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EDITORIALTEAM
Editor
Dav jd Saw david_saw@adprconsult.com.my
Associate Editor
R. S. Sassheen,

K.
Farouk Kamal
Copy Editor
Arish, William Tan
CONTENTS
Assistant Editors Volume 15 November/December 2008
R.G.G. Paran

5enior Writer
Adam lsmail
Russia Correspondent
Elena Laskina
IN FOCUS
Librarian
Noor Afzan Md. Affan
Contributors
Prof. Dr. Bilveer 5inqh, Prof. DI Philip Davies,
Prof. Dr. K. S. Nathan. Dr. Ahmad Faruqui
REGIONAT FOCUS 4
Defence Developments in lndonesia

The Pakistan Armed Forces 11

ADPR Consult fMf Sdn Bhd Testing Times For The Military
Founder Major (R) R. Sachi Thananthan (1942-2001)

DIRECTORS
Chairman
Dato'Hj.Ahmad Hasmuni Hj.Hussein AIR SYSTEMS 17
Managing Director
l,4dm. V. Ranee Sachi ranee,sachi@adprconsult.com.my The Chinese Air Force Growth Path
Executive Publisher
Vittorio Rorsi Prudente vittorio_prudente@odprconsult.com.my

Chief Operating Offi<er

Siva Sachi Jiya_sachi@adptconsult.com.my NAVAL 5Y5TEM5 27
Secretary to the Publisher
Zariana Omar anno@adprconsult.com.my Evolution & Revolution
Web & Art Dire(tol Chinese Naval Developments
Vijay Pingili vijay@adprconsult.com.my

lTExecutive KaneshNaidu webmastet@odprconsult.com.my

Ac(ountsExe(utive RuzzieHassan ruzzie@odprconsult.com,my

Circulation Executive Khairul Naem REGIONAT UPDATE 28
Promotions Fauziah Harun,5. Kavin
Regional Defence News Analysis
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY is a monthly publication for
diplomats and professionals in the defence, security and
academic fields. Opinions expressed by contributors in
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY do not necessarily
represent those of the publisher or editor.
'46
This publication may not be reprcduced or transmitted in any form in
lndustry News From Around The World
whole or in pott without the written exprcss consent of the publishers.

ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY ls published by

ADPR Consult (M) Sdn Bhd, which also publishes Front Cover Picture: On landing with its braking parachute de-
ASIAN AIRLINES & AEROSPACE,
ASIA-PACIFIC MILITARY BALANCE and SHOW DAILY.
ployed, a Sukhoi Su-27SK of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army
SUBSCRIPTION, BACK COPIES and REPRINTS Air Force (PLAAF). ln December 1991 PLAAF placed its first order
Khairul Naem circuloti on@ad prconsu lt.com. my
for the Su-27SlVUBK and this acquisition would start the transfor-
Distributed by Vishal Magazine Distributor Sdn Bhd, Malaysia and mation of Chinese combat aircraft capabilities.This issue of Asian
MarketAsia Distributors (5) Pte Ltd, Singapore.
Defence & Diplomacy contains articles on the Chinese Air Force
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ORDER IN CHAOS OR
CHAOS ON ORDER
Pick up any newspaper or look at the television wherever
you are around the world and there is a good chance that
the leading story will be the financial crisis. Depending on
the day you decide to look its either a crisis or a crisis avert-
ed, followed by the opposite the next day. lf you like the fi-
nancial news to be unpredictable there is plenty for you to
like at the momentl
Financial markets are suffering there is no doubt about
that. Using 3lst December 2007 as our starting point, in
Malaysia the KLSE
was down 34.3o/o
in local currency
terms on October
15th. ln Hong Kong
the Hang Seng was
down 42.5o/o, in
Singapore the STI
was down 40.60/o,
in the Republic of
Korea the KOSPI
was down 29.4o/o,in
China the SSEA was
down 62]0/o and
lndia the BSE was
down 46.70lo - the
bad news goes on
and on.
Markets inevitably correct themselves - they are like grav-
ity where what goes up must come down. We are now in a
situation where after years of cheap money there in no li-
quidity in the system and those institutions, companies and
financial markets thatthrived on this excess liquidity are now
in deep trouble. Before anybody starts thinking of jumping
out of the window, this does not mean that the end of the
world is in prospect. ln so many areas of the world there are
national economies with fundamental strengths and many
companies that are also fundamentally strong. That is the
good news.
Equally good, unless you happen to be an oil producer, is
the fact that oil prices are declining. ln the London market
at close of business on 16th October, benchmark West Texas
Crude was down to 570.25 per barrel for December delivery.
It was at over 5140 per barrel in July. That will be extremely
helpful for many regional economies.
IN FOCUS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
Turning to the bad news, the problem is there is far too
much bad news. Whether you like it or not the world econo-
my is interconnected, globalisation is a reality. The US econ-
omy is contracting and although it is estimated that Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) will grow by 1.60lo this year and by
0.60/oin 2009, this is not enough. Add to that the uncertainty
of the upcoming elections and you have the world's largest
economy looking totally unable to generate the demand
necessary to help us out of this financial mess. ln Japan esti-
mated GDP growth for this year is down to 0.7o/o and growth
in 2009 is estimated al0.60/o. The major European economies
are slowing as well and allthings considered the trend is to-
wards a recession.
The Chinese economy on the other hand is still growing
with GDP estimated to increase by 9.8o/o this year and by
8.5% next year, lndia is also growing with an estimated GDP
increase of 7.3o/o this year and 6.80/o next year. Domestic de-
mand can account for much of this growth, but export mar-
kets are still critical, particularly for China, and with the US,
Japan and Europe heading into recession there are storm
clouds on the horizon.
Domestically in the region we must also consider the re-
ality of growing inflation, in lndia Consumer Price lnflation
(CPl) was running al 9o/oin August, in lndonesia it was 1iol0,
in Pakistan it was at 23.9o/o in September, in Malaysia it was
8.50lo in August and in Singapore 6.40/o. Add all of this to-
gether and it is not a pleasant picture, when you use words
like inflation and recession at the end of the day they are not
abstracts - real people suffer.
Getting out of this mess will not be easy - it will require
political leadership and economic responsibility. One can
only hope that that the political leaders of the major eco-
nomic powers are up to the task.
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008

DEFENCE DEVELOPMENTS
IN INDONESIA bYDAVIDSAW

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needs to start by looking at the past,
for it is the past that has shaped the
present in political, economic and de-
fence terms. lndonesia is still a state
in transition; it is still coming to terms
with a democratic political system and
still trying to overcome years of eco-
nomic mismanagement and corrup-
tion. Much progress has been made
by lndonesia in recent years, but much
still remains and needs to be done to
transform th is country.
After the surrender of Japan in Au-
gust 1945, lndonesian nationalists de-
clared independence from colonial
rule by the Netherlands on lTth August
1945 and Sukarno became the first
president of independent lndonesia.
The return of the Dutch to lndonesia
led to an anti-colonial struggle and it
was only on 27th December 1949 that
the Dutch finally understood that their
attempts to retain their colony had
failed and finally accepted lndonesian
independence.
With the prestige of success in an
anti-colonial struggle against a west-
ern power, Sukarno became a major
political figure in the emerging post-
colonial world. He was also a leading
light in the formation of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM). Sukarno
gradually moved closer to the Soviet
bloc, probably prompted by the grow-

ing political importance of the lndo-
nesian Communist Party (PKl), and this
led to the supply of military equipment
by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,
Poland and China from 1957 onwards.
This Soviet bloc assistance totally
transformed the lndonesian military.
Naval equipment supplied bythe Soviet
Union included a Sverdlov class heavy
cruiser, Skory class destroyers, Riga
class frigates and 12 Project 613 Whis-
key class submarines. Aircraft included
Tupolev Tu-16 bombers, MiG-l9 and
MiG-21 fighters. By the mid-1960s the
lndonesian Air Force, Tentara Nasional
lndonesia - Angkatan Udara (TNl-AU)
was the largest and best equipped in
L
Southeast Asia. ln addition armoured
vehicles and air defence equipment
came from the Soviet bloc.
The Tentara Nasional lndonesia (TNl)
had become a major military power in
regional terms, but lndonesia had in-
creasing security concerns. For exam-
ple, the US Central lntelligence Agency
(ClA) was supporting separatist groups
in lndonesia with weapons, equipment
and even air support. ln 1958 there
was an attempted coup in Sumatra
and Sulawesi. The reality of the situa-
tion in the lndonesia of that period was
that Sukarno was attempting to tread
a path between three distinct political
currents, which were known as'Nasa-
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
kom' standing for nationalism, religion
and communism. The contradictions
between these three political currents
would inevitably lead to conflict.
On top of this lndonesia created its
own problems as Sukarno decided on
a policy of 'Konfrontasi' with Malay-
that also drew in British Common-
sia
wealth forces. ln consequence, by the
mid-l960s, lndonesia was at the centre
of an absolutely unstable security en-
vironment.
Then events suddenly spun out of
control. On 30th September 1965 the
PKI attempted a coup, which was ruth-
lessly suppressed by the TNI under the
leadership of General Suharto. Gradu-
 rir6,s}jA;" rs('u3
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
ally Sukarno was eased out of power
and in 1962 Suharto became the sec-
ond president of lndonesia. Suharto
and the TNI instituted the corporatist
'New Order' regime and proceeded to
take an unshakeable hold on political
power in lndonesia. On reflection, the
Suharto regime did achieve a lot for ln-
donesia, but whatever the gains much
was also lost, to cronyism, corruption,
mismanagement and sheer incompe-
tence.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 hit
lndonesia hard and it appeared that
the Suharto government was para-
lysed by indecision. Demonstrations
and riots erupted, the government was
losing control and eventually Suharto,
who by this time was ill, was persuaded
to step down from office in May 1998.
He was succeeded by his vice president
B.J. Habibie,who went on to contest
and lose the 1999 election to Abdur-
rahman Wahid. The new president
only lasted until July 2001, when he
l=.1
was forced to step aside in favour of the
vice president Megawati Sukarnoputri,
the daughter of Sukarno.
The Political Environment
ln the 2004 elections, Megawati was
faced by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
and soundly beaten, with Susilo Bam-
bang Yudhoyono (SBY) winning 60.60/o
of the votes cast. The new government
faced major challenges, with the most
pressing being making the economy
function in a more satisfactory man-
ner. lndeed the SBY administration has
much to point to in this regard; in 2006
and 2007 the Jakarta stockmarket (JSX)
was one of the top three performers
in the world. By the end of December
2007 lndonesia's foreign exchange re-
serves had reached a level of 556.92 bil-
lion - an all time high.
The positive signs would lose some
of their lustre in 2008, as oil and food
prices rose. This forced the govern-
ment to increase its subsidy payments,
with the inevitable negative outcome
for public finances. Everybody in the
lndonesian political elite was perfectly
well aware that elections would be
held in 2009 and in that environment it
is unlikely that politicians would make
any hard economic choices. The fact
that oil prices have reduced and food
prices are now more stable is good
news for the lndonesian government.
What is not is the current international
financial crisis, which will inevitably im-
pact on lndonesia - it is still too early to
say what the outcome of that will be.
Despite this mixed picture, the ln-
donesian economy has been doing
well this year. At the end of the second
quarter lndonesian Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) was up 6.50/o compared
to the same period in 2007. Current
estimates are that lndonesian GDP
growth will average out at 5.8% for this
year and the predictions are that it will
be 5.50lo in 2009. These are good num-
bers, but lndonesia needs its GDP to
grow at a sustained higher rate if it is to
meet the needs of its growing popula-
tion. There are concerns over inflation,
in September Consumer Price lnflation
(CPl) was running at an uncomfortable
11o/o, up f rom 7o/o last year. Another is-
sue is unemployment; this had reached
8,5% in February and is now believed
to be runnin g al9.1o/o.
As previously mentioned there will
be an election in April 2009 and the
main protagonists will once again be
SBY and Megawati Sukarnoputri. Ac-
cording to recent polls, Megawati is
running ahead of SBY in terms of popu-
larity, although its stilltoo close to call
and there is a long way to go until April
next year. That being said, a downturn
in economic conditions can only hurt
SBY.
The current administration has not
been perfect, yet it has achieved con-
structive things and proved that it is
able to respond effectively to unex-
 Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY

pected events, such as natural disas- role of the TNI over the years has done limited.
ters. lf circumstances had been dif- little or nothing to aid it in discharging lf we take 1988 as our base year, in
ferent SBY would have been expected its core security mission or giving it the financial terms using constant 2005
to win a second term, now things are appropriate tools to do so. US dollars as a comparator lndonesian
much more unpredictable. Arguably, military expenditure was $1,885 mil-
lndonesia could do with a bit of po- lio n eq u iva le nt to 2o/o of G D P. ln 1996,
litical stability, especially in the cur- Defence Funding military expenditure was 52,840 mil-
rent diffi cult economic circumstances, Environment lion, which was equivalent to L6o/o of
in the end though it will come down GDP. The next year spending was re-
to the will of the estimared 174 million ln real terms, the TNI and its major duced to 52,653 million or 1.5o/o of GDP,
voters in lndonesia. constituent elements, the TNI-Ang- falling to 52,079 million or 1.10/o of GDP
Governing lndonesia is no easy task. katan Darat. (TNl-AD), the army, the in 1998. ln the ten years from i988,
This archipelagic nation of 12508 is- TNI-Angkatan Laut (TNl-AL), the navy, military expenditure as a percentage
lands has a population in excess of and the TNI-Angkatan Udara (TNl-AU), of GDP either remained static or de-
237.5 million people and a multiplicity air force, have never had the financial clined.
of ethnic groups of which the Javanese resources required. lt is commonly Entering the democratic era, military
al 40.60/o are the most numerous. All assumed that under the New Order expenditure hardly grew in a measur-
regime that the TNI benefited from
of this also presents the TNI with a dif- able fashion for many years. ln 1999
ficult task in trying to defend the coun-
major funding - that is not the case. ln military expenditure amounted to
try against both internal and external fact in the last decade of rule by Suhar-
threats. Added to which, the political to military expenditure was essentially (...Continued on page 8)

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ASIANDEFENCE&DIPLOMACY No\
(...Continued from page 7)
S1,710 million or of the GDP. For
0.9o/o
the next three years it remained at the
equivalent of 1o/o of GDP, rising to 1.3%
in 2003. Here the value of using con-
stant 2005 U5 dollars as a comparison
tool is useful, in 2003 lndonesian mili-
tary expenditure amounted to 53,319
million far more than any equivalent
year in the last ten years ofthe Suharto
regime. The following year saw mili-
tary expenditure as a slice of GDP ris-
ing lo 1.4o/o and expenditure of 53,653
million. However, 2005 spending was
down to 53,517 million equivalent to
1.2o/o of GDP.
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The improving lndonesian economY
gave the TNI an increase in funding in
both 2006 and 2007 in comParative
and percentage of GDP terms. Yet in
reality the level of military expendi-
ture in lndonesia is not enough to
support the modernisation needs of a
military with over 300,000 personnel
and an inventory of essentially aged
equipment.
With concerns growing about the
future direction of the lndonesian
economy, the government has chosen
to reduce its expenditure. One of the
casualties of this is military expendi-
ture, with a I00lo cut being made in TNI-
AD budget allocations primarily in the
procurement area. This comes on top
of the fact that military expenditure as
a percentage of GDP is now running
at under 1o/o. ln this environment any
overhaul of TNI equipment resources
as part of a sustained modernisation
programme is virtually impossible.
Modernisation Sttess
A look at the armoured vehicle re-
sources of the TNI-AD presents a ma-
jor argument for the pressing need for
modernisation. There are large num-
(...Continued on page 10)
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EXCEL:ENCI iN QuAi.-] i-Y IOR YOilt S/\f :-:'Y AN;) -c:C;i,i': Y

ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
It
(...Continued from page 8)
bers of AMX-I3 tanks acquired in the
early 1960s, some reworked in lndo-
nesia and some modernised with the
Singaporean SM1 package. In terms
of tracked personnel carriers there are
large numbers of AMX-VCl vehicles,
the last of these was delivere d in 1962.
Turning to wheeled armoured vehicles
there are over 100 BTR-4Os acquired
in the early 1960s, many of these have
been subject to a basic modernisation,
and there are some 55 British Saracen
vehicles, again acquired in the early
1960s, with a limited number modern-
ised.
The TNI-AD has been ingenious in
keeping its aged armoured vehicles
viable, but the fact that it has had to
do this is symptomatic of the prob-
lems that it faces. Years of under in-
vestment, plus the imposition of arms
embargos have left the three services
with tremendous problems. Much of
the legacy equipment in lndonesia is
desperately short of spares a problem
for the TNI-AU in particular. Progress
is being made on that front, the fact
that spares can now be obtained for
US or European-supplied equipment
is a major bonus. However. much of
the legacy equipment in lndonesia is
beyond economic salvation and ought
to be scrapped.
ln the past few years though there
has been some progress on acquiring
new equipment, from amongst oth-
ers the Republic of Korea (ROK) and
Poland. The ROK has supplied training
aircraft, two LPDs and assisted PT PAL
in Surabaya with the construction of
two more LPDs (the first was launched
in August). Poland supplied air defence
equipment and aircraft, with lndonesia
able to finance the purchase through a
loan from Poland. The most significant
defence supply relationship is with
Russia; in 2003 lndonesia acquired four
Sukhoi combat aircraft for around 5i 95
million, of which 526 million was paid
in cash and the rest in bartered prod-
ucts.
This first Sukhoi contract opened
the way to an expansion of defence
links between lndonesia and Russia.
Last year the two countries seemed to
agree a major defence package with
a value in excess of $1 billion to cover
more Sukhoi aircraft and naval equip-
ment amongst other systems. At the
time it was believed that this package
would be financed by a loan from Rus-
sia, but this appears to have been dif-
ficult to resolve.
The TNI is now trying to arrange
the delivery of three of the six Sukhoi
combat aircraft that were ordered
in 2007, but this is proving problem-
atic. A loan has been agreed with the
French investment bank Natixis to cov-
er the 5360 million purchase price of
these three aircraft, the only problem
was that parliamentary approval was
needed for this release of this funding
and it was proving hard to get.
The problem in funding the Sukhoi
purchase illustrates the difficulties that
lndonesia faces in trying to modernise
its military. To purchase foreign equip-
ment it needs to obtain loan packages
at reasonable terms, something that is
not that easy to obtain. with the cur-
rent financial crisis finding any accept-
able loan package is going to be ex-
tremely difficult, further adding to the
modernisation problems of the TNl.
Once again it looks as if circumstances
will conspire to limit the ability of the
TNI to acquire new equipment. r
 It's offi cial !
We are the official and only show daily news
published at lndo Defence & lndo Aerospace 2008.
INDO
INBODEFENCE Af,ROTPACE
208
THE 3FO lNDONESIA'S OFFICIALTBI-SERVICE OEFENCE EVENT
2c.8
THE 1ST INDONESIA'S OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL AVIATION,
AIRCRAFT AND Y EVENT

Booking deadline: 7th November 2008

Material deadline: lOth November 2008

Points to ponder:
o The exhibition is fully supported by the lndonesian Government & the
lndonesian Armed Forces
r lndonesia is investing significant funds into the acquisition of new defence
systems for theArmed Forces, with air, land and naval systems required
o Existing legacy equipment is to be subject to upgrade and modernization
Programmes
o lndonesia is looking to develop the capabilities of the indigenous defence
industry through technology transfer programmes and joint ventures
o The growing lndonesian economy is generating increasing demand for air
transport with local airlines modernizing and expanding their fleets
o New major airport and infrastructure development programmes across
lndonesia to cope with increasing air transport demand
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008

THE PAKISTAN ARMED FORCES.

TESTING TIMES FOR THE MILITARY 'YDAVDSAW

rFhe new and untested civilian

I leadership in Pakistan is find-
ing that while it might have proved
far easier than expected to grasp the
levers of power, the challenges that
they are currently facing are probably
more than they bargained for. Presi-
dent Asif Ali Zardari is now having to
come to terms with the fact that the
Pakistani economy is ialling apart and
that something must be done, and
very soon, or the country will be in the 7
midst of an immense crisis.
Pakistan has had to confront major
economic problems on numerous oc-
casions in recent years and has often

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_*ryl*"
 Nov/De. 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY

found itself going to international do-

nors in a desperate search for financial
assistance. This happened under the
civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto
and Nawaz Sharil it also happened at
the start of General Musharraf's rule.
The difference this time is that the fi-
nancial situation is far worse and the
overall political environment in Paki-
stan is incredibly unstable.
Pakistan currently has an enormous
bala nce of payments deficiU it will need
to obtain 53 billion just to cover its for-
eign currency debt before the end of
November. ln fact Pakistan might ac-
tualiy require as much as 54 billion to
cover its immediate difficulties! That
is just the start though. To resolve the
balance of payments crisis, Pakistan
will need to obtain anything from 510
billion to $tS billion of financial sup-
port over the next two years!
The world is in the midst of an
enormous financial crisis and Pakistan
starts to look for anything between
513 billion and 519 billion of financial
support. lt is hardly surprising to note
that the level of enthusiasm for helping
Pakistan out of this situation has been
virtually non-existent. The Pakistan
government had hoped that its tradi-
tional friends would be prepared to
help in its hour of need, but they have
been extremely reluctant. ploring is assistance from the Asian rorist attack. An obvious message that
The government in lslamabad Development Bank (ADB) or even the there are forces in Pakistan who des-
thought that Saudi Arabia could be World Bank. The ADB came up with perately want the Pakistani economy
persuaded to defer payments for oil, 5500 million for Pakistan in September, to sink into deeper turmoil.
which could have given Pakistan the but obtaining anything more substan-
equivalent of nearly 56 billion. The tial is proving difficult. The way things
Saudi response has thus far been less are going at the momen| the only op-
Getting Worse
than helpful. China is also extremely tion left to Pakistan could turn out to be
reluctant to help out, all of which leaves the lnternational Monetary Fund (lMF). The reason that the government
Pakistan with an enormous problem. The problem for the Pakistani govern- wants to avoid going to the IMF is the
They cannot turn to the US for help, as ment is that aid from the IMF could terms that will be extracted for finan-
that is not an option at the moment. come at a price they will be unwilling cial assistance. The IMF will demand
There is still a chance that they might and perhaps even unable to pay. Ap- major cuts in government spending
be able to get some help from friendly parently there have been meetings and will want to see major increases in
nations, with a conference due to be between the government and the IMF taxation. All of which is guaranteed to
held in November in Abu Dhabito dis- held in Dubai. The last time IMF officials make the government highly unpopu-
cuss financial aid. visited Pakistan was when lslamabad's lar. Any Pakistani government has to be
Another option that Pakistan is ex- Marriot hotel was destroyed in a ter- able to offer patronage to its support-

Jl
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
ers and this comes through the ability
to direct government expenditure to
appropriate areas. ln consequence less
government expenditure equals less
ability to buy support and that equals
unpopularity.
The IMF will also demand the Paki-
stan significantly reduce the amount
of money that it spends on defence.
Bearing in mind the propensity of the
Pakistani military to intervene in poli-
tics, aggravating them by reducing
their budget is hardly likely to be a wise
move. All things considered it is not
difficult to see why the government
would wish to avoid the medicine of
the lMF. However, unless they can find
another solution, the IMF is the only
game in town.
The scope of the crisis in Pakistan is
immense. lnflation is running at almost
30%, the Pakistan rupee has been shed-
ding value against the dollar and this is
a major problem as Pakistan needs dol-
lars to pay for food and fuel imports.
Last year on 22nd October 60.7 rupees
was equivalent to a US dollar, this year
the rate is 81.4 rupees for a US dollar.
There is only enough foreign currency
to cover less than six weeks of imports.
The picture of doom and gloom is un-
ending.
What Pakistan needs, in addition
to the massive infusion of money to
resolve the balance of payments cri-
sis, is foreign investment to keep its
economy growing. With terrorist in-
cidents in Pakistan continuing to rise,
a less than decisive government and
a dreadful macro-economic climate,
it is hardly surprising that Pakistan is
most definitely not a favoured invest-
ment destination at present. Yet it is
not that long ago that Pakistan could
attract substantial foreign investment,
from 2003 onwards the economy grew
rapidly. Last year though as political
uncertainties grew the economy suf-
fered and nothing has happened since
to slow the downward trend.
One of the big contributors to
growth in Pakistan was US economic
assistance, this flowed in after Pakistan
decided that it would become an ally
in the 'War on Terror'. From the end
of2001 onwards this US assistance
amounted to s10 billion. Future US
economic assistance depends on how
they perceive that Pakistan is contrib-
uting in assisting US policy objectives
in Afghanistan, future aid will come
with strings attached. Even worse is
the fact that Washington currently
sees Pakistan in a rather negative light,
add to this a new administration taking
office in January in the US and its all a
recipe for uncertainty for the Pakistani
leadership. One thing is for certain, in
the future Pakistan will not receive the
easy ride that it got from the Bush ad-
ministration for so many years.
Security Scenario
There was a time when security plan-
ning in Pakistan was pretty straightfor-
ward, the fundamental threat was the
overwhelming conventional superior-
ity of lndia and the requirement was to
find a means to counter this superior-
ity. The belief in Pakistani military cir-
cles was that although they could never
match the lndian military in terms of
numbers, they could offset this numeri-
cal disadvantage through what they
thought was the superior quality of

their soldiers and their martial spirit. ln
reality this was a fallacy, yet it impact-
ed on Pakistani defence planning for
years.
Another immense obstacle for Paki-
stan to surmount was finding a counter
to lndia's possession of nuclear weap-
ons. This was achieved at great cost and
the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and its as-
sociated delivery systems act as a coun-
ter to lndian capabilities in this area.
Howevet the nuclear programme also
led to the estrangement of Pakistan
from the U5, its main defence equip-
ment supplier, for more than a decade.
This resulted in a dramatic dilution
in the combat power of the Pakistan
Armed Forces as existing equipment
could not be sustained. Furthermore,
alternative sources of supply could not
replace the US in terms of both capabil-
ity and cost.
When General Musharraf decided
to support US military operations in
Afghanistan in the wake of the terror-
ist attacks of 11th September 2001, it
marked a dramatic reversal of Paki-
stani policy regarding the Taliban and
Afghanistan. Yet, from the perspective
of the Paklstani military it was the cor-
rect choice to make. By March 2004,
Pakistan had been granted Major Non-
NATO Ally (MNNA) status by the US gov-
ernment. This opened the way to the
full resumption of the defence supply
relationship and significant financial as-
sistance as well.
ln equipment terms, the ability to
acquire F-16C/D aircraft, upgrade the
existing F-16A/8 fleet and acquire more
F-16A/8 aircraft was a significant bonus
for the Pakistan Air Force. The other two
services also benefited from US equip-
ment, for example the Pakistan Army
received attack and utility helicopters,
with the Pakistan Navy receiving new
P-3C Orion MPA aircraft. All of this was
extremely welcome.
l:;lit{}Xar.
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Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
Beyond this though, the critical point
was that the decislon taken by General
Musharraf in 2001 to support the US
broke Pakistan out of international iso-
lation. When US economic assistance
came into play, this acted as the cata-
lyst for Pakistani economic growth and
encouraged more foreign investment
that further stimulated the economy.
Had Pakistan continued to pursue more
sensible economic policies in recent
years, current circumstances might be
very different. Sadly, this was not to be.
Pakistan has paid a price for turning
its back on Afghanistan and the Taliban
in 2001 and perhaps this was not antici-
pated. One of the things that Pakistan
has always lacked was strategic depth
in a geographical sense, there was tre-
mendous logic in allowing lnter Serv-
ices lntelligence (lSl) to sponsor and
support the Taliban, as once the Taliban
had come to power in Afghanistan they
provided Pakistan with that strategic
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
.r:l'
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T
ii
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depth.
The lSl was supporting the Taliban
on the one side and on the other were
supporting jihadist groups in Kashmir
in furtherance of Pakistani objectives in
that area. The danger for Pakistan was
that its support of these jihadist groups
might have unintended consequences.
This is what has come to pass, with the
rise of the 'Pakistani Taliban', an insur-
gency along the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border and terrorism in the main cities
of Pakistan. The jihadist groups have
gone from being a tool that could be
manipulated to suit the purposes of the
lSl and Pakistan, to being a direct threat
to the security of the Pakistani state.
This is a classic example of the law of
unintended consequences.
The Next Step
The leadership of the Pakistan
Armed Forces currentlY find them-
selves in an incredibly difficult situ-
ation. Their aim in withdrawing sup-
1L
"w
port from Pervez Musharraf was to
move into the background and leave
the civilian politicians to attempt to
solve the mess that Pakistan was in.
US pressure to allow the 'democratic
process' to proceed doubtless played
a part in this decision by the military.
The only problem is that General Ash-
faq Kayani, the ArmY Chief of Staff'
must now be wondering how much
worse the security situation could get
and what options he has to deal with
it.
The last thing that the Pakistani
military wants to be doing is fight-
ing a counter-insurgency campaign
within Pakistan. They are a military
that is structured to deal with conven-
tional rather than asymmetric threats,
hence the costlY nature of recent
military operations in the tribal areas
along the Afghan border. By inclina-
tion President Zardari is a dealmaker
and will seek to negotiate his way out
of dealing with the insurgency, this
might actually suit the military at this
point. Yet making deals will not make
the problem go away, esPeciallY if
economic conditions do not improve,
they will only postPone events.
For Pakistan it is vital that the po-
litical elites understand the danger of
the current situation in the country.
Unfortunately, over the years the po-
litical elites have proven more inclined
to self-interest rather than looking to
support the national interest. There is
no reason to believe that this will have
changed, as the current Zardari gov'
ernment and the main political oppo-
sition led by Nawaz Sharif are implac-
able opponents.
The only certaintY in Pakistan is
that things are likely to 9et much
worse before they get any better, un-
less all concerned are truly lucky. The
sad thing is that Pakistan has never
been that lucky with its politicians.
All of which means that the Pakistan
Armed Forces, as the eventual guaran-
tor of the state, must potentially be
prepared to intervene in the political
process, even though that is the last
thing they wish to do at the moment.r

THE CHINESE AIR FORCE GROWTH PATH
he Chinese People's Liberation
Army Air Force (PLAAF) was
formally established on lith Novem-
ber 1949, yet its history can be traced
back to the numerous air units that the
Chinese Communist Party had formed
during the Civil War period with vary-
ing degrees of success. The prime rea-
son behind the establishment of the
PLAAF in 1949 was the future availabil-
ity of extensive military assistance from
the Soviet Union in the form of equip-
ment, training and support.
It was Soviet methods that would
fundamentally shape the PLAAF and
also support the establishment of a
Chinese aerospace industry. From the
end of 1949 Soviet advisors made great
efforts to train pilots and other person-
nel for the fledgling PLAAF. Not that
PLAAF was aware of yet, but a critical
test was on the horizon that would see
them thrown into combat far earlier
than anybody had anticipated.
On 25th June 1950, Kim ll Sung un-
leashed the North Korean People's
Army (NKPA) in an effort to destroy the
Republic of Korea (ROK) and unify the
Korean peninsula by force. Although
the Chinese leadership had been in-
formed about the invasion, what it did
not expect in the aftermath was Amer-
ican intervention. China was marshal-
Iing its forces for what it hoped would
AIR SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
bYDAVDSAW
be the final defeat of the Nationalist
forces on Taiwan, now it had to deal
with a new security situation and by
the end of July 1950, PLA units started
moving towards the Sino-North Kore-
an border area.
The Chinese attitude to the Korean
conflict grew more focussed after the
US/UN amphibious landing in lnchon
and the move across the 38th Parallel
into North Korean territory by the end
of September 1950. ln October 1950,
Beijing was convinced that it had to
intervene to protect its borders and
save North Korea. This saw PLA forces
organized into the Chinese People's
Volunteers (CPV) under the command
NAVAL SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
of Peng Dehuai. Peng was an experi-
enced field commander and realised
immediately that if the CPV were com-
mitted against the US/UN forces in
Korea it would need effective air sup-
port. The only problem was that Mao
Zedong and the Chinese leadership
had no ability to provide Peng with air
support at this time, and could onlY
hope that the Soviet Union would be
prepared to help.
On 19th October 1950 the CPV
moved into Korea, staging a sharp of-
fensive action against ROK troops on
25th October and then withdrawing
on 16th November. The US/UN forces
failed to understand what was hap-
pening and after launching their own
offensive on 24Ih November 1950,
suddenly found themselves facing a
CPV counteroffensive launched the
next day. By 4th January 1951, the CPV
had taken Seoul, but were eventually
itl
pushed back. The middle of 1951 saw
the Korean War move to a stalemate
along the 38th Parallel, with armistice
negotiations commencing at Kaesong.
Stalemate on the ground did not
mean that military operations ceased,
they would continue at tremendous
cost to all involved. ln the air though
things were changing and the PLAAF
was finally ready to enter combat
in Korea. On 25th September 1951,
MiG-15 aircraft of the 12th Regiment,
4th Air Dlvision PLAAF, saw combat for
the first time. When the armistice that
ended the Korean War was signed on
ZTth )uly 1953, PLAAF units had flown
26,491 sorties over Korea.
PLAAF had gone from virtually
nothing in 1949, to having 27 Ai Divi-
sions and over 3,000 combat aircraft in
1953. The combat experience gained
was critical to the development of
PLAAF and many of the pilots who had
flown in Korea would go on to become
the PLAAF leadership in the 1980s
and 1990s. lt was this leadership that
would transform the PLAAF and lay
the groundwork to make it the force it
is today.
Air Systems
China had its air force, but this air
force was totally dependent on the
Soviet Union for the supply of equip-
ment. During the 1950s PLAAF would
receive large deliveries of Soviet air-
craft, in parallel with this the Chinese
aerospace industry would receive
training and technology transfer pack-
ages allowing them to produce Soviet
aircraft under license. lnitially this saw
Shenyang manufacture the MiG-l5UTl
trainer as the JJ-2.
Then came the first true advance

in capability with license production
rights for the MiG-17F. The Soviet Union
supplied two complete aircraft, 15 in kit
form and parts for 10 complete aircraft,
as well as the plans for the aircraft. The
first Chinese assembled MiG-17F flew in
July 1956 and was designated as the J-5
in PLAAF service. Shenyang later went
on to build the J-5A based on the MiG-
17PF and j-5 production finally ended
in 1969. A trainer version of the J-5 was
developed and built at Chengdu as the
JJ-5, with its first flight in 1968 and pro-
duction finally ending in 1986.
The Chinese industry did not find
license production of Soviet combat
aircraft to be a straightforward proc-
ess. ln particular they discovered that
there were major differences between
the plans they received and the aircraft
and parts kits. The reason behind this
was that changes and modifications to
the aircraft happened on the produc-
tion line, and it was a long time before
anybody got around to changing the
technical data packages for the aircraft.
Fortunately Soviet advisors and techni-
cians were available in China to explain
these mysteries and resolve any diffi-
culties.
After the J-5 came the arrival of the
MiG-l9, this aircraft proved extremely
difficult to master in terms of local pro-
duction. lnitial efforts were plagued by
poor quality, but eventually both Shen-
yang and Nanchang were involved in
production of the J-6 (Mic-l95) and the
J-6A (MiG-l9P)from the late 1950s into
the 1960s. The J-6 actually went back
into full production in 1974 at Guizhou
due to a lack of any viable modern
fighter alternative for PLAAF at that
time. J-6 production eventually ended
in the early 1980s with more than 3,000
built. A trainer version, the JJ-6, was
developed by Shenyang with first flight
taking place in November 1970. JJ-6
production started in 1976 and some
624 were built before production end-
ed in 1986.
ln 1957 a license production agree-
g-*'djt-:'
0q,'
ment was signed with the Soviet Union
covering the Tupolev Tu-16 bomber,
this would be the most ambitious Sino-
Soviet aerospace project. The aircraft
was to be produced at Harbin and in
1959 parts arrived to enable the assem-
bly of the Tu-l6 and two Tu-l6 aircraft
arrived to act as models for the local
assembly effort. On 27th September
1959, the first Chinese manufactured
Tu-16 flew and subsequently was fol-
lowed by a second aircraft. lt was one
of these aircraft that became the first
PLAAF aircraft to drop a nuclear weap-
on in 1965.
The bomber programme then en-
tered a period of uncertainty when it
was decided to transfer production
from Harbin to Xian. This was an enor-
mous undertaking, involving moving
production tooling and thousands of
personnel to a new facility. Even worse
was the fact that it was discovered that
the technical data package supplied to
China was incomplete, meaning that it
would be necessary to essentially re-
verse engineer the Tu-l6. lt was 1968
before the first locally manufactured
Xian H-6 bomber would make its first
fli9ht.
September 1958 saw the PLAAF
AIR SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
,t A4:
involved in air combat with Taiwan's
Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF)
during what was called the 'Taiwan
Straits Crisis'. PLAAF J-5 aircraft did ex-
tremely well against ROCAF F-86 Sabre
aircraft, but then the balance of forces
was changed when the US supplied
the AIM-98 Sidewinder air-to-air mis-
sile (AAM). These early infrared-guided
missiles were' unreliable-when they
worked they were deadly, sometimes
though the unexpected happened. A
ROCAF F-86 launched an AIM-98 at a
PLAAF J-5; the missile failed to explode
and remained stuck in the fuselage of
the PLAAF aircraft, which returned back
to base. lt was this missile that would
reinvigorate Soviet AAM development
and eventually result in the fielding of
the K-13/R-3S (AA-2 Atoll) missile
End 0f The Beginning
At the end of the 1950s PLAAF had
achieved real advances in capability,
even though the Chinese industry
was finding it difficult to meet the
challenges of producing advanced
aircraft and systems. This was particu-
larly true in the case of the MiG-.l9/J-6
AIR SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
asmentioned above. This period also
saw Chinese industry attempting to
start designing its own combat air-
craft, through organisations such as
60'l lnstitute in Shenyang and the 611
lnstitute in Chengdu. The end results
of these initial indigenous aircraft de-
sign efforts were negligible, but they
were they were the start of a long
process towards the development of
truly functional local design capabili-
ti es.
Developments outside the aero-
space sector were to have the most
significant impact on PLAAF over the
next few years. Sino-Soviet relations
were starting to worsen and in 1960
Soviet advisers and technicians left
China. Soviet leader Khrushchev did
not want an open break in relations
with Mao and China at this point; in-
deed he offered some inducements
to China to stay faithful to the Soviet
bloc. Amongst these inducements
was technology transfer and license
production of the MiG-21F-l3, its en-
gines and the K-l3 missile, negoti-
ated in March 196i. A small number
of aircraft were delivered, along with
some parts kits although China never
received the full technical documen-
tation for the aircraft.
The MiG-21 was the last system
that PLAAF would receive from the
Soviet Union. By 1962 relations be-
tween China and the Soviet Union
had ceased to exist and China was
virtually isolated internationally, with
Albania being its only overt ally. As far
as PLAAF and the Chinese aerospace
industry were concerned, the split
with the Soviet Union was a disaster.
Now they would both have to make
the best of what they had already
obtained from the Soviet Union and
what they were able to develop on
their own.
Matters were not helped by the
fact that China now plunged into
the maelstrom of disaster that was
the Cultural Revolution. This was to
disrupt most of the plans that PLAAF
and the industry had to improve ex-
isting systems and introduce new
types. Even so, there were significant
developments. PLAAF had decided
that it wanted to have more llyushin
ll-28 light bombers, which had been
directly supplied by the Soviet Union.
Harbin was tasked with reverse engi-
neering the aircraft and the first H-5
prototype flew in 1966 with produc-
tion commencing in 1967 (il ended in
1984).
Another PLAAF requirement was
for an attack aircraft and in 1958 Nan-
chang started work on a programme
to develop the Q-5 based on the J-6
(MiG-19). lt took until 1965 for the air-
craft to make its first flight and the
Q-5 did not enter production until
1970. Turning the MiG-21 into a vi-
able programme was more efficient
with the aircraft making its first flight
in 1966 and entering producing in
1968 at Chengdu.
Authentic indigenous programmes
had their problems, characterised by
the Shenyang J-8 fighter programme.
PLAAF had a requirement for a high-
altitude interceptor, which the 601 ln-
stitute at Shenyang designed based
on an enlarged version of the MiG-21
design with two engines. Develop-
ment commenced in 1964, the proto-
type flew in 1969 but production did
not start until late in the i970s and
the aircraft did not enter service until
1981. Even then the aircraft suffered
from major performance def icien-
cies.

A New Beginning
lf it was politics that resulted in the
Sino-Soviet split and damaging con-
sequences for PLAAF and the Chinese
aerospace industry, it was politics that
offered new opportunities at the end
ofthe 1970s.The death ofMao Zedong
and the re-emergence of Deng Xiaop-
ing as a national leader saw major
changes in China. As Deng solidified
his power, he was able to sideline the
political radicals, and then proceeded
to break the international isolation of
China. This had two purposes, firstly a
need to counter the Soviet Union and
its satellite states who were seen as a
major threat and secondly to modern-
ise the Chinese economy.
The immense damage of the Cultur-
al Revolution and other mass political
campaigns unleashed by Mao needed
to be repaired. Deng instituted the
'Four Modernisations' policy under
which China would focus on improving
the areas of agriculture, industry, sci-
ence and technology and the military.
A pragmatic leadership was now set on
unleashing the extraordinary econom-
ic potential of China.
As far as PLAAF and the Chinese aer-
ospace industry were concerned there
was an immense need to access new
technology, it had become increasingly
obvious howfarthey had fallen behind.
With foreign countries and companies
drawn to the huge untapped Poten-
tial of the Chinese market, technology
started to flood into China. However, in
terms of defence China was not look-
:*d&&s:G;:.:i;e'6ilAr*
AIR SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
ing and was in no position to PaY for
complete systems. The requirement
was to acquire technology that could
be applied to improve the quality of
existing Chinese systems and create
the basis upon which new generation
systems could be built.
This era saw China start working
with US, European and lsraeli compa-
nies, which opened up a host of major
possibilities to the Chinese aerospace
industry. ln 1986 Grumman started
working with Shenyang on the Peace
Pearl programme, under which the
troubled J-8 would be upgraded with
western avionics and other modifi-
cations. Nanchang started working
with ltalian industry on an upgraded
version of the Q-5, British companies
supplied radar and other technology,
r' _-
;_!'_ 4_"r_;e*;:@'i_.]6'#
AIR SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
while French and lsraeli companies
were working across a whole spectrum
of defence programmes. The hunger
for western technology was immense.
Chinese aerospace companies then
started producing components for
foreign companies, for example aero-
engine parts were produced for GE.
This was tremendously helpful as it
provided access to modern materi-
als technology and foreign currency.
Equally as important in this period was
the fact that Chinese students were
going to foreign universities and re-
search institutions; this was to have
both short and long-term benefits for
Chinese industry. As the 1980s contin-
ued, China's economic modernisation
picked up speed and as the economy
grew, so did industry and science and
technology in China.
The Tiananmen Square incident of
1 989 put an end to overt defence coop-
eration between the west and China,
with an embargo being imposed and
programmes such as Peace Pearl being
cancelled. Yet China was not isolated
in wake of Tiananmen, it was too big a
market to be ignored. China still had
access to technology, much of it dual-
use which could be applied to defence
programmes, and in a broad economic
sense China was much stronger than
it had been ten years earlier. Despite
the embargo, defence cooperation did
continue with foreign countries, with
important benefits to China. There
were also other developments on the
horizon that would work in China's fa-
VOU T.
A Different Time
By 1989, the China's main ideo-
logical adversary and prime security
threat, the Soviet Union, was starting
to fall apart. This was a welcome devel-
opment and also a major opportunity.
China opened discussions on the ac-
quisition of military equipment in 1990
and in March '199'l was able to evalu-
ate the MiG-29 and the Sukhoi Su-27
in China. By this time the Soviet Union
was no more and China was working
with Russiawho was desperate for
money and for products, this allowed
China to negotiate contracts where
it could pay by bartering goods and
other commodities. ln 1991 a contract
was signed for 20 Su-27SK and six Su-
27UBK aircraft, which were delivered
from KNAAPO in 1995.
The arrival of the Sukhoi Su-27 was
a revolution for PLAAF, for the first
time in four decades they actually had
a world-class combat aircraft. A sec-
ond batch of aircraft was purchased
from KNAAPO in 1995 and delivered in
of 16 Su-27SK and six
1996, consisting
the scene
Su-27UBK aircraft. This set
for the most ambitious Sino-Russian

programme of this era, the license
production of the Su-27SK in China.
The contract was agreed in 1995, with
a contract valued at 52.5 billion being
signed in 1996.
The license production agreement
would allow Shenyang to build up to
200 Su-275K aircraft, which would be
known as the J-11 in China. lnitially
Russia would supply complete parts
kits for assembly, gradually local con-
tent would rise although the main el-
ements such as avionics, engines and
weapons would still be imported. The
first locally assembled J-l1 flew in De-
cember 1998, with local production
commencing in 2000 with 48 J-11 air-
craft built by 2002. Then a total of be-
tween 48 and 57 aircraft were built to
the end of 2004. lnstead of200 aircraft,
China decided to stop Su-27SKL-11 li-
,l05.
cense production at
China continued to purchase com-
plete aircraft from Russia, a require-
ment for a strike aircraft saw China
acquire 38 Sukhoi Su-30MKK aircraft
in 1996 in a contract valued at $2 bil-
lion. KNAAPO delivered these aircraft
between 2000 and 2001. This was fol-
lowed by a second contract for 38
more Su-3OMKK in 2001 and these air-
craft were delivered between 2002 and
2003. ln 1999 an order was placed for
28 Su-27UBK aircraft, which were built
by lrkut, and delivered in 2002.
On top of this China signed nu-
AIR SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
merous contracts for Sukhoi-related
spares and sub-systems, as well as for
air weapons such as the R-73 Within
Visual Range (WVR) AAM, the R-27 and
R-77 Beyond Visual Range (BVR) AAM,
KAB guided bombs and Kh-29, Kh-31
and Kh-59 air-to-surface weapons. Rus-
sia had supplied export versions of the
R-27 in the semi-active radar homing (R-
27R) and infrared homing (R-27T) ver-
sions. China then went to the Ukraine
and acquired the active radar homing
variant of the missile (R-27AE), they also
acquired the R-27RE and R-27TE which
were extended range versions of the
standard R-27R and R-27T. ln 2000
China acquired 124 R-27RE, R-27TE and
R-73 from the Ukraine, between 200,l
AIR SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
and 2006 they acquired a further 1,153
R-27 missiles from the Ukraine.
China was extremely conscious of
becoming over-dependent on Russia; it
was therefore consistently developing
its own independent aircraft, avion-
ics, engine and weapons capabilities.
However, the Sukhoi fleet would need
to be supported and the Su-27 offered
incredible potential for further devel-
opment. This saw Shenyang start work
on an indigenous variant of the
27SK that was to be known as the J-l18,
activity on this programme had started
before 2002 with the aim of creating a
true multirole combat aircraft.
More recently, the scope of the J-1 1B
programme has become clear as during
2007 more prototypes were seen and
by the end of that year were conduct-
ing weapons trials. The J-'l1B looks like
the Su-27SK, but there are significant
differences. Structurally the aircraft
@
uses composite materials and there
have been other changes that reduce
weight by as much as 700 kg according
to some sources, these changes also
extend airframe life and reduce RCS. ln
terms of avionics the aircraft features
a complete package from China and
is fitted with the Type 1474 (KLJ-4) ra-
dar, a bigger version of the radar in the
indigenous J-10 fighter, new cockpit
featuring multi-function displays and
Su- a wide-angle HUD, navigation system,
Feibao flight control system and other
equipment.
A critical development was the abil-
ity to provide an indigenous engine
for the J-l1B, this was achieved when
the WS-10A Tai Hang was successfully
integrated and achieved the majority
of its performance goals. The aircraft
also uses the complete array of Chi-
nese air weapons; early examples were
seen with the PL-8 wvR AAM, in reality
a local version of the Rafael Python 3,
and then with the new PL-12 BVR AAM.
The PL-12 uses sub-systems from both
Russia and the Ukraine and offers ca-
pabilities equivalent to the R-77. More
recently, in mid-2002 it was disclosed
that China was working on a new indig-
enous WVR AAM. Earlier this year some
images of the weapon became availa-
ble and the PL-ASR designator was not-
ed, although it is now called the PL-l0.
It appears that the system was actually
tested in late 2007 although there is no
firm evidence of when it could be de-
ployed, with 2010 being suggested.
The J-l 1B is in production and is en-
tering service with PLAAF units in sig-
nificant numbers. Work has reportedly
also commenced on a two-seat version
of the aircraft which some call the J-
aircraft would make sense as
11BS. This
PLAAF has found that it requires large
numbers of Su-27UBK aircraft for OCU

applications. ln addition the Su-27UBK
has been used as a mission controller
where a senior pilot acts as the flight
leader for a Su-27SK formation. Equally
a two-seat version could fulfil a role
similar to that of the Su-3OMKK in serv-
ice with PLAAF.
Chinese Developments
The most significant development
for PLAAF and the Chinese aerospace
industry is the successful entry into
service of the Chengdu J-10 fighter.
Back in the 1970s, the 611 lnstitute de-
veloped a new design for the J-9 fight-
er project that was based on a PLAAF
requirement for a Mach 2.4 high alti-
tude fighter. This design had a canard,
delta wing configuration and the de-
sign was completed around 1975 be-
fore the programme was cancelled
in 1980. Then, in the mid-l980s work
started at the 611 lnstitute on Project
10 - a high-performance single-seat
single-engine fighter for PLAAF that
would eventually result in the J-10.
At this time the links that had been
opened with the US, Europe and lsrael
gave PLAAF and the 611 lnstitute the
opportunity to explore a host of new
possibilities in working on Project
10. This is where the linkage comes
between the J-l 0 and the lsraeli Lavi
fighter programme. The lsraeli pro-
gramme provided much inspiration
and access to advanced avionics,
equally others contributed to the J-1 0
programme as well, from US comput-
ers and machine tools to design as-
sistance from European companies.
lnto the .l990s as PLAAF require-
ments evolved there were changes to
the Project 10 design, which appar-
ently saw two separate design tracks
- one with indigenous systems (J-10)
and the other incorporating Russian
systems (J-10A). The incorporation
of the Russian Lyulka-Saturn AL-31FN
was a major step forward in the pro-
gramme. First flight of the J-l0 took
AIR SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
place on 23rd March 1998, with the
first J-10A production aircraft, with
the AL-31, taking place on 28th June
2002.
After testing at the Central Flight
Test Establishment (CFTE), the J-10A
was granted state certification at the
end of 2003 allowing full-scale pro-
duction to commence. First deliver-
ies of the J-l0A were made in 2004
to 44th Air Division PLAAF in Yunnan.
The next stage in the programme saw
the development of the two-seat J-
10S for the OCU role, the prototype
first flew on 23rd December 2003 and
state certification for production was
received in 2005.
Today well in excess of 100 J-10A/S
aircraft are in service with the 44th,
2nd and 3rd PLAAF Air Divisions.
There have been some changes to the
aircraft, with more recent examples
being fitted with a refuelling probe.
ln addition the design has reportedly
been further developed. The J-10S
provided the basis for the develop-
AIR SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 200B
ment of the J-108; this is a two-seat
aircraft for more demanding strike
and presumably air defence suppres-
sion missions. The J-108 is said to
have made its first flight this year and
should soon go to CFTE to enter the
state certification process as a prel-
ude to entering full Production.
The arrival of the J-10A/S shows the
increasing capabilities of the Chinese
aerospace industry, very few nations
are able to develop what aPPears to
be a world-class fighter aircraft. Yet
this appears to only be the start, with
a future combat aircraft programme
already in the development stage' ln
1997 lhe US Navy revealed that China
was working on a future fighter pro-
gramme known as JXX and theY es-
timated that the aircraft would be in
service by 2015.
It appears that the 601 lnstitute in
ta4
&.::*
Shenyang was working on a future
fighter under the J-13 designation,
while the 611 lnstitute in Chengdu
had the J-14 as their future fighter
concept. All we can really surmise at
present is that the future aircraft will
have two-engines, be highly stealthy
and be equivalent to the Russian PAK-
FA aircraft (see: AD&D SePtember/
October 2008), as well as a counter to
the US F-22 and the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF).
Presumably work on the future
fighter got underwaY in the mid-
1990s, although as we do not know
exactly who is going to build it at
this point, is difficult to determine a
real programme timescale. lncreas-
ingly there has been speculation that
Shenyang will be responsible for the
new aircraft, with Chengdu assisting
in various ways. This remains to be
seen, even so a programme of this
sophistication shows the confidence
of PLAAF and the Chinese aerospace
industry that they can design and de-
velop a truly advanced future combat
a i rc raft.
This article has sadlY onlY
scratched the far as PLAAF
surface as
programmes are concerned - it truly
is a complex and fascinating area to
study. For space reasons we have ne-
glected to mention developments of
the J-8 fighter and H-6 bomber, as
well as the JH-7A attack aircraft. There
are also major developments in train-
ing aircraft and AEW&C Platforms.
The fundamental message is that
the PLAAF of today is an increasingly
capable and well-equiPPed force.
with the future holding the promise
of even more significant capability
growth. r

EUCILUTION & REVOLUTION I
CHINESE NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS
I n a orevious issue of Asian Defence
I a oiptorucy (AD&D) we looked at
the submarine capabilities of the Chi-
nese People's Liberation Army Navy
(See: AD&D July/August 2008: 'Red Star
Rising - China's Expanding Submarine
Capabilities') and the immense growth
in qualitative terms of the People's Lib-
eration Army Navy (PLAN) submarine
fleet. With this article we will be look-
ing at PLAN surface combatants and
'I
r.id.ig
describing some of the most important
ship classes, as well as looking at key
future developments.
PLAN was established in 1950 and
it was equipped with whatever re-
mained of the former Nationalist Navy
and anything else that could be found.
At this time PLAN was just an adjunct
to the dominant ground forces of the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) and it
could provide a limited capability for
NAVAL SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
bYDAV DSAW
amphibious operations. Outside of
this, the prime mission of PLAN was
coastal patrol.
The first transformation of PLAN
came in the '1950s with the arrival of
extensive military assistance from the
Soviet Union. This went beyond the
supply of equipmenU there was assist-
ance in the establishment of a ship-
building industry and the granting of
license production rights for Soviet
NAVAL SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
naval equipment in China. ln essence
the Chinese naval sector was primarily
a product of Soviet assistance. When
relations between the Soviet Union
and China ruptured and Soviet techni-
cians left China in 1960, the fate of na-
val programmes in China was thrown
in to chaos.
With the break in relations with the
Soviet bloc, China found itself inter-
nationally isolated and in the context
of naval systems was left with a lot
of 1940s and 1950s era technology
with very little ability to develop in-
digenous successor technology. Even
worse, any progress that China might
have made in the 1960s was halted by
the ideologically driven catastrophe
that was the Cultural Revolution. As a
consequence of this, PLAN found itself
having to make do with whatever the
Chinese industrial base could come
up with. The end result was that PLAN
was condemned to working with infe-
rior technology and therefore had to
develop strategic concepts that took
these facts into account.
With the political changes ushered
''* %**
W
in by the end of the Maoist period and
the arrival of a more pragmatic leader-
ship, China started to open up to the
world. There was also an understand-
ing that the PLA desperately needed
to modernise and that foreign technol-
ogy would be necessary to achieve this
goal. ln this period China perceived
the Soviet Union to be a major threat
to its security and forged links with the
US and European nations to acquire
defence technology to meet its needs.
This led to both the military and the de-
fence industry being confronted with
the reality of how far China had fallen
behind the rest of the world in defence
equipment and technology. The result
of this was a process of transformation
in the PLA and in the Chinese defence
industry.
The Tiananmen Square incident in
1989 brought a halt to open defence
links with the west, even though cer-
tain European countries would con-
tinue to supply China with defence
equipment and defence-related sys-
tems in spite of the embargo that had
been imposed on China. By this time
the Chinese economic miracle was
starting to pick up pace and the coun-
try was in a far stronger position than it
had been at the start ofthat decade. ln
the context of security, China was see-
ing the Soviet bloc disintegrate which
removed its most dangerous strategic
competitor.
The Russian Option
The collapse of the Soviet Union and
the emergence of the successor states,
such as Russia, provided China with
the opportunity to acquire defence
systems and technology in a virtualiy
unrestricted manner at extremely af-
fordable prices. Arguably it is this link-
age with Russia that has been one of
the most important factors in the de-
velopment of the PLA and the Chinese
defence industry, as we know it today.
For PLAN the opportunity to pur
chase equipment and technology from
Russia and the Ukraine offered them
the ability to radically transform their
capabilities. ln 1994 PLAN purchased
 NAVAL SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY

two Project 877EKM class submarines

from Russia, following this in 1996
with the acquisition of two Project 956
Sovremenny class destroyers and two
Project 636 Kilo class submarines. The
submarines and surface combatants
would have an immediate impact on
PLAN capabilities. Equally important
was that fact that the Chinese naval
designers and the naval industry would
have access to state of the art equip-
ment, which would enable them to
incorporate new ideas and capabilities
into indigenous naval programmes.
The two Sovremenny class destroy-
ers had originally been destined for the
Soviet Navy, but the Soviet collapse left
them incomplete. PLAN was therefore
able modify them to meet its needs,
the two destroyers Hangzhou (136) and
Fuzhou (137) were commissioned into
PLAN in December 1999 and Decem- *.#.' - -- :r
ber 2000 respectively. The armament ,€._':",: i-;*:t-
of these units consists of eight 3M-80E
Moskit anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM)
with a range of '120 km, the 9M38 me-
dium range air defence systems (two
launchers + 48 9M38M1 missiles), two
twin 130 mm AK-l30MR-l84 guns,
four AK-630 30 mm CIWS systems,
two twin-533 mm torpedo tubes, two
RBU-1000 anti-ship rocket launchers
and an embarked Kamov Ka-28 heli-
copter.
A follow on order for two improved lndigenOqs Pfggfammgs ants. However, PLAN is still being very
Project 956EM Sovremennys was placed cautious, it has ordered many new de-
in 2002, the first unit Taizhou (138) was PLAN was never going to be in a stroyer classes but has never ordered
launched in April 2004 and commis- position to meet its surface combat- more than two units in each class. Now
sioned with the East Sea Fleet in De- ant needs from foreign purchases perhaps this is due to caution or it is a
cember 2005. Then came Ningbo (139), - fortunately it had no need to do so. reasoned policy to add new capability
which was launched in July 2004 and The Chinese shipbuilding industry had to the fleet, learn lessons from build-
commissioned with the East Sea Fleet been systematically improving its ca- ing and operating a particular class
in September 2006. The Project 956EM pabilities, the defence industry was in- and then apply those lessons to the
has the 3M87 Kashtan combined gun/ creasingly able to supply sophisticated follow-on class.
missile CIWS in place of the AK-630 and systems and there was now the ability ln May 2002 the Jiangnan Shipyard
one of the 130 mm gun mounts was to design advanced vessels. Foreign in Shanghai launched Guangzhou
discarded. Reportedly these units came systems and components would still (168), the first Type 0528 Luyang class
with the improved 3M-80MBE missile be used where necessary though. destroyer, featuring both indigenous
system that has a range of 200 km. All China is now proving that it is ca- and foreign (Russian/Ukrainian) sys-
four Sovremenny class destroyers are in pable of designing, developing and tems that was eventually commis-
service with the East Sea Fleet (ESF). producing advanced surface combat- sioned into the South Sea Fleet (SSF) in
NAVAI- SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
)uly 20O4. The sister ship, Wuhan (169)
was launched in January 2003 and
commissioned into the SSF at the end
of 2004. The Type 0528 design then
provided the basis for the Type 052C
Luyang-ll air defence destroyer design
that was to be built at Jiangnan.
The first Type 052C, Lanzhou (170),
was launched in April 2003 and com-
missioned in July 2004, the second
unit, Haikou (171) was launched in Oc-
tober 2003 and commissioned in 2005,
both are in service with the SSF. These
impressive units are equipped with the
HQ-9 vertical launch air defence sys-
tem with 48 missiles, they have eight
YJ-62 ASCM, a 100 mm gun, two Type
730 CIWS systems, two triple tube 324
mm torpedo launchers, four iS-barrel
ASW rocket launchers and can embark
aKa-28 or Harbin Z-9C helicopter.
There are now reports that a follow
on class to the Type 052C is to be built,
known as the Type 052D, but no real
details are available. There is specula-
tr
t rx 1- 1$1
tion that at least two of these could sile system, with six revolver-type VLS
be built, although other reports talk of each containing eight 5V55RM missiles.
four. What will be interesting to see is The system uses the 3R41 Volna radar,
the evolution of the Type 052D com- which has a range of 100 km and can
pared to the Type 052C. engage six targets simultaneously,
Up at the Dalian Shipyard another with each target being addressed with
destroyer class was being built, in the two missiles. Other radars include the
mid-l990s work started on the Type Fregat-MAE-5 3D air search radar and
0518 Luhai and in October 1997 the the Mineral-ME surveillance and tar-
first unit Shenzhen (167) was launched geting radar. There are also are eight
and then commissioned late in 1998. YJ-83 ASCM, 100 mm gun, two Type
The Type 0518 class did not progress 730 CIWS and two triple tube 324 mm
beyond a single unit, but its hull form torpedo launchers.
and steam turbine propulsion plant The Type 051C performs a similar
provided the basis for the Type 05lC mission to the Type 052C, but has a to-
Luzhou air defence destroyer class. tally different equipment fit with the
The first Type 051C, Shenyang (115), primary systems all being of Russian
was Iaunched in December 2004 origin. lt is suggested that Dalian will
and commissioned wlth the North be starting work on a follow up to the
Sea Fleet (NSF) in October 2006. The Type 05iC design, initially designated
second unit, Shijiazhuang (116) was Type 051D, and that two units will be
launched in 2005 and commissioned built. The hull form and propulsion will
with the NSF at Qingdao in March 2007. be a development of the Type 051C,
The main weapons system of the Type the interesting thing to watch for in the
051C is the Russian Rif air defence mis- envisaged Type 05i D is its weapon and
 NAVAI- SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec20OB ASIANDEFENCE&DIPLOMACY

sensor fit, how much indigenous versus graded, while of the five in the SSF two .Jianghu-ll, while Thailand acquired
how much foreign equiPment. have been upgraded, none of the four four Type 053HT Jianghu-lll class. Nu-
ln total PLAN have 26 destroYers in Luda in the ESF have been uPgraded. merous different versions were built
service, the most significant classes It would be fair to assume that non- and 43 remain in PLAN service.
of which we have described above. Of modernised Luda class units will con- The NSF has one TYPe 053 Jianghu
the others, the two TYPe 052 Luhu are tinue to be withdrawn in the coming and fourType 053H1 Jianghu-llclass in
worth noting, these were the first truly years and presumably be replaced by service, the ESF has eight Jianghu, two
modern indigenous destroyers to en- the expected new TYPe 051 D and TYPe Jianghu-ll, three Type 053H2 Jianghu-
ter service with PLAN. Commissioned 052D classes. lll, four Type 053H2G Jiangwei and six
in 1994 and 1996 with the NSF, they Type 053H3 Jiangwei-ll. Finally the
were given refits and modernised in S5F has two Jianghu, three Jianghu-
200312004. Significantly, the most nu- ll, six Type 053H1G Jianghu-V and four
Fnr ga€e Fx'*g *"e aax rc*s
merous destroyer class in PLAN service Jiangwei-ll. Early model Jianghu class
is the older Type 051 Luda class. The PLAN frigate force currentlY units are being decommissioned and
Originally there were 17 Luda class numbers some 49 units, but the ma- this process will doubtless continue,
built, with units commissioned be- jority are older Jianghu/-Jiangwei class other units of the class have been put
tween 1970 and 1993, with four distinct units. These were launched from 1971 through modernisation programmes
variants being built. One Luda was lost through to the early 1990s and were to extend their service lives.
in an explosion, while three have been also successful in the export market. The key frigate class in PLAN is
decommissioned. Of the four Luda in Bangladesh acquired a single TYPe the Type 054/054A Jiangkai/Jiang-
service with the NSF, two have been up- 053H1 Jianghu-ll, Egypt acquired two kai-ll, construction of the first unit,

rsi
i"d l
iLo;-*-*

tr
 NAVAI SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
Ma'anshan (525), started at Hudong-
Zhonghua Shipyard in
Shanghai in
2002 and was launched in September
2003, being commissioned into the
ESF in Februa ry 2005. The second Type
054 unit, Wenzhou (526), was built by
the Huangpu Shipyard in Guangzhou
and was commissioned in the ESF in
January 2008.
The Type 054 was then replaced in
production by the more impressive
Type 054A Jiangkai-ll class. Xuzhou
(530) was launched at Huangpu in
September 2006, being commissioned
and joining the ESF in January 2008.
Hudong-Zhonghua then built their
first Type 054A in the form of Zhoush-
an (529), which was launched in May
2007 and is believed to be attached
to the SSF. Huangpu then delivered
Huangshan (570), with Hudong-Zhon-
ghua building Chaohu (568) that was
commissioned in July this year. A new
Type 0544 is currently under construc-
tion at the Huangpu Shipyard.
The Type 054 has a Chinese sensor
fit
and is equipped with eight YJ-83
ASCM, the HQ-7 air defence missile
system, 100 mm gun, two AK-630
CIWS systems and an embarked Ka-28
or Z-9C helicopter. The Type 0544 has
a larger displacement and its sensor
fit is of mixed Russian and Chinese
origin, including the Russian Fregat-
MAE-5 air search radar. They have the
HQ-16 air defence system with a VLS
containing 32 missiles, two Type 730
CIWS and a 76 mm gun, while retain-
ing the YJ-83 ASCM and the helicopter
capability.
The Type O54/054A Jiangkai class
is obviously inspired by the French La
Fayette class frigate particularly with
the emphasis on RCS reduction, but
it represents an impressive develop-
ment in Chinese naval construction
and extremely effective addition to
PLAN capabilities. The unit under con-
struction at Huangpu is rumoured to
feature some changes to the standard
Type 0544 design, but it is too early to
say whether this will actually repre-
sent a distinct new variant to this frig-
ate design.
Carrier Ambitions
PLAN has been interested in acquir-
ing an aircraft carrier capability for
 NAVAI SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 200B ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY

many years, realising that the posses- independent Ukraine would find itself long journey to China. ln 2002 Varyag
sion of such a capability would make having an incomplete aircraft carrier reached China and was Placed at the
it a true'blue water' navY. lt was how- that they could not finish, by this time Dalian Shipyard.
ever quick to understand that it could the name of the ship was Varyag. Var- Varyag stayed at
Dalian, then in
not just rush into an aircraft carrier yag languished in the Ukraine until it 2005 it was suddenly emerging from a
programme, it had to obtain the theo- was decided to sell the carrier, either dry dock having been freshly repaint-
retical knowledge to build complex for scrapping or for any non-military ed. lt was now apparentlY obvious
systems of this type, develop the nec- purpose. ln 1998 a Macau-based com- that China was serious about obtain-
essary personnel resources to be able pany acquired VarYag for what theY ing an aircraft carrier capability. How-
to operate a carrier and have the fleet described as conversion into a 'float- ever, the magnitude of the task facing
structure necessary to sustain a carrier ing casino' that would be located off Dalian in turning Varyag into a usable
capability. Another important factor Macau. capability was immense. Bear in mind
was that PLAN had to have the budget The Ukraine accepted this offer, that Varyag is a hulk; the Ukrainians
to acquire, operate and maintain an but decided to strip any materiel that stripped anything from the ship that
aircraft carrier or carriers, and this is a might have any military application, might have a military application, so
vastly expensive proPosition. essentially leaving Varyag as a hulk. Dalian will have a major task on their
Developing a knowledge base on The Macau-based comPanY now had hands to return it to a usable condi-
carriers was not an easy process and to move Varyag to Asia after taking tion. Gorshkov, the aircraft carrier be-
so PLAN took every opportunity to ob- possession in 1999, but this would ing refurbished in Russia for lndia, was
tain information on the subject. When not be easy especially when the Turk- in an immensely better condition than
the Royal Australian Navy decided to ish government declined to let it pass Varyag ever reached.
retire and scrap the carrier HMAS Mel- through the Bosphorous and transit At this point it is worth discussing
bourne, a Chinese company made the to the Mediterranean fearing an acci- aircraft carrier developments in the
most satisfactory bid to break up the dent. This situation was only resolved Soviet Union to see where Gorshkov
ship. After being taken to China in in 2001 when the Chinese government and Varyag fit into the picture. Gor-
1995, Melbourne was extensively in- stepped in and reassured the Turks shkov is a Project 1143 class carrier;
vestigated by PLAN and by Chinese in- who then allowed VarYag to transit four of these were built in the shape
dustry, before being finally scrapped. through Turkish waters to begin its of Kiev, Minsk, Novorossiysk and Baku
Other aspects of aircraft carrier design
were investigated when Chinese'com-
mercial' interests acquired the former
Soviet carriers Minsk in 1998 and Kiev
in 2000 and brought them to China.
Where the future destiny of Chinese
aircraft carrier ambitions lies is with a
former Soviet aircraft carrier that is cu r-
rentiy at the Dalian Shipyard in China.
Back in December 1985 the Nikolayev
South Shipyard in what is todaY the
Ukraine started work on what was to
be the second Project 1143.5 aircraft
for the Soviet Navy. The first Project
1143.5 aircraft carrier was the Admiral
Kuznetsov, which is currently in serv-
ice with the Russian NavY.
Nikolayev launched their aircraft
carrier for the Soviet Navy on 4th De-
cember 1988and itwasto begiventhe
name Riga in Soviet service. Building
work was still continuing when the So-
viet Union collapsed and so the newly

E
NAVAL SYSTTMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
(later renamed Gorshkov in October
1990). All of these units were built at
the Nikolayev South Shipyard. With
a 45,500-ton full load displacement,
Gorshkov was laid down at Nikolayev
in December'1978 and launched on 1st
April 1982, being completed on 11th
December 1987 and then assigned to
the Soviet Northern Fleet. All of these
Project 1143 carriers met interesting
fates after the collapse of the Soviet
Union; Novorossiysk was scrapped,
while Minsk and Kiev were sold to Chi-
nese commercial interests (Minsk is
used as the centrepiece of the 'Minsk
World'theme park in Shenzhen).
The fate of the Gorshkov was to be
different to that of its sister ships. Gor-
shkov remained in Russian Navy serv-
F4
;ft
.?i^l
t.-
t'
L"'
!L,. &i
\N
ice, but had a major machinery acci-
'1993
dent in 1992, suffered a fire in
and then a boiler explosion and fire
in February 1994. lt was then placed
in repair, going to sea in May 1995
and then being laid up. At this point
lndia entered the picture and discus-
sions commenced on a possible sale
of the carrier to the lndian Navy. By
1999 il was announced that an agree-
ment in principle had been reached
on the sale of the Gorshkov, covering
its refurbishment, modernisation and
upgrade to a STOBAR (Short Take Off
But Arrested Landing) configuration.
What followed were negotiations on
how to achieve these goals and at
what cost, along with the acquisition
of an air group with the RAC MiG-29K
'9.
t't ,,-*."
..lrt
It\'d\ :
-,,r4r,-l
lYi
\d:
asthe prime component.
The sale of the Gorshkov to lndia
was finally signed in January 2004.
The plan was that the carrier would
be modified and completed to lndian
Navy specifications in August 2008.
At that point the carrier would be
transferred to the lndian Navy, would
then return to lndia in preparation for
entry into service in 2009. Consider-
ing that Gorshkov had been laid up
since mid-1995, the fact that Russia
believed that it could complete the
conversion in a little over four years
seemed somewhat ambitious. This
proved to be the case; it became ap-
parent that the magnitude of the task
had been seriously underestimated in
terms of time and cost. The timeline

for the programme now aPPears to be
that the carrier, which will INS Vikra-
maditya in lndian service, will finish
trials in mid-2012 and be handed over
to the lndian Navy at the end of that
year, becoming operational in lndian
waters in 2013.
Bearing in mind the fact that Gor-
shkov was in far better condition than
the Varyag, gives you an idea of how
complex it will be for China to make
Varyag a viable carrier. Although
the fact that China has extensively
studied two of the sister ships of the
Gorshkov both Kiev and Minsk are in
China, might prove extremely useful
in gaining an understanding of the
challenges faced by the Russian ship-
yard in the Gorshkov conversion and
of what went wrong.
There was a time when attemPting
to bring the Varyag back to a usable
condition would have been beyond
the capabilities of the Chinese ship-
building industry, that is no longer
.b-
*l*f,:-,+..-
the case. ln recent years Chinese ship-
yards have become a major comPeti-
tor to Japanese and Korean shipyards
in the most sophisticated segments
of the merchant shipbuilding indus-
try including chemical and oil tank-
ers. China has also developed major
skills in the repair and conversion of
large tonnage merchant ships. All of
this will be a major contribution to the
successful refurbishment of Varyag.
Another positive is the fact that
China has strong relationships with
the Ukrainian naval industry, for ex-
ample Ukrainian DA80/DN80 gas tur-
bines are widely used as powerplants
in Chinese destroyer designs. This
should give China access to a much
of the data necessary for a successful
refurbishment of Varyag. Equally as
important is the defence relationship
with Russia, which will be critical in
the provision of systems and equip-
ment to complete the transformation
of Varyag into an operable carrier.
NAVAL SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
Future Ptospects
Once it has been fullY refurbished
the role of the Varyag will be to act
as a training carrier, so that PLAN can
refine its naval aviation doctrine and
develop the necessary skills to put that
doctrine into practice. ln parallel with
this, work has already started on inves-
tigating the appropriate design, tech-
nology and systems requirements for
an indigenous Chinese aircraft carrier
design. There has already been much
theoretical work carried out, however,
the possession of Varyag and its use
as a training carrier will allow PLAN to
apply real world information gained in
an operational environment to future
carrier design. China's ability to build
an aircraft carrier-sized unit is not in
doubt, its commercial shipyards have
proven that they can successfully build
and deliver highly sophisticated large
tonnage ships to commercial custom-
NAVAT SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLoMACY Nov/Dec 2008
ers around the world.
PLAN has already started on devel-
oping the personnel resources neces-
sary to operate its future carrier fleet.
A number of pilot-qualified PLAN naval
aviation officers have gone through
commanders'courses that have led to
them commanding surface warships
such as destroyers. More recently the
Chinese media reported that a class of
50 students have been enrolled at the
Dalian Naval Academy to be prepared
for naval aviation officertraining to pro-
vide the pilots for the combat aircraft
to be used by the future PLAN aircraft
carriers. lt should be noted that in Rus-
sian Navy service that a Project 1143.5
aircraft carrier has a crew of 1,960, plus
the air group with 626 people and a
flag staff of 40 people. '
This leads us to the aircraft that PLAN
r**J .Ali'
will select for its new carrier capability,
for a number of years PLAN has been in
discussions with Rosoboronexport over
the acquisition of up to 50 Sukhoi Su-33
aircraft manufactured by the Komso-
molsk-na-Amure Aircraft Production
Association (KNAAPO), a subsidiary of
the Unified Aircraft Corporation (OAK).
This aircraft is a logical choice, it is the
aircraft used by the Russian Navy on
their carrier Kuznetsov and PLAN is
perfectly familiar with the aircraft as it is
from the Sukhoi Su-271-30 family, land-
based PLAN aviation units currently
operate the Sukhoi Su-30MK2. PLA Air
Force units in China also operate the
Su-27SK/UBK and the Su-30MKK, while
Shenyang manufactures the Sukhoi Su-
27SK under license as the J-l1. Hence
there is plenty of Sukhoi operational
and support experience in China.
ln the beginning PLAN is only look-
ing to acquire two Su-33 aircraft for tri-
als purposes, a requirement which has
complicated negotiations with Russia.
After all there is still suspicion over Chi-
nese activities in the Su-27/J-11 license
production programme at Shenyang.
The Russian suspicion of what China's
aims are in only looking to acquire two
Su-33 aircraft for 'trials and evalua-
tion' purposes would appear to be ex-
tremely sensible and goes beyond the
annoyance at the J-11B programme. ln
2000 China started acquiring weapons
and equipment from Ukrainian stocks
and by 2006 this had included 1,277
R-73 and R-27 air-to-air missiles. Signifi-
cantly in 2004 China acquired what was
described as a Sukhoi Su-27 from the
Ukraine. However, this was not an or-
dinary Su-27,iLwas actually a develop-
ment aircraft for the 5u-33 programme.
Bearing in mind Chinese knowledge
of the Su-27/-30 family and the fact that
they are building their own Su-27 in the
form of the J-1lB, it is not difficult to
imagine that this Ukrainian acquisition
would potentially allow China to start
work on a carrier variant of the J-1 1B.
After this the acquisition of only two
5u-33 aircraft makes sense, these air-
craft would give China a true pattern to
work against in building a naval version
of the J-l 1 B.
Equally interesting is the fact that in
2007 China acquired a Ukrainian Sukhoi
Su-25YTG aircraft. The point of this is
that the Su-25YTG is essentially the
Su-25UTG trainer used on the Russian
aircraft carrier. China does not operate
the Su-25; the only reason for acquiring
this aircraft is to obtain the technical
details necessary to help in the devel-
opment of a training aircraft to support
Chinese carrier operations.

+ Fla *a,
.=>
There is no doubt that Russia is right
to be cautious in dealing with China on
the Su-33 issue. However, building a
carrier-based combat aircraft is not an
easy process and one can only presume
that the potential purchase of 50 Su-33
aircraft is a fallback position if China is
unable to meet its needs with an in-
digenous naval aircraft solution. So it
would appear that Russian suspicion of
Chinese motives is justified thus far.
ln the Russian Navy the air grouP of
the carrier Admiral Kuznetsov has 12
Sukhoi Su-33 aircraft, five Sukhoi Su-
25UTG/UBG aircraft and up to 20 Kam-
ov Ka-27 helicopters. The role of the
Sukhoi Su-25 is to provide a two-seater
trainer and light attack aircraft capabil-
ity. The Russian Navy has a single regi-
ment of 24 Su-33 aircraft, supported by
a number of 5u-27UBK training aircraft
for operational conversation purposes.
For PLAN the possession of an air-
.G
craft carrier force will mark its trans-
formation into the first rank of world
navies and offer a host of new strategic
and operational possibilities. As pre-
viously mentioned, an aircraft carrier
along with its air group is an incredibly
expensive investment. That is why it is
worth being cautious in speculating on
the number of carriers that PLAN would
be looking to acquire. There have been
suggestions that up to six carriers could
be acquired or more realistic sugges-
tions that there will be three carriers
acquired, allowing PLAN to have three
carrier battle groups (the carrier, escort
units and support units). With three
carriers PLAN will be able to have two
carriers available, with the third going
to or from a maintenance state.
With Varyag set to act as a training
carriet it is worth speculating on the
shape that the future PLAN aircraft car-
rier might take. One possible solution
NAVAL SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
is to look what the Soviet Navy was in-
tending to do ,with a successor to the
Project 1143.5 design of the Varyag.
Back in 1973 work started on the design
of Project 1153 Orel class aircraft car-
rier, this programme was terminated in
1983. Then in 1984 work started on the
Project 1143.7 Ulyanovsk aircraft car-
rier design, with the first unit being laid
down at Nicolayev South Shipyard in
November 1988. The Programme was
cancelled in November 1991 when the
carrier was 45o/o complete; it was then
scrapped in February 1992. The con-
struction materials for a second carrier
had been assembled at Nicolayev and
these were also scrapped.
Unlike Varyag, the Ulyanovsk was
a conventional aircraft carrier with
catapult assisted take off and arrested
landing (CATOBAR), whereas Varyag is
a STOBAR carrier. The Ulyanovsk has
a nuclear propulsion plant and has a
NAVAL SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLoMACY Nov/Dec 2008
substantially larger displacement than
Varyag at over 80,000 tons full load.
Crew numbers were 2,300 plus 1,500
for the air group, with the air group
consisting of 27 to 30 Sukhoi 5u-33, 10
Sukhoi 5u-25 UTG/UBG, three Yak-44
AEW aircraft and 15 to 20 Kamov Ka-27
helicopters for various missions.
Building a carrier of the Ulyanovsk
type should not be unduly difficult in
theory for the Chinese, as mentioned
previously highly complex large dis-
placement vessels are produced quite
regularly and successfully in China.
There have been quite a few rumours
that the proposed future Chinese car-
rier will actually have a displacement
in excess of 90,000 tons. As to power-
plants, nuclear propulsion is also not
an unknown area to China, with PLAN
having extensive nuclear submarine
propulsion experience to draw upon.
It is also highly likely that China will
be abre to obtain
"t'"i:t,':,l::j]i:
plans for the Project 1143.7 aircrafl car-
rier from the Ukraine, which will be of
great assistance to the future carrier
construction programme.
The complexity of the task that Chi-
na will be undertaking in the design of
a large displacement conventional or
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier should
not be underestimated. Nor should the
cost of two or three carriers and their
respective air groups. However, there
seems to be a high degree of confi-
dence in China that it can both afford
and successfully complete these ambi-
tious naval construction programmes.
It is expected by many sources that
China will have an indigenous aircraft
carrier by the middle of the next dec-
ade, with a second by the end of that
decade. That would appear to be an
achievable schedule for the introduc-
tion of a carrier capability by PLAN.
Amphibious Enhancement
The PLA actually has historical expe-
rience of successful amphibious warfare
operations, for example the successful
invasion of Hainan in the Chinese Civil
War. More recently its most likely am-
phibious warfare mission has been fo-
cussed on a possible invasion of Taiwan.
ln this context PLAN has assembled a
large numbers of LSTs, for example the
fy pe 02 / 07 2-ll/ 07 21ll Yu ka n, Yuti n g an d
Yuting ll classes. ln addition there are
medium LST classes consisting of the
Type 073 Yuding, Type 074/0744 Yuhai
and the Type 079 Yulian. These are sup-
ported by substantial numbers of con-
ventional landing craft. PLAN fype 072
LSTs successfully conducted landing
operations on disputed territory in the
(...Continued on page 40)
 98%
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NAVAT 5Y5TEM5
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
u!-1,
rl
,%!,ry
(...Continued from page 38)
Spratly lslands in 1988.
As with other areas of the PLAN in-
ventory there have been significant
improvements in the design and capa-
bilities of the LST fleet in recent years.
However, in comparison with other
major navies the amphibious warfare
capabilities of PLAN are somewhat lim-
ited. This has started to change with
the introduction of the first LPD into
PLAN service in the form of the Type
071 class.
Kulunshan (998), the first Type 07'l
LPD was launched at the Hudong-
Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai in De-
cember 2006 and was commissioned
into the PLAN South Sea Fleet 0n 30th
November 2007. This LPD has a full
load displacement in excess of 12000
F'l
!'a
r ar-lr-t, rir:'
i.$,,t'
l_r !t
,rl
jil.q.,,.,::.::'.r
tons and can also embark up to four
Chinese-designed Landing Craft Air
Cushion (LCAC). The LCAC can carry a
main battle tank, other armoured vehi-
cles, logistic vehicles, troops and sup-
plies. lt is believed that the Type 07i
has the capacity to carry between 15
and 20 armoured vehicles, and in ex-
cess of 500 troops. lt is helicopter ca-
pable with two deck spots for the Z-8
(Super Frelon) helicopter. The Type 071
is equipped with a 76 mm AK-176 gun
and four AK-630 CIWS systems.
The Type 071 LPD provides PLAN
with a modern power projection capa-
bility that up to this point it has lacked.
It is to be expected that at least one
other Type 071 LPD will be built, after
which a modified version of the design
will be developed or PLAN will move on
to a larger and more capable LPD class.
ffii#'
Y4!ry-
a *€,'
,i a:* .. :
li
-;:.. 1 -*-:,:t;.
;f;l r ,r t :-e
tl -&
) ? ,1,, ,,
t,
While an LPD does not have the glam-
our of the future aircraft carrier pro-
gramme, it is proof that PLAN has not
forgotten the importance of amphibi-
ous warfare to modern navies.
This article on the major surface
combatant programmes in PLAN illus-
trates that it is becoming a very power-
ful military instrument for the Chinese
leadership. ln a little over a decade
PLAN has transformed itself from op-
erating a few capable units and a large
number of historical curiosities into a
force with increasingly modern and
sophisticated units. This process is set
to continue, with the aircraft carrier
programme being conclusive proof of
the level of ambitions of PLAN. More
and more, PLAN is becoming a force to
be reckoned with in the Asian security
environment. r
 LIMA

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REGIONAL UPDATE
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
TAIWAN ACHIEVES PROGRESS
I n early October Taiwan was finally
lwett on course to sign a major se-
ries of contracts with the US govern-
ment to procure a number of different
defence systems. That being said, what
Taiwan actually got and what it really
wanted are two different things. All of
which is quite ironic when you consider
the fact that the Bush administration is
the most favourably disposed adminis-
tration to Taiwan in many yearsl
Right from the start the Bush admin-
istration was ready to support the sale
of a major package of defence equip-
ment to Taiwan, including eight con-
ventional submarines (SSK), 12 P-3C Ori-
on MPA aircraft and six Patriot PAC-3 air
defence systems. This equipment was
on offer to Taiwan from April 2001 and
the Taiwan government had allocated
@l
a special budget of 519 billion to pay
for it all. The problem was that every
time the government tried to get the
budget through the Legislative Yuan,
Taiwan's parliament, the Kuomintang
(KMT) who at that time was the main
opposition party blocked it.
Eventually these tactics by the KMT
forced the special budget programmes
to be sidelined. Then all of a sudden,
with Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT becom-
ing Taiwan's President, there is inter-
est in acquiring a host of new defence
systems from the US. By this time, the
attitude of the Bush administration to
Taiwan is less than friendly and those
in the US State Department who are al-
ways anxious to avoid offending China
are in the ascendant and perfectly pre-
pared to block weapon requests from
Taiwan.
This puts Taiwan in a very difficult
situation as they realise that they have
to modernise their military capabilities,
but are limited in what they can ask for.
Taiwan has actually allocated funding
for the acquisition of some 66 Lock-
heed Martin F-16C/D Block 52 aircraft
and had made a request to the US to
negotiate an acquisition programme.
The US response was to sit on the re-
quest and it is unlikely that it can be
considered u ntil after Ja n uary 2009 a nd
the installation of a new administration
in Washington. What will happen next
on the F-16C/D front remains an open
question.
What Taiwan will actually receive
(...Continued on paqe 44)
ffi*ffi;il
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REGIONAL UPDATE
(...Continued from page 42)
was disclosed by the US Defense Se-
curity Cooperation Agency in a notifi-
cation to Congress. The four Northrop
Grumman E-2T AEW&C aircraft current-
ly in service with the Republic of China
Air Force (ROCAF) are to be upgraded
to the Hawkeye 2000 configuration in a
contract with a potential value of $250
million.
The Republic of China Army (ROCA)
will finally be able to meet its require-
ment for a new attack helicopter to
supplement its existing AH-lW attack
helicopter fleet. ln total 30 Boeing
AH-64D Block lll Apache Longbow at-
tack helicopters are involved, as well
as 1,000 AGM-1141 Longbow,Hellfire
t4
ll missiles and 173 Stinger Block 1 air-
to-air-missiles. Assuming all options
involved in the DSCA notification are
taken up, the total value ofthe contract
would be 52.532 billion.
The air defence capabilities of Tai-
wan are to be improved through the
acquisition of 330 Patriot PAC-3 missiles,
four AN/MPQ-65 radars and associated
command, control and communica-
tions equipment. The DSCA estimates
that the total cost of this contract will
be $3.1 billion. Over seven years after it
was first offered to Taiwan, the Patriot
PAC-3 is finally on the verge of being
acquiredl
ROCAF will also be the recipient of
what the DSCA describes as a 'Blanket
Order Requisition Case'. ln plain Eng-
lish this is a logistic support and spares
contract for ROCAF aircraft including
the F-l6A/8 Block 20, the AIDC Ching
Guo F-CK-lA/B lndigenous Defense
Fighter (lDF), the Lockheed Martin C-
130H Hercules and the Northrop Grum-
man F-5E/F.The value of this contract is
estimated at 5334 million.
The Republic of China Navy (ROCN)
will be obtaining a total of 32 UGM-84
Sub-Launched Harpoon Block ll mis-
siles for its Sea Dragon class subma-
rines (SSK). ln addition the contract will
include training missiles, spares, test
equipment and support services. This
contract has a total value of $200 mil-
lion.
(...Continued on page 46)
t-
REGIONAT UPDATE
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008

(...Continued from page 44) it.

,.i

Finally the ROCA will be acquiring

the Javelin anti-tank missile system, in
*a,i

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y'r
the form of 20 command launch units Fry 'l

and 182 missile rounds, along with as- g,-e.,

sociated training and logistic support !r
*-
il
services. This contract will have a value
of 547 million. Add it all together and
Taiwan is on the verge of acquiring a
tl
grand total of 56.463 billion worth of
US defence equipment. >

Undoubtedly this is a vast amount of

money, yet it does not represent all the
equipment that Taiwan would like to
purchase from the US. Apart from the :.:i#'
F-16C/D requirement, another major crews. The RMN is due to receive KD natives such as the AW101, S-92 and
contract is the ROCA requirement for Tunku Abdul Rahman in January 2009, Mi-17, for a total of some $470 million.
up to 60 Sikorsky S-70 utility helicopters with KD Tun Razak following in Octo- As we prepared to go to press, less than
to replace the current fleet of some 70 ber 2009. (Photo: Navantia) a month after the original announce-
Bell UH-1H helicopters. There is grow- ment, plans had changed and citing the
ing uncertainty over how requests for financial crisis the Malaysian govern-
defence equipment from Taiwan will Helicopter Hiccup ment stated that it would be cancelling
be handled in the future, it all depends The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) the EC725 purchase. There had been
on the character and attitude of the fu- finally appeared to have got its replace- criticism of the helicopter selection
ture administration that will take office ment programme for the aged 5-61A-4 and the cost of the programme, bear-
in Washington in January of next year. Nuri helicopter underway in September, ing in mind the fact that the political
but what was a done deal in September situation is tense in Malaysia at present,
was undone in October. At the end of it is obvious that the government had
Submarine Developments September the Malaysian government second thoughts. The only problem
On 6th October the second Scor- announced that it would be procuring is how long the existing Nuri fleet can
pene class submarine for the Royal Ma- an initial batch of 12 EC725 helicopters keep flying until a successor helicopter
laysian Navy (RMN), KD Tun Razak, was from Eurocopter in preference to alter- is acquired. (Photo: Eurocopter) r
launched at the Cartagena Shipyard of
Navantia in Spain. The first Scorpene
class submarine for the RMN, KD Tunku
Abdul Rahman, was launched in Oc-
tober 2007 at the DCNS yard at Cher-
bourg in France. The building and de-
livery of these two units commenced
under a June 2002 contract, under
which DCNS would build the forward
section of the submarine and Navan-
tia the rear section. The French yard
would then assemble one submarine
and the Spanish yard would assemble
the other. ln addition the RMN signed
a contract with NAVFCO, part of De-
fense Conseil lnternational, to provide
a full programme of training services
for the RMN submarine force and its
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INDUSTRY INSIGHT
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
The Alenia Aeronautica C-27J Spar
tan tactical transport aircraft continues
to build major momentum in the in-
ternational marketplace. This is hardly
surprising when you consider the fact
that orders for the aircraft now amount
to 121 from eight air forces around the
world. The most significant victory for
this ltalian aircraft is its selection for the
Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) programme
for the US Air Force and the US Army.
For the JCA programme, Alenia Aer-
onautica works with L-3 Communica-
tions lntegrated Systems who act as the
prime contractor, supported by Alenia
North America. ln June 2007 a 52.04
billion contract was signed with the
US military, covering the acquisition of
78 C-27J aircraft. The JCA requirement
as outlined for the US actually covers
a total of 145 aircraft, of which 75 are
for the US Army and 70 for the US Air
Force. Eventually the US C-2il require-
ment could expand to a total over 207
aircraft over the next ten years, which
would bring the contract value to the
region of 56 billion.
The C-27J in the JCA configuration
first flew in June of this year at Caselle
in ltaly and in August flew to the US to
the L3 Communications facility at Waco,
Texas, for the installation and integra-
tion of customer specified equipment.
On 'l5th October the first C-27J was of-
ficially handed over to the US military.
The second aircraft will be handed over
in November.
This US contract and the potential
for follow-on US purchases puts the
C-27J in a very strong position in the
tactical transport aircraft category. An-
other point to note is that the aircraft
has already been successful in the Euro-
pean NATO countries. Greece was the
first customer acquiring 12 aircraft, fol-
lowed by ltaly with 12 aircraft and then
by Lithuania with three aircraft. Other
customers in Europe include Bulgaria
with five aircraft and Romania. More
recently it was confirmed that Morocco
had ordered four aircraft in a €130 mil-
lion contract.
The C-27J could also be on the verge
of finding a new application in the US.
Reports in the US media suggest that
US Air Force Special Operations Com-
mand (AFSOC) is looking to use the C-
27J as the basis for a gunship aircraft
to meet its AC-XX requirement. Exist-
ing AC-130 gunships are suffering from
over use, what AFSOC intends to do is
to develop an affordable gunship alter-
native to complement its current fleet.
Here the C-27J comes into the picture,
with the aim being to integrate it with
existing weapon and sensor packages
to create a new gunship in the form of
the AC-27J Stinger ll. Up to 16 of these
aircraft could be required.
 INBODEFENCE
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PT. Napindo Media Ashatama
Jl. Kelapa Sawit XIV Blok M1 No.10,
Kompleks Billy & Moon Pondok Kelapa
Jakarta '13450 - lndonesia.
Phone :62-2 1 8650962, 8644756185,
Fax :62-2'1 865 0963,
Email :info@indodefence.com,
info@indoaerospace.com

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previous investrncnts and continuc usiug s1'stems the freeclom to crpand your capabilities as )'our
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and products are based on scalable, open archi- And tliat's the tt ue porver of legacy O O
tecture. 'lake our CEROS 200 radar and optronic
tracking s)'stcm, lbr example. It is designed to
facilitate trouble-lree integratior-r rvitli all t1'pes of
legacy commancl and control systems. \A1\;l: CEROS 200
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DClrli\rN NAVALOPERATIONS

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