Incharge Item Case Issue
Baguinon 1 Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS 267 SCRA 408 (1997) Whether or Not the provisions of the Constitution,
particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
Baguinon 2 Lambino vs. COMELEC GR 174153 (2006) Whether or not the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago
declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution
Baguinon 3 Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137 Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus?
Baguinon 4 Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936) Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Baguinon 5 Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. vs. Benigno Simeon C. Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their
Aquino III et al, GR 209287, July 1, 2014 non-conformity
with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and the
principles of
separation of power and equal protection, constitutional?
Baguinon 6 Francisco vs. House of Representatives GR, 160261 Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may
(Nov 10, 2003) be invoked to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint pursuant to Article XI of the
Constitution.
Facts Decision
The GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Government under Proclamation 50 Dismissed
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).
Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their Dismissed
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section
73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. They alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum
(12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. They also claimed that COMELEC election registrars
had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.The Lambino Group’s initiative
petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article
XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On the last day in office President John Adams names forty-two justices of the peace and Dismissed
sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Law, to take
control of the federal judiciary before the Thomas Jefferson took office.The commission
was signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State, John Marshall but
they wenot delivered before the expiration of Adam’s term as President. When the new
President Thomas Jefferson took office he refused to honor the commissions, claiming that
they were invalid because they have not been delivered before the end of Adam’s term as
president. William Marbury was one of the intended recipient of an appointment as justice of
the peace. Marbury directly went tothe supreme court to file his complaint, refusing for a
writ of Mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary James Madisonto deliver the
commissions. At that time The Judiciary Act 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction to issue writs of Mandamus toany courts appointed or persons holding office,
under the authority of the United States
On the last day in office President John Adams names forty-two justices of the peace and Dismissed
sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Law, to take
control of the federal judiciary before the Thomas Jefferson took office.The commission
was signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State, John Marshall but
they wenot delivered before the expiration of Adam’s term as President. When the new
President Thomas Jefferson took office he refused to honor the commissions, claiming that
they were invalid because they have not been delivered before the end of Adam’s term as
president. William Marbury was one of the intended recipient of an appointment as justice of
the peace. Marbury directly went tothe supreme court to file his complaint, refusing for a
writ of Mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary James Madisonto deliver the
commissions. At that time The Judiciary Act 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction to issue writs of Mandamus toany courts appointed or persons holding office,
under the authority of the United States
In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et al. maintain that the issues in these WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the
consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized because the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the
Court’s interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation considering that savings is following acts and practices under the Disbursement
defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue. Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and
They aver that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
constitute savings and may be used for augmentation and that the Court should apply legally being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
recognized norms and principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers
resolving their motion. On their part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial reconsideration of the
decision on the ground that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all
moneys under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) used for alleged augmentation
of appropriation items that did not have actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation
of items beyond the maximum amounts recommended by the President for the programs,
activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to Congress should be
declared unconstitutional.
An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven Asociate Justices The second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
was filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on 22 Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Justice. Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives et al, most of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
which contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution
violates the provision of Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution, “no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within the period of
one year.” Senator Aquilino Pimintel Jr, filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and that the sole
power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court be recognized and
upheld pursuant to the provision of Article XI of the Constitution.
Ratio Decidendi
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. A provision which lays
down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.
No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to
courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to
sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.
No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and
regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating thenational economy, the acts
and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should
remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are
sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on
the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws,
even the best intentions must come within the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the
law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal methods.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Incharge Item Case Issue
Baguinon 7 Mariano vs. Comelec, GR 118577 Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to
challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned
sections of R.A. No. 7854
Baguinon 8 Montesclaros vs. Comelec, GR 152295 (2002) Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to
respondents.
Baguinon 9 Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, 710 SCRA 1,89, Nov Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
19, 2013 Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b)
non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f)
local autonomy.
Baguinon 10 Ocampo vs Enriquez GR 225973, November 8, 2016 [1] Would respondents gravely abuse their discretion in
allowing Marcos' burial in the LNMB? [2] Would Marcos'
burial be violative of the 1987 Constitution, jurisprudence
and the law?
Chua 11 Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 Whether or not the petition present an actual case or
controversy even though the RH Law is not yet effective
Facts Decision
The petitioners assails certain provisions of RA 7854, Section 51 on the ground that it Dismissed
attempts to alter or restart the "3-consecutive term" limit for local elective officials,
disregarding the term previously served by them which collides with Section 8 Article X and
Section 7, Article VI of the constitution
Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date since Denied
doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation
set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was
deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections
simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of age for
membership in the SK.
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the
declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and
three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of
the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking
that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
President Duterte allowed the burial of President Marcos's remains in the Libingan ng Mga Dismissed
Bayani (LNMB). He ordered herein respondent's superior to prepare the burial.
On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH Law is an
enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception,
women’s health and population control. Petitioners assail its constitutionality because
according to them, it violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the
State is mandated to protect and promote. The proponents of the RH law, however,
contend that the petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH
Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not
yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of
its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been
adversely affected by its operation.
Ratio Decidendi
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They
are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised
by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who
are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue.
Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no
jurisdiction.
The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the
power of judicial review.
While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless
amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has
reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress
merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the
maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a
vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code
of 1991.
Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.
It is not. The Supreme Court found for the respondents.
It is the President's discretion to allow who should be buried in the LNMB. In fact, even Congress may
and can enact a law allowing anyone to be buried therein. Since the LNMB is under the authority of the
AFP and the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is the President, it is within the President's discretion to
allow or disallow the burial of anyone in the LNMB.
The Pantheon Law does not cover the LNMB. It is merely a national shrine converted into a memorial
shrine. Hence, anyone buried therein would not be treated as a hero and would not be labeled as one
who is worth emulating or who is an inspiration to the youth.
The petition present an actual case or controversy even though RH Law is not yet effective. An actual
case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination.
The fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts
under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Here, an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty
of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Hence, the court shall take cognizance of the case.

Chua 12 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560 (2001) Whether or not RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague Petitioner Joseph Estrada was prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law). He assailed,
however, that the Plunder Law does not constitute an indictable offense because of its
failure to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the
key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and
Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to Estrada, render the
Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence,
violative of his fundamental right to due process.
Chua 13 Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 Whether or not the RH Law cannot be challenged “on its On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH Law is an
face” because it is not a speech regulating measure enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception,
women’s health and population control. Petitioners assail its constitutionality because
according to them, it violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the
State is mandated to protect and promote. The proponents of the RH law, however, assails
the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH
Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.
Tha Plunder Law is not unconstitutional for being vague. Congress is not restricted in the form of
expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily
result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be
gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. The void-for-vagueness
doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees
that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to
free speech cases, but not to penal statutes.
While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded
its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law
not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Consequently,
considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court
has authority to take cognizance of the petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Chua 14 Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, Gr 203335, Whether or not aiding or abetting libel on the cyberspace is RA 10175 (Cybercrime Law) was enacted, which aims to regulate access to and use of the
February 11, 2014 consitutional. cyberspace. Petitioners filed petitions to declare several provisions of Cybercrime Law
unconsitutional and void. One of the assailed provisions is Section 5, which punishes the
aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of Cybercrimes such as libel. Petitioners
argue that such provision suffers from overbreadth, creating chilling and deterrent effect on
protected expression. The OSG, however, contends that the current body of jurisprudence
and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of
"netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out
that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting"
a crime as to protect the innocent.
Chua 15 Gonzales III v. Office of the President Whether or not a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to Rolando Mendoza (Mendoza) was dismissed in the PNP on account of the extortion
the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President incident, which led him to hijack a tourist bus that resulted his death and several others on
(concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable board. Said incident is on account of Mendoza’s plea to the Office of the Ombudsman to
not a political question. reconsider his case. President Benigno Aquino III created an Incident Investigation and
Review Committee (IIRC) to conduct an investigation relative to the incident of hostage-
taking. Subsequently, IIRC charged and dismissed Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III
(Gonzales), who handled Mendoza’s case. Gonzales argues that the Office of the President
has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman.
Chua 16 Vinuya v. Romulo, GR 162230, April 28, 2010 WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an Petition lacks merit.
discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan. of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the
OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape
by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through
the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women”
stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the
petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against
them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other
international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war
were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former
comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.
Chua 17 Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835 Whether or not the court can take cognizance of the case On November 26, 1998, President Joseph Estrada created the Preparatory Commission on Dismissed
Consitutional Reform (PCCR) by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 to study and
recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Consitution, and the
manner implementing the same. On November 9, 1999, Petitioner, in his capacity as a citizen
and taxpayer, assails the consitutionality of the creation of the PCCR. On December 20,
1999, the PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President, and was dissolved by the
President on the same day.
Chua 18 Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780 Whether or not the Petitions have been rendered moot and On May 1, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) issued Proclamation No. 38 Dismissed.
academic declaring a state of rebellion in the NCR. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing
the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Petitioners assail the declaration
of a state of rebellion and the warrantless arrest allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as
having no basis both in fact and in law. On May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo
ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila.
Chua 19 Defunis v. Odegard Whether or not the petition is moot and academic DeFunis was denied admission at the University of Washington Law School, a state-
operated institution. He sued a state education official, Odegaard, as well as the law school
admissions committee on the basis that it had violated the Equal Protection Clause because
its policies and procedures had resulted in discrimination against him because of his race.
He sought a mandatory injunction from the trial court that would compel Odegaard to grant
him admission into the first-year law school class because his application had been
unconstitutionally denied. He prevailed in the lower court and was admitted to the law
school, pending Odegaard's appeal. The state Supreme Court eventually ruled that the law
school admissions policy was constitutional.DeFunis received a writ of certiorari from the
U.S. Supreme Court, which stayed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court until the
U.S. Supreme Court had resolved the case. DeFunis was already in his third and final year
of law school when the Court granted his petition.
Ratio Decidendi
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-
for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. A
petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims
no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect"
on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know
whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself
from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him
into silence. Here, the terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on
those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence,
Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
The issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable not a political
question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds
recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise
of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government. Here, in resolving the petitions, the
Court does not inquire into the wisdom of the Congress’ choice to grant concurrent disciplinary
authority to the President, but as to whether the statutory grant violates the Constitution.
From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine
whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that
“the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative–‘the political’–departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate,
complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the
authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the
Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts
but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the
best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty
of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in
foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our
country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which
authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an
extraordinary
The length ofmoot
case has become time has
and lapsed between
academic. the treaty’s
An action conclusion
is considered and when
"moot" our consideration – the a
it no longer presents
justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead. The PCCR
submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the
President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it. Thus, the PCCR has ceased to
exist, having lost its raison d’etre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has
nothing left to resolve. The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of
granting the relief prayed for by petitioner.
The Petitions have been rendered moot and academic when GMA lifted the declaration of a state of
rebellion in Metro Manila.
Because petitioner will complete law school at the end of the term for which he has registered regardless
of any decision, the case is moot. Mootness here does not depend upon a "voluntary cessation" of the
school's admissions practices, but upon the simple fact that petitioner is in his final term, and the
school's fixed policy to permit him to complete the term. The case presents no question that is "capable
of repetition, yet evading review," since petitioner will never again have to go through the school's
admissions process, and since it does not follow that the issue petitioner raises will in the future evade
review merely because this case did not reach the Court until the eve of petitioner's graduation.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Chua 20 Interational Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Whether or not the case is moot and academic. On September 24, 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking was executed pursuant to
Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia, GR collaborative research and development project on eggplants. The petitioners conducted
209271, December 8, 2015 field trials for "bioengineered eggplants," known as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt
talong). Bt talong contains the crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bt, which
produces the CrylAc protein that is toxic to target insect pests. The Cry1Ac protein is said
to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer, the most
destructive insect pest to eggplants. Subsequently, respondents filed a Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan alleging that the field trials violated their consitutional right to health and a balance
ecology considering that BT talong is presumed harmful to human health and the
environment
David 21 David vs. Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006 [Per J. Whether or not the petition is moot and academic. On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of Edsa People Power The petition was PARTLY GRANTED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez] I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. President
Arroyo by virtue of the powers vested upon her by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution commanded the Armed Forces of the Philippines to maintain peace and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any
act of insurrection or rebellion. Comes petitioners Randolf S. David, et al, who was arrested
without warrant on the basis of PP 1017 and was brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City
where he was finger printed, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect. He was also
treated brusquely by policemen and was charged with violation of BP Blg. 880 and later on
detained for 7 hours and was released thereafter due to insuffiecieny of evidence. The
petition herein assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requireents for the
imposition of Martial Law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
press, speech and of assembly.
David 22 Belgica, et al vs. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, et al, GR No. Whether or not the petition is moot and academic. On September 3, 2013, petitioners Belgica et al filed an Urgent Petition for Certiorari and The petition was PARTLY GRANTED.
208566, November 19, 2013 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Prohibition with Prayer for the immediate issuance of TRO and or writ of Preliminary
Banc] injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the
provisions of the GA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive's lump-
sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,
be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion.
David 23 KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, GR 115381, December Whether or not Kilusang Mayo Uno has legal standing to The Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center (KMU) assails the constitutionality and validity of a The petition was GRANTED.
23, 1994 [Per J. Kapunan, First Division] file a petition against LTFRB. memorandum which, among others, authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to
increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application therefore with
the LTFRB, and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency.
David 24 IBP vs. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000 [Per J. Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, The petition was DISMISSED.
Kapunan, En Banc] constitutionality of calling the AFP to assist PNP to President Ejercito Estrada directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff and
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Philippine National Police Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed a petition
seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional. Solicitor General contend that petitioner has no legal standing to assail.
David 25 Tanada vs. Tuvera, GR L-63915, April 24, 1985 [Per J. Whether or not Petitioners have legal standing. Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, The petition was GRANTED.
Escolin, En Banc] and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to
bring the instant petition and that it is not required for a law to be published when the date of
its effectivity are expressly mentioned in said laws. Petitioners then contended that the
publication of said Presidential Issuances is a public right and that compelling the
respondent to publish it is a public duty that does not need any other specific interest from
the petitioner to be given due course.
David 26 Ople vs. Torres, GR 127685, July 23, 1998 [Per J. Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit. Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National Computerized The petition was GRANTED.
Puno, En Banc] Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December
1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to
privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1)
that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to
privacy.
David 27 Information Technology Foundation vs. ComElec, GR Whether or not ITF has standing to file the case. RA 8046 was passed on 07 June 1995 authorizing COMELEC to conduct nationwide The petition was GRANTED.
159139 [Per J. Panganban, En Banc] computerized election system. Gloria Arroyo allocated php 2.5 billion fund for the
automated election system on 24 January 2003. The bidding process commenced on the
same month and out of the 57 bidders it was awarded to MPC and TIMC. Although
DOST’s evaluation report states that the two obtained a number of failed marks in the
technical evaluation. Five individuals and entities protested the matter to COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. Abalos rejected the protest, hence the present petition.
Ratio Decidendi
The case is not moot and academic. An action is considered “moot” when it presents a justiciable
controversy becasue the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute
has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely
to be raised again between the parties. The case falls under the “capable of repetition yet evading review”
exception to the mootness principle. The human and environmental health hazards posed by the
introduction of a genetically modified plant which is a very popular staple vegetable among Filipinos is
an issue of paramount public interest.
The case was partly granted since the court finds and so holds PP 1017 constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent ot suppress lawless violence. The proclamation
is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, PP 1017's extraneous provisions
giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce
obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violenece as well as decrees promulgated by the
President; (3) to imposed standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press are ultra vires
and unconstitutional. The court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
business afftected with public interest.
The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually
terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have constitutional authority to nullify or
annul the legal existence of the PDAF. The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the Court from
deciding the case considering that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of
paramount public interest, (c) there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s
constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the
national budget is an annual occurrence.
Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue. The requirement of LOCUS STANDI inheres from the
definition of judicial power. In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue
to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda,
circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be
violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members,
who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome
cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise
the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.
IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi.
While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit standing. However, when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. The Court
relaxed the rules on standing and resolved the issue now.
Yes, the Court agrees with petitioners that although they are private citizens, the subject of the Petition is
a public right and thus they, being citizens of this country, have the proper interest in seeing this case
resolved.
Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed
of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of Administrative Order No 308 is a
usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that the Executive branch not to trespass on the
lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring demarcation line between the power of
legislature to make laws and the power of executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and
cannot be allowed.
The case at bar is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest, it is of paramount public
interest and transcendental importance. Taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of “illegal
disbursement of public funds” or if public money is being “deflected to any improper use,” or when
petitioner seek to restrain “wasting of public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional law.”
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
David 28 Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, GR 113375, May 5, 1994 Whether or not Kilosbayan has standing to maintain instant Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. The petition was GRANTED.
[Per J. Davide, En Banc] suit. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes races, lotteries
and other similar activities,” the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the
purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime
before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line
lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad became interested to offer its services and
resources to PCSO. Berjaya Group Berhad organized with some Filipino investors in March
1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC), which “was intended to be the medium through which the technical and
management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.”
KILOSBAYAN submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of
Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and
conduct the on-line lottery system in “collaboration” or “association” with the PGMC, in
violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42. respondents allege
that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing our resolution in
Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
David 29 Ocampo, et al vs. Admiral Enriquez, GR 225973, Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. The petition was GRANTED.
November 08, 2016 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc] petitions. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB).
He won the May 9, 2016 election, garnering 16,601,997 votes. At noon of June 30, 2016, he
formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in the Malacañang Palace. August 7, 2016,
public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a
Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB
David 30 Arigo vs. Swift, et al, GR 206510, Septeber 16, 2014 Whether or not petitioners have legal standing. The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In The petition was DENIED.
[Per J. Villarama, En Banc] December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the
said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port
of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.”
On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013
after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian
departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at
2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was
injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. Petitioners claim
that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and
continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of
Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga
del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology.
Del Mundo 31 MIRASOL VS CA Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed
statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor the
General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme.
for the resolution of the Trial Court. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and
Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are sell the latter'ssugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to
unconstitutional. it.President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co.,
Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance
Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review. PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to
be remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay
their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored.
Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals
from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and
demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of
dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extra judicially foreclose
the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds,
if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in
its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all
earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. On August 9,
1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against
PNB.
Ratio Decidendi
Yes. Issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party’s
standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set
aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, 29 this
Court brushed aside this technicality because “the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.
Yes. Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their
capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers,
have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will
suffer direct and personal injury
as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
Yes. Petitioners have legal standing Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a
generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review
or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all regional trial courts The purpose of
the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his
intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary.
To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We
must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions
involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in
"any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words
used in the rule, there is no room for construction. In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty,
presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory. Petitioners
contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause
and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask
this Court to exercise its power of judicial review. Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites
for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise
of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Del Mundo 32 WON the mandamus suit of the respondent (Singson) "In January 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare No
involving a money claim against the government, predicated parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer Fernandez,
SAYSON VS SINGSON on a contract is valid and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. ... It was approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It is noted in the
approval of the said requisition that "This is an exception to the telegram dated Feb. 21,
1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." ...
So, a canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967. The committee on award
accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor Service for the sum of P43,530.00. ... Subsequently,
it was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May
16,1967 the Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu
requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00.
...It would appear that a purchase order signed by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning
Officer and the Procurement Officer, was addressed to the Singkier Motor Service. ... In
due course the Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-
audit. He then made inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. ... Thus, after finding
from the indorsements of the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of Public Highways
that the prices of the various spare parts are just and reasonable and that the requisition was
also approved by no less than the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with the
verification of V.M. Secarroa representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination, Manila,
he approved it for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent
to P8,706.00 to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising Auditor,
which he did. ... The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to
Singson. On June 10,1967, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising
Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which states:
"In view of excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by
vouchers already submitted this Office direct all highway auditors refer General Office
payment similar nature for appropriate action." ...
In the interim it would appear that when the voucher and the supporting papers reached the
GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the
USI(Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the
Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00
less than the price of the Singkier. ... In view of the overpricing the GAO took up the matter
Del Mundo 33 REPUBLIC VS PURISIMA WON the respondent’s decision is valid with the Secretary
A motion of Public
to dismiss Works
was filed in a third indorsement
on September of July 18,Rice
7, 1972 by defendant 1967.
and...Corn
The Secretary No
Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a
money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private
respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of
Mobil Philippines Exploration Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service where Justice Bengzon
stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office
or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be
shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of
the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972.
Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Ratio Decidendi
the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy, mandamus is
not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but an ordinary action for
specific performance. the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the
vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court
except with the consent of the State. In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the
General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under
which money claim against the government may be filed: "In all cases involving the settlement of
accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide
the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts
or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid
shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him."
Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final decision of the
Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the
decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States, pending the final and
complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the President of the Philippines,
or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity. "Once
consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such
statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the
proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party
aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to
which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the
matter.
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the
present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent. "The doctrine of non-suability
recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary
of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as
against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all,
even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government
enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the
analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause
private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the
statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for
final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington
Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has
operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice,
considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever
difficulties for private claimants may still exist,is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In
the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if
government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its
continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [
Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines]
***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as
pointed out byJustice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn
Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Del Mundo 34 UP VS DIZON Was UP's funds validly garnished? University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation
of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second
billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by
the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid
balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders.
Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the
motion. The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco
(Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not
the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due
course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon
motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final
and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their
previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having
already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on
May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4,
2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks
and the RTC ordered the release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
Decision Ratio Decidendi
Granted UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of public funds;
suability vs. liability of the State)
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing
a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the
States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government
instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under
Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve
the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds
going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in
any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be
aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The
funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing
from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional
objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated
in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability
and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and
the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable;
on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within
the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already
validated the claim against the UP.

Del Mundo 35 RAYO VS CFI Whether respondent National Power Corporation performs
a governmental function with respect to the management
and operation of the Angat Dam; and Whether the power of
respondent National Power Corporation to sue and be sued
under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for
tort.
On October 26, 1978, typhoon “Kading” struck Bulacan. Due to this, the National Power
Corporation (NPC), through its plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez, simultaneously
opened 3 floodgates of Angat Dam.The opening of the floodgates caused several towns to
be inundated (the town of Norzagaray was the most affected one). It resulted to a hundred
deaths and damage to properties that were worth over a million pesos. Petitioners (victims)
filed a complaint for damages against NPC, including plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez.
Respondent filed counterclaims and put up a special and affirmative defense that “in the
operation of the Angat Dam,” it is “performing a purely governmental function”, hence it
“cannot be sued without the express consent of the State.”Petitioners oppose the defense,
contending that the NPC is not performing governmental but merely proprietary functions
and that under its own organic act, Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6395, it can sue and
be sued in any court.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, the CFI ruled that
petitioners’ reliance on Sec. 3 of RA 6395 is not tenable
since the same refer to such matters that are only within the
scope of the other corporate powers of said defendant and
not matters of tort as in the instant cases.
Being an agency performing a purely governmental function
in the operation of the Angat Dam, said defendant was not
given any right to commit wrongs upon individuals. To sue
said defendant for tort may require the express consent of
the State. PETITION DISMISSED.
SC reversed the CFI decision and GRANTED petitioners to reinstate their complaint against the NPC.It
is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has
allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395). As a government owned
and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
Government. Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can “sue and be sued in any court” is
without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one
instituted by the petitioners.

CFI dropped the NPC from the complaint and left Chavez as the sole party-defendant.

Del Mundo 36 FAROLAN VS CTA Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port of
for the 43,050 yardsactually lost by the private respondent. Manila carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading
(Bagong Buhay). The import was classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of theTariff
and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the
amount of P11,350.00. The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of
the shipment upon hearing the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito net made
of nylon under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon re-
examination, it turns out that the shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as
previously declared. Thus the Collector of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the
government. Private respondent filed a petition on August 20, 1976 for the release of the
questioned goods which the Court denied. On June 2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales
were released to Bagong Buhay after several motion. The sixteen remaining bales were
missing. The respondent claims that of the 143,454 yards released, only 116,950 yards were
in good condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents demand that the
Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it actually lost.
Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with
regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper would violate the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay
for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that
this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state.
On this point, the political doctrine that “state may not be sued without its consent,”
categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate judicial personality
of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit.
Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely
taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting
revenues which is defined not a proprietary function. Thus private respondents claim for damages
against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision Ratio Decidendi
Del Mundo 37 REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN WON the Republic can invoke state immunity. The PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and No In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner
other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its
Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a
due to his involvement incases of ill-gotten wealth. Among the properties thus sequestered legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or
and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by and reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without
registered under the name of private respondent. As sequester of the 227 shares formerly its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of
owned by Benedicto, PCGG did not pay the monthly membership fee. Later on, the shares the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of
were declared to be delinquent to be put into an auction sale. which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

Despite filing a writ of injunction, it was nevertheless dismissed. So petitioner Republic and
private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement which contains a
general release clause where petitioner agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on
the227 NOGCCI shares acknowledging that it was within private respondent’s capacity to
acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his profession.
Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner that the subject shares of stock
could not have been ill-gotten Benedicto filed a Motion for Release from Sequestration and
Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of
stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as
part of the parties’ Compromise Agreement in that case. It was granted but the shares were
ordered to be put under the custody of the Clerk of Court. Along with this, PCGG was
ordered to deliver the shares to the Clerk of Court which it failed to comply with without
any justifiable grounds. In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic,
through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit.

Del Mundo 38 SANTIAGO VS REPUBLIC Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent. On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for revocation of The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit
a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied. In this case it must be emphasized,
Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being a Donee, is entitle
alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting facilities to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation.
and water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot thereon
which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7, 1974.
That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified, set
compliance with an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos aside and declare to be without force and effect. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City,
case, a 1952 decision which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure set forth in the rules of
favor of the respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and court. No cost.
Santos v Santos case is discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the
dismissal on ground of constitutional mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Del Mundo 39 DOTC VS SPS. ABECINA Whether or not DOTC may properly invoke state immunity In February 1993, the DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENTDOMAIN It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the
a contract for the management, operation, maintenance, and development of a Regional BECAUSE NO EXPROPRIATIONPROCEEDINGS government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal
Telecommunications Development Project (RTDP) under the National Telephone Program, WERE HELD. norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that
Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1). Later on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just
Norte, donated a one thousand two hundred (1,200)square-meter parcel of land to the compensation, tobe judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court.
DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. However, the municipality There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
erroneously included portions of the respondents' property in the donation. Pursuant to the
FLAs, Digitel constructed a telephone exchange on the property which encroached on the
properties of the respondent spouses. It argues that while the DOTC, in good faith and in
the performance of its mandate, took private property without formal expropriation
proceedings, the taking was nevertheless an exercise of eminent domain. The Department
prays that instead of allowing recovery of the property, the case should be remanded to the
RTC for determination of just compensation.

Del Mundo 40 AMIGABLE VS CUENCA W/N the appellant may properly sue the government. Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation Where the government takes away property from a private
proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the landowner for public use without going through the legal
President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
expropriated by the government. party may properly maintain a suit against the government
without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for from suit.
recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for
compensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees. The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only
The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government relief available is for the government to make due
did not give its consent to be sued. compensation which it could and should have done years
ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis
should be the price or value at the time of the taking.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision Ratio Decidendi
Dicang 41 EPG CONSTRUCTION VS VIGILAR Whether or not the Principle of State Immunity is applicable (1983) The herein petitioners-contractors, under contracts with DPWH,constructed 145 Petition Granted The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit,
March 16, 2001 in the case at bar. housing units but coverage of construction and funding under the saidcontracts was only for considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. The State's immunity cannot serve as
2/3 of each housing unit. Through the verbal request andassurance of then DPWH an instrument perpetrating injustice
Undersecretary Canlas, they undertook additional constructionsfor the completion of the
project, but said additional constructions were not issued payment by DPWH.With a
favorable recommendation from the DPWH Asst. Secretary for LegalAffairs, the petitioners
sent a demend letter to the DPWH Secretary. The DPWH Auditor did not object to the
payment subject to whatever action COA may adopt.(1992) Through the request of then
DPWH Secretary De Jesus, the DBM releasedthe amount for payment but (1996)
respondent DPWH Secreatry Vigilar denied themoney claims prompting petitioners to file a
petition for mandamus before the RTCwhich said trial court denied. Hence, this
petition.Among others, respondent-secretary argues that the state may not be suedinvoking
the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State also known as the RoyalPrerogative
of Dishonesty
Dicang 42 TORIO v. FONTANILLA Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2 resolutions: Yes. The Municipality of Malasiqui was held liable. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable for damages for the death of
GR No. L-29993 liable. one for management of the town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of the Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers,
Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, organized a employees, or agents.
sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council
appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela"
and another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed.
Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of the following day.
Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants
were the municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members. In its
Answer, defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public
corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise
of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence
of any of its agents.
Dicang 43 ARIGO v. SWIFT G.R. No. 206510 Whether or not immunity from suits can be invoked within The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In Yes. Immunity from suits can be invoked within territorial Warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS
territorial waters. December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the waters, except from the exceptions set by UNCLOS. creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the
said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.”
On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013
after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship
ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles
eastsoutheast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no
reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Dicang 44 Holy See vs. Rosario G.R. 101949 (1994) Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Petiton granted. The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature.
business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity. Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose,
Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The
Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-
Rome, Italy, for his residence. proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict
the squatters living in said property.
Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to
respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties
because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots.
Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property
while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be
returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest
money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance
and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of
Dicang 45 USA vs Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645 Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said jurisdiction
The United based
States on sovereignhad
of America immunity
a navalfrom
base suit
in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United exercise of its sovereign functions the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United
invoke state immunity. States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not
couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams
requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The
company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests.
The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the
Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did
not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For this
reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision Ratio Decidendi
Dicang 46 MINUCHER VS. COURT OF APPEALS Whether the Doctrine of State Immunity from suit is Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a Case was dismissed. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be
G.R. No. 142396 applicable herein. “buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.
Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been
seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court.

Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo.

Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being
merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of
Justice.

Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a
special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to
Dicang 47 REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the diplomatic Republic
Petitioner, immunity.of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Yes. The Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with
G.R. No. 154705 doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit. Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade sovereign immunity from suit. the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the
and Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning discharge of its governmental functions.
units and was to take effect in a period of four years.

When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of

Administration, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in
compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian
Embassy terminated the agreement.

The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he
filed a complaint against the petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit.
Dicang 48 DFA v. NLRC G.R. No. 113191 Whether the ADB is correct in invoking its immunity from On January 27, 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case for his alleged illegal
suit. dismissal by Asian Development Bank and the latter's violation of the "labor-only"
contracting law. Two summonses were served, one to the ADB and the other through the
DFA. Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as
well as its President and Office, were covered by an immunity from legal processes except
for borrowing, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the
Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") and the Agreement Between the Bank and the
Government of the Philippines regarding the Banker's Headquarters (the "Headquarters
Agreement). The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the
ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit. The ADB did not appeal the decision.
Instead, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal
vacation of the void jugdgment".
Dicang 49 ATCI v. Echin 632 SCRA 528 (2010) Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner,
contract specifically stipulates that respondent‘s Ministry of PublicHealth of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-
employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and year contract with a monthlysalary of US$1,200.00. Within a year, Respondent was
Regulations of Kuwait. terminated for not passing the probationaryperiod which was under the Memorandum of
Agreement. Ministry denied respondent‘s request and she returned to the Philippines
shouldering her own fair. Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) a complaint against ATCI forillegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in
favor of respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her$3,600.00, her salary for the three months
unexpired portion of the contract.
ATCI appealed Labor Arbiter‘s decision, however, NLRC affirmed the latter‘s decision and
denied petitioner ATCI‘s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the Court
Appeals contending thattheir principal being a foreign government agency is immune from
suit, and as such, immunity extendedto them.
Dicang 50 Animos vs. PVAO G.R. No. 79156 Whether or not the complaint against PVAO can be Isidro Animos is a World War II veteran, having been a member of the USAFFE and the
considered a suit against the state. guerilla forces thereafter. Originally, the case was a suit for mandamus by the petitioners
against PVAO, for the payment of full pension benefits, retroactive to 1947, under Republic
Act No. 65, as amended. However, the petitioner’s claim was denied on the basis that
Animos’ disability was only considered partial, rather than total, according to the “Rules on
Disability Ratings”, thus precluding the maximum payment of his pension benefits. The
petitioner submits that the rating system adopted by PVAO is null and void.
Yes. The stipulations of both the Charter and the
Headquarter's Agreement establish that, except in the
specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as
well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the
ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form
Petition denied.
No. The doctrine of immunity from the suit will not apply
and may not be invoked where the public official is being
sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen.
The Bank's officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their
official capacity. The granting of these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants ans commitments
voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government. Being an international organization that has been
extended diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law.
According to RA 8042:
The obligations covenanted in the recruitmentagreement entered into by and between the local agent and
its foreign principal are not coterminouswith the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the
parties decide to end the agreement,the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees
under the agreement do not at allend, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employeesrecruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment
agreement. In international law, the party whowants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law.Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not
proved, the presumption is that foreignlaw is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in
determining the issues presented before us.
When officers and agents of the government are sued in their individual capacity, the cloak of protection
from the government is removed. According to the doctrine in Ruiz vs. Cabahug: “We hold that under
the facts and circumstances alleged in the amended complaint, which should be taken on its face value,
the suit is not one against the Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel
them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent
them from making payment and recognition until the contending architects have established their
respective rights and interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done”. Hence, the
complaint cannot be considered a suit against the state because it is a well-settled principle of law that we
may consider a public official liable in his personal private capacity for the damage caused by his acts
when done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.

Fajatin 51 USA v. Reyes, GR No. 79233 (1993) Whether or not Bradford enjoys state immunity Nelia T. Montoya, an American citizen employed as an identification checker at the U.S.
Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters in Quezon City, filed a complaint against Maxine Bradford, also an American
citizen working as a manager at JUSMAG Headquarter’s activity exchange, for damages due
to the oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority
as store manager of the NEX JUSMAG. This was due to the incident on January 22, 1987
when Bradford searched Montoya’s body and belongings while the latter was already in the
parking area after buying some items NEX JUSMAG’s retail store, where she had
purchasing privileges.
No, Bradford does not enjoy state immunity.
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is expressly declared in the Constitution. It also
applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of its duties. However, it is a different matter where the public official is made to account in
his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. In other words, the
doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being
sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
Here, Bradford acted beyond his authority when he searched Montoya in the parking lot, that is, outside
of NEX JUSMAG. Hence, he may be sued in his private and personal capacity.

Bradford then invoked his non-suability on the ground of state immunity.

Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Fajatin 52 Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990) Whether or not private respondents are immune from suit Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin, filed for damages and equal employment opportunity
being officers of the US ArmedForces complaint against Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi, both officers of the Base Education
Office at Clark Air Base. The former was allegedly rejected for a position of Guidance
Counselor in the said institution because of her sex, color, and origin. The respondents
defended that they are immune from suit for acts done made by them inperformance of their
official governmental functions.
Fajatin 53 Nessia v. Fermin, 220 SCRA 615 (1993) Whether or not Fermin was acting within the scope of his Nessia was the Deputy Municipal Assesor of Victorias, Negros Occidental. He filed a No, he acted maliciously and intended to prejudice Nessia
authority. complaint for recovery of damages and reimbursement of expenses against respondent
Fermin and Municipality of Victorias. He alleged that respondent deliberately ignored and
caused non-payment of the vouchers because he defied the latter’s request to register and
vote in the local elections. On the other hand, Fermin countered that Nessia’s claims could
not be approved because they exceeded budgetary appropriations. The Municipality, for its
part, added that Nessia was also at fault since he did not give justification for drawing funds
in excess of the budget.
Fajatin 54 Caloocan City v. Allarde, GR No. 107721 (2003) Is Judge Allarde correct in ordering the garnishment of City The City Mayor, through an ordinance, abolished the position of Assistant City Yes, Judge Allarde's action were proper.
funds to satisfy the judgment in favor of Santiago? Administrator and 17 other positions from the plantilla of the local government of Caloocan.
Later, all dismissed employees were paid their back wages except respondent Santiago who
was only partially paid. When the City Council of Caloocan enacted appropriation
Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by
Santiago, Judge Allarde issued an order for the City of Caloocan to deliver to the RTC a
manager’s check for the satisfaction of the judgment. When the City Mayor refused to sign
the check intended for Santiago’s payment, Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to garnish the
funds of the City of Caloocan. The order was questioned by the City contending their
public funds are beyond the reach of garnishment.
Fajatin 55 Pable Ocampo v. HRET, GR No. 158466 (2004) Whether or not the candidate who has the second highest Mario B. Crespo aka Mark Jimenez, a duly-elected congressman of the 6th district of No, it is not the proper procedure.
vote should be declared as winner considering that the duly- Manila, was declared ineligible for the position in which he was elected for lack of residency
elected representative is not eligible for the office. in the district and was ordered to vacate his office. Ocampo then averred that since Crespo
was declared as such, he should be declared the winner, having garnered the second highest
number of votes.
Fajatin 56 Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649 (2013) Is the rule on succession in the Local Government Code Rommel Arnado is a natural bon Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship upon his No, it is not applicable.
applicable? naturalization as an American citizen. Subsequently, he renounced his American citizenship
and ran as a Mayor of Lanao del Norte. After he was proclaimed the winner, the
COMELEC anulled such proclamation and consequently directed that the order of
succession under the Local Government Code be followed.
Maquiling, another candidate for mayor, and who garnered the second highest number of
votes in the election intervened the case, claims that he should be proclaimed as the winner.
Fajatin 57 Villavivencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 (1919) Whether or not mayor of Manila had the power to deport In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly rounded up, put on a No, he did not have such power.
the women without their knowledge. ship, and sent to Davao as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against him. The
Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the
fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of residence. This case justifies one
of the basic rights of citizen, the right of domain.
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of
Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters
consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao
where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution
situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
Fajatin 58 Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979) Whether or not the assailed Letter of Instruction is invalid This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an early No, the LOI is valid.
and violated constitutional guarantees of due process. warning device mandatory for motor vehicles. It is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as
being violative to the constitutional guarantee of due process in as far as the rules and
regulations for its implementation are concerned.
Fajatin 59 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115 (1957) Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or Lao Ichong, representing himself and other resident-aliens who are engagedin the retail
generally accepted principles. industry in the Philippines petitioned the Supreme Court to declare RA1180 (An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business) as unconstitutional. One of the provisions of the Act was the
prohibition of persons, not Filipino citizens, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations not wholly-owned by citizens of the Philippines from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade. Petitioners said that the act denies them the equal protection of
laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process.
Fajatin 60 Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR, 704 SCRA Whether or not Deutsche Bank is no longer entitled to the Deutsche Bank applied for a tax refund by virtue of the preferential rate of 10% BPRT
216 (2013) treaty relief due to failure to comply with the application provided by the RP-Germany Tax Treaty as it had erroneously paid the regular 15% rate.
first with the BIR. When the matter was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals, the tax refund was denied due
to the failure of the taxpayer to file an application with the BIR prior to the availment of the
preferential tax rate under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
Decision Ratio Decidendi
No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is expressly declared in the Constitution. It also
diplomatic immunity for all its acts orthe acts of its agents in applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
the Philippines. discharge of its duties. However, it is a different matter where the public official is made to account in
his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. In other words, the
doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being
sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
Here, the respondents were found guilty of discriminating against Shauf on account of her sex, origin
and color. Hence, the respondents may be sued in their private and personal capacity.
The Court held that while it is true that Fermin may not be compelled by mandamus to approve vouchers
because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations, he may, nevertheless, be held liable for damages
under Art. 27 for malicious inaction because he did not act on the vouchers. It is apparent that public
officials are called upon to act expeditiously on matters pending before them. For only in acting thereon
either by signifying approval or disapproval may the plaintiff continue on to the next step of the
bureaucratic process. On the other hand, official inaction brings to a standstill the administrative process
and the plaintiff is left in the darkness of uncertainty. In this regard, official "inaction" cannot be equated
with "disapproval."
The rule is and has always been that all government funds may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in
the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. However, the rule admits a
qualification, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In other words, the
rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought
to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money
judgment against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by
judicial processes.
Here, the amount was allocated for the back-pay obligation. Hence, The judgment of the trial court
could then be validly enforced against such funds.
The fact that the candidate who had the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or
ineligible for office does not give rise to the right of the candidate who garnered the second highest vote
to be declared winner. To do otherwise would be anathema to the most basic precepts of republicanism
and democracy. Therefore, the only recourse to ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to hold
another election.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission on election offenses as provided for in the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of
which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected,
from holding the office. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
The old doctrine was that the vice mayor or the vice governor, as the case may be, shall succeed the
disqualified winning candidate, not the candidate for the same position who had received the next highest
vote.
Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against
their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing
public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his
residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights,
as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen.
The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful
delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote
public safety.
In addition, the UN and the Vienna Convention, both ratified by the Philippine Government
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices. The
Constitution provides that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged
its word.
Yes, a law may supersed a treaty or a generally accepted In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with
principle. RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.”
Deutsche bank is still entitled. The Court held that the BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate the availment of
the reliefs provided for under international agreements. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the failure
to strictly comply with RMO 1-2000 will not deprive the taxpayer of the benefits provided under the RP-
Germany Tax Treaty for as long as it possesses all the requirements stated therein. It went on to state
that at most, the application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the
entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Garner 61 IN RE GARCIA Whether or not a treaty may enable Garcia to practice Arturo E. Garcia, a Filipino citizen, finished a law course in Spain and was
law in the Philippines? thereafter allowed to practice law. He contends that he is entitled to practice law in
the Philippines without submitting himself to the bar examinations under the
Treaty of Academic Degree and the Exercise of Professions between the
Philippines and Spain.
Garner 62 PEOPLE VS LAGMAN Whether or not Sec. 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1 In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman, a Filipino citizen whom have attained the age of 20, is
is constitutional? being compelled by Section 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1, otherwise known as the
“National Defense Law’ to join and render the military service. Lagman refused to join
the military and argued the provision was unconstitutional. He also defended that
reason he does not want to serve the military is because he has a father to support, has
no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed.
Garner 63 ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas City. Estrada
such conjugal arrangement requested an investigation of respondent for cohabiting with a man not her husband
and having a child with the latter while she was still married.Estrada believes that
Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary,
thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that
the court condones her act. Escritor admitted the above-mentioned allegations but
denies any liability for the alleged gross immoral conduct for the reason that she
is a member of the religious sect Jehovah’s Witness and Watch Tower Society and
her conjugal arrangement is approved and is in conformity with her religious beliefs.
Garner 64 REPUBLIC VS MANALO Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Manila Republic of the Philippines, represented in this case by the Anti-Money Laundering
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Council (AMLC), filed a complaint for civil forfeiture. In the said civil forfeiture cases,
joint order? the Republic sought the forfeiture in its favor of certain deposits and government
securities maintained in several bank accounts by the defendants therein, which were
related to the unlawful activity of fraudulently accepting investments from the public,
in violation of the Securities Regulation Code as well as the Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001. In a Decision dated May 21, 2009, the CA granted respondents' petition,
ruling that the Manila RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondents'
separate motions for intervention. Feeling aggrieved, the Republic moved for
reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA.
Garner 65 SALONGA VS CRUZ Whether or not Salongas alleged remarks are protected Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act
by thefreedom of speech. after he was implicated, along with other 39 accused, byVictor Lovely in the series
of bombings in Metro Manila. He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the
leader of subversive organizations for two reasons 1) because his house was used
as contact point; and because of his remarks during the party of RaulDaza in Los
Angeles. Heallegedly opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the
Philippinesif reforms are not instituted immediately by then President Marcos.
Garner 66 SERRANO DE AGBAYANI VS PNB WON the action prescribed? In 1939, Agbayani borrowed P450 from PNB secured by a realty mortgage. In1944,
the loan matured but PNB could not collect because it was at thistime of the war.
In 1945, Pres.Osmena issued the Debt Moratorium Law (EO #32), suspending the
payment of loans for four years due to the ravagesof war. In 1948, RA 342 extended
the Debt Moratorium Law for another eight years (up to 1956). In 1953, however,
the SC declared RA 342 as unconstitutional in the case of Rutter v Esteban. In 1959,
PNB filed a suit for payment of the loan.
Garner 67 CIR VS SAN ROQUE POWER CORP WON San Roque is entitled to tax refund? On October 11, 1997, San Roque entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)
with the National Power Corporation (NPC) by building the San Roque Multi-
Purpose Project in San Manuel, Pangasinan. The San Roque Multi-Purpose Project
allegedly incurred, excess input VAT in the amount of P559,709,337.54 for
taxable year 2001 which it declared in its Quarterly VAT Returns filed for the same
year. San Roque duly filed with the BIR separate claims for refund, amounting to
P559,709,337.54, representing unutilized input taxes as declared in its VAT returns
for taxable year 2001. However, on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed amended Quarterly
VAT Returns for the year2001 since it increased its unutilized input VAT To the
amount of P560,200,283.14. SanRoque filed with the BIR on the same date, separate
amended claims for refund in the aggregate amount of P560,200,283.14.
On April 10, 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its amended administrative claim
with the CIR on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the
CTA. CIR alleged that the claim by San Roque was prematurely filed with the CTA.
Decision
No. The treaty only applies to Filipino citizens
desiring to practice their profession in Spain and
Spanish citizens desiring to practice their profession
in the Philippines.
Yes. Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 is constitutional.
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is
exercising her right to freedom of religion.
No. The petition must be dismissed for having
become moot and academic. A case or issue is
considered moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that an adjudication of
the case or a declaration on the issue would be
of no practical value or use.
Yes the petitioners is a legitimate exercise of freedom of
thought and expression.
No. The action could still prosper.
No. SC granted the petition of CIR to deny the tax
refund or credit claim of San Roque.
Ratio Decidendi
Since, Garcia is a Filipino citizen, he is therefore subject to the laws of his own country.
The executive department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Because it is the duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through
an army. Thus, the National Defense Law, may require its citizens to compulsory render military
service. Sec. 4, Art. II of the Constitution states that “The prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service.”
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in
our Constitution. the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage
or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts
to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction
between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be
entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.In this case
, the Manila RTC's rendition of the Decision dated September 23, 2010 as
well as the Decision dated February 11, 2011 and the Amended Decision dated
May 9, 2011 by virtue of which the assets subject of the said cases were all forfeited
in favor of the government, are supervening events which have effectively rendered
the essential issue in this case moot and academic, that is, whether or not respondents
should have been allowed by the Manila RTC to intervene on the ground that they
have a legal interest in the forfeited assets.
In PD 885, political discussion will only constitute prima facieevidence of membership in
a subversive organization if such discussionamounts to conferring with officers or other
members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof.
In the case,there is noproof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan tooverthrow
the government through illegalmeans. Lovely also declared thathis bombing mission was not
against the government, but directedagainst aparticular family. Such a statement negates any
politically motivated or subversive assignment.
The period from 1945 when the law was promulgated, to 1953
when itwas declared unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose ofprescription
since the Debt Moratorium Law was operative during this time. Ineffect, only 7 years had
elapsed (1944-45, 1953-59). Indeed, it would be unjust topunish the creditor who could not
collect prior to 1953 because the DebtMoratorium Law was effective, only to be told later
that his respect foranapparently valid law made him lose his right to collect.
Art. 7 of the Civil Code which provides that, "When the courtsdeclare a law to be inconsistent
with the Constitution, the former shall be voidand the latter shall govern."
San Roque is not entitled to a tax refund because it failed to comply with the mandatory and
jurisdictional requirement of waiting 120 days before filing its judicial claim. On April 10, 2003,
a mere 13 days after it filed its amended administrative claim with the CIR on March 28, 2003,
San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the CTA, which showed that San Roque did not wait for
the 120-day period to lapse before filing its judicial claim. Compliance with the 120-day waiting
period is mandatory and jurisdictional, under RA8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Failure to
comply renders the petition void.
Article 5 of the Civil Code provides, "Acts executed against provisions of mandatory or prohibitory
laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity."
Section 112(D) of the 1997 Tax Code is clear, unequivocal, and categorical that the CIR has 120
days to act on an administrative claim. The taxpayer can file the judicial claim(1) Only within 30
days after the CIR partially or fully denies the claim within the 120-day period, or(2) only within
30 days from the expiration of the 120- day period if the CIR does not act within the 120-day period.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Garner 68 MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO 1.Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the Senator Jinggoy Estrada, in his privileged speech, revealed that some senators had been
AQUINO III, JULY 1,2014 1987 Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be allotted an additional PHP50 million each as incentive for voting in favor of the
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an impeachment of Chief Justice Corona. As a response, Department of Budget and
appropriation made by law." Management Secretary Abad explained that the funds released had been part of the DAP,
a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion.
2. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other The DAP is a stimulus package intended to fast track public spending and to push
executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP economic growth by investing on high-impact budgetary programs, activities, or projects
violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution to be funded from the savings generated during the year as well as from unprogrammed
funds. Petitioners contend that the appropriations funded under the DAP, being an
appropriation that set aside public funds for public use, should require an enabling law
for its validity. Petitioners also question the constitutionality of such realignments and
transfers pursuant to Section 25 (5) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Garner 69 MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO Whether or not the DAP realignments or transfers are Section 24 and 26(2), Article VI, 1987 When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his Yes. The Court held that for the transfer of
AQUINO III, FEBRUARY 3, 2015 (ENBANC) unconstitutional? administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that
the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came
up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was
seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting
for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds
allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority
projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court).
Garner 70 MAGALLONA VS ERMITA Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional for Magallona, et. al., assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act 9522 which
reducing the Philippine Maritime Territory? mandates the adjustment of the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying
the baseline regime of nearby territories. Historically, Republic Act No. 3046 is the
ruling law which demarcates the maritime baselines of the Philippines, as an
archipelago. Republic Act No. 3046 follows the framing of the Convention on
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958, which codifies the sovereign
rights of the states over their territorial sea. Republic Act No. 9522 aims to amend
Republic Act No. 3046 by complying with the terms of United Nations Convention
Igdanes 71 Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional for on the
The MOALawonofthe
theAncestral
Sea III which
DomaintookAspect
betweenof 1973 and 1982. Tripoli Agreement of Peace
the GRP-MILF
Ancestral reducing the Philippine Maritime Territory? of 2001 is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the joint efforts of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points
reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro
homeland.
Igdanes 72 Reagan v CIR , 30 SCRA 968 (1969) Whether or not a sale made on a foreign military base is Petitioner questioned the payment of an income tax assessed on him by public respondent
excluded from tax on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the US Marine
Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base. Petitioner contends
that the base is outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond the jurisdictional power to
tax.
Igdanes 73 People vs Gozo 53 SCRA 476 Whether or not the State can exercise administrative Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
jurisdiction within the naval base leased by the Philippines convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit
to the American armed forces. from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any
modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity on the pretext
that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces.
While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine
territory, she in effect seek to emasculate the State's sovereign rights by the assertion that the
latter cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction.
Igdanes 74 Lee vs. Director of Lands GR 128195 Whether or not the lot can revert back to the owner. The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the
effectivity of the1935 Constitution which prohibits aliens to acquire private agricultural
lands, save in cases of hereditary succession.Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was
disqualified to acquire the land in question. The former owners filed with theCourt of First
Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery
of land.
Igdanes 75 Republic vs Chule Lim GR 153883 Whether or not Lim complied with the legal requirement in Chule Y. Lim filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
electing her citizenship with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte. She claimed that she was born on 29
October 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to
Iligan City. The Court finding the petition sufficient in form and substance ordered the
publication of the hearing of the petition.
Decision
1.No. The SC held that the DAP did not violate this
constitutional provision.
2.Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget
Circular No. 541 and related executive declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
appropriated funds to be valid
No. United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea III (UNCLOS III) has nothing to do with
the acquisition or loss territory.
The MOA on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared
contrary to law and the Constitution.
The decision of the CTA asof May 12, 1966 denying the
refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by petitioner is
affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
The appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed
insofar as it found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No.
14,
The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 36274. In lieu
thereof, the Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of
title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas City, and dismisses the petition, without
prejudice.
The instant petition for review is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Civil Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the
following corrections in the birth record of respondent
Chule Y. Lim, to wit: 1. Her family name from "YO" to
"YU"; 2. Her father’s name from "YO DIU TO (CO
TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)"; 3. Her status from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in
answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and, 4. Her
citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
Ratio Decidendi
1.DAP was merely a program of the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a
program for prioritizing government spending. As such, no additional funds were withdrawn from
the Treasury; otherwise, an appropriation law would have been signed. Funds already appropriated
were merely realigned.
2. DAP being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine
of separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration
of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end
of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the
General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of
other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in
the General Appropriations Act.
Such transfer must be made upon the concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) there is a law authorizing the president, the Senate President, the Speaker of the HOR, the Chief
Justice of the SC, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer such funds within
their respective offices; (2) the funds to be transferred are savings, generated from the appropriations
for their respective offices; and (3) the purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the General
Appropriations Law for their respective offices. That law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal
year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize such transfers.
Whereas the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize transfers of funds under
the DAP, such transfers were unconstitutional. DAP also failed to comply with the second requisite
since the DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there
is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, discontinued, or abandoned.
The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the
statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis for the
transfers, further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. However, under the
DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and
subsequently being declared as savings by the Executive through the DBM.
It is a multilateral treaty regulating sea use rights over maritime zones. Baseline
laws such as Republic Act 9522 are enacted pursuant to UNCLOS III and only
serves to mark out specific basepoints from which baselines are drawn straight or
curve, and to serve and to start as geographic starting points to measure the breadth
of maritime zones and continental shelf.
Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will
forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no
legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The
instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They
no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.
No. The said foreign military bases is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes of income tax
legislation. Philippine jurisdictional rights including the power to tax are preserved.
The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of
the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such
offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such
ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of.
No. The land is now in the hands of Filipinos. If the land was invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is valid.
The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention “in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.”
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Igdanes 76 Calilung vs Datumanong GR 160869 Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Dismissed
and allowing dual allegiance RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it
violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Igdanes 77 Republic vs Nora Sagun GR 187567 (2012) Has Norma complied with the procedural requirements in Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Petition Granted
the election of Philippine citizenship? Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and
after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. Said document was notarized but was not recorded and registered with the
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Igdanes 78 In re Ching, Bar Matter 914 (1999) Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's
lawyer’s oath Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law
degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was
advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take
his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino
citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution,
a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the
foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he
is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as
a councilor in a municipality in La Union.
Igdanes 79 Co v HRET 199 SCRA 692 Whether or Not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was Dismissed
Philippines held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and
the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election
protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
Igdanes 80 Bengson v HRET GR 142840 Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Dismissed
the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
"no person shall be a Member of the House of applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz
Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.” enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in
the armed forces of a foreign country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17,
1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio
Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Lim 81 So v Republic 513 SCRA 268 (2007) Whether or not Edison So did meet all the qualification He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. Denied
needed to be a naturalized Filipino citizen 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average
annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is
single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of
Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m.
of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined to show
cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its annexes,
including the order, were ordered published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the
Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The
RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be posted in public and
conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.9
During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know
petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So family’s business. He would
usually attend parties and other social functions hosted by petitioner’s family. He knew
petitioner to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all
the qualifications mandated by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten
(10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the
University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member
of some school organizations and mingled well with friends.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.
Ratio Decidendi
What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. In its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance.
The respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective
election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the
law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise
of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise
of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent
cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship
when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of CA No. 625 or fourteen years after he had reached the age of majority. The age of
majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. The Supreme Court noted that the period is
originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s
special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a
Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship
are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino
citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the
bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship
and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay
in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
The Court interprets Sec 1, Par 3 of Art 4 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation
where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-
born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there are three
ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant
to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative
naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their
lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To
reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring
Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather
than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the
naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was
intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to
prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens.
The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative
naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral
character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.56
Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not
been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has
not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not
the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing
in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicant’s
worthiness.
e do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of
naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by
misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a
certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the
certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal
the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before
the lower court.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Lim 82 David vs. Agbay G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015 Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon Denied
for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the
Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225 where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the
DENR. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 9225.
The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a
warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.
Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that
petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen.
Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied.
Lim 83 Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec GR 162759 August 4, Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of Granted
2006 sans the compliance of the 1 year residency. suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however,
did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to
comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under
Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.
Lim 84 JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and loss of his On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of candidacy with the Granted
Osmeña GR 83820 25 May 1990 Philippine Citizenship cannot be presumed. COMELEC for the position of Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a
petition for disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino
citizen.
In 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate
issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commission that Osmeña is an American
Citizen. According to the evidence presented, Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino
Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the Late President
Sergio Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and been
continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and that he has been a registered voter in
the Philippines.
COMELEC dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having been timingly filed
and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not s Filipino citizen and Osmeña
Lim 85 Valles v COMELEC GR 137000, Aug. 9, 2000 Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino was proclaim
Rosalind Ybascoof winning candidates
Lopez was born onfor obtaining
May theinhighest
16, 1934 number
Australia of votes.father and an Granted
to a Filipino
Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran
for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground
that she is an Australian.
Ratio Decidendi
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he
belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he
was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not
necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in
contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into
force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign
citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the
second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the
time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship.
While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was
already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status
is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public
document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225 may exercise their
right to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189.
Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency requirement in
Section 1 of the same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth to provide a
system wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines are
empowered to vote.
The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189
Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmeña had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any of the
modes provided for under C.A. No. 63 these are :
1. By naturalization in foreign country;
2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or Law of the foreign country.
The evidence clearly shows that Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three
(3) mentioned hereinaboved or any other modes of losing Philippine citizenship.
The 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states “Dual allegiance of citizens is iniminical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law” has no retroactive effect.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time,
what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United
States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy
Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899
and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By
virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter,
herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as
basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her
possession of dual citizenship.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Lim 86 MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- (1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al. GR 221697 , born Filipino citizen natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016
GR 221698-700 March 8,2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency
requirement Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally
adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN
ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore
Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American
citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical
condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the
US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on
MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine
Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion
of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since
she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The
Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship
and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
Decision Ratio Decidendi
Granted YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features
which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing
99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are
admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born
citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where
they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was
granted by the SC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that
POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.

Lim 87 DEPT OF AGRICULTURE VS NLRC GR 104269 Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and Denied No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at
November 11, 1993 applies in the case. requested by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). times be sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083,
where the Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving
Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between
security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to private parties.”
their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises
of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non- n this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental
payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act
and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency. proprietary in character. But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money
claims.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the
security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The
DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and
executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the
judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff
levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the
writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money
claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded
the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.

The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its
immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Lim 88 Philippine Agila Sattelite Inc. vs. Lichauco G.R. No. Is the suit one against the state? Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. is a duly organized corporation, whose President and Denied
142362, May 3, 2006 Chief Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by
a consortium of private telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia,
concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. The
Philippine government, through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU to secure from the
International Telecommunication Union the required orbital slots and frequency assignments
for the Philippine satellite.
The government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International
Telecommunication Union two orbital slots, designated as 161º East Longitude and 153º
East Longitude, for Philippine satellites. PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S.
Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of
the two aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its satellites. Secretary
Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter confirming “the Philippine Government’s assignment of
Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its satellites.”
PASI averred that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine government, it
proceeded with preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites,
including the availment of loans, the increase in its capital. However, respondent Lichauco,
then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly “embarked on a crusade to
malign the name of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.”
Aggrieved by Lichauco’s actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted a civil complaint against
Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC. The complaint, alleging three causes
of action, was for injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages.
The third cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her
alleged “crusade” to malign the name of plaintiff De Guzman and sabotage the business of
PASI.
Lim 89 Lansang vs. CA G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000 Whether or not the complaint filed against the petitioner is in Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and Jose Iglesias were Denied
reality a complaint against the State, which could not allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 to occupy a portion of Rizal Park by
prosper without the State’s consent the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body
engaged in the development of national parks. Private respondents were allegedly given
office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. Private respondent
GABI was to remit to NPDC 40% of the profits derived from operating the kiosks. After the
EDSA Revolution, petitioner Lansang, the new Chairman of the NPDC, sought to clean up
Rizal Park. Petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded
that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. On
the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction against
petitioner.
Lim 90 Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124 (1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There Denied
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores
were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola
Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant
recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims
to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of
Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police
officers involved in the incident.
Ratio Decidendi
The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer
of the government by a private citizen that would result in a charge against or financial liability to the
government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although the latter has not been formally
impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the
government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is
personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his duties.
As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three causes of action against Lichauco: one for injunction against
her performing any act in relation to orbital slot 153º East Longitude; one for declaration of nullity of
award, seeking to nullify the alleged award of orbital slot 153º East Longitude; and one for damages
against Lichauco herself.
As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official functions by an officer of the
government will result in a charge against or financial liability to the government that the complaint must
be regarded as a suit against the State itself. However, the distinction must also be raised between where
the government official concerned performs an act in his/her official and jurisdictional capacity and
where he performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In
the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official
concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party- defendant or respondent.
As to the first two causes of action, the Court ruled that the defense of state immunity from suit do not
apply since said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in
constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability
against the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of
action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing
more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the
suit would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself,
an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been considered as
one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case.
The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals states: “While the doctrine appears to
prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that
if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
same,doctrine
The such asofthe appropriation
state of the
immunity from amount
suit appliesneeded to pay the
to complaints damages
filed againstawarded against for
public officials them,
actsthe suit
done
in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state
where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to
perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to
the plaintiff.
The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are
unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity,
from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does its apply where the public official is
clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained
of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
In the case, the petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal
capacity. It is also evident the petitioner is sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the
ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
The important question to consider is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the
ejectment of GABI.
The Court found no evidence of such abuse of authority. Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man
and, thus, could not be the subject of lease contract. That private respondents were allowed to occupy
office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the previous administrator.
This being so, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents,
who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and do not claim a
The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The
recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does
not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation
of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis
for a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the
Commission does not in any way bind the State.
The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for
the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled
rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were
responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority,
hence, the acts cannot be considered official.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision Ratio Decidendi
Manez 91 Bayan v Exec Secretary GR 138570 Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Dismissed No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, the Court
Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then without
territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP- power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character
US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and
possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine bounds within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the powers
Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.
which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign
Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on “the complementing
strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both
sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the
VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites
States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada,
through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the
President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially
transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the
President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution
Manez 92 Pamatong v Comelec GR 161872 Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold office Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent Dismissed No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of justifies an interpretation of the sort.
Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal
access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC
supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the
office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international
campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of
government.
Manez 93 Garcia v Drilon 699 SCRA 352 Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition on Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Dismissed Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex
the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not
collateral attack on the validity of the law. for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be
victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of considered in appeal.
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set
forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a
TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner
failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance
to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an
“axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO
on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of
an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Manez 94 PASEI v Drilon 163 SCRA 386 Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
challenged Department Order No. 1. recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing
the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.”
It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and
that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to
the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed
the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there
exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for
sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
Dismissed the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad
were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no
question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not
import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:
(1) Such classification rests on substantial distinctions (2.) That they are germane to the purpose of the
law (3). They are not confined to existing conditions (4.) They apply equally to al members of the same
class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on
the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the
requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper
is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of
legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Manez 95 UP BOR v CA GR 134625` Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in Dismissed
deprived of her right to substantive due process. Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work
required and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense. After going over her
dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism. However,
respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a
passing mark except Dr. Medina. UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels
indicated disapproval. Hence, she expressed her disappointments over the CSSP
administration and warned Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s
name from the list of candidates for graduation but it did not reach the Board of Regents on
time, hence Celine graduated. Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with
plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz
informed private respondent of the charges against her. CSSP College Assembly
unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent's doctorate
degree. The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate
Degree recommended by the University Council. She sought an audience with the Board of
Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by President Hence, Celine
then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree
without justification and without affording her procedural due process.
Manez 96 CoTesCUP v Secretary of Education GR 216930 Whether the K to 12 Law violates petitioners' right to In an attempt to bolster petitioner case against the K to 12 Law, petitioners also raised the Denied
substantive due process and equal protection of the laws. following policy issues:
1)K to 12 only increases the resource gap by creating more need for resources. The solution
to the problem is closing the resource gap by giving priority to education in the budget and
public spending program of the government and addressing the issue of poverty and
malnutrition and programs aimed at alleviating if not eradicating poverty in the long run but
instead government comes up with the K to 12 Law which is a copycat and elitist
solution.275
2)K to 12 is problem-ridden. Instead, what we need is to prioritize deficiencies in personnel,
facilities and materials; and a nationalist-oriented curriculum relevant to the needs of the
people.276
3)The Philippine government does not have enough funds to add two (2) more years of
senior high school.277
4)Student-teacher ratio is far from ideal.278
5)Teachers are paid low salaries.279
6)There is no assurance that senior high school results in good employment.
Ratio Decidendi
No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard several times.
Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had
committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side
of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who
has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due
process.
In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given opportunities to
answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which she submiited. She, as well, met
with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition,
she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the
Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance
of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.
Policy matters are not the concern of the Court. To reiterate, government policy is within the exclusive
dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for the Court to look into the wisdom or
propriety of legislative determination. Stated otherwise, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it
is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether,
in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner
— all these are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not
suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. When the validity of a statute is challenged
on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends
constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power.Further, the courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution, but also because the judiciary, in the determination of actual cases and controversies, must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.The Court, despite its vast powers, will not review the
wisdom, merits, or propriety of governmental policies, but will strike them down only on either of two
grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and/or (2) grave abuse of discretionFor having failed to show
any of the above in the passage of the assailed law and the department issuances, the petitioners' remedy
thus lies not with the Court, but with the executive and legislative branches of the government.

Manez 97 University v CA 230 SCRA 761 Wheter or not the That Mandamus will not lie to compel the
respondents to enroll petitioning students because of their
academic deficiencies and that this refusal of respondent
university falls within its right to do so under the academic
freedom clause of our Constitution.
Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael Kim Granted Equally mandated by Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution is that academic freedom shall
So and Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Academic freedom of educational institutions has been
Agustin (USA) who were refused re-admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two defined as the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
semesters of school year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades attain them - free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare
of not lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II With Related Learning calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students.
Experience). Its persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely choose Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That
their field of study and finish a college degree and worse, no other school within the city and would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent.
nearby areas is willing to accept them due to the difference in the curriculum and school
residency requirement. Thus, they filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, to command petitioner USA to re-admit them. Aside from the prayer
for re-admission, they also prayed for actual and moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 for each of them.

Submitting a joint answer to the petition, petitioner USA and the other petitioners, Dean
Concepcion Cajilig and Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda, Mary Espino, Rhodora
Azucena, Ma. Dulce Socorro Posa and Cosette Monteblanco admitted having barred private
respondents from finishing their Nursing course but justified the decision not to re-admit
them as being in pursuance of the school's policy that only students with grades of at least
80% in any major Nursing subject, including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, are
allowed enrollment in the following year. Private respondents were duly informed and
forewarned of their below 80% performance rating. To buttress petitioners' stance, they
placed reliance on Section 9(2) of the Education Act of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232) which
recognizes the right of students to freely choose their field of study subject to existing
curricula, and to continue their course up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2) thereof vesting in
institutions of higher learning the right to determine on academic grounds who shall be
admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of study and
research.Additionally, petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of
action for mandamus under the premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of
the latter which has been violated neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial
duty to re-admit them, since petitioner USA is a private educational institution not
performing public functions and duties. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to academic freedom.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Manez 98 SSS vs CA 175 SCRA 686 whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint Denied
Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that
from striking and order the striking employees to return to on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded
work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for
Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was
reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to
return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered
damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the
defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared
illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands,
which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay,
night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees
with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of
the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted
certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of
Manez 99 Oposa v Factoran GR 101083 Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a A taxpayer’s class
discrimination suit was
and unfair filedpractices
labor by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their Granted
class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Philippine rainforests?” Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they
claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property
he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.
Manez 100 Republic v Albios 707 SCRA 5584 (2013) Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later on filed Granted
declared null and void. a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that
after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United
States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
The RTC ruled in her favor.
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the
OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the
RTC decision.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It
held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in
jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court
Ratio Decidendi
The court ruled that Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either
petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the
ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those
which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service
may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private
sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III
of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to Self-
Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of
employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
No, respondent’s marriage is not void.
The court said:
“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.”
The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.”
“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the
whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may
easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
needed.”
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision Ratio Decidendi
Mendoza 101 Imbong vs Ochoa, 721 SCRA 584 (2013) SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and SUBSTANTIAL
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health 2012. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the: medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However,
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Right to life Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
Right to health protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
Freedom of religion and right to free speech SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
Freedom of expression and academic freedom The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
Due process clause The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
Equal protection clause products.
Prohibition against involuntary servitude The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
PROCEDURAL: The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review Constitution.
over the controversy. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

Actual Case or Controversy

Facial Challenge PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
Locus Standi controversy.
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule

Mendoza 102 Roe vs Wade, 410 US 113 Whether or not a woman’s right to privacy as protected This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas, which granted the Yes. The “right of privacy x x x is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not
by the constitution includes the right to abort her child. declaratory relief prayed for by the plaintiff who challenged the constitutionality of the Texas to terminate her pregnancy. We therefore conclude that the right of personal privacy includes abortion
Criminal abortion laws; but denied issuing an injunction against enforcement of such decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in
statutes. regulation.”

In 1970, Norma L McCorvey ( “Jane Roe” ), a pregnant single woman (allegedly a “A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type that exempts from criminality only a
result of rape), filed a suit against the defendant, District Attorney Henry Wade questioning lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition
Texas State Laws which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical of the interests involved (such as liberty interests), is violative of the Due Process Clause of the
advice for the purpose of saving the mother’s life. She argues that said laws are Fourteenth Amendment.”
unconstitutionally vague and that they abridge her right of personal privacy as guaranteed
and protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Later, she
amended her complaint as to represent or sue “ on behalf of herself and all other women
similarly situated;” thereby becoming a class suit.
Mendoza 103 Limbona vs Conte Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786 s the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed
governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, Government and was later elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly. warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper
subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other Congressman Datu invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly for proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within
words, what is the extent of self-government given to the consulations and dialogues on the recent and present political developments and other the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are
two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII? issues affecting Regions IX and XII hopefully resulting to chart the autonomous nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised
governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute with grave abuse.
immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission. the Decree PD 168 established “internal autonomy” in the two regions “[w]ithin the framework of the
Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner addressed all Assemblymen that there shall be national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,” with
no session in November as “our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein
(sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook … .”
In defiance of Petitioner’s advice, After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker
Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the
Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative.
Mendoza 104 Mamiscal vs Abdullah 761 SCRA 39 (2015)
Mendoza 105 In RE Laureta and Maravilla 148 SCRA 382 WON privacy of communication was violated Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.There is no
case(aland dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It
unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his
railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.Illustre also client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.
threatened in her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is far fromfinished
by a long shot.” She threatened that she would call for a press conference. Illustre’s letter
basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was
established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen
and counsel for the opponents. The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC
clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not
Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not
aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap
eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices
(Narvasa, Herrera,Cruz), again with more threats to “exposethe kind of judicial performance
readily constituting travesty of justice.”True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal
complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust
Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their
influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty LAURETA was the
counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to thepress, without any copy
furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were
charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC
is charging them with contempt.They claim that the letters were private communication, and
that they did not intend to dishonor the court.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Mendoza 106 INS vs Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) Whether a single house can vote to override an executive An immigration law passed by Congress holds that the attorney general can suspend the
decision such that it violates the principle of separation of deportation of an illegal immigrant if the immigrant would sustain “severe hardship” as a
powers. result. Additionally, if either the Senate or House of Representatives voted by majority to
veto the attorney general’s decision regarding deportation. Chadha was a student who had
remained in the US with an expired Visa. The attorney general held that he should remain in
the US due to hardship. The House of Representatives vetoed the decision to grant
amnesty, thereby sustaining the deportation order. Chadha brought this litigation after the
legislative veto.
Mendoza 107 Arnault vs Balagtas, 97 Phil 358 (1955) Whether or not Congress has authority to punish Arnault continuously withheld information. This time about an affidavit supposedly giving
recalcitrant witness? details surrounding the acquisitions of the estates. To this he gave the name Jesse Santos as
the person he gave the amount to.
Mendoza 108 Belgica vs Ochoa, Jr, 710 SCRA 1(2013) Whether or not the 2013 PDAF article and all other Petitioner sought that the annual pork barrel system be declared unconstitutional and null
Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional for and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretition.
violating the constitutional provisions on separation of
powers, non-delegability of legislative power and checks
and balances.
Mendoza 109 Mendoza vs People, 659 SCRA 681 (2011) Without violating the separation of powers, can the Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a
Supreme Court recommend to the President, the grant of special law known as the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of
executive clemency to a convict? the Social Security Service (SSS) contributions to his employees. The offense is criminal in
nature. Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted his fault, as he said, he acted in good faith. But still,
the Court has to render judgment and apply the proper penalty how harsh it may be dura lex
sed lex).
The Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison term. Considering the
circumstances, the court the Court transmitted the case to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the
petitioner
Mendoza 110 NPC Drivers and Mechanical Association vs Napocor, On June 8, 2001, Republic Act 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry
503 SCRA 138 (2006) The issue was whether or not NPB Resolution Nos. 2002- Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by President Gloria
124 and 2002-125 were properly enacted. Macapagal-Arroyo. It took effect on 26 June 2001.
Under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law,[2] a new National Power Board (NPB) of Directors
was formed. An energy restructuring committee (Restructuring Committee) was also created
to manage the privatization and the restructuring of the National Power Corporation (NPC),
the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), and the Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Corporation (PSALC).
On November 18 , 2002, pursuant to Section 63[3] of the EPIRA Law and Rule
33[4] of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the NPB passed NPB Resolution
No. 2002-124, which provided for “Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and
the Selection and Placement of Personnel.” Under this Resolution,
the services of all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003, and shall
be entitled to separation benefits provided therein. On the same day, the NPB approved
NPB Resolution 2002-125, constituting a Transition Team to manage and implement the
NPC’s Separation Program.
Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions were void, petitioners filed, in their individual
and representative capacities, the present Petition for Injunction to restrain respondents from
implementing NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002- 125.
More 111 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 Whether or not the President may issue an EO that can The President issued an EO 438 which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for
increase tariff rates other oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus is hereby
on said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and appropriate action. DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
The President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter
of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products
More 112 US v. Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 Whether or not Article 2868 is a delegation of power and is The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section 1,
thus unconstitutional authorizing the governor-General “for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price
of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purposes of the Act”. Thus, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General
signed EO 53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang Tang Ho was caught selling
a ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher than that fixed by EO 53.
Defendant was found guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid
delegation of legislative powers.
More 113 CoTeSCUP v. Secretary of Education, G.R. 216930, Whether the K to 12 Law constitutes an undue delegation of On May 15, 2013, Congress passed the K to 12 law, which took effect on June 8, 2013.
October 2018 power This essentially adds 2 more years to the then-current 10-year scheme of the Philippine
education system.
Decision Ratio Decidendi
Yes, Act invalidated. The court recognize the argument of “efficiency” regarding a single house vote.
Efficiency is achieved by this measure because the attorney general may frequently override deportation
and calling both houses of the legislature to vote for each instance would be time consuming and
burdensome. However, the constitution is very clear that legislative decisions are to be bicameral. There
are reasons relating to fair representation of states that maintain this justification as paramount,
particularly when weighed against arguments of efficiency. The act of overriding an executive veto is
inherently legislative and therefore requires bicameral, legislative support.
Judgment appealed reversed. Provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power
and is committed in the course of legislative process, the legislative authority is supreme. Said power
must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power or necessary to effectuate
said power.
The post enactent measures including project identification, fund relelase, and fund alignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and does not allow legislature to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere belongs to the executive department.
The Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its
power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. It is clearly stated in the Revised Penal Code
which provides; “Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and
which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act
should be made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the
execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense.”
The Court’s Decision, written by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[5] held that the Resolutions were
invalid, because they lacked the necessary number of votes for their adoption.
Under Section 48, the power to exercise judgment and discretion in running the affairs of the NPC was
vested by the legislature upon the persons composing the National Power Board of Directors. When
applied to public functionaries, discretion refers to a power or right conferred upon them by law,
consisting of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment
and conscience, and uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.
Presumably, in naming the respective department heads as members of the board of directors, the
legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive departments on the basis of their personal
qualifications and acumen that had made them eligible to occupy their present positions as department
heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much less
their power to vote and approve board resolutions. Their personal judgments are what they must
exercise in the fulfillment of their responsibilities.
There was no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions involved the exercise of discretion,
not merely a ministerial act that could be validly performed by a delegate.
Respondents’ reliance on American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents[6] was misplaced. The
Court explicitly stated in that case that, in exercising their own
judgment and discretion, administrative officers were not prevented from using the help of subordinates
as a matter of practical administrative procedure. Officers could seek such aid, as long as the legally
authorized official was the one who would make the final decision through the use of personal judgment.
In the present case, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB Resolutions 2002-124 and
2002-125, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive departments and not the
secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution. This action violates
the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to employ their own sound
discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the NPC.
Yes, the delegation is constitutional. The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in question,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure are prohibited to the President, that they must
be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The
Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix… tariff rates and other duties or imposts…” Thus,
there is explicit constitutional permission for Congress to authorize the President "subject to such
limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose. This referred to the Tariff and Customs Code
which authorized the President to issue said EOs.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized the Governor-
defendant discharged General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect the law. The said Act was not
complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what conditions the Governor-General shall
issue the proclamation as the said Act states “for any cause”. It also failed to define “extraordinary rise”
that such proclamation by the Governor-General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the
promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor-General,
Petitions were denied; RA No 10533 (K to 12 Law), among There is no undue delegation of legislative power in the enactment of the K to 12 law. To determine this,
others, was declared constitutional there are two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. For completeness test, the law
must be complete when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he
will have to do is to enforce it. For sufficient standard test, it mandates adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority; limits must be specified. The K to 12
law's lack of provision on labor does not render the law incomplete. Clearly, under the two tests, the K
to 12 law, is complete in all essential terms and conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the
power delegated to the DepEd, CHED and TESDA.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
More 114 Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 Whehter or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code Pursuant to the Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President issued EO EOs were declared null and void
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129, creating 33 municipalities enumerated in the margin.
Petitioner Pelaez alleged that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA No. 2370,
and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of
RA No. 2370 stated: "Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their nams
changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress."
More 115 People v. Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 Whether or not the case constitutes an undue delegation of Private respondents were charged with violating RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School
legislative power, the duration of the penalty of Teachers), for which they have been convicted of. The penal provision, Section 32 of said
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court Act, states that "x x x upon conviction, [they] may be punished by a fine of not less than
as if the latter were the legislative department of the one hundred pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court." Respondents
Government posited that said penalty merely indicated as imprisonment is too broad and should not be
enforced.
More 116 Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. 177597, (2008) Whether or not the Congress can delegate to the Regional On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
Assembly the power to create provinces provinces under Section 19 of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued
Resolution 7902 renaming the legislative district combining the said provice with Cotabato
as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." Sema, here petitioner, questioned the
Resolution combining the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato CIty into a single legislative
district.
More 117 Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Whether or not Congress validly delegated its legislative Petitioners, as taxpayers, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court.
Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014 power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and They seek to nullify the several sections of RA 10175, otherwise known as the "Cybercrime
Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a Prevention Act of 2012". They claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
national cybersecurity plan regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate constitutional rights. The government in
turn posits that the law merely seeks to put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent attacks in the system.
More 118 Powell v. McCormack 395 US 486 Does the House have a textual commitment in the During the 89th Congress, it was found that Plaintiff had engaged in deceptive and possibly Yes. Case reversed and remanded.
constitution to determine the qualifications of its members? illegal actions surrounding his service as chairman of the Committee on Education and
Labor. After his reelection to the 90th Congress, he was asked to step aside while the other
representatives were sworn in. Also, he was later asked to inform the Governor of New
York that his seat was vacant. Plaintiff sued, alleging the House did not have the
constitutional authority to deny his seat when he met the qualifications expressly set forth for
Representatives in Article I of the United States Constitution (Constitution).
More 119 Pobre v Defensor-Santiago 597 SCRA 1 (2009) Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor- In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago as a
Santiago to be disbarred or subjected to disciplinary action response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting
by the Court for her questioned speech. members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ
post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court, including
Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified.
Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending
that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban
and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other
disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-Santiago.
More 120 Aquino III vs COMELEC 617 SCRA 623 (2010) w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 Dismissed
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No.
legislative district in a province? 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Held: Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will
end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Decision and resolution of respondent judge are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional
Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, SC declares
VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. COMELEC Resolution
7902 is VALID.
The following were declared void for being unconstitutional:
Section 4(c)(3), 12 and 19 of RA 10175.
No
Ratio Decidendi
Yes, there is undue delegation of power. Section 10 (1) of the Constitution's Article VII states that: "The
President shall have control of al the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws are
faithfully executed." The Constitution is clear in saying that only general supervision can be exercised
over the local governments. No more authority that that of checking or supervision may be done. In this
case, by creating the 33 municipalities, the law conferred upon the President more power over the local
governments.
There is undue delegation of legislative powers. Section 32 of RA 4670 provides an indeterminable
period of imprisonment, with no maximum or minimum period set by legislative authority. The courts are
thus given a wide latitude of discretion, without benefit of sufficient standard. This cannot be allowed, as
it vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and is thus violative of the rules
on separation of powers as well as non-delegability of legislative powers.
SC ruled that Section 19, RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces and cities, is void. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can
exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.
Yes, the delegation is valid. The Court referred to the two tests for valid delegation: the completeness
test and sufficient standard test. The Cybercrime law was deemed to be complete in itself when it
directed CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Sufficient standards were also
clear when the law provided for the definition of cybersecurity. The definition served as the parameters
within which CICC should work in formulating the plan. The formulation of the cybersecurity plan is
also consisted with the policy of the law; the policy was clearly adopted in the interest of law and order,
which has been considered as sufficient standard.
The Defendants-Respondents, members of Congress including the Speaker of the House John W.
McCormack (Defendants), argued that the House has broad powers under Article I, Section: 5 of the
Constitution to determine the qualifications of its membership. Plaintiff argued and the Supreme Court of
the United States (Supreme Court) agreed, the ratification debates and historical context of the framers
limit the qualifications to those set forth in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court also notes that to hold otherwise would nullify the framers’ decision to require two-
thirds vote for expulsion.
The Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be afforded parliamentary
immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which section states in part
that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Although there was no express admission on the
part of the lady senator that she did indeed say those words, there was no categorical denial either,
which the Court ultimately regarded as an implied admission.
Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady senator for indulging in
"insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse that her questioned speech was a
prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light
of the controversy her utterances had managed to stir.
Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament or its
equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should be noted that
"[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their legislative duties, not for
their private
There indulgence,
is no specific but forinthe
provision thepublic good." that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
Constitution
compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion than
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. Requisites for
Creation. –
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative
addition to the indispensable income requirement.
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Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision Ratio Decidendi
Motas 121 Aldaba vs. COMELEC 611 SCRA 147 (2010) RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 Granted RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a
representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.”
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region
separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos “will be
population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that 254,030 by the year 2010.” The Certification states that the population of “Malolos, Bulacan as of May
House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the 1, 2000 is 175,291.” The Certification further states that it was “issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo
National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality of A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.”
1995 to 2000.”
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared
official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on
demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying
officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.

Moreover, the Certification states that “the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is
175,291.” The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year
between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of
175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an
official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the
population projection would be unreliable or speculative.
Motas 122 Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014) Whether or not Naval can be elected as a member of From 2004 to 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the Dismissed Naval violated Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code when he filed his COC despite knowledge of
Sanggunian constituting a new three-period term on a Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. Upon the creation of RA 9716, his ineligibility
different district. the legislative districts of Camarines Sur has been reapportioned moving the distric of Naval
to the Secon District. In the 2010 & 2013 elections, Naval won again as member of the
Sanggunian and subsequently questioned by Julia as another member of the Sanggunian
positing the three-consecutive term which is viloaltive of the Constitution

Motas 123 Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008) Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed Dismissed The Court upheld respondent’s arguments saying that such law only increased the representation of
apportionment of a city, involve the division and conversion and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: CDO in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod. Creation, division, merger,
of a local government unit, necessitating a plebiscite An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of abolition, and alteration of boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a plebiscite ,
Cagayan De Oro or RA No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oro’s legislative district from while legislative apportionment or reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 need not. There was also no
one to two. For the election of May 2007, CDO’s voters would be classified as belonging change in CDO’s territory, population, income and classfication
to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. On March 13,
2007, COMELEC promulgated a resolution implementing the said act. Bagabuyo filed a
petition at the Supreme Court asking for the nullification of RA 9371 and Resolution No.
7837 on constitutional grounds. Petitioner argued that COMELEC cannot implement a law
without the commencement of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division and
conversion of a local govt. unit.
Motas 124 Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Dismissed 1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral
SCRA 197 (2013 the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be . the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns
already taken her oath of office for the position of member of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of and qualification of the members of House of Representative.
of the House of Representative. petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the 2. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations. Respondent alleged 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not
petitioner is illegible to run for office that the petitioner is an American citizen because of her failure to comply with the abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial
requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225. Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to
be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
Motas 125 Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009) (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before Dismissed 1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the
or is it merely a ceiling? list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20%
(2)Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then
the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation
(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court
major political parties participate in the party-list elections? COMELEC. finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number
of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the
two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive
ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and
prevents the
attainment of “the
-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.”
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the
Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
Incharge Item Case Issue
Motas 126 Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010) 1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by
COMELEC, violated the constitutional guaranteesagainst
the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma.
2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened
the constitutional rights to privacy, freedomof speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, of
Ang Ladlad
, as well as constitutedviolations of the Philippines¶
international obligations against discrimination based on
sexualorientation
Motas 127 Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010) 1) whether mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to
disqualify AGPP's nominees motu proprio or to cancel
AGPP's registration;
(2) whether the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving
due course to AGPP's participation in the May 10, 2010...
elections, the canvassing of AGPP's votes, and proclaiming
it a winner; and
(3) whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
Arroyo's qualifications as AGPP's nominee after his
proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the
House of Representatives.
Motas 128 Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766 Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
Motas 129 Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. v Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the
Comelec, 201 SCRA 786 (2013) part of COMELEC for issuing Resolution without due
process?
Facts Decision
The COMELEC (Second Division)dismissed the Petition for registration of the petitioner on Granted
moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs, and
advocates sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for
advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it ³ or any
of itsnominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws,
rules, or regulationsrelating to the elections. Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad
will be exposing our youth to anenvironment that does not conform to the teachings of our
faith.
GPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to Dismissed
Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, It filed its Certificate of Nomination
together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees wherein the first nominee is
Mike Arroyo. Several petitions for disqualification of Arroyo emerged but have been
dismissed both by Comelec Second division and comelec en banc. In the interim, AGPP
obtained in the May 10, 2010 elections the required percentage of votes sufficient to secure
a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as AGPP’s first nominee, to sit in the House of
Representatives. He was proclaimed as AGPP’s duly -elected party-list representative in the
House of Representatives. On the same day, Arroyo took his oath of office, as AGPP’s
Representative. And, his name was, thereafter, entered in the Roll of Members of the House
of Representatives. Thereafter two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto were filed with
the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo’s eligibility as AGPP’s
representative in the House of Representatives. The HRET took cognizance of the petitions
by issuing
Atong a Summons
Paglaum, directing
Inc. and 51 otherArroyo
partiestowere
file his Answer to
disqualified bythe
thetwo petitions on Elections Remanded to COMELEC
Commission
in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified
as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then
filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Yes
Irrevocable Covenant, containing the list of nominees to share power in their sharing power
agreement.
The COMELEC issued a Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-
191 (PLM) stating that the list of nominees submitted to them shall be permanent. This is in
lieu of the empty seat in Congress after the 2010 elections following the resignation of Rep.
Kho. Two SENIOR CITIZENS were allocated seats in the House of Representatives, the
first being Rep. Arquiza, and Rep. Kho as the second.
Rep. Arquiza, honoring Rep. Kho’s resignation, stated that their fourth nominee shall take
the latter’s seat considering that the third nominee, Datol, has previously been expelled from
the party.
COMELEC claims that they shall stay true to the list presented by SENIOR CITIZENS,
regardless of Datol’s (being the third nominee) expulsion. Also that the resignation of Rep.
Kho shall not be recognized because it will change the order of nominees.
Ratio Decidendi
omelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a violation of the
non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law
relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought
to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate
their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society. The LGBT
community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their
sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws
nor by any international laws to which we adhere.
For a writ of mandamus to issue (in G.R. No. 191998), the mandamus petitioners must comply with
Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides: "In the present case, the mandamus
petitioners failed to comply with the condition that there be "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law." Under Section 2, in relation with Section 4, of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8807 (quoted below), any... interested party may file with the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification against a party-list nominee
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts new
parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions
applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present
petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to
participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-
list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for
sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first
"three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system
fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will
be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the
party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties
only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
There is grave abuse on the part of COMELEC for violating due process. Instead, the COMELEC
issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM)
without conducting any further proceedings.
The Court ruled that the Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections En
Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. is concerned, and that the
Commission on Elections En Banc is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of Associations of
Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list organizations during the May 13,
2013 elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to based on the total number of votes it
garnered during the said elections.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Motas 130 Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015 Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64[1] in relation to Rule 65,[2] seeking to annul the
the expulsion of a sitting party-list representative: from the Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January 2013 of the COMELEC.
House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from his Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization
party-list organization, on the other On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the
Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections.[4] On 6 March 2010, it
filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first... nominee and
Roberto Mascarina as second nominee.
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list
groups
Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives,[7] and thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, or
on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which
incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees.[8] Under the agreement,...
petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-year
term.
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the
Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalt
The said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second Division, prayed that
petitioner Lico... be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as
Ating Koop's representative in the House.
Ating Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the party-list group, such
as malversation, graft and corruption
Muring 131 Abang Lingkod vs. Comelec 2013 Whether national, regional, and sectoral parties and This is a petition for certiorari filed by Abang Lingkod challenging the May 2013 resolution
organizations are required under the law to show their issued by COMELEC cancelling the Abang Lingkod's party-list registration. COMELEC
genuineness and bona fide existence in determining if they says that it is not enough that the party-list organization claim representation of the
are eligible for registration with the Commission on marginalized and underrepresented because representation is easy to claim. Records shows
Elections that Abang Lingkod failed to stablish its track record which is important to prove that the
party-list continuously represents the marginalized. Abang Lingkod merely offered pictures
of some alleged activities they conducted after the 2010 elections. These pictures appears to
be edited. Under The Party-List System Act, a group’s registration may be cancelled for
declaring unlawful statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that
did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this ground that the
Commission cancels ABANG LINGKOD’s registration.
Muring 132 Akbayan vs HRET Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in
question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others
Palparan. alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list
nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that
Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Petitioner Palparan
countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-
list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any
question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such
question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
Muring 133 Aquino vs. Comelec Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a
Aquino from the position in the electoral district. duly registered political party, and MateoBedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the
latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6,
Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately
preceding the elections.
Decision Ratio Decidendi
Granted We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the
House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the
validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview.
The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as party-list representative as a
disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of... jurisdiction,
insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution[34] endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve
questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the
HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case... upon proclamation of the winning party-list
group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives.[35]
In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took
his oath; and... he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case
The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any
matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner
A party, by law, is either "a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."17 A political
party is defined as: x x x an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office. A party is a national party "when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory
of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region." On the
other hand, a sectoral party:
x x x refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits
as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5
identifies who the “members” of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives
no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the
party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his
certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding
that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same
district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his
most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to
establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying
one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Muring 134 Abayon vs HRET Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Palparan. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner
Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the
wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.
It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon
who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said
Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
Muring 135 Santiago vs Guingona Whether or not there was an actual violation of the During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both
Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was
minority leader declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the
agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was
assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen.
Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing
nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the
minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.
Muring 136 Avelino vs Cuenco Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved. The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to
declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a
session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges
against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate
President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada
from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried
to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members
of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting
President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.
Muring 137 Alejandrino vs Quezon Whether or not the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of
and void? the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de Vera. He
was deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of being a senator. He filed
mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon from
executing the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void.
Muring 138 De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the
members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019. Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of
Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution
filed a “Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June
1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the
accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed,
through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers
and claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to
House Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan
rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and
ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice.Jose de Venecia, Jr., in
his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his
capacity as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño,
Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of
Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.
Ratio Decidendi
although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits
as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5
identifies who the “members” of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives
no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the
party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction
over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number
out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.”
The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate
President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it
thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is
no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these
terms.In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members
who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority
leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.
It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that
the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may
participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will
support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most
injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one
that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure
of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter
held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of
opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved
the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a
doubt.
Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their
legislative powers by any judicial process. The court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition.No court
has ever held and no court will ever hold that it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the
Legislature to take any particular action. Also, if the Court does not have any authority to control the
Philippine Senate, it has likewise no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting
under the direction of the same.
As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of separation of powers does
not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension
prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, upon an erring member.Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from
frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and from
committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings
before the court. On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a
House-imposed sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to
enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Muring 139 Pobre vs. Defensor Santiago Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor- In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered
Santiago to be disbarred or subjected to disciplinary action the following remarks:
by the Court for her questioned speech
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I
am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be
living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested
in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a
different environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x x
Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
declaring that only sitting members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the
impending vacancy of the CJ post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent
members of the Court, including Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified.
Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending
that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban
and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other
disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-Santiago.
Muring 140 Philconsa vs. Mathay Whether or not the salary increase was constitutional? RA 4134 provided for increase of salary of Senate President, Speaker of the House and
members of the Senate and House of Representatives. This took effect on 30 June 1966.
However record show that the increase was implemented on 1964.Philippine Constitution
Association assailed the validity of RA 4134, stating that this is in violation of Section 14
Article 6 of the Constitution, “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and House of Representatives
approving such increase. Thus the petition for writ of prohibition.
Obregon 141 Ligot vs. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to such retirement Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was Dismissed.
benefit held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this
Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay. He lost his next bid and filed for
retirement claim. House of Representative issued a treasury warrant using the unapproved
amount. Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Petitioner’s request for reconsideration
was denied, hence the petition.
Obregon 142 People vs. Jalosjos, GR 132875-76, February 3, 2000 Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is Denied.
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
persons in general? lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to
be represented.
Obregon 143 Adaza vs Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985) Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their respective Dismissed.
Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously. term of office expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa (BP)
elections in 1984 and respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath
of office as the governor. Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom,
claiming to be the lawful occupant of the position.
Obregon 144 Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982) Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was The intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC No.
of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in
11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to
which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman
could “appear as counsel before any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative
body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he
filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal
interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of
Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10 shares.
Ratio Decidendi
o, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be afforded parliamentary
immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which section states in part
that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Although there was no express admission on the
part of the lady senator that she did indeed say those words, there was no categorical denial either,
which the Court ultimately regarded as an implied admission.
Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady senator for indulging in
"insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse that her questioned speech was a
prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light
of the controversy her utterances had managed to stir.
Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament or its
equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should be noted that
"[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their legislative duties, not for
their private indulgence, but for the public good."
Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of
the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation
for such increased compensation may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic
Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased
compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.
To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by
the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments
which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive
during their incumbency.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A member of the BP may not hold
any other office in the government. A public office is a public trust. A holder thereof is subject to
regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions on his
holding of more than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere private citizen, runs afoul of BP
Blg. 697 which provides that governors, or members of Sanggunian or barangay officials, upon filing a
certificate of candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence from office. When respondent
reassumed the position of vice-governor after the BP elections, he was acting within the law. Thus, the
instant petition is denied.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the
cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the
SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843
outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact” that is, after the contested election of directors,
after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the
case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to
appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps,
the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter
under litigation.
The Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an
administrative body, it is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII
(now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Obregon 145 Liban vs. Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City
709 (2011) constitutionality of the PNRC statute? Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare
Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon,
Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Constitution
Gordon filed a motion for partial reconsideration on a Supreme Court decision which ruled
that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him
from being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is
a private corporation and the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.The
Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation.
Gordon takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which addressed the
constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Gordon avers
that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a
rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case.
Obregon 146 Macalintal vs. COMELEC, GR 157013, July 10, 2003 Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Partly granted.
& constitutional? Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he
has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant
petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V
of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court
of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder
immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in
the Philippines.
Obregon 147 Abakada Group Party list vs. Purisima, GR 166715, Whether the creation of the congressional oversight Petitioners, Abakada Guro Party list invoking their right as taxpayers, filed a petition
August 14, 2008 committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from
under the Constitution implementing and enforcing said law.
RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board.
Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative function should have been
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law. Respondents, through
the OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the congressional oversight
committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation of powers, as it ensures
Obregon 148 Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 thewas
Whether or not the inquiry that is sought by the Senate Blue It fulfillment
alleged of
thatthe legislative
Benjamin policy. and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully Granted.
Romualdez
Ribbon Committee should be granted and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained
with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government
owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to
the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. Enrile
subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have
an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea. Hence this
petition.
Obregon 149 Arnault vs. Nazareno, GR L-3820, July 18, 1950 Whether or not the senate has the authority to commit A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Arnault to relieve him from his confinement in the Denied.
petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the
legislative session Senate on May 15, 1950. The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two
parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that
the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to
one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5million for his
alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to
have forfeited any way long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible
for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.
Obregon 150 PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation vs. Senate, GR Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of discretion Petitioners Locsin and Andal are bot directors and corporate officers of PHC, as well as Dismissed.
180308, June 19, 2012 amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving nominees of the government to the board of directors of both POTC and PHILCOMSAT
Committee Resolution No. 312 filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assails and seeks to enjoin the implementation
of and nullify Committee Report No. 312 submitted by respondents Senate Committees on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and on Public Services (respondents
Senate Committees) on June 7, 2007 for allegedly having been approved by respondent
Senate of the Republic of the Philippines (respondent Senate) with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Decision
No, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the
constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of
the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither
strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Partially granted.
Ratio Decidendi
The Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will
be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions the Philippine government does not own
the PNRC. It does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress. It is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities
obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. The PNRC is not
government-owned but privately owned.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law
prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such
mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily
presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country.
The petition was partly granted, Sections 17(a), 18(b), 19(c), 20(d) are declared void for being repugnant
to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commision,
such as COMELEC. Pursuant to Section 30 of RA No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law
continues to be in full force and effect.
Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of
powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government.
It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in
the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified
under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-
enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation
The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look in to a possible violation of Sec.5 of RA No.3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated
the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa
Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry
by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress.
The Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session. There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for
contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of
that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the
legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution provides that the Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. Such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this
case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its
effective discharge. The respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No.
312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision Ratio Decidendi
Pila 151 Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct Granted The Supreme Court found the Senate to have gravely abused its discretion in citing the petitioner for
Officers 549 SCRA 77 and 564 SCRA 152) questions covered by executive privilege an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to contempt for his refusal to answer questions propounded to him in the course of legislative inquiry.
testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos The Court declared that “there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of contempt
offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed order suffers from constitutional infirmity.” Executive privilege: 2 kinds: presidential communications
PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, (between president and executive official) and deliberative process (between executive officials only)
when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result,
the Senate cited him for contempt.
Pila 152 Balag v. Senate GR 234608 Whether or not the Senate has power to impose the Balag, leader of Aegis Juris Fraternity filed a petition before the SC after senators ordered Denied for being moot and academic. However, the period The Court declared the case as moot and academic but the petition presents a critical and decisive issue
indefinite detention of a person cited in contempt during its him detained in Senate premises for being uncooperative in the probe into the death of the of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of that must be resolved and capable of repetition. This issue must be threshed out as the Senate's exercise
inquiries UST Law Student Horacio "Atio" del Castillo III. During the Senate inquiry, Balag the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only of its power of contempt without a definite period is capable of repetition,” it said, adding that “the
repeatedly invoked his right against self-incrimination when asked if he headed the fraternity last until the termination of the legislative inquiry. indefinite detention of persons cited in contempt impairs their constitutional right to liberty. The Supreme
Court has ruled that the Senate has no power to impose the indefinite detention of a person cited in
contempt during its inquiries.
Pila 153 Senate v. Ermita GR 169777 Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Partly Granted No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege.
officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation. The Committee The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
of the President prior to appearing before either house of of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
Congress, valid and constitutional? appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of
consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress
Pila 154 Belgica v. Executive Secretary GR 208566 Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Partly Granted Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be
non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
local autonomy discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents guaranteed by the constitution. Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
Pila 155 Araullo v Abad GR 209287 Whether or not the DAP, and all other executive issuances Maria Carolina Araullo filed a petition before the Supreme Cort questioning the validity of Partly Granted Yes, it violated Sec 25 (5) of Article VI of the Costitution.
allegedly implementing the DAP, violated Sec 25(5) of DAP (Disbursement Accelaration Program). That, it is unconstitutional because it violates The augmentation is, according to the ponencia, and defined in Art. VI, Sec. 25 (5) of the 1987
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution the constitutional rule which provides that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury Constitution, and authorized within each year’s General Appropriations Act (GAA), is the use of clearly-
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. DBM Secretary Abad argued that the identified savings in the expenditures of government departments and offices to augment clearly-
DAP is based on GAA (General Appropriations Act) (Savings and augmentation identified, actual deficiencies within those respective government departments and offices. What
provisions) augmentation is not, however, is to allocate what was not authorized as an expenditure in the GAA. It is
not a transfer of executive department savings to legislative lump sum allocations (cross-border
augmentation) – by virtue of the latter’s unconstitutionality, or at the very least, because such itself
violates Art. VI Sec. 25 (5)
Pila 156 Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the LAMP filed an action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the Dismissed The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that,
Secretary of Budget and Management GR 164987 Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them
Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of
LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly
Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
Pila 157 Arnault v. Balagtas 97 Phil 358 Whether or not Congress has authority to punish This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of Prisons, Denied The question raised by the petitioner was the legality of his detention by order of the Senate for his
recalcitrant witness Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in refusal to answer questions put to him by one of its investigating committees.
contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business in The Supreme Court refused to order his release and deferred to the discretionary authority of the
relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The legislative body to punish contumacious witnesses for contempt. The exercise of the legislature's
circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion case Arnaultvs. authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to
Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere
defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry. Arnault eventually exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations.
divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and
Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's
explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114.

Pila 158 Imbong v. Ochoa 721 SCRA 146 Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title Petitioners question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section
rule under the Constitution 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to
them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation
violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent – to act as a
population control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a
birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and
“reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are inseparable.
Partly Granted No. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive
health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control
the population growth. Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive
the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

Pila 159 Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 Whether or not the statutes in question which contain Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect still and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
need to be published in the Official Gazette instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation, and
administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this case has no legal
personality or standing. Further, they argued that the publication in the Official Gazette in
necessary for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own
effectivity dates
Pila 160 Abbas v. SET Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election contest
senators, six of which are sitting in the tribunal against 22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators-elect. With the
exemption of Senator Estrada, the senators filed for motion for disqualification or inhibition
from the hearing and resolution on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said
case.
Granted . Yes. Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining the date of the
effectivity which must be 15 days following the completion of its publication, but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes to effect. Publication of laws is part of substantive due process
Dismissed The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the
Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases
would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Pranes 161 Bondoc vs Pineda Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered On May 11, 1987, the petitioner (NP) and Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates for Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted
to interfere with election protests in the HRET by Congressman of the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed the winner having
reorganizing the representation of the majority party in the garnered a total of 31,700 votes compared to Bondoc’s 28,400 votes. The petitioner filed a
HRET? protest with the HRET, composed of 9 members, 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, 6
members of the House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political
parties. A decision was reached declaring Bondoc as the winner by 23 votes, another
recount was insisted by the LDP members of the tribunal which increased Bondoc to 107
votes more than Pineda’s. Congressman Camasura (LDP) along with the Justices, voted to
proclaim Bondoc as the winner. Thereafter, Congressman Camasura received a letter
informing him that he was expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping organize the Partido
Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and inviting LDP members to join. The House voted for
Cong. Cmasura’s removal from the HRET and that his vote be withdrawn.
Pranes 162 Codilla vs De Venecia Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid. Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Petition for mandamus is granted
Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending.
Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the
Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on
resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him.
Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was
however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and
void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly
known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.
Pranes 163 Cunanan vs Tan Whether or not the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid. Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as acting Deputy Dismissed
Administrator of the Reforestation Administration. Carlos Cunanan was formerly appointed
in the same position but was later on rejected by the Commision of Appointment prompting
the President to replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent. Filing the
quo warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of the
convened Commission of Appointments citing irregularities as to the numbers of members
comprising the same.
Pranes 164 Velasco vs Belmonte Does HRET have the jurisdiction over BB? COMELEC has cancelled BB’s CoC, acting upon the petition of AA, for alleged Granted
misrepresentations in BB’s CoC. While the motion for reconsideration field by BB was
pending, the election was held and BB was proclaimed as winner by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers. CC filed an Election Protest in the HRET. COMELEC issued a Certificate of
Finality on its cancellation of BB’s CoC. Despite it, Speaker DD administered the oath of
office to BB. BB challenged COMELEC’s action and the Supreme Court upheld that there
was no grave abuse of discretion by COMELEC. AA filed for an immediate execution of
COMELEC’s previous resolution and to declare CC as winner. COMELEC declared the
proclamation of BB as null and void. CC filed a petition for the Court to issue a writ of
mandamus to compel Speaker DD to proclaim him as winner, despite notice given to him by
COMELEC.
Pranes 165 Ty-Delgado vs HRET WON the HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to Philip Arreza Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of libel. On 9 October Granted
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the House of
Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner filed a petition
turpitude for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before
the Commission on Elections on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime
involving moral turpitude. She argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011,
the five-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse. HRET held that Pichay
did not participated the writing of the libelous articles but his conviction was in line with his
duty as the president of the publishing company. Based on the circumstances, the HRET
concluded that Pichay’s conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude.
Pranes 166 Republic vs Sandiganbayan Whether or not the Swiss funds can be forfeited in favour Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), Granted
of the Republic, on the basis of the Marcoses’s lawful represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture
income? before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of
US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest)
deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the
following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks.
Moreover, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury
notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income
from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the
Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the
PCGG. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreements were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family to identify, collate,
cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family
under their conditions contained therein.
Ratio Decidendi
No, pursuant to Sec. 17 of Art. VI, the HRET is sole judge of all contests in relation to the election,
returns and qualification of their members. It is created as non-partisan court to provide an independent
and impartial tribunal for determination of contests. The House cannot just shuffle and manipulate the
political component for their benefit and interests. The alleged “party disloyalty” of Cong. Camasura, as
a reason for his removal from the party, when he voted in favor of Bondoc, undermines the
independence of the HRET. Such members of the HRET have security of tenure. They can only be
replaced in cases of term expiration, death, permanent disability, resignation from the party. Disloyalty is
not a valid cause of termination.
The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been
disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was
null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore,
respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s
choice. Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the
Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying
petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending
finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions
or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was
not the issue.
With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was ruled that such is a power vested in
the Congress as they deem it proper taking into consideration the proportionate numbers of the members
of the Commission of Appointment members as to their political affiliations. However, with their
reorganization, this affected a third party's right which they rejected as its result. To correct this, the
Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn
over the office in contention.
NO. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House
of Representatives. BB is not a bona fide member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid
proclamation.. When BB took her oath of office before respondent Speaker DD in open session, BB
had no valid COC NOR a valid proclamation. In view of the foregoing, BB has absolutely no legal basis
to serve as a Member of the House of Representatives, and therefore, she has no legal personality to be
recognized as a party-respondent at a proceeding before the HRET.
In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. the HRET committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for
his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. Since Pichay’s ineligibility existed on the day
he filed his certificate of candidacy and he was never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives, the votes cast for him were considered stray votes.
Yes. Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for
determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. The sum of $304,372.43
should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file any Statement of
Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined.
Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other
emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities." Likewise, under the
1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive during his tenure any other
emolument from the Government or any other source." In fact, his management of businesses, like the
administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973
Constitution.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Pranes 167 Estrada vs Arroyo Whether or not Estrada permanently unable to act as Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further Dismissed
President. proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto
case, praying for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President
of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
Pranes 168 Macalintal vs PET Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration reiterates his Dismissed
Tribunal is Constitutional. arguments that Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and that the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII
of the Constitution. In order to strengthen his position, petitioner cites the concurring
opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010 that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a public office
which cannot be created by the president, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with
Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive
Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in
the absence of an act of legislature.
Pranes 169 Pormento vs Estrada Whether or not Joseph Estrada is disqualified to run for Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification against former President Joseph Estrada Dismissed
presidency in the May 2010 elections according to the for being a presidential candidate in the May 2010 elections. The petition was denied by
phrase in the Constitution which states that "the President COMELEC second division and subsequently by COMELEC en banc. Pormento then filed
shall not be eligible for any re-election"? the present petition for certiorari before the Court. In the meantime, Estrada was able to
participate as a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the
second highest number of votes.
Pranes 170 Laurel vs Garcia Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Granted
have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the
property. Roppongi property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese government through
Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter
was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President
Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government
properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale,
lease or disposition.
Rivera 171 Marcos v. Manglapus Whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non- Dismissed
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has
Philippines. signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise
and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his
family. Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to
issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s
decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s
power to bar his return in the country. According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them
of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws.
They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6,
Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Rivera 172 Saguisag v. Ochoa Whether the President may enter into an executive EDCA or Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between the Dismissed
agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Philippines and America wherein it authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and
conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. After eight rounds of
negotiations for two years, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to
the Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S. Aquino III
ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's
understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. Senators file Senate Resolution No.
(SR) 105.91. The resolution expresses the "strong sense" of the Senators that for EDCA to
become valid and effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and
concurrence
Ratio Decidendi
Yes, Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution
to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise
that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s
claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made
by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
The Court reiterates that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission,
which drafted the present Constitution. With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated
to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the
task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise
thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of
law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court. We have previously declared that the
PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as
intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from
the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
No. There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent did not win the second time he
ran. The issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any re- election" will be premised on a person
second election as President. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation
of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections; the same is no longer true today.
Following the results of that election, private respondent was not elected President for the second time.
Thus, any discussion of his "re-election" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no
useful or practical purpose.
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will.
Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires
executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so
much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its
symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related
properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must
concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of
property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article
VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same
article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines
tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not
stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is
obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the
Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do
anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to
maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not expressly granted by the law, is justified
by necessity and limited only by law, since the President must "take necessary and proper steps to carry
into execution the law”. It is the President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for
Philippine defense interests (commander-in-chief powers). EDCA is considered an executive agreement,
therefore may be bound through the President without the need of senatorial votes for its execution. The
right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Rivera 173 Funa v. Ermita Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena Granted
OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had Communications (DOTC). Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime
been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006. On
against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T.
their deputies and assistants. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator,
MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. On October 21, 2008, Dennis
A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant
petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista's appointment/designation, which is
proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.
Rivera 174 Funa v. Agra Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Petitioner alleges that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was appointed by the president to be the Acting Granted
Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of Secretary of Justice and that Agra was also aubsequently appointed as Acting Solicitor
Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional General in concurrent capacity. Respondent has a diferrent story, he alleged that he was
prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the Members assigned to be the Acting Solicitor General first then was subsequently assigned to be the
of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants Acvting Secretary of Justice. Agra also alleged that he relinquished his position as Acting
Solicitor General but kept performing his duties until his successor was appointed.
Nothwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted
to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for
puposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.
Rivera 175 De Castro v. JBC Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming Denied
next Chief Justice compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering
that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position
of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination
through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG
contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments
Rivera 176 Velicaria-Garafil v. OP Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, in thepresent
The Supreme Court.
consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty. Cheloy the petitions in G.R. Nos. 203372, 206290, and 212030 are
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution E. Velicaria-Garafil, who was appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor DENIED, and the petition in G.R. No. 209138 is
General, as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza, who was DISMISSED. The appointments of petitioners Atty. Cheloy
appointed Prosecutor IV of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A. E. Velicaria-Garafil (G.R. No. 203372), Atty. Dindo G.
Villanueva , who was appointed Administrator for Visayas of the Board of Administrators Venturanza (G.R. No. 206290), Irma A. Villanueva, and
of the Cooperative Development Authority, and Francisca B. Rosquita, who was appointed Francisca B. Rosquita (G.R. No. 209138), and Atty. Eddie
Commissioner of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples, as petitioners; and G.R. U. Tamondong (G.R. No. 212030) are declared VOID.
No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong, who was appointed member of the Board of
Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, as petitioner. Prior to the conduct of the
May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800
appointments to various positions in several government offices. The ban on midnight
appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety. Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the
cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban
on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an
exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety." None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception. On
30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO
2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo
which violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
Ratio Decidendi
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office. On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Sec. 7. Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Thus, the Court ruled these sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his
official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such
as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces,
are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by
itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
According to the Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions: (1) those provided for
under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice Presided to become a
member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article
VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as ewquires by the
primary functions of the officials’ offices. The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General
are not related or necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that the
nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public
policy, for one person to retain both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the
declaration of Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as
the Acting Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the
Constitution.
Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the
Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of
the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect
their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article
VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the
Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and
16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written
the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as
both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the
authority; The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution
and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that
appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. (2) transmittal
of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; It is not enough that the President signs the
appointment paper. There should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be
issued. It could happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months
before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the
appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its
issuance. (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and
acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking
the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a
public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. Petitioners have failed to show
compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their
appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand,
petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Rivera 177 Manalo v. Sistosa Whether or not the appointments made by the President Petitioners question the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments issued Dismissed
were valid even without the confirmation of Commission on by former President Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the Philippine
Appointments National Police who were promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director
without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation
under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act 6975 otherwise
known as the Local Government Act of 1990. On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975
creating the Department of Interior and Local Government was signed into law by former
President Corazon C. Aquino. In accordance therewith, on March 10, 1992, the President of
the Philippines, through then Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, promoted the fifteen
(15) respondent police officers herein, by appointing them to positions in the Philippine
National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The appointments of
respondent police officers were in a permanent capacity. Without their names submitted to
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, the said police officers took their oath
of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and
Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements
for their salaries and other emoluments.
Rivera 178 Hontiveros-Baraquel v. TollRegulatory Board Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created on 31 March 1977 by Presidential Decree Dismissed
operate a toll facility No. (P.D.) 1112 in order to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government, the
collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private sector. On the same
date, P.D. 1113 was issued granting to the Construction and Development Corporation of
the Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Corporation or PNCC) the right,
privilege, and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and
South Luzon Toll Expressways for a period of 30 years starting 1 May 1977. TRB and
PNCC later entered into a Toll Operation Agreement, which prescribed the operating
conditions of the right granted to PNCC under P.D. 1113. On 27 November 1995, the
Republic of the Philippines through the TRB as Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC
as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) covering Stage 1,
Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Under the STOA,
the design and construction of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege
and responsibility of CMMTC. The operation and maintenance of the project roads became
the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of the PNCC Skyway Corporation
(PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC, which undertook and performed the latter's
obligations under the STOA. On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed Amendment to the Supplemental Toll
Operation Agreement (ASTOA). Under the ASTOA, Skyway O & M Corporation
(SOMCO) replaced PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the
South Metro Manila Skyway. Petitioners argue that the franchise for toll operations was
exclusively vested by P.D. 1113 in PNCC, which exercised the powers under its franchise
through PSC in accordance with the STOA.
Rivera 179 Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the Granted
TanonStrait, et al v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al 1987 Philippine Constitution and statutes toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in
and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza
Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the
Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned
marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to
protect the Tañon Strait, among others. On June 13, 2002, the Government of the
Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical
studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and
reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted
geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait. On
December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the
exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. JAPEX committed to drill
one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. On March 6, 2007, the
EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and
gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX
began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in
the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008. The petitioners
insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Ratio Decidendi
Yes. Appointments are valid. PNP, herein respondents, do not fall under the first category of presidential
appointees requiring the confirmation by Commission on Appointments. Section 116 Article VII provide
for four groups of government to be appointed by President: First, the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth,
officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. It is well-
settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first
category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Congress cannot by law expand
the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution.
TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility. In Francisco v. TRB, the court held: It is
abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of P.D. 1894 have
invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to construct,
maintain, and operate a toll facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC. First,
there is nothing in P.D. 1113 or P.D. 1894 that states that the franchise granted to PNCC is to the
exclusion of all others. Second, if we were to go by the theory of petitioners, it is only the operation and
maintenance of the toll facilities that is vested with PNCC. This interpretation is contrary to the wording
of P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894 granting PNCC the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and
maintain the North Luzon, South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways and their toll facilities. Third,
aside from having been granted the power to grant administrative franchises for toll facility projects,
TRB is also empowered to modify, amend, and impose additional conditions on the franchise of PNCC
in an appropriate contract, particularly when public interest calls for it.
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987
Constitution. In La Bugal, the Court held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987
Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, portions of the deliberations of the
members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4,
Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973
Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial
law regime. In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, the Court established that paragraph
4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following
are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal: Such service contracts may be entered into only
with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several
safeguards, among which are these requirements: (1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance
with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to
attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country. (2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at
different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny. (3) Within thirty days
of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of government an
opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.69cralawlawlibrary.
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, the Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Rivera 180 Kulayan v. Tan Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped Granted
powers of President? in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and
Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu
Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail
when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis
Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping
incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail
Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of
2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the
power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and
calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress
disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF
to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including
arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et
al. contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires,
and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out
powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Decision Ratio Decidendi
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President
of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive
power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive,
who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the
Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII
thereof. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that
civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s
supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is
that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The
Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as
Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy.
Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts;
but the ultimate power is his. Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call
upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded
his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon Armed Forces, the police, and his
own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive
to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and
may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

Santos 181 Ampatuan vs Puno Wheter or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised
emergency powers when she called out the AFP and PNP
to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in
Maguindano, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
Santos 182 Fortun vs Arroyo Whether or not the Presidential Proclamation of Martial Law
and suspension of the privelege of Habeas Corpus in 2009
in Central Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight
days is constitutional
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Dismissed
Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City
of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake
such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress
all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO
273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG.
She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer”
used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by
the DILG).
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, Moot and Academic; Political Issue; Dismissed
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on
November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of
emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress
similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from
large groups of persons that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the
province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959
declaring... martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that
province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President's action. But, two days
later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao.
The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise
extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in
such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising
the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise
the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly... since, after the President has initiated the
proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of
the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the
Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is... automatic rather than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should
the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation
of martial law or... suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of
Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in
fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and
the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and... restoration of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy

Santos 183 Lagman vs Medialdea Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
privelege of writ of habeas corpus of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress
on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the Constitution).
The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi
City. According to the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to
establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other
parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued
Mindanao for decades.
Yes In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers
only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration.
The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and
information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.
The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending
to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a
declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with
neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof.

As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus
without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter
asserted.

The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these
alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual
rebellion exists.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision Ratio Decidendi
Santos 184 Monsantos vs Factoran Jr. Whether or not public officer, who has been granted an The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of No The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
appointment? the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending,
she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that
time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her
former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred
to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute
pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out
the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and
therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that
she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary
Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment
and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.
Santos 185 Rosa-Vidal vs Comelec Whether or not former President Joseph Estrada run for On Sep 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the crime of plunder with the penalty of Yes Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
public office despite having been convicted of the crime of reclusion perpetua and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the
plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual and perpetual absolute disqualification. pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
disqualification to hold public office? unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
On Oct 2007, President Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon to Estrada constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36
thereby restoring his civil and political right upon which Estrada received and accepted. and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

On Nov 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of President and has
earned 3 oppositions in the COMELEC. In 2012 Estrada filed a COC vying for the position
of Manila City Mayor. Then, Risos-Vidal, petitioner, filed a petition for disqualification
against Estrada.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the
Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government
Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of
the term “civil and political rights”as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an
essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word “whereas.” Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute
because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the
whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by
itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the
fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s
right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by
former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the
second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as
the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

Santos 186 Saguisag vs Ochoa Jr. Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND Yes
Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines SET - ASIDE its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING
and the United States of America (U.S.) constitutional the instant consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the
United States of America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently
enjoin its implementation.
petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In
connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to
comply with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate
their arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]
Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed
in" to refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that
the plain meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign
bases, troops, and facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply
applied the plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once
entry has been established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be
embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the Constitution did not state that foreign military
bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines.
The EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been authorized under a
valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the VFA along
with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion that an
executive agreement such as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both
treaties.
Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines'
legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued policy to
enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise. This
Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the
Decision.
Principles:
On verba legis interpretation... verba legis
Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an absurdity,
which legal construction strictly abhors.
The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be
construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning
With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial entry"
mentioned above ventured into a construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language and meaning of the said constitutional
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Santos 187 Bayan vs Exec Secretary Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement No
unconstitutional called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the
Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the
concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S.
and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel
and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”
Santos 188 Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the principle of Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) No
separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress dated July 30, 2010.
to create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions; PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task
to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-
judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
Santos 189 Chavez vs. JBC performing
Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise In its functions.
1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two Yes
of the power of judicial review have been met. representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then,
the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the
controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two
houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its
substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of
choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Santos 190 Jardeleza vs. Sereno Whether or not the right to due process is available in the Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) Yes
course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H.
opposition to an application is raised. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of
candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.
However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno,
will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in
question.
During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized
Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided
that due process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the
shortlist.
Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC
to include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse
of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to
qualify for the position.
Sulit 191 Villanueva vs JBC W/N the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as Petitioner applied for a position as a judge in a second level court but JBC did not include Yes
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as his name in the list of applicants since he failed to qualify. This is because the JBC put
applicant to second-level courts is constitutional priority to incumbent judges who served their position for at least five years and petitioner
hereonly served as judged for more than a year. The petitioner assailed, inter alia, the
authority of the JBC to add another qualification (5-year-qualitification) because thesaid
qualification was already prescribed
Ratio Decidendi
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must
have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he
has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these
conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch
of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he
is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case
is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief
Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC
likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard,
the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast
number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More
importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus
of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object
of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate an
applicant’s entitlement to due process.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding
being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process
neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment
on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process
supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth
of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of
the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of
information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its
assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged
complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount
is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist
submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose
from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the
JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
The said added 5-year-qualification being assailed by the petitioner is constitutional since as stated in the
Sect. 8 (5), Art.VIII, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary. Consequently, it
was also stated in the said provision thatonly the persons nominated by the JBC is transmitted to the
president that will choose whom to nominate as judge in the judiciary.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision
Sulit 192 RE: COAopinion on the computation of the appraised W/N COA’s interference, in this case, violates the Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) found that an Yes
value of the properties purchased by the retired Chief / judiciary’s autonomy. underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five retired Supreme Court justices
associate justices of the supreme court A.M. NO. 11-7- purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their
10-SC JULY 31, 2012 incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property
Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the
purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the
subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint
Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En
Banc in A.M. No. 03- 12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA
Memorandum No. 98-569-A4. Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief
Administrative Officer, recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house
computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA
questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its
guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in
1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two retired Court of Appeals
Associate Justices, the COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the
formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the
Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources.
Sulit 193 RE: Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, W/N the said provision is applicable to members of the Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. No
Rule III of RA NO 10154, Requiring retiring government judiciary (RA) 101541 states that: Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek
employees to secure a clearance of pendency/non- Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from his/her employer
pendency of case/s from the Civi Service Commission agency, Civil Service Commission (CSC),Office of the Ombudsman, or in case of
presidential appointees, from the Office of the President.
Sulit 194 RE: Save the SC judicial independence and fiscal W/N petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to No
autonomy movement v abolition of judiciary grounds for this court to grant the petition and issue a writ compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the
development fund(JDF) and reduction of fiscal of mandamus. perceived hostility of Congress. In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino
autonomy UDK-15143, Jan. 21, 2015 citizen, and a concerned taxpayer. He filed this petition as part of his "continuing crusade to
defend and uphold the Constitution" because he believes in the rule of law. He is concerned
about the threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development
Assistance Fund. The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the
President after the promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence.
Petitioner argues that Congress "gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of
judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court. Petitioner points out that
Congress is exercising its power "in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility by abolishing the ‘Judiciary Development Fund’ (JDF) of the Supreme
Court. With regard to his prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, petitioner avers
that Congress should not act as "wreckers of the law" by threatening "to clip the powers of
the High Tribunal[.]" Congress committed a "blunder of monumental proportions" when it
reduced the judiciary’s 2015 budget. Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to
"REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing
laws affecting the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the
Constitution to better serve public interest and general welfare of the people."
Sulit 195 RE: Petition for recognition of exemption of the GSIS W/N the legislature can exempt the GSIS from legal fees The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under Sec No
from payment of legal fees 612 SCRA 193 (2010) imposed by the Court on GOCCs and local government 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the ROC. The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its
units charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997) Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the
OSG maintains that the petition should be denied. On this Court’s order, the Office of the
Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on the petition of the GSIS
and the comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for
exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis.
Sulit 196 Cayetano v Monsod W/N the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the No
violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Constitution? Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman
of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and
void.
Ratio Decidendi
The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal
autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority,
however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the
constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on
these matters. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and
availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches
upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to
manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.
Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in the Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.3 As such, it oversees the court
personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative action against them for any
violation thereof. The requirement of seeking a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative
Case from the Civil Service Commission embodied in Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 10154 is declared INAPPLICABLE to retiring employees of the
Judiciary
The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations.
Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of
the case. The requisites are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. The court held that there is no actual case or controversy and that the
petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill.
The GSIS is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its individual
members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely
and are not shared by its members. More importantly, the Congress could not have carved out an
exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important
institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence — fiscal autonomy. Legal fees therefore do not only
constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the
Court’s fiscal independence. The 1987 Constitution also took away the power of Congress to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). In the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, the Court said that, Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Sulit 197 Gaminde v COA W/N the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as The President appointed petitioner Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she Commission. The Commission on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines confirmed
was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, the appointment. On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the
1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief
02, 2000, as claimed by her. Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998, opined that petitioner's term of
office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on, February 02, 1999. Relying on said
advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,
1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon; wrote the Commission on Audit requesting
opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may
be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February
02,1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an
opinion that "the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as
stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent." Consequently, on
March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance
disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus
staff, effective February 02, 1999. Petitioner appealed the disallowance but the Commission
on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner's
term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper
which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the Commission was bereft of
power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the
Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999,
the Commission on Audit denied the motion in Decision No. 99-129.
Sulit 198 Brillantes v Yorac W/N the President may designate the Acting Chairman of The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the
the COMELEC in the absence of the regular Chairman. Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named
chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat
attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional
provision that ensures the independence the Commission on Elections as an independent
constitutional body and the specific provision that “(I)n no case shall any Member (of the
Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”
Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections
is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the
intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. The Solicitor
General the designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be
sustained for reasons of “administrative expediency,” to prevent disruption of the functions
of the COMELEC.
Sulit 199 CSC v DBM W/N DBM’s policy of “No Report, No Release” is CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its
constitutional budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the
extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. General Appropriation Act of 2002
(GAA) appropriated total funds to the CSC but they claimed that there is an unreleased
balance. To CSC, this balance was intentionally withheld by DBM on the basis of its no
report, no release policy. DBM proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance of
CSC budget was not on account of any failure on CSC part to submit the required reports;
rather, it was due to a shortfall in revenues. Moreover, DBM contends that CSC did not
exhaust administrative remedies as it could have sought clarification from DBM Secretary
regarding the extent of fiscal autonomy before resorting to Court. Second, even assuming
that administrative remedies were exhausted, there are no exceptional and compelling
reasons to justify the direct filing of the petition with Supreme Court instead of the trial
court, thus violating the hierarchy of courts.
Sulit 200 Funa v Duque W/N the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Then president GMA issued EO 864 which allows tge chairman of the CSC to be in the
Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC board of trustees/directors of certain GOCCs. Funa asserts that EO 864 and Section 14,
and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the independence of the CSC, which was
independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and political pressures due
prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices to the significance of its government functions. He further asserts that such independence is
for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions violated by the fact that the CSC is not a part of the Executive Branch of Government while
the concerned GOCCs are considered instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the
Government. In this situation, the President may exercise his power of control over the CSC
considering that the GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member are attached to the
Executive Department. Funa claims that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book
V of EO 292 violate the prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions
from holding any other office or employment. A conflict of interest may arise in the event
that a Board decision of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning personnel-
related matters is elevated to the CSC considering that such GOCCs have original charters,
and their employees are governed by CSC laws, rules and regulations. Respondents submit
that the prohibition against holding any other office or employment under Section 2, Article
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution does not cover positions held without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities.
Suwalawan 201 Sarmiento v Comelec Whether or not the Commission on Elections en banc may Petitioners impugned the challenged resolutions of the Commission on Elections in pre-
Suwalawan 202 Ambil v Comelec Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review On 04 Jun 1998, respondent Jose Ramirez filed an election protest with the COMELEC
decisions of the COMELEC. challenging the result of the 11 May 1998 elections where petitioner Ruperto Ambil, Jr. was
proclaimed the duly-elected governor of Eastern Samar. On 24 Feb 2000, Commissioner
Japal Guidani retired from the service prior to the finalization of his proposed resolution in
the Ramirez protest. In said resolution, Commissioner Julio Desamito had dissented while
Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco did not indicate her vote.
Decision
Her appointment expired on February 02, 1999, but is
entitled to received her salary and other emoluments
No
No
Yes. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares
unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an
ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
No
Yes
Ratio Decidendi
The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an
appointment extended to her expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in
good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for
actual service rendered. The terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in
the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first
terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval
between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the
appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions
under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987
Constitution. In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and "tenure."
"The term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time
during the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent
actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter
than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent." We thus see the regular interval
of vacancy every two (2) years, namely, February 02, 1994, for the first Chairman, February 02, 1992,
for the first five-year term Commissioner, and February 02, 1990, for the first three-year term
Commissioner. Their successors must also maintain the two year interval, namely: February 02, 2001,
for Chairman; February 02, 1999, for Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, and February 02, 1997, for
Commissioner Ramon P. Ereñeta, Jr.||
The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” They are not
under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each
of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in
the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on
certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the
absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it,
even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The lack of a statutory rule covering the
situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the
temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by the
members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President.
DBM’s policy of “No Report, No Release” may not be validly enforced against offices possessing
fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which states: The
Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically
and regularly released. It is under such situation that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to
automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed. Their approved appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in
the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. .Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally
not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch, hence when the CSC
Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he
may exercise powers and functions which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman
Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides that election cases include pre-
Article IX-A, Section 7 provides that any decision, order or ruling of each commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof. The Court interpreted the provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The decision must be a
final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, not a division, certainly not an interlocutory order
of a division.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision Ratio Decidendi
Suwalawan 203 Brillantes v comelec Whether or not COMELEC may conduct “unofficial” Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election No The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election results based on
tabulation of presidential election results based on a copy of system for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results a copy of the election results, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the
the election returns. of national and local elections. COMELEC subsequently approved Resolution 6712 election of President and Vice-President.
adopting the policy that the precint election results of each city and municipality shall be
immediately transmitted electronically in advance to the COMELEC in Manila. Petitioners
questioned the constitutionality of the quickcount as being preemptive of the authority
vested in Congress to canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President under Article
VII, Section 4 of the Constitutuion.
Suwalawan 204 Sandoval v comelec whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the No its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due
proclamation was valid. Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that
canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it
petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations.
day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of
petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec
Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district
board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal
order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass,
which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc
issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as
void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec
order.
Suwalawan 205 Al haj v comelec Whether or not the grounds assailed by the petitioners Petitioner assail the resolution of the Commission on elections en banc dismissing their Dismissed Under Article 1, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly states the only three instances
constitute grounds for declaration of failure of election. petition to declare a failure of elections in the Municipality of Munai, Province of Lanao del wherein a failure of election may be validly declared are when: 1) the election in any polling places has
Norte. In their petition, petitioners Tawantawan M. caruntongan and Nasser Manalao, not been held on the date fixed in account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
candidates for Municipal Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively, enumerated the following as analogous causes; 2) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law
grounds for declaration of failure of election: 1.Massive vote buying; 2.Illegal assignment of for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
Rakim Paute as Election Officer of Munai; 3.Appointment of disqualified BEIs; 4.Shoot-out causes, or 3) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
on the eve of the election between unidentified armed men and members of the Philippine custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
Army escorting election forms and paraphernalia in barangay Cadulawan; 5.Transfer of violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases. This enumeration is exclusive and restrictive. It
polling places without notice; 6.Absence of voting booths in barangay Tambo and limits the power of the Commission to annul the results of an election only to those instances where the
cadulawan; and 7.Non-signing of the Voter’s Registration Form. The COMELEC dismissed election is not held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect. The latter phrase should be understood
the petition because the grounds relied upon are not those which constitute grounds for in its literal sense, which is, nobody was elected. Moreover, the irregularities pointed out by the
declaration of failure of election. petitioners such as vote-buying, fraud, and terrorism are grounds for an election contest and may not, as
a rule, be invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the greater number of electorate
through the misdeeds, precisely, of only relative few.
Suwalawan 206 General v Roco Whether or not a CES eligibility is sufficient to acquire Respondent Ramon S. Roco was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos on 26 Aug No Two requisites must concur in order for an employee in the career executive service may attain security
security of tenure. 1996 as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office in Region V, a position of tenure: CES eligibility and appointment ot the appropriate CES rank.
equivalent to CES rank Level V. He was re-appointed to the same position by then President
Joseph Estrada. From his appointment in 1996, respondent was not a CES eligible and was
only conferred CES eligibility by the Career Executive Board on 13 Aug 1999. On 07 Sep
1999, petitioner Luis Mario General, who was not a CES eligible, was appointed by then
President Estrada as Regional Director of LTO-V. Pursuant thereto, DOTC Undersecretary
Herminio B. Coloma, Jr., as officer-in-charge of the department, issued a memorandum
directing petitioner General to assume the said office immediately and for respondent Roco
to report to the Office of the Secretary.
Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Suwalawan 207 CSC v salas Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee. On 07 Oct 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR chairman as internal
security staff member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His
employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on 03 Dec 1991,
allegedly for loss of confidence.
Suwalawan 208 Office of the ombudsman v CSC Whether or not de Jesus’ appointment may be properly On 31 Jul 2002, Melchor Arthur Carandang, Paul Elmer Clemente, and Jose Tereso de Yes
changed from temporary status to permanent despite non- Jesus, Jr. were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of the Office of the Ombudsman.
compliance with the eligibility requirement for the position The Civil Service Commission approved such appointments on the condition that
of Graft Investigation Officer III. appointees must obtain CES or CSE eligibility to acquire security of tenure. Carandang and
Clemente had been conferred with CSE eligibility on 06 Jun 2003.
Suwalawan 209 Vistan v nicolas Whether or not respondent judge engaged in electioneering Complainant Leonila Vistan alleged that as early as 10 Feb 1987, prior to the start of the
while still an MTC judge. campaign period, and while still an MTC judge, respondent Ruben Nicolas started
circulating handbills/letters addressed to electoral constitutents in the second district of
Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a congressional seat.
Suwalawan 210 Domingo v zamora whether EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid. On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No. 813
(EO 81 for brevity) entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and
Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports. Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS
Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales (Secretary Gonzales for brevity) issued Memorandum No.
01592 on January 10, 2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the
exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the
DECS effective March 15, 2000.On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued
Memorandum No. 01594 reassigning the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various
offices within the DECS effective March 15, 2000. Petitioners were among the BPESS
personnel affected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with their reassignment,
petitioners filed the instant petition. petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional
for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the Presidents
issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners also challenge
the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure.Petitioners seek to nullify
EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 9155
(RA 9155 for brevity), otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001,
was enacted on August 11, 2001. RA 9155 expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred
the functions, programs and activities of the DECS relating to sports competition to the
Suwalawan 211 OP v Buenaobra Whether or not respondent being a presidential appointee The Office of the Ombudsman’s Special Prosecution Officer filed an information against
PSC.
and a holder of a non-career service postion could be Nita Buenaobra, chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino, with the Sandiganbayan for
removed from service at the pleasure of the President. violation of Section 4(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for allegedly causing undue injury to the
government through gross inexcusable negligence in connection with the unauthorized
reprinting of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino. The Sandiganbayan ordered a
reinvestigation while the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) conducted a parallel
administrative investigation against respondent charging her with the same acts and
ommissions subject of the Sandiganbayan case. On 11 Apr 2003, petitioner adopted
PAGC’s recommendation and dismissed respondent from office.
Untalan 212 Capablanca v. CSC Whether or not the CSC can conduct an investigation Eugenio Capablanca was appointed into the PNP with the position of PO1 with temporary
regarding the irregularity of Capablanca’s CSP-CAT. status. He passed both the PNP Entrance Examination conducted by the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) and the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer
Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) he was
subsequently conferred permanent status. The CSC conducted an investigation because of
irregularities regarding Capablanca’s CSP-CAT. Capablanca averred that only the
NAPOLCOM had sole authority to conduct police entrance exams.
Untalan 213 DBP v. COA 231 SCRA 202 Whether or not COA is allowed to conduct post-audit. DBP conducted a public bidding for one unit of uninterruptible power supply (UPS).
Thereafter, DBP issued Purchase Order No. 0137 to Voltronics for P1,436,539.25 inclusive
of customs duties and taxes. COA sent a notice to the chairman of DBP notifying him of the
disallowance of the amount representing customs duties and taxes and at the same time
holding him, along with other petitioners, jointly and severally liable for the aforementioned
sum. They submit the contrary on the ground that the transaction in question had already
been approved and passed in audit in accordance with the pre-audit system then obtaining
and the later circular requiring post-audit should not be applied retroactively
Untalan 214 Bustamante v. COA Whether or not such denial to give due course to the appeal Benito Bustamante, Regional Legal Counsel for the National Power Corporation (NPC). No. The denial to give due course does not constitute grave COA Circular No. 75-6 prohibited the use of government vehicles by officials provided with
of Bustamante constitutes grave abuse of discretion Pursuant to NPC policy, in addition to the use of a government vehicle, Bustamante claimed abuse of discretion.
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. On May 31, 1990, he received
an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable dated April 17, 1990 from Regional Auditor Martha
Roxana Caburian disallowing P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation allowance.
Bustamante moved for reconsideration but was denied due course.
Untalan 215 DBP v. COA GR 88435 Whether or not the Constitution vests in the COA the sole After learning that the DBP had signed a contract with a private auditing firm for calendar
and exclusive power to examine and audit government year 1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP Chairman that the COA resident auditors
banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external were under instructions to disallow any payment to the private auditor whose services were
auditors under any circumstance unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary. On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the
COA Chairman a copy of the DBP's contract with Joaquin Cunanan& Co., signed four
months earlier on March 5, 1987. The DBP Chairman's covering handwritten note sought
the COA’s concurrence to the contract. During the pendency of the DBP Chairman's note-
request for concurrence, the DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount
of P487,321.14 despite the objection of the COA. On October 30, 1987, the COA
Chairman issued a Memorandum disallowing the payments, and holding the following
persons personally liable for such payment.
Decision Ratio Decidendi
No t is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technical. The occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential
employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latter’s
belief that he can share a close relationship with the occupant. Where the position occupied is remote
from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant.
Under P.D.No. 807, Section 9(h) which authorizes the CSC to approve appointments to postitions in the
civil service, except those specified therein, its authority is limited only to whether or not the appointee
possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else. Third level eligibility is not
required for third level officials appointed by the Ombudsman in light of the provisions of the
Constitution vis a vis the Administrative Code of 1987.
Yes For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench, respondent
took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the statude of his office, and must be
pronounced guilty of gross misconduct, a clear violation of Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Dismissed We dismiss this petition for being moot and academic. As manifested by both petitioners and
respondents, the subsequent enactment of RA 9155 has rendered the issues in the present case moot
and academic. Since RA 9155 abolished the BPESS and transferred the DECS functions relating to
sports competition to the PSC, petitioners now admit that it is no longer plausible to raise any ultra vires
assumption by the PSC of the functions of the BPESS. Moreover, since RA 9155 provides that BPESS
personnel not transferred to the PSC shall be retained by the DECS, petitioners now accept that the law
explicitly protects and preserves their right to security of tenure.
No Non-career service personnel enjoy security of tenure. They may not be removed without just cause and
observance of due process.
Yes. The CSC can conduct an investigation. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish a career service,
to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and
integrity in the civil service. Jurisprudence has held that Appointees to Police Officer and Senior Police
Officer positions in the Philippine National Police must have passed any of the following examinations:
a) PNP Entrance Examination; b) Police Officer 3rd Class Examination; and c) CSC Police Officer
Entrance Examination. The CSC is mandated to conduct the qualifying entrance examination (CSC
Police Officer Entrance Examination) for Police Officer 1.
Yes. COA can conduct post-audit. While it is true that the applicable procedure in force at the time of the questioned transaction was COA
Circular 86-257 requiring a pre-audit, there is nothing to preclude COA from conducting a post-audit of
the already pre-audited transaction. Article IX (D) Section 2(1) of the Constitution expressly grants
respondent Commission the power to conduct a post-audit.
transportation allowance. This includes the NPC which Bustamante avers is not mentioned in the said
circular. Said circular was within the powers of the COA provided by the Constitution.
No. COA does not have the sole and exclusive power to The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2, Article IX-D is that the
examine and audit government banks so as to prohibit COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's authority to define
concurrent audit by private external auditors under any the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures
circumstance. is exclusive. As the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA's findings
and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government
agencies and officials are concerned. The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies
does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is
neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual
examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their
officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the
usual scrutiny of a COA audit.
 Incharge Item Case Issue Facts Decision Ratio Decidendi
Untalan 216 Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal Rufino Nuñez assailed the validity of P.D. 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan does not violate The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan,
protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. P.D. 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan for estafa through falsification of equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the
public documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in public service.
several cases.
Untalan 217 Roxas v. Vasquez Whether or not the Court may review or interfere with the Manuel C. Roxas was the Chairman, while Ahmed S. Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Yes. The Court may interfere with the prosecutorial Ordinarily, the Court will not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there
prosecutorial prerogative of the Ombudsman. Awards Committee of the PC-INP who invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire prerogative of the Ombudsman. exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probable
trucks. The COA subsequently discovered that while the disbursement voucher indicated guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. However,
the bid price has discrepancy. DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for the Court found that the case at bar falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule, more
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against Roxas and Nacpil. specifically, the constitutional rights of the accused are impaired and the charges are manifestly false. In
cases where the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor were unable to agree on whether or not
probable cause exists, the Court may interfere with the findings and conclusions.

Untalan 218 People v. Velez Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated Section 27 of
Republic Act 6770 when it treated the "Joint Motion for
Reconsideration/ Reinvestigation" of Velez as a motion for
reconsideration under Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 and
when it granted the "Motion to Withdraw Information" filed
by the Office of the Ombudsman and dismissed the
Criminal Case.
Ignacio Salmingo filed an affidavit-criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against Edwin Velez, mayor of Silay City, et al. for violation of R.A. 3019. After finding
probable cause, Ombudsman recommended the filing of information against the
malefactors. Velez filed with the Sandiganbayan a joint motion for reconsideration which
was granted.
No. The Sandiganbayan did not violate R.A. 6770 or AN
ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND
STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Records show that when the Office of the Ombudsman approved the resolution prepared by the Graft
Investigator, the Information was filed prematurely against the respondents. The Office of the
Ombudsman must have realized this when Velez et al. filed with the Sandiganbayan their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation and thus agreed to treat the Motion as a motion for reconsideration
under Sec 27 of RA 6770. By its agreement, the Office of the Ombudsman merely corrected itself when
it denied the motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation filed by Velez with the Office of the Ombudsman
on the sole ground that the Information had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the
Ombudsman is vested under the Constitution with investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Said office,
through the Special Prosecutor, has direct control over the prosecution of the case. The Office of the
Ombudsman merely exercised its investigatory and prosecutorial powers.

Untalan 219 Ledesma v. CA Whether or not the Ombudsman has encroached into the An investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the No. The Ombudsman has not encroached into the power of The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The
power of the Bureau of Immigration over immigration Temporary Resident Visas of two foreign nationals. Graft Investigator resolved the the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters. Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on complaints
matters. administrative case suspending petitioner for a year. The criminal case was dismissed. filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the government, or any of its subdivisions,
agency or instrumentality.
Untalan 220 Ombudsman v. Madriaga Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to Article XI, Section 13 of the Constitution grants petitioner administrative disciplinary powers to
authority to impose administrative sanctions over public charging Gertudes Madriaga with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI impose administrative sanctions over public officials. investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
officials. of the rules implementing R.A. 6713. employee, office or agent, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient, and direct the officer concerned to take appropriate actions against a public official or
employee at fault and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution and
ensure compliance therewith.
Untalan 221
Yapchiongco 222 Caoibes v. Ombudsman Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer Judge Jose Caoibes, Jr. and Florentino Alumbres were embroiled in an altercation resulting Yes, Under Section C, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with
action on the criminal complaint pending resolution of the to the latter filing before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for physical exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Ombudsman cannot determine
Supreme Court for appropriate action injuries, malicious mischief and assault upon a person in authority against the former. for itself and by itself whether a crminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves
Alumbres also filed an administrative case against Caoibes with the Supreme Court. administrative matter.

Yapchiongco 223 Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the authority to Zaldivar sought to restrain Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from proceeding Under the Constitution, the Special Prosecutor is a mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan and can
conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of with the prosecution and hearing of criminal cases were filed by said Tanodbayan without investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan legal and constitutional authority. initiate the prosecution cases but only conduct the same if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman.

Yapchiongco 224 Orap v. Sandiganbayan Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation of a complaint charging
a municipal judge and his clerk of court with violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and, upon a finding of
prima facie case, proceed to file the corresponding
information before the Sandiganbayan and prosecute the
same.
Three informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor
Rodolfo B. Aquino, charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Court of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The information, duly approved by Hon. Juan A. Sison, then Chief Special Prosecutor
of the Tanodbayan, were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. SB-020, 021 and 022. Likewise
charged under Criminal Case No. 020 was Melanio B. Fernandez, petitioner's Clerk of
Court. The fourth information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-189, was filed against
petitioner, also for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The gravamen of all
these charges was to the effect that the accused on different occasions unlawfully and
feloniously received and took various sums of money from several persons in connection
with Criminal Case No. 2032 of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem entitled, "People vs.
Pepito F. Iglesias", for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, serious physical
injuries and damage to property. Before his scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed a motion
to quash the informations on the ground that the officer who signed the same had no
authority to do so and that, corollarily, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over
the offenses charged. After due hearing, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion to
quash. Petitioner verbally moved for the reconsideration of the order but the relief sought
was denied.
Hence, the instant recourse.
The respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that the Tanodbayan has such authority. The Tanodbayan
functions not only as an ombudsman, but as prosecutor as well. As ombudsman, his investigatory
powers are limited to complaints initiated against officers and personnel of administrative agencies, as
defined in Section 9(a) of the law. As prosecutor, however, the authority of the Tanodbayan is primary
and without exceptions. His powers are defined in Sections 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607.
Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term, confers upon the Tanodbayan, through the Chief Special
Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors, the exclusive authority to "conduct preliminary investigation of
all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases therein." If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court personnel lie
outside the investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee could ever be
brought to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of proper officer
or entity authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation on complaints of such nature against them.
This absurd situation the law could never have intended, considering that the Office of the Tanodbayan
was purposely created to "give effect to the constitutional right of the people to petition the government
for redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity and efficiency in the government
service."
The informations in question have complied with the substantial and formal requirements of the law.
They carry the certification of the investigating prosecutor as to the existence of a prima facie case. They
also bear the approval of the Chief Special Prosecutor, as required by Section 11 of PD 1606.
As petitioner is charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which are within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, the said court validly
acquired jurisdiction over the informations in question.

Yapchiongco 225 Canonizado vs Aguirre Whether or Not petitioners were removed by virtue of The commissioners of NAPOLCOM were appointed separately, in various years and their No Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as a collegial body within the DILG. Whereas, RA
abolition terms had not expired at the time amendatory law RA 6975 was passed. RA 8551 declared 8551 made it an agency attached to the department for policy and program coordination. This does not
the terms of sitting commissioners upon its effectivity. result to a creation of a new office.
 Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Yapchiongco 226 Carino v CHR Whether or not, CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among
human rights violations them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School
Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook
“mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged
failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought
to the latter’s attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They
complained to CHR.
Yapchiongco 227 PBM Employees v. PBM Co. Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
the CBA? demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses
of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called
for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned
demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration
was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable
constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition
for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal
course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with
the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through
with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the
workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not
absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late
to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually
dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were
found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
Decision Ratio Decidendi
No, the Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of
finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of
Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the
teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory
powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law
to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to
such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on
the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their
human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious
in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only
"with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right
to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”
 Incharge Item Case Issue Facts
Yapchiongco 228 MMDA v. Viron Trans. Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional. To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President issued
Executive Order (E.O.) 179, ―Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass
Transportation System. As determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion
in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of
vehicles and commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes. To
decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up
with a recommendation, proposing the elimination of bus terminals located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares, and the construction of mass transport terminal facilties to
provide a more convenient access to mass transport system to the commuting public. The
project provided for under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila Transport System‖
(Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the
Metro Manila Council the governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full
support of the project. The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public
transportation with a provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp
Transportation System, Inc., assailed the constitutionality of E.O. 179 before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O., insofar as it permitted the closure of
existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of property without due process; that it
contravened the Public Service Act which mandates public utilities to provide and maintain
their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as common carriers; and that
Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order the closure
of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional. The MMDA argued
before the Court that there was no justiciable controversy in the case for declaratory relief
filed by the respondents; that E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to government
agencies to coordinate with the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that the
President has the authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179
was a valid exercise of police power.
Decision Ratio Decidendi
By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater Manila Transport System,” the
President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires.
Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President Aquino in her exercise of
legislative powers. This executive order reorganized the Ministry (now Department) of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), and defined its powers and functions. It mandated the DOTC to be the
primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity
to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority
to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for
transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is authorized to issue
such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective
implementation of the law. The President may also exercise the same power and authority to order the
implementation of the mass transport system project, which admittedly is one for transportation. Such
authority springs from the President‘s power of control over all executive departments as well as for the
faithful execution of the laws under the Constitution. Thus, the President, although authorized to
establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the
promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the
MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the mass transport system. By
designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the
limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. In the absence of a specific grant
of authority to it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus terminals
Republic Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-
wide services, including transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion has been
recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not granted police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision
in R.A. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to enact ordinances,
approveresolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. In
light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Greater Manila Transport System as envisioned by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have
been validly designated by the President to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot
validly order the elimination of respondents‘ terminals. Even assuming arguendo that police power was
delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid police power
measure: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires
its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the