PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES, and  Respondents claim that it is Section 7, par.
ndents claim that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
JOCELYN P. CELESTINO v. MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel (CPLC) and as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), and RONALDO ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary
June 23, 2006 |Chico-Nazario, J.|
Digester: Agustin, Chrissete
SUMMARY: Petitioners question the appointment of Elma as CPLC because he is
concurrently serving as the Chairman of PCGG. Respondents allege that the
constitutional prohibition on holding multiple positions does not apply to him since his
position is not one of those enumerated. The Court held that Elma’s concurrent
appointment is unconstitutional. The prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution does not apply to Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC
is a Cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if the Court assumes,
arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to Elma, he still could not be
appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because
neither office was occupied by him in an ex-officio capacity, and the primary functions
of one office do not require an appointment to the other post. Moreover, even if the
appointments in question are not covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, said appointments are still prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B, which
covers all appointive and elective officials, due to the incompatibility between the
primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
DOCTRINE: There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two
government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility.
FACTS:
 On 30 October 1998, Elma was appointed and took his oath of office as Chairman
of the PCGG. Thereafter, on 11 January 1999, during his tenure as PCGG
Chairman, Elma was appointed CPLC. He took his oath of office as CPLC the
following day, but he waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
PETITIONERS:
 Petitioners cited CLU v. Executive Secretary to support their position that Elma's
concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC contravenes Section 13,
Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
 Petitioners also maintained that respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices.
RESPONDENTS:
 Citing the Resolution in CLU v. Executive Secretary, respondents allege that the strict
prohibition against holding multiple positions provided under Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution applies only to heads of executive departments, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not cover other public officials
given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.
that should be applied in their case. This provision, according to the respondents,
would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the law allows the
concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the primary functions of either
position allows such concurrent appointment. Respondents also alleged that since
there exists a close relation between the two positions and there is no
incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position would allow
respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to both positions. Respondents
further add that the appointment of the CPLC among incumbent public officials is
an accepted practice.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court partly GRANTS this
petition and declares respondent Magdangal B. Elma's concurrent appointments as
PCGG Chairman and CPLC as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No costs.
Whether the case is now mooted by supervening events – Yes, but capable of
repetition yet evading review
 The resolution of this case had already been overtaken by supervening events. In
2001, the appointees of former President Joseph Estrada were replaced by the
appointees of the incumbent president, GMA. The present PCGG Chairman is
Camilo Sabio, while the position vacated by the last CPLC, now Solicitor General
Antonio Nachura, has not yet been filled. There no longer exists an actual
controversy that needs to be resolved.
 However, this case raises a significant legal question as yet unresolved — whether
the PCGG Chairman can concurrently hold the position of CPLC. The
resolution of this question requires the exercise of the Court's judicial power, more
specifically its exclusive and final authority to interpret laws. Moreover, the
likelihood that the same substantive issue raised in this case will be raised again
compels this Court to resolve it. The rule is that courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
 Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases
where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to
resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar, and public.
[TOPIC] Whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls
under the prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 13, Article VII
and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution – YES. Elma’s
concurrent appointment UNCONSITUTIONAL
 Art. VII. Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure…
 Art. IX-B. Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
 Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government- owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
 CLU v. Executive Secretary: (harmonizing the 2 prohibitions): While all other
appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or
by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
ARTICLE IX-B, SEC. 7 PROHIBITION – applicable since the two offices held
by Elma are incompatible
 GR: Art. IX-B, Sec. 7 permits an appointive official to hold more than one office
only if "allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position."
 EXC: Incompatibility in the two government offices
 There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government
offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility.
(Quimson v. Ozaeta)
 The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two
offices was laid out in People v. Green — whether one office is subordinate
to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the
other.
 Incompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the
two. Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one
to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility
from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the
other. The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the
nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to be
held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would
result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the
duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. The offices must
subordinate, one [over] the other, and they must, per se, have the right to interfere,
one with the other, before they are incompatible at common law.
As applied
 In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG
Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and
impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments
and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments
and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without
question, an agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the
PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC.
 In Memorandum Order No. 152, issued on 9 July 2004, the Office of the President, in an effort to
promote efficiency and effective coordination, clearly delineated and specified the functions and duties
of its senior officers as such:
SECTION 1. The Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) shall advise and provide the President with
legal assistance on matters requiring her action, including matters pertaining to legislation.
The CPLC shall have the following duties and functions:
o Exercise administrative supervision over the Office of the CPLC; 

o Review and/or draft legal orders referred to her by the President on the following
matters that are subject of decisions of the President;
o Executive Orders, proclamations, administrative orders, memorandum orders, and
other legal documents initiated by the President; 

o Decision on investigation involving Cabinet Secretaries, agency heads, or Presidential
appointees with the rank of Secretary 
 conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC)
 As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on his
own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by
the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself as
PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably
be raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the
prohibition against holding incompatible offices.
ARTICLE VII, SEC. 13 PROHIBITION – not applicable
 While Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution applies in general to all
elective and appointive officials, Section 13, Article VII, thereof applies in
particular to Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries.
 Resolution in CLU v. Executive Secretary: Specific persons who are affected by this
prohibition are secretaries, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; and
categorically excluded public officers who merely have the rank of secretary,
undersecretary or assistant secretary (US v. Mouat)
 Another point of clarification raised by the Solicitor General refers to the persons
affected by the constitutional prohibition. The persons cited in the constitutional
provision are the "Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants." These
terms must be given their common and general acceptation as referring to
the heads of the executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries. Public officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary,
Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition, nor is the
Solicitor General affected thereby.
As applied:
 The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not
applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a
secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have
the same rank as the latter positions.
 It must be emphasized, however, that despite the non-applicability of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to respondent Elma, he
 remains covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and
his appointments must still comply with the standard of compatibility of
officers laid down therein; failing which, his appointments are hereby
pronounced in violation of the Constitution.
 Granting that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is applicable to the present case, the defect in respondent Elma's
concurrent appointments to the incompatible offices of the PCGG Chairman and
the CPLC would even be magnified when seen through the more stringent
requirements imposed by the said constitutional provision.
 CLU v. Executive Secretary: Language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple offices or employment.
The Court cautiously allowed only two exceptions to the rule against multiple
offices: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article
VII, authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or (2)
posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The Court further
qualified that additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be
required by the official's primary functions. Moreover, the additional post must be
exercised in an ex-officio capacity, which "denotes an act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office." Thus, it will not suffice that no
additional compensation shall be received by virtue of the second appointment, it is
mandatory that the second post is required by the primary functions of the first
appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity.
 With its forgoing qualifications, it is evident that even Section 13, Article VII does
not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to the position of PCGG
Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice versa.
The primary functions of the PCGG Chairman involve the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and
associates, the investigation of graft and corruption cases assigned to him by the
President, and the adoption of measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption.
 On the other hand, the primary functions of the CPLC encompass a different
matter, that is, the review and/or drafting of legal orders referred to him by the
President.
 And while respondent Elma did not receive additional compensation in connection
with his position as CPLC, he did not act as either CPLC or PGCC Chairman in an
ex-officio capacity. The fact that a separate appointment had to be made for
respondent Elma to qualify as CPLC negates the premise that he is acting in an ex-
officio capacity.