ALCOREZA, Maria Kaela S.

CONTEPI A51

Analysis of “Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address”

By Gilbert Ryle

Introduction

In the article, Gilbert Ryle argued that there is something wrong with the “prevalent doctrine” on
intelligence, and may even become a source of misconceptions. According to Ryle, the popular
notion of intelligence is based on one’s ability to consider propositions. Seeing the problems of
such notion, he contends that knowing that is not the ideal indicator of intelligence, and further
elucidates this by explaining that knowing-how cannot always be reduced to knowing-that, and
that it logically precedes the other.

In this paper’s summary, I will be tackling Ryle’s second claim that knowing-how is logically
prior to knowing-that. To supplement my discussion on this matter, will also be briefly
summarizing his contention on the inadequacy of merely considering propositions due to the fact
that one can either think stupidly or think intelligently.

Although at first glance, Ryle seems to be successful in defending the primacy of knowledge-how,
it still seems to be that the author has failed to take into consideration other important stages and
propositional concepts which may serve as important benchmarks in determining intelligence. In
line with this, I shall question this claim by illustrating how propositional knowledge (not limited
to regulative propositions) is not only present after a certain action is done, rather is present
throughout the whole learning experience. In this case, propositional knowledge should be seen as
a companion to practical knowledge, present before, during and after the application.

Summary

As said before, Ryle argues for the logical primacy of knowledge-how to knowledge-that. He
claims that certain propositions such as rules, maxims and the like should be realized through a
person’s action or that of others’. Once they are intelligently realized, one is finally able to consider
these principles in theory. Rationalizing alone will not showcase an individual’s intelligence,
because it leads to an infinite regress; as Ryle presents it, a person can think either stupidly or
intelligently. When a person relies solely on knowledge-that, he or she will encounter a dilemma
in the middle of the process, prompting one to formulate other principles ad infinitum. This then
calls us to question the viability of rationalization as the source of intelligent behavior. Principles
then have to be tested or applied intelligently in order to find the truth. After these principles are
acted upon, one can now use the information he or she has garnered to form new propositions, thus
proving that knowledge-that follows from knowledge-how.

Critique

In one way or another, I agree with Ryle’s claim that act of considering propositions must rely on
the information one garners from knowledge-how. However, I disagree that knowledge-how is
always logically prior to knowledge-that. In the process of learning, propositional knowledge is
present in every state. Although Ryle focuses on arguing against the active consideration of
propositions as a sign of intelligence, one has to take into consideration that knowledge-that can
also assume the form of dispositional belief of propositions. The dispositional form of knowledge
is important in our understanding of how knowing-that relates to knowing-how. By definition,
dispositional belief is information readily available in our minds, but are not currently being
entertained nor considered (Lemos, 2007). I presume that with the large amount of dispositional
beliefs we have, we rarely become aware of them even if the situation calls them into
consciousness. Echoing one of Ryle’s example, before a person rides a bike, he or she will consider
a lot of propositions consciously or not like knowing where the breaks are (this may be
dispositional) or contemplating whether road is safe enough for a beginner like you. Upon riding
the bike, Ryle suggests that it is at that time when one can determine whether or not the person
actually has knowledge of riding the bike; at the same time, one is feeding their own dispositional
beliefs as they learn how to ride the bike, and the active consideration of certain propositions may
or may not take place after. If one does not actively consider, a person unconsciously stores this
information. Likewise, knowing-how cannot survive by itself, because the information one gains
must be interpreted in such a way a person may claim to know-that. The action by itself serves no
meaning to a person unless he or she consciously or unconsciously ascribes certain principles for
it. As one can observe, propositional knowledge (if taken more holistically) equally supports
knowing-how rather than being inferior to it. The two forms have to work together in order to
surmise intelligence.

Conclusion

In conclusion, in order to value the importance of concepts of know-how and know-that in

assessing a person’s intelligence, one has to consider that the two have to work together to establish
the knowledge. I agree with Ryle in his position that intelligence cannot merely root down to
regulative propositions, but have to be tested in real life. In this critical analysis paper, I opted to
support and extend the know-that concept so as to explicitly present the connection (and not
submission) of one over the other. Our concept of knowledge-that needs to extend towards the
presence of dispositional beliefs in the learning process. Through this, one can better recognize
that the two concepts are not mutually exclusive from each other, as Ryle has clearly expressed.

References:
Lemos, N. (2007). An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. New York: Cambridge
University Press. doi:978-0-511-27118-2.
Ryle, G. (1945-1946). Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address. Proceedings
of the Aristotelean Society, 46, 1-16. Retrieved May 31, 2017, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544405.