1.) US VS.

AH CHONG
G.R NO. 5272
March 19, 1910

FACTS:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in one
of the Officers’ quarters at Fort McKinley, Rizal Province.
Together living with him in the said quarters was the deceased,
Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a houseboy. There
had been several robberies in Fort McKinley prior to the incident
thus prompting the defendant and his roommate to reinforce
the flimsy hook used to lock the door of their room by placing a
chair against it. The defendant and the deceased had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he should
knock on the door and say his name. On the night of Aug. 14,
1908, Ah Chong, who was alone in his room, was awakened by
someone trying to force open the door of the room. The
defendant called out twice, asking the identity of the person but
heard no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber or a
thief, the defendant called out that he would kill the intruder if
he tried to enter. At that moment, the door was forced open and
the defendant was struck first above the knee by the edge of the
chair. Because of the darkness of the room, the defendant
thought he was being hit by the intruder and tried to defend
himself by striking wildly at the intruder using a common
kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow. It turned out that
the said intruder was actually the defendant’s roommate,
Pascual Gualberto. The roommate was brought to the military
hospital where he died from the effects of the wound the
following day. Defendant was charged with murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a person can be held criminally responsible
by reason of a mistake of facts.

RULING:
No. That, under such circumstances, there is no criminal
liability, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not
due to negligence or bad faith. In other words, if such ignorance
or mistake of facts is sufficient to negative a particular intent
which, under the law, is a necessary ingredient of the offense
charged it destroys the presumption of intent and works on
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances
demand conviction under the penal provisions governing

Page 1 of 31
negligence, and in cases when, under the provisions of Article
1 of the Penal Code, a person voluntarily committing an act
incurs criminal liability even though the act be different from
which he intended to commit. Ah Chong must be acquitted
because of mistake of fact.

Page 2 of 31
 2.) PEOPLE VS. BINDOY
G.R NO. 34665
August 28, 1931

FACTS:
The appellant was sentenced by the court of First Instance
of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1, 000 and to pay the
costs. The crime charge against the accused is homicide,
according to the following information.

That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of

Calunod, Municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental
Misamis, the accused Bindoy offered a tuba to Tibay, Pacas wife
and threatened to inflict injury upon her if she will refuse.
However, Pacas come to rescue his wife against Bindoy who at
that time carried a bolo. When Bindoy and Pacas struggling with
the bolo, Omamdam come to the rescue however, he was
accidentally hit in the chest by Bindoy who didn’t notice that
the latter was behind him. The trial court held that Bindoy was
guilty of the crime of homicide.

The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court,

and his counsel in this instance contends that the court erred
in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and in
convicting him of the crime homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty
of can be mitigated on the ground of accident, and if he was
entitled of acquittal according to Article 8, No. 8 of the Revised
Penal Code.

HELD:
Yes. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to
Article 8, No. 8 of the Revised Penal Code.

RATIO:
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas,
corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy
were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that
when the latter let go, the former pulled so violently that it flew
towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio

Page 3 of 31
Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without
Donato’s seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind him.

The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at

his home later, and asked him about his wound when he
replied: “I think I shall die in this wound” and then he
continued: “please look after my wife when I die: see that she
doesn’t starve”, adding further: “this wound was an accident.
Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: it was a mishap”. The
testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal
evidenced adduced by the fiscal.

The court searched the record in vain for the motive of this
kind, which it existed, would have greatly facilitated the
solution of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this
court said in United States vs. Carlos 15, Phil., to wit: “the
attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial
fiscals, directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining and
proving, when possible, the motives which actuated the
commission of a crime under investigation. In many criminal
cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of
the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction
of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of
the guilty person to indulge the criminal act”.

In view of the evidence before us, the court held, that the
appellant is entitled to acquittal according to Article 8, No.8
Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed is reversed, and
the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with cost de
officio.

Page 4 of 31
 3.) BATACLAN VS. MEDINA
G.R NO. L-10126
October 22, 1957

FACTS:
On September 13, 1952, bus no. 30 of the Medina
Transportation, operated by its owner, defendant Mariano
Medina, under a certificate of public convenience, left the town
of Amadeo Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular
chauffeur, Conrado Saylor, there were about 18, passengers;
including the driver and conductor.

At about 2:00 o’clock that same morning, while the bus

was running within the jurisdiction of Imus Cavite, one of the
front tires burst and the vehicle began to zigzag until it fell into
the canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way
they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while 4
passengers seated beside the driver named Bataclan, Lara, and
the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus.

It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began

to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the
chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and
the ground under and around it, and that lighted torch brought
by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
The same day, the charred bodies of the four doomed
passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified,
especially that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his
widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her 5
minor children, brought the present suit to recover from
Mariano Medina a compensatory, moral, and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount of P87, 150.

After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite

awarded P19, 000 to the plaintiffs, plus P6, 000, as attorney’s
fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by
Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was host on fire. The
plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court
of Appeals but latter court endorsed the appeal to us because
of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.

Page 5 of 31
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the proximate cause of death of Juan
Bataclan is the fire that burned the bus.
2.) Whether or not the carrier is liable.

HELD/RATIO:
1. No. When a vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank
was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men
with lighted torch was in response to the call for help made not
only by the passengers but most probably by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about
2:30 in the morning) the rescuers had to carry a light with them;
and coming as they did from a rural area where contains and
flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch the most
handy available; and what was more natural, than that said
rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. The
court held that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan
was the overturning of the vehicle thru the negligence of the
defendant and his agent.

2. Yes. The failure of the driver and the conductor to

have cautioned on taking steps to warn the rescuers not to bring
the lighted torch too near the bus, constitute negligence on the
part of the agents of the carrier under the provisions of the Civil
Code, particularly Article 1733, 1959 and 1963 thereof.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification that

damages awarded by the trial court are increased from one
thousand (P1, 000) Pesos to six thousand (6, 000) Pesos, and
from six hundred (P600) Pesos to eight hundred (P800) Pesos
for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney’s fees,
respectively, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with
cost.

Page 6 of 31
 4.) SERRANO VS. PEOPLE
G.R N0. 175023
July 5, 2010

FACTS:
A brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two rival groups
resulted to the stabbing of Anthony Galang, the victim, by the
herein petitioner, Giovannie Serrano. During the rumble, the
victim was stabbed at the left side of his stomach and was
beaten until he fell into a nearby creek. In his fallen position,
Galang claimed that when he inspected his stabbed wound, he
saw a portion of his intestines showed. The victim received
medical attention, stayed in the hospital for one week and
thereafter stayed home for one month to recuperate.

The RTC held that the crime committed reached the

frustrated stage since the victim was stabbed on the left side of
his stomach and that the victim had to be referred from an
infirmary to hospital for medical treatment. On the other hand,
the CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the
attempted stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab
wound inflicted was fatal to cause the victim’s death. It was
observed that the attending physician did not testify in court
and that the Medical Certificate and the Discharge Summary
issued by the hospital fell short of “specifying the nature or
gravity of the wound”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted homicide
instead of frustrated homicide.

RULING:
Yes. The crucial point to consider is the nature of the
wound inflicted which must be supported by independent proof
showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the
victim’s death without timely medical intervention. When
nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal
without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters
the realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by
the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner.
Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated
homicide.

Page 7 of 31
 5.) US VS. BROBST
G.R No.4935
October 25, 1909

FACTS:
The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another American
named Mann, were engaged in work on a mine located in the
Municipality of Masbate, where they gave employment to a
number of native laborers. Mann discharged one of these
laborers names Simeon Saldivar, warned him not to come back
on the premises, and told the defendant not to employ him
again, because he was a thief and a disturbing element with the
other.

A few days after, on the morning of July 10, 1907,

Saldivar, in company with three or four others, went to the mine
to look for work. The defendant saw Saldivar and ordered him
to leave, however, Saldivar made no move to leave, and although
the order was repeated, he merely smiled or grinned at the
defendant, whereupon the latter become enraged, took three
steps towards Saldivar, and struck him a powerful blow with
his closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs, at the
point where the handle of Saldivar’s bolo lay against the belt
from which it was suspended. On being struck, Saldivar threw
up his hands, staggered and without saying a word, went away
in the direction of his sister’s house, which stood about 200
yards away, and about 100 feet up the side of the hill. He died
as he reached the door of the house.

The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime

homicide, and sentenced him to suffer six years and one day of
prison mayor, and from this the defendant appealed to this
court.

The counsel of the appellant argue that the trial court

erred to the following: (1) that the evidence fails to sustain a
finding that the deceased came to his death as a result of
injuries inflicted by the defendant and (2) that even if it be a fact
that the defendant, in laying his hand upon the deceased,
contributed to his death, nevertheless, since the defendant had
a perfect right to eject the deceased from the mining property,
he cannot be held criminally liable for unintentional injuries
inflicted in the lawful exercise of this right.

Page 8 of 31
ISSUE:
Whether or not a death of Saldivar resulting from a blow
of the defendant was proven without reasonable doubt?

HELD/RATIO:
Yes. That proof that a heavy blow with the closed fist, over
the lower left ribs, inflicted upon the person in apparent good
health, was followed by the death of that person in less two
hours, sustains a finding that death resulted from the infliction
of the blow in the absence of proof of any intervening cause and
the circumstances being such as to afford no ground for
reasonable doubt that no extraneous cause did in fact
intervene.

Where death results as the direct consequence of the use

of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened
condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does
not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.

The judgment of conviction and the sentenced imposed by

the trial court should be and are hereby affirmed, with the cost
of this instance against the appellant.

Page 9 of 31
 6.) MERRITT VS. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
G.R No.11164
March 21, 1916

FACTS:
E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work.
One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre
Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver
of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because
of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely
injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never
perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn
at least half of what he used to earn.

In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue

the government which later authorized Merritt to sue the
government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An
Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government
of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General
of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the
government to pay the same.

This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the

Court of First Instance of the City of Manila in favor of the
plaintiff for the sum of P14, 741, together with the cost of the
cause.

Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred: (1)
in limiting the general damages which was the plaintiff suffered
to P5, 000, instead of P25, 000 as claimed in the complaint and
(2) in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to
two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage
accordingly in the sum of P2, 666, instead of P6, 000 as claimed
by plaintiff in this complaint.

The Attorney General on behalf of the defendant urges that

the trial court erred: (1) in finding that the collision between the
plaintiff’s motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur, (2) in
holding that the government of the Philippine Islands is liable
for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to

Page 10 of 31
negligence of the chauffeur, and (3) in rendering judgment
against the defendant for the sum of P14, 471.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government of the Philippine Islands
is liable for the damage caused by an agent?

HELD/RATIO:
No. According to the paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the
Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision among
others, of the 18th of May, 1994, in a damage cause, the
responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts
through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged, with some definite
purpose which give rise to the claim, and not where the claim is
based on acts or commissions is imputable to a public official
charged with some administrative or technical office who can be
held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the
law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so
deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of
damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to,
has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of
articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code (Supreme Court of
Spain, July 30, 1911, 122 Jus. Civ., 146).

It is, therefore, evident that the state (the Government of

the Phil. Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its
agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents
within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and
that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was
not such an agent, therefore the Government of the Philippine
Islands is not liable for the damage caused by an agent.

Page 11 of 31
 7.) SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO
G.R No. L-46930
June 10, 1988

FACTS:
Petitioner Sander was, at the time the incident in question
occurred, the special services director of the U.S Naval Station
(NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Private respondent Rossi is an
American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines
as so was private respondent Wyer, who died two years ago.
They were both employed as game room attendants in the
special department of the NAVSTA.

On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised

that their employment had been converted from permanent full-
time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance
proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S Department
of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement
of their permanent full-time status. However, in a letter
addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the
hearing officer's report.

The private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance

of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the herein
petitioners on November 8, 1976. The plaintiffs claimed that the
letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them
to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that judgment
of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal
propriety rights. The private respondents made it clear that the
petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity.
However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special
appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties
and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them
under the doctrine of state immunity.

After extensive written arguments between the parties, the

motion was denied, on the ground that the petitioners had not
presented any evidence that their acts where official in nature
and not personal torts, moreover, the allegation in the
complaint was that the defendants had acted maliciously and
in bad faith.

Page 12 of 31
 This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary
injunction was thereafter filed before this court, on the
contention that the above narrated acts of the respondents’
court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack
of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their
official duties when they did the acts for which they have been
sued for damages by the private respondents.

HELD/RATIO:
Yes. It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation
that a government functioning is being sued in his personal
capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection
of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of
state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of
official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability
for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without
or in excess of his authority. These well settled principles are
applicable not only to officers of the local state but also where
the person sued in its courts pertain to the government of a
foreign state, as in the present case. The acts for which the
petitioners are being called to account were performed by them
in the discharge of their official duties.

Wherefore, the petition is granted. The challenged orders

acted on March 8, 1977, August 9, 1977 and September 7,
1977, are set aside. The respondent court is directed to dismiss
Civil Case no. 2077-0. The temporary restraining order of
September 26, 1977, is permanent. No costs.

Page 13 of 31
 8.) RUIZ VS. CABAHUG
G.R. No. L-9990 (54 O.G 351)
September 30, 1957

FACTS:
The Secretary of National Defense, defendant Hon. Sotero
B. Cabahug, accepted the bid of Allied Technologists, Inc. on
July 31, 1950 for the furnishing of the architectural and
engineering services in the construction of the Veterans
Hospital at the price of Php 302, 700. The architectural
requirements were submitted by Allied Technologies through
Enrique Ruiz, Jose Herrera and Pablo Panlillo and were
approved by the United States Veterans Administration and a
contract was signed due to the technical objection to the
capacity of the said company in the practice of architecture and
upon the advice of the Secretary of Justice. The defendants
allegedly took 15% of the sum due to Allied Technologies, Inc.
at the time of the payment of the contract price for the reason
that Panlillo asserted that he is the sole architect of the
Veterans Hospital, excluding Ruiz and Herrera, the assertion of
which was abetted by defendant Jimenez (the first cause of
action).

The plaintiffs were to be deprived of their share of

professional services and their professional prestige and
standing were to be gravely damaged unless the defendants are
prevented from recognizing Panlillo as the sole architect.
Furthermore, the second cause of action is Title II of the
contract where at any time prior to six months after completion
and acceptance of the work under Title I, the Government may
direct Allied Technologists, Inc. to do the services stated in said
Title II yet nevertheless the completion the government declined
to direct the plaintiffs to perform the job.

ISSUE:
Whether the suit filed qualify as against the government
without its consent.

HELD:
The case is a not a suit against the government, which
could not be sued without its consent. It was found that the
government has already allotted the full amount for the contract
price; it was the defendant-officials which were responsible for
the allegation. This was to be directed to the officials alone,

Page 14 of 31
where they are compelled to act in accordance with the rights
established by Ruiz and Herrera or to desist them from paying
and recognizing the rights and interests in the funds retained
and the credit for the job finished.

The order of dismissal was reversed and set aside and the
case was remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings
with costs against the defendants.

Page 15 of 31
 9.) AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA
G.R No. L-26400
February 29, 1972

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing the
plaintiff’s complaint.

Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered

owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as
shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which
superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435)
issued to her by the register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1,
1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or
interest in the property appears at the back of the Certificate
without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government
used a portion of the said lot, with an area of 6, 167 meters, for
the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines

requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been
appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the
Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th endorsement dated
December 9, 1958. A copy of said endorsement was transmitted
to Amigable’s counsel by the office of the President on January
7, 1959.

On February 6, 1959, Amigable filed in the court of a quo

a complaint, which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon
motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of the
ownership and possession of the 6, 167 square meters of land
traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought
the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,
000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in
the sum of P25, 000.00, attorney’s fees in the sum of P5, 000.00
and the cost of suit.

Within the reglamentary period of defendants filed a suit

answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and
interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit; (1) the
action was premature, the claim not having been filed with the

Page 16 of 31
office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of the action for
the recovery of any amount which might be due to the plaintiff,
if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit
against the government, the claim for moral damages,
attorney’s fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these
items the Government had not give its consent to be sued; (4)
that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated
and sued the area involved in the construction of Margo Avenue,
plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

On July 29, 1959 the court rendered its decision holding

that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of action for
the recovery of possession and ownership of the position of lot
in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued
without its consent. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed
unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to us,
there being no question of fact involved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the
government under the facts of the case.

HELD/RATIO:
Yes. Immunity of State from suit; Exception-where the
government takes away property from a private land owner for
public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without
thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit without its consent. The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetuating as an injustice on a citizen. Had the government
followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the
time, a compliant would have been filed by it, and only upon
payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after
tender of the party entitled to such payment of the amount
fixed, may it “have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined
in the judgment”.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside

and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination
of compensation, including attorney’s fees, to which the
appellant is entitled. No pronouncement as to cost.

Page 17 of 31
 10.) THE MUNICIPALITY OF MONCADE VS. CAJUIGAN
G.R No. 7048
January 12, 1912

FACTS:
This case comes before us on appeal from a judgment of
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac, the
Honorable Julio Ilorente presiding, condemning the defendants,
the first as principal and the other three sureties, to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P 1, 855, together with penalties, interest
and costs.

The Municipality of Moncada and the defendant, Pio

Cajuigan, entered into a contract of lease whereby the plaintiff
leased to his defendant certain fish ponds situated within the
jurisdiction of that municipality for the term embracing July 1,
1908 to June 30, 1909, for which defendant agreed to pay P 3,
710 in quarterly installments. By virtue of this lease, the fish
ponds were duly delivered into the possession of the defendant
Cajuigan by the plaintiff, and he for with began placing
accessories necessary for the conduct of a fishery. The lessee
failing to meet his payments as provided in the contract of lease,
petitioned for and received an extension first until October 1,
1908, and Second until November 30 of the same year.

The lease was declared rescinded by the Municipality

Council on November 30, 1908, and on or about the sixth day
of the following month the plaintiff, through its officials, entered
the property and ejected the defendants and his tenants.

Subsequently thereto and on February 15, 1910, this

complaint filed by the plaintiff, wherein judgment was asked
against the defendant Pio Cajuigan, as principal and Florentino
Sagui, Juan Isla and Artero Alegado as sureties, for the sum of
P3, 710 together with penalties, interest and cost.

The defendants, after specifically denying all the

allegations of the complaint, alleged as a special defuse that the
failure to pay the rents as stipulated in the lease was not due to
the fault of the defendant, but to that of plaintiff, through its
treasurer, agreed to accept on December 2, the amount then
due, but that when the tender was made, said treasurer refused
to comply with this agreement. The defendants asked by way of
cross-complaint damages in the sum of P9, 800 against the

Page 18 of 31
plaintiff for forcibly taking possession of the leased premises
and for the value of certain nets, corals, etc. left in the fish
ponds seized by the plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lessee did on the 30th of November and
the 2nd of December try to pay the payment which he then
owned.

HELD/RATIO:
No. The trial court accepted as true testimony of the
municipal treasurer, and found as a fact that the lessee never
did at any time offer to make any payment. This finding of fact,
we think, is supported the preponderance of the evidence, the
testimony of the municipal treasurer is clear, direct, positive
and convincing.

On the other hand, we have the testimony of the lessee,

his sub-tenant, and one of his bondsmen, all of whom testified
that the lessee did offer the treasurer the money if the lessee
had gone there with his money on the 30th of November and
treasurer would have unquestionably accepted it, or, even if the
treasurer had refused to accept it under the pretense that he
was busy, the lessee could have notified the municipal
president, whose office was in the same building, and
demanded that the treasurer did not accept the money.

It is well settled that the term ‘preponderance of evidence’,

is not meant the mere numerical away of witnesses, but it
means the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side. The preponderance of evidence may be
determined, under certain conditions, by the number of
witnesses testifying to a particular fact or state of fact.

The judgment appealed from hereby modified by allowing

the plaintiff to recover for five months’ rent, together with 20%
penalties thereon, and deducting from this amount P210, the
amount of the actual damages caused by the plaintiff’s trespass
and thus modified, said judgment is affirmed with cost against
the appellant.

Page 19 of 31
 11.) TORIO VS. FONTANILLA
G.R No. L-29993
October 23, 1978

FACTS:
On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui
Pangasinan, passed a resolution no. 159 whereby “it resolved to
manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January
21, 22 and 23, 1959”. The resolution no. 182 was also passed
creating the “1959 Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee”
which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and
stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council
appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2
stages, one for the “zarzuela” and another for the “cancionan”.
Jose Macaraeg supervised the construction.

The program started at about 10:15 o’clock that evening

with some speeches, and many persons went up to the stage.
The “zarzuela” then began but before the dramatic part of the
play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla
was near the stage and he was pinned underneath. Fontanilla
died in the afternoon of the following day.

The heirs of Vicente Fontanilla filed a complaint with the

Court of First Instance of Manila on September 11, 1959 to
recover damages. Named party-defendants were the
Municipality of Malasiqui, the Council of Malasiqui and all the
individual members of Municipal Council in 1959.

Answering the complaint, defendant municipality invoked

inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly
organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions
and holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental
functions from which no liability can rise to answer for the
negligence of any of its agents.

After trial, the Presiding Judge, narrowed the issue to

whether or not the defendants exercised due diligence in the
construction of the stage. From this findings he arrived at the
conclusion that the Executive Committee appointed by the
Municipal Council had exercised due diligence and care like a
good father of the family in selecting a competent man to
construct a strong stage enough for the occasion and that if it

Page 20 of 31
collapsed that was due to forces beyond control of the
committee on entertainment. Consequently, the defendants
were not liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla.
The complaint was accordingly dismissed. However, the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered all the
defendants-appellee to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Vicente Fontanilla the sums of P12, 000.00 by way of moral and
actual damages P1, 200.00 as attorney’s fees; and the cost.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized
by a Municipal Councilor under Section 2282 of the Municipal
Law as embodied in the Revised Administrative Code is a
governmental or a corporate or proprietary function of the
municipality.

Whether or not the Municipal Councilors who enacted the

ordinance and created the fiesta committee liable for the death
of Fontanilla?

HELD/RATIO:
The court held that the holding of the town fiesta in 1959
by the Municipality of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, was an exercise
of a private or proprietary function of the Municipality. Under
Section 2282 of the chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised
Administrative Code, and this provision simply gives authority
to the Municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not
impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a town fiesta even
if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event
of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the
community and not for the general welfare of the public policy
of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

The court held that the celebration of a town fiesta by the

Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We
upheld that ruling. The legal consequence thereof is that the
Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private
corporation with the Municipal Council acting as its board of
directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a
personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors or
persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-
responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence
(culpa acquiliana) committed by the corporation’s employees or

Page 21 of 31
agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton
negligence on their part.

No. On these principles we absolve the Municipal

Councilors from any liability for the death of Vicente Fontanilla.
The records do not show that said petitioners directly
participated in the defective construction of the “Zarzuela” stage
or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the
platform.

The Court affirmed in to-to the decision of the Court of

Appeals insofar as the Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned,
and the court absolve the Municipal councilors from liability
and set aside the judgment against them without
pronouncement as to costs.

Page 22 of 31
 12.) SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS
240 SCRA 20, January 4, 1995

FACTS:
Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on
September 20, 1986. On May 18, 1988, Julia left for U.S.A. she
did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the
country. In 1991, Leouel filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental,
a complaint for voiding of the marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA
affirmed the dismissal.

ISSUE:
Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least
to communicate with Leouel for more than five years constitute
psychological incapacity?

RULING:
No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate
with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not
constitute psychological incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by a)

gravity, b) juridical antecedent, and c) incurability.

Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a

mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
in their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning

of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensibility or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. The psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved,

even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers
to every individual problem.

Page 23 of 31
 13.) CHI MING TSOI V. COURT OF APPEALS
266 SCRA 324
January 16, 1997

FACTS:
On May 22, 1988, Gina Lao married Chi Ming Tsoi. Since
their marriage until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
was no sexual contact between them. Gina filed a case of
annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity with the RCT of Quezon City. The RTC granted
annulment which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Is the failure of the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife from the time of the marriage until their separation
on March 15, 1989 a ground for psychological incapacity?

RULING:
Yes. One of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is “to procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”

In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of

one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligations is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Page 24 of 31
 14.) REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS
268 SCRA 198
February 13, 1997, J Panganiban

FACTS:
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O Molina married
Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After years of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred to
spend more time with his friends, depended on his parents for
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC
grated Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
constitute psychological incapacity?

HELD/RATIO:
No. There is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of
a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.

Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and

"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that

she and her husband could not get along with each other. There
had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability.

The following guidelines in the interpretation and

application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed
down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the

marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved

Page 25 of 31
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical.
Although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Page 26 of 31
 15.) HERNANDEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
320 SCRA 76
December 8, 1999, J. Mendoza

FACTS:
Lucita Estrella married Mario Hernandez on January 1,
1981 and they begot three children. On July 10, 1992, Lucita
filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City, a petition for annulment
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
from the time of their marriage, Mario failed to perform his
obligation to support the family, devoting most of this time
drinking, had affairs with many women and cohabiting with
another women with whom he had an illegitimate child, and
finally abandoning her and the family.

The RTC dismissed the petition which was affirmed by the

Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether there was psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code.

RULING:
Petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they
were married, private respondent was suffering from a
psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no
evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not
cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently
proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling
his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and
not merely psychological.

Private respondent’s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual

infidelity or perversion, and abandonment to not by themselves
constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, and not merely due to private respondent’s youth
and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate
court held. Judgment affirmed.

Page 27 of 31
 16.) MARCOS V. MARCOS
G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
(3rd Div.) J. Panganiban

FACTS:
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982
and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to
provide material support to the family and have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the
nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC
declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was
however reversed by CA.

ISSUES:
1. Whether personal medical or psychological
examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
2. Whether the totality of evidence presented in this
case show psychological incapacity.

RULING:
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the
nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the
respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for such declaration.

Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that

respondent failed to provide material support to the family and
may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the

fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for
a period of more than six years. It was during this period that
he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and
moral support, and even left the family home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to

said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is

Page 28 of 31
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the

marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20); and
for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v.
CA and Molina, 268 SCRA 198.

Page 29 of 31
 17.) REPUBLIC V. DAGDAG
G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001
(2nd Division), J. Quisumbing

FACTS:
Plaintiff Erlinda Matias married Avelino Dagdag in 1975
and they begot children. A week after the wedding, Avelino
would disappear for months. During the times he was with the
family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would
return home drunk. He would likewise inflict physical injuries
on her. In 1983, Avelino left the family again and that was the
last they heard from him. Erlinda later learned that Avelino was
imprisoned but escaped from jail.

In 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a

petition for nullity of marriage for psychological incapacity. On
December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence,
only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and
presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only
witness. Virginia testified that she was married to the brother
of Avelino. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino always
quarreled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple’s
house. Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The RTC declared
the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether the husband suffers from psychological
incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a
habitual alcoholic and a fugitive from justice.

RULING:
No. Taking into consideration these guidelines laid down
in the Molina case, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply
with the required evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to
comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause
of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified and sufficiently proven by exerts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation
that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently
proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not
even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not

Page 30 of 31
given opportunity to present controverting evidence sine the
trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.

Page 31 of 31