DISCLAIMER AND USE IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

1. The NADMO Research Unit could not verify, beyond a physical on-site visual surface
inspection of the debris, the actual construction, properties and conditions of the
materials used, or changes that might have been made over the life of the building.

2. No part of this report may be used in any suit or action for damages arising out of any
matter mentioned herein.

2|Page
 NADMO RESEARCH TEAM

Abibatu Walenkaki

Kafui Agbleze

Fred Mensah

Frank Dankwah Carboo

Ebenezer V. Akoto

Martha Nettey

Rejoyce Anum

Emmanuel Asafo-Adjei

Joseph T. Hayford

Ebenezer Victor O. Addabor

Frank Baah Nketia

Mohammed A. Issah

Nathaniel O. Sagoe

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 CONTRIBUTORS TO THE INVESTIGATION

Joseph Ofei Ankrah Head of Department (Geological/Radiological Disasters)

Asomaning Odei-Mensah Head of Department (Relief/Reconstruction)

Koranteng Abrokwah Head of Department (Training)

Diana Boakye (Mrs.) Head of Department (MERIT)

Mr. Nomotey Winfred Tesia Head of Department (Operations)

Dr. Kingsford Asamoah CREW Project Manager

Members Geological/Radiological Technical Committee

Members Urban Search and Rescue

Nana Yaw Adjei Architect

Nii Akai Architect

4|Page
 DEDICATION

This report is dedicated to Comfort Adjei, Alice Atiso, Gerald Berhene, Chaunhary Mayank,
Christian Bedzrah, Dora Odoi, Frederick, Michael Aboagye, Neil Luterotte, Portia Boateng,
Prince Adjei Darko, Samuel Adu Agyekum, Selina Ghartey, and all those who lost their lives in
the disaster; to Abigail Addobea, Abu Mubarak, Benjamin Aduboahene, Joe Agyeman,
Ahouancicede, Ebenezer Amoako, Salomey Amponsah, George Ampratwum, Asantewaa
Appiah, Awudu Bulley, Stephen Bavon, Benedette Quartey, Bernice Dogbey, Bernice Segri,
Evelyn Bissaba, Lawrence Boadu, Sophia Bossman, Charles Barfo, Christian Nyamavor,
Christiana Agyapong, Christiana Osei, Cynthia Abasimi, Daniel Langari, Lawrence Darkwah,
Dendaline Aryee, Derrick Addo, Emmanuel Okyere, Emmanuel Tawiah, Esther Aborsoka, Esther
Laryea, Fati Mohammed , Felix Lartey, George Amanfo, Gladys Donkor, Samuel Gyimah, Isaac
Amakye Listowel, Jennifer Attoh, Johnson Attoh, Josephine Fordjour, Joshua Asiedu Omarri,
Joyce Dansua, Juliet Botchwey, Kombart Moses, Kwabena Appiah, Kwame Megbenyo, Mahama
Jabaru, Mandy Adofo, Maxwel Asuako, Maxwell Awuah, Ayishetu Mohammed, Jacqueline Ofori
Amoako, Felix Okor, Christiana Osei, Philipa Armah, Prince Halim, Prince Odame, Edith
Quayemah, Richard Logosu, Rose Attiso, Abraham Sackey, Sadami Ahounchebe, Sampson
Allotey, Sharon Amankra, Solomon Amo, Stephen Ofori and Wahab Suhani. They were all
victims of the Melcom Store disaster. This work is also dedicated to the collaborating
institutions of NADMO who will carry forward the lessons learnt to reduce the risk of such
disasters.

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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report takes a look at possible reasons for the collapse of the Achimota Melcom store with
a broad spectrum of knowledge on factors that cause buildings to collapse. The report also
looks at the preparedness of the National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO) in
responding to the incident.

In assessing possible reasons for the collapse of the Melcom store, eye witness accounts,
disaster management technical committee reports, emergency operation reports, geophysical
details of the site, three (3) dimensional computer modelling of the building, and site
photographs were combined to gain knowledge of the most probable collapse sequence.

In assessing NADMO’s preparedness, a score system was applied on the basis of the following:
Readiness for the incident, co-ordination of response, effectiveness of communication and
speed of transmitting vital information, effective assessment of the building’s plan vis a vis
rescue operations, effective identification of logistical solutions and direction of vital relief,
effective mobilisation of stakeholders’ expertise and logistical support.

The report concludes with a list of fifteen (15) recommendations for ensuring the structural
integrity of high rise buildings, improved emergency response by NADMO, and post trauma
care for victims and their families.

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 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACCRONYMS

NADMO National Disaster Management Organisation

SOP Standard Operation Procedures

GAF Ghana Armed Forces

GIE Ghana Institute of Engineers

GNFS Ghana National Fire Service

AESL Architectural and Engineering Service Limited

NSCS National Security Council Secretariat

AMA Accra Metropolitan Assembly

NTAC National Technical Advisory Committee

ICP Incident Command Post

EOC Emergency Operations Centre

GAMA Greater Accra Metropolitan Area

GSD Geological Survey Department

UN United Nations

CP Contingency Plan

USAR Urban Search and Rescue

SOP Standard Operating Procedures

CEC Cation Exchange Capacity

IC Incident Commander

EMS Emergency Medical Service

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISCLAIMER AND USE IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS …………..…………………………………………………………………….……1

NADMO RESEARCH UNIT ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…… 2
CONTRIBUTORS TO THE INVESTIGATION …………………………………………………………………………………………..….. 3
DEDICATION ..……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYM ……………………………………………………………………………..….…………………………6
TABLE OF CONTENTS ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……………. 7
CHAPTER 1 ..………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 9
1.0 BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................................... 9
1.1 MAIN OBJECTIVE ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12

1.2 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES....................................................................................................................... 113

1.3 SCOPE OF THE ASSESSMENT………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
113
CHAPTER 2 ..………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13
2.0 INTRODUCTION …….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….13
2.1 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF COLLAPSE OF BUILDINGS IN GHANA ...………………………………………………………. 13
2.2 DEFINITION OF BUILDING COLLAPSE ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 14
2.3 CAUSES OF BUILDING COLLAPSE…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 15
CHAPTER 3 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17
3.0 DATA SOURCES .................................................................................................................................. 17
3.1 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA ..................................................................................................... 17
3.2 INFORMATION FROM SURVIVING VICTIMS AND EYE WITNESSES ……………………….…………………….. 17
3.2.1 Cracks in some of the pillars days before collapse …………..…….…………………………………..………… 18
3.2.2 Shaking, cracking, sound in pillars just before collapse ………..………………………..……….…………… 18
3.2.3 An explosion before collapse …………………………………………………………………….…….…………………… 18
3.2.4 Total Collapse in a matter of seconds …..…………………………..………………………………………………... 18
3.3 OUTLINE DESCRIPTION, KEY FEATURES AND PHOTOS ……………………………………………………………….. 19
3.4 INVESTIGATIONS (SOILS, GEOLOGY AND SEISMOLOGY) …………………………………………….………………. 22
3.4.1 Soil Structure of Building Site …………….………………………………………..………………………….……… ….. 22
3.4.2 Geology of Building Site …………………………………………………………………………………….…….………….. 22
3.4.3 Seismology of Building Site ……………….…………..……………………………………………………………….…… 23
3.4.4 Earth Tremor Effects ……………………………………………………………………………………………….…………… 23
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 3. 5 TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE EXAMINATION ........................................................................ 26
3.6 POST-OCCUPANCY ALTERATIONS ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 28

3.7 POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE SCENARIO ................................................................................... 28

CHAPTER 4 .................................................................................................................................................. 29
4.0 NADMO’S CAPACITY IN THE COORDINATION OF THE RESPONSE TO THE MELCOM DISASTER ....... 29
4.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 29
4.2 CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT .............................................................................................................. 29
4.2.1 Evidence of Readiness for the Incident. ..................................................................................... 30
4.2.2 Evidence of a Co-ordinated Response to the Incident. ................................................................ 30
4.2.3 Evidence of Effective Communication and Speed of Transmitting Vital Information ................. 30
4.2.4 Evidence of Effective Assessment of the Building’s Plan vis a vis Rescue Operations................. 31
4.2.5 Evidence of Effective Identification of Logistical Solutions and Direction of Vital Relief ............ 31
4.2.6 Evidence of Effective Mobilisation of Stakeholders and Logistical Support ................................ 31
4.2.7 Evidence of Effective Reduction of Possible Deaths .................................................................... 31
4.2.8 Evidence of Post Disaster Victim Support ................................................................................... 32
CHAPTER 5 .................................................................................................................................................. 34
5.0 OUTCOME AND CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 34
5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................... 35
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................ 37
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 The Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale
APPENDIX 2 Earth tremor hit certain parts of Accra
APPENDIX 3 Statistics of Victims
APPENDIX 4 List of Participating Agencies/Organizations

APPENDIX 5 List of Participating Private Sector Organizations

APPENDIX 6 List of Equipment by Agencies/Organizations
APPENDIX: 7 List of Donor Organizations

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 CHAPTER 1
1.0 BACKGROUND
On 7th November, 2012 at 9:42 GMT, a distress call was received by the National Disaster
Management Organisation (NADMO) on the total collapse of the Melcom Building at Achimota,
in Accra, with about fifty two (52) employees trapped. An advanced team of the NADMO Urban
Search and Rescue (USAR) Unit was immediately dispatched to the disaster scene upon
receiving the information.
Picture 1. The collapsed building’s Fascia slabs thrown backwards in a westward and
south westward direction as can be seen from the picture below.

Source: Disaster scene pictures. (NADMO)

In accordance with NADMO’s operational standards, all collaborating agencies including the
Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), Ghana Institute of Engineers (GIE), Ghana National Fire Service
(GNFS), the Architectural & Engineering Services Limited (AESL), the National Security

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Secretariat (NSS), Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) and NADMO’s National Technical
Advisory Committee (NTAC) members were notified.
Rescue operations started with an Incident Command Post (ICP) on site and an Emergency
Operation Centre (EOC) at the NADMO headquarters coordinating response and relief
operations. Relevant equipment were mobilised and assembled to dismantle the collapsed
building to rescue the victims.

The collapse of the building took the form referred to as pancake collapse where columns failed
and concrete fascia slabs were parked directly on each other with a westward and south-
westward throw. This made the rescue operation more difficult. See picture 1 above.

Prior to the collapse of the Melcom building some surviving staff of the disaster confirmed to
the media that the building had developed various degrees of cracks in some of the walls and
columns. Subsequently, some staff drew the attention of their supervisors to the problem. They
were however told the building only needed plastering and nothing more. Three days
afterwards, the building suffered a total collapse. In addition to this early warning of the
disaster, according to the workers in the building, on that fateful day of the collapse, there was
a loud bang at the lower floor of the building. This was also ignored. From these and other
reports, it is evident that there was enough early warning of the impending disaster but
supervisors underestimated the threat.

The nation was thrown into a state of grief and mourning moments after the disaster. The
building collapse occurred shortly before the shop was opened to the public. The severity of the
disaster necessitated President John Dramani Mahama to accept a nine (9)-member rescue
team from Israel, with special equipment and a sniffer dog, to help locate and remove both
dead and living victims. Rescuers and volunteers worked tirelessly day and night for four (4)
continuous days to rescue victims from the rubble of what would go down in history as one of
Accra's darkest days. The incident affected a total of eighty-one (81) Ghanaians; of which
fourteen (14) lost their lives and sixty one (61) were admitted to various hospitals in the Accra

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Metropolis. It resulted in the damage of several Melcom merchandise which run into several
thousands of Ghana Cedis. Detailed statistics of victims is attached as appendix 3.
The Melcom Group of Companies, a super market chain in Ghana, occupied the first three
levels of the building from May to October/November 2012. Thereafter they acquired the top
floors for warehousing their merchandise (see picture 2).
Picture 2. The Achimota Melcom Store building before its collapse.

Source: www.vblayleak.com

From investigations, it was realised that the Achimota Melcom building did not have any
building permit from the Accra Metropolitan Assembly, hence did not undergo the scrutiny of
the Assembly’s Building Bye-Laws. It is evident from the 15th December, 2008 satellite imagery
that column centres had shifted on the grid. An implication of this is that some columns will
bear more load than expected compromising the structural integrity of the building. The Soil
group of the emergency site is Acrisol, defined by the World Reference Base for Soil Resources,
2006 as soils with clay-enriched subsoil but of low base status and low-activity clay. Clayey
bases affect foundation settlement; particularly where live-loads exceeds design, resulting in
building movement.

There are no records to the effect that later acquisition of the top levels by Melcom for
warehousing was accompanied by structural changes.

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1.1 MAIN OBJECTIVE
To investigate the root causes of the disaster and make recommendations thereof.

1.2 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

 To assess the design code, construction method, and controls applied in building the
structure.
 To assess the seismic hazard and ground condition of the site.
 To study satellite imagery of the site, photographs of the rubble and eye witness
account of the incident.
 To assess the capacity of NADMO to coordinate agencies during the disaster.
 To assess the risk levels of the incident.

1.3 SCOPE OF THE ASSESSMENT

This assessment seeks to highlight the main factors that led to the collapse of the Melcom
building, taking into consideration a broad spectrum of knowledge. It assesses NADMO’s
performance in the handling of the incident and the risk levels of the incident.

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 CHAPTER 2
2.0 INTRDUCTION
This chapter looks at related studies that have been undertaken in buildings that have collapsed
in Ghana. It discusses the construction industry, design deficiencies, foundation problems,
quality management, contractors’ variability, unprofessional conduct and maintenance. It also
brings to light overview of previous coordinating roles played by NADMO if there was any in a
similar disaster.

2.1 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF COLLAPSE OF BUILDINGS IN GHANA

Ghanaian governments since independence have continued to make efforts to supply mass
housing through huge budgetary and policy provisions to boost private sector investment in
order to meet the huge building infrastructure deficit in the country. The rate at which existing
buildings and those under construction are collapsing calls for urgent attention. The sight of
building collapses across the length and breadth of Ghana is quite alarming. Many buildings
have collapsed before the Melcom disaster but did not catch the eye of the media as this did. If
care is not taken to ensure building construction quality compliance, the few contractors who
do bad jobs will not only create bad image for the construction industry but will tarnish the
image of the regulatory bodies as well. Consumers may also lose confidence in local building
construction firms as a repercussion of building collapses.

On 23rd January, 2000 at Aberewa-Nnko, a suburb of Tema New Town, two people were killed instantly
when a church building collapsed on their wooden structure during a downpour in the early hours of
Sunday. On 23rd April 2000, two people were reported missing and 16 others injured, eight of them
seriously, at Madina, Accra when a three storey building they were working on suddenly collapsed on
them. Again, on 13th December, 2002, a four-storey building collapsed in Accra. Fortunately, an
observant fire officer saved lives by evacuating the occupants moments before it collapsed. This was an
uncompleted building located near the Central Post Office. A similar incident occurred on 15th December,
2006 at Asafo in Kumasi, where a four-storey office complex with a car park under construction at the O
& A Travel and Tour terminal at Asafo-Labour collapsed, around midnight. Also, on 6th March, 2008, at
Danyame in Kumasi, a 27-year-old man died on the spot when a two-storey building which he and his
14 | P a g e
colleagues were constructing collapsed. In August 2008, there was Pandemonium at the Kejetia Terminal
in Kumasi, when the middle section of a two-storey building suddenly collapsed. The incident which
happened in the afternoon affected 40 stalls and shops. Although there were no casualties, all
merchandise in stock was destroyed. On the 9th October, 2009, at Ashiaman, in Accra four people lost
their lives when an uncompleted two-storey building collapsed on them in the suburb Zenu. A similar
incident occurred on the 31st January, 2010 at Tarkwa in the Western Region, where three people died
when part of a five-storey hotel building under construction collapsed on workers. A collapse which left
an indelible mark in the minds of the residents of Spintex Road, in Accra, occurred on 5th June, 2010 when
a four-storey building collapsed, injuring about six people including a four-year-old boy. On 5th January,
2011, two people died on the spot and three others sustained serious injuries when a two storey building
collapsed at Dormaa Ahenkro in the Brong Ahafo Region. Again, two people died and others got injured,
when the entire veranda of a two-storey building collapsed at Krofrom, a suburb of Kumasi in 2011. A
similar incident happened at the O & A Bus Terminal in Kumasi in 2011. Public outcry caused the city
authorities to commence an investigation into the incident which outcome is still unknown. Not only
that, a three-story structure also suffered collapse in the Ashanti regional town of Obuasi. Another two-
storey building also collapsed at Asene Dzornshie in James Town around Bukom Square, Accra. In April
2013, a two-storey building under construction collapsed in Kumasi, at the Kejetia bus terminal, causing
severe damage to property although there were no casualties.

From the evidence above, the collapse of buildings is no new phenomena, but it appears
authorities in charge have not given it the needed attention. If precautions had been taken
upon warnings of such looming dangers such as that reported by the Melcom staff days before
the collapse, that disaster could have been averted or its impact mitigated.

2.2 DEFINITION OF BUILDING COLLAPSE

According to Fadamiro and Odulami (2002), a building is an enclosure for spaces designed for
specific use, meant to control local climate, and structures for human habitation which must be
safe for the occupants. Buildings as structural entities must be capable of securing self by
transmitting weights to the ground (Fadamiro & Odulami, 2002). Buildings are meant to provide
conveniences and shelter to the people; however, on the contrary they are posing threats and
dangers to people either during or after construction as a result of poor standards.

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The recurring incidence of building collapse, as chronicled above have claimed innocent lives
and injured others. Collapse as a whole occurs when part or whole body of a structure fails and
suddenly fall down (Arilesere, 2002). It also implies that the structure, as a result of this failure,
could not meet the purpose for which it was meant. Complete building collapse is an extreme
case of building failure. It means the super-structure crashes down totally or partially (Arilesere,
2002).

Building failure occurs when there is a defect in one or more elements of the building caused by
the inability of the materials making up the components of such building elements to perform
their original function(s) effectively, which may finally lead to building collapse (Olusola, Atta &
Ayangade, 2002). A building is expected to meet certain basic requirements such as build
ability, design performance, cost effectiveness, quality, safety and timely completion
(Olusola,Atta &Ayangade, 2002).

Generally, buildings are expected to be elegant, able to withstand seismic activity and
functional but many projects constructed do not meet some of these basic requirements. Many
studies have been carried out and various workshops organised, particularly in Accra and
Kumasi, (the two largest cities in the country), by various bodies, government agencies and
institutions with the aim of looking into the causes of these incidences, but the problem still
persists.

2.3 CAUSES OF BUILDING COLLAPSE

There are many factors that cause building collapses. According to Olusola (2002), structural
design and quality management are imperative in building construction. The quality
management entails material variability, testing variability, judgment factor, contractors’
variability, poorly skilled workmen and unprofessional conduct. Buildings fail mainly through
ignorance, negligence and greed (Bolaji, 2002). Ignorance comes into play when incompetent
personnel are put in charge of design, construction or inspection. One of the major areas of
negligence is in specification writing where that of a past project is adopted without cross
checking those areas that need improvement, addition or omission.

16 | P a g e
Greed on the part of building contractors e.g. diversion of building materials, cement in
particular, meant for the production on the client’s site to his own site, the use of sub-standard
materials so as to achieve high profit, etc. In discussing the issue of building collapse, distinction
must be made between buildings, which fail during construction or within their service life and
to those that fail after their service life, which is usually 25 years (Olusola, 2002).

The inadequacies in the brief supplied by the clients can bring about defects even at the
inception of the project when clients fail to give all the necessary information on the functional
requirements of the building (Fadamiro, 2002). He further said that design deficiencies also
stem from calculation errors, bearing support problems, deformation, secondary stresses,
elastic cracking, temperature and shrinkage problems, detailing and drafting problems, errors in
assumed loading, changes and alterations in existing buildings; all contributing substantially to
building structural failures, and building collapse.

Foundation is one of the major structural members of any building and any problem arising
from it will surely affect the whole building. Fadamiro (2002) averred that the crushing and
collapse of concrete footing or other foundation members are usually due to unequal
settlements which may be caused by changing sub-grade condition or by wrong assumptions in
the design, inadequate or unequal support for foundations, soil and ground water movements
as well as expanding soils. Hence, the most common form of abuse of foundation occurs due to
abnormal situations especially in structures being converted to new use or having additional
floors.

Natural factors that result into building collapse may include rainfall, temperature, pressure,
etc. Whenever there is a heavy downpour of rain, there is a possibility that one or more
buildings (completed or uncompleted), somewhere may cave in (Chinwokwu, 2000). The fact
remains that this is a natural factor that cannot be stopped. Buildings therefore need to be
constructed adequately, bearing in mind such uncontrollable factors. The need for stringent
quality control in material utilization within the construction industry around the world today

17 | P a g e
cannot be overemphasized (Olusola, 2002). The neglect of quality control in the construction
industry has resulted in many of collapse buildings in the past and present years which have
claimed many lives.

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 CHAPTER 3

3.0 DATA SOURCES

3.1 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA

This section basically details the sources of data and how the investigation was carried out.

The following secondary and primary data were collected by the research team;
 The Environmental and Engineering Geology Map of the Greater Accra Metropolitan
Area (GAMA).
 Soil Classification Map of the site.
 Satellite imagery of the site: Google Earth (DigitalGlobe: 7th December, 2004, 23rd
January, 2007, 15th December, 2008, 1st December, 2010); Google Earth (GeoEye: 1st
April, 2013.)
 Site photographs; before collapse, debris pile structure prior to rescue excavation
efforts.
 Operational reports and data on the incident.

3.2 INFORMATION FROM SURVIVING VICTIMS AND EYE WITNESSES

The experiences of those who survived the collapse of the building, combined with those
outside, as captured by the media, have given clues as to what happened to the Achimota
Melcom building.
When survivors were asked if they remembered any incident before the collapse, they
responded that, they observed the following:

 Cracks in some of the pillars days before the collapse.

 A shaky pillar just before the collapse.
 Creaky Sound in pillars just before collapse.
 An explosion before collapse.
 Total collapse in a matter of seconds.

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3.2.1 Cracks in some of the pillars days before collapse.
• One eyewitness said he saw one of the pillars of the wall with cracks the previous Sunday
afternoon. The following Monday, another crack was noticed on another pillar but a
mason was called to work on it.
• The eyewitness further said she had earlier seen the cracks about three days ago when
she was decorating the pillars.
• Another eyewitness said he had also seen the cracks on the pillars and confirmed that
pictures were taken of it to be sent to the head office.
• He visited the mall days before the disaster occurred and realized the building was weak,
having cracks in it. His claims were confirmed by some surviving staff of the mall who
told Joy News (an FM radio station in Accra) that they noticed cracks in some of the
pillars three days earlier and reported to their supervisors.
3.2.2 Shaking, cracking, sound in pillars just before collapse.
• A member of staff said, “we were at devotion and we heard the sound from one of the
pillars. So we were about to run and all of a sudden the building broke and fell on us.”
• Another staff added, “we were at our morning devotion, when I realized that the pillar I
was standing by was cracking… when I heard the cracking, it didn’t even take two
minutes before the building just collapsed. It took a long while before I was eventually
rescued. I was helped by one of the rescuers who saw my hand…”
• The last thing this second staff saw before the incident was the shaking pillar.
3.2.3 An explosion before collapse.
• According to eye witnesses, the building collapsed after an explosion, injuring workers,
shoppers, pedestrians and cracked the windscreens of nearby vehicles.
3.2.4 Total Collapsed in a matter of seconds.
• “The building just collapsed”.
• “…sudden collapse of the building”.
• An eyewitness said he saw the building caving in slowly1, around 9:36 am, minutes after
business had commenced.

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Fig.1 The Key words used by victims and eye witnesses can be visualised below.

Source: Jigsaw Analytics Word Cloud2 of victims and eye-witness account

3.3 OUTLINE DESCRIPTION, KEY FEATURES AND PHOTOS

The Achimota Melcom Building had six levels including the ground floor as level one (1). This
investigation followed the convention used on structural drawings where floors are designated
as levels with level one (1) being the ground floor.

It was started after January, 2007 (Satellite imagery 23rd January, 2007 did not capture it), and
completed by December, 2008 (Satellite imagery on 15th December, 2008 captures it at near
roofing level).

1
With increased fear there is the perception of time passing slowly, (Campbell and Bryant 2007).
2
Shows the key words used throughout the account.

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 Picture 3. Time sliced satellite imagery of the collapsed building site.

Source: Google Earth

From picture 3 above, it is observed that in 2007 the building was not in place as the site is
captured in the Google Earth shot. However in 2008, the same site is captured with some
activity of construction at a certain floor then in 2010 it was again captured with the roof in
place signifying the completion or near completion of the building.
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The gross floor dimensions were approximately 26m x 24m. The building had a light weight roof
supported on steel rafters and concrete columns above level 6.
Picture 4. Irregular column distances.

Source: Digital Globe: 15th December, 2008

It is evident from the 15th December, 2008 satellite imagery (picture 4) that column centres had
shifted on the grid. An implication of this is that some columns will bear more load than
expected (1bearing support problems) compromising the structural integrity of the building. The
suspended reinforced concrete floors were cast monolithically in situ on standard concrete
beams and in situ concrete columns and walls.

The foundation comprised strip and pad footing, evident from foundation excavations on site,
during rescue operation. The Achimota Melcom building did not have any building permit from
the Accra Metropolitan Assembly, and so did not suffer the scrutiny of its Building Bye-Laws.

(Fadamiro, 2002)

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3.4 INVESTIGATIONS (SOILS, GEOLOGY AND SEISMOLOGY)

Detail of soil structure, geological and seismological factors of the building site were considered
as part for the investigation.

3.4.1 SOIL STRUCTURE OF BUILDING SITE

Soil group of the site is Acrisol described by the World reference base for soil resources 2006 as
an argic horizon that has a CEC of less than 24 cmolc kg-1 clay2 in some part to a maximum
depth of 50 cm below its upper limit and belongs to Soils with clay-enriched subsoil but of low
base status and low-activity clay.

3.4.2 GEOLOGY OF BUILDING SITE

The site falls under the Quartz schist geological unit, in the zone of metamorphic basement
rocks of Middle-Late Precambrian age, known under the Ghana Geological Survey classification
as the Dahomeyan System. This unit has been described generally by the Ghana Geological
Survey Department (field mapping 2003-2005) as follows: “Fresh rock has good bearing
capacity and slope stability and is resistant to weathering. In weathering zones, rock parts easily
along schistosity plane. Clayey soil develops in flat and depressed areas. Laterite soil has good
bearing properties and is used as fill material for road construction. The clayey soil has very
poor foundation properties because it expands and contracts according to moisture contents.”
Thus the clayey content of the Acrisol soil layer could have made the site a little if not
vulnerable to foundation failure. Bad construction site practices such as allowing water to
stagnate in foundation pits could also have worsened the situation further, particularly with the
absence of official supervision, and could have created a localised and very precarious 1poor
foundation bearing situation for the site.

1
Fadamiro (2002)

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3.4.3 SEISMOLOGY OF THE BUILDING SITE
Within a 300 to 400 meter radius of the site (south-westward, to the west, and to the north-
west) rests a thrust and low angle reverse geological fault line observed and reasonably well
established by the Geological Survey Department (GSD) of Ghana (field mapping 2003-2005).

3.4.4 EARTH TREMOR EFFECTS

An earth tremor hit certain parts of Accra in the early hours of 16th February, 2011 but
unfortunately, there was no tracking devise to pinpoint the epicenter and its impact. The earth
tremor of approximately 3.5 to 4.0 magnitude on the Modified Mercalli Scale (See appendix 1)
occurred at the following areas: Kasoa, Weija, Tantra Hills, Airport Residential Area, East Legon,
Achimota and other earthquake prone areas in the city. See appendix 2 for the news item.

According to the Geological Survey Department, the country has been without any useful
earthquake detecting devices for some time now. This makes it impossible to detect the source
and measure of the impact of the earth tremor. Picture 4 shows the fault line path of the earth
tremor in relation to the location of the building. The arrows show the location of the Melcom
Building 300 metres away from the fault line. There is high probability that, the earth tremor
was a contributing factor to the weakening of the building judging by its distance from the
disaster scene.

The satellite imagery proved that the building had been completed when this earth tremor took
place. This suggests that the earth tremor could be a contributing factor to the weakening of
the structure and the eventual collapse of the building.

This research however, took into account the close presence of a thrust and low angle reverse
geological fault 315 m away, the earth tremor of approximately 4.0 magnitude on February 16
2011, which shook the north western parts of Accra where the fault and incident site are, and
thus, modelled the Achimota Melcom building for a better understanding of debris throw
direction(s) – from picture angles – which depicts which pillars were the weakest and possible
impact of the earthquake on the building.

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 Picture 5. The Location of the building vis-à-vis the low angle reverse geological fault line.

Source: Google Earth

Picture 6. Front view of the Melcom Building (arrowed 3D model)

]
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 Source: Google Earth
The three (3) dimensional model (Picture 6) depicts the front view of the Melcom Building
positioned in its real geographic setting on Google earth. The collapsed debris was thrown
backwards… a scenario which basic physics will indicate that a column(s) at the back failed first,
hence, the backward throw. From the time slice satellite imagery (Picture 3), the Melcom
Building was completed in 2008 and the earth tremor occurred in 2011. This shows that the
building was in existence before the tremor took place hence could have contributed to the
possible weakening of the structure prior to the collapse.

Picture 7. Collapse direction of the Melcom Building (3D model)

Source: Google Earth

The arrows in picture 7 above depict the direction of fall of the building; backwards and in the
direction of the closest edge of the low angle reverse geological fault line 300m away. This
shows that the earth tremor which occurred in that area could have been a contributing factor
to the weakening of the building prior to its collapse.

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3. 5 TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE EXAMINATION
The Technical Advisory Committee on Geological Disasters of NADMO conducted a physical on-
site visual surface inspection of the debris and observed the following among others:

 That some columns appeared to be decorative (seemed not to be providing support to

the structure)
 The appearance and nature of the concrete looked like that of the honey-combing type
which is a sign of weakness.
 That there were flaws in the design and construction as well as the reinforcements; as
the iron rods appeared inadequate and their tying was poor.

Picture 8 below shows that the collapse of the building was in the pancake format (layers falling
on each other) as a result of weak pillars and it fell in the west south west direction. Columns
failed and the concrete fascia slabs were seen directly packed on top of each other.

Picture 8. Backward throw of debris

Source: Disaster scene pictures.

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3.6 POST-OCCUPANCY ALTERATIONS

Preliminary investigations indicate that Melcom Group of Companies was the only occupant of
the building and had occupied it since May 2012, using the first three (3) levels as shopping
space. Investigations also support the assertion that management of Melcom Group of
Companies acquired the top floors in anticipation of an increase in sales due to the Christmas
festivities and used them to warehouse their merchandise.

There are no records to the effect that the later acquisition of the top floors by Melcom for
warehousing was accompanied by structural changes. This extra load on critical columns could
have aggravated the precarious situation of the building, and could have been the last straw
that broke the camel’s back.

3.6 POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL COLLAPSED SCENARIO

The evidence gathered from the disaster scene and the subsequent analysis is illustrated in
figure 2 below.

Figure 2. A scenario of the sequence of structural fatigue leading to the collapse of the building.

A. Structure completed hurriedly on the blind side of regulatory bodies (sub standard work done)
B. Seismic waves hit the building, 16th February, 2011, South-West end hardest.
C. Post occupancy tenancy alterations, November/December, 2012 warehousing top floors leads
to failure of South-Western columns on 7th November, 2012.
D. Subsequent failure of internal columns.
E. Concrete fascia slabs are thrown in a south west direction, indicating where columns first failed.

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 CHAPTER 4

4.0 NADMO’S CAPACITY IN THE COORDINATION OF THE RESPONSE TO THE MELCOM DISASTER

4.1 INTRODUCTION
The 1965 United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 2034 called on all nations to
establish mechanisms to manage disasters and emergencies. A later resolution 49/22 of 1994
carried this further by inaugurating an International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. This
Strategy triggered the birth of the National Disaster Management Organisation by an Act of
Parliament No. 517, in 1996. NADMO’s Mandate is “To manage disasters by co-ordinating the
resources of government institutions and non-governmental agencies, and developing the
capacity of communities to respond effectively to disasters and improve the livelihoods of their
citizens through social mobilisation, employment generation and poverty reduction project”.

4.2 CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT

In assessing NADMO's preparedness and capability for the Melcom disaster this research
sought to identify evidence for the following:
 Readiness for the incident.
 A co-ordinated response to the incident.
 Effective communication and speed of transmitting vital information.
 Effective assessment of the building’s plan vis a vis rescue operations.
 Effective Identification of logistical solutions and direction of vital relief.
 Effective mobilisation of stakeholders and a call upon their logistical support.
 Effective reduction of possible deaths.
 Post disaster victim support.

For this assessment, a study of operational reports and data on the incident was made.

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This research quantified the findings by a score each, for the eight (8) point criteria used in
defining the level of preparedness and capability in handling the Melcom disaster. This was
based on a 1 – 3 score.

 One (1) representing low capability/capacity,

 Two (2) is medium capability/capacity,
 Three (3) is high capability/capacity,

Weights were assigned to each criteria based on incident reports, NADMO Research Unit’s
assessment, and NADMO Man Made Disasters Departmental assessment. These were
summed and the average calculated on a scale of 1 – 9 was used as the indicator of
NADMO’s effectiveness in managing the Melcom disaster. (See table 1.)

4.2.1 Evidence of readiness for the incident.

 Existence of Contingency Plan (CP) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
 NADMO Hotline active.
 Eight (8) member advance Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) team dispatched to the
scene with some rescue equipment. A second set of forty (40) rescue workers sent to
the scene within 30 minutes of the departure of the advance team.

4.2.2 Evidence of a co-ordinated response to the incident.

 An Incident Command Post (ICP) was set up on site, as well as an Emergency Operations
Centre (EOC) at the NADMO Headquarters, to coordinate response and relief
operations.
 Personnel from the various agencies forming the rescue team were organized into a
two-shift system to run a 24 hour non-stop schedule for the entire duration of the
rescue operations (Wednesday, 7th – Sunday, 11th November, 2012).

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4.2.3 Evidence of effective communication and speed of transmitting vital information.
 The advance team started sending information on the operations. They assessed the
situation and made requests for additional resources through the Incident Commander
(IC) who in turn prompted EOC. The EOC acted swiftly to provide the needed resources.
NADMO’s own resources as well as those of other technical agencies and the private
sector were quickly mobilized and provided to the incident scene for deployment.

4.2.4 Evidence of effective assessment of the building’s plan vis a vis rescue operations.
 Copies of the building plan, particularly ground floor plans, were not readily available
and this hampered the rescue operations.

4.2.5 Evidence of effective Identification of logistical solutions and direction of vital relief.
 Most of NADMO’s emergency workers were not in the appropriate protective or safety
gear, such as helmets, gloves, nose masks, among others. This reduced public &
stakeholder expectations of NADMO and attracted negative reportage in the media.
 Victims who could not be reached readily were supplied with oxygen and water to
sustain them.

4.2.6 Evidence of effective mobilisation of stakeholders and logistical support.

 A tall list of participating Agencies, Organisations (public and private) and list of
equipment by Agencies and Organizations attached in the appendices (4-7) tell a story
of effective mobilisation of stakeholders and their logistical support.

4.2.7 Evidence of effective reduction of possible deaths.

 The rescue of fifty (50) victims representing sixty two per cent (62%) of the total number
of victims, and seventy five per cent (75%) of total live rescues, within twenty four (24)
hours, effectively reduced the number of possible deaths.

 The rescue operation followed the chaos theory which states that most victims should
be rescued within the first 24 to 72 hours. This time period defines the performance

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 window for Emergency Medical Service (EMS) action as people begin dying and their
morbidity increases with every passing hour.
For day-to-day EMS performance standard called the "Golden Hour", EMS systems must
be able to rescue, triage, stabilize and transport a victim to a hospital for appropriate
care within one (1) hour. This Golden Hour standard was largely met. In the sense that
the victims were moved to the hospital within an hour, except those who were sent to
the Korle-bu Teaching Hospital which sometimes took more than an hour.

4.2.8 Evidence of post disaster victim support.

 Information from the Relief & Reconstruction Department indicated that support to
post disaster victims by NADMO involved coordination of counselling sessions by the
National Counselling Association for the victims.

On a scale of 1-9 for preparedness, NADMO’s performance was scored as 6; indicating a high
response capability for the incident.

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Table 1. NADMO’s Preparedness and Capacity/Capability Assessment Table for the Achimota Melcom Disaster
INCIDENT RESEARCH UNIT’S MAN MADE’S
CRITERIA REPORTS ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT TOTAL
1. Readiness for the incident. 3 2 1 6
2. A co-ordinated response to the incident. 3 3 3 9
3. Effective communication and speed of transmitting vital information. 3 3 3 9
4. Effective assessment of the building's plan vis a vis rescue operations. 0 0 0 0
5. Effective Identification of logistical solutions and direction of vital relief. 1 2 1 4
6. Effective mobilisation of stakeholders and logistical support. 3 3 3 9
7. Effective reduction of possible deaths. 3 2 2 7
8. Post disaster victim support. 0 2 3* 5

1= very low, 2 – 3 = low, 4 – 5 = medium, 6 – 7 = high, 8 – 9 = very high, Average = 6.

Overall Capacity = 6 [of 0 – 9].
*Relief & Reconstruction Department’s Assessment

On a scale of 1-9 NADMO’s capacity is ranked 6, which is high.

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 CHAPTER 5
5.0 OUTCOME AND CONCLUSION

1. It can be inferred from the investigations that the management of Melcom Group of
Companies ignored the early warning of the disaster. This evidence is supported by the
testimony of staff victims. There were cracks in the pillars and some columns of the
building, yet the officials did not take a critical look at the cracks.
2. The collapse of the building could also be attributed to the use of poor building
materials in the construction of the building.
3. The Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) building inspectors failed to carry out thorough
work on the building. This was confirmed by the fact that the building had no permit at
the time of the disaster.
4. Even though not backed by structural tests, information gathered from experts gives a
strong indication that the use of the upper floors for warehousing without structural
changes to fit storage purpose also could have contributed to the collapse of the
building.
5. Extensive analysis shows the possibility that the earth tremor of approximately 3.5 to
4.0 magnitudes on the Modified Mercalli Scale, which occurred in 2011 at Achimota and
other places in the city could have significantly impacted on the building. The accident
occurred just 300 meters from a thrust and low angle reverse geological fault line,
observed and reasonably well established by the Geological Survey Department of
Ghana. The earth tremor might have led to the disturbance of the foundation or a
settlement of it, thereby causing cracks. This calls for a detailed seismological study of
the area and detailed inspection of buildings, particularly the Fidelity Bank which
occupied a structure of the same height, constructed by the same contractor and next
to the collapsed building, which might have also suffered similar ‘weakening effect’.
6. NADMO’s preparedness assessment indicates that the organisation is well prepared to
respond to emergency situations.

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 7. Risk level analysis in relation to the preparedness of NADMO was in the very low to low
risk range, whereas that for the accident was in the medium to high risk range. This
indicates the effective role NADMO played in the disaster.

5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Structural Audit should be carried out to confirm the integrity of all high-rise buildings in
the country to avert further potential collapses. This must be a major project to be
spearheaded by the Ministries of Water Resources Works and Housing, and Local
Government and Rural Development.
2. Enact proactive laws that would make it mandatory for all high-rise and commercial
buildings to be built by only qualified building professionals at all stages of the construction
process.
3. Proper and rigorous supervision and monitoring before, during and after construction
should be ensured so that all high-rise and commercial buildings are built according to
building codes and specifications.
4. Building bye-laws and regulations should be reviewed and appropriate amendments made
to deter estate developers from engaging untrained and unqualified tradesmen with
limited knowledge in design, planning and materials.
5. Government must invest into both workplace safety and public safety by way of
developing regulations and ensuring its enforcement to guarantee the safety of the
citizenry both at the workplaces and in public places.
6. “Death traps” such as deteriorated and abandoned buildings be immediately demolished.
7. Buildings must be designed to withstand earth quakes.
8. We recommend that the permit granting institutions are adequately resourced with both
personnel and equipment to enhance their operations.
9. One may suspect that there may be a lot of other similar buildings within Accra and other
cities waiting for their day to collapse. A national Task Force must be set up to inspect
existing structures to determine their strength and possible life span remaining and the
way it is being used and those found inadequate must be retrofitted or demolished. There

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 is also the need to start doing deformation measurements on all high rise buildings to
know whether they are sinking, tilting or swinging.
10. The Government must not only educate developers and the public to use professionals in
this field but also enforce the law to make it mandatory to do so.
11. All buildings are required by law to be insured against all these risks and more particularly
commercial buildings. This law must be fully enforced. The process of insurance must
require the examination of basic parameters of the structure; this will also help in quality
control.
12. A provisional seismic risk map of Ghana places metropolitan and municipal areas in the
coastal regions of Ghana in either zone 3 or 4 seismic risk areas. NADMO and its
stakeholders must develop a set of criteria for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) compliance to
mitigate the potential disaster effects from seismic hazards.
13. All NADMO emergency workers should don the appropriate protective and safety
equipment, such as: helmets, gloves, nose masks, and boots among others, when
dispatched to emergency scenes.
14. We recommend that NADMO carries out further investigation to find out whether
Melcom paid the required compensation to the affected victims.
15. NADMO must follow-up on victims and families (especially the traumatised) to ensure they
have fully come out of the shock of the disaster.

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 REFERENCES

1. Fadamiro, O. A. (2002). An Examination Of The Causes And Effects Of Building Collapse

In Nigeria, Journal of Design and Built Environment Vol. 9, December 2011, pp. 37–47.

2. Arilesere, M. O. (2000). The Role Of Professionals In Averting Building Collapse, Pp. 60-
68. A paper presented at a workshop on Building collapse: Causes, prevention and remedies.
The Nigerian Institutes of Builders (NIOB), Lagos.

3. Olusola, K.O., Ata, O. & Ayangade, J.A. (2002). Quality And Structural Strength Of
Sandcrete Blocks Production Ile-Ife:
A Preliminary Investigation. Journal of E n v i r o n m e n t a l Technology, 1
(1&2), Pp. 136-142. F e d e r a l University of Technology, Akure, Nigeria.

4. Bolaji E.O. (2002). Building Materials Specification And Enforcement On Site. In D.R.
Ogunsemi (Ed.). Workshop by Nigerian Institute of Building (NIOB), Ondo State, Nigeria.

5. Chinwokwu, G. (2000). The Role of Professionals In Averting Building Collapse, Pp.12-28.

Proceedings of a Seminar on Building Collapse in Nigeria. The Nigerian Institute of
Building (NIOB), Lagos.

6. World Reference Base For Soil Resources (2006). A Framework For International
Classification, Correlation And Communication, 2006 Edition. Pp. 11-15. World Soil
Resources Reports 103. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome.

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 The following is an abbreviated description of the 12 levels of Modified Mercalli intensity.

APPENDIX: 1
TheI.Modified
Not felt except by a Intensity
Mercalli very few under especially favourable conditions.
Scale
II. Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors of buildings.
III. Felt quite noticeably by persons indoors, especially on upper floors of buildings. Many people do
not recognize it as an earthquake. Standing motor cars may rock slightly. Vibrations similar to
the passing of a truck. Duration estimated.
IV. Felt indoors by many, outdoors by few during the day. At night, some awakened. Dishes,
windows, doors disturbed; walls make cracking sound. Sensation like heavy truck striking
building. Standing motor cars rocked noticeably.
V. Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes, windows broken. Unstable objects
overturned. Pendulum clocks may stop.
VI. Felt by all, many frightened. Some heavy furniture moved; a few instances of fallen plaster.
Damage slight.
VII. Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built
ordinary structures; considerable damage in poorly built or badly designed structures; some
chimneys broken.
VIII. Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable damage in ordinary substantial
buildings with partial collapse. Damage great in poorly built structures. Fall of chimneys, factory
stacks, columns, monuments and walls. Heavy furniture overturned.
IX. Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed frame structures thrown
out of plumb. Damage great in substantial buildings, with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off
foundations.
X. Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame structures destroyed
with foundations. Rails bent.
XI. Few, if any (masonry) structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed. Rails bent greatly.
XII. Damage total. Lines of sight and level are distorted. Objects thrown into the air.

Source: Abridged from The Severity of an Earthquake, a United States Geological Survey General Interest
Publication.

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APPENDIX: 2
Earth tremor hit certain parts of Accra
www.dailyguideghana.com By William Yaw Owusu. Thursday 17th February, 2011.

Earth tremor hit certain parts of Accra in the early hours of 16th February, 2011, but unfortunately there
was no tracking devise to pinpoint the epicenter and its impact.

Residents said they were woken by the tremor between 4-4:30am in areas around Kasoa, Weija, Tantra
Hills, Airport Residential Area, East Legon, Achimota and other earthquake prone areas in the city. To
make matters worse, no seismologist could tell how yesterday’s natural happening which shook suburbs
in north western parts of Accra for few seconds came about.

According to the Geological Survey Department (GSD), the country has been without any useful
earthquake detecting equipment for the past three years.

John Agyei Duodu confirmed to the Daily Guide in Accra yesterday that there was indeed shaking of the
earth but said nobody could tell where it originated from or how it happened.

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APPENDIX: 3

Statistics of victims

HOSPITAL NO.ON ADMISSION NO.TREATED AND DISCHARGED NO.DEAD TOTAL AFFECTED

M F TOTAL M F TOTAL M F TOTAL M F TOTAL

37 MILITARY 5 - 5 16 12 28 6 4 10 28 15 43
HOSPITAL

KORLE-BU HOSPITAL 1 - 1 1 3 4 - - - 2 3 5

ACHIMOTA HOSPITAL - - - 18 10 28 - - - 18 10 28

POLICE HOSPITAL - - - - 1 1 1 3 4 1 4 5

GRAND TOTAL 6 - 6 35 26 61 7 7 14 49 32 81

Data sources: NADMO Operations Department Final Incident Report.

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 APPENDIX: 4
List of Participating Agencies/Organizations
1. Office of the President

2. Ministry of the Interior

3. Ministry of Defence

4. Ministry of Health

5. Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology

6. Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development

7. National Disaster Management Organization

8. National Security Secretariat

9. Ghana Armed Forces

10. Ghana Health Service

11. Ghana Police Service

12. Ghana National Fire Service

13. Accra Metropolitan Assembly

14. Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority

15. National Ambulance Service

16. Ghana Red Cross Society

17. Zoomlion (Sanitary Taskforce)

18. Melcom Group

19. Disaster Volunteer Groups

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 APPENDIX: 5
List of Participating Private Sector Organizations
1. Zoomlion (Sanitary Taskforce)

2. Engineers & Planners

3. Melcom Group

4. China Railway Engineering Corporation

5. Various Media Houses

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 APPENDIX: 6
List of Equipment by Agencies/ Organizations
1. National Disaster Management Organization - Vehicles
Concrete & Metal cutters
Lamps & touch lights
Pay loaders
Excavators
Toggle ropes
Reflective vests
Nose and mouth guards

2. National Security Secretariat - Earth moving equipment

Tipper trucks
Pay loaders
Excavators
Compressors
Power tools
Backhoes
Ambulances
Chairs and Canopies

3. Ghana Armed Forces - JCV Backhoe Digger

Pay loaders
Bulldozer

4. National Ambulance Service - Ambulances

5. Zoomlion (Sanitary Taskforce) - Tipper trucks

Cranes
Hammers
Concrete & Metal cutters
Excavators
Mega phones
6. Engineers & Planners - Earth Moving Equipment

7. China Railway Engineering Corporation - Mobile crane

8. Monkarzel Construction Limited - 1 Excavator

9. High Brains/GHire - Compressors and Lighting

10. USAID - Lighting system

11. CHIRE Ltd - Lighting system

12. Manphy Development - Lighting system

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 APPENDIX: 7
List of Donor Organizations
1 Global Evangelical Church
2 Achimota Market Women Association
3 Melcom Company
4 Zoomlion
5 High Brains Limited
6 G-Hire
7 K. Odame Enterprise
8 Confidence Mineral Water
9 Erata Hotel Limited
10 Anonymous
11 Miss Lillian Asante & Gertrude Segbefia
12 Attaah Maame
13 Zoozoo Restaurant
14 Shoprite
15 Isaac Andoh & Yaa Rose Kponyo
16 Kings Meal Bread
17 Vantage Real Estates
18 Anti Mary
19 Anointed Revival Ministry
20 Trudy Catering Services
21 Francis Amoah
22 Isaac Andoh & Rose Kponyo
23 Odo Rice
24 Alhaji Issah Mohammed
25 Kinsby Hotel Limited
26 Vero’s Bakery
27 Augustine & Rebecca Arkofu
28 Melcom Company Limited
29 SOMM Naturals
30 International Central Gospel Church
31 Sisters Handmaid of Sevine Redeemer of Accra
32 Woolworth
33 Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development

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