Consolidated Case Digest

GROUP 3 - Benzon, Cadano, Dimapilis, Gonzales, Laguardia, Marcial, Mora, Pulido, Ternora
G.R. No. 140153 March 28, 2001
ANTONIO DOCENA and ALFREDA DOCENA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. RICARDO P. LAPESURA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch III,
Guian, Eastern Samar; RUFINO M. GARADO, Sheriff IV; and CASIANO HOMBRIA, respondents.
FACTS: On June 1, 1977, private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint .for the recovery of
a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners
claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since time immemorial.
A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. In a Decision dated November 24, 1989, the trial
court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. The trial court ruled in favor of the
petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. The CA reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the
petitioners to vacate the land they have leased from Casiano. The Complaint in Intervention of Abuda
was dismissed.
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in
issuing the Writ of Demolition.
ISSUE: Whether or not does require that the husband and the wife always act together in a joint
management or administration
RULING: Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband
and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both
spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband and wife
always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to
the intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is
believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal
property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached
certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
No justifiable reason why he may not lawfully undertake together with his wife to inform the court of
any similar action or proceeding which may be filed. Premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated June 18, 1999 and September 9, 1999
are hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 159889 June 5, 2008
WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA, petitioners,

vs.
FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA CHIONG, respondents.
FACTS: Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but
have been separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired Lot No. 997-D-1 situated
at Poblacion, Dipolog City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)-
2325, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold
the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners for P8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter,
Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house thereon. Shortly
after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986, petitioners demanded from respondents
the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
ISSUE: (1) Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents?
(2) Was its sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent valid?
RULING: (1) Petitioners' contention that the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino because of his
separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved their property relations, is bereft
of merit. Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced
Elisera's interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband
and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal
nature.
Likewise, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the spouses during the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Petitioners' mere insistence as to the lot's
supposed exclusive nature is insufficient to overcome such presumption when taken against all the
evidence for respondents.
(2) The sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is not, however, void ab initio. In Vda. de
Ramones v. Agbayani, citing Villaranda v. Villaranda, it was held that without the wife's consent, the
husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 149801 June 26, 2008
SPOUSES RENATO and FLORINDA DELA CRUZ, petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES GIL and LEONILA SEGOVIA, respondents.
FACTS: Sometime in July 1985, petitioner Florinda dela Cruz (Florinda) wanted to purchase two (2)
parcels of land located at Paltok Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, Lot 503 with an apartment unit erected
thereon and Lot 505 with a residential house. The two lots were being sold together for P180,000.00.
Inasmuch as Florinda had only P144,000.00 at hand, she asked her sister, respondent Leonila
Segovia (Leonila), to contribute P36,000.00 to complete the purchase price. The sisters agreed that
Lot 503 and the apartment unit thereat would belong to Leonila upon full payment of its purchase
price of P80,000.00, while Lot 505 with a residential house would belong to Florinda. The properties
were then registered in the name of petitioner Renato dela Cruz married to Florinda. The parties,
however, verbally agreed that Leonila and her family would stay at Lot 505 until she had fully paid for
Lot 503.
ISSUE: Whether or not subject Agreement is void due to absence of the husband’s signature
RULING: As to the contention that the subject agreement had no force and effect on account of the
absence of the signature of Florinda’s husband, petitioner Renato dela Cruz (Renato), the RTC ruled
to the contrary, thus:
Indeed, Renato dela Cruz did not sign the Agreement, however, he was present at the time the
Agreement was signed by the parties and their witnesses, and the same was presented to him for
his signature. In fact, attempts were even made to procure his signature, but plaintiff wife Florinda
dela Cruz insisted that her signature already carries that of her husband Renato dela Cruz. The
parties never insisted that Renato dela Cruz sign the Agreement as the wife has spoken. It is further
observed that by his actuations Renato dela Cruz has agreed and has given his conformity to the
agreement. He also did not object to the execution of the same at the time it was signed by his wife
Florinda dela Cruz on September 9, 1991, even he was present and he was shown and furnished a
copy of the said agreement.
G.R. NO. 160708 October 16, 2009

PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners
v.
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE,
INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN
DYAN VILLA ABRILLE, Respondents.
Facts
1. In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7,
located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names.
2. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and
which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.
3. Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro's lot
4. by himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia
and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but
Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann's consent, as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale5 dated June 21, 1991.
5. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.
Issue
1. Whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro
or conjugal property, and
2. 2. whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann's consent.
Held
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro
and Mary Ann. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the
subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.12
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be
void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse's
inability, the authority of the court.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and
consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void.
The Decision dated February 21, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560 are AFFIRMED.
1. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 26471 in favor of spouses Wilfredo and Patrocinia Ravina is
declared valid.
2. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of spouses Ravina, together with the house
thereon, is declared null and void.
3. Pedro Abrille is ordered to return the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No.
88674 and the house thereon to co-defendants spouses Ravina.
G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, Petitioner
v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG (with aliases JOSE JO and
CONSING), Respondents
Facts
1. Private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women and fathered
fifteen children. The first of these women, the herein petitioner, claims to be his legal wife
whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo.
2. In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property.
3. The complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property was dismissed by CA for lack of a
cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article
178 of the Civil Code.chanroblesv
4. The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the
petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she
returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too
clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning
1968 until the determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private
respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the
parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner,
sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.cha
Issue
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled for her share in the conjugal properties?
Held
Yes, It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered properties of Jose
Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to separation of property under Article 178, third paragraph of
the Civil Code, which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.
the petitioner argues that a disposition of the case was nonetheless made in the penultimate paragraph
of the decision reading as follows:
The petitioner says she believed this to be disposition enough and so did not feel it was necessary for
her to appeal, particularly since the order embodied in that paragraph was in her favor. It was only
when the respondent court observed that there was no dispositive portion regarding that case and so
ordered its dismissal that she found it necessary to come to this Court for
relief.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property:chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
The amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case before us although they
became effective only on August 3, 1988.
It is these properties that should now be divided between him and the petitioner, on the assumption
that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the respondent court is
MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in favor the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the
conjugal property of the petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered divided between
them, share and share alike. This division shall be implemented by the trial court after determination
of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership, including those that may have been
illegally registered in the name of the persons.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
G.R. NO. 130623 February 29, 2008

LOREA DE UGALDE, Petitioner
v.
JON DE YSASI, Respondent.
Facts
1. On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got
married
2. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement. They had a son
named Jon de Ysasi III.
3. Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April 1957.5 On 26 May 1964, respondent
allegedly contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith (Smith)
4. Petitioner further alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of
real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. Petitioner alleged that she
had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties.
5. On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Bacolod
City, Branch 48 (trial court).
6. In particular, petitioner asked for her conjugal share in respondent's inheritance as per the
settlement of the estate of respondent's parents, Juan Ysasi6 and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi,
who died on 17 November 1975 and 25 February 1979, respectively
7. Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement
which provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed
dissolved as of 15 April 1957.
8. Respondent alleged that the marriage between him and petitioner was void because it was
executed without the benefit of a marriage license.
Issue
Whether or not there was a conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent in the
absence of marriage license?
Held
No. the trial court ruled that the existence of conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid
marriage.
The compromise agreement is a valid contract between the parties Since the compromise
agreement was entered into freely, voluntarily, and with the full understanding of its consequences, it
is conclusive and binding on the parties.
The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it was
approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFI's approval of the Compromise Agreement on 6 June
1961 resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and
respondent on even date.
G.R. NO. 155409 June 8, 2007

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN
vs.
DITA MAQUILAN
Facts: The respondent and her paramour were convicted of adultery. Thereafter, the respondent filed
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Damages, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT which basically allocated the cash in joint bank account in favor of
their common child and their properties divided between the petitioner and respondent.
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated, praying for the repudiation of the
Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement
by the respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and
judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement which was
denied and reappeared until it reached the court of appeals.
The CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The CA held that the conviction of the
respondent of the crime of adultery does not disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal
property and that Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code, do not apply, considering, too, that
the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Marriage filed by the respondent invoking
Article 36 of the Family Code has yet to be decided, and, hence, it is premature to apply;
that the spouses voluntarily separated their property through their Compromise Agreement with
court approval under Article 134 of the Family Code;
Issues: Whether or not;
A. A spouse convicted of either concubinage or adultery, can still share in conjugal partnership
B. A compromise agreement entered into by spouses, one of whom was convicted of adultery,
giving the convicted spouse a share in the conjugal property, valid and legal
C. Whether or not a judgement for annulment and legal separation is a pre-requisite before a
spouse convicted of either concubinage or adultery, be disqualified and prohibited from sharing
in the conjugal property
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with
MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise Agreement is VALID without prejudice to the
rights of all creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest in the properties of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
Citing of Article 43 is misplaced since it pertains to a subsequent marriage terminated because of

the reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal
separation. The present case involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be
declared under the ground of psychological capacity.
Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of

the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced.
Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or
for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which
was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This
conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still
pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject
to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with
pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.
G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003

ELNA MERCADO-FEHR
vs.
BRUNO FEHR
Facts: The trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
of property. The conjugal partnership of property existing between the parties is dissolved
and a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established.
The properties were divided in thirds, the petitioner, respondent and the children took a part each.
Suite 204, LCG Condominium was declared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of respondent,
BRUNO FRANZ FEHR. Accordingly, petitioner was directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204
in the name of respondent, acquired prior to his marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on
installment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership
should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is Bruno Fehr’s exclusive property?
Ruling: No. It appears from the facts, that in March 1983, petitioner moved in with respondent
in the latter’s residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael
Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married on March 14, 1985. In
the meantime, they purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG
Condominium on July 26, 1983. Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium unit was
issued in the name of petitioner. In light of these facts, the Court ruled that Suite 204 was acquired
during the parties’ cohabitation and said property should be governed by the rules on co-
ownership as per Article 147, which applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,
as in the case at bar.
G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000

EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR.
vs.
MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment of CoOwnership Share,
Accounting and Damages" against respondent. The complaint alleged that petitioner and
respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses,
cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still
subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation,
with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-
president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real
and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name. In 1992, due to
irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share
in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered
solely in her name.
Issue: Whether or not parties can be considered as co-owners of the properties, under the law,
considering the present status of the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each
other, even assuming that they lived together as husband and wife?
Ruling: Yes. Co-ownership exists between the parties even though they were not capacitated to
marry. While adulterous relationships are not covered by Article 144, their property regime falls under
Article 148 of the Family Code which provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties
in union are incapacitated to marry each other. Only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same
rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credits.
G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003

JACINTO SAGUID
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC,
MARINDUQUE AND GINA S. REY
Facts: Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband.
She cohabitated as husband and wife with Jacinto, but was not blessed with children. The couple
decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. Private respondent filed a compaint for
Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner alleging
that from her salary as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute the completion of their
unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was
able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects. She
prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount
of contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her. Petitioner claimed that the
expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a captain
of their fishing vessel.
Issue: Whether or not there are actual contributions from the respondents?
Ruling: Yes. However there is no proof thereof. Since Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to
marry each other, their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code.
Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution is required.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,
however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant
to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.
Therefore the Court declared Private respondent Gina S. Rey as co-owner of petitioner Jacinto
Saguid in the controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the
extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private
respondent, failing which the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private respondent’s
claim.
G.R. No. 153029, September 27, 2007

ACRE
Vs.
EVANGELINE YUTTIKKI
Facts: Beatriz Acre, petitioner, and Sofronio Acre, Jr. were married on November 8, 1957.
Their union produced six children, also petitioners. Sometime in 1972, Sofronio left the conjugal
dwelling and later married Evangeline Yuttikki, respondent, on May 18, 1972 while his marriage
to Beatriz was still subsisting. On November 16, 1996, Sofronio died. His union with respondent
lasted for more than 24 years.
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of
properties and/or partition with damages. They alleged that Sofronio alone acquired the subject
properties with his funds.
Issue: Whether or not there is co-ownership between Sofronio and the respondent
Ruling: No there is no co-ownership. The marriage between respondent and Sofronio is bigamous.
As such, their property regime is covered by Article 148 of the Family Code providing that all
properties acquired by the parties out of their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Hence, if there is no contribution from
either or both of the spouses, there can be no co-ownership. Petitioners failed to present any
evidence to establish that Sofronio made an actual contribution in acquiring the contested
properties. So the co-ownership does not exist.
G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, Respondents
Facts: On 1949, Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Carlina Vallesterol, private
respondent in Pangasinan. A few months after, Palang left to work in Hawaii and had attempted to
divorce Carlina. In 1950, their only child Herminia was born. When he returned for good in 1972,
he refused to live with private respondents, instead stayed alone in a house in Pangasinan.
In 1973, Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19-year old Erlinda Agapay. Two
months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land and a house and lot. Miguel and
Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher.
1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement
to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia.
In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two
years later, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a case for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against Erlinda, seeking to get back the riceland and the house and lot
allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the
complaint but CA reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the property acquired during the subsequent void marriage belongs to conjugal
property of the first and valid marriage.
Held: Yes, the provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases
of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. The
marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was null and void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina
was still subsisting.
UnderArt.148, only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint
contribution of money or property shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective
contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. And in contrast to Art. 147 of the same
code if actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.
Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell
and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade the Court that she actually contributed money to buy
the subject property. When the property was acquired, the petitioner was only around twenty years of
age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Since there
being no proof that she contributed, for the said property, the court found no basis to justify her co-
ownership with Miguel. Consequently, the land should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert
to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C.
TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE,
BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
Facts: On 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima became the owners of Lot No. 437-A
located in Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in
law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share
consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. The latter became the absolute owner of the lot.
Since he has no children, he asked his niece, Leticia and her cousin Luzviminda, and petitioner Cirila
Arcaba to take care of his house. Eventually when his niece Leticia and Luzviminda got
married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco.
Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda,
another niece of francisco claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress but cirila
contended that she was just a helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
In 1991, a few months before the death of Francisco, he executed a "Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted
the donation in the same instrument. This was made on the consideration of the services rendered
by Cirila over the past 10 years.
When Francisco died, the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity
of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents alleged that
Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco because she did not receive a regular cash wage as a
househelper. The RTC declared the donation void under Article 87 of the Family Code in which
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be
declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Ruling: Yes, The donation made was void under Article 87 of the Family Code. The court in this case
considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion
was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila
Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco.
Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old
and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men
and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial court and court of appeals.
G.R. No. 143286 April 14, 2004

PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and PACITA VILLANUEVA, petitioners,
vs.
CO URT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA, respondents.

Facts:
Eusebia Napisa Retuya was married to Nicolas Retuya in 1926. They begot five children out of
wedlock (5), namely, namely, Natividad, Angela, Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. They resided at
Tipolo, Mandaue City and during their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements
situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Prior to marriage, Nicolas Retuya inherited of a
parcel of lands situated in Mandaue City.
Nicolas Retuya left his legitimate family and cohabited with Pacita Villanueva. Nicolas and Pacita
started cohabiting in 1936. When Eusebia died on 23 November 1996, Nicolas married Pacita and
Nicolas on 16 December 1996. They bore illegitimate son named Procopio Villanueva.
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore, cannot walk anymore and they have to
raise him up in order to walk. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her father because
they visited him at the hospital. From the time Nicolas suffered a stroke until the present, it was
Procopio Villanueva who has been receiving the income of these properties. Natividad went to
Procopio to negotiate and talk things over as their father is incapacitated. Procopio replied that it was
not yet the time to talk about the matter.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties acquired during the marriage of Eusebia and Nicolas are conjugal?
Held:
The properties acquired during the marriage of Eusebia and Nicolas are conjugal. Even though
Nicolas and Pacita cohabitated for a long period, this does not sever the tie of the subsisting
previous marriage. Nicolas and Pacita’s cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of Eusebia. The
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already
living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7 October 1926, the date of Nicolas and
Eusebia’s marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of Eusebia’s death, are still presumed
conjugal.
G.R. No. 185063 July 23, 2009

SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA, Petitioners,
vs.
AN ITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and VILMA B. DE LEON, Respondents.

Facts:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment lot situated in
Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil
rite and to this union were born Danilo and Vilma.
Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC executed, on June 22,
1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, the Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, "single."
Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas).
The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 did not bear the written consent and signature
of Anita.
On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale
and had TCT No. 173677 canceled. They secured the issuance in their names of TCT No. N-173911
from the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not that the land purchased on installment by Bonifacio before marriage although
some installments were paid during the marriage is conjugal and not his exclusive property?
(2) Whether or not one-half (1/2) of the conjugal assets do not vest to Bonifacio O. De Leon
because of the absence of liquidation?
Held:
(1) The property under issue belongs to the conjugal partnership. The contract to sell ownership
is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price. The
ownership over and title to the property was vested on Bonifacio upon execution of the final
deed of sale which became effective upon payment of the full purchase price. The full
payment, was made more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita. In effect, the
property was acquired during the existence of the marriage which is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership.
(2) The right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage,
when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net
assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.
Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal
partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right of the
husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership.
G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009

ROGER V. NAVARRO, Petitioner,
vs.
HO N. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and
KAREN T. GO, doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, Respondents.
Facts:
Spouses Karen and Glenn Go had a business under the trade name Kargo Enterprises. Roger
Navarro entered into lease agreement with right to purchase of an equipment with Kargo
Enterprises. 3 checks presented for payment and/or credit were dishonored and/or returned by the
drawee bank for the common reason that the current deposit account against which the said checks
were issued did not have sufficient funds to cover the amounts thereof. Demands were made of
ROGER NAVARRO to pay the due amount or to return the subject motor vehicle as stipulated in the
lease agreement with right to purchase.
Issue:
Whether or not Karen Go, who filed the complaints and not Glenn Go, is a party-in-interest and the
complaints failed to state a cause of action?
Held:
Karen Go is the real party-in-interest. Even though the agreement was signed by Glenn Go as
representative of Kargo Enterprise, Kargo Enterprises is the real party to the lease agreement. As
the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be
injured by a judgment in this case. Thus Karen Go is the real party-in-interest and it is legally
incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not
appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. The
registration of the trade name in the name of one person – a woman – does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is
married. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved.
G.R. No. 164401 , June 25, 2008

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte; THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
SHERIFF, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte; THE CLERK OF COURT OF MANILA,
as Ex-Officio Sheriff; and LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondents.
Facts: In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership in the marketing of liquefied petroleum
gas under the name (Shellite). After Jacinto’s death in 1989, the petitioner took over the business
without Chua’s consent. Chua’s demands for accounting and winding up went unheeded, prompting
him to file on June 22, 1992 a Complaint for Winding Up of a Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal
and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment before RTC in Zamboanga
del Norte and raffled to Branch 11 of the court.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. On 2002,
the RTC granted Chua’s motion for execution.
Chua asked the trial court to commission a certified public accountant (CPA) to undertake the
accounting work and inventory of the partnership in which the petitioners refuse in the court. In the
report, it used the compounding-of-interest method, amounted to PhP 14,277,344.94. Subsequently,
the RTC admitted and approved the computation of claims in view of petitioners’ failure and refusal.
On September 24, 2002, the petitioners submitted their own CPA-certified valuation and accounting
report. In it, petitioners limited Chua’s partnership affairs to an aggregate amount of PhP 3,154,736.65
only. Chua submitted a new computation, this time applying simple interest on the various items
covered by his claim. Under this methodology, Chua’s aggregate claim went down to PhP
8,733,644.75.
On November 6, 2002, the RTC issued a Resolution, rejecting the accounting report petitioners
submitted, while approving the new computation of claims Chua submitted. Petitioners’
reconsideration was denied.
Petitioners went to the CA on a petition for certiorari assailing the November 6, 2002 and January 7,
2003 resolutions of the RTC. CA denied the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan with her
husband Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under the
judgment.
Ruling: The fact that the levied parcel of land is a conjugal or community property, as the case may
be, of spouses Norberto and Sunga-Chan does not per se vitiate the levy and the consequent sale of
the property. Verily, said property is not among those exempted from execution under Section 13, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court. And it cannot be overemphasized that the TRO issued by the Court on May
31, 2005 came after the auction sale in question.
Parenthetically, the records show that spouses were married on 1992, with that, their absolute
community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse. Article 94 of
family code provides that all debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the
consent of the other and debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been benefited.
In net effect, Chua owes petitioner Sunga-Chan the amount of PhP 2,470,607.48, representing the
excess of the purchase price over his legitimate claims. Therefore, subject to the payment by Chua of
PhP 2,470,607.48 to petitioner Sunga-Chan, we affirm the RTC’s April 11, 2005 resolution, confirming
the sheriff’s final deed of sale of the levied property, ordering the Registry of Deeds of Manila to cancel
TCT No. 208782, and issuing a writ of possession in favor of Chua.
Hence, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed decision and resolution of the
CA are hereby AFFIRMED.
Hernandez vs Mingoa
The subject matter of the action is a parcel of land with an area of 520.50 square meters situated in
Diliman,... registered in the name of Domingo B. Hernandez, Sr. married to Sergia V. Hernandez.
Later on, said TCT No. 107534 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 290121[5] was issued in
favor of Melanie Mingoa.
A complaint[6] was filed with the RTC of Quezon City by herein petitioners, heirs of Domingo
Hernandez, Sr., namely, spouse Sergia Hernandez and their surviving children Domingo, Jr. and Maria
Leonora Wilma, against the respondents... herein, Dolores Camisura, Melanie Mingoa, Atty. Plaridel
Mingoa, Sr. and all persons claiming rights under the latter, and the Quezon City Register of Deeds...
petitioners asked for (a) the annulment and/or declaration of nullity of TCT No. 290121 including all its
derivative titles, the Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated February 14, 1963 in favor of
Dolores Camisura... the reconveyance and/or issuance to them (petitioners) by the Quezon City
Register of Deeds of the certificate of title covering the subject property.
Domingo Hernandez, Sr. (who was then a Central Bank employee) and his spouse Sergia V.
Hernandez were awarded a piece of real property by the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC) by way of salary... deduction. Then having paid in full the entire amount of P6,888.96, a Deed
of Absolute Sale of the property was executed by the PHHC in their favor. It bears an annotation of
the retention period of the property by the awardee (i.e., restriction of any unauthorized sale to third
persons within a certain period). Tax payments due on the property were religiously paid (until 1955)
by the [petitioners] as evidenced by receipts... under the [petitioners'] name... it was only after his
burial that his heirs found out that TCT No. 107534 was already cancelled a year before (in 1982), and
in lieu thereof, TCT No. 290121 was issued to the [respondents].
Upon diligent inquiry, [petitioners] came... to know that the cancellation of TCT (No. 107534) in favor
of the [respondents'] xxx TCT (No. 290121) was based upon three sets of documents, namely, (1)
Irrevocable Power of Attorney; (2) Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney; and (3) Deed of Absolute
Sale. According to the [respondents] xxx, Hernandez, Sr. was awarded by the PHHC the Right to
Purchase the property in question; however, the late Hernandez,... Sr. failed to pay all the installments
due on the said property. Hernandez, Sr. sold to Dolores Camisura his rights for the sum of P6,500.00
on February 14, 1963, through a deed of transfer of... rights, seemingly a printed form from the PHHC.
Simultaneous to this, Hernandez, Sr. and his spouse executed an irrevocable special power of
attorney, appointing Dolores Camisura as their attorney-in-fact with express power to sign, execute
and acknowledge any contract of... disposition, alienation and conveyance of her right over the
aforesaid parcel of land.
Apparently, this special power of attorney was executed for the purpose of securing her right to transfer
the property to a third person considering that there was a prohibition to dispose of the property by the
original purchaser within one (1) year from full payment. Else wise... stated, the irrevocable power of
attorney was necessary in order to enable the buyer, Dolores Camisura, to sell the lot to another,
Plaridel Mingoa, without the need of requiring Hernandez, to sign a deed of conveyance.
On May 9, 1964, Dolores Camisura sold her right over the said property to Plaridel Mingoa for
P7,000.00. Camisura then executed a similar irrevocable power of attorney and a deed of sale of right
in a residential land and improvements therein in favor of Plaridel Mingoa.
Plaridel Mingoa took possession of the said property and began paying all the installments due on the
property to PHHC.
On July 9, 1978, Plaridel Mingoa sold to his eldest child, Melanie Mingoa, the property in question for
P18,000.00. TCT No. 107534 was thus cancelled and TCT No. 290121 was issued in the name of
Melanie Mingoa. Domingo Hernandez, Sr. was awarded a piece of real property in 1958 by the PHHC
as part of the government's housing program at the time. Title over the said property was issued in
1966 in the name of Hernandez, Sr., after full payment for the property was received by the PHHC.
Neither [petitioners] nor Hernandez, Sr., took possession of the said property. On the other hand, the
[respondents] took possession of the said property in 1966 and are in actual and physical possession
thereof up to the present, and have made considerable improvements... thereon, including a
residential house where they presently reside.
The Owner's Duplicate Copy of the title over the property given by the PHHC to Hernandez, Sr. was
in the possession of Plaridel Mingoa, the latter being able to facilitate the cancellation of the said title
and [the issuance of] a new TCT xxx in the name of Melanie Mingoa.The realty taxes have been paid
by [respondents], albeit in the name of Hernandez, Sr., but all official receipts of tax payments are kept
by the [respondents].
From 1966 (the time when the [respondents] were able to possess the property) to 1983 (the time
when the [petitioners] had knowledge that the TCT in the name of Hernandez, Sr. had already been
cancelled by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City) covers almost a span of 17... years; and from
1983 to 1995 (the time when the Heirs filed the original action) is a period of another 12 years.
The SPA[31] in favor of Dolores Camisura pertinently states that the latter is the lawful attorney-in-fact
of Domingo B. Hernandez, Sr., married to Sergia Hernandez, to do and perform, among others, the
following acts and deeds:
1. To sign, execute and acknowledge all such contracts, deeds or other instruments which may be
required by the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation with respect to the purchase of that
certain parcel of land known and designated as Lot No. 15 Block E-89 of the
Malaya Avenue Subdivision, situated in Quezon City and containing an area of 520 square meters,
more or less, which I have acquired thru the CENTRAL BANK STAFF HOUSING CORPORATION;
2. To sign, execute and acknowledge all such contracts or other instruments which may deem
necessary or be required to sign, execute and acknowledge for the purpose of selling,
transferring, conveying, disposing of or alienating whatever rights I may have over that parcel
of... land mentioned above.
Issue:
Whether or not such sale was valid.
Ruling:
the Court cannot but conclude that the SPA executed by Hernandez, Sr. in respondent Camisura's
favor was, in reality, an alienation involving the subject property... aside from executing said SPA,
likewise sold his... rights and interests over the property awarded by the PHHC to Camisura. CA
committed no error when it ruled:... the purported SPA appear to be merely a grant of authority to
Camisura (and then to Plaridel Mingoa) to sell and dispose of the subject property as well as a grant
of right to purchase the said property; but in essence,... such SPA are disguised deeds of sale of the
property executed in circumventing the retention period restriction over the said property. The consent
of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. to the contract is undisputed, thus, the sale of his ½ share in the conjugal
property was valid. With regard to the consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to the sale involving their
conjugal property, the trial court found that it was... lacking because said wife's signature on the SPA
was falsified.
CA observed that the forgery was so blatant as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an
ordinary person. Sergia's lack of consent to the sale did not render the transfer of her share invalid. It
bears stressing that the subject matter herein involves conjugal property. Said property was awarded
to Domingo Hernandez, Sr. in 1958. The assailed SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964. Title in the
name of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. covering the subject property was issued on May 23, 1966 sale of
the property to Melanie Mingoa and the issuance of a new title in her name happened in 1978.
The provisions of the New Civil Code govern these transactions Art. 173. The wife may, during the
marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of
any contract of the husband entered into without her consent,... the contract, in its entirety, executed
by the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Alienation and/or
encumbrance of conjugal property by the husband without the wife's consent is not null and void but
merely voidable. The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife, otherwise, the contract is voidable. Even if we were to consider
that their right of action arose when they... learned of the cancellation of TCT No. 107534 and the
issuance of TCT No. 290121 in Melanie Mingoa's name in 1993, still, twelve (12) years have lapsed
since such discovery, and they filed the petition beyond the period allowed by law.
Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, together... with her children, filed the action for reconveyance, the
conjugal partnership of property with Hernandez, Sr. had already been terminated by virtue of the
latter's death on April 16, 1983. Clearly, therefore, petitioners' action has prescribed.
Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an action for annulment of the contract
during the marriage and within ten (10) years from the transaction necessarily barred her from
questioning the sale of the subject property to third persons.
Furthermore, Hernandez, Sr.'s inaction during his lifetime lends more credence to the defendants-
appellants assertion that the said property was indeed sold by Hernandez, Sr. by way of the SPAs,
albeit without the consent of his wife.
Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named Consuelo Garcia.
Santiago already died when this controversy arose. Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a case
against Consuelo Garcia and was able to obtain an attachment over the land. While the case was
pending, the 9 children sold their 1/10 share in the lot to Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents
here. Estonina were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo Garcia. The land was
sold at public auction and a TCT was issued in the name of Estonina. Atayan however filed a
complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the TCT claiming that they own 9/10 of the land. The
RTC said that the land was presumed to be conjugal hence Consuelo Garcia owned 50% of the land
plus 5% as her share in the intestate estate of her husband Santiago Garcia. RTC ordered the
amendment of the TCT to show that Estonina owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%. Both parties
appealed. The CA modified the judgment. The CA held that lot was the exclusive property of
Santiago Garcia and not conjugal. It held that Estonina only owns 1/10 or 10% and Atayan owns
9/10 or 90%.
Issue:
Is the property exclusive or conjugal? Exclusive share of the deceased Santiago
What’s the real share of Estonina and Atayan? 10% and 90%, respectively.
Held:
SC affirms CA in toto. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof
of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua nonfor the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. Here, Estonino failed to present any proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Estonino merely relies on the certificate of title which was issued
during the marriage. The TCT does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property.
Acquisition of property and registration of title are two different acts. Registration does not confer title
but merely confirms one already existing. Thus, the property is the exclusive property of the
deceased Santiago and when he died leaving 10 compulsory heirs, each one got 10% of the lot.
Hence, what the Estonino spouses purchased in the public auction was merely the rights of
Consuelo Garcia consisting of 10% of the lot.
Ching v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000 from the Allied
Banking Corporation (ABC). As an added security for the said loan, Alfredo Ching, together with
Emilio Tadeo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding them to
jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing to the ABC. The
PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans.
Hence, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Citing as one of the grounds for the writ was the fraud defendants employed in incurring the
obligations by representing themselves as having the financial capacity to pay the loan when in fact
they did not have such capacity. In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial
court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo
Ching.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a
Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks
levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal
funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. She, likewise, alleged that
being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release
of the properties. She attached therewith a copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo Ching.
ISSUE:
Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the liability?
RULING:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of Appeals, the court held that it is not even necessary to
prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were
acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact,
even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will
still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of the conjugal
nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence to overcome the same.
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks
in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the
name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This
was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks
are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The private
respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his
exclusive money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate
books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not
constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone
there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a
conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to
frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well
being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary
and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners
was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was
between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption
can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private
respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the
term “… obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Here, no actual benefit may be
proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from
the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where
the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so,
that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In this case, the
petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private
respondent. The petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The assailed orders of the RTC are AFFIRMED.

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GROUP 3 - Benzon, Cadano, Dimapilis, Gonzales, Laguardia, Marcial, Mora, Pulido, Ternora

G.R. No. 140153 March 28, 2001

ANTONIO DOCENA and ALFREDA DOCENA, petitioners,

G.R. No. 159889 June 5, 2008

WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA, petitioners,

G.R. No. 149801 June 26, 2008

SPOUSES RENATO and FLORINDA DELA CRUZ, petitioners,

G.R. NO. 160708 October 16, 2009

G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, Petitioner

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

G.R. NO. 130623 February 29, 2008

G.R. NO. 155409 June 8, 2007

Issues: Whether or not;

Citing of Article 43 is misplaced since it pertains to a subsequent marriage terminated because of

Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of

G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003

G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000

G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003

G.R. No. 153029, September 27, 2007

G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997

G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner,

G.R. No. 143286 April 14, 2004

CO URT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA, respondents.

G.R. No. 185063 July 23, 2009

AN ITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and VILMA B. DE LEON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009

G.R. No. 164401 , June 25, 2008

Whether or not such sale was valid.

Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals

Is the property exclusive or conjugal? Exclusive share of the deceased Santiago

Ching v. Court of Appeals

Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the liability?

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