Sanlakas

v. Execu/ve Secretary ‫ ׀‬GR No. 155908 ‫ ׀‬February 3, 2004 ‫ ׀‬Tinga, J.

Nature of the Case: —

GR No. 159085
Pe//oner: Sanlakas & Par'do ng Manggagawa — party-list organiza'ons
Respondent: Execu/ve Secretary Angelo Reyes

GR No. 159103
Pe//oner: Social Jus'ce Society (SJS) Officers / Members — Filipino ci'zens, taxpayers, law professors, bar reviewers
Respondent: Execu/ve Secretary Alberto G. Romulo

GR No. 159185
Pe//oner: Rep. Suplico, et. al. — Members of the House of Representa'ves
Respondent: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo & Execu've Secretary Alberto G. Romulo

GR No. 159196
Pe//oner: Aquilino Q. Pimentel — Member of Senate
Respondent: Execu/ve Secretary Alberto Romulo

SUMMARY: PGMA issued Proclama'on No. 427— Declaring a State of Rebellion & General Order No. 4 — Direc'ng
the AFP & the PNP to Suppress Rebellion. Pe''oners ques'on the validity of these declara'ons. The Court ruled that
although the declara'on of a state of rebellion is NOT NECESSARY to call upon the armed forced to suppress the
rebellion, the mere declara'on does not violate any cons'tu'onally protected rights.

—> Pe//ons are DISMISSED.

DOCTRINE: Execu've Department —> Powers & Func'ons of the President —> Commander-in-Chief

FACTS:

July 27, 2003 — “Oakwood Incident”

- Around 300 junior officers & enlisted men of the AFP stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Maka'
City, bewailing the corrup'on in the AFP
- Demanded the resigna'on of the President, the Sec. of Defense, and Chief of the PNP
- PGMA issued:
- Proclama'on No. 427 — Declaring a State of Rebellion
- General Order No. 4 — Direc'ng the AFP & the PNP to Suppress Rebellion
- By the evening of July 27, Oakwood occupa'on had ENDED

August 1, 2003
- PGMA issued Proclama'on No. 435 — Declaring that the state of Rebellion has Ceased to Exist
- Note: even though the incident had ended, PGMA did not lid the declara'on of a state of rebellion right away

- Several pe''ons were filed CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF PROCLAMATION NO. 427 & GEN. ORDER NO. 4
ISSUES:

(1) WoN the cases presents a jus/ciable controversy — NO

- Court agrees with Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclama'on No. 435 (Declaring that the state of Rebellion
has Ceased to Exist) has rendered the case MOOT.
- Court will s'll decide on the case since it is “CAPABLE OF REPETITION YET EVADING REVIEW”

Lacson v. Perez (MAY 1, 2001)

- President declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP & the PNP to suppress the rebellion
- Pe''ons were field assailing the validity of the proclama'ons
- 5 days later, President lided the declara'on of a state of rebellion
- Court held that the case was MOOT

- Since the exact same thing is happening now, the Court has decided to seile this issue once and for all!

(2) WoN pe//oners have standing

1. Sanlakas & Par'do ng Manggagawa — party-list organiza'ons

2. Social Jus'ce Society (SJS) Officers / Members — Filipino ci'zens, taxpayers, law professors, bar reviewers
3. Rep. Suplico, et. al. — Members of the House of Representa'ves
4. Aquilino Q. Pimentel — Member of Senate

- Only SUPLICO & PIMENTEL have standing as MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

- Pe''oners claim that the declara'on of a state of rebellion by the President is:
- tantamount to an exercise of Congress' emergency powers, thus impairing the lawmakers' legisla've powers
- a subterfuge to avoid congressional scru'ny into the President's exercise of mar'al law powers
- Reason: An act of the Execu've which injures the ins'tu'on of Congress causes a deriva've but nonetheless
substan'al injury, which can be ques'oned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress
can have a resort to the courts

- Sanlakas & SJS no legal standing because they will not sustain any direct injury

(3) WoN a declara/on of a state of rebellion is required to call out the armed forces — NO

Sec. 18, Art. 7, Cons'tu'on —

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under mar'al law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclama'on of mar'al law or the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in wri'ng to the Congress. The
Congress, vo'ng jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclama'on or suspension, which revoca'on shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
ini'a've of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclama'on or suspension for
a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires
it.
 The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclama'on or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any ci'zen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the proclama'on of mar'al law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of mar'al law does not suspend the opera'on of the Cons'tu'on, nor supplant the func'oning of the
civil courts or legisla've assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdic'on on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to func'on, nor automa'cally suspend the privilege of the
writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

- This provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “SEQUENCE” of “GRADUATED POWERS”

POWER CRITERIA / CONDITIONS

a. ‘Whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed

1. Calling out power
forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'

2. Power to suspend the privilege of

the writ of habeas corpus a. An actual invasion or rebellion
b. Public safety requires the exercise of such power
3. Power to declare martial law

- Sec. 18, Art. 7 DOES NOT expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion
- Cons'tu'on grants President with PRIMARILY — EXECUTIVE POWER; + COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF POWERS
- US cons'tu'onal history shows that the Commander-in-Chief powers are BROAD enough as it is, but become even
more so when coupled with EXECUTIVE POWER
- Even though 1987 Cons'tu'on restricted the President’s power as Commander-in-Chief (in response to abuses of
Marcos), it did NOT diminish President’s power as CHIEF EXECUTIVE

- THUS, the court ruled that in calling out the armed forces, a declara'on of a state of rebellion is an UTTER
SUPERFLUITY (meaning super unnecessary)
- At most, it only gives no'ce to the na'on that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to
prevent or suppress it
- The Court is only tasked to determine the LEGALITY of stuff
- The declara'on is DEVOID OF ANY LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE — so the Court doesn't even say if it’s legal or not, it jsut
simply doesn't maier

- As per the dissenters in Lacson v. Perez:

- The mere declara'on of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate cons'tu'onally protected rights
- If a state of mar'al law does not suspend the opera'on of the Cons'tu'on or automa'cally suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declara'on of a state of rebellion
could not bring about these condi'ons
 - The presiden'al issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion "with due regard to cons'tu'onal
rights.”
- Apprehensions that the military and police authori'es may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded
- A person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has
declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present

(4) WoN there is factual basis for the imposi/on of a state of rebellion — NO

Sec. 18, Art. 7, Cons'tu'on —

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any ci/zen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the proclama/on of mar/al law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

- While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within cons'tu'onal limits or in a manner
cons'tu'ng grave abuse of discre'on, none of the pe''oners here have, by way of proof, supported their asser'on
that the President acted without factual basis.

(5) WoN the issuances are tantamount to exercising mar/al law powers — NO

- The argument that the declara'on of a state of rebellion amounts to a declara'on of mar'al law and, therefore, is
a circumven'on of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indica'on that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts in the "theater of war" or that military authori'es have taken over the func'ons of civil
government. There is no allega'on of curtailment of civil or poli'cal rights. There is no indica'on that the President
has exercised judicial and legisla've powers

- There is no illustra'on that the President has aiempted to exercise or has exercised mar'al law powers

(6) WoN said declara/on cons/tutes exercise of emergency powers — NO

Sec 23(2), Art. 6, Cons'tu'on —

In 'mes of war or other na'onal emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restric'ons as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared na'onal policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolu'on of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.

- The pe''ons do not cite a specific instance where the President has aiempted to or has exercised powers beyond
her powers as Chief Execu've or as Commander-in-Chief
- The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding
of her Chief Execu've and Commander-in-Chief powers
- These are purely execu/ve powers, vested on the President by Sec'ons 1 and 18, Ar'cle VII, as opposed to the
delegated legisla/ve powers contemplated by Sec'on 23 (2), Ar'cle VI.

DISPOSITION: Pe//ons DISMISSED

DISSENTING OPINION — Sandoval-Gu2errez

- Also dissented in the case of Lacson with regard to the Court’s ruling that the case was rendered moot

- Stance: PGMA’s declara'on of a “state of rebellion” is UNCONSTITUTIONAL

- Nowhere in the Cons'tu'on does it grant the President the authority to declare a “state of rebellion” or exercise
powers which may be legally allowed only under a state of mar'al law

- If President Arroyo's only purpose was merely to exercise her "calling out power," then she could have simply
ordered the AFP to prevent or suppress what she perceived as an invasion or rebellion
- Contends that the guarantees and limita'ons in the case of invasion or rebellion are ABSENT in the declara'on of a
“state of rebellion” — not subject to clear legal restraints
- Thus, excess of power cannot be curtailed

- Recalls the abuse of power that happened in the first incident on May 1, 2001
- Police authori'es arrested without warrants certain personali'es
- In effect, PGMA placed the Philippines under mar'al law without a declara'on to that effect and without
observing the proper procedure

- Significantly, while the Oakwood event ended peacefully on the night of July 27, 2003, President Arroyo's
declara'on of a "state of rebellion" con'nued un'l the liding thereof on August 1, 2003. This means that although
the alleged rebellion had ceased, the President's declara'on con'nued to be in effect. As it turned out, several
searches and seizures took place during the extended period.

- The power of the President in 'mes of war, invasion or rebellion and during other emergency situa'ons should be
exercised jointly with Congress

- Every presiden'al claim to a power must be scru'nized with cau'on, for what is at stake is the equilibrium
established by our cons'tu'onal system
- The powers of the President are not as par'cularized as are those of Congress. Enumerated powers do not include
undefined powers, as what the majority would want to point out.
- There is no provision in our Cons'tu'on authorizing the President to declare "a state of rebellion." Not even the
cons'tu'onal powers vested upon her include such power.

DISPOSITION: Votes to GRANT the pe''ons. Declares Proclama'on No. 427 & General order No. 4 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.