of stocks have been sequestered by the PCGG and presently subject of Civil Case No. 0096.

The majority opinion downplays the role of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he "merely advised the Central Bank on the
legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK" which procedure is "given in black and white in R.A. No. 265, section 29."
This procedural advice, according to the majority opinion, "is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility."

On the contrary, the acts of Atty. Mendoza may be rightfully considered as falling within the contemplation of the
term "matter" within the meaning of Rule 6.03. Specifically, Atty. Mendoza's giving counsel to the Central Bank on
the procedure to go about GENBANK's liquidation and the filing of the petition therefor in Special Proceedings No.
107812 did not merely involve the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.[37] These acts were discrete, isolatable as well as identifiable transactions
or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, i.e., the procedure for the liquidation of GENBANK.
Consequently, the same can be properly considered "matter" withi n the contemplation of Rule 6.03.

Moreover, contrary to the contention of respondents Tan, et al., the interdiction in Rule 6.03 does not only apply if
precisely the same legal issues are involved in each representation.[38] The Comments of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) that drafted our Code of Professional Responsibility explained that the restriction covers
"engagement or employment, which means that he cannot accept any work or employment from anyone that will
involve or relate to the matter in which he intervened as a public official."[39] The sequestration of the shares of
stock in Allied Banking Corp. in the names of respondents Tan, et al., which is subject of Civil Case No. 0096,
necessarily involves or relates to their acquisition of GENBANK upon its liquidation, in which Atty. Mendoza had
intervened as the Solicitor General.

It should be emphasized that Atty. Mendoza's participation in GENBANK's liquidation is sufficient to place his
present engagement as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096 within the ambit of Rule 6.03. His
role was significant and substantial. The Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials[40] of
the Central Bank, is revealing:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following
procedure should be taken:
Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been
made since the last examination of the bank as of Au gust 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be
reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.

If the said report is confirmed by the Moneta ry Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank
and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been
taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.[41]
The Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board likewise shows that Atty. Mendoza was furnished
copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for
assistance in the bank's liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the
Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 19 77, together with copies of:
Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25,
1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24,
1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a report on the stat e of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General.

for his use in filing a petition in the Court of First Instance praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank."[42]
By advising the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation of GENBANK and, more significantly,
by filing the petition for assistance in its liquidation, Atty. Mendoza had clearly intervened in the liquidation of
GENBANK and its subsequent acquisition by respondents Tan, et al.

I disagree with the ponencia's holding that Atty. Mendoza could not be considered as having intervened as it describes
the participation of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he "had no iota of participation in the decision of the Central Bank
to liquidate GENBANK."

That the decision to declare GENBANK insolvent was made wholly by the Central Bank, without the participation of
Atty. Mendoza, is not in question. Rather, it was his participatio n in the proceedings taken subsequent to such
declaration, i.e., his giving advise to the Central Bank on how to proceed with GENBANK's liquidation and his filing
of the petition in Special Proceeding No. 107812 pursuant to Section 29[43] of Rep. Act No. 2 65, that constitutes
"intervention" as to place him within the contemplation of Rule 6.03. To intervene means "
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance; 2: to occur, fall or come between points
of time or events; 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE; 4: to occur or lie
between two things "[44]
Further, "intervention" is defined as -
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others ...[45]
With the foregoing definitions, it is not difficult to see that by giving counsel to the Central Bank on how to proceed
with GENBANK's liquidation and filing the necessary petition therefor with the court, Atty. Mendoza "had
intervened," "had come in," or "had interfered," in the liquidation of GENBANK and the subsequent acquisition by
respondents Tan, et al. of the said banking institution. Moreover, his acts clearly affected the interests of GENBANK
as well as its stockholders.

Contrary to the majority opinion, Rule 6.03 applies even if Atty. Mendoza did not "switch sides" or did not take
inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if no conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendoza's former government
client (Central Bank) and his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)

As earlier intimated, Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics, now
superseded by the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility. In lieu of the old Canon 36, Canon 9 of the ABA's
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.
Providing specificity to this general caveat, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9 -101(B) commands, thus:
A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a
public employee.
The purpose of the interdiction, as stated in the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 37, is -
"[to avoid] the manifest possibility that - [a former Government lawyer's] action as a public legal official might be
influenced (or open to the charge that it had been influenced) by the hope of later being employed privately to uphold
or upset what he had done.[46]
The old Canon 36, as well as the present Canon 9 and DR9-101(B), rest on the policy consideration that an attorney
must seek to avoid even the appearance of evil.[47]

Being undoubtedly of American origin, the interpretation adopted by the American courts and the ABA has persuasive
effect on the interpretation of Rule 6.03.[48] Accordingly, I find the case of General Motors Corporation v. City of
New York,[49] where the pertinent ethical precepts were applied by the United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit),
particularly instructive. The said US court disqualified the privately retained counsel of the City of New York in the
antitrust case it filed against the General Motors Corp. because the said counsel, a former lawyer of the US
Department of Justice, had not only participated in t he latter's case against General Motors Corp. but signed the
complaint in that action.

George D. Reycraft, the counsel whose disqualification was sought in that case, served as a trial attorney assigned at
the General Litigation Services of the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice from 1952 to 1962.
Sometime in 1954, he participated in the investigation of the alleged monopolization by General Motors Corp. of the
city and intercity bus business. The investigation culminated with the filing of the antitrust complaint against General
Motors Corp. in 1956. Reycraft signed the said complaint but alleged that after 1958 through the time that he left the
Department of Justice in 1962, he no longer had any participation in that case.

In disqualifying Reycraft, the US Court gave short shrift to the argument that Reycraft "has not changed sides" - i.e.
"there is nothing antithetical in the postures of the two governments in question," stating that, per Opinion No. 37 of
the ABA Commission on Professional Ethics, the ethical precepts of Canon 9 and DR9 -101(B) apply irrespective of
the side chosen in private practice. The said court believed that it "is as it should be for there lurks great potential for
lucrative returns in following into private practic e the course already charted with the aid of governmental
resources."[50]
The US Court stressed that Reycraft not only participated in the investigation, but he signed the complaint in that
action and admittedly had "substantial responsibility" in its inv estigatory and preparatory stages. It thus concluded
that "where the overlap of issues is so plain and the involvement while in Government employ is so direct, the
appearance of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification."[51]

The General Motors case is illustrative of the "congruent-interest representation conflict" doctrine. It bears stressing
that this doctrine applies uniquely to former government lawyers and has been distinguished from the normal rule
applicable for non-government lawyers in this wise -
To illustrate the normal rule for non-government lawyers, imagine that the lawyer has represented passenger A and
has recovered substantial damages in a suit against a driver. No conflict of interest principle or rule restricts the
lawyer from later representing passenger B against the driver with respect to exactly the same accident. B may obtain
the benefits of the lawyer's help regardless of the fact that the lawyer might be able to employ to B's advantage
information and strategies developed in the representation of A. The critical element is that the interest of A and B do
not conflict.

The analysis does not change if we move from an area that is entirely private into one that is arguably more connected
with the public interest. Suppose a lawyer in private practice represents Small Soap Company in its suit for damages
under the federal antitrust laws against Giant Soap Company. The lawyer would not be disqualified from representing
Medium Soap Company against Giant Soap in a succeeding suit for damages based on precisely the same conspiracy.
The congruence of interests between Small Soap and Medium Soap would almost certainly mean that the lawyer could
represent both clients. In the absence of a conflict - an opposing interest between the two clients - the existence of a
substantial relationship between the matters involved in both cases is irrelevant.

Now, suppose the lawyer has filed suit in behalf of the government against Giant Soap Company to force divestiture
of an acquired company on a theory that, because of the acquisition, Giant Soap has monopolized an industry in
conflict with antitrust laws. May the lawyer, after leaving government service and while in private practice, represent
Medium Soap Company against Giant Soap in a suit for damages based on the same antitrust conspiracy? Does the
absence of opposing interests between Medium Soap and the lawyer's former government client similarly mean that
there should be no disqualification?

At this point, the rules for the former government lawyer diverge sharply from the normal former-client conflict rules:
the lawyer is disqualified from representing the successive client in private practice, despite the fact that the interests
of the client and the lawyer's former government client are apparently aligned. All that is required for disqualification
is the relationship between the former and the succeeding representations.[52]
The rationale for the "congruent-interest representation conflict" doctrine has been explained, thus:
The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern with the impact that any other rule would have upon the
decisions and actions taken by the government lawyer during the course of the earlier representation of the
government. Both courts and commentators have expressed the fear that permitting a lawyer to take action in behalf
of a government client that later could be to the advantage of private practice client would present grave dangers that
a government lawyer's largely discretionary actions would be wrongl y influenced by the temptation to secure private
practice employment or to favor parties who might later become private practice clients ...

The fear that government lawyers will misuse government power in that way is not idle. Lawyers who represent the
government often exercise enormous discretion unchecked by an actual client who oversees the lawyer's work. For
that reason a special rule is needed to remove the incentive for government lawyers to take discretionary decisions
with an eye cast toward advantages in future, nongovernmental employment. The broad disqualification accomplishes
that and, particularly under rubrics that do not invariably require disqualification of the entire firm with which the
former government lawyer practices, does it without unnecessarily discouraging lawyers from entering temporary
public service.[53]
The foregoing disquisition applies to the case of Atty. Mendoza. Indeed, a textual reading of Rule 6.03 of our Code of
Professional Responsibility reveals that no conflict of interests or adverse interests is required for the interdiction to
apply. If it were so, or if conflict of interests were an element, then the general conflict of interests rule (Rule
15.03)[54] would apply. Rather, the interdiction in Rule 6.03 broadly cove rs "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service." To reiterate, the drafters of our
Code of Professional Responsibility had construed this to mean that a lawyer "cannot accept any work or empl oyment
from anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in which he intervened as a public official, except on behalf of
the body or authority which he served during his public employment."[55]

In Civil Case No. 0096, Atty. Mendoza is certainly not r epresenting the Central Bank but respondents Tan, et al.
Granting arguendo that the interests of his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.) and former
government client (Central Bank) are apparently aligned, the interdiction in Rule 6.0 3 applies.

Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit

temporal limitation because cases have to be
resolved based on their peculiar circumstances

Unless the Code itself provides, the Court cannot set a prescriptive period for any of the provisions therein. That
Rule 6.03, in particular, contains no explicit temporal limitation is deliberate. It recognizes that while passage of time
is a factor to consider in determining its applicability, the peculiarities of each case have to be considered. For
example, in Control Data Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp.,[56] the US District Court of Minnesota held
that the lawyer who, 15 years earlier, while an employee of the Department of Justice had been in charge of
negotiations in antitrust case against a corporation, was not disqualified from acting as counsel for the plaintiffs suing
such corporation. On the other hand, the lawyer whose conduct was the subject of the ABA Opinion No. 37, earlier
cited, was himself 10 years removed from the matter over which he had substantial responsibility while in public
employ at the time he accepted the private engagement relating to the same matter.[57] Clearly, it is the degree of
involvement or participation in the matter while in government service, not the pass age of time, which is the crucial
element in Rule 6.03.

The Code of Professional Responsibility is a codification of legal ethics, that "body of principles by which the
conduct of members of the legal profession is controlled. More specifically and practi cally considered, legal ethics may
be defined as that branch of moral science which treats of the duties which the attorney -at-law owes to his clients, to
the courts, to the bar, and to the public."[58] In this connection, the Court has consistently charac terized disciplinary
proceedings, including disqualification cases, against lawyers as sui generis, neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
thus:
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor pure criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plainti ff
nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu propio. Public interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administra tion of justice...[59]
For this reason, the civil law concept of prescription of actions finds no application in disqualification cases against
lawyers.

In this case, while the liquidation of GENBANK took place in 1977, the period that had lapsed is not s ufficient to
consider it far removed from the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil
Case No. 0096. In fact, the validity of the said liquidation is still pending with the Court.[60] The validity of the
sequestration of the shares in Allied Banking Corp., which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0096, is necessarily
intertwined with Special Proceeding No. 107812 involving the liquidation of GENBANK and the acquisition thereof
by respondents Tan, et al. The issues presented in the two proceedings are so overlapping and the involvement of
Atty. Mendoza while in government employ is so plain, direct and substantial, his disqualification as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0095 is warranted u nder Rule 6.03.

Contrary to the majority opinion, the peculiar

circumstances of this case justify the strict application
of Rule 6.03

The ponencia cautions against the strict application of Rule 6.03 because it would have a "chilling effect on the right
of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests." This concern is similar to that raised by the City
of New York in the General Motors case where it argued that if Reycraft was disqualified, the US court would "chill
the ardor for Government service by rendering worthless the experience gained in Government employ."[61] It
appeared that the City of New York relied on the pronouncement in the earlier case of United States v. Standard Oil
Co,[62] known as the Esso Export Case, thus:
If the government service will tend to sterilize an attorney in too large an area of law for too long a time, or will
prevent him from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which he has devoted years in acquiring, and if that
sterilization will spread to the firm which he becomes associated, the sacrifice of entering government service will be
too great for most men to make.[63]
Addressing this argument in General Motors, the same US court, through Justice Irving F. Kaufman, also the ponente
of the Esso Export Case, distinguished the two cases. It noted that the said court denied the motion to disqualify the
former government lawyer in Esso Export Case because the lawyer therein "never investigated or passed upon the
subject matter of the pending case ... never rendered or had any specific duty to render any legal advice in relation to
the regulations involved in the litigation."[64] Hence, the accommodation between maintaining high ethical standards
for former Government employees, on the one hand, and encouraging entry into Government service, on the other,
was struck under far different circumstances of the Esso Export Case.

In General Motors, the admonition voiced by Justice Kaufman in his article The Former Government Attorney and
the Canons of Professional Ethics[65] was considered more to the point:
If there was a likelihood that information pertaining to the pending matter reached the attorney, although he did not
"investigate" or "pass upon" it, ..., there would undoubtedly be an appearance of ev il if he were not disqualified.[66]
Thus, it was concluded that the Esso Export Case unquestionably presented a case for the cautious application of the
"appearance-of-evil doctrine" because the former Government lawyer's connection with the matter at issu e was the
tenuous one of mere employment in the same Government agency.

In contrast, in General Motors, Reycraft, not only participated in the investigatory and preparatory stages, but also
signed the complaint in the action. Thus, according to the US cou rt, where the overlap of issues is so plain, and the
involvement while in Government employ so direct, the resulting appearance of impropriety must be avoided through
disqualification.

From the foregoing disquisition, it can be gleaned that disqualificati on cases involving former government lawyers will
have to be resolved on the basis of peculiar circumstances attending each case. A balance between the two seemingly
conflicting policy considerations of maintaining high ethical standards for former Governm ent employees, on the one
hand, and encouraging entry into Government service, on the other, must be struck based on, inter alia, the
relationship between the former and the succeeding representations of the former government lawyer. Likewise, as
already discussed, the degree of his involvement in the matter while in Government employ is a crucial element in
determining if his present representation is within the purview of Rule 6.03.

In this case, not unlike in General Motors, the involvement of Atty. Men doza in the liquidation of GENBANK while
he was the Solicitor General is so direct that the appearance of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification.

Conclusion

Let me just clarify that the record is free from any intimation that Atty. Mendoza was improperly influenced while in
government service or that he is guilty of any impropriety in agreeing to represent respondents Tan, et al. However, I
am constrained to vote for his disqualification in Civil Case No. 0096 in order to avoid any appearanc e of impropriety
lest it taint both the public and private segments of the legal profession.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The Motion to Disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza
is GRANTED insofar as Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned.

SEPARATE OPINION

TINGA, J.:

My vote to grant the petition hinges on the reasons stated hereunder. They pertain to a significant and material
dimension to this case which deserves greater illumination.

To sustain the view that Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) should be disqualified as counsel in Civil Case No.
0096, as the dissenters are wont to hold, there should be a clear legal basis that would mandate such disqualification.
The dissenters would hold Atty. Mendoza liable for violating Section 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
while the ponencia disputes the assertion that the provision was indeed transgressed. I maintain that Section 6.03
cannot be made applicable in the present case to Atty. Mendoza, as to do so would be violat ive of his right to due
process.

I have qualms in holding any member of the Bar liable for violating Section 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, in connection with acts that they may have engaged in as government officials before the enactmen t of
the said Code. In this case, at the time Atty. Mendoza entered the government service he had no idea of the kind of
inhibition proposed to be foisted on him currently. Indeed, he is being faulted for representing the respondents in
Civil Case No. 0096 notwithstanding the fact that as Solicitor General and in the discharge of his official functions, he
had advised the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company,
which was subsequently acquired by the re spondents. However, whether it be at the time then Solicitor General
Mendoza participated in the process of the dissolution of General Bank in 1977, or at sometime in 1987 when he
agreed to represent the respondents, the Code of Professional Responsibility had not yet been promulgated.

The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the Supreme Court on 21 June 1988.[1] Prior to its
official adoption, there was no similar official body of rules or guidelines enacted by the Supreme Court other th an
the provisions on Legal Ethics in the Rules of Court.

I fear it would set a dangerous precedent to hinge Atty. Mendoza's culpability on the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as it would effectively imply that the Code of Professional Responsibility has application even as to
acts performed prior to its enactment. Our laws frown upon the prospectivity of statutes. Article 4 of the Civil Code
declares that "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." There is no declaration in the
Code of Professional Responsibility that gives retroactive effect to its canons and rules. It is settled that the
presumption is that all laws operate prospectively absent clear contrary language in the text,[2] and that in every case
of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws.[3]

The Court in Co v. Court of Appeals provided an exhaustive disquisition on the scope of the rule on the prospective
application of statutes:
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include:
Buyco v. PNB, 961) 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine
National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment
made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, as
amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be
given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections
9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v.
Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank,
when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104
SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of
the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the
promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging
that RA 6389 which removed "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given
retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac -An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that
the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo,
161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (See also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 1 77
SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS -CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v.
COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90 -0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the
holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled
that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent
appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason why under Article 8 of the N ew Civil Code,
'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ...."[4]
I believe that there is a greater demand to ward off the retroactive application of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for the Code is the source of penal liabilities against its infringers. It is well entrenched that generally,
penal laws or those laws which define offenses and prescribe penalties for their violation operate prospectively.[5] The
Constitution itself bars the enactment of ex-post facto laws.[6] I do not think it necessary to flirt with the
constitutional issue whether the Code of Professional Responsibility operates as a penal statute within the definition
of an ex-post facto law, but I am satisfied with the general rules, affirmed by jurisprudence, that abhor the
retroactivity of statutes and regulations such as the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Hence, to impute culpability on the part of Atty. Mendoza, it would be necessary to ascertain whe ther his accession to
represent the respondents violated any binding law or regulation at the time of the engagement. It is but proper to
frame the question in such manner, for only then could it be ascertained whether Atty. Mendoza knew or should have
known that his professional representation of the respondents was illegal. It would also be unfair to ascribe liability to
any lawyer whom, at the time he/she was in government service, was not guided by any definitive rule prescribing the
possible subsequent restrictions on the lawyer's professional activity as a consequence of the exercise of public office.

Ostensibly, Atty. Mendoza's actions violated Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which some authorities
deemed as a source of legal ethics prior to the Code of Professional Responsibility.[7] Canon 36 states:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Canon 36 would apparently cover the allegations imputed to Atty. Mendoza. However, a thorough review should first
be examined on whether Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics may be used as legal basis in resolving this
case.

The Canons of Professional Ethics originated from the American Bar Association.[8] They were adopted by the
Philippine Bar Association as its own in 1917 and in 1946.[9] There is no denying the high regard enjoyed by the
Philippine Bar Association in the legal community in its nearly one hundr ed years of existence. However, there is also
no denying that the Philippine Bar Association, a civic non -profit association,[10] is a private entity of limited
membership within the Philippine bar. The rules or canons it has adopted are per se binding onl y on its members, and
the penalties for violation of the same could affect only the status or rights of the infringers as members of the
association.

At the same time, reference has been had by this Court to the Canons of Professional Ethics in deciding
administrative cases against lawyers, especially prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Ethics. Hence, the
belief by some commentators that the said Canons may serve as a source of legal ethics in this country. However, I
think it would be grave error to declare that the Canons of Professional Ethics, on their own, serves as an
indisputable source of obligations and basis of penalties imposable upon members of the Philippine legal profession.
This would violate the long-established constitutional principle that it is the Supreme Court which is tasked with the
promulgation of rules governing the admission to the practice of law, as well as the pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts.[11] The task of formulating ethical rules governing the pr actice of law in the Philippines could not have
been delegated to the Philippine Bar Association by the Supreme Court. Neither could such rules as adopted by the
private body be binding on the Supreme Court or the members of the bar.

If provisions of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the Philippine Bar Association have jurisprudentially been
enforced, or acknowledged as basis for legal liability by the Supreme Court, they may be recognized as a binding
standard imposable upon members of the bar, but not because said Canons or the Philippine Bar Association itself
said so, but because the Supreme Court said so. This is keeping in line with the entrenched rule, as evinced by Article
8 of the Civil Code, which states that "judicial decisions applying or int erpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system."

Thus, I would be willing to consider Canon 36 as binding on Atty. Mendoza when he deigned to represent the
respondents if at such time, this Court had expressly acknowledged Ca non 36 as a rule or standard which deserves
obeisance by members of the bar. After all, it would only be through such process of judicial recognition that these
guidelines adopted by a private entity could be considered as a normative rule compulsory on al l practitioners.
Unfortunately, no such case exists in Philippine jurisprudence.
It might be possible to concede that this principle embodied under Canon 36 or even as stated in American case law,
subsisted within that penumbra of ethical standards from w hich the Court could have derived a jurisprudential rule
had one been called for by a particular case. However, it remains that none such was pronounced by this Court in
jurisprudence, and indeed the prohibition under Canon 36 was not prescribed by this Co urt or by statute as a norm
until the enactment of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 21 June 1988. Accordingly, when Atty. Mendoza
agreed to represent the respondents, there was no definitive binding rule proscribing him from such engagement or
penalizing him for such representation.

I am mindful that what the Court is called upon to decide is whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion, and not just mere error in fact or law, in denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza. Th e absence of a
definitive disqualificatory rule that would have guided Atty. Mendoza when he undertook the questioned acts
sufficiently justifies the Sandiganbayan's denial of the motion.

We should not render insensate the concerns raised by the minority, arising as they do from an understandable
concern that the line dividing the professional activities and the government services rendered by lawyers should
remain distinct. Yet the majority likewise demonstrates that there is no unanimity on prevalent leg al thought on the
matter, and a healthy debate on the issue will result in no harm. Still, the due process dimension, as highlighted by the
absence of a definitive rule for which Atty. Mendoza could have been held accountable, proves determinative to my
mind. The Court is the enforcer of the constitutional guarantees of due process to all persons, and my vote is but a
consequence of this primordial duty.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF ATTY. EDILLON
A.C. No. 1928, December 19, 1980
FERNANDO, C.J.:

The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the bar admits of
no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, pub lic interest, the integrity of the profession and the
welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon
was disbarred on August 3, 1978,[1] the vote being unanimous with the late Chief Ju stice Castro as ponente. From
June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted
such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion."[2]

Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be amiss. As set
forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philip-pines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75 -65 in Administrative Case
No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommend-ing to the
Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Ro ll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the
IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said reso-lution to the Court for consideration and
approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By -Laws of the IBP, which reads: '* * * Should the
delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of
the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action
taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27,
1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his
comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976,
the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24,
1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on Ju ne 3, 1976. After the hearing, the
parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution."[3]

Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to rec ommend to the Supreme Court the
removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of attorneys as found in Rule of Court: "Effect of non -
payment of dues.– Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for si x
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall
be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."[4]

The submission of respondent Edillon as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre -condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of t he IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above pro-visions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By -Laws are
void and of no legal force and effect."[5] It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues were "raised on a
previous case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all
these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973."[6] The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar
raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionabl e, "and, within the context of contemporary
conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively."[7]

As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered, there were various
pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978.
Characte-rized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the
matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned out.[8] It was the consensus that he continued to
be oblivious to certain basic juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of
intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other
cases coming before this Tribunal were quite liter ate, even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he
had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from plain and sheer obstinacy.
Necessarily, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified.

Since then, however, there were other com-munications to this Court where a different attitude on his part was
discernible.[9] The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked – the state of his
health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel,
their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender
of the causes entrusted to him.

This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the resolution of
October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the
exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly
paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he was barred from exercising his
profession was like-wise taken into account. It m ay likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to
punish for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban,[10] the power to
discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the p reservative and not on the vindictive
principle.[11]

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to the bar is
concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be born e in mind is that membership in the
bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of
such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after
actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered
for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. VS. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS

A.C No. 4749, January 20, 2000
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non -payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of
the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Fr ancisco R.
Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place
of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least
three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997:
(originals available)
Annex A
-
"Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q -95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B
-
"Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95 -030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257),
Parañaque, MM

Annex C
-
"An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17,
1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member
of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10
which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of t he
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports
to be a member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for
payment of professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspensio n of an attorney may be done not only by the
Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of
these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037 -CJ En Banc Decision on October 28,
1981 ( in SCRA )

his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see
attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which
is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17,
1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondent’s signature above his
name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated
February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondent’s motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par.
2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent’s "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991.
Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after
which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and re commendation. In his comment-
memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]
3. That with respect to the complainant’s absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No.
259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no lo nger a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is
entitled to practice law.

The complainant’s basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good stan ding, were as above cited, the
October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article
316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was even
promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals
and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and
reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a
limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30
hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section
4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus
exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law , but only in a limited practice, the
subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised
his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any
manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and
pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges an d penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or
payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by
the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reali ty for him to pay such dues despite his
candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution[6] adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of
the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated Apri l 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B,
§12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent’s
suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent’s non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in
his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at
least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud
Javier that respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that
"being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect
in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
....

The above cited provision of law is not a pplicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in
the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax
Return up to the present time that he had only a limited pra ctice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent’s Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing i n the IBP by using
the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his
memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practi ce without having paid his IBP dues. He
likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP -Rizal
259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrep resenting that such
was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the
payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment
of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does
not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true tha t R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from
the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level
as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not
include payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respon dent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE L EGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow
the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the
most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent’s advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea
for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law
or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR,
or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas’ personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to a ll chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.
 In re: Victoriano Lanuevo
Adm. Case No. 1162, August 29, 1975
MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
— for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions
during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the court for re -correction and re-evaluation
of his answers to the 1971 Bar Examinations questions, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967
Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court to
"the startling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason
or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2, Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed,
according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio
D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects also underwent alterations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results.
Note that this was without any formal motion or requests from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned.
If the bar examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not
do so now when proper request and motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might
not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered
'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient rea son for the Court en banc to go into these
matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter,
Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found
that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal
Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records
revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, a perennial
bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1967, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%,
68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court resolution making 74% as the passing mark for the 1971
bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo
and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn stateme nts on the matter, with which request they
complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re -evaluation and/or re-
checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re -evaluated and/or rechecked the
notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the
authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a
resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of A ttorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the
the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and
therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5,
1971 to require him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by t he Court
"to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.) while respondents Pardo,
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60 -63, 32-35, 40-
41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in
addition to, and in amplification of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45 -47, rec.).
Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100 -104, rec.). He was
required by the Court to verify the same and com pliance came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106 -110,
rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re -evaluated and/or
rechecked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political La w and Public International Law of examinee
Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises,
who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Pu blic
International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17 -24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo
remained as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law
also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1622 turned out to be owned
by another successful candidate by the name of Er nesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of
another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of
the grade from 47% to 50%. This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is o wned by another successful candidate
by the name of Alfredy Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in
the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of t he Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee as Investigating Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a
student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of
slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the
same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20 -21, 32, rec.),
respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries.
Because of this denial, a summons was issued to Eufrosino F. de Vera, who narrated the circumstances surrounding
the case and identified respondent Galang as the very same person charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in
that case (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his applications to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is
required under the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973.
Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo
submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed
to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral testimony,
submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same
became the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answers, which they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation
conducted by the Court, the respondents-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re -evaluated
and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.

In his affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C.
Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

"2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination n otebooks, Atty.
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty.
Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all segments and if he finds that a candidate obtained an
extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner
concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

"3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination book let in Civil
Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider
his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

"4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to
do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;

"5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I
found that the notebook is numbered 95';

"6. That the original grade was 64% and my re -evaluation of the answers were based on the same standard used in the
correction and evaluation of all others; thus Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%;
No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (italics supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with the
following additional statements:

"xxx xxx xxx

"3. x x x However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer possible to make the
reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remained at
5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

"4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 95 I did not know the identity of its
owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other
subjects;
"5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of
the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:

"a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself
had developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the examination bookl ets of bar candidates I have
always followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme
Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;

"b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real rules and
policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the consent and permission of the Chairman
of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court and
specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

"xxx xxx xxx

"e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I
declined to reconsider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the
original correction of the same" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32 -35, rec.; italics supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public International
Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

"On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence t o obtain from me the last bag of two hundred
notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972,
he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with a t least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual
amenities, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re -examine the said notebook because it appears
that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.

"I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to review o r re-examine the notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority
as long as the particular examinee's' name had not been identified or that the code n umber decoded and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case presented
bearing code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a
particularly low grade to said examinee.

"Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I
might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re -examined the same, carefully read the answer s, and graded
it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result
that the examinee deserved an increase grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to
correct the grades, and as he has assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded
and his name known, x x x I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto,
and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two
sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy of the
grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; italics supplied).

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted
and repleaded therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in addition alleged that:

"xxx xxx xxx

"3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered 661, I did not
know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5,
1973; now knowing his name, I Wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even
up to the present;

"4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly asked
the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of
the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar confidant's assurance was apparently regular
and so appeared to be in the regular course of official business which thus convinced me because there was no
express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official
liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the
Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. x x x;

"5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it
inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the
Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me;
"xxx xxx xxx

"7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted the same. In
agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction,
not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, becau se I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in
remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of
the examinee in the other subjects; I presumed that, as Bar Confidant, he was in the position to know and that there
was nothing irregular in that;

"8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661
was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass
the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation
that he had passed the other subjects x x x

"9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiner's Committee, which according to my diary was on
February 8, 1972, the committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest,
the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.

"10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. I had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar
Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contact with
him before or after the review and even up to the present" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60 -63; rec.; italics supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

"1. x x x

"2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my then residence at 951
Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

"3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and was he lping in
the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1)paper in
Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and
that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make the general passing
average.

"4. That seeing the justification, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialed the revised mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

"5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; italics
supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in
good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a
total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 7 0, rec.;
italics supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:

"xxx xxx xxx

"2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others
(he used the word 'we') had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly
reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average
was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the
examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention
to the fact that in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo
however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previous ly given and submitted was entirely
within my discretion.

"3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and
that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded to re-read and re-evaluate each and
every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re -evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some
items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I rec all that after
Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re -evaluation, the total grade increased by a few
points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.
x x x" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; italics supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement,
adding the following:

"xxx xxx xxx

"5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, which resulted in increasing the total grade of the examinee concerned in
Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted
for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Exa miners the legitimacy of the request made by
Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that —

"a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that
it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a
particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly
fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate.

"xxx xxx xxx

"c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every
answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said
examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that
the said examinee failed, herein respondent became co nvinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than
that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the
passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in re -appraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded
a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9%" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36 -39, rec.;
italics supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated Apr il 17, 1972:

"xxx xxx xxx

"That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was
informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mer cantile Law;

"That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re -evaluate the paper of this particular Bar
candidate;

"That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%.

"That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to
increase his final grade to 71%;

"That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
72, rec.; italics supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo re -stated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17,
1972, and

" xxx xxx xxx

"2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re -evaluated the examination notebook of
Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made
during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the
Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.

"3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned r e-evaluation that notebook No.
1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never
met up to this time this particular bar examinee" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40 -41, rec.; italics supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

"xxx xxx xxx

"As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of
ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks. Believing that those five merited re -evaluation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the
examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
'x x x in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarity of language, and soundness of
reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re -evaluation and/or re-checking.

"It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the examinations, we are
usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their
answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re -
correction and/ or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are readying for
submission to the Honorable Court.

"Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because the result of the
examination when released is final and irrevocable.

"It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those noteb ooks back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; italics supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

"That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hon est belief that the same merited
re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant
but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiner's decision; and that, to
is knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having
brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a
passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said sub ject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the
Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the
examinee concerned is one surnamed 'de la Cruz' or 'Ty -de la Cruz'.

"Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to
undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.

"x x x" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; italics supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in
addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:

"xxx xxx xxx

"1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners conc erned into believing that the examinee involved failed
only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so meri ted on the basis of the Confidential
Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1 -a- Lanuevo)
which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re -evaluation
was in order;

"2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

"Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar
Division) after lunch, I thought of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I think
of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the
ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first num ber that I saw was '954' boldly printed on an electrical contrivance
(evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street
towards the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino Street and almost adjace nt to the southeastern corner of the
fence of the Araullo High School (photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a
portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4 -Lanuevo and the number '954' as Exh.
4-a-Lanuevo).

"With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such number.
Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to '954'. This number be came
doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was '27', a number that is so
significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever
possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge
of the examinations as bar confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number '27' (or '227') or end with said
number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure '27' at the beginning of the list,
as Exh. 5-a-Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo and the figure '227' at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6 -
a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7- Lanuevo and the figure '227' at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo;
and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure '227' at the end of the list as Exh. 8 -a-Lanuevo).
"The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27,
1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific
War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as
the beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being among the casualties; (b) On
February 27, 1946 I was able to get out of the army by way of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I
got married and since then we begot children the youngest o f whom was born on February 27, 1957.

"Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on the
checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office code n umber '954'.
As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the
notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent soundness of the answers and,
thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1 -Lanuevo
and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the respective
examiners for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter
to their discretion and judgment.

"3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases which I brought
to the attention of the Committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective
examiners, namely:

"(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law
(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9 - Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 47% increased to 50%
after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Ianuevo); and

"(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one
subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out
that the subject was Political and Internationa l Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10 -Lanuevo and the notebook in Political
and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the origi nal grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-
evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is precisely the same notebook
mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (Exh. - Pardo).

"4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was
reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the
latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee
authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;

"5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re -check some 19, or so, notebooks
in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re -
evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of onl y 10%"
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In
his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks " of respondent Galang,
because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook" as he "was going over those
notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of
August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the
notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954'."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Romon E. Galang, asserted, among others:

"1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before
except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.

"xxx xxx xxx

"4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider 'failure' cases; after the official
release thereof; why should it now reconsider a 'passing' case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the
bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official business?

"It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which
respondent is richly entitled?

"5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no
knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the
resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to
contact the Bar Confidani Lanuevo in his behalf.
"But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are eviden tly
purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re -
evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him
and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re -
evaluation of Respondents grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of policy
of the Committee to increase the percentage of pas sing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation that
only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if
not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that Bar Confidant Lanuevo's actu ations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit
an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf?
To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination
Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy
of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which onl y goes
to show said narration of facts as unworthy of credence, or consideration.

"xxx xxx xxx

"7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent account or answer for the
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the
Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration
of this case.

"x x x" (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated a nd
prepared the stage leading to the reevaluation and/or re -correction of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving
separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the
Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant,
who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day,
respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting
examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as Bar Confidant, he makes a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade
in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re -
evaluation and change of grade (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent -examiner Pamatian an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular
notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said
examinee will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the
belief that that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re -evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject
to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with
Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not
know the identity of the examinee at the time he re -evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such
revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to
the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the
residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook
in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo had previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then
requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and po ssibly to reconsider the grade given explaining and
representing that "they" had reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent M analo in Remedial Law,
the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent
Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore,
respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that
read as follows:

"4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and
solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to
clarity of language and soundness of reasoning."
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely
within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the
authority to make such request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to reevaluate the
examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting i n an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular
subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made
by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code nu mber is 136, instead of 310 as
earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2 -
Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to his failing
marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International
Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number
1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that that particular examinee who
owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International
Law; and that if the said notebook would be re -evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee
will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible — the respondent Bar
Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one
subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said
notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re -evaluation, the
grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the changes made. This notebook with Office Code Number
954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol . V, pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade,
because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent
Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in
the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correctin g the
examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that particular
notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be
raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent
Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee,
respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% an d thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised
the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his
Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Gal ang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V,pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter
approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate
had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is
applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recall s, however, that he was provided a copy
of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re -evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the
same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because of his
failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in
Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing
authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law to reevaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent L anuevo suggested that
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook.
Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B -Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent
Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the
meeting within hearing of the other. members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made
known his willingness to re-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent
Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent
Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re -evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs.
A & B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed only in
his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re -evaluation of the said paper (Vol.
V, p. 33, rec.). Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is
substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his
report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V. pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent -examiner Pardo
to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in
a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent
Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. Respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code
No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re -examine, if
possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examinee who owns that particular
notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with
respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re -evaluated the answers of the
examinee concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% to 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office
code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2 -Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V,
pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED REEVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINEE RAMON E. GALANG, alias

ROMAN E. GALANG, alias IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re -
evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of
Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of ei ght (8) weighted points, more or
less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar Examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing
average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang ther eafter
took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to
initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their
respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on
the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential M emorandum (Exhs. I and 1-A Lanuevo, Adm. Cases
Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar
Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as Bar Confidant but
on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision x x x" (Exh.
2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was intended
solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him
to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.).
Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose declarations on the
matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as
corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents -examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified
extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent
Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar
Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo took undu e advantage of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit .in his position as Bar Confidant as well as the
trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re -evaluating the answers of only respondent
Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a
member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's' well -studied and well-
calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the
examinee failed only in his particular subject and/ or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, before the
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects
while his general average was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed
that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of
Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re -evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was
in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with a grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of
Galang before and after the unauthorized re -evaluation are as follows:

B
A
I

1. Political Law and Public International Law 68% 78% =10 pts. or 30 weighted points.

Labor Laws and Social Legislations - 67% 67% = no re-evaluation made.

2. Civil Law - 64% 75% = 11 points or 33 weighted points.

Taxation - 74% 74% = no re-evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law - 61% 71% = 10 points or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law - 64% 75% = 11 pts. or 22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law - 63.75% (64) 74.5% (75%) = 11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise - 81% 81% = no re-evaluation made.

____________ ____________
General Weighted Averages - 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re -evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under
the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9
weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of
the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto
Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re -evaluated for each of the latter two — Political
Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re -evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passin g mark before or after their notebooks are
submitted, to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only
function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter c ompute the general
average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation
to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will
determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers
of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiner concerned.
He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the Examiner. Any request for re -
evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly
act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes hims elf to suspicion and thereby compromises his
position as well as the image of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust
and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar C onfidant, can hardly invite belief in the face of the
incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re -evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety
(90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47,
101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's
claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re -evaluation. For certainly,
as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the
aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to
Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar
examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to
apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-
evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the
notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz was to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of
impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than Gala ng would not give him away.
Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the
members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one
subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the
first time by respondent Lanuevo in his supplemental sworn statement (Exh. 3-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-
47, rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it
was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five (5)
months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973 (Exh. 2 -Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing
that it was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ' NOTEBOOK IN MERCANTILED LAW TO RAISE

HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO
QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-
EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law
and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were
referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought
to the Bar Examinations Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50 -51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer
them back to the Examiners concerned for re -evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the
disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz (Vol. VI, pp. 33 -39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that
the data of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first me eting of the
Committee (Vol VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was
made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the data of the two examinees and
record of the dates of the meeting a the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him,
he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar
results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in
the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet or record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162,
p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law
which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34 -35, rec.).
According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol V, p. 35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela
Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated
with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the
notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner Code Number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9 -Lanuevo in
Adminstrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of
Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23 -24, 26, Vol. VIII, p. 4,
rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the
Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the
Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15 -16, rec.). He cannot
recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.). Fur ther, Pardo declared that he is
not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one
subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16 -17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang)
which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day
following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo
handed him said notebook and he accordingly re -evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number
954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the
Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59 -61, rec.). Pardo declared
that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re -
evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to
him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee
failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.; Exh. 2 -Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A. Montecillo, allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner
Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---
73%
Taxation ------------------------- 69%
Mercantile Law - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -------- 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re -evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:

B A

Political Law 57% 66% =

9 pts. or 27 weighted points

Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation

Civil Law 75% 75% =
Taxation 69% 69% =
Mercantile Law 68% 68% =
Criminal Law 78% 78% =
Remedial Law 85% 85% =
Legal Ethics 83% 83% =
_____________ _____________
Average (weighted)
73.15%

74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the
disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:

Political Law - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 70%

Taxation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:

B A

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% =
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. Or 9 weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = No reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79%
79% =

"
_________ _________
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law,
violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1972, which violation was due to the
misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be
said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referr al,
which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers in four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in
Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the
Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re -
evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed
in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the
Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names striken from the Roll of
Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the unauthorized re -evaluation of his answers in five (5) major subjects
— Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves
the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether pa st or
present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar — 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The
determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal
and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member o f the
Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with
one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one
hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a
deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in
the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court
and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is
primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in co nnection with the conduct of the Bar
Examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects,
as already clearly established, was initiated by respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious
breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re -evaluation
that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity.
The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar.
He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-
correction or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited
was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the procee dings or incidents that led
to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character
requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the
Bar must be x x x of good moral character x x x and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character, and that no charges against him involving m oral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rul e 127). Under both rules,
every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise
terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what
crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or
informing the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case
dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations
provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving
moral turpitude filed or pending against the applic ant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been
accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first
time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's cri minal records, if any. But as already
intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to
reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in t he ascertainment
and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court
will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant' s
involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction,
has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took
the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants
already required the applicant td declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any
court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against
him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the
Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal a ll his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or
not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with
any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, i ndicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56,
rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of
slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly
omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding
from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in
1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case
in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was
allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examination seven ( 7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been
charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well-settled
(see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:

"[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the board of law
examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admiss ion, information respecting so serious a
matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).

"[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been
apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming"
(State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N.W. 709 -710)."

The license of respondent Podell was revoked and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the
license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

"[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred 'in the discretion of the App ellate Division.' In the exercise
of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the
applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments aga inst him, one
of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court,
with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court"
(165 NYS, pp. 102, 104; italics supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised
by the Investigator of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that
case (he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his
continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that c riminal case up to the present time, indicate his
lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a
member of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973,
apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for
such omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar
examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alt ernative but to order
the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said
in Re Felipe del Rosario:

"The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be
extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary
to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its
confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the Bar (citing American cases )"
[52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any
precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar
candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a) misrepresentations of, or false
pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the
Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Public o from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the
Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA
475-478]; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313 -314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar
examinations [People vs. Romualdez — re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People
vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades
of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon
Pamatian (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased), Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re -evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in
question upon the misrepresentation of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and
that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the exa minee who
owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the
records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents -examiners
made the re-evaluation or re-correction in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the
respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should have
been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked
the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Cour t. At least
the respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades
and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and
particular subject and/ or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned
was really so circumstanced. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been
avoided.

Respondents Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of
respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with
the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it
would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You bro ught to me one
paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something,
I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I
agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure x x x" (Vol. V, pp. 60 -61, rec.; see also
allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1 Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; italization ours). And respondent Pablo: "x x x
he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in all other subjects except this subject and that if I can
re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar
examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done? and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done
before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave
it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what I did was to go over the book and tried to be
as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient
and if the answer was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and
what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44 -45, rec.; italics
supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re -evaluations made by respondents Pamatian,
Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved
by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by
respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

"Q And by reason of that information you made the re -evaluation of the paper?
"A Yes, your Honor.
"Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such information?
"A No your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B- -Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated March 19,
1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41; and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —
"3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evalution because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider
his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

"4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court
to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re--evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; . . ." (Exh. 2 - Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

"5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view
of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, . . ." (Exh. 1 - Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34,
rec.).

Manalo —

"(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent care fully evaluated each and
every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said
examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in the particular sub ject
that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than
that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing
grade of 75%. . . ." (allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, ref.; italics supplied).
Pardo —

"x x x I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the Ba r Confidant that the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall correctly x x x
"(allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; italics supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to
make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re -evaluation effected by them was
impartial or free from any improper influence , their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said reevaluations
(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents -examiners, which were earlier
quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re -evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects
do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents -examiners that their participation in the admission of
members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest co nsideration of public interest — absolute purity of the
proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost care and vigilance in the performance of their
duties relative thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandu m filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent -
examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto . . . was
motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping hi s (examiner's) alleged friend
— a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records
will show, did not pass said examinations" (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian,
who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D.
Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investiga tion which in his words is "essential to his defense." His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when.Justice Pamatian was still alive, deferred the
filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Osc ar Landicho before the latter departed for
Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a
leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", doe s not invite belief;
because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who
also affirmed that he deceived them into re -evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective
subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in
that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law Examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in
connection with the 1971 Bar examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was
re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the s aid bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec.). Even though such
information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous
act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restrain t in his actuations demanded by resolute
adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to
impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evide nce that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable
Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of t he 1971 Bar
examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lo t with an area
of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was
notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)
mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First
mortgage —P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913; date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972;
Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20,
1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which
according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo
claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol.
VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and
accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In
his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that
of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or
withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because
the transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo
from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VII,) p. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely
doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time
he received the $2000 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to respondent
Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or
time of payment, was agreed upon by them. And furthe rmore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo
promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out
by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a fam ily of her own, is among the top
earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of
respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstanc es.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the
amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes„ Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20, 1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973,
the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also r edeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter
cancelled on March 20, 1973 (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as
the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amo rtization of the
GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement
of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the
house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in
the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he
acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such
car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears,
however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as
of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said
1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the
above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his
passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious
irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after
respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court,
respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter of resignation on October 13, 1972 with an end in view of ret iring
from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of
the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of t he results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent
Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the cash value thereof in
lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down
payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40 -48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:

"(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the offic ial duties of the latter,
or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

"x x x xxx xxx

"(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions."

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined
that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property x x x " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep.
Act 3019).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were
not presented or taken up during the investigation; but thay were examined as they are part of the records of this
Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father
and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter became the Bar Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational pro gram of the Philippine
Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational
Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was
connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our
veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, respondent Lanuevo
successively held the positions of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claim Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator
and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore,
respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of th e Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's
educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is
also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was hi s father who all the time attended to the availment of the
said educational benefits and even when the he was already in Manila taking up his pre -law at MLQ Educational
Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was
employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79 -80, 86-87, rec.). [Subsequently, during
the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12 -13, rec.)]. It
appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ
Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ
Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955 -56 was directly addressed and furnished to
respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A -12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never we nt to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow
up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also
know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are requi red to go to the Philippine
Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he has
gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the
neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the
GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veteran s Board, he investigated claims for the
several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember,
however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application o f Ramon E.
Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and. has never met
him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFFE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48 -49, rec.). Later he joined the guerilla movement in
Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans
Board (Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese
occupation, his guerilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerilla
organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember having
attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a
member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p. 519, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was ho spitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162. p. 4 6,
rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the
Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank
of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army 43rd Div., US
Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division US army stationed at Corregidor in
the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization" (Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A -3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confid ant, the
same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this
Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164
as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY

DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IS
HEREBY, LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., is on official leave.

Concepcion Jr., and Martin, JJ., took no part.

 DIONNIE RICAFORT VS. ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA
A.C. No. 5179, May 31, 2016
LEONEN, J.:

Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment[1] against respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina on
December 10, 1999.[2]

Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle sideswiped respondent's car along Sarvida
Street in Surigao City.[3] Respondent alighted from his car and confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly
snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila sa ako?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap
complainant, and then left.[4]

Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of respondent's car.[5] Complainant
later learned that the driver of the car was Atty. Rene O. Medina, a provincial board member of Surigao del Norte.[6]

According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and humiliated."[7] Respondent's act showed arrogance and
disrespect for his oath of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this act constituted gross misconduct.[8]

Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit,[9] Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit,[10] and a letter[11] dated October
27, 1999 signed by Mayor Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of Surigao del Norte
Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that respondent slapped complainant and caused him great
humiliation.[12] Thus, respondent should be administratively penalized for his gross misconduc t and abuse of
authority:
Dear Mr. Chief Justice:

This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October 4, 1999 in Surigao City, committed by
Provincial Board Member Rene O. Medina.

The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie Ricafort, a tricycle driver, causing great
humiliation on the person. We believe that such conduct is very unbecoming of an elected official. Considering the
nature and purpose of your Office, it is respectfully submitted that appropriate action be taken on the matter as such
uncalled for abuse consists of gross misconduct and abuse of authority.

Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition of the Municipal Mayors League of Surigao
del Norte.

Thank you very much for your attention and more power.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter[13]
(Emphasis in the original)
Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the signatures of 19 Mayors of different
municipalities in Surigao Del Norte.[14]

In his Comment,[15] respondent denied slapping complainant. He alleged that the incident happened while he was
bringing his 10-year-old son to school.[16] He further alleged that complain ant's reckless driving caused complainant's
tricycle to bump the fender of respondent's car.[17] When respondent alighted from his car to check the damage,
complainant approached him in an unfriendly manner.[18] Respondent pushed complainant on the chest t o defend
himself.[19] Sensing, however, that complainant was not making a move against his son and himself, respondent asked
complainant if his tricycle suffered any damage and if they should wait for a traffic officer.[20] Both parties agreed
that they were both too busy to wait for a traffic officer who would prepare a sketch.[21] No traffic officer was
present during the incident.[22]

Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the subject of attacks on radio programs by the
Provincial Governor's allies, accusing him of slapping the tricycle driver.[23] He alleged that complainant's Affidavit
was caused to be prepared by the Provincial Governor as it was prepared in the English language, which was unknown
to complainant.[24]

Respondent was identified with those who politically opposed the Provincial Governor.[25]

According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might have arisen out of the incident during
the conciliation proceedings before the Office of the P unong Barangay of Barangay Washington, Surigao City.[26]
During the proceedings, respondent explained that he pushed complainant because of fear that complainant was
carrying a weapon, as he assumed tricycle drivers did.[27] On the other hand, complainant explained that he went near
respondent to check if there was damage to respondent's car.[28] As part of the settlement, respondent agreed to no
longer demand any indemnity for the damage caused by the tricycle to his car.[29]
Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification[30] dated October 27, 2006 of the Officer -in-Charge Punong
Barangay stating that the case had already been mediated by Punong Barangay Adriano F. Laxa and was amicably
settled by the parties.[31]

On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report,
and recommendation.[32]

Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 20,
2007.[33] Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) noted
the Certification from Barangay Washington, Surigao City attesting that the case between the parties had already been
settled.[34] Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settl ement "could be the reason why the complainant has
not been appearing in this case[.]"[35] The Mandatory Conference was reset to September 21, 2007.[36]

In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only respondent appeared.[37] Hence, the
Commission proceeded with the case ex-parte.[38]

In his Report[39] dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama recommended the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for 60 days from notice for misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of th e Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to recommend for the suspension of Atty. Rene O.
Medina from the practice of law for a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof due to misconduct a nd violation of
Canon 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in an scandalous manner that tends to discredit
the legal profession.[40] (Emphasis in the original)
Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim, there was indeed a slapping incident.[41] The
slapping incident was witnessed by one Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1) the photocopy of Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit
attached to complainant's complaint;[42] and (2) the signatures on the League of Mayors' letter dat ed October 29,
1999 of the Surigao Mayors who believed that respondent was guilty of gross misconduct and abuse of authority and
should be held administratively liable.[43]

On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issue d the Resolution[44] adopting and
approving with modification Commissioner De La Rama's recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investiga ting Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A "; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's misconduct and violat ion of Canon 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in a scandalous manner, Atty. Rene O, Medina is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for thirty (30) days.[45] (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent moved for reconsideration[46] of the Board of Governors' August 14, 2008 Resolution. The Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Board of Governors in the Resolution[47] dated March 22, 2014.

We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held administratively li able.

There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.

Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident happened.[48] He stresses complainant's
seeming disinterest in and lack of participation throughout t he case and hints that this administrative case is politically
motivated.[49]

It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers
with baseless allegations. This Court will exercise its dis ciplinary power against its officers only if allegations of
misconduct are established.[50] A lawyer is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she
enjoys the presumption that his or her acts are consistent with his or her oath.[51 ]

Thus, the burden of proof still rests upon complainant to prove his or her claim.[52]

In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of evidence,[53] or evidence
that is superior, more convincing, or of "greater weight than the other."[54]

In this case, complainant discharged this burden.

During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama —as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors also adopted—found that the slapping incident actually occurred.[55]

The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed and notarized Affidavit;[56]
complainant's Affidavit was also supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit[57] of a traffic aide present during
the incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed complainant of respondent's plate number.[58]

In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent,[59] Commissioner De La Rama gave weight to the letter sent
by the League of Mayors and ruled that "the peopl e's faith in the legal profession eroded"[60] because of respondent's
act of slapping complainant.[61] The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and
adopted this finding.
The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened complainant's allegations. Contrary to
respondent's claim that it shows the political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced complainant's credibility
and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures only reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's act. It reflects
the public's reaction to respondent's display of arrogance.

The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is protected from lawyers who are no longer fit
for the profession. In this instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance of and harassment committed by its
officers.

Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints of a character tha t
disregards the human dignity of another. Respondent's question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa ako?" ("Do you
not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse the profession as a tool for bullying, harassment,
and discrimination.

This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a stereotype that is unreflective of the
nobility of the profession. As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers are granted the privilege to serve the public,
not to bully them to submission.

Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers.[62] This Court has the power to impose disciplinary
sanctions to lawyers who commit acts of misconduct in either a public or private capacity if the acts show them
unworthy to remain officers of the court.[63]

This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.[64] They are
neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are not a determination of the parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued as a
matter of public interest and as a means to determine a lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of being a
court officer. In Ylaya v. Gacott:[65]
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.[66]
As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are mere witnesses. They are not
indispensable to the proceedings. It is the investigative process and the finding of administrative liability that are
important in disciplinary proceedings.[67]

Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not a bar against a
finding of administrative liability.

WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are ADOPTED and APPROVED.
Respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina is found to have violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Profes sional
Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent as attorney, and be furnished to the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
proper dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Caguioa, JJ.,
concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., on official business.
Jardeleza, J., on official leave.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on May 31, 2016 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme
Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 26, 2016 at 1:40 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA
Clerk of Court