LHUILLIER v.

BRITISSH AIRWAYS TRANSPO: Warsaw Convention

144
GR No.171092 March 25, 2010 Del Castillo, J. Javier
Petitioners: Respondents:
Edna Diago Lhuilier British Airways
Recit Ready Summary

Lhuillier took BA’s flight from London, UK to Rome, Italy, While on board, she asked Halliday, one of the FAs, to
assist her in placing her hand carried luggage in the overhead bin, but she was told that if he was going to help all
300 passengers, he would have a broken back. When the plane was about to land in Rome, Kerrigan, another FA,
also singled her out from the other passengers, and made it appear to the others that Lhuillier was stupid,
uneducated, and ignorant and that she didn’t know the rules and regulations of the plane. Kerrigan also told her
that they don’t like her attitude.

Lhuillier filed a complaint for damages against BA in the RTC of Makati. BA filed a MTD on the basis that the court
lacked jurisdiction over the case and person of BA. RTC granted the MTD based on the Warsaw Convention. Hence,
this petition for review.

The issues in this case are:

(1) whether or not PH courts have jurisdiction over a tortious conduct committed against a Filipino citizen and
resident by an airline personnel of a foreign carrier traveling beyond the territorial limit of any foreign country; and
thus is outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention? No
(2) whether or not BA’s appearance constitutes voluntary appearance, thus they have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the PH courts.

As to the first issue, the SC held in the negative. This is because the Warsaw Convention is a treaty commitment
voluntarily assumed by the PH government, thus has the force and effect of law in the country. Based on Art. 1 of
the Warsaw Convention, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are
situated within the territories of 2 High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an “international carriage”. The
High Contracting Parties referred to in this case were the 2 signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which
subsequently adhered to it. In this case, Lhuillier’s place of departure was London, while her place of destination
was Rome. Both UK and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. Since the Warsaw Convention applies,
then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
Based on Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before: (1) court
where the carrier is domiciled; (2) court where the carrier has its principal place of business; (3) court where the
carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or (4) court of the place of destination. In this
case, it is not disputed that BA is a British corporation domiciled in London, so London is its principal place of
business. And based on the 1st and 2nd jurisdictional rules, Lhuillier may bring her case before the courts of London.
In the passenger tix and baggage check presented by Lhuillier and BA, the ticket was issued in Rome. So under the
3rd rule, Lhuillier can bring her case in Rome. Lastly, since her destination is in Rome, she can also bring her action
in the courts of Rome. So the RTC was correct in saying that PH courts have no jurisdiction over her. In
addition, allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during the course of
the international carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.

As to the second issue, special appearance of the counsel of BA in filing the MTD and other pleadings before the
trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

[IMPORTANT]: Based on Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages
before: (1) court where the carrier is domiciled; (2) court where the carrier has its principal place of business; (3)
court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or (4) court of the place of
destination.
Facts
1. On 28 February 2005, Edna Diago Lhuillier (Lhuillier) took British Airways’ (BA) flight 548 from London, UK
to Rome, Italy.
 On board, she requested Julian Halliday (Halliday), one of the flight attendants, to assist her in
placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin, but Halliday refused to help and assist her
and sarcastically remarked that “If I were to help all 300 passengeres in this flight, I would have
a broken back!”

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  That when the plane was about to land in Rome, another flight attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan
(Kerrigan) singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class to lecture her on
plane safety.
 Kerrigan made it appear to the other passengers that Lhuillier was ignorant, uneducated, stupid,
and that she needed lectures on the safety rules and regulations of the plane. But Lhuillier assured
Kerrigan that she knew the regulations since she was a frequent traveler.
 Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few centimerters away from that of Lhuillier’s and said
to her “We don’t like your attitude.”
 When she arrived in Rome, Lhuillier complained to BA’s ground manager and demanded an
apology, but the manager said that the flight stewards were “only doing their job”.
2. Lhuillier filed a complaint for damages against BA in the RTC of Makati City.
 She ordered the following: 5m for moral damages, 2m nominal damages, 1m for exemplary
damages, 300k for atty’s fees, 200k for litigation expenses and cost of the suit (all in PH currency).
3. 16 May 2005, summons + complaint were served on BA through Violeta Echevarria, General Manager of
Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc (EPASI).
4. 30 May 2005, by way of special appearance through counsel, BA filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of BA.
 BA alleged that only the courts of London or Rome have jurisdiction over the complaint for
damages based on Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention.1
 So since BA is: (a) domiciled in London, (b) principal place of business is in London, (c) Lhuillier
bought her ticket in Italy (through Jeepney Travel SAS in Rome) and (d) Rome is the place of
destination of Lhuillier, so it follows that the complaint should only be filed in the courts of either
London or Rome.
 Also, the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of BA since the
summons were erroneously served on EPASI, which is not its resident agent in the PH.
5. RTC issued an order granting BA’s MTD.
 The RTC said that they sympathize with Lhuillier, but the courts have to apply the
principles of international law and are bound by the treaty stipulations entered into by
the PH which form part of the law of the land, and one of which is the Warsaw
Convention.
 Since the PH is a signatory, PH adheres to the stipulations and is bound by the provisions
including the place where actions involving damages to plaintiff is to be instituted.
 That there is no justifiable reason to deviate from the indicated limitations as it will only
run counter to the Warsaw Convention. \
 Since the PH is not the place of domicile of BA nor is it its principal place of business,
the courts are divested of jurisdiction over cases for damages. Neither was Lhuillier’s ticket
issued in the PH nor was her destination Manila, but it was Rome.
 But, referral to court of proper jurisdiction does not constitute constructive denial of
Lhuillier’s right to have access to our courts since the Warsaw Convention itself provided
for jurisdiction over cases arising from international transportation.
 Treaty stipulations must be complied with in good faith based on pacta sunt servanda.
Lhuillier filed a MR, but was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Points of Contention
Lhuillier: Cause of action arose not from contract of carriage, but based on the tortious conduct committed
by the airline personnel of BA, in violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations. a.
Since the cause of action was not predicated on the contract of carriage, she has the option to pursue
the case in this jurisdiction pursuant to PH laws.

British Airways: Claim for damages fell within the ambit of Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. So,
the same can only be filed before the courts of London or Rome.

Issues Ruling
1. NO

1
An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the
carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been
made, or before the court of the place of destination

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 1. WON the PH courts have jurisdiction over a tortious conduct committed against a 2. NO
Filipino citizen and resident by an airline personnel of a foreign carrier traveling
beyond the territorial limit of any foreign country; and thus is outside the ambit
of the Warsaw Convention?
2. WON BA, in its filing of a MTD based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case and over its person?

Rationale

On whether PH courts have jurisdiction over a tortious conduct committed against a Filipino
citizen and resident by an airline personnel of a foreign carrier
 SC: The petition of Lhuillier is without merit.
o The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.
o Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines: PH is a party to the Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, or the Warsaw Convention,
which took effect on 13 February 1933.
o The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the PH government,
thus has the force and effect of law in the country.
o The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct
occurred, was between UK and Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention.
 Based on Art. 1 of the Warsaw Convention 2, when the place of departure
and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated within
the territories of 2 High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an
“international carriage”. The High Contracting Parties referred to in this
case were the 2 signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which
subsequently adhered to it.
 [CASE APPLICATION] Lhuillier’s place of departure was London, while her place
of destination was Rome. Both UK and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw
Convention. So, the transport of Lhuillier is deemed to be an “international
carriage” within the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.

Since the Warsaw Convention applies, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is
governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
 Based on Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for
damages before:
1. court where the carrier is domiciled;
2. court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3. court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been
made; or
4. court of the place of destination.
 In this case, it is not disputed that BA is a British corporation domiciled in London, so London
is its principal place of business. And based on the 1st and 2nd jurisdictional rules, Lhuillier may
bring her case before the courts of London.
 In the passenger tix and baggage check presented by Lhuillier and BA, the ticket was issued in
Rome. So under the 3rd rule, Lhuillier can bring her case in Rome.

2
Article 1:
1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by aircraft for
reward. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport undertaking.
2. For the purposes of this Convention the expression “international carriage” means any carriage in which,
according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether
or not there be a break in the carriage or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two
High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping
place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another Power, even
though that Power is not a party to this Convention. A carriage without such an agreed stopping place between
territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is
not deemed to be international for the purposes of this Convention.

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  Lastly, since her destination is in Rome, she can also bring her action in the courts of Rome.
So the RTC was correct in saying that PH courts have no jurisdiction over her.

Santos III v. Northwest Orient case applies.

 In that case, Santos III, PH resident, bought a ticket in Northwest Orient in San Francisco (SF),
for transport between SF and Manila via Tokyo and back to SF. He was waitlisted in the Tokyo
to MNL segment despite prior reservation. In that case, he also sued the airlines, but based on
Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, his claim was likewise denied, since he should have sued
in San Francisco courts.
 Where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept.
Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with Art. 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention.
 Reason why characterization of Art. 28(1) is a jurisdiction and not a venue provision: (1) wording
indicates that the place where action for damages “must” be brought underscores the mandatory
nature; (2) consistent with the objective of the Convention which is to regulate in a uniform
manner the conditions of international transportation by air; (3) Convention does not contain any
provision prescribing rules of jurisdiction other than 28(1).
 The facts of the case in Santos III are analogous to this case: (1) domicile of BA is in London,
(2) principal office of BA is in London, (3) ticket bought in Rome, (4) destination is Rome.
 Moreover, Santos III ruled that Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention does not apply if the action
is based on tort.

Tortious conduct as ground for Lhuillier’s complaint is within the purview of the Warsaw
Convention.
 Lhuillier claims that in the Santos III case, the cause of action was based on a breach of
contract, but here her cause of action is based on tortious conduct and that the pronouncement
in Santos III that: “allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude the
case from the comprehension of the Warsaw Convention” is an obiter.
 But the SC says that the allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to
exclude the case from the realm of the Warsaw Convention. And that the ruling that a cause of
action based on tort did not bring the case outside the sphere of the Warsaw Convention was
the ratio decidendi in disposing of the specific issue raised by Santos III.
 Carey v. United Airlines: USCA held that “passenger’s action against the airline carrier arising from
alleged confrontational incident between passenger and flight attendant on international flight was
governed exclusively by the Warsaw Convention, even though the incident allegedly involved
intentional misconduct by the FA.
 Bloom v. Alaskan Airlines: USCA said that “Warsaw Convention governs actions arising from
international air travel and provides the exclusive remedy for conduct which falls within its
provisions.” v. It is settled that allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger
during the course of the international carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the
Warsaw Convention.

On the issue of voluntary appearance

 The case of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan and La Naval Drug Corporation v. CA both said that special
appearance to question a court’s jurisdiction is NOT voluntary appearance (civpro and crimpro). 3
 In this case, special appearance of the counsel of BA in filing the MTD and other pleadings
before the trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial
court.

Disposition
Complaint dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

3Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. - The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a MTD of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

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