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Battlefield Formations
The previous pages have depicted the legion formations in schematic terms, following the pattern set by the illustrations one finds in
books. But these are idealistic formations based on perfect arrangement of the ranks and files, full strength units, and usually represent
what we might call parade ground formations.
What is missing is a clear discussion of the actual formation as it might have existed in battle.
The illustration left below shows the 80 man century as it is often depicted. The 80 men are arranged in 8 ranks and 10 files. In front of
them are the signifer, the centurion, the optio and the cornicen
The illustration on the right below shows the same century with some significant differences that are explained below.
The main problem with the standard diagram is that it supposes that the unit is at full strength. This was probably a rare exception.
When we do know actual troop strengths it is clear that legions were always understrength, sometimes by very large percentages.
Orange: There are four officers sown at the front of the company: a signifier, a centurion, an optio, and a cornicen. All but the centurion
were drawn from the ranks of the 80 man unit itself. The three orange circles indicate that three of the 80 men are officers, not included
in the ranks and files.
Green: The legions had excellent medical care. At least some of the doctors were non-combatant personnel, but it seems that some of what
we would call medics were ordinary soldiers trained for the job. For a combat unit of 80 men two medics do not seem excessive. They are
present on the battlefield but behind, not in, the rank and file formation.
Magenta: At least by the late republic the legions had artillery as a regular part of their equipment. In theory, at least, each century had a
scorpio and each cohort had a ballista. Two men are detached from the century to man its scorpio. One man is detached from each of the
six centuries of the cohort to man its ballista.
Blue: Military units are always understrength. Recruiting quotas may not be filled. There are inevitable losses during basic training.
Illness on the campaign has been a leading cause of death until modern times. And, of course, there are those killed and wounded in
fighting. The number of men a unit would be understrength could be anything up to half of its strength. This particular century is shown
as missing 9 soldiers.
A Battlefield Formation
The illustration on the right shows the same century in battle formation, which is different
from the parade-ground formation shown above. The centurion takes his place in the front
rank of the right file, the place of honor. We are fairly certain of this placement for the
centurion. As he takes his place in the first rank, one more soldier is added to the last rank
which now has 4 instead of the 3 in the parade formation.
The cornicen, the optio and the signifer have moved to the back of the formation.
The decision to place the standards behind the formation is probably controversial.
Almost every representation will show the standards at the front of the century.
Delbruck (Vol 1: p 278) discussed the probable placement of the standards and signaling
horns at some length. He concludes that the standards were behind the maniples in the
pre-cohort legion formation but in the second rank in the cohort formation. The rationale
for the move is not well explained. It is with some degree of trepidation that one argues
with Delbruck, however the placement of the standards at the front of the formation
simply defies understanding. The standards were the symbols of the unit, highly valued by
the soldiers, and highly prized trophies by the enemy. The soldiers holding the standards
needed both hands and had only a small shield that was virtually useless. In other words,
they were defenseless. It is nearly impossible to imagine placing these men in the first or
second ranks of the unit.
There is some slight evidence in Caesar's Gallic War commentary [2:25] to support this
point of view. In a battle with the Nervii he records that all of the centurions in the fourth
cohort of the 12th legion had been killed, and one standard bearer killed and the standard
lost. There would have been 6 centurions and 6 standards in the cohort. If all had been in
the front ranks there would almost certainly have been more standard bearers killed,
especially considering that they were highly prized trophies that could not defend
themselves.
The optio can fulfill two important functions from the back of the formation. First he can keep good order among the troops, ensure that
no one tries to slip away from the formation, and move men around to fill in gaps or weak spots as they occur. He is also in a good
position to receive and relay commands from the tribune or legate.
Behind the optio are the two medical orderlies, distinguishable by their silver armor. These are men from the century itself, trained as
orderlies. They have 8 servants to carry the two litters.
To one side there are two servants with a mule carrying water. Meeting the need for water would be critical. These soldiers fought in the
summer months, under the Mediterranean sun, and inside metal armor. Lack of water could easily lead to heat stroke, incapacitating the
soldier. The mule could carry about 250 pounds, roughly 30 gallons (113 liters) of water. Counting soldiers, officers and servants, the
century depicted has 79 men. That would give them each about 3 pints of water per mule load. During a long battle the water would have
to be replenished.
The soldiers detached to handle the artillery are not depicted since they would be located elsewhere on the battlefield.
The placement of the two servants with the water and the two medical orderlies with their litter is also speculative, but reasonable. We
know that the Romans had good medical care for the wounded soldiers; for that to be at all effective some orderlies would have to be near
the action to evacuate the wounded during the battle whenever that was possible. As for the water, men fighting in the summer heat
would require lots of water if the battle extended for any length of time at all. There would almost certainly be any number of other
individuals running around behind the front line. But, since we do not know about their roles or identities, I elected not to try to include
any additional figures in the drawing.
At the bottom of the illustration the first rank of the second echelon is shown to give a sense of the space between the lines.
The groups of 7 horsemen behind each cohort represent the tribunes who may have had command of the cohorts. The use of tribunes as
cohort commanders may not have begun until the empire, so if they should be omitted if the army were thought of as republican. There is
also the possibility that the tribunes were more administrators than battle commanders. However, as Delbruck notes, once the tactical
unit of the army became the cohort it would seem to be a military necessity to have a single commander, and one that could be reached
more easily and reliably than the centurion.
"In time, perhaps under Augustus or possibly not until Hadrian, the tribunes also became permanent commanders of the
cohorts, a situation that actually would have been required by the military principle as early as Marius' time. The legions
continuously had six tribunes, whereas they had ten cohorts, and we are told expressly by Vegetius that the cohorts were
commanded partly by tribunes, partly by praepostiti . . . the balance . . . was provided for by holding four positions as cohort
commanders for promoted centurions." [Delbruck:Vol. 2, p 167]
Legate
"Each legion had a legate as permanent commander, perhaps as early as Caesar's time." [Delbruck:Vol. 2, p 167]
The legate's group appears behind the third echelon of the legion.
The General
Roman generals commanded from all positions but it seems that the most favored location was from a position just behind the right side
of the front line. Caesar often took a position on the right side of his army but also moved around from legion to legion during battles. In
the illustration above the general is shown just behind the first line of cohorts. There would certainly be more room for maneuver if the
general and his entourage were behind the second line instead of the first.
It is challenging to attempt to visualize just what a general's command post might have looked like. Who would be with the general?
We should probably imagine messengers coming and going constantly, keeping the general informed of developments, and relaying
commands. There would probably also be aeneatores to signal his instructions with their trumpets. The general may well have had a
personal flag, a vexillum. We know that many top commanders, certainly those after Caesar, had bodyguards. It seems likely that the
general would have at least some protection around him. And all of these individuals would need to be mounted.
The illustration below tries to flesh out these suppositions. It shows the general in front. Behind him his vexillarius is flanked by 8
aeneatores, enough to sound a signal loud enough to be heard at some distance. On either side are some of the 40 mounted bodyguards.
The Army Battlefield Formation
The next illustration shows the four legions making up the heavy infantry of the Generic Army.
This is the same diagram as the legion formation shown above, just converted to blocks instead of individual figures. the types of units are
color coded. The general and his entourage are represented by the solid orange block. The legates commanding each legion by the light
green blocks, the tribunes (who may not have commanded cohorts until the first century BCE) are purple blocks. Behind each cohort are
the small blocks representing their support men.
On either side of the legions there are wings of 12 alae and two centuries of light infantry. They are illustrated below.
This image is at a slightly larger scale than the 4 legion diagram just above. In this larger view, the support blocks can be distinguished.
The red is the medic unit, the blue represents the water supply. For the cavalry three water mules are provided for each 333 man alae
because of the needs of the horses. Behind each ala is a purple block representing the ala commander, and behind the wing is the light
green box for the wing commander. In this model the army is shown with two equal wings of cavalry on either flank. In many battles the
cavalry was used predominately on one side or the other, depending on terrain and the enemy dispositions.
The full scale drawing makes it clearer how difficult it would have been for the commander to exercise any real control over his army
once combat actually began. His knowledge of events on his left flank would be minimal and what little information he did obtain would
be outdated by the time a courier could get to him. Any orders sent back would arrive many minutes later still. This underlines the
importance of the unit commanders who must have had to exercise considerable independent authority, as, indeed, the evidence bears
out.
On either flank, just between the infantry and the cavalry are two centuries of light infantry.
The only new element added in this image are the 6 columns of additional water supply well behind the army. Long battles or
exceptionally hot weather would probably require replenishment of the supply sent forward with each century.
Conclusion
Command, Control and Chaos
This depiction of the battlefield should raise some questions about just how a general could exercise any sort of command and control
from the position shown. One needs to imagine 3 more legions like this spread out to the left. The challenge of exercising leadership over
such a battlefield is difficult to imagine. The general could see only a small piece of the actual battle and would know of other
developments only by way of messengers.
We should also not imagine a general of the caliber of Caesar being stationary during the battle. His command post would be in constant
motion. There are numerous examples of him riding from one end of a battle to the other, encouraging his men, calling for changes in
positions and reinforcements, even taking up a shield and entering the fray himself. Whenever he moved, somehow his location would
have to be communicated to his subordinate commanders so that they would know where to send messengers with reports.
One can imagine the general and his entourage on the move. Couriers trailing him around the battlefield, trying to find him and then to
catch up with his fast moving command center to deliver their messages. At various places the second and even third line units begin to
fill in the space between the lines, making travel and communications between commanders even more difficult. Dust clouds raised by the
thousands of men and horses would obscure anything that is at a distance. The noise of combat would all but drown out even the loudest
horns.
Truly, the chaos of battle cannot be pictured and can hardly even be imagined
The purpose of these models is not to suggest that any Roman army ever looked like this.
The purpose is, rather, to try to correct the error that almost all depictions of the Roman army make; that is, they omit everyone but the
rank and file soldiers from the illustrations. They do that, of course, because so little is known about them. The question is, is it better to
simply omit them or to include them even if the numbers types and placements can only be speculative.
The usefulness including them in these models is to remind the reader that there were command units on the battlefield. That is known.
That they had to have some number of men associated with them, and that they had to be located somewhere on the battlefield. Even if
the guesses made in these illustrations are incorrect, they still give a basis from which one can make changes and adjustments. In my
opinion, it is an improvement of omitting them altogether.
The scenario worked out on these pages has shown one way that the century could have moved from its tents to the battlefield. It is
important to emphasize that the model does not presume to be a definitive description of how the Romans actually moved their army. We
do not have enough information to know the details. At best, the models are reasonable guesses as to how it might have been done. But
with considerable confidence we could say that the Romans almost certainly did not do it the way these models show. With their thousand
years of experience, they surely found more effective ways of organizing their war activities than we can imagine from out distant
vantage.
It is easy to be general and somewhat vague in written descriptions: "the optio stood behind the line." But when a visual model is
constructed that ambiguity has to be resolved, the optio has to be drawn at an exact location, the word "behind" has to be given a specific
meaning. This is both the benefit and the problem with models, for we simply do not know enough to accurately represent the Roman
army. But, it is hoped that the attempt to do so can at least serve some useful purposes. Because they offer a visual clarity, they may help
generate some insights into aspects of the army that are not otherwise obvious. The realization that the army may well have moved in
columns-of-two's because of the space allocations inside the camp is an example. But even if that insight were incorrect, the process of
thinking through just how the men did get from tent to battlefield is useful. And in all cases, the models should raise questions. All of that,
I think, is good.
Above all, it is hoped that the models give a somewhat greater appreciation for the complexity of Roman warfare.
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© 2003, Gary Brueggeman. All rights reserved world wide. No part of this work may be reproduced in part or whole, in any form or by any means, without permission from the
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