Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 129670 February 1, 2000

MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge
Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No.
7610 (AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL
PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION,
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION, AND OTHER PURPOSES). His arrest was
made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that
on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that
their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that
night at petitioner's room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this
was not the first time the police received reports of petitioner's activities. An entrapment
operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 in the evening of April 3, 1997, the
police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was
staying. When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing
only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn
statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at
the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed on April 7,
1997 against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, where it was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550. 1âwphi1.nêt

On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an
Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above
Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He
is Charged.1

On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the
same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann
Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talingting. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874. In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates
mentioned in the informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse with complainants who had
been "exploited in prostitution and . . . given money [by petitioner] as payment for the said
[acts of] sexual intercourse."

No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the
nine cases.
On May 16, 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving petitioner's Omnibus Motion, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds that:

1. In Crim. Case No. Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under
detention, his arrest having been made in accordance with the Rules. He must
therefore remain under detention until further order of this Court;

2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case. He is hereby granted
the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of
P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following conditions:

a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial
of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these
cases;

b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;

c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and

d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to
enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;

3. Let these cases be set for arraignment on May 23, 1997 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning.2

On May 20, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except
those filed in Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his
motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23,
1997.3 Then on May 22, 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail
bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his
arraignment.4

On May 23, 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner's motions to reduce
bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner
was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then
ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to
the conditions in the May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of April 10, 1997.
The pre-trial conference was set on June 7, 1997.

On June 2, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 44316) in the Court
of Appeals, assailing the trial court's order, dated May 16, 1997, and its two orders, dated
May 23, 1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its
order of May 16, 1997, respectively.

While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed
against petitioner, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all
consolidated.
On June 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the conditions imposed under Nos. 2-a) and 2-b),5 of
the May 23 [should be May 16], 1997 Order, are separable, and would not affect the
cash bond which petitioner posted for his provisional liberty, with the sole
modification that those aforesaid conditions are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE,
the May 16, May 23 and May 23, 1997 Orders are MAINTAINED in all other
respects.6

The appellate court invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for
the grant of bail to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition
making arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of petitioner's bail bonds to be moot and
academic. It noted "that petitioner has posted the cash bonds; that when arraigned,
represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that he has already been
released from detention." The Court of Appeals thought that the aforesaid conditions in the
May 16, 1997 order were contrary to Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution which provides that
"[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."

With respect to the denial of petitioner's motion to quash the informations against him, the
appellate court held that petitioner could not question the same in a petition
for certiorari before it, but what he must do was to go to trial and to reiterate the grounds of
his motion to quash on appeal should the decision be adverse to him.

Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred7 —

1. In ruling that the condition imposed by respondent Judge that the approval of
petitioner's bail bonds "shall be made only after his arraignment" is of no moment
and has been rendered moot and academic by the fact that he had already posted
the bail bonds and had pleaded not guilty to all the offenses;

2. In not resolving the submission that the arraignment was void not only because it
was made under compelling circumstance which left petitioner no option to question
the respondent Judge's arbitrary action but also because it emanated from a void
Order;

3. In ruling that the denial of petitioner's motion to quash may not be impugned in a
petition for certiorari; and

4. In not resolving the legal issue of whether or not petitioner may be validly charged
for violation of Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 under several informations corresponding
to the number of alleged acts of child abuse allegedly committed against each private
complainant by the petitioner.

We will deal with each of these contentions although not in the order in which they are stated
by petitioner.

First. As already stated, the trial court's order, dated May 16, 1997, imposed four conditions
for the grant of bail to petitioner:
 a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of
these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;

b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the
cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;

c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and

d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this
Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;

The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the
validity of condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become moot and academic.
Petitioner takes issue with the Court of Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition (d)
of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes petitioner's arraignment a
prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void and
that his arraignment was also invalid because it was held pursuant to such invalid condition.

We agree with petitioner that the appellate court should have determined the validity of the
conditions imposed in the trial court's order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail because
petitioner's contention is that his arraignment was held in pursuance of these conditions for
bail.

In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial court
apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent his
early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest
in their cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of petitioner's bail
bonds should be deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even if petitioner does not
appear, trial can proceed as long as he is notified of the date of hearing and his failure to
appear is unjustified, since under Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution, trial in absentia is
authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial court in its May 16, 1997 order
conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment.

This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases
where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused
may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the
case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the
second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment
precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the
conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so
required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the
accused at the arraignment is required.

On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be
to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and
thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can
be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly
undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid
complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.8
It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds
shall be made only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead have
declared void. The condition imposed in the trial court's order of May 16, 1997 that the
accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings
of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under
Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification
despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to
be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia."

Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be
absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and
plea, whether of innocence or of guilt,9 (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification
purposes,10 and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which
case the accused may appear by counsel or representative.11 At such stages of the
proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived. As pointed out in Borja
v. Mendoza,12 in an opinion by Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, there can be
no trial in absentia unless the accused has been arraigned.

Undoubtedly, the trial court knew this. Petitioner could delay the proceedings by absenting
himself from the arraignment. But once he is arraigned, trial could proceed even in his
absence. So it thought that to ensure petitioner's presence at the arraignment, petitioner
should be denied bail in the meantime. The fly in the ointment, however, is that such court
strategy violates petitioner's constitutional rights.

Second. Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of petitioner
on May 23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the arraignment did not
emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after
the arraignment." Even without such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be
omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his
arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.

Third. Petitioner concedes that the rule is that the remedy of an accused whose motion to
quash is denied is not to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed to trial without prejudice to
his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash during trial on the merits or
on appeal if an adverse judgment is rendered against him. However, he argues that this case
should be treated as an exception. He contends that the Court of Appeals should not have
evaded the issue of whether he should be charged under several informations corresponding
to the number of acts of child abuse allegedly committed by him against each of the
complainants.

In Tano v. Salvador,13 the Court, while holding that certiorari will not lie from a denial of a
motion to quash, nevertheless recognized that there may be cases where there are special
circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal. In such cases, the
accused may resort to the appellate court to raise the issue decided against him. This is
such a case. Whether petitioner is liable for just one crime regardless of the number of
sexual acts allegedly committed by him and the number of children with whom he had sexual
intercourse, or whether each act of intercourse constitutes one crime is a question that bears
on the presentation of evidence by either party. It is important to petitioner as well as to the
prosecution how many crimes there are. For instance, if there is only one offense of sexual
abuse regardless of the number of children involved, it will not matter much to the
prosecution whether it is able to present only one of the complainants. On the other hand, if
each act of sexual intercourse with a child constitutes a separate offense, it will matter
whether the other children are presented during the trial.

The issue then should have been decided by the Court of Appeals. However, instead of
remanding this case to the appellate court for a determination of this issue, we will decide the
issue now so that the trial in the court below can proceed without further delay.

Petitioner's contention is that the 12 informations filed against him allege only one offense of
child abuse, regardless of the number of alleged victims (four) and the number of acts of
sexual intercourse committed with them (twelve). He argues that the act of sexual
intercourse is only a means of committing the offense so that the acts of sexual
intercourse/lasciviousness with minors attributed to him should not be subject of separate
informations. He cites the affidavits of the alleged victims which show that their involvement
with him constitutes an "unbroken chain of events," i.e., the first victim was the one who
introduced the second to petitioner and so on. Petitioner says that child abuse is similar to
the crime of large-scale illegal recruitment where there is only a single offense regardless of
the number of workers illegally recruited on different occasions. In the alternative, he
contends that, at the most, only four informations, corresponding to the number of alleged
child victims, can be filed against him.

Art. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7160 under which petitioner is being prosecuted, provides:

Sec. 5 Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.

The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) that said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child,14 whether male or female, is
or is deemed under 18 years of age. Exploitation in prostitution or other sexual abuse occurs
when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or
any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or
group.

Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a child under the circumstances
mentioned in Air. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and distinct offense. The offense
is similar to rape or act of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in which each act of
rape or lascivious conduct should be the subject of a separate information. This conclusion is
confirmed by Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7160, which provides:

[t]hat when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
 may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is
RENDERED declaring the orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City to be valid, with the exception of condition (d) in the
second paragraph of the order of May 16, 1997 (making arraignment a prerequisite to the
grant of bail to petitioner), which is hereby declared void.
1âw phi 1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-101 December 20, 1945

HAYDEE HERRAS TEEHANKEE, petitioner,

vs.
LEOPOLDO ROVIRA, ANTONIO QUIRINO, and POMPEYO DIAZ, respondents.

Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.

Respondent Judges in their own behalf.

HILADO, J.:

Petitioner Haydee Herras Teehankee is a political detainee delivered by the Counter

Intelligence Corps, United States Army, to the Commonwealth Government, pursuant to the
Proclamation of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, dated December 29, 1944. She
was one of the petitioners in case No. L-44, "Raquiza vs. Bradford," of this court (p.
50, ante). She is now confined in the Correctional Institution for Women under the custody of
the Commonwealth Government since October, 1945, when she was thus delivered to the
said government.

Under the date of October 2, 1945, petitioner, through her husband, Alberto Teehankee, filed
with the People's Court a petition wherein, invoking the provisions of Executive Order No. 65,
promulgated by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, dated September 3, 1945,
she prayed that her immediate release be ordered on the ground that no evidence exists
upon which she could be charged with any act punishable by law, or, alternatively, that the
People's Court fix the bail for her provisional liberty, in conformity with the aforesaid
executive order, and upon approval of such bail, that an order be forthwith issued directing
then officer having official custody of her person to immediately release her.
On October 4, 1945, the Hon. Antonio Quirino, one of the Associate Judges of the People's
Court, upon considering the said petition, required the Solicitor General "to file his comment
and recommendation as soon as possible."

On October 5, 1945, the Solicitor General filed recommendation in compliance with said
order, stating: "that on the strength of the evidence at hand, the reasonable basil
recommended for the provisional release of the petitioner be fixed at Fifty Thousand Pesos
(50,000)."

On October 9, 1945, the Hon. Leopoldo Rovira, Presiding Judge of the People's Court,
entered an order referring the petition for provisional release above mentioned for
consideration by the Fifth Division of said Court, but adding the following statement: "in my
opinion, it should be denied notwithstanding the recommendation of the Solicitor General for
her provisional release under a bond of Fifty Thousand Pesos (50,000)."

On the same date, October 9, 1945, the Hon. Pompeyo Diaz, Associate Judge of said Court,
entered an order disposing of said petition and denying the same "in view of the gravity of
the offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of the Special Prosecutors
recommends as high as Fifty Thousand Pesos (50,000) for her provisional release."

A motion having been filed by petitioner with the People's Court praying said court to
reconsider its order of October 9, 1945, denying her petition for provisional release the Court,
through Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz, denied said motion.

In her present petition for the writs of certiorari and mandamus originally filed with this Court
on October 19, 1945, petitioner avers that the above-mentioned Judges of the People's
Court, in denying her petition for provisional liberty under bail, as well as her motion for
reconsideration, acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Paragraph
VII of this petition contains her allegations in support of this charge.

Under the date of October 21, 1945, respondent Judge Pompeyo Diaz filed his answer
stating that the order denying bail "was issued under express mandate of the law", citing
section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682.

Article III, section 1 (16) of the Commonwealth Constitution provides that:

All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall
not be required.

Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides in the following sections:

SEC. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. —
After judgement by a justice of the peace and before conviction by the court of First
Instance, the defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.

SEC. 4. Noncapital offenses after conviction by the Court of First

Instance. — After conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon
application, be bailed at the discretion of the court.
 SEC. 5. Capital offenses defined. — A capital offense, as the term the time of its
commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be
punished by death.

SEC. 6. Capital offense not bailable. — No person in custody for the commission of a
capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.

SEC. 7. Capital offenses — burden of proof. — On the hearing of an application for

admission to bail made by any person who is in custody for the commission of a
capital offense, the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong is on the
prosecution.lawphi 1.net

SEC. 8. Notice of application to fiscal. — When admission to bail is a matter of

discretion, the court must require that reasonable notice of the hearing of the
application for bail be given to the fiscal.

Section 66 of General Orders, No. 58 stipulates:

When admission to bail is a matter of discretion, the court must require that
reasonable notice of the hearing of the application for bail be given to the promotor
fiscal.

Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 contains the following proviso:

SEC. 19. . . . Provided, however, That existing provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the aforesaid political prisoners may, in the discretion of the
People's Court, after due notice to the office of Special Prosecutors and hearing, be
released on bail, even prior to the presentation of the corresponding information,
unless the Court finds that there is strong evidence of the commission of a capital
offense. . . . .

Section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 ordains:

SEC. 22. The prosecution, trial and disposal of cases before the People's Court shall
be governed by existing laws and rules of court, unless otherwise expressly provided
herein . . . .

Against the petitioner herein no information had yet been presented when she filed her
petition dated October 2, 1945, containing the alternative prayer for the fixing of bail for her
provisional liberty. She there invokes Executive Order No. 65 of the President of the
Philippines, date September 3, 1945. The proviso above quoted from section 19 of the
People's Court Act (Commonwealth At No. 682) also existed in the statute books at the time.

The able arguments adduced on both sides have received the most careful consideration of
the Court as befits the importance of the questions involved. However, in the view we take of
the case, a majority of the Court are of opinion that the only question calling for decision at
this time are: (1) whether Article III, section 1 (16) of the Commonwealth Constitution is
applicable to the instant case; (2) whether a hearing should be held of the application for bail
with attendance of the petitioner and the Solicitor General or the latter's representative; and
(3) if so, what kind of hearing it should be.
1. As to the first question, we hold that Article III, section 1 (16) of the Commonwealth
Constitution is applicable to the instant case. This Constitutional mandate refers to all
persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been
formally filed. It lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except
those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. According to this
provision, the general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his
guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or
otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said
provision. But in order that a person can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary
that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the
moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can
claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is
charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong. Indeed if, as admitted on all
sides, the precept protects those already charged under a formal complaint or information,
there seems to be no legal or just reason for denying its benefits to one as against whom the
proper authorities may even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To
place the former in a more favored position than the latter would be, to say the least,
anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in favor of one already
formally charged with criminal offense (Constitution, Article III, section 1[17], a fortiori, this
presumption should be indulged in favor of one not yet so charged, although already
arrested or detained.

In Cooleys Constitutional Limitations, 7th edition, pages 436-438, we read the following:

Perhaps the most important of the protections to personal liberty consists in the
mode of trial which is secured to every person accused of crime. At the common law,
accusations of felony were made in the form of an indictment by a grand jury; and
this process is still retained in many of the States, while others have substituted in its
stead an information filed by the prosecuting officer of the State or county. The mode
of investigating the facts, however, is the same in all; and this is through a trial by
jury, surrounded by certain safeguards which are a well-understood part of the
system, and which the government cannot dispense with.

First, we may mention that the humanity of our law always presumes an accused
party innocent until he is proved to be guilty. This is a presumption which attends all
the proceedings against him, from their initiation until they result in a verdict, which
either finds the party guilty or converts the presumption of innocence into an
adjudged fact.

If there were any mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty,
insure the attendance of the accused to answer the accusation, it would not be
justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him, in a
greater or less degree, to the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it is not
determined that he has committed any crime. If the punishment on conviction cannot
exceed in severity the forfeiture of a large sum of money, then it is reasonable to
suppose that such a sum of money, or an agreement by responsible parties to pay it
to the government in case the accused should fail to appear, would be sufficient
security for his attendance; and therefore, at the common law, it was customary to
take security of this character in all cases of misdemeanor; one or more friends of the
accused undertaking for his appearance for trial, and agreeing that a certain sum of
money should be levied of their goods and chattels, lands and tenements, if he made
default. But in the case of felonies, the privilege of giving bail before trial was not a
 matter of right; and in this country, although the criminal code is much more merciful
than it formerly was in England, and in some cases the allowance of bail is almost a
matter of course, there are others in which it is discretionary with the magistrate to
allow it or not, and where it will sometimes be refused if the evidence of guilty is
strong or the presumption great. Capital offenses are not generally regarded as
bailable; at least, after indictment, or when the party is charged by the finding of a
coroner's jury; . . . ."

All the Justice Cooley says in the foregoing quotations regarding the humanity of the law in
his jurisdiction and its presumption that an accused party is innocent until he is proved to be
guilty, is distinctly true also in ours where the constitutional, statutory, and reglementary
provisions on the point have been borrowed from America. The same should be said of what
he says regarding the granting of bail for provisional liberty before conviction, and even after,
in exceptional cases, of course, always subject to the limitation established by our own
Constitutional, laws and rules of court. From the last part of said quotation it follows, firstly,
that before indictment or charge by the corner's jury, in the jurisdiction to which the author
refers, there may be cases in which even a capital offense is bailable, and, secondly, that
even after indictment or the finding of a corner's jury in these jurisdictions, there may be
exceptional cases where a capital offense is still bailable. Under our Constitution, as we have
seen, all offenses are bailable before conviction except capital offenses when evidence of
guilt is strong. In consonance with this constitutional provision, section 3 of Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court stipulates that non-capital offenses before conviction by the Court of First
Instance shall be bailable as of right; section 4 of the same Rule provides that after
conviction by the Court of First Instance such offense may, upon application, be bailable at
the discretion of the court; and section 6 of the said Rule provides that "no person in custody
for the commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is
strong."

By the common law, all offenses including treason, murder, and other felonies, were
bailable before indictment found, although the granting or refusing of such bail in
case of capital offenses was a matter within the discretion of the court. (6 C. J.,
953; emphasis supplied.)

2. As to the second question, we hold that upon application by a political prisoner or detainee
to the People's Court for provisional release under bail, a hearing, summary or otherwise,
should be held with due notice to the Office of Special Prosecutors, as well as to the prisoner
or detainee. It will be remembered that section 22 of the People's Court Act subjects the
prosecution, trial, and disposal of cases before the People's Court to existing laws and rules
of court," unless otherwise expressly provide in said act. Consequently, the hearing and
disposal of application for bail for provisional release before the People's Court should be
governed by existing laws and rules of court, the hearing and disposal of such applications
being a mere part of the "prosecution, trial, and disposal" of the corresponding cases before
said court. If attention should be directed to the clause "unless otherwise expressly provided
herein " in said section 22, in connection with the first proviso of section 19 of the same act, it
should be borne in mind that the provisions of said act should be construed in harmony with
those of the Constitution, under the well-settled rule of the statutory construction that
legislative enactments should be construed, wherever possible, in manner that would avoid
their conflicting with the fundamental law.

3. As to the third question. While it is true that the Solicitor General on October 3, 1945,
recommended Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as a reasonable bail "on the strength of the
evidence at hand," it may happen that thereafter his office may have secured additional
evidence which in addition to or in connection with the already possessed, in his opinion is
sufficiently strong to prove petitioner's guilt for a capital offense, in which case, he may yet
decide to oppose the application for bail heretofore filed by petitioner at the hearing thereof
hereinafter ordered. It will be remembered that petitioner, while under the custody of the
Counter Intelligence Corps, United States Army, was charged with (a) "Active Collaboration
with the Japanese" and (b) "Previous Association with the enemy" (Raquiza vs. Bradford, p.
50, ante). Under the definition of the treason in the Revised Penal Code, active collaboration
with the Japanese and association with them during the war in the Philippines may constitute
treason, a capital offense.

ART. 114. Any person who, owing allegiance to the United States or the Government
of the Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, . . . adheres to their enemies, giving
them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished
by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 20,000 pesos.
(Revised Penal Code.)

Of course, it may also happen that either because no such further evidence has come into
his possession or because, in his judgement, the public interest would be better served by
him withholding the evidence that he has until the trial in the merits, he would prefer not to
oppose the application for bail. At the hearing of the application the Solicitor General will be
free to adopt one course or the other. If he opposes, the burden of proof will be on him to
show the petitioner is not entitled to bail. Petitioner will have the right to offer evidence to
prove her right thereto. In fine, the hearing is for the purpose of enabling the People's Court
to exercise its sound discretion as to whether or not under the Constitution and laws in force
petitioner is entitled to provisional release under bail.

WHEREFORE, it is the judgement of this Court that: (a) the order of the People's Court,
dated October 9, 1945, denying petitioner's petition for provisional release under bail, and
the order of said Court, dated October 13, 1945, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of said order of October 9, 1945, which we declare to have been entered
with grave abuse of discretion, be set aside; and (b) that for the proper application of the
pertinent constitutional, statutory, and reglementary provisions alluded to in the body of this
decision, a hearing of the petitioner's application for bail be held before the People's Court
with due notice to the Solicitor General, as well as to the petitioner, as hereinabove outlined,
said hearing, whether summary or otherwise, to be such as would enable the People's Court
to exercise its sound discretion in the disposal of the aforesaid petition. Without costs. So
ordered.

Moran, C. J., and Briones, J., concur.

Jaranilla, Feria, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur only in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995

MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26,
1994 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, are challenged by petitioner
Miguel P. Paderanga in this appeal by certiorari through a petition which raises
issues centering mainly on said petitioner's right to be admitted to bail.

On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as

a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of
the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the
mayor at the time. The original information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the
Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, 1 had initially indicted for multiple murder eight
accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo,
Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the
indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr.
However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and
eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained at
large up to the present. 2

In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime.
In an amended information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused
therein. As herein petitioner was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas
engaged the former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the
preliminary investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30,
1989 but which he later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as the
supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family. 3

Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the
case per his resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of
said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon,
for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case
No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989,
petitioner was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second
amended information dated October 6, 1992. Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein
as a co-accused all the way to this Court in G.R. No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P.
Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F.
Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision
promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended
information against him. 4

Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an
arrest warrant for petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on him,
petitioner through counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail
with the trial court which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner
 duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin
Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for
bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only Assistant Prosecutor
Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's Office appeared for the
prosecution. 5

As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due
to "acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody
over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of
the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he
considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand,
informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive of the chief of their office,
Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting
nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the same to the
sound discretion of the trail judge. 6

Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was
waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated
November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of
P200,000.00. The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak
but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of
court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter
arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all
the scheduled court hearings of the case. 7

The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on
November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition
for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus
order dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later,
Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a special
civil action for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail
to petitioner annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the
ground that they were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 8

Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's application
for bail, he was not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his
motion for admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily
surrendered. It further noted that apart from the circumstance that petitioner was
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was
strong as borne out by the fact that no bail was recommended by the prosecution, for
which reasons it held that the grant of bail was doubly improvident. Lastly, the
prosecution, according to respondent court, was not afforded an opportunity to
oppose petitioner's application for bail contrary to the requirements of due process.
Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago
vs. Vasquez etc., et al., 9 his filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court
effectively conferred on the latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents and
purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In petitioner's words, the "invocation by the
accused of the court's jurisdiction by filing a pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court
with jurisdiction over the person of the accused and bring him within the custody of the
law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence of
such strong evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the
prosecution, by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further presentation
of evidence to oppose the application for bail and whose representation in court in
behalf of the prosecution bound the latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a denial
of procedural due process. Finally, petitioner points out that the special civil action
for certiorari was filed in respondent court after an unjustifiable length of time.

On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the equities involved in
this case, the Court finds for petitioner.

1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the
release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
conditioned upon his appearing before any court as required under the conditions
specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors
of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 10 As
bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted
before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful
arrest or voluntary surrender. 11 As this Court has put it in a case "it would be incongruous
to grant bail to one who is free." 12

The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post
his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance
therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. 13 Thus, in Feliciano
vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., 14 where the petitioner who had been charged with kidnapping
with murder went into hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter filed a
motion asking the court to fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial, the
Supreme Court categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for
admission to bail.

As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested,
detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the
protective mantle extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional
release under the auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or
information to be filed against him as it is available to "all persons" 15 where the
offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation that the
applicant is in the custody of the law. 16

On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when
he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7,
Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper
authorities. 17 in this light, the ruling, vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et
al., 18 should be explained.

In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to
be an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner
was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from serious physical injuries
which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly
sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction
of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings." On
the basis of said ex-parte motion and the peculiar circumstances obtaining in that
incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her
provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of her physical
incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.

When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she
question the jurisdiction of that court over her person in a recourse before this Court,
on the ground that "she neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered,
aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally
appeared before said court" In rejecting her arguments, the Court held that she was
clearly estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her own
representations in the urgent ex parte motion for bail she had earlier recognized such
jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually posting a cash bail was accepted by the court,
she had effectively submitted to its jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the
matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the same cannot be posted
before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by
his arrest or voluntary surrender.

In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his
motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under
arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be
considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise
peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail
court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily
submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of
the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made
either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of
the person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called
"house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or
restricted to the military camp area.

It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it
known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he
could not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol
College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain
medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court,
notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner,
never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it
would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical custody of
the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital
bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him
under guard.

The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the
law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since
they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he
expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the
application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his
actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the
jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant
for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any
intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the
 authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission application
for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.

At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on
account of an acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they were easily
verifiable. And, as a manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of
the authority of trial court, petitioner's counsel readily informed the court that they
were surrendering custody of petitioner to the president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Misamis Oriental Chapter. 20 In other words, the motion for admission to
bail was filed not for the purpose or in the manner of the former practice which the law
proscribes for the being derogatory of the authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as what
had happened in Feliciano. There was here no intent or strategy employed to obtain
bail in absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should the application therefore be
denied.

2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all
indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of
Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a
regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived
considering its personal nature 21 and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the
custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon
whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt. 22

Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal
offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present
exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment 23 and the evidence of
guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court
having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now,
Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial
discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature
and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, 24 is required with the
participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to
ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the
applicant. 25 Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets
the required quantum. 26

Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be give an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to
introduce before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the
accused to due process. 27 If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a denial
of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court's order in respect of the motion
or petition is void.28 At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. 29 When, eventually, the
court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong. 30 The court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely
objected to, for these represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the
quantum of evidence that the law requires. 31
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural due
process when the court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor
Henrick P. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole government prosecutor expressly
authorized to handle the case and who received his copy of the motion only on the day after
the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor
Abejo had no authority at all to waive the presentation of any further evidence in opposition
to the application for bail and to submit the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. In
addition, they argue that the prosecution was not afforded "reasonable time" to oppose that
application for bail.

We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted
as the collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No.
86-39 on the basis of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which
was sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. This authorization, which was to be continuing
until and unless it was expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only on
July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after one
Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority of Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado
and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their appearance as collaborating government
prosecutors in said criminal case. 32 It was in fact by virtue of this arrangement that the same
Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana entered their appearance as
collaborating prosecutor in the previous hearing in said case. 33 Hence, on the strength of said
authority and of its receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office, through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing held on
November 5, 1992.

Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar
with the case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose
office received its copy of the motion on the very day when it was sent, that is,
October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the court that the
prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they
were submitting the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously, what this meant was
that the prosecution, at that particular posture of the case, was waiving the
presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the court a quo sought to
ascertain whether or not that was the real import of the submission by Prosecutor
Abejo, the latter readily answered in the affirmative.

The following exchanges bear this out:

PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:

I was informed to appear in this case just now Your Honor.

COURT:

Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received a copy of

the motion as early as October 28. There is an element of
urgency here.

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only informed just
now. The one assigned here is State Prosecutor
Perseverando Arena, Jr. who unfortunately is in the hospital
attending to his sick son. I do not know about this but before I
came I received an instruction from our Chief to relay to this
court the stand of the office regarding the motion to admit
bail. That office is neither supporting nor opposing it and we
are submitting to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Place that manifestation on record. For the record, Fiscal

Abejo, would you like to formally enter your appearance in
this matter?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional State

Prosecutor's Office represented by State Prosecutor Erlindo
Abejo.

COURT:

By that manifestation do you want the Court to understand

that in effect, at least, the prosecution is dispensing with the
presentation of evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong, the denial . . .

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.

COURT:

Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the incident

covered by this particular motion for resolution by this court?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Without presenting any further evidence?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor. 34

It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of
Regional State prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion
for bail and this should be so notwithstanding the statement that they were "neither
supporting nor opposing" the motion. What is of significance is the manifestation that
the prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to the sound discretion of the Honorable
Court." By that, it could not be any clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the
introduction of evidence en contra and this it did at the proper forum and stage of the
proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing for bail and after the trial court
had fully satisfied itself that such was the position of the prosecution.

3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 35 it was stressed that where the trial
court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application
for bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of
duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as
the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. And, in the very recent
administrative matter Re: First Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de
Leon, Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of
Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, 36 the Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas,
etc., 37 held that where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the
accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there
diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail
application.

No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed

to the trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the
transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992
and the omnibus order of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence
to procedural rules. As summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court
exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on
the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite
summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after
sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner could be provisionally
released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to the
present, petitioner has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.

As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to present its
evidence within a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate
that the Regional State Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the application
for bail on the very same day that the it was filed with the trial court on October 28,
1992. Counted from said date up to the day of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the
prosecution had more than one (1) week to muster such evidence as it would have
wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to the motion. Certainly, under the
circumstances, that period was more than reasonable. The fact that Prosecutor
Gingoyon received his copy of the application only on November 6, 1992 is beside
the point for, as already established, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor was
authorized to appear for the People.

4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the indubitably
unreasonable period of time that elapsed before it questioned before the respondent
court the resolution and the omnibus order of the trial court through a special civil
action for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the delay of more than six (6)
months, or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due to
the attendant difficulties which characterized the prosecution of the criminal case
 against petitioner. But then, the certiorari proceeding was initiated before the
respondent court long after trial on the merits of the case had ensued in the court
below with the active participation of prosecution lawyers, including Prosecutor
Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now in that the special civil action
for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of the three months, 38 the same
to be reckoned by taking into account the duration of time that had expired from the
commission of the acts complained to annul the same. 39

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233,

promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and
the omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
as well as said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid
resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P.
Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an
incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the
Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure
that the accused appears at trial.1

The Case

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and
annul the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder
along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his
Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion
and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On
June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and
Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should
probable cause be found against him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after
the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7

On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had
not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the
law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9

On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to
Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police
(PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination.10

Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his
Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on
July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail
because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was
strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be
reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and
physical condition must further be seriously considered.

On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s
Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall
have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile
can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to
fix the amount of his bail.

To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has
not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.

Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged
with plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion
temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as
amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily
surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."

The argument has no merit.

x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper
penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a
flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.

Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the
factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained
above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that
the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated
July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14

On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny

Enrile’s motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15

Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:

A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of

right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence
of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever
he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.

C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of

Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.

D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of
right; th at it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that
Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that
the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and
his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that
his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk
taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social
standing.

In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is
charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and
that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant
circumstances.

Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and further binds the court to
wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional
crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial,
and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.23

2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution, viz.:

x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.

This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court , as
follows:

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at
the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with
death.25

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of
Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt
is strong.26 Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail
shall be recognized.27

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are
bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of
right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong.28

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC
has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed

the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.

3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has
held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or
not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be
allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has
been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.31The indispensability of the hearing with notice
has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32

x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs.
Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused
who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing
on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or
comment, as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole
basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently
witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned
ruling was intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons
who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual
accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it
has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and
reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the
evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the
accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other
cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can
appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present
nor heard.

The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court,
should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
For this purpose, a summary hearing means:

x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left
to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross examination.33

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor
of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
 4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail

We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70
years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily
surrendered.35

Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the
Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that –

8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon
Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice
it to state that the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration
that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an
offense punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that
has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the
accused’s favor.36

Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the
presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime
alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply because the
determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.

Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at
the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’
responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained
or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail.38

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in
criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that
the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of
this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a
similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during
the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation
in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s
judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the
medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following
conditions:

(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug
therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);

(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following :

a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral

artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)

b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)

c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter
monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)

(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome;

(Annexes 2.1, 2.2)

(5) Ophthalmology:

a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina,

s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)

b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes

3.1, 3.2)

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;

c. Alpha thalassemia;
 d. Gait/balance disorder;

e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;

f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent

ultrasound).42

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose
significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could
lead to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it
could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions;
(3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could
indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of
ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat,
humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with
asthma or COPD.43

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health
required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his
own instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist
doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that
hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at
the Philippine National Police Hospital?

DR. SERVILLANO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at
the PNP Hospital ?

PSUPT. JOCSON:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Why?

PSUPT. JOCSON:

Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you
happy or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the
facilities of the hospital?

DR. SERVILLANO:

Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?

DR. SERVILLANO:

Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition of
the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail
despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.

Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already
held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:46

x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:

x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the
prisoner,

independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law
makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ;47

xxx

Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the
petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis,
and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen similar cases,
later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any
avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by
the People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not
active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to
the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his
lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in
order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said
People’s Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-
quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No.
3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released on
bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison
would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently
hold that the People’s Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the
petitioner on bail.48

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have
his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians
in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense
but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is
to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances
decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is
properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of
justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at
the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to
be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to
ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the
clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of
discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of
certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014;
ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-
CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and
DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is
being detained for some other lawful cause.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-61388 April 20, 1983

IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG,
NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE
LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO
TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ. JR.,
JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ. JOSEFINA GARCIA-PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN, FABIAN C. VER, GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, and
FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Efren M Mercado and Alexander
Padilla for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus and mandamus seeking the following relief:

WHEREFORE, petitioners pray this Honorable Court:

1. To immediately issue a writ of habeas corpus directing respondents to

appear and produce the bodies of Dr. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO
PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE
LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO
SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA,
EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ,
forthwith before this Honorable Court and to make due return of the writ
therewith;

2. To issue, in addition or in the alternative to the writ of habeas corpus, a

writ of mandamus compelling the respondents to disclose the petitioners'
present place of detention and to order the respondents to allow counsel and
relatives to visit and confer with the petitioners;

3. Pending the determination of the legality of their continued detention, to

forthwith release the detainees on bail upon such terms and conditions as the
Court may fix, and after hearing, to order petitioners' immediate release; and

4. To grant petitioners such other and further relief as may be deemed just
and equitable in the premises.

The records show that nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein were arrested on July 6,
1982 at about 1:45 p.m. when three (3) teams of the PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya
led by Lt. Col. Coronel, lst Lt. de Guzman and lst Lt. Baria, after securing a Search Warrant
No. S-82 issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya
conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong. Apprehended during the said raid
were Dra. Aurora Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco Divinagracia, Zenaida
Mallari, Letty Ballogan, Norberto Portuguese, and Mariano Soriano who were then having a
conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's residence which had been doing on since
10:00 a.m. of that same day.
The other four (4) detainees herein, namely: Imelda de los Santos, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr.,
Juanita Granada, and Bienvenida Garcia, were arrested on the following day, July 7, 1982 by
the same PC teams.

On July 15, 1982, Tom Vasquez was arrested, and his Volkswagen car, bearing Plate No.
DAP 347, was seized by the PC authorities.

The herein fourteen (14) detainees (hereafter referred to sometimes as petitioners) were all
detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya from July 6,
1982 until their transfer on the morning of August 10, 1982 to an undisclosed place
reportedly to Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Echague, Isabela, and to Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

Hence, this petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-
Padilla, mother of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr. on August 13, 1982. The
mandamus aspect of the instant petition has, however, become moot and academic, and
whereabouts of petitioners having already become known to petitioner Josefina Garcia-
Padilla.

It is alleged in the petition that the arrest of petitioners was patently unlawful and illegal since
it was effected without any warrant of arrest; that the PC/INP raiding team which made the
arrest were only armed with a search warrant (No. 3-82) issued by Judge Sofronio G. Sayo
of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya, and nowhere in said warrant was authority
given to make arrests, much less detention; that the search warrant which authorized
respondents to seize "subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers, medicine and
other subversive paraphernalia" in the house and clinic of Dra. Aurora Parong was a roving
and general warrant and is, therefore, illegal per se because it does not state specifically the
things that are to be seized (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383); that no criminal charges
have as of yet been filed against any of the detainees; that the fourteen (14) detainees were
initially held at the PC/INP Command in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya from July 6 up to
August 10, 1982, but were subsequently transferred by helicopter in the morning of August
10, 1982 to a place or safehouse known only to respondents; that there is no judgment,
decree, decision or order from a court of law which would validate the continued detention of
the petitioner; that while it is true that a purported telegram stating the issuance of a
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was shown to the detainees on or about July 11 and
12, 1982, but counsel and the detainees have not yet been given a copy of such PCO nor
notified of its contents, raising a doubt whether such commitment order has in fact been
issued.

It is further alleged that respondents are denying the detainees their constitutional right to
counsel, averring that the detainees were allowed regular visits by counsel and relatives
during their period of detention from July 6 to August 10, 1982 at the PC/INP Command in
Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya; however, when a certain Major Cristobal and Lt. Marcos
(alleged to be from the Camp Crame Intelligence Units) took full control of the investigation,
counsels were allowed to visit only on weekends; that when the detainees were transferred
on August 10, 1982 to a place known only to respondents, the detainees' counsels and
relatives were not notified, raising the apprehension that petitioners' constitutional rights to
silence, to counsel and against self- incrimination are being violated; that counsels have tried
to locate if the detainees were taken to Camp Crame or Camp Bago Bantay but to no avail;
that Major Forondo of the PC Command in Nueva Viscaya informed Mrs. Josefina Padilla
that the detainees were transferred to Tuguegarao, Cagayan, others to Echague, Isabela;
that there seems to be a deliberate and concerted effort by respondents to conceal from
counsel and relatives the detainees' place of detention, raising the apprehension that
respondents are using force, violence, threat, intimidation and other means which vitiate free
will to obtain confession and statements from the detainees in violation of their constitutional
rights.

In the resolution of this Court en banc dated August 17, 1982, the writ of habeas corpus
was issued and respondents were required to make a return of the writ. Hearing on the
petition was set on August 26, 1982.

In the return to the writ filed on August 23, 1982. respondents, through the Solicitor General,
alleged, to wit:

I. AS TO HABEAS CORPUS

1. The detainees mentioned in the petition, with the exception of Tom

Vasquez who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, after his arrest on
July 15, 1982, are all being detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment
Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, pursuant to LOI No. 1211 dated March
9, 1982, in relation to Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 dated January 17,
1981. The said PCO was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos for
violation of P.D. No. 885. ...

2. The corresponding charges against the said detainees have been filed in
court and before the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Viscaya where they
are pleading. A warrant of arrest against detainee Dra. Aurora Parong was
issued on August 4, 1982, by the Municipal Court of Bayombong, for illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. ...

II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ON HABEAS CORPUS

3. The persons named in the above-mentioned Presidential Commitment

Order were arrested and are being detained for offenses with respect to
which under Proclamation No. 2045, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus continues to be suspended, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,

President/Prime Minister of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby revoke
Proclamation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a state of Martial Law in
the Philippines) and Proclamation No. 1104 (Declaring the
Continuation of Martial Law) and proclaim the termination of
the state of martial law throughout the Philippines; Provided,
that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and
subversion shall continue to be in force and effect; and
Provided that in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao,
upon the request of the residents therein, the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shag continue; and
in all other places the suspension of the privilege of the writ
shall also continue with respect to persons at present
detained as well as others who may hereafter be similarly
detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposals to commit such crimes,
 and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in
furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or
in connection therewith. (Emphasis supplied)

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing as to them. Courts

cannot inquire into the validity and cause of their arrest and detention.

4. The power of the President in an emergency, such as that which

necessitated the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, to order the detention of persons believed engaged in crimes related
to national security is recognized. (Aquino vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 83; Luneta, et
al. vs. Special Military Commission, No. 1, et al., 102 SCRA 56).

5. In the instant petition, petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla does not appear to

have been authorized by the thirteen (13) other detainees to represent them
in the case at bar."

Accordingly, the petition was duly heard on August 26, 1982. After hearing, the Court issued
the following resolution, to wit:

G.R. No. 61388 (In the Matter of the Petition for the Insurance of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus of Dr. Aurora Parong, Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla,
Francis Divinagracia, Imelda de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida
Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan, Bienvenida Garcia,
Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada and Tom Vasquez; Josefina Garcia-
Padilla vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Gen. Fidel V.
Ramos and Lt. Col. Miguel Coronel.)- The return of the writ of habeas corpus
and answer to the prayer for mandamus filed by the Solicitor General for
respondents in compliance with the resolution of August 17, 1982 is NOTED.

At the hearing of this case this morning, former Senator Jose W. Diokno,
Attorneys Alexander A. Padilla and Efren H. Mercado appeared for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Ramon
A. Barcelona, appeared for the respondents. All of the detainees, except Tom
Vasquez, who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, were present in
Court; Dr. Aurora Parong, Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis
Divinagracia, Imelda de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari,
Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan, Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio
Ortiz, Jr. and Juanito Granada. Attorney Alexander A. Padilla argued for the
petitioner. Solicitor General Mendoza argued for the respondents. Former
Senator Diokno argued in the rebuttal. The Court Resolved to require the
Solicitor General to SUBMIT within five (5) days from date the documents
relevant to the issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order. Thereafter,
the case shall be considered SUBMITTED for resolution.

As required, the Solicitor General submitted the documents relevant to the issuance of the
Presidential Commitment Order on August 27, 1982, after which the case was submitted for
resolution.

The fundamental issue here, as in all petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus, is whether or
not petitioners' detention is legal. We have carefully gone over the claims of the parties in
their respective pleadings as well as in the oral argument during the hearing on August 26,
1982, and We find that petitioners have not been illegally deprived of their constitutional right
to liberty, neither in the manner of their arrest, nor by their continued detention, and that the
circumstances attendant in the herein case do not warrant their release on a writ of habeas
corpus.

1. At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein on July 6,
1982, records reveal that they were then having conference in the dining room of Dra.
Parong's residence from 10:00 a.m. of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14)
detainees were under surveillance as they were then Identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaging in subversive activities and using the
house of detainee Dra. Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their headquarters.
Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered towards different
directions leaving in top of their conference table numerous subversive documents,
periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationaries, and other papers, including a
plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student sector (code-named YORK). Also
found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of
ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred fifty pesos (P18,650.00) cash
believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed and ready for distribution, as
sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia, which were then seized. There is no doubt that
circumstances attendant in the arrest of the herein detainees fall under a situation where
arrest is lawful even without a judicial warrant as specifically provided for under Section 6(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and allowed under existing jurisprudence on the matter. As
provided therein, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when the person to be arrested has committed or actually committing, or is about to commit
an offense in his presence.

From the facts as above narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested
illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing
offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the
herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our
jurisdiction.

2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or
for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing
them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not
follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant
is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence
against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the
rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation
that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.
If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of
armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most
assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any
of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. In the language of Moyer vs.
Peabody, 1 cited with approval in Aquino, et al. vs. Ponce Enrile, 2 the President " shall make the
ordinary use of the soldiers to that end that he may kill persons who resist, and, of course, that he
may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the
way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but are by way of
precaution, to prevent the exercise of hostile power."

Thus characterized, the arrest and detention of persons ordered by the President through the
issuance of Presidential Commitment Order PCO is merely preventive. "When it comes to a
decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of
individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger
warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process." 3 What should be
underscored is that if the greater violation against life itself such as killing, will not be the subject
of judicial inquiry, as it cannot be raised as transgressing against the due process clause that
protects life, liberty and property, lesser violations against liberty, such as arrest and detention,
may not be insisted upon as reviewable by the courts.

3. Transcendentally important, therefore, is the question of whether the issuance of a

Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has provided the legal basis of the detention of herein
detainees following their arrest for Proclamation No. 2045 covered offenses. This question
has to be set at rest promptly and decisively, if We are to break a seemingly continuous flow
of petitions for habeas corpus, as what had been seen lately of such petitioners being filed in
this Court one after the other.

The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a person for
any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially
without any warrant, its legal effect is to render the writ unavailing as a means of judicially
inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
The grant of the power to suspend the said privilege provides the basis for continuing with
perfect legality the detention as long as the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or
quelled, and the need therefor in the interest of public safety continues.

The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the President as
Commander-in-Chief, is that the exercise thereof is not subject to judicial inquiry, with a view
to determining its legality in the light of the bill of rights guarantee to individual freedom. This
must be so because the suspension of the privilege is a military measure the necessity of
which the President alone may determine as an incident of his grave responsibility as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, of protecting not only public safety but the very
life of the State, the government and duly constituted authorities. This should be clear
beyond doubt in the case of "invasion," along which "rebellion" or "insurrection" is mentioned
by the Constitution, which contingency does not present a legal question on whether there is
a violation of the right to personal liberty when any member of the invading force is captured
and detained.

The presidential responsibility is one attended with all urgency when so grave a peril to the
life of the Nation besets the country in times of the aforementioned contingencies. In the
discharge of this awesome and sacred responsibility, the President should be free from
interference. The existence of warlike conditions as are created by invasion, rebellion or
insurrection, the direst of all emergencies that can possibly confront a nation, argues, beyond
dispute, against subjecting his actions in this regard to judicial inquiry or interference from
whatever source. If freedom from judicial review is conceded in the exercise of his peacetime
powers as that of appointment and of granting pardon, denominated as political powers of
the President, it should incontestably be more so with his wartime power, as it were, to adopt
any measure in dealing with situations calling for military action as in case of invasion,
rebellion or insurrection.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is one such measure. To be
effective, the occasion for its application on specific individuals should be left to the exclusive
and sound judgment of the President, at least while the exigencies of invasion, rebellion or
insurrection persist, and the public safety requires it, a matter, likewise, which should be left
for the sole determination of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Nation's armed
forces. The need for a unified command in such contingencies is imperative-even axiomatic-
as a basic military concept in the art of warfare.

4. From the clear language of the Lansang case, 4 "the function of Court is merely to check —
not to supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act. " If, however, the constitutional right to bail is granted to the herein petitioners
by the court, through the procedure laid down under Rule 114 of the Rules of court, what
inevitably results is the supplanting of the decision of the President to detain pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2045, of persons who come under its coverage.

The specific mention in the Constitution of rebellion and insurrection along with invasion and
imminent danger thereof, shows that the terms "rebellion and insurrection" are used therein
in the sense of a state or condition of the Nation, not in the concept of a statutory offense.
What, therefore, should determine the legality of imposing what is commonly referred to as
"preventive detention" resulting from the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, is the
necessity of its adoption as a measure to suppress or quell the rebellion, or beat off an
invasion. The necessity for such measure as a means of defense for national survival quite
clearly transcends in importance and urgency the claim of those detained to the right to bail
to obtain their freedom. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the constitutional
grant of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the occasions
expressly mentioned in the charter. For what indeed could the purpose be of suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus other than to restrict, at least for the duration of the
emergency of invasion or rebellion, the right to personal liberty, dictated as it is, in the
greater interest of public safety and national security.

So it is that Proclamation No. 2045 mentions not only rebellion or insurrection as coming
within the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but also other offenses,
including subversion which is not mentioned in the Constitution, committed by reason or on
the occasion of the rebellion, or in connection therewith, or in the furtherance thereof. There
need be no alarm over what libertarian jurists fear as violation of the constitutional right to
personal liberty when the President decrees the suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus. Only those who give cause for it will be subject to restriction of their liberty, as the
necessity therefor arises in the interest of national defense and survival. The constitutional
guarantee of individual freedom is intact in all its plenitude and sanctity, save only as the
Constitution has envisioned the need for its limitation, and only to a few, in relation to the
entire population, as the Constitution itself permits in case of overwhelming and imperious
necessity.

5. Worthy of profound notice and keen appreciation is the fact that the authority to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been deliberately vested on the President as
the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, together with the related power to call out the
armed forces to suppress lawless violence and impose martial law. 5The choice could not
have been more wise and sound, for no other official may, with equal capability and fitness, be
entrusted with the grave responsibility that goes with the grant of the authority. The legislature
was considered in the alternative upon which to lodge the power, or to share in its exercise, but
the distilled wisdom of the Constitutional Convention finally made its choice for the President
alone.
As previously noted, "invasion" which is not a statutorily-defined offense and "imminent
danger thereof" as mentioned in the Constitution indicate that "rebellion and insurrection" are
also mentioned therein not in their concept as statutorily-defined public crimes, but as a state
or condition of extreme emergency resulting from the existence of the aforesaid events. Now,
if captured enemies from the invading force may not be charged with any statutory offense
that would provide the occasion to demand the right to bail, it is obvious that persons
engaged in rebellion or insurrection may not claim the right to be released on bail when
similarly captured or arrested during the continuance of the aforesaid contingency. They may
not even claim the right to be charged immediately in court, as they may rightfully do so,
were they being charged with an ordinary or common offense. This is so because according
to legal writers or publicists, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus "has
the sole effect of allowing the executive to defer the trials of persons charged with certain
offenses during the period of emergency." 6 This clearly means denial of the right to be
released on bail on being charged in court with bailable offenses.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to
be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof
will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.

Realistically, a person engaged in the rebellion does not, upon being arrested or captured,
cease to be as committed to the cause of the movement. Through a grand conspiracy, as is
of the essence of how rebellion is committed, involving a great mass of confederates bound
together by a common goal, he remains in a state of continued participation in the criminal
act or design. His heart still beats with the same emotion for the success of the movement of
which he continues to be an ardent adherent and ally. It is simple logic then to hold that there
should be no legal compulsion for a captured rebel to be charged in court, only to be
released on bail, while he is, realistically and legally, still as much as part and parcel of the
movement, continuing as it is, as those still engaged in carrying on actively to attain their
goal of overthrowing the established regime. Hence, it is easy to perceive how impressed
with absolute verity is the opinion expressed by two acknowledged authorities on
Constitutional law in our country, 7 which We quote:

... If the return to the writ shows that the person in custody was apprehended
and detained in areas where the privileges of the writ have been suspended
or for the crimes mentioned in the executive proclamation, the court will
suspend further proceedings in the action.

Impeccable as it is, the opinion could not but find a resonant echo as it did in the recent case
of Buscayno vs. Military Commission; 8 decided after Proclamation No. 2045 was issued, which
in terms clear and categorical, held that the constitutional right to bail is unavailing when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended with respect to certain crimes as enumerated
or described in the abovementioned Proclamation.

It is, likewise, all too well-known that when the rebel forces capture government troopers or
kidnap private individuals, they do not accord to them any of the rights now being demanded
by the herein petitioners, particularly to be set at liberty upon the filing of bail. As a matter of
common knowledge, captives of the rebels or insurgents are not only not given the right to
be released, but also denied trial of any kind. In some instances, they may even be
liquidated unceremoniously. What is then sought by the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is, among others, to put the government forces on equal fighting terms
with the rebels, by authorizing the detention of their own rebel or dissident captives as the
rebellion goes on. In this way, the advantage the rebellion forces have over those of the
government, as when they resort to guerilla tactics with sophisticated weapons, is, at least,
minimized, thereby enhancing the latter's chances of beating their enemy. It would,
therefore, seem to be ignoring realities in the name of misplaced magnanimity and
compassion, and for the sake of humanity, to grant the demand for respect of rights
supposedly guaranteed by the Constitution by those who themselves seek to destroy that
very same instrument, trampling over it already as they are still waging war against the
government. This stark actuality gives added force and substance to the rationale of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in case of invasion, insurrection,
rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when public safety requires it.

6. Invoking the Lansang case, 9 however, petitioners would ask this Court to review the
issuance of the PCO against them, intimating that arbitrariness attended its issuance because,
relying on the evidence supposedly available in the hands of the military, they claim they are not
guilty of rebellion. They also contend that the provisions of LOI No. 1211 have not been complied
with.

The Lansang case went no further than to pronounce the suspension of the writ of the
privilege of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, valid and constitutional, on a finding that
there was no arbitrariness attendant to the suspension. It never intended to suggest that for
every individual case of arrest and detention, the writ of habeas corpus is available, even
after the suspension of this privilege, to question the legality of the arrest and detention on
ground of arbitrariness. When a person is charged in court for an ordinary offense, the law
does not authorize the filing of a petition for habeas corpus based on the ground that there is
absolutely no evidence to hold him for trial, which, in effect, constitutes an allegation of
arbitrariness in the filing of the case against him. The law has afforded him adequate
safeguards against arbitrariness, such as the requirement of determining the existence of a
probable cause by the judge before the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The finding of such
probable cause may not be immediately brought for review by this Court in a habeas corpus
proceeding, on the claim of arbitrariness. The matter is to be decided on the basis of the
evidence, and this Court is not the proper forum for the review sought, not being a trier of
facts. If such a procedure were allowed, it would be easy to delay and obstruct the
prosecution of an offense by a resort to a petition for habeas corpus based on arbitrariness,
which most accuse, if not all, would be most inclined, specially when they are out on bail.
The petition now before Us is exactly one of this kind. If granted, the effect is to transfer the
jurisdiction of the trial courts in criminal cases to this Court, which is simply inconceivable.
Moreover, arbitrariness, while so easy to allege, is hard to prove, in the face of the
formidable obstacle built up by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty. Unexhilaratingly, this is the revealing experience of this Court in the Lansang case,
where it doubtlessly realized how hardly possible it is to adduce evidence or proof upon
which to show the President having acted with arbitrariness.

7. The last question relates to the legality of the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO)
issued by the President on July 12, 1982, tested by the conformity of its issuance to the
procedure laid down under LOI 1211, petitioners insisting that the LOI limits the authority of
the President to cause the arrest and detention of persons engaged in or charged with, the
crimes mentioned in Proclamation No. 2045. They contend that the procedure prescribed in
the LOI not having been observed, the PCO issued thereunder did not validate the initial
illegal arrest of the herein petitioners as wen as their continued detention.
It must be noted that LOI No. 1211, which provides the guidelines in the arrest and detention
of persons engaged in, or charged with, the crimes mentioned in Proclamation No. 2045,
charged with, the crimes mentioned contemplates of three situations when an arrest can be
made, to wit:

1. The arrest and detention effected by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge;

2. The arrest and detention effected by a military commander or the head of

a law enforcement agency after it is determined that the person or persons to
be arrested would probably escape or commit further acts which would
endanger public order and safety. After the arrest, however, the case shall be
immediately referred to the city or provincial fiscal or to the municipal, city,
circuit, or district judge for preliminary examination or investigation who, if the
evidence warrants, shall file the corresponding charges and, thereafter, we a
warrant of arrest;

3. The military commander or the head of the law enforcement agency may
apply to the President thru the Minister of National Defense, for a Presidential
Commitment Order under the following circumstances:

(a) When resort to judicial process is not possible or

expedient without endangering public order and safety; or

(b) When the release on bail of the person or persons already

under arrest by virtue of a judicial warrant would endanger
said public order and safety.

Petitioners appear to place entire reliance on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOI No. 1211, ignoring
paragraph 3 of LOI No. 1211, which provides:

3. The above notwithstanding, the military commander or the head of the law
enforcement agency may apply to the President thru the Minister of National
Defense, for a Presidential Commitment Order covering the person or
persons believed to be participants in the commission of the crimes referred
to in paragraph 1 under the following circumstances:

(a) When resort to judicial process is not possible or

expedient without endangering public order and safety; or

(b) When the release on bail of the person or persons already

under arrest by virtue of a judicial warrant would endanger
said public order and safety.

The reliance of petitioners on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOI 1211 as to the alleged necessity of
judicial warrant before a person may be arrested and detained is not well-founded. Neither is
the contention that paragraph 3 of LOI 1211 applies only when judicial process is not
possible. This is a narrow and constricted interpretation of LOI 1211 when viewed in its
entirety. Even in instances when a resort to judicial process is possible, where, in the
judgment of the President, a resort thereto would not be expedient because it would
endanger the public order or safety, a PCO is justified. So, too, when release on bail in the
ordinary judicial process will invite the same danger.
By its very nature, and clearly by its language, LOI 1211 is a mere directive of the President
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to his subordinates or
implementing officers for the ultimate objective of providing guidelines in the arrest and
detention of the persons covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 2045. The purpose is "to
insure protection to individual liberties without sacrificing the requirements of public order
and safety and the effectiveness of the campaign against those seeking the forcible
overthrow of the government and duty constituted authorities. " LOI 1211 does not, in any
manner, limit the authority of the President to cause the arrest and detention of persons
engaged in, or charged with the crimes or offenses mentioned in said Proclamation in that he
(President) would subject himself to the superior authority of the judge who, under normal
judicial processes in the prosecution of the common offenses, is the one authorized to issue
a judicial warrant after a preliminary investigation is conducted with a finding of probable
cause. Those who would read such an intention on the part of the President in issuing LOI
1211 seems to do so in their view that LOI forms part of the law of the land under the 1976
amendment of the Constitution. 10 They would then contend that a PCO issued not in
compliance with the provisions of the LOI would be an illegality and of no effect.

To form part of the law of the land, the decree, order or LOI must be issued by the President
in the exercise of his extraordinary power of legislation as contemplated in Section 6 of the
1976 amendments to the Constitution, whenever in his judgment, there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or
the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any
reason that in his judgment requires immediate action. There can be no pretense, much less
a showing, that these conditions prompted the President to issue LOI 1211. Verily, not all
LOI issued by the President should be dignified into forming part of the law of the land.

In the event then that the judge believes no warrant shall issue, the President, under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 and Letter of Instruction No. 1211, is not bound by such
finding, as explicitly provided in paragraph 2 of LOI 1211. That the President avails of the
facilities of the judicial machinery, as is the clear intent of LOI 1211, to aid him in exercising
his power to restrain personal liberty, as dictated by the necessities and exigencies of the
emergency, does not indicate any intention on his part to renounce or to allow even mere
curtailment of his power such that the judicial process will thereupon take its normal course,
under which the detainees or accused would then be entitled to demand their right of due
process, particularly in relation to their personal liberty. 11 The issuance of the PCO by the
President necessarily constitutes a finding that the conditions he has prescribed in LOI 1211 for
the issuance of that PCO have been met, and intends that the detention would be pursuant to the
executive process incident to the government campaign against the rebels, subversives and
dissidents waging a rebellion or insurrection. The ruling in the Nava vs. Gatmaitan case,* as above
intimated, must have shown him that to prosecute the offense through the judicial process of forthwith instead of deferring it,
would neither be wise nor expedient if he were to deal effectively with the grave emergency at hand.

What has been said above shows the need of reexamining the Lansang case with a view to
reverting to the ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, a 1905 decision, and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952), that the President's decision to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons." This
well-settled ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which declared that the "function of the
Court is merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or ascertain merely whether he
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested
in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." Judicial interference was thus held as
permissible, and the test as laid down therein is not whether the President acted correctly but
whether he acted arbitrarily. This would seem to be pure semanticism, if We consider that
with particular reference to the nature of the actions the President would take on the
occasion of the grave emergency he has to deal with, which, as clearly indicated in Section
9, Art. VII of the Constitution partakes of military measures, the judiciary can, with becoming
modesty, ill afford to assume the authority to check or reverse or supplant the presidential
actions. On these occasions, the President takes absolute command, for the very life of the
Nation and its government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so
doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to God. For their
part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the people can only trust and
pray that, giving him their own loyalty with utmost patriotism, the President will not fail them.

In his separate opinion in the Lansang case, then Justice Fernando, now our learned Chief
Justice, went along with the proposition that the decision of the Executive in the exercise of
his power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is his alone, and in his own
language, is "ordinarily beyond the ken of the Courts." This is so, as the Founding Fathers
must have felt that in the particular situations at hand, the Executive and the Judiciary should
maintain a mutually deferential attitude. This is the very essence of the doctrine of "political
question, " as determining the justiciability of a case. The wisdom of this concept remains
well-recognized in advanced constitutional systems. To erase it from our own system as
seems to be what was done in the Lansang case, may neither be proper nor prudent. A good
example could be given in the exercise of the presidential power of pardon which is beyond
judicial review, specially under the new Constitution where the condition that it may be
granted only after final conviction has been done away with.

True, the Constitution is the law "equally in war and in peace," 12 as Chief Justice Fernando
cited in his brilliant separate opinion in the same Lansang case. Precisely, it is the Constitution
that gives the President specific "military power" in times of warlike conditions as exist on the
occasion of invasion, insurrection or rebellion. Both power and right are constitutionally granted,
with the difference that the guarantee of the right to liberty is for personal benefit, while the grant
of the presidential power is for public safety. Which of the two enjoys primacy over the other is all
too obvious. For the power is intended as a limitation of the right, in much the same way as
individual freedom yields to the exercise of the police power of the State in the interest of general
welfare. The difference again is that the power comes into being during extreme emergencies the
exercise of which, for complete effectiveness for the purpose it was granted should not permit
intereference, while individual freedom is obviously for full enjoyment in time of peace, but in time
of war or grave peril to the nation, should be limited or restricted. In a true sense then, our
Constitution is for both peacetime and in time of war; it is not that in time of war the Constitution is
silenced. The Founding Fathers, with admirable foresight and vision, inserted provisions therein
that come into play and application in time of war or similar emergencies. So it is that, as
proclaimed by the Constitution, the defense of the State is a prime duty of government.
Compulsory military service may be imposed, certainly a mandate that derogates on the right to
personal liberty. It, therefore, becomes self-evident that the duty of the judiciary to protect
individual rights must yield to the power of the Executive to protect the State, for if the State
perishes, the Constitution, with the Bill of Rights that guarantees the right to personal liberty,
perishes with it.

In times of war or national emergency, the legislature may surrender a part of its power of
legislation to the President. 13 Would it not be as proper and wholly acceptable to lay down the
principle that during such crises, the judiciary should be less jealous of its power and more
trusting of the Executive in the exercise of its emergency powers in recognition of the same
necessity? Verily, the existence of the emergencies should be left to President's sole and
unfettered determination. His exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus on the occasion thereof, should also be beyond judicial review. Arbitrariness, as a ground
for judicial inquiry of presidential acts and decisions, sounds good in theory but impractical and
unrealistic, considering how well-nigh impossible it is for the courts to contradict the finding of the
President on the existence of the emergency that gives occasion for the exercise of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ. For the Court to insist on reviewing Presidential action on the
ground of arbitrariness may only result in a violent collision of two jealous powers with tragic
consequences, by all means to be avoided, in favor of adhering to the more desirable and long-
tested doctrine of "political question" in reference to the power of judicial review. 14

Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, as earlier cited, affords further reason for the
reexamination of the Lansang doctrine and reversion to that of Barcelon vs.
Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda.

Accordingly, We hold that in times of war and similar emergency as expressly provided in the
Constitution, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which
has the effect of allowing the Executive to defer the prosecution of any of the offenses
covered by Proclamation No. 2045, including, as a necessary consequence, the withholding
for the duration of the suspension of the privilege, of the right to bail. The power could have
been vested in Congress, instead of the President, as it was so vested in the United States
for which reason, when President Lincoln himself exercised the power in 1861, Chief Justice
Taney of the U.S. Supreme Court expressed the opinion that Congress alone possessed this
power under the Constitutional., 15 Incidentally, it seems unimaginable that the judiciary could
subject the suspension, if decreed through congressional action, to the same inquiry as our
Supreme Court did with the act of the President, in the Lansang case, to determine if the
Congress acted with arbitrariness.

We further hold that under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of
which is the exclusive prerogative of the President under the Constitution, may not be
declared void by the courts, under the doctrine of "political question," as has been applied in
the Baker and Castaneda cases, on any ground, let alone its supposed violation of the
provision of LOI 1211, thus diluting, if not abandoning the doctrine of the Lansang case. The
supreme mandate received by the President from the people and his oath to do justice to
every man should be sufficient guarantee, without need of judicial overseeing, against
commission by him of an act of arbitrariness in the discharge particularly of those duties
imposed upon him for the protection of public safety which in itself includes the protection of
life, liberty and property. This Court is not possessed with the attribute of infallibility that
when it reviews the acts of the President in the exercise of his exclusive power, for possible
fault of arbitrariness, it would not itself go so far as to commit the self-same fault.

Finally, We hold that upon the issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order against herein
petitioners, their continued detention is rendered valid and legal, and their right to be
released even after the filing of charges against them in court, to depend on the President,
who may order the release of a detainee or his being placed under house arrest, as he has
done in meritorious cases.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Guerrero, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr. and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur in the result.

Aquino, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-61388 July 19, 1985

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA,
FRANCIS DIVINA GRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA
MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA
GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ, JOSEFINA
GARCIA PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER GENERAL FIDEL V.
RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.

Lorenzo Tanada, Jose W. Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Efren H. Mercado and Alexander A.
Padilla for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Garcia Padilla v. Minister Enrile, 1 is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
on behalf of fourteen detainees, nine of whom were arrested on July 6, 1982, 2 another four on
July 7, 1982, 3 and the last one on July 15, 1982. 4The writ was issued, respondents were
required to make a return, and the case heard on August 26, 1982. 5

In such return, it was alleged: "The detainees mentioned in the petition, with the exception of
Tom Vasquez, who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, after his arrest on July 15,
1982, are all being detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued on
July 12, 1982, pursuant to LOI No. 1211 dated March 9, 1982, in relation to Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045 dated January 17, 1981. The said PCO was issued by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos for violation of P.D. No. 885 ... ." 6

The facts were set forth thus in the opinion of the Court penned by retired Justice Pacifico de
Castro: "At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein on July
6, 1982, records reveal that they were then having conference in the dining room of Dr.
Parong's residence from 10:00 a.m. of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14)
detainees were under surveillance as they were then Identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaging in subversive activities and using the
house of detainee Dr. Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as their headquarters.
Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered towards different
directions leaving on top of their conference table numerous subversive documents,
periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationeries, and other papers, including a
plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student sector (code-named YORK). Also
found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of
ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred fifty pesos P l8,650.00) cash
believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed and ready for distribution, a
sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia, which were then seized. 7

According to the main opinion of the Court, concurred in full by six other members: 8 "The
function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a person for any of
the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any warrant. Its
legal effect is to render the writ unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the
detention in view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ. The grant of the power to suspend
the said privilege provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the detention as long as
the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or quelled and the need therefor in the interest of
public safety continues." 9 Further: "The significance of the confernment of this power,
constitutionally upon the President as Commander-in-Chief, is that the exercise thereof is not
subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to determining its legality in the light of the bill of rights
guarantee to individual freedom." 10

The opinion then went on to reiterate the doctrine that with the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the right to bail is likewise suspended and to hold "that under LOI
1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which is the executive prerogative
of the President under the Constitution, may not be declared void by the Courts, under the
doctrine of 'political question,' as has been applied in the Baker and Castañeda cases, on
any ground, let alone its supposed violation of the provision of LOI 1211, thus diluting, if not
abandoning, the doctrine of the Lansang case." 11 Finally, the Court held "that upon the
issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order against herein petitioners, their continued
detention is rendered valid and legal, and their right to be released even after the filing of charges
against them in court, to depend on the President, who may order the release of a detainee or his
being placed under house arrest, as he has done in meritorious cases." 12

The dispositive portion of the decision promulgated on April 20, 1983 reads as follows:
"[Wherefore], the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed." 13

Thereafter, on June 6, 1983, a motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner Garcia
Padilla. The stress is on the continuing validity of Garcia v. Lansang 14 as well as the
existence of the right to bail even with the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. The motion asserted further that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not vest the President with the power to issue warrants of arrest or presidential
commitment orders, and that even it be assumed that he has such a power, the Supreme Court
may review its issuance when challenged. It was finally alleged that since petitioners were not
caught in flagrante delicto, their arrest was illegal and void.

In the comment of respondents on the motion for reconsideration, it was the submission of
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question and that the right to bail cannot be
invoked during such a period. On the question of whether or not the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus vests the President with the power to issue warrants of
arrest or presidential commitment orders, this is what the Comment stated: "It is to be
pointed out that this argument was not raised in the petition. Nonetheless, suffice it to point
out that an arrest order by the President incident to the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is essentially preventive in nature." 15 It added: "Besides, PD No. 1836 and
LOI 1211 have vested, assuming a law is necessary, in the President the power of preventive
arrest incident to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In addition,
however, it should be noted that the PCO has been replaced by Preventive Detention Action
(PDA), pursuant to PD No. 1877 dated July 21, 1983. As provided for in the said decree, a PDA
constitute an authority to arrest and preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned
crimes, for a period not exceeding one (1) year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected
to review by the President or by the Review Committee created for that purpose." 16 The last
argument of petitioner, namely that the detainees were not caught in flagrante delicto and
therefore the arrest was illegal was refuted in the Comment thus: "Again petitioner simply misses
the point. As this Court correctly observed, the crimes of subversion and rebellion are continuing
offenses. Besides this point involves an issue of fact. 17

It suffices to refer to the above Comment for the resolution of the motion for reconsideration.
As therein noted, Presidential Decree No. 1877 dated July 21, 1983 limits the duration of the
preventive detention action for the period not exceeding one year. In the language of such
Decree: "When issued, the preventive detention action shall constitute authority to arrest the
subject person or persons, and to preventively detain him or them for a period not exceeding
one year and sequester all arms, equipment or properly used or to be used in the
commission of the crime or crimes." 18 There is no need to mention the amendments as there is
no change as to the preventive detention period remaining at "not exceeding one year." This
Presidential Decree No. 1877 explicitly provides in its Section 8: "The Minister of Defense shall
promulgate the rules and regulations to implement this Decree." 19 Such implementing rules and
regulations were issued on September 7, 1983 by Minister of National Defense, respondent Juan
Ponce Enrile and duly approved by the President of the Philippines. One of its Sections deals
with the period of detention under a presidential commitment order thus: "The period of detention
of all persons presently detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order or its derivatives
shall not extend beyond one (1) year from and after the date of effectivity of Presidential Decree
No. 1877, as amended. Upon the effectivity of these rules and regulations, all cases of persons
presently detained under a presidential commitment order or its derivatives shall be governed by
Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations." 20

Subsequently, on May 28, 1985, respondents filed the following Manifestation: "1. The
persons listed below who were detained by virtue of Presidential Commitment Order (PCO)
issued on July 12, 1982, and in whose behalf the above-captioned cases was filed have
been released detention by the military authorities concerned on the dates appearing
opposite their names, to wit: Names of Detainees — Dates of Release: a. Dr. Aurora Parong-
December 12, 1983: b. Norberto Portuguese- January 31, 1985; c. Sabino Padilla —
January 31, 1985; d. Francis Divinagracia — January 31, 1985; e. Imelda delos Santos —
October 20, 1983; f. Benjamin Pineda — January 3l 1985; g. Zenaida Mallari — January 31,
1985 h. Tito Tanguilig — October 21, 1983; i. Letty Ballogan — March 4, 1983; j. Bienvenida
Garcia — October 20, 1983; k Eufronio Ortiz, Jr. January 31, 1985; 1. Juanito Granada —
October 20, 1983. 2. The foregoing information was received from the Off ice of Civil
Relations, Ministry of National Defense, through Major Felizardo O. Montero, JAGS-GHO 3.
As regards Tom Vasquez, who was included in the instant petition, he was released on July
17, 1982, after his arrest on July 15, 1982, since he was not named in the PCO 4. Anent
Mariano Soriano, the undersigned have been informed by the Office of Civil Relations that
the subject escaped from detention two (2) years ago and as of date hereof is still at
large." 21

There is no question, therefore, that the force and effectivity of a presidential commitment
order issued as far back as July 12, 1982 had ceased to have any force or effect.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and Section 8 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the motion for
reconsideration should have been granted, and the writ of habeas corpus ordering the
release of the detainees covered by such Section 8 issued, but in the light of the foregoing
manifestation as to Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divina gracia, Imelda de
los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty
Ballogan, Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada, and Tom Vasquez, having
been released, the petition as to them has been declared moot and academic. As to Dr.
Aurora Parong, since a warrant of arrest against her was issued by the municipal court of
Bayombong on August 4, 1982, for illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions, the
petition is likewise declared moot and academic. No costs.

Fernando, * CJ., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente,

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by
petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of
Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya,
who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming
elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and
a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey
the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter,
and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of
the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI

I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which
 are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
enumerated in section 1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and
who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him,
and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation."

For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory
provisions:

Sec 7. Terms of Office — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective
officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years,
which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.

.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.

Sec. 4. ...

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including
acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes,
shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this
Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:

provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes

shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence
of such fact.

... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).

Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials — ... The election shall be held
on January 30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)

Section 6. Election and Campaign Period — The election period shall be

fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-
C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December
29, 1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.)

In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question
the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the
Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from
any form of harassment and discrimination. "The question of accreditation will not be taken
up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the
issue has been squarely raised,

Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and
void for being violative of the Constitution.

I . The procedural Aspect

At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities,
hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of
parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and
Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of
their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. The respectively contest completely
different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity
as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a
taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead nine constraints as the reason of their joint
Petition, it would have required only a modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one
hand said petitioners lgot and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the
interest of orderly procedure.

For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).

It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties
have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.

This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.

A. Actual case and controversy.

It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and
controversies.

Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause
guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from
implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application
of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the
COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is
being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical
issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without
the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary
jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec,
82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for
the Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads:

"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:
 1) xxx

2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns

and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective
provincial and city officials. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:

Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from his receipt of a copy thereof.

B. Proper party.

The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).

In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their
Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that
neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor
disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been
calle ed to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they
assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor
substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus
standi in seeking judicial redress.

It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit,
and that the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual
vs. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:

... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one
who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there
are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for
the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of
public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may
be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.

In the same vein, it has been held:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite

standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not
only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they
may, therefore, question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure
of public moneys. (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs.
Gimenez, et als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).

However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and
sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds.
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted
and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative
power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds
by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]),
or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek
to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]),
citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the
institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court
in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice,
this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.

C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.

Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality
of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of
the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."

We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not
an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan.
They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue
of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be
dismissed.

II. The substantive viewpoint.

We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts
not being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural
standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481
[1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and
Gonzalez cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have
impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections
which will be held only a few days hence.

Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him

personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other
candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with
the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows
Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination.

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those
of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates
should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General
has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood
in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65
years old may also be good elective local officials.

Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be
a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be
retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like
one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city
or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from
which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood
assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he
would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection
neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons
similarly situated are sinlilarly treated.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all
Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa
vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection
Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The
purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid
"even it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical
inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p.
547).

There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the
questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal
breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be
declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt
(Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases
on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the compentence of the
legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office
provided they are reasonable, as in this case.

In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may
be divided in two parts. The first provides:
 a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact ...

The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that
"all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will
not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs.
Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to
the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public
office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of
proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against
whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for
public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have
been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted
of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal
Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore,
may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the
Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible
conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person
charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of
guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby

declared valid. Said paragraph reads:

SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of

Article XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing
laws which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective
officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or
municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to
which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age
at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected,
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired.
 2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such
crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation
shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void,
for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed
to an accused.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., concurs and submits a brief separate opinion.

De Castro, J., abstain as far as petitioner Dumlao is concerned.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2809 March 22, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRISCO HOLGADO, defendant-appellant.

Mauricio Carlos for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.

MORAN, C.J.:

Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight
illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did
"feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the
house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
personal liberty." On may 8, 1948, the day set for the trial, the trial court proceeded as
follows:

Court:

Is this the case ready for trial?

Fiscal:

I am ready, your honor.

Court: — to the accused.

 Q. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? — A. I have no lawyer
and I will plead guilty.

Court:

Arraign the accused.

Note:

Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he
was asked this question.

Q. What do you plead? — A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.

Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? — A. Mr. Numeriano
Ocampo.

The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man.

Fiscal:

I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do
with the case and I found no evidence against this Ocampo.

Court:

Sentenced reserved.

Two days later, or on May 10, 1948, the trial court rendered the following judgment:

[Criminal Case No. V-118]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-
appellant.

SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION

SENTENCE

The accused, Frisco Holgado, stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention in the following

INFORMATION

That on or about December 11, 1947, in the municipality of Concepcion,

Province of Romblon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused being a private individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain
one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about 8 hours
thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty.
 Contrary to law.

This case is called for trial on May 8, 1948. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded
guilty to the information above described.

The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal detention as
defined by article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of
Republic Act No. 18 and punished by reclusion temporal in it minimum period to
death. Applying indeterminate sentence law the penalty shall be prision mayor in its
maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree as minimum, or ten
years (10) and one (1) day of prision mayor to twenty (20) years, with the accessory
penalties provided for by law, with costs. The accused is entitled to one-half of his
preventive imprisonment.

It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above quoted,
the offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the
judgment if is said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention." In the formation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he
"accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention." The facts alleged in said
information are not clear as to whether the offense is named therein or capital offense of
"kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his judgment. Since
the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by
either party, the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in
the information.

Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was
unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a
serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such
a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute
any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case.

The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided in
our rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:

If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is
his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time
must be allowed for procuring attorney.

Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four
important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have
attorney before being arraigned; 2 — After giving him such information the court must ask
him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney,
the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 — If the accused desires to
procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.

Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that
said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he
desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to
employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio.
The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you
going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his
right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed
that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he
plead guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due
process clause contained in our Constitution.

One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused
"shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no
fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to
be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly
in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be
assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is
so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the
aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires
and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.

It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded
guilty but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The trial
court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification. the record does not show
whether the supposed instructions was real and whether it had reference to the commission
of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court
on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining
whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the
confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had
investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such
attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was
not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should
have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified
plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a
new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be
assisted by counsel. So ordered.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 151284-85 February 5, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee

vs.
JONATHAN BESONIA, appellant.
 DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

From just a three-page, double-spaced decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 23, emanates the fiat sentencing appellant Jonathan Besonia to two counts of the
most severe penalty of death for having committed two counts of murder. The decision
leaves much to be desired. More than half of it was devoted to the narration about Besonia’s
plea of guilty and the consequent searching inquiry conducted by the trial court. After that
narration is a statement that he was not authorized to carry the fatal weapon recovered from
him, which is immediately followed by the dispositive portion, thus:

In the light of the evidence thus far adduced by the prosecution, both oral, real and
documentary and with the attendant qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation as well as the aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm,
the plea of guilty notwithstanding, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for two (2) counts in Criminal Cases Nos.
00-52307 and 00-52308, hereby sentencing the accused to two (2) counts of the Supreme
Penalty of Death, further condemning the said accused to indemnify the heirs of the victims
Ernesto Mospa Nieles and Jerry Sampiano the amount of P50,000.00 by way of death
compensation and P30,000.00 moral damages in each case.2

Besonia was charged with murder in two separate informations docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 00-52307 and 00-52308. Upon his arraignment on 22 August 2000, Besonia entered a
plea of not guilty in each case.3 Pre-trial was then held, where the following facts were
admitted by both the prosecution and the defense:

1. The identities of the victims Ernesto Mospa Nie[l]es and Jerry Sampiano as well as
that of the accused Jonathan Besonia;

2. The date and time of the incident, which is June 27, 2000 at 3:30 o’clock in the
afternoon;

3. The place of the incident which is at Guzman Street, Mandurriao, Iloilo City;

4. That the weapon used during the incident which resulted to the killing of the
victims Ernesto Mospa Nie[l]es and Jerry Sampiano was an unlicensed firearm; and

5. That Jerry Sampiano was a construction worker of the aunt of the accused at the
time of the incident.4

On 6 March 2001, before the start of the trial, Besonia, through his counsel Atty. Calixto
Perez, manifested that he would enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide after
a medical operation on his gall bladder.5Thereafter, the trial court ordered the prosecution to
begin presenting its evidence. The prosecution thereupon presented as witnesses Dr. Tito
Doromal and SPO1 Ricardo Clarete.

Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer who conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of the
victim Ernesto Mospa Nieles, testified that his autopsy findings revealed that Nieles had a
bullet wound on the left side of his head and another one on the thoraco-abdominal region at
the left side of his body. He declared that the two bullet slugs recovered from the body of
Nieles came from a .38 caliber firearm, and that the cause of his death was the laceration of
the brain and internal hemorrhage secondary to bullet wounds.6

SPO1 Ricardo Clarete, the duly authorized representative of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Division, declared that based on the certification issued by his office after a
verification from available records,7 Besonia was not a licensed or registered holder of a
firearm of any kind and caliber.

At the continuation of the trial, Dr. Agustin P. Vencer testified that he examined the other
victim Jerry Sampiano at the West Visayas Medical Center on 27 June 2000. Sampiano had
gunshot wounds on the right arm, extending to the right lung and liver; and on the right eye,
which extended to the respiratory center of the brain.8 Since Sampiano’s abdomen was
distended, he was operated on twice. But a day after his second operation, or on 30 June
2000, he expired.

On 29 May 2001, Besonia manifested his desire to enter a plea of guilty to murder. Re-
arraignment was then scheduled on 5 June 2001.9 On his re-arraignment, Besonia pleaded
guilty to the two charges of murder.10 The trial court forthwith conducted a searching inquiry
to determine the voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea.11

Thereafter, the prosecution presented PO3 Efren Feliprada and PO3 Hilarion Roga, Jr., as
additional witnesses to testify on the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm
in perpetrating the crimes charged.

PO3 Feliprada testified that at about 3:30 p.m. of 27 June 2000 he, together with PO3
Gerardo Jison and PO2 Hagmay Dignadice, responded to a report of a shooting incident in
Guzman St., Mandurriao, Iloilo City. Later, while his companions were carrying the body of
Sampiano to be brought to the hospital, he gathered information from the bystanders, who
readily identified Besonia as the assailant. He was also informed that Besonia boarded a
passenger jeep en route to Leon, Iloilo. He and PO2 Dignadice immediately chased the jeep.
In Barangay Buhay, Alimodian, they saw Besonia alight. Upon noticing them, Besonia
attempted to escape, but to no avail. PO2 Dignadice recovered from Besonia’s waist a .38
caliber revolver with marking .38JB,12 which was loaded with three live ammunition and two
empty shells. Thereafter, Besonia was brought to the police station for investigation, and the
firearm was submitted to the crime laboratory for gunpowder residue examination.

PO3 Hilarion Roga, the forensic examiner who examined the firearm subject of these cases,
testified that he conducted the test fire ballistic examination on the firearm and found that the
three live ammunition and two empty shells recovered by the police and submitted for
examination came from the same .38 caliber firearm.13

When recalled to the witness stand, PO3 Feliprada testified that the firearm examined by
PO3 Roga and presented before the trial court was the same firearm recovered from
Besonia.14

After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense manifested that it would not present
any evidence. On 26 June 2001, the trial court promulgated judgment which is now the
subject of this automatic review.

In the Appellant’s Brief, Besonia, through his new counsel de parte Atty. Jose B. Tiangco,
prays for the reversal of the judgment of conviction and his acquittal based on this sole
assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF [THE]
ACCUSED NOT TO BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY AGAINST HIMSELF, AND HAVING SO
COMPELLED HIM, RENDERED JUDGMENT SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH.15

Besonia argues that the finding of guilt by the trial court was based mainly on his confession,
which is inadmissible for having been obtained in gross violation of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. Moreover, the prosecution endeavored to prove the charges for
murder by evidence other than the testimonies of the proclaimed eyewitnesses. In the
absence of evidence proving his guilt, he should be acquitted.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that Besonia’s
voluntary confession in open court is valid in all respects. There is no indication that he was
forced, intimidated, coerced, or lured by anybody into admitting the crimes. His judicial
confession is buttressed by the prosecution evidence that the .38 caliber revolver taken from
him was the same gun that fired the two slugs recovered from the cadaver of Nieles.
However, his admission that he planned the killing a couple of months before its perpetration
is insufficient to prove the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. Hence, the OSG
recommends the downgrading in each case of (1) the crime from murder to homicide,
aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm, and (2) the penalty from death to an
indeterminate sentence of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, as maximum. It also recommends that temperate damages
of P10,000 be awarded in each case in favor of the victims’ heirs, and that the award of
moral damages be increased from P30,000 to P50,000.

In his Reply Brief,16 Besonia claims that his re-arraignment was "notoriously flawed" in that
despite his endeavor to plead guilty to the lesser crime of homicide, the trial court paid no
attention to it, thus depriving him of the opportunity to make such plea. Moreover, there is no
basis for the recommendation of the OSG to hold Besonia guilty of the lesser crime of
homicide because of the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree
of his culpability. The only support for such recommendation is the testimony of Besonia
himself, which was obtained in gross violation of his right not to be compelled to testify
against himself. He then prays that the judgment in these cases be set aside and that the
cases be remanded to the trial court for re-arraignment and further proceedings.

We cannot fault the trial court for not acting on the manifestation of Besonia before the start
of the trial on 6 May 2001 that he would plead guilty to the lesser crime of homicide.17 It must
be recalled that the intended change of plea was still subject to a suspensive condition, i.e.
after the operation on Besonia’s gall bladder, which nobody knew when. The trial court could
not afford to hold the trial in abeyance for an indefinite period of time. Besides, under Section
2 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a plea to a lesser
offense that is necessarily included in the crime charged must be with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor. And as can be gleaned from the use of the word may in
the second sentence of that Section, it is discretionary upon the trial court whether to allow
him to make such plea. In any case, when two months later, or on 29 May 2001, Besonia
again manifested his desire to enter a plea of guilty, but this time, to the crime of
murder,18 the trial court set the re-arraignment to 5 June 2001.

We do not find anything irregular in the re-arraignment on 5 June 2001. It complied with
Section 1 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Before
Besonia pleaded guilty to both charges, the two informations for murder were first read and
translated to Ilonggo dialect, which was the language known to him.
The two informations, to which Besonia pleaded guilty, allege that the killing was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and the aggravating circumstance of
use of an unlicensed firearm, which if proved would warrant the penalty of death. With such a
plea of guilty to a capital offense, Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure will apply. The said Section reads:

Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in
his behalf.

We have already outlined, as early as in the case of People v. Camay,19 how compliance
with the said rule could be attained by the trial court, thus:

1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences of his plea;

2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused and precise degree of his culpability; and

3. The court must ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence in his
behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires.

A searching inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension
by the accused of the consequences of the plea so that the plea of guilty can truly be said to
be based on a free and informed judgment. While there can be no hard and fast rule as to
how a judge may conduct a searching inquiry, we declared in People v. Aranzado, 20 citing a
plethora of cases, that it would be well for the court to do the following:

(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of
the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was
detained and interrogated during the investigations. These the court shall do in order
to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state
of duress by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging
quarters.

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred
with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a
plea of guilty.

(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty
under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently
indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad
advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should
he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the
accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions.
 (5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges
against him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or
cause him to supply missing details of significance.

Moreover, in some cases,21 we ruled that the trial court should also explain to the accused
the essential elements of the crime charged, as well as the penalty and civil liabilities.

We quote in full the searching inquiry that was conducted by the trial court, thus:

Q Now Mr. Jonathan Besonia, did anybody threaten[] you so that you will enter plea
of guilty to these two (2) charges?

A No, Your Honor.

Q Did anybody offer[] a promise or reward in terms of money or property for you to
plead guilty?

A None, Your Honor.

Q Now, do you fully understand the implication of entering into a plea of guilty to the
capital offense of Murder?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Now, how old are you?

A 28.

Q What is your work, if any?

A In Mindanao.

Q What is your work there?

A What work I could find, I work.

Q Like for example, what kind of work?

A Bodyguard.

Q What is your highest educational attainment?

A Third year high school.

Q Now Mr. Besonia, I will explain to you the elements of Murder as mandated by the
Supreme Court that the Court should explain to the accused the elements of the
crime. Now, the elements of Murder are: 1) that [a] person was killed; 2) that the
accused killed him. In these cases, do you know the persons who were killed, in
Crim. Case No. 00-52307?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q What’s the name?

A Ernesto Nieles alias "Maymay."

Q In Crim. Case No. 00-52308, who was the victim, who was killed?

A Jerry Sampiano.

Q Now, who killed these two (2) victims?

A I myself, Your Honor.

Q Now, the Informations in these cases allege that you killed Ernesto Mospa Nieles
and Jerry Sampiano with evident premeditation and using an unlicensed firearm.
What can you say to that?

A Yes, Your Honor. One thing important there is I killed him.

Q You know the Information alleges evident premeditation to qualify the killing from
Homicide to Murder. Evident premeditation means that you have mold [sic] the idea
or you entertain[ed] the idea before or you plan[ned] way before in killing the victims,
do you understand that?

A It [[was] my plan [for a] long time already to kill them. I just want to let them know.

Q With respect to Ernesto Mospa Nieles, how long before June 27, 2000 when the
incident happened did you plan to kill him, how long before?

A Two (2) months.

Q How about in the case of Jerry Sampiano, how long before June 27, 2000 did you
plan to kill him?

A The same, Your Honor. Together.

Q Now, are you at liberty to tell the Court why did you plan to kill him?

A Because they planned to kill me so I know their plan that is why I killed them
ahead.

Q When were you actually arrested?

A June 27, Tuesday, year 2000.

Q Right in that day?

A After the incident.

Q Now, do you know who was that person who arrested you?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Tell the Court.

A Dignadice and Sir Efren.

Q Please give the full name[s] of the arresting officers?

A PO3 Efren Feliprada and PO2 Hagmay Dignadice of Police Precinct 5.

Q Both of them?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Of Iloilo City?

A Of Mandurriao.

Q Now Jonathan, how were you arrested by the two (2)?

A Because they are my friends.

Q So you voluntarily surrendered?

A No, they arrested me.

Q When they arrested you, did you resist or not?

A No, You Honor. I go [sic] with them because they are also my group.

Q After you were arrested, were you investigated or interrogated?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Do you know who investigated you? The name of the police officer?

A I know him if I will see him but I forgot the name.

Q Where were you investigated?

A Mandurriao Police Station.

Q When, after you were arrested?

A They brought me to the Police Station.

Q And after you were arrested you were brought to the Police Station where you
were investigated?

A After the investigation was conducted, I was put inside the cell.

Q Do you know whether the incident that led to the death of the two (2) victims was
recorded in the Police Blotter?

A It was blottered. I was even told by Sir Duco that if it’s not blottered they could
release me.

Q So you agree [with] the entry in the Police Blotter regarding these cases?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q The rule specifically provides that if a person commits the crime of Murder using
an unlicensed firearm, the penalty is death, do you know that?

A Yes, Your Honor. I [am] even in fact asking [for] a penalty in order to make them
happy.

Q So you are asking the Court to impose the death penalty just to make the
complainant happy?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Whom would you want to please?

A My family, Your Honor. And I will kill them if they will touch my relatives, my family.

Q Now, the law also provides that aside from being sentenced either to a life
imprisonment or death, you should also pay compensation to the surviving heirs of
the victims in the amount of no less than P50,000.00 each by way of death
indemnity, do you know that?

A How could I pay when I am already sentenced. I know, Your Honor.

Q Now, so you are assisted here by Atty. Calixto Perez, your counsel?

A Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Now, the Court hereby orders that the accused and counsel be furnished with copy
of the Complaint together with the list of witnesses.

Q Now, so you are therefore warned that if you enter[] the plea of guilty to the capital
offense, you may be sentenced to death under Rule [sic] 7659 if the evidence of [the]
prosecution will warrant that imposition of penalty.
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q I am likewise informing you that your plea of guilty will not affect or reduce the
death penalty under Section 20-a of Republic Act 7659?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Now, next. You are also informed that after being sentenced guilty [of] the crime of
Murder and in the event that the death sentence [would] be imposed upon you before
it is implemented you are required to serve or confine at Muntinlupa Penal Colony?

A I know, sir.

Q Now, let us briefly hear again. Now, could you briefly relate to the Court how and
why you killed Ernesto Mospa Nieles on June 27, 2000?

A I shot him.

Q Where was he situated when you shot him?

A Inside the compound of the house of my aunt.

Q What weapon did you use in shooting?

A .38 caliber revolver.

Q Who owns that firearm?

A I am the owner of that, Your Honor.

Q Is it licensed in your name?

A No, Your Honor.

Q Was the victim Ernesto Mospa Nieles armed during that time?

A I do not know Your Honor but I know they planned to kill me and since they
planned to kill me that means they were also armed.

Q Before you shot Ernesto was there any altercation or argument that ensued
between you and Ernesto?

A There was a rumble and fist fight.

Q When you were confined there before this case was filed in Court, were you
present during the preliminary investigation before the Fiscal’s office?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Were you represented by a lawyer during the preliminary investigation?

A A lawyer was given to me Your Honor and it [sic] was already here in Court.

Q How about during the time when you were investigated before the Fiscal’s Office,
do you know if a lawyer assisted you there?

A No, Your Honor.

PROS. MADERO:

Atty. Richelle Baldoza, Your Honor.

ACCUSED:

A There was Your Honor, I only forgot.

COURT:

Q Can you recall what is the name of your lawyer before the Fiscal’s Office?

A I cannot remember but she is a lawyer. Lady, Your Honor.

Q Can you also tell us briefly how did you shoot Jerry Sampiano and where?

A During that same occasion, Your Honor but Jerry was ahead to fell [sic] down.

Q In the same place?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q You used the same weapon?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Was Jerry Sampiano armed during that time?

A He was armed but I was not able to see it.

Q Did you see his firearm?

A Tucked on his waist but I did not allow him to draw first.

Q Was there any exchange of words or arguments that took place before you shot
Jerry Sampiano?

A None, Your Honor. And he was one also who planned to kill me.

Q So it is now clear that you voluntarily is [sic] entering the plea of guilty to these two
(2) criminal charges for Murder?

A Yes, sir.
 Q And that nobody forced you or threatened you into entering a plea of guilty to
these charges?

A None, Your Honor. It is my own decision to make them happy.

Q [sic] The Court is satisfied with your answer and hereby ordered [sic] the
prosecution to present their evidence in order to prove the guilt or degree of
culpability of the accused for the use of unlicensed firearm.22

Clearly, the trial court has substantially followed the aforementioned parameters for the
conduct of a searching inquiry.

We cannot subscribe to Besonia’s claim that his confession and admissions during the
searching inquiry were elicited in violation of his constitutional right not to be compelled to
testify against himself. The right against self-incrimination23 is intended to prevent the State,
with all its coercive powers, from extracting from the suspect testimony that may convict him
and to avoid a person subjected to such compulsion to perjure himself for his own
protection.24 It does not apply where, as in these cases, the testimony was freely and
voluntarily given by the accused himself without any compulsion from the agents of the
State. There is nothing in the records that would indicate that Besonia was forced,
intimidated, or compelled by the trial court or by anybody into admitting the crimes. At any
rate, his plea of guilty and confession or admissions during the searching inquiry cannot be
the sole basis for his conviction.

It must be stressed that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or secondary basis for
a finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital
offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted just the same as if no such
plea was entered.25 The court cannot, and should not, relieve the prosecution of its duty to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability by the requisite
quantum of evidence. The reason for such rule is to preclude any room for reasonable doubt
in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that the
accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and
to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which may justify or
require either a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed
penalties.

In these cases, the trial court did not comply with the second requisite mentioned in Section
3 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is to order the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. It only required the
prosecution to present evidence "to prove the guilt or degree of culpability of the accused for
the use of [an] unlicensed firearm." Thus, the evidence presented by the prosecution were
merely the testimonies of the police officers on the aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime, apart from those of the doctors on the
injuries sustained by the victims. Doubtless, they are insufficient to establish the guilt of
Besonia.

It must be noted that among the witnesses listed in the complaint for murder was Mildred
Besonia, the aunt of Besonia who was allegedly an eyewitness to the crime and who had
executed an affidavit26 narrating the shooting incident and identifying the appellant as the
perpetrator thereof. On the hearing of 16 April 2001, the trial court ordered the issuance of a
subpoena for her to testify in court.27 However, she was not made to testify anymore
obviously because of the plea of guilt of Besonia.

Worth noting also is that, apart from the Besonia’s admissions during the searching inquiry,
the only evidence mentioned by the trial court in the decision subject of this automatic review
were the testimonies regarding the use of an unlicensed firearm. There was neither a
discussion on the guilt of the appellant, the reasons for the appreciation of the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation, the penalty, and the civil liabilities.

Apparently, the trial court and the prosecution unduly relied on Besonia’s plea of guilty and
his admissions made during the searching inquiry. The prosecution did not discharge its
obligation as seriously as it would have had there been no plea of guilt on the part of
Besonia.28 Its presentation of its case was lacking in assiduity that is necessarily expected in
a prosecution for a capital offense; it was too meager to be accepted as being the standard
constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life.29 It has been held that
where the plea of guilt to a capital offense has adversely influenced or impaired the
presentation of the prosecution’s case, the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings is imperative.30

Additionally, we observe that Besonia’s defense counsel Atty. Perez merely performed a
lackadaisical and perfunctory representation of the appellant before and during the trial. First,
he failed to question before the arraignment the legality of Besonia’s arrest, which failure is
deemed as a waiver of the right to raise that question once an accused enters a plea.
Second, he failed to object to the admissibility of the firearm seized after Besonia’s arrest.
Third, there is no showing that he advised Besonia of the consequences of his plea of guilty
to the crimes of murder. Fourth, he remained silent throughout the searching inquiry. Fifth,
he did not cross-examine the police officers,31 and his cross-examination of the two doctors
was limited to only two questions each.32 Lastly, he did not present any evidence on behalf of
Besonia. These are all indicative of his failure to effectively provide Besonia with qualified
and competent representation. His behavior irrefutably falls short of the demanding mandate
required of a lawyer to defend an accused no matter how guilty the latter may seem to be. In
short, his deportment evinces an apparent disregard of his fidelity to his oath as a lawyer and
responsibility as an officer of the court to aid in the administration and dispensation of justice.

Enlightening is the Court’s discourse on a counsel’s avowed passionate dedication and

resolve in his duty, viz.:

… The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person’s basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to
the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by
the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in
mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing
the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an
accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn fidelity to
his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a
simple perfunctory representation. 33
We reiterate that the constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible. Absolute heedfulness of this
constitutional injunction is most pronounced in criminal cases where the accused is in the
gravest jeopardy of losing his life. It constantly behooves the courts to proceed with utmost
care in each and every case before them; but perhaps nothing can be more demanding of
judges in that respect than when the punishment is in its severest form – death -- a penalty
that, once carried out, is irreversible and irreparable.34

Therefore, given the attendant circumstances, we are constrained to remand these cases to
the court a quo for further reception of evidence. No matter how outrageous the crimes
charged might be or how depraved the offender would appear to be, the uncompromising
demand of due process and of the rule of law must still prevail.35

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 00-52307-08, finding appellant Jonathan Besonia guilty of two counts of murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death in each case is hereby SET ASIDE, and
Criminal Cases Nos. 00-52307 and 00-52308 are hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial
court for further reception of evidence and rendition of a new judgement.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 115236-37 January 29, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BRYAN FERDINAND DY y LA MADRID and GIOVAN BERNARDINO y GARCIA, accused-
appellants.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-appellants Bryan Dy and Giovan Bernardino were charged with Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness in a complaint initiated by Gina Marie Mobley under the following
informations:
Criminal Case No. 12600-R:

That on or about the 12th day of January, 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
taking advantage of the unconscious state of the complainant who was then under the
influence of drugs, have carnal knowledge of the complainant GINA MARIE MOBLEY,
against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 12601-R:

That on or about the 12th day of January, 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust with
lewd design and with deliberate intent to satisfy their lascivious desire, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kiss her, fondle her breast, undress her and insert their fingers into her vagina,
who was then unconscious by reason of the drugs employed on her by the accused, all
against her will and without her consent, thereby inflicting upon the latter moral shock, fright,
humiliation, dishonor and besmirched reputation on the part of the complainant and her
family.

The two cases were tried jointly. Accused-appellants refused to be arraigned and enter a
plea; hence, a plea of "not guilty" was entered on their behalf.

During the trial, the following undisputed facts were established: Complainant Gina Marie
Mobley, together with her companion Helen Kathleen Tennican, both American nationals,
were exchange students at the Chengdu University of Science and Technology in Chengdu,
Sichuan, China. Gina was taking up Biology. Helen was also a Biology major and took
Chinese Studies as an additional course. Both were enrolled at the Pacific Lutheran
University at Tacoma, Washington, where Gina was a university scholar.

Having heard of the renowned Filipino hospitality from their Filipino-American friends, Gina
and Helen decided to spend their semestral break in the Philippines. They arrived in the
country on January 10, 1994. They stayed overnight in Manila then went to Angeles City the
next day. In Angeles City, they visited a bar and had cocktails, played billiards and went
disco dancing.

The following morning, January 12, 1994, they flew over Mt. Pinatubo and viewed the lahar-
covered areas on board an ultralight plane. That afternoon, they were driven from their hotel
to the Philippine Rabbit Bus terminal in Dau, Pampanga, where they were supposed to take
a ride to Baguio City. While waiting for their bus, they went to a Shakey’s Pizza Parlor near
the terminal.

Gina and Helen took the table near the comfort room. Accused-appellants Bryan and
Giovan, who are brothers-in-law, were seated at the next table. With them was their driver,
Rizal. Bryan recognized the two girls from the Angeles Flying Club, where Gina and Helen
rented the ultralight plane. Gina went to the comfort room. Bryan and Giovan approached
Helen and introduced themselves. They invited Helen to join them at their table, but she
declined.
While Brian and Giovan were still talking to Helen, Gina returned. She presumed that Helen
knew them, so she started to talk with the boys. Gina told them they came to the country to
see the sights and that they wanted to experience Filipino hospitality. Since they could hardly
hear each other above the din of the TV, the girls agreed to join them at their table. The girls
talked about their plan to go to Baguio City and Banaue. Bryan and Giovan offered the girls a
ride to Baguio City. Gina and Helen talked the matter between themselves. Eventually they
accepted the offer thinking that they could save some money. Besides, they thought the boys
looked nice and trustworthy.

They left Shakey’s at 7:30 in the evening and boarded a white 1991 four-door Mitsubishi
sedan. Rizal took the wheel, while Bryan sat at the front passenger seat. Helen, Gina and
Giovan stayed on the back seat, in that order. Before proceeding to Baguio, they stopped at
a residential area where Bryan delivered some papers and picked up some jackets.

On their way to Baguio, they talked about school. The girls told them about their boyfriends,
while Bryan talked about his Italian ex-girlfriend. Rizal and Giovan did not join in the
conversation at all. Bryan asked Gina whether she has taken drugs, but Gina replied that she
only drinks alcohol occasionally.

The group arrived in Baguio City at 10:45 in the evening. They proceeded to the house of
Bryan’s uncle, but shortly afterwards, they left to look for another place to stay. They went to
the Terraces Hotel but found the rates too expensive. Then, they checked the Baden Powell.
The girls found the dormitory style accommodations to their liking and were about to unload
their things, when Bryan suggested the Benguet Pines Tourist Inn, which he said he had
already tried and had found to be a very fine hotel.

They checked in at the Benguet Pines Tourist Inn at 11:00 in the evening. They got two
rooms on opposite sides of the corridor on the second floor. After a while, Bryan and Giovan
asked the girls out for some drinks and dancing at the Songs Jazz Bar along Session Road.

The parties’ versions of the events that followed differed.

According to Gina and Helen, while at the Songs Jazz Bar, Helen drank a margarita, tequila
and blowjob with plenty of water. Gina drank Singaporean sling, blowjob and half a glass of
Giovan’s mai tai. Bryan drank just one shot of tequila while Giovan drank half a glass of mai
tai. They also had appetizers. Gina and Helen did not feel intoxicated. They just felt warm.

On the other hand, Bryan and Giovan narrate that Helen drank margarita, daiquiri, tequila
and blow job while Gina had Singaporean sling, tequila, blow job and mai tai. Bryan had a
bottle of beer and two shots of tequila while Giovan only drank one bottle of beer. They
ordered chicken wings and kropeck chips.

After the group left Songs Jazz Bar, Gina’s and Helen’s account went as follows:

As they were pulling away, Giovan, who was driving, said that he was thirsty and wanted to
buy cola drinks. Gina agreed to have one (See Exhibit "B-2"). But Helen declined since she
had drank plenty of water already at the Songs Jazz Bar (Ibid.). Giovan then drove to what
the girls called a convenience store because it was open at odd hours, but which is actually
the Kowloon Restaurant, according to the boys. Giovan and Bryan alighted and returned
after some ten minutes with Giovan carrying three plastic cups of Sprite or Seven-Up and
Bryan, two cups and a plastic bag containing Chinese food with small lemons to be
squeezed on it. Bryan gave Helen and Gina a cup each. Since she thought it impolite not to
drink what was given her, Helen removed the cover of her cup and sipped from it as there
was no straw, although the cup cover had a hole into which a straw is to be inserted. On the
other hand, Gina did not at first remove the lid of her cup (See Exhibit "4"); she just sucked
from the hole intended for the straw (Exhibit "4-B"). But later on she took off the cover
(Exhibit "4-A") and drunk from the cup.

Meanwhile, as they were drinking their cola drinks, Giovan drove the group to Camp John
Hay (should be Club John Hay) where he told the guards at the gate that they were just
going to check on the Club’s billeting rates. They parked in front of the billeting office. Gina
was then about to finish her cola drink when she felt something gritty in it which stuck into
her teeth; they were like small particles. She spat them back into the cup and dumped out
the remaining contents of the cup outside the car and thereafter gave the cup to Giovan who
threw it into a trash can. Gina commented out loud about the gritty substance in her drink
and related that in China they often found strange things in their food. There was no word
from the boys. Helen finished her drink and then handed the empty cup to Giovan who
likewise threw it into a trash can.1

After leaving Club John Hay, the group returned to their hotel. The girls went on to narrate:

Giovan, Gina, Bryan and Helen, in that order entered. Helen no longer noticed where Rizal
was. Giovan directly proceeded upstairs and stopped on the stair just above the first landing
while Gina followed him and stopped on the first landing. Helen got the keys to their room
while Bryan was behind her talking to the desk clerk. Helen tossed the key to the boys’ room
to Gina who was about seven to ten feet away and the latter, in turn, gave it to Giovan. Helen
also flipped their key to Gina who caught it with one hand. Helen waited for Bryan and they
went upstairs together. Gina was trying to open her and Helen’s room with difficulty and so
the latter got the key from her and opened the door. Both entered the room briefly and when
Helen was still by the doorway, Gina went out and walked towards the boys’ room. Gina had
no recollection why she did so; all she could recall was that she was standing inside the
boys’ room.

On the other hand, Helen remembered that one of the boys asked if she had playing cards
but he seemed preoccupied with something else, so she did not make any move to get the
playing cards from her bag. Since she was very tired she entered their (girls’) room, took off
her contact lenses in the comfort room, put them in her contacts case and went to bed.
Thereupon, she lost her memory. Sometime later, she felt the sensation of wanting to vomit
and ran to the comfort room in panic that she might not get there on time. However, she did
not know if she vomitted. She lost her sense of time and did not know if she ever went back
to bed. She had never felt that way before.

She again regained partial consciousness when she felt being wet on her face and upper
chest as though somebody was touching her with the mouth. She could not tell if her eyes
were open but, in any event, she could not see anyone or anything; she only felt that her
personal space was being violated. She curled up like a baby in the womb and kept on
saying, "no", until whoever was with her in the room went away. Then, she lapsed into
unconsciousness.

At this time in the boys’ room, Gina noticed that one of the boys pushed the two beds in the
room together. She walked up to one of the beds and lay down on her belly. Giovan lay
alongside her and forcefully kissed her. She could not call to mind what else happened as
she believed she was drugged. She could only remember that Giovan was trying to take off
her pants while she was trying to prevent him by holding on to its elastic waist line. Giovan
was all along kissing her with his tongue in her mouth, lying on top of her and touching her
breasts. He inserted his fingers into her vagina but at this precise moment someone knocked
on the door. So, Giovan got up and it was then that Gina realized that he was completely
naked and so was she. He handed the blanket on the bed to her and she covered her body
with it. She saw lights coming from the hallway and heard Giovan say, "I think she is asleep."
She could not recall removing them again. When that someone laid on top of her, she found
out that it was Bryan. He placed himself between her legs. She could not recollect if they
kissed but she felt his erect penis against her vaginal opening. She told him that she did not
want to have sex; that she was still a virgin. He asked why she was still a virgin and she
replied that she wanted to wait for a husband. More words were in her mind but she could
not speak them out. Bryan told her that he won’t put it in. But Gina felt pain in her vagina
because his penis was going into it.

The thought occurred to Gina that if she did not do anything, she knew what was going to
happen. It dawned on her that if she stimulated him in some other way, he might not
penetrate her further. So, she slid down and did a fellatio or oral sex on him. She could not
explain her feelings then; to her it was like a nightmare; it was as if she was observing what
was going on and it wasn’t really her; she felt like her head was detached from her body. She
did the oral sex for only several seconds because it was as if someone went into the room.
Then, she became unconscious.2

Again, Bryan and Giovan had a different story:

[F]rom the Songs Jazz Bar they went to Kowloon Restaurant because Bryan was hungry and
wanted to eat siomai and chicken pao with Sprite. Gina and Helen also wanted Sprite while
Giovan and Rizal, grape juice and root beer, respectively. Giovan and Rizal went down to
buy all these. They made their orders through a small window because the main entrance to
the restaurant was already closed. They returned with Rizal holding three plastic cups of
Sprite with ice in them and Giovan, root beer and grape juice and two plastic bags containing
siomai and chicken pao. Then, Giovan drove them to John Hay because one of the girls
wanted to see the place. That was already past 2:00 o’clock in the morning of January 13.
They pulled over the premises of the billeting area because Giovan told the guards at the
gate that they would just check on the billeting rates. Giovan went to the billeting office where
he stayed for about ten minutes. In the meantime, those left in the car finished their drinks
and Bryan collected the cups and threw them into a trash can at the farther left side of where
they parked. They were at John Hay for less than 15 minutes. Then, they left for the Benguet
Pines Tourist Inn at about 2:00 o’clock in the morning of January 13.3

As to the events that occurred at the hotel, accused-appellants had this to say:

Bryan, Helen, Gina and Rizal got off the car ahead as Giovan went to park it. Giovan got the
key to their room from the car’s glove compartment and picked up the key to the girls’ room
from the backseat of the car because he saw it lying there. He averred that they did not leave
their hotel keys at the front desk when they left for the Songs Jazz Bar since there was no
one there at the time. After giving the girls’ key to them at the hallway where they were
talking with Bryan, he went to their room followed by Rizal and then Gina. On the other hand,
Bryan went with Helen to the girls’ room where he borrowed Helen’s playing cards.

After Bryan had entered the boy’s room, they joined together the two beds inside and sat on
them (Exhibit ‘8"). They taught Gina how to play Russian poker or what is commonly called
pusoy for more than thirty minutes. But Gina never learned the game and so they switched to
blackjack. Then, Gina said that she was hungry. Giovan offered to go out and buy what Gina
wanted, to which the latter replied that any food will do. Giovan left with Rizal. That was
already past 4:00 o’clock in the morning of January 13. After Giovan had closed the door,
she and Bryan continued playing blackjack. After some ten minutes, Gina put down the
playing cards and said that she just wanted to talk with Bryan. She lay down on her left side
facing Bryan with her left hand supporting her head. Bryan moved up on the bed until his
face was on the same level as Gina’s. Their heads were more than a foot but less than two
feet away from each other. While they were talking Gina was stroking Bryan’s head, maybe
six times. Bryan just kept silent as he did not know what to do. On the other hand, Gina was
smiling at him. He then smacked her on the lips. She kissed him back and they started
kissing each other. Gina inquired if he had had sex before and he replied, "yes", although it
was not true because he was afraid that Gina might laugh at him if he told the truth that he
has no experience in lovemaking. Bryan shot back a similar question to her and she
answered that she has not had sex yet and is still a virgin as she wanted to preserve her
virginity for her future husband. At this point they again kissed each other. Then, Gina asked
if Bryan had a condom and the latter said, "none". She remarked that she was worried about
AIDS and he told her that he is not afflicted with the disease. Thereupon, Gina said that if
they are to do it, he should not tell it to anyone to which he commented that he is not the
kiss-and-tell type. She then undressed and he did the same. They went back to bed and
resumed kissing each other. Gina went on top of Bryan and then she slid down and kissed
the area around his organ and later did a fellatio on him. After he had climaxed, Gina moved
up and wanted to kiss him but he did not react. She then asked him to enter her and he
replied, "yes", and touched her breasts. However, he was turned off when, upon feeling her
genitals, his hand was smeared with transparent liquid with something like brown or dark
brown or red substance in it which smelled awful. He concluded that it was menstrual fluid
because earlier when they were playing cards something fell from Gina’s jogging pants
which he picked up. When he handed it to her, she commented that it was tampon used for
menstruation. He told her that he could not do the act anymore to which she replied, "never
mind". They then put back their clothes on. Bryan went to the comfort room where he
washed his smeared hand. When he came out, he saw Gina lying in bed with her eyes
closed. He switched off the lights and laid beside her but he could not sleep. He later on got
1awp++i1

up and went down to see if Giovan and Rizal had already arrived. However, the security
guard told him that the two had not yet gone back. He returned to their room and, again, lay
down beside Gina. This time he fell asleep. The sun was already somewhat up. He went to
the porch to see if their car was already there and he saw it there. He went down to the car
and found both Giovan and Rizal sleeping inside the car; Rizal on the driver’s seat with
Giovan beside him.4

Giovan claimed that he and Rizal bought food for Gina at the Kowloon Restaurant. When
Giovan returned to the room, however, he found Bryan and Gina sleeping. So he just ate the
food that they bought. He slept in the car with Rizal until Bryan woke them up.

Bryan related to Giovan what had transpired between him and Gina. Giovan teased Bryan
that he might get AIDS. Giovan told Bryan that he would like to go home to his wife. Bryan
ordered breakfast, then the he and Giovan went upstairs to their room. Gina was still there.
They asked her if she would like some breakfast, but she said no.

Bryan and Giovan then got their things and went downstairs. Bryan finished his breakfast.
Bryan told Giovan that they should wait for the girls to wake up before leaving Baguio. They
went first to the driving range at Camp John Hay, but it was full, so they just went back to the
hotel. It was 8:00 in the morning. Bryan wrote his phone number on a piece of paper to give
to the girls, since he had promised to show them around Manila. They went upstairs to the
girls’ room and found Gina there. Both girls were still sleeping. Bryan roused Gina and asked
her if it was alright for them to leave. Gina said, "Yes." Before leaving, Brian left the paper
with his phone number.

Gina testified that she passed out after doing oral sex on Bryan. She woke up at 3:00 in the
afternoon feeling groggy and confused. She was shocked to realize what time it was, since
she normally sleeps only seven and a half to eight hours a day. She also felt tired. She could
not remember how she was able to get back to their room. She also felt that her hair, pillow
and underwear, which was on the floor, were wet. She remembered that check-out time at
the hotel was at 12:00 noon. She opened her purse to get money to pay for the room, but
found that her US$290.00, P2,000.00, 300 yuan and US$200.00 traveller’s check were all
missing. Only her US $100.00 traveller’s check was left. She tried to wake Helen up but the
latter only rolled over.

She got up and went out of the room, but she had difficulty balancing herself. She walked to
the boys’ room but found that the door was already open and the beddings had been
changed. She ran downstairs and met Hilda, a hotel desk girl, who asked her if she was
alright. Gina cried and told her that she had been robbed. Hilda said she will call the police.
Gina returned to their room to wake up Helen but the latter still did not wake up.

After sometime, Gina again went downstairs and was introduced to five or six members of
the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS). She told them that she was robbed and sexually
molested and narrated to them what had happened. Two CIS agents drove Gina to look for
the house of Bryan’s uncle but Gina could not find it.

The hotel owner, Mrs. Delos Santos, asked two hotel guests, Mariano Robles, Jr. and Rizza
Lao, for assistance in helping Gina. Together, they went upstairs and found Helen still
asleep. She was wearing black tights and a green sweatsuit. A bra lay on the table. Mrs.
Delos Santos tried to wake her up. It took a while before Helen opened her eyes and gazed
around her. Mrs. Delos Santos introduced Mariano and Rizza. Helen said nothing. Rizza
propped her up with a pillow on her back. Helen appeared sleepy, helpless and unable to
move. When Rizza asked her what happened, she just cried. They thought she was drunk
but her breath did not smell of alcohol. Someone brought in a bowl of soup and Rizza let her
sip from it a little at a time. Helen tried to eat it with a spoon but her hands trembled and she
could not put the spoon properly into her mouth. It took her about 30 minutes to finish the
soup.

Mariano and Rizza decided to take Helen for a walk to let her blood circulate. Rizza helped
her into her sandals and pulled her to the side of the bed. Helen tried to stand up but she fell
back. Mariano held her on both arms and pulled her up. He stood on Helen’s right side, held
her right arm with his right hand and placed his left arm around her waist. Rizza held Helen’s
left arm. Mariano and Rizza tried to move forward but Helen could not take a single step.
Mariano dragged her forward and she made shaky steps.

On the stairway, Mariano had to remind Helen that they were going downstairs. He guided
her every step until they reached the hotel lobby. From the hotel, they walked around
Burnham Park for about fifty (50) minutes to an hour. Everytime they came upon a stairway,
Mariano had to instruct Helen how to go down step by step. Whenever Helen got tired, they
sat on a bench. They did this four (4) or five (5) times. Mariano had to support Helen’s back
every time they sat down on the park benches to prevent her from falling over.

When they returned to the hotel, they saw Gina. Mariano and Rizza invited the two girls to
have dinner with them. Gina declined. They took Helen to the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant along
Session Road. Again, they had to assist Helen in getting out of Mariano’s car. At the
restaurant, Helen hardly ate.

On the witness stand, Helen recounted that at that time she felt as if the effects of anesthesia
was wearing out. She was disoriented and groggy. She was dizzy and did not feel like
waking up. She had difficulty focusing on a single object. The act of walking was itself an
ordeal.

The following morning, Helen still felt groggy and had difficulty concentrating and walking.
She and Gina decided to go to Baguio General Hospital for a urinalysis and pelvic
examination. Dr. Mildred Torres, who conducted the tests, made the following findings:

Perineal Exam.: Positive erythema at the lateral aspect of vaginal wall. No

lacerations; no bleeding noted.

Internal Exam.: Nulliparous introitus. Vagina admits two fingers with difficulty.

Uterus: small. Adnexae: negative. Bleeding: negative. Discharge: minimal; whitish.

Specimen taken for sperm analysis and gram straining.

Urinalysis and pregnancy test requested.

Result: Pregnancy Test: Negative.

Urinalysis: Epithelial cells: occasional. Amorphous Urates: moderate. Pus cells: 0-3.
RBC:0-2

Gram Stain: Smear shows gram (-) reds.

Pus cells:

Epithelial cells: many.

Smear Identification: Negative for sperm cell.

Dr. Torres also found erythema on both the lateral aspects of the inner part of the labia
minora which could have been caused by infection, scratching or insertion of any foreign
object into the introitus. Ruling out infection due to the absence of purulent or yellowish
discharge, she supposed that it could have been caused by scratching or coitus. On cross-
examination, she opined that it could also have been caused by the use of tampon during
menstruation. She concluded that no force could have been applied on Gina’s hymen as it
did not have any laceration or bleeding.

Gina likewise underwent urinalysis and her urine sample yielded negative of sperm cell. She
did not, however, undergo drug testing as there were no facilities for such anywhere in
Baguio City.

The prosecution presented Dr. Francisco Hernandez, a neuro-surgeon, as expert witness to

corroborate Gina’s testimony that she was drugged. Dr. Hernandez testified that in the
practice of his profession, he uses sedative-hypnotic drugs belonging to the benzodiazepine
family of drugs. According to him, he uses these drugs as tools, such that whenever he sees
a patient, he can form an opinion on whether he or she has been drugged.

Based on the set of facts provided by the private prosecutor, the entries in Gina’s journal and
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary examination conducted by
the trial court in the afternoon of January 26 and 27, 1994, Dr. Hernandez opined that Gina
and Helen were drugged, possibly with lorazepam or ativan, which is a benzodiazepine.

The defense presented two expert witnesses to counter Dr. Hernandez’s opinion. Dr. Rey
San Pedro, a psychiatrist, opined that Gina and Helen could not have been drugged because
they have not been medically examined for the presence of drugs in their system. Neither
were the cups used by Gina and Helen examined if they were indeed laced with drugs.
Instead, the condition described by the girls based on the documents given by the defense
could have been caused by the alcoholic drinks. He added, though, that while Gina’s
behavior as described in her journal might have been caused by ativan, he did not have any
basis to conclude the same in much the same way that he concluded that said behavior was
caused by alcohol. He conceded that if ativan were to be taken with alcohol, there would be
a potentiating effect, meaning, that because of the alcohol, the effect of the ativan would last
longer or there would be sedation.

The second expert witness, Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that a person who imbibes alcohol goes
through three stages, namely: (a) stage of excitement; (b) stage of intoxication or the
proprioception stage; and (c) stage of being dead drunk or the toxic stage. On the basis of
the statement of facts and documents provided him by the defense, Gina was only at the first
stage, the stage of excitement due to her alcohol intake for the following reasons: she had
the power to coordinate when she caught the room key thrown to her by Helen with one
hand; she could properly walk; and she could properly reason out when she decided to do
oral sex on Bryan in order to avoid sexual intercourse. Dr. Solis explained that the rather
long sleep experienced by Gina and Helen was due to fatigue brought about by their
activities the previous day, their alcohol intake, their youth and the cool ambience of Baguio
City.

He said it could not be definitely concluded that the girls were drugged because no drug test
was conducted. He added that mere observance of the clinical symptoms can not be a basis
for concluding that they were drugged. He conceded, though, that ativan and some other
benzodiazepines are relatively new drugs and, as yet, he has had no experience observing
its effects except from what he has read. Like Dr. San Pedro, he stated that if alcohol is
ingested with any of the psychotropic drugs like ativan, a potentiating effect would be
produced in the sense that the pharmacologic effect of the drug is increased.

The trial court gave credence to the version of the prosecution. On March 16, 1994, it
rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds and declares both the accused BRYAN FERDINAND
DY y LA MADRID and GIOVAN BERNARDINO y GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness as charged and -

(a) In Crim. Case No. 12600-R, for rape, DY is sentenced, after appreciating in his
favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the generic mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8)
YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; while BERNARDINO is sentenced,
 likewise after appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion perpetua, as maximum. Both accused are ordered to pay the offended
party GINA MARIE MOBLEY in the amounts of: P50,000.00 for her being raped,
P12,195.00 (the equivalent of US$450.00 dollars at the exchange rate of P27.10 to
US$1.00) as actual damages, and P500,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs.

(b) In Crim. Case No. 12601-R, for acts of lasciviousness, DY is sentenced, after
applying in his favor the same mitigating circumstances mentioned above, to suffer a
straight penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS of arresto mayor; and BERNARDINO is
sentenced, likewise after applying to him the same mitigating circumstance stated
above, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS OF arresto mayor, as
minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional, as
maximum. Both accused shall also indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended
party, GINA MARIE MOBLEY, in the amount of P100,000.00 for and as moral
damages, plus costs.

Both accused shall furthermore pay, jointly and severally, the offended party attorney’s fees
in the amount of P100,000.00 in the two cases.

The accused BERNARDINO shall be credited with his preventive imprisonment under the
terms and conditions prescribed in Article 29 in relation to Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.5

Accused-appellants filed separate appeals. Accused-appellant Bryan Dy assigned the

following errors:

A. Errors of Law

I. THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE ON THE GROUND THAT NO VALID ARRAIGNMENT TOOK PLACE DURING THE
TRIAL BELOW.

II. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW WERE VALIDLY CONDUCTED,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF RAPE AND
OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS BECAUSE:

a. THE CHARGE OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN

DEEMED INCLUDED IN THE CHARGE OF RAPE.

b. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN USING THE TESTIMONY OF DR. PEDRO

SOLIS, THE EXPERT WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE, GIVEN BY HIM MORE
THAN TWENTY YEARS AGO IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. CESAR GUY, 12 C.A.
REP. 2nd 258, TO DISCREDIT THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY HIM DURING THE
TRIAL BELOW.

B. Errors of Fact
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF RAPE BECAUSE:

a. THERE WAS IN FACT NO CARNAL KNOWLEDGE;

b. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF REASON OR

OTHERWISE UNCONSCIOUS;

c. THERE WAS NO FORCE OR INTIMIDATION.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF ACTS OF

LASCIVIOUSNESS BECAUSE:

a. THERE WAS NO ACT OF LEWDNESS COMMITTED;

b. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF REASON OR

OTHERWISE UNCONSCIOUS; and

c. THERE WAS NO FORCE OR INTIMIDATION.

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF
APPELLANT ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE ACTS OF A PERSON WHO HAD JUST
COMMITTED AN OFFENSE.

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S
SUBSEQUENT ACTS AND STATEMENTS MADE AS PART OF THE RES GESTAE SHOW
THAT SHE HAD NOT BEEN MOLESTED.

VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S
CREDIBILITY HAS BEEN IMPEACHED.

VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE
OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES HAS BEEN IMPEACHED.6

Accused-appellant Giovan Bernardino, on the other hand, assigns the following errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACCORD THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF

THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW THUS DEPRIVING THEM OF A FAIR
TRIAL.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING GIOVAN BERNARDINO GUILTY AS A

CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE CRIME OF RAPE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
CARNAL KNOWLEDGE BETWEEN BRYAN DY AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING GIOVAN BERNARDINO GUILTY AS A

CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE CRIME OF RAPE BECAUSE NEITHER FORCE NOR
INTIMIDATION WAS EMPLOYED NOR WAS THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
DEPRIVED OF REASON OR OTHERWISE UNCONSCIOUS.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING GIOVAN BERNARDINO GUILTY AS A

CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE CRIME OF RAPE BECAUSE BRYAN DY LACKED
 THE REQUISITE DOLO OR CRIMINAL INTENT TO COMMIT THE SAID
INTENTIONAL FELONY.

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT GIOVAN BERNARDINO

WAS A CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE CRIME OF RAPE BY REASON OF
CONSPIRACY OR THAT HE PARTICIPATED IN ANY WAY IN THE ALLEGED
CRIME.

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING GIOVAN BERNARDINO GUILTY OF

THE CRIME OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CRIME ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED WAS QUALIFIED RAPE, AND IN FAILING TO CREDIT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GIOVAN BERNARDINO WITH THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF MINORITY.

VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

IN CRIMINAL CASE No. 12600-R TO PAY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS FOR THE ALLEGED RAPE, ACTUAL AND MORAL
DAMAGES PLUS COSTS; AND IN CRIMINAL CASE No. 12601 TO MORAL
DAMAGES PLUS COSTS.7

The defense contends that there was no valid arraignment since they were not furnished a
copy of the complaint or information. Moreover, the complaint or information was not read in
a dialect or language known to them. While they waived their right to enter a plea, they claim
that they never waived their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them.

Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be
waived. Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a
plea of "not guilty" in their behalf. However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the
accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them. The defense can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the
complaint or information.

The reason proffered by accused-appellants’ for their refusal to be arraigned, i.e., that to do
so would supposedly constitute a waiver of their right to appeal the resolutions of the
prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice,8 appears to be specious. Evidently, accused-
appellants only wanted the trial court to suspend the arraignment to enable them to exhaust
their remedy of appeal to the Secretary of Justice. However, accused-appellants had no valid
ground to move that their arraignment be held in abeyance, considering that at that time they
had not filed a petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution before the Department of
Justice. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How,9 this Court has held that:

Procedurally speaking, after the filing of an information, the court is in complete control of the
case and any disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion. The decision to suspend
arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise
of such discretion.

xxx xxx xxx

It bears stressing that the court is however, not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the
merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an
abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine prima facie case.

As the Solicitor General correctly observed, thus:

x x x [A]ssuming, arguendo, that appellants were not validly arraigned, such defect, if any,
was waived when appellants, without objection, proceeded to trial as if they have been duly
arraigned (22 C.J.S. 626). Any irregularity in an arraignment, such as failure to deliver a copy
of the indictment, or to read the same to accused, or delivering the same to the attorney of
the accused, instead of to the accused himself, is waived by failure to object thereto in the
trial court (Ibid., p. 628).

xxx xxx xxx

It is also important to stress that to nullify the proceedings had before the court a quo would
set a dangerous precedent. For, all that an accused would do is to refuse to be arraigned
and then proceed to trial, and if found guilty would just invoke the absence of arraignment to
set aside the proceedings had in the trial court. Such practice would run counter to the
purpose and spirit of our rules of procedure which is: to help achieve an orderly and speedy
disposition of cases.10

Nonetheless, accused-appellants were substantially informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them when their counsel received a copy of the Prosecutor’s resolution
maintaining the charge for rape and acts of lasciviousness.11 The failure to read the
complaint or information in a language or dialect known to them was essentially a procedural
infirmity that was eventually non-prejudicial to accused-appellants. Not only did they receive
a copy of the information, they likewise participated in the trial, cross-examined the
complainant and her witnesses and presented their own witnesses to debunk and deny the
charges against them. The conduct of the defense, particularly their participation in the trial,
clearly indicates that they were fully aware of the nature and cause of the accusations
against them.

Interestingly, after the arraignment, the defense never brought up the supposed invalidity or
defect thereof. Rather, accused-appellants and their counsel vigorously and fully participated
in the trial of the case.

Accused-appellants are clearly estopped to question the alleged invalidity of or infirmity in

their arraignment. By actively participating in the trial of the case, they have effectively
waived whatever procedural error there was in their arraignment. In short, whatever was the
defect in their arraignment was substantially cured by their own omission and subsequent
actions.

Accused-appellants next submit that the crime of acts of lasciviousness should have been
absorbed by the crime of rape.

The Office of the Solicitor General disagreed arguing, thus:

While it may be true that in certain cases, the crime of acts of lasciviousness may be
considered absorbed by the crime of rape, in the instant case, it cannot be so because the
two crimes were committed by two different persons acting in conspiracy. Such being the
case, there is no occasion for the application of the procedural rule that one crime whose
elements are identical with another crime is absorbed by the more serious crime. There
being conspiracy, what is applicable is the rule that the crime committed by one conspirator
is added to the crime committed by his co-conspirator and vice-versa. This is so because in
conspiracy, the act of one is considered as the act of the other co-conspirator. In the case
under consideration, while appellant Bernardino has committed the crime of acts of
lasciviousness, his co-conspirator appellant Bryan Dy, committed the crime of rape. They
are, therefore, liable for both offenses in view of the presence of conspiracy.

Appellants, in insisting that the crime of acts of lasciviousness should have been absorbed
by the crime of rape, misappreciated the application of Section 5, Rule 120 (when an offense
includes or is included in another) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the principle of
conspiracy.12

The position of the Solicitor General is well-taken. As will be shown hereunder, both
accused-appellants acted in conspiracy, especially in their act of offering the girls alcoholic
drinks at the Songs Jazz Bar and in administering drugs in their cola drinks. Under the
principle of conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Consequently, Bryan should also be
held criminally liable for the acts of lasciviousness committed by Giovan on Gina, made
possible by his convenient absence in the room. Corollarily, Giovan should be held equally
guilty for the rape committed by Bryan.

Accused-appellants dispute the factual findings of rape made by the trial court, arguing that:
(1) that there was no carnal knowledge; (2) complainant was not deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and (3) there was no force or intimidation.

In rape cases, courts are guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is
easy, but to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent; (2) considering that
in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and not be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.13

Accused-appellant Dy insists there was no carnal knowledge between him and complainant.
He avers that "the only intimate contact between them consisted merely of Mobley’s kissing
him, holding his penis and eventually sucking it, and of him in turn kissing her and placing his
fingers in her vagina."14 He claims that Dr. Torres’ and Dr. Solis’ findings as well as
complainant’s journal confirmed his testimony. Dr. Torres, in particular, testified that
complainant’s cervix merely showed reddening and irritation indicating positive erythema at
the lateral aspect of the vaginal wall. Said erythema could have been caused by coitus,
infection, scratching, or the use of a tampon. She added that erythema could not be caused
solely by sex. The presence of erythema, however, cannot give a definitive conclusion as to
its cause. She also found complainant’s hymen to be intact and that there was no laceration,
bleeding or spermatozoa.

Dr. Solis, on the other hand, submits that erythema or reddening could not have been
caused by intercourse as said act would have produced not only irritation on the vaginal wall
but also irritation, swelling and reddening of complainant’s outer genital area. He added that
coitus is a blind act and would have caused irritation to the labia majora, labia minora and
hymen in addition to the vaginal wall, suggesting that erythema on the vaginal wall was more
consistent with scratching or the insertion of a foreign object such as a tampon.
Accused-appellant Dy’s contention fails to persuade. The medical opinions he cites do not
totally rule out penetration or contact of penis with the vagina. In fact, Dr. Torres could not
give a definitive conclusion that the reddening of the vaginal walls was not caused by sexual
intercourse. Even if we were to follow Dr. Solis’ line of reasoning, he was not likewise
categorical in stating that the reddening of the vaginal walls was not caused by penetration
by a penis. Rather, he stated that such reddening was "more consistent" with scratching or
the use of a tampon.15

Further, lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse. A freshly broken
hymen is not an essential element of rape. Even the fact that the hymen of the victim was
still intact does not negate rape. As explained by Dr. Maximo Reyes, medico-legal officer of
the NBI, there are hymens that may admit without necessarily producing laceration and there
are hymens that may admit injuries that will produce such laceration.16

Even the presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in the prosecution of a rape

case. It is well settled that penetration of the woman’s vagina, however slight, and not
ejaculation, constitutes rape. The Court rejects the argument that the absence of sperm in
the vaginal area is a good defense in a rape case.17

For rape to be consummated, full penetration is not necessary. Penile invasion necessarily
entails contact with the labia. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ
with the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the
lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a
conviction for rape. To repeat, the rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the
woman’s genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape.18

Accused-appellant Dy also insists that complainant could not have been drugged, relying on
the opinion of his expert witnesses, namely, Dr. San Pedro and Dr. Solis. The reasoning that
complainant could not have been drugged as there was no drug test taken is at least
speculative and at most non sequitur. The trial court found that:

The proven reaction of Gina and Helen to the cola drinks given them by the accused
unmistakably indicates that they were indeed drugged. Dr. Francisco Hernandez, the
prosecution expert witness, opined that the sedative-hypnotic drug known as ativan or
lorazepam could probably be the one used. As explained by him, ativan is a dose-related
drug. A dosage of from 0.5 milligram to 4 milligrams could produce in a person of average
built or with a weight of 130 pounds anxiolytic effect, visual hallucination, amnesia,
confusion, disorientation, gait unsteadiness and sedation. At a 4-milligram dosage, the
imbiber would experience sedation and excessive sleepiness (See Exhibit "G"). The onset of
the action of the drug is within 15 to 45 minutes from the time it is ingested; it peaks after 2
hours; and the action will last for 6 to 8 hours.

The effects of ativan manifested themselves in Gina and Helen but they were more profound
in Helen because she drank all the cola drink spiked with drug and she is slimmer than the
165-pound Gina who did not finish her cola drink because when she felt something gritty that
stuck into her teeth, she spat back into her cup the cola in her mouth and dumped out the
rest of her drink.

Accused-appellant Dy can not take comfort in the fact that Gina failed to undergo a drug test.
In People v. Villanos,19 the issue of whether the laced softdrink should have been presented
in evidence to prove that complainant felt dizzy and unconscious after drinking the same was
resolved thus:
True, there was no test conducted to determine the presence of any sedative or drug in the
drinks given to the victims which caused them to lose momentary control of their faculties.
But this is of little consequence as the same is not an indispensable element in a prosecution
for rape. Under the circumstances, it suffices that the victim was found to have been
unconscious at the time the offender had carnal knowledge of her.

Accused-appellant Dy’s submission that the ativan is an anxiety-reducing drug and not a
sedative which would not normally produce sleep unless taken in massive quantities is belied
by the undisputed fact that Gina slept for approximately thirteen hours while Helen slept for
almost eighteen hours. Gina testified that she normally sleeps from seven and a half hours to
eight hours. The trial court correctly appreciated the clinical and academic assessment of the
potency and effect of ativan which, according to Dr. Hernandez, is a benzodiazepine or a
sedative-hypnotic drug. More specifically, the trial court found that:

Gina experienced patchy amnesia, i.e., she could remember some of the events happening
to her and in front of her but forget the others, like her inability to recall that she went back to
their room and even bathed. She also had disorientation and confusion because she did not
know why she went to the boys’ room and why she was naked. Disorientation and confusion,
in turn, produce hypnotic effect, making the one drugged easily suggestible, easily
manipulated and easily taken advantaged of. Gina likewise had visual hallucination since she
had the sensation that it was as if her head was detached from her body. She could resist
but she had no means of resisting because ativan is a muscle relaxant and all her muscles
were flaccid or lax.

Quite significantly, Dr. San Pedro, one of the defense expert witnesses, stated that ativan
could also cause Gina’s feeling that she was falling in and out of consciousness during the
incident in question. Significantly, too, Dr. San Pedro further testified that Gina’s behavior
could be consistent with her taking alcoholic drinks and ativan on the same occasion. Dr.
Solis, the other defense expert witness, also gave the view that imbibing alcohol together
with ativan would produce potentiation or increase the pharmacologic effect of the drug.20

Accused-appellant Dy asserts that: (a) the combination of drugs and

alcohol normally produces a potentiating effect in that the subject can either fall into a coma
or do the opposite which is to act aggressively and with extreme hostility, and (b) the effects
described by complainant and Helen Tennican are more consistent with alcohol use rather
than the effect of drugs. These assertions are not in accord with the trial court’s findings of
fact, and when combined with the adverbs "normally" and "more consistent," are not
definitive.

Even so, the trial court did not err in its assessment of the credibility of Dr. Hernandez’s
testimony. The fact that Dr. Hernandez has not been accredited as an expert by the
Dangerous Drugs Board does not necessarily mean that he is not an expert on the effects of
drugs, as accused-appellant Dy would like this Court to believe. Accreditation by the Board is
not an essential element of expertise. More properly, expertise pertains to knowledge and
experience as well as relevant exposure to a particular field of discipline. It appears that Dr.
Hernandez has met these latter requisites.

Since complainant was drugged, she was effectively deprived of reason if not effectively
rendered unconscious.

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman who is unconscious. In such a case, the
fact of sexual assault and the identity of the assailant can be established from the events
preceding or following the victim’s loss of consciousness.21 Here, complainant was not totally
unconscious but was physically helpless to resist or effectively communicate her refusal to
the lewd desires of accused-appellants. She was aware of the fact of sexual assault and the
identity of her assailants despite her patchy amnesia, disorientation and confusion. In People
v. Lintag,22 this Court held that:

[I]f the ability to resist is taken away by administering drugs, even though the woman may be
conscious, sexual intercourse with her is rape. (Citation omitted) If the woman’s will is
affected by the anesthetic so that the connection is had without her consent, though she may
be more or less conscious, the act will be rape. (Citation omitted)

In this regard, the trial court observed:

Gina has positively and steadfastly and unrelentingly claimed that after the effects of the
drug had taken on her and she lay down on the beds put together in the boy’s room, Giovan
lay alongside her and forcibly kissed her with his tongue inside her mouth, kissed her breasts
and inserted his index and middle fingers into her vagina followed by Bryan having sexual
intercourse with her and just to prevent Bryan from penetrating her further, she did oral sex
on him.23

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The agreement may be deduced from the
manner in which the offense was committed. It must be shown that all participants performed
specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or
design to commit the felony.24

Accused-appellants joint participation in the crime of rape is clear from the trial court’s
findings as follows:

(a) Bryan and Giovan were both at the Angeles Flying Club when Bryan spotted Gina
and Helen;

(b) The two boys and their driver sat at a table next to the girls’ and immediately
Bryan and later on Giovan struck up a conversation with the girls, initially with Helen
whom they invited to their table which she declined, and then with Gina after the
latter came out of the washroom who accepted the boys’ invitation to their table and
Helen then followed suit;

(c) Upon learning that the girls were coming up to Baguio City, the boys intimated
that they, too, were coming up as they had planned two weeks earlier and offered the
girls a ride with them. The boys’ pretension could not be true otherwise Bryan, who
came from Manila, would have prepared at least a jacket and some clothes for their
well-planned Baguio trip; instead, they had to go first to a residential area in Angeles
City where Bryan borrowed a jacket (two according to Helen) before driving to
Baguio City;

xxx xxx xxx

(e) At the Songs Jazz Bar, Bryan and Giovan kept on offering and giving Gina and
Helen alcoholic drinks;
 (f) As they left, Giovan suggested that he was thirsty and wanted cola drink;

(g) Notably, Helen declined any further cola drink since she had already drunk
enough water at the Songs;

(h) But Bryan and Giovan, who went to buy the drinks at Kowloon Restaurant, saw to
it that the two plastic cups of Sprite carried by Bryan be given to Gina and Helen.
They were the drugged cola drinks;

(i) As heretofore stated, they detoured through Club John Hay to let Gina and Helen
drink their drug-laced Sprite and have the drug take its initial effect;

(j) When Giovan was satiating his lust on Gina, Bryan was not around to let Giovan
freely do what he wanted. When Bryan’s turn came, Giovan also left.

Accused-appellant Bernardino’s contention that he could not have been a co-conspirator in

the crime of rape because Bryan Dy lacked the requisite dolo or criminal intent to commit
said intentional felony is unmeritorious. Complainant was found to have been drugged. The
obvious implication of drugging complainant was to render her unconscious or at least
unable to resist the malicious and sexual designs of accused-appellants on the former. By
doing so, accused-appellants ensured that complainant would be in no position to resist or to
effectively say "no". The fact of drugging complainant betrays both accused-appellants’ intent
to sexually assault complainant or engage in sexual intercourse with her.

In addition, accused-appellant Dy submits that he would not have acted the way he did had
he committed the crime of rape. His argument is non sequitur. While an accused-appellant’s
post-incident behavior is never proof of guilt, neither is it of innocence.

By the same token, accused-appellant submits that complainant’s acts and statements,
which are allegedly part of the res gestae, indicate that she had not been raped or molested.
This contention is, likewise, unmeritorious. The behavior and reaction of every person cannot
be predicted with accuracy. It is an accepted maxim that "different people react differently to
a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response
when one is confronted with a strange or startling experience. Not every rape victim can be
expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of every one. Some may shout; some
may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may openly welcome the
intrusion."25 Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations
dissimilarly. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking
incident. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable. This Court indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should
behave immediately after she has been abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt
with in any way by the victim depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should not
be tainted by any modicum of doubt.26

Accused-appellant Dy also avers that the credibility of complainant and her other witnesses
was impeached. In effect, accused-appellants question the trial court’s assessment of
complainant’s credibility.

Credible witness and credible testimony are the two essential elements for the determination
of the weight of a particular testimony. This principle could not ring any truer where the
prosecution relies mainly on the testimony of the complainant, corroborated by the medico-
legal findings of a physician. Be that as it may, the accused may be convicted on the basis of
the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear,
convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature.27

Needless to say, this is a matter best assigned to the trial court which had the first-hand
opportunity to hear the testimonies of the witnesses and observe their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude during cross-examination. Such matters cannot be gathered from a mere
reading of the transcripts of stenographic notes. Hence, the trial court’s findings carry great
weight and substance.28

In any case, well-settled is the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of
witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having
observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the
stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge
can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering
tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath – all of which are useful aids
for an accurate determination of a witness’ honesty and sincerity. The trial court’s findings
are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight
which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if
properly considered, would alter the results of the case.29 Unless certain facts of substance
and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its
assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they are lying.30

This Court does not agree that the trial court overlooked or misappreciated any fact of
substance or value. In assessing the credibility of complainant, the trial court commented
thus:

The Court had observed her demeanor when she was testifying and she was direct,
spontaneous and straightforward, even crying in narrating the sensitive details of her horrible
experience; she had also demonstrated much care and concern about her obligation to tell
the truth and nothing but the truth under the oath which she had taken before sitting on the
witness chair.31

The victim’s act of crying during her testimony bolsters the credibility of the rape charge with
the verity born out of human nature and experience.32

Besides, no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private
parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape
and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. It is settled jurisprudence that when a
woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape was indeed committed.33 A woman would think twice before she concocts a story of
rape unless she is motivated by a patent desire to seek justice for the wrong committed
against her.34

No decent woman in her right mind would tell a tale that could sully her reputation and bring
undue embarrassment and shame to herself and expose her family to all sorts of public
aspersions if it is not the truth.35 If her story had only been contrived, she would not have
been so composed and consistent throughout her entire testimony in the face of intense and
lengthy interrogation.36 Indeed, if an accused had really nothing to do with the crime, it is
against the natural order of events and human nature and against the presumption of good
faith that the prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former.37
In this case, accused-appellants could not even come up with a credible motive for
complainant to charge them with rape. At any rate, ill motive is never an essential element of
a crime. It becomes inconsequential in a case where there are affirmative, nay, categorical
declarations towards the accused-appellant’s accountability for the felony.38

It is doctrinally settled that the lone testimony of a rape victim, by itself, is sufficient to convict
if credible. Equally settled is the principle that when a woman declares that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where
her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis
thereof. This is because from the nature of the crime, the only evidence that can be offered
to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony.39

Accused-appellant Bernardino assails the trial court’s failure to credit him with the mitigating
circumstance of minority. There is no merit to this contention. Accused-appellant Bernardino
was already nineteen when the crime was committed. Moreover, in the case of People v.
Abad,40 which accused-appellant Bernardino cites, the circumstances and immaturity of
accused in said case "did not allow him the freedom of initiative and action which should be
expected of a person who is aware of the full consequences and responsibility for his acts."
Accused-appellant Bernardino was not under similar circumstances and neither was there
any clinical basis to show he was immature.

Under the second paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is punished
by reclusion perpetua. Although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 fixed the duration of reclusion
perpetua from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, the penalty has remained indivisible.

At the time of the commission of the crime, accused-appellant Dy was 17 years old, hence a
minor. Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18
years, the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period.

Minority being a privileged mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty in this case
for accused-appellant Dy is reclusion temporal, which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20
years. Appreciating the ordinary generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of Dy, the imposable penalty should be within minimum period of reclusion
temporal, i.e., 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum term of the penalty should be within the range of prision
mayor in any of its periods, i.e., from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years.

Considering the foregoing, accused-appellant Dy is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of

8 years of prision mayor, as minimum up to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

As regards accused-appellant Bernardino, he is not entitled to the privileged mitigating

circumstance of minority considering that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was
already nineteen years old.41 Hence, as to him, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua, an indivisible penalty. Under Article 63, first paragraph, of the Revised Penal
Code, this penalty shall be imposed regardless of the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The trial court erred in sentencing accused-appellant Bernardino to an indeterminate penalty.

Since the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed on him, accused-appellant Bernardino
can not enjoy the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.42
Accused-appellant Bernardino’s act of kissing Gina’s breasts and inserting his finger into her
vagina constituted acts of lasciviousness.43 The penalty for this felony, under Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code, is prision correccional. The penalty to be imposed on accused-
appellant Dy, after appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the
generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, is arresto mayor in its minimum
period. Inasmuch as the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable,44 the trial court
correctly imposed on him the straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor.

On the other hand, the penalty to be imposed on accused-appellant Bernardino, considering

the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, is prision correccional in its
minimum period. The trial court, therefore, correctly imposed on him the indeterminate
penalty of two months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum.

Finally, in the matter of the damages awarded by the trial court, this Court reduces the award
of moral damages from P500,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
Moral damages are not awarded to punish the accused but to compensate for the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the victim or his family as the
proximate result of the wrongful act. The award is not meant to enrich the victim at the
expense of the accused.45

Likewise, the award of P12,195.00 or the equivalent of US$450.00 as actual damages is

deleted for lack of factual basis. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to
prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.46

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 5, in Criminal Case No. 12600-R, finding accused-appellant BRYAN
FERDINAND DY y LA MADRID and GIOVAN BERNARDINO y GARCIA guilty of Rape, and
sentencing accused-appellant Bryan Dy to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight years
of prision mayor, as minimum, up to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, is AFFIRMED. The said decision, insofar as accused-appellant Giovan
Bernardino’s penalty is concerned, is MODIFIED in that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

The decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 12601-R, finding accused-appellants
guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness and sentencing accused-appellant Dy to suffer the straight
penalty of two months of arresto mayor, and accused-appellant Bernardino to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.

Accused-appellants Dy and Bernardino are further ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay
complainant, Gina Marie Mobley, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages and P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and to pay the costs of the suit. The
award of P12,195.00 or US$450.00 as actual damages is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 153008 May 20, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
LARRY CACHAPERO y BASILIO, appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Time is not an essential element of rape. An information that states the approximate rather
than the precise time it was committed is sufficient in form. Any perceived formal defect in
the information must be raised before arraignment, either through a bill of particulars or a
motion to quash; otherwise, objection to such defect shall be considered waived.

The Case

Larry Cachapero y Basilio appeals the January 15, 2002 Decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 98-68 Cam, finding him
guilty of rape as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused LARRY CACHAPERO y

[BASILIO] is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE,
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with its accessory
penalties, and [is hereby further] directed to pay the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and another sum
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages."2

The Information3 dated December 1, 1998, charged appellant in these words:

"That sometime in March 1998, in the Municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and
intimidation succeed in having sexual intercourse with Anna Laurence Toledo, a 7-
year old minor."4

Upon his arraignment on October 2, 2000,5 appellant, assisted by his counsel de

oficio,6 pleaded not guilty. After trial in due course, the court a quo rendered the assailed
Decision.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution’s version of the
facts in the following manner:

"Sometime in March 1998, complainant Anna Toledo, who was seven (7) years old,
went to play with Lorena Cachapero and Dino Cachapero at a nearby house in Barrio
Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac.

"During that occasion, appellant Larry Cachapero, brother of Lorena, made her lie
down and removed her shorts and panty. He inserted his penis into her sexual organ
and she felt pain. Larry told her not to tell her parents because he might be scolded.

"On September 2, 1998, witness Conchita Donato was conducting a remedial class
in Reading to her Grade I and II students. While they were reading the word
‘tagtuyot’ or ‘saluyot,’ one of her students Jocelyn Meneses told her that Anna was
sexually abused by ‘Manong Larry.’

"She then ordered the students to leave the room and asked Jocelyn and Anna to
stay behind. She confronted Anna and asked her the truth. Anna covered her face
with her two hands, cried, and said yes. The teachers had a conference, after which
they decided to report the matter to the parents of Anna.

"On September 3, 1998, Anna’s mother brought her to the Camiling District Hospital
where she was examined. Dr. Mercedes B. Gapultos, a Medico Legal Officer,
examined Anna and came out with the following report:

‘Findings:

Pelvic - Mons pubis undeveloped, no pubic hairs

Exam: - Old hymenal lacerations noted at 3:00 o’clock and 9:00
o’clock positions.
- No abrasions, contusions noted in the perineum.’

"Dr. Gapultos testified that she found old hymenal lacerations and that it may be
caused by many factors like penetration of the hymen by a hard object, or by an
object forcibly entered."7 (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Interposing the defenses of denial and alibi, appellant tersely relates his version of the facts
in these words:

"Accused Larry Cachapero testified that at the time of the alleged incident, he was in
their house together with his father and mother. He denied seeing the private
complainant on that day. He alleged the case was filed against [him] because of the
long standing feud between his mother and the mother of the private
complainant."8 (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

According to the trial court, testimony coming from an innocent child like the victim was
credible and sufficient to convict appellant of rape, more so because the testimony was
supported by medical findings.

The lower court thus brushed aside the claim of appellant that he was falsely accused. It held
that, whatever feud may have existed between the mother of the rape victim and the
accused, no woman in her right mind would unnecessarily expose her minor daughter to the
humiliation and stigma of a public trial. Citing Section 3(b)(1) of RA No. 7610,9 it added that
the sexual abuse of the victim prejudiced her development.

Hence, this appeal.10

Issues

In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues for our consideration:

"I.

The court a quo erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of private
complainant which is full of inconsistencies.

"II.

The court a quo erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged
despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

"III.

The court a quo erred in not considering the Information as insufficient to support a
judgment of conviction for failure of the prosecution to state the precise date of
commission of the alleged rape[,] it being an essential element of the crime
charged."11

Simply put, appellant questions the sufficiency of (1) the Information and (2) the
prosecution’s evidence.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal has no merit; appellant’s conviction for statutory rape is affirmed, but the award
of exemplary damages is deleted.

First Issue:
Sufficiency of Information

Contending that time is a material ingredient of rape, appellant argues that the Information
was fatally defective for failing to state the precise hour when the crime was committed. Such
infirmity, he added, jeopardized his right to be properly informed of the charge against him.

We disagree. The time of occurrence is not an essential element of rape.12 This being so,
its precise date and hour need not be alleged in the complaint or information.13 Section 11 of
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
 "SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it
is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission."(Italics
supplied)

The Information in this case alleged that the crime was committed "sometime in March 1998"
which, according to private complainant, was more or less at the closing of the school
year.14 Being reasonably definite and certain, this approximation sufficiently meets the
requirement of the law. After all, Section 6 of Rule 11015 of the Rules of Court merely
requires that the information must state, among others, the approximate time of the
commission of the offense.

Moreover, objections as to the form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the
first time on appeal.16 If the present appellant found the Information insufficient, he should
have moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars,17 for him to be properly
informed of the exact date of the alleged rape; or for the quashal of the Information, on the
ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form.18 Having failed to pursue either
remedy, he is deemed to have waived objection to any formal defect in the Information.19

By cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and presenting evidence for the defense,
appellant’s counsel actively took part in the trial. Furthermore, the defense never objected to
the presentation of the prosecution evidence20proving that the offense had been committed
in March 1998. Appellant has not shown that he was deprived of a proper defense, for he
was in fact able to foist an alibi. It cannot be said, therefore, that his constitutionally protected
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him has been violated.

Second Issue:
Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence

Appellant contends that private complainant’s testimony, which was tainted with material
inconsistencies, should not have been received by the trial court with precipitate credulity.
Calling the victim a coached witness, he points out that her answers were inconsistent on (1)
whether or not she bled after the alleged rape and (2) what time she informed her mother
about the incident.

Appellant’s contentions are unconvincing. It is well-established that the testimony of a rape

victim is generally given full weight and credit,21 more so if she is a minor. The revelation of
an innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to
undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth
of her complaint.22 In so testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the truth,
especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.

In this case, the victim was a young girl of seven years when she came forward to declare
that appellant had raped her. At age nine, she narrated to the court the violation of her
person in this manner:

"PROS. GUARDIANO [to Anna]:

Q Do you remember an incident that happened [i]n March, 1998 in relation [to] the
accused?
A Yes, Sir.

Q [T]hat March, 1998, [is] that x x x, more or less, [about the] closing of the school
year?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Can you tell us on that date, what did Larry Cachapero do to you?

A Larry Cachapero made [me lie] down and [he] remove[d] my panty and shorts, Sir.

Q Can you tell us if Larry Cachapero was the one who removed your panty and
shorts?

A Yes, Sir.

Q After removing your panty and shorts, what did Larry Cachapero do after that?

A He had sexual intercourse with me, Sir.

Q Can you tell us what is [the] sexual intercourse [that] Larry Cachapero did to you?

A He just removed my shorts and panty and he sexually abused me, Sir.

Q How did he sexually abuse you?

A He made me [lie] down, Sir.

Q After he made you [lie] down, what did he do after that?

A He sexually abused me, Sir.

Q And did he put out his penis?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Did he place his penis touching your sex organ?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And did you feel any pressure when his penis touched your sex organ?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And that feels very painful?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And that pain you felt is at the [opening] of your sex organ?
 A Yes, Sir.

Q And it is very painful everytime there was pressure in the opening of your sex
organ?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And how many times did he put pressure in the opening of your organ?

A Only once, Sir.

Q And do you remember if his penis penetrated your sex organ?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Can you estimate which part of his penis penetrated your organ, how long?

A (Witness demonstrated by spreading her index finger measuring about two [2]
inches as stipulated).

Q After that, did your organ bleed?

A Yes, Sir."23

To be sure, the victim’s testimony was not flawless or perfect in all aspects. We must
remember, however, that it was the narration of a minor who barely understood sex and
sexuality.24 Hence, in assessing her testimony, it would not be fair to apply the standards
used for adults.25 Indeed, she fully understood the defilement of her person, even if she was
at a loss for the right words with which to describe the horrid details. It was for this reason
that the prosecutor had to ask leading questions, which are allowed under Section 10 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.26

Furthermore, the account given by the victim, stating the essential fact that appellant had
carnal knowledge of her, refers to details that are not in any way affected or obscured by the
supposed contradictions -- whether or not she bled after the rape or how soon she informed
her mother of the incident.27 What further buttressed the story of private complainant were
Dr. Gapultos’ medical findings28 that there were old lacerations in her hymen. Although not
indispensable to a rape conviction,29 such findings were credible physical evidence of forcible
defloration, among others.30

Similarly corroborative of the girl’s tale of woe was Conchita Donato’s unrebutted testimony.
It disclosed that appellant’s sister, Lorena, had admitted to having seen the incident in much
the same detail as the victim had declared. The pertinent portion of Lorena’s testimony
during cross-examination is reproduced below:

"ATTY. JOAQUIN:

Q When you heard of this conversation, did you ask what she mean[t] by the word
‘yot.’?
 A Yes, Sir. I asked her if she understands the word ‘yot.’ [T]he child Jocelyn
Meneses said that ‘niyotyot’ ni Mang Larry ni Anna Lorraine’ and I asked Anna
Lorraine if it is true that she was sexually abused by Larry and she cried and
answered yes, Sir.

Q But you did not ask x x x further questions?

A No more, Sir, because the child cried.

Q So, she did not exactly tell what happened to her and what Larry did to her
because she was already crying?

A No, Sir[,] we again interviewed the child while we were at the Guidance Center with
my co-teachers and she said yes and I even asked how the incident happened and
Lorena told me that both were inside the room and they were naked and Larry was
on top of Anna Lorraine, Sir.

Q Are we made to understand Madam Witness that you also interviewed the sister[,]
Lorena?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Who between the two (2) were naked as narrated to you by Lorena?

A ‘Labus da’ they were naked, she told us, Sir.

Q And that was only the exact narration given by Lorena?

A Yes, Sir[,] and that Larry was on top of Anna Lorraine.

Q Did Lorena see the private organ[s] of those naked persons?

A I did not ask about that, Sir.

Q And you did not also ask whether the private organ of Larry Cachapero was
inserted into the private organ of Anna Lorraine?

A I did not, Sir."31 (Italics supplied)

Finally, it is a general rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the judgment of trial
courts on the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears on record some facts or
circumstances of weight and influence that have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.32 This deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the
credibility of witnesses is consistent with the principle that when the testimony of a witness
meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to convict the accused.33 Thus, when a
guileless girl of seven credibly declares that she has been raped, she has said all that is
necessary to prove the ravishment of her honor.34

The gravamen of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of
age.35 In this case, the prosecution duly established that appellant had sexual intercourse
with private complainant; and that the latter, as shown by her birth certificate,36 was under
twelve years old at the time.

On the other hand, of little probative value is the alibi of appellant that he was in the house of
his parents at the time of the rape. In rape cases, while denial and alibi are legitimate
defenses, bare assertions thereof cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the
victim.37 In particular, the defense of alibi is weak if wanting in material corroboration,38 as in
this case.

Also unpersuasive is the contention of appellant that the charge against him was precipitated
by a long-standing feud between his family and that of private complainant. He himself belied
this allegation during his cross-examination, from which we quote:

"PROS. GUARDIANO [to Cachapero]:

Q Mr. Witness, how far is your house [from] the house of the private complainant?

A From my seat to the Municipal building, Sir (estimated at 150 meters).

Q And you are aware that Anna [Laurence] Toledo and your younger sister and
brother are friends, is that correct?

A No, Sir.

Q And there was a quarrel between your mother and the mother of the complainant,
as you said earlier?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And you said [that] they quarreled [with] each other even before this crime, is that
correct?

A Not yet, Sir.

Q So they quarrel[ed] after this incident, is that correct?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Because you are accused of rape by the private complainant who is the daughter
of that mother whom your mother quarreled with, is that correct?

A Yes, Sir."39 (Italics supplied)

Award of Exemplary Damages Improper

The trial court’s award of P25,000 for exemplary damages should be deleted. Such damages
may be given only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the
information and proved during the trial.40 In the present case, there are no such
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, AFFIRMED. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr.*, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.